

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Bertram C. A. Windle,

LL.D., D.Sc., K.S.G., F.R.S.

THE second edition of Dr Rice Holmes's monumental work *Cæsar's Conquest of Gaul* (Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. 1911. pp. xl—872. Maps and Plans. Price 24s. net) is a revised and largely rewritten successor to the first issue which, when it appeared in 1899, attracted so much attention on the part of scholars. This new issue is regarded by its author as being final in its present form. It consists of an account of the Conquest of Gaul and of a number of excurses on points arising in connexion with the epoch of history, and especially in connexion with Cæsar's *Commentaries*, on which any description of the operations in question must be founded.

The first mentioned part of the book may be described as a digest of Cæsar's Gallic War, written in a lively and fascinating style, illustrated by maps and plans, and made so attractive to the reader that we could wish that it might be published by itself and put into the hands of boys who are about to be launched upon the study of the *Commentaries*. For, if one may judge from one's own experience, the human boy at that period of his career generally fails to grasp the fact that the persons and occurrences described in those immortal pages are real beings and real events, but rather is inclined to look upon them as tiresome and vexatious imaginings, probably conceived, by some one of more than ordinary brutality, expressly and solely for the wearying and exasperation of youth. Hence his languid interest and his utter failure to appreciate the real and extraordinary fascination in, for example, the operations against Vercingetorix. We should like to see the experiments tried of reading this account to a class of boys with a large wall-map on which the operations could be easily followed, and then setting them to work upon the *Commentaries* as an ordinary Latin task. Dull indeed must be the boy whose interest failed to be roused by the spirited account which forms the basis, though much the smaller part, of Dr Rice Holmes's work. It is to the excurses that scholars of all kinds will mainly direct their attention and these will appeal to three classes of persons. Classical scholars, of course, come first, and they and historical students will find abundance of material for consideration and for criticism. But, perhaps, especially to anthropologists and ethnologists will these portions of the work be of absorbing interest. For Dr Rice Holmes grapples with all sorts of problems at present subjects of fierce debate and wholly unsettles, and crosses swords with experts like Sir John Rhys and Professor Ridgeway. To touch upon these problems even briefly is not possible within the limits of this notice, but enough has been said to show in outline the intention of the book. Like its companion work from the same pen, *Ancient Britain and the Invasions of Julius Cæsar* which, on its appearance, was welcomed by the DUBLIN REVIEW, the *Conquest of Gaul* is the outcome of the ripe knowledge and judgement of a distinguished scholar; it is packed with information and there are thousands of references to the literature of the subject, and, in fine, it is a book which no library of any institution devoted to learned pursuits, nor any scholars' library either, can afford to be without.

B.C.A.W.

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

Julius Caesar

from the marble bust in the British Museum.

CAESAR'S CONQUEST OF GAUL

BY

T. RICE HOLMES

Hon. Litt.D. (Dublin)

SECOND EDITION

REVISED THROUGHOUT AND LARGELY REWRITTEN

OXFORD

AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

1911

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PREFACE

The first edition of this book was exhausted in January, 1909; and as it had been found useful by many scholars both in this country and abroad, and had also attracted general readers, it seemed advisable to re-issue it. But in consequence of its own defects as well as of the progress of research in some of the subjects with which it deals, it needed revision; and this task has required the almost incessant labour of two years. Indeed, the book has been not only revised, word by word, but largely rewritten. The narrative is increased by thirty-seven pages, of which twenty belong to the Introduction. In Part II several short articles have been struck out altogether; many passages that either were originally or had become superfluous have been deleted: many have been corrected or amended in substance or in style. Certain articles have been lengthened, either because it had become necessary to take note of fresh information or of recent theories or because the argument had not been completely thought out; while others are entirely new. The instances in which conclusions reached in the old edition have been altered are, however, rare.

I wish to express my gratitude to Dr. H. Meusel, the leading Caesarian scholar of Germany, who kindly sent me a proof of his important article in the *Jahresberichte des philologischen Vereins zu Berlin* of 1910, and also a transcript of the notes which he had written on the margin of his copy of my first edition, thus enabling me to correct inaccuracies and misprints, chiefly in footnotes; to Dr. A. Gudeman, who sent me an extract from the proof of one of his articles in the *Thesaurus linguae Latinae*, which I have utilized on page 663; and to Mr. Stanley Hall, A.R.I.B.A., who wrote

for my use a paper, from which I have made excerpts on pages 719–20, embodying his interpretation of a disputed passage in Caesar's description of the bridge which he built over the Rhine. Elsewhere I have done my best to recommend to English readers M. Camille Jullian's *Histoire de la Gaule*, which is in course of publication ; and as sundry passages in which I have referred to it relate to matters on which we differ, I am the more anxious to acknowledge what I owe to him. Some of his footnotes have led me to read books or articles which I had overlooked, to grasp the significance of words which I had not sufficiently weighed, or to modify opinions which I had expressed before. His plan is different from mine ; for his book contains nothing which corresponds to Part II of this volume.

The book in its present form may be regarded as final ; for the edition is large, and I do not expect that another will be demanded while I live, or that I should have time or inclination to make further alterations. Moreover, although minute details are constantly being added to our knowledge of prehistoric Gaul, and although the criticism of Caesar's text has been continued with zeal and not wholly without profit, it is unlikely that we shall ever know much more about Caesar's conquest, with which this book is mainly concerned, than we do now.

11 Douro Place, Kensington, W.
March 27, 1911.

PREFACE

TO THE FIRST EDITION

As this book has far outgrown my original conception, I will explain how it came to assume its existing form. Eleven years ago it occurred to me that an English narrative of Caesar's conquest of Gaul might help to relieve the weariness of the schoolboys whose lot it is to flounder, in ceaseless conflict with the Ablative Absolute, through the pages of the *Commentaries* ; might help them to realize that those pages were not written for the purpose of inflicting mental torture, but were the story of events which did really happen, and many of which rival in interest the exploits of Cortes or of Clive. I hoped too that a few ' general readers ' might, if they could overcome their aversion to the title of the book, find something to interest them in its contents. In my ignorance I promised myself a comparatively easy task. Certain chapters of history, which I had written before, had cost me prolonged research and anxious toil. For the history of the Gallic war, on the other hand, I imagined that virtually the sole original authority was the Memoirs of the conqueror. Virtually the sole original authority, but so great a one that it would be impossible, I thought, for a man who honestly worked upon it to produce a really bad book. So I said to myself, Let me once master the *Commentaries*, and it will go hard with me if I cannot, with the aid of Napoleon's *Histoire de Jules César*, and sundry other books which I must of course consult, evolve from such material a readable narrative. I shall be spared the labour of searching through Blue Books, forgotten memoirs and dusty bundles of MSS. It is needless to say that I soon found out my mistake. The list of the ' sundry other books '

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was continually lengthening. Though for the narrative as a whole, Caesar is virtually the sole original authority—for Plutarch and Suetonius, Dion Cassius, Florus and Orosius do not count for much—yet, in order to understand his military system and to supplement the information which he gives on certain points, we are obliged to have recourse to many other writers, ancient and mediaeval, historians, geographers, chroniclers, compilers of itineraries. He has left many questions obscure,—questions of geography, of ethnology, of sociology, of religion, of politics, and of military science. To throw light upon these questions, and to explain the difficulties in his language, has engaged the labour of a host of scholars,—geographers, antiquaries, anthropologists, ethnologists, archaeologists, military specialists, philologists, learned editors; and the works which they have produced, the greater part of which are scattered in the learned periodicals of foreign countries, would fill a large library. If the bulk of these works are mainly controversial or exegetical, if they are largely devoted to the discussion and elucidation of ancient texts, yet on this point or on that many of them are virtually original authorities. They contain scraps of genuine information, which enable one to fill up gaps in the memoirs of the conqueror. Excavators have discovered disputed sites. Coins, inscriptions, rusty weapons, and even skulls have added items to our store of knowledge. Soldier-scholars, trained to observe the geographical features of a country, have travelled, *Commentaries* in hand, through the length and breadth of France and Belgium and Alsace and Switzerland; and, if prejudiced zeal or local patriotism have often misled them, their united labours have not been in vain.

Nor was this all. It was not enough for my purpose merely to write a narrative of the conquest. I was obliged of course also to write an introduction, in order to render my narrative of the conquest intelligible; and gradually it became evident that, if I wished to avoid defrauding and insulting the purchasers whom I hoped to attract, even this

brief chapter could not be written without recourse to the most recondite materials. Since the publication of the standard histories of Thierry, Mommsen, Merivale, and others, new light had been thrown upon the ethnological and other questions which I had set myself to handle. Some opinion I must hazard regarding the degree of political development which the Gauls had reached ; and, if it were to be worth printing, I must form it at first hand. I had no intention of writing a history of the Gauls : my subject was only their conquest by Julius Caesar ; but I was bound to take as much pains to understand their history as if I had been ambitious of writing it. As I plunged deeper and deeper into the slough, I saw that many of the problems were insoluble ; but this did not absolve me from the duty of grappling with them. Even if a historical or geographical problem cannot be solved with mathematical certainty, probability may be attainable ; and if one solution is as good or as bad as another, the reader has a right to ask the reason why. It is something even to fix precisely the extent of one's ignorance. Either I must leave the subject alone, or I must master it. If the study of Caesar is arduous, it is fascinating. Year after year I read on and on, quite as much for the delight of learning as with the ambition of instructing. And I determined to do my best to produce something which should not only be useful to teachers and interesting to general readers, but should also be worthy of the notice of scholars and of students of the art of war.

To praise the *Commentaries* of Caesar, *laudatos toties a laudatis*, would be almost impertinent. But I may be allowed to say why I hope that a better fate may yet be in store for them than to serve as a mere whetstone for gerund-grinders. At present, I believe that the book is rarely used in education, at least in this country, except by young boys, and never read through by them. But, even if only one or two of the seven *Commentaries* can be read, they can at all events be read not merely as a lesson in construing but also

as history. Something, I gladly acknowledge, has already been done to promote this object. Much, however, still remains to be done. Unfortunately, the editions of the *Commentaries* which have been published in this country are defective, especially in the department of geography. Most of the editors are far too prone to submit to the authority of Napoleon. Those of them who have worked in the most intelligent spirit, sometimes, for want of drudgery, lead their readers farthest astray. I know of one who, inspired by the hope of firing the imagination of youthful scholars, embellished his edition with pictures with which only one fault could be found,—that the greater number represented places where Caesar had never been. If a little knowledge is a dangerous thing, a little research is labour thrown away. The fact is that, if a man professes to explain the geography of the Gallic war, he must do one of two things. Either he must go into the subject as an independent inquirer, pursuing his researches whithersoever they may lead him—and to do this requires an amount of labour so enormous that it would not pay the editor of a school-book to undertake it—or he must take Napoleon, or some such writer, as his guide ; in which case he will assuredly be led into a great many mistakes.

Nor is there any reason, apart from the consideration of what subjects are most remunerative, why Caesar should only be used as an elementary textbook. The reform which I hope to see one day accomplished is that he should be read by more advanced students as well. Boys in the highest class of a public school could easily read the whole work through, side by side with other authors, in the course of a couple of years. By doing so, their knowledge of Latin would gain at least as much as their knowledge of history.

I do not know whether educationists will consider this ideal desirable. But is it even attainable ? Not certainly at present. It does not ' pay ' to teach Caesar to the more advanced scholars of public schools. If there is ever to be

a reform, it must begin with the universities. And there is another class of students for whom the *Commentaries* would be peculiarly appropriate,—the candidates for the Royal Military Academy and for the Royal Military College.

But this book is not addressed only, not even primarily, to teachers; and for pupils, in its present form, it is of course too costly and too large. The narrative is addressed both to scholars and to those general readers, civil and military, who are interested in history. The second part is addressed in the first instance to scholars; and if it wins their approval, I hope that the labour spent upon it will not repel other readers who are willing to be interested in the subject. Of all that has been done in France, Germany, Italy, and Belgium to solve the problems of Gallic history nothing is known in this country, except to a few students. And yet to those who care for history the study would be full of entertainment. The story of the conquest of Gaul, if that of any war of antiquity, is still worth reading; for not only were the operations intrinsically interesting, but their results are of permanent importance. Mr. Freeman was right when he called the conquest 'one of the most important events in the history of the world'.[1] The war with Hannibal, and it alone, rivals the Gallic war in interest. And the Gallic war has this great advantage over the war with Hannibal, that we know far more about it. Viewed simply as military history, intelligible without being technical, the *Commentaries* are by far the most valuable work of antiquity: they are among the most valuable of any age. Let any soldier who possesses a fair knowledge of Latin read Livy's description of the battle of Cannae: let him then read Caesar's description of the battle with the Nervii, and he will have made up his mind. He will appreciate the difference between military history as written by a mere literary artist and military history as written by a literary artist who was also a general.

[1] *General Sketch of European History*, 1874, p. 77.

I said that I would not take upon myself to praise the *Commentaries*; but when one has derived great and wholesome pleasure from a book, it is hard to refrain from expressing one's gratitude and admiration. Not to repeat encomiums that are familiar to all who take any interest in the classics, I will only speak my own thoughts; for I would fain persuade all who have not wholly forgotten their Latin —all who love good literature; all who can appreciate an informing story well and truly told—to get a copy of Caesar, and read him through from end to end. I sometimes wish that the book had never been used, in the way it has been used, as a school-book at all. For the reminiscences of the Fourth Form are at once so vivid and so dreary, that even classical scholars, many of them, pass through life without reading this great classic. In boyhood they plodded through the pages, chapter by chapter, forgetting one chapter before they began the next, reading one book and missing the others, and of the whole story or even of single episodes forming no idea. Some critics say that the narrative is dull, cold, and colourless. I do not believe that any one would maintain these charges if he read the book rapidly through; and otherwise no story can be fairly judged. Macaulay himself might be dull, if he were read by a foreigner at the rate of a single paragraph a day. Caesar certainly did not pour out his spirit with the fervid passion of a Napier. But if a man's heart beats faster when he reads how Badajoz was stormed, and how 'six thousand unconquerable British soldiers' fought their way up 'the fatal hill' of Albuera, he will not be unmoved by Caesar's account of the battle with the Nervii or of the last struggle of Vercingetorix. If his eyes become dim when they light on Napier's epitaph on Colonel Ridge—'And no man died that night with more glory; yet many died, and there was much glory'—he will hardly keep down a tear when he reads how Sextius Baculus arose and saved the camp at Aduatuca, 'facing fearful odds,' till he was borne back fainting to his sick-bed. No, Caesar is not

dull, except to minds enervated by sensational reading. There is no tinsel in his narrative ; but it is not void of colour. His style is severe ; but it is not frigid. Like Thucydides and the historian of the Acts of the Apostles, he has no sentimentality, but no lack of sentiment. His passion never breaks from his control ; but it communicates itself to us. Intent simply on telling his tale, he rises without an effort, whenever the subject inspires, to genuine eloquence. It is true that that swift narrative often baffles curiosity, even when curiosity is legitimate ; but it is idle to wish a good book other than it is. Enough that this book is worthy of its theme and of its author. We know on the highest authority that even in our age the soldier who means to study his profession cannot afford to neglect the *Commentaries*.[1] And if a time should ever come when for purely professional purposes they shall have lost their value, they will still be worth reading for themselves.[2] They were written, with a purpose no doubt but still in the main honestly, by the greatest man of the world who has ever lived ; and men of the world who are also lovers of literature will best appreciate and most enjoy them. Whoever cares

[1] 'The statement,' says General Maurice (*War*, 1891, p. 12), 'of the most brilliant and successful general of the British army of to-day appears to be indisputable that a perusal of the words of even Caesar himself will suggest to any thoughtful soldier who knows something also of modern war, reflections that he may afterwards recall with advantage as applicable to modern campaigns.' (See Lord Wolseley's *The Soldier's Pocket-Book*, 5th ed., p. 286.) The great Napoleon, himself a diligent student of the *Commentaries*, recommended all aspiring officers to read them (*Mémoires, notes et mélanges*, ii, 155).

[2] 'La *partie divine* de l'art,' writes Colonel Stoffel (*Hist. de Jules César, Guerre civile*, i, v), 'est restée la même et elle ne changera jamais . . . l'étude des campagnes de César est fertile en renseignements. On y trouvera l'application presque constante des vrais principes : tenir ses forces réunies, n'être vulnérable nulle part, marcher avec rapidité sur les points importants, s'en rapporter aux moyens moraux, à la réputation de ses armes, à la crainte qu'on inspire et aussi aux moyens politiques pour maintenir dans la fidélité ses alliés, dans l'obéissance les peuples conquis ; se donner toutes les chances possibles pour s'assurer la victoire sur le champ de bataille ; pour cela faire, y réunir toutes ses troupes. On y remarquera la promptitude dans l'exécution, l'habileté à profiter de la victoire. Enfin on reconnaîtra chez César . . . un chef . . . en qui ni la bonne ni la mauvaise fortune . . . ne troublent l'équilibre.'

for a great book in a small compass, and will give it the attention that it demands ; whoever can appreciate literary qualities that have fallen out of fashion but will have their turn again—masculine strength, simplicity, directness, reserve, relevancy ; and, above all, the natural dignity that belongs to 'the foremost man of all this world' writing the history that he had himself made—whoever cares for these things should read Caesar's *Commentaries*, and he will have his reward.

Let me try to explain the scope of my own book. It does not narrate the events of the conquest in precisely the same detail, from first to last, in which Caesar narrated them ; for such a narrative, even if it were skilfully composed, would inevitably weary a modern reader ; and where it wearied, it would also fail to instruct. Caesar doubtless knew, though it was not his way to say so, that his book would be a κτῆμα ἐς ἀεί : but he wrote, first of all, for his own generation ; and, regarded as material for history, some of his matter, if only a little, has lost its interest. Nothing, for instance, would be gained by narrating in full detail the campaign of Crassus in Aquitania. The general reader would be bored by what he could not but regard as an anticlimax to the more dramatic struggle of Caesar with the Veneti ; and the student of Roman warfare would learn nothing that he might not learn as well or better from a study of the operations which Caesar conducted in person. On the other hand, of such events as the siege of Avaricum, the blockade of Alesia, the campaign of that great marshal, Labienus, against the Parisii, indeed of almost every operation of the war, I have tried to give a full and clear account, which might at once satisfy professional and interest general readers. Moreover, knowledge derived from personal exploration of the country, from the results of excavation, from Cicero's letters and other ancient authorities, from the researches of anthropologists, and from various monuments, has made it possible, as the reader of the Second Part will discover, to fill up certain gaps in Caesar's narrative. The

two expeditions to Britain I have, of course, not described at all, but only made such a passing allusion to them as was necessary to a right understanding of my subject,—the conquest of Gaul. I do not profess to have followed the whole of Caesar's track, because the thing is impossible: only sections of the track can be traced with certainty, and we often have to be content with the knowledge of the general direction of his march. But I have travelled long distances in order to explore the known sites at which importan events occurred. I hold that discussions on questions o evidence ought to be rigidly excluded from narrative; and my narrative therefore takes for granted the conclusions at which I have arrived in the Second Part of the book. Let me take the opportunity of expressing my gratitude to Colonel Stoffel, the principal collaborator of the late Emperor Napoleon, who has sent me a most interesting account, which will be found on pp. xxv–xxvii, of the method by which he discovered Caesar's camps and entrenchments near Mont Auxois (Alesia) and at other places; and also to Major-General J. F. Maurice and Major-General Sir Coleridge Grove, who allowed me to consult them on certain military questions, which are discussed in Part II, and whose opinions, I was glad to find, generally confirmed my own conclusions.

One word regarding the Second Part of this volume. I dare say the impatient reader, who measures its length against that of the narrative, will be inclined to reverse Prince Hal's dictum, and cry, 'Oh, monstrous! but one half-pennyworth of sack to this intolerable deal of bread.' But the remedy is in his own hands. It is not for me to warrant the quality of my sack; but whoever has no appetite for the bread can leave it untouched. It happened once at a dinner party that the lady whom I had taken in asked me whether I had read an account of a certain battle by a famous historian. I replied that I had not, but that, if the critics were to be believed, it was most likely full of mistakes. 'What does that matter,' rejoined my neighbour,

'so long as he makes a good battle of it?' It was a delicious little speech; and I verily believe that, if it had been addressed to the late Mr. Freeman, he would not have had the heart to scold the lady. For my part, I have always been grateful to her for her frank avowal. She made it so clear to me that the majority of readers who take up a history care nothing whether it is accurate or not, provided it is interesting. Still, while I should like to think I had succeeded in 'making a good battle of it', I do like to make sure that this or that statement is true before committing it to paper; and so, for my own satisfaction and for the satisfaction of scholars and the few general readers who are not satisfied with results, but want to know the evidence on which they are based, I have written my Appendix. Those who are at all familiar with the difficulties of the subject will not think that it has run to an undue length. For a writer who deals with ancient history is at one great disadvantage as compared with a writer whose period falls within more recent times. He is obliged to spend years of labour in finding out the truth on matters of geography, military science, and the like, which his fellow-labourer finds ready to his hand.

My object in writing the Second Part has been to determine what can and what cannot be proved in regard to those points which are still in dispute, and to furnish readers with the materials for forming their own opinion. My method has been not only to state my own reasons for the opinions which I have formed, but also to present, in the briefest possible compass, the reasons for the views from which I dissent. It is true that a point can hardly be called disputed when a decision, all but unanimously accepted, is cavilled at by a few crotcheteers. Astronomers do not waste their time in defending the conclusions of Copernicus and Kepler against the assaults of 'Parallax'; and I once thought that it would not be worth while to answer the objections of the antiquaries who, even after the appearance of the famous article by the Duc d'Aumale in the *Revue des*

Deux Mondes, of the *Dictionnaire archéologique de la Gaule*, of M. A. de Barthélemy's admirable article in the *Revue des Questions Historiques*, and of Ernest Desjardins's candid recantation, persisted in identifying Alesia with Alaise. But, for reasons which I have given in the Appendix, I decided that it would be expedient to treat M. Quicherat and his school, and even M. Maissiat, with more respect than ' Parallax '.

So far as I am aware, this is the only English narrative which deals specially with Caesar's conquest of Gaul. Narratives more or less detailed are to be found in Mr. Froude's *Caesar*, in Mr. Warde Fowler's *Julius Caesar*, in Colonel Dodge's *Caesar*, in Dean Merivale's *History of the Romans under the Empire*, in Long's *Decline of the Roman Republic*, and in the English translations of Mommsen's *Römische Geschichte*, the late Emperor Napoleon's *Histoire de Jules César*, and Duruy's *Histoire des Romains*. None of these writers, however, makes any systematic and comprehensive attempt to discuss doubtful points ; and even the von Gölers, father and son, in *Cäsars Gallischer Krieg*, which has not been translated, have not regarded this task as falling within their scope. Indeed there has not hitherto appeared in any language a book which attempts to collect, to co-ordinate, and to estimate the results of the innumerable researches which have aimed at throwing light upon the problems of Gallic history, and most of which are practically inaccessible. Mommsen, strictly subordinating his narrative to his great historical scheme, goes into details hardly at all. Mr. Froude writes, not as a military historian but as the biographer of Caesar ; and his brilliant sketch, which has been as enthusiastically, if not as widely, admired as his larger works, necessarily omits much that would interest not only military but even general readers. On geographical questions he almost invariably follows Napoleon; and his book would certainly have been not less trustworthy than it is if he had never looked at any other commentary. The scheme of his work and the rules of art compel him to

dismiss battles, such as that with the Helvetii or Ariovistus, in a single sentence ; even when he is describing such important operations as the siege of Avaricum or the attack on Gergovia, he leaves very much to the imagination of his readers ; and throughout his narrative he draws freely upon his own.[1] Indeed, as he apparently wrote the entire work in less than a year,[2] it is safe to say that he did not waste much time in investigation. Colonel Dodge's account, which, like Mr. Fowler's brief sketch, did not appear until the rough draft of my own narrative had been completed, is sufficiently full : but he too, like Mr. Froude, is a faithful follower of Napoleon ; and Napoleon, as I shall show, makes many serious mistakes. The colonel claims credit for having studied the works of ' the best recognized modern critics ', and for having visited ' the theatre of Caesar's campaign and his many battle-fields '. But if a man wants to find out what can and what cannot be known about the Gallic war, he must not shrink from the labour of checking the opinions of ' the best recognized modern critics ' by the works of unrecognized scholars who have wrought diligently in the same field ; and, if I may be pardoned the Hibernicism, it is of no use to visit battle-fields, unless it is certain that battles were fought upon them. Merivale wrote before the modern era of continental research had begun : he worked upon a scale which forbade him to describe military operations in detail ; and I am obliged to say that whoever compares his pages with the *Commentaries* will find that some of his most impressive passages are purely fictitious. Long's narrative, which forms the bulk of his fourth volume, is very full,—too full perhaps in parts ; but Long had a hearty contempt for the general reader. Moreover, his

[1] See my article in the *Westminster Review* of August, 1892, pp. 174–89.

[2] In a letter, dated May 3, 1878, to Mr. John Skelton, Froude says, ' I am reading up Caesar and his times, with a view to writing a book about him.' In a letter dated February 6, 1879, he says, ' " Caesar " is in the press.' The book was published some time before July of the same year. (*Blackwood's Magazine*, December, 1894, pp. 772, 774.)

knowledge of Gallic geography, although thoroughly sound, was very far from complete. Every student of Caesar is, indeed, under the deepest obligations to him ; for no man ever brought a stronger judgement to the study of the problems which Caesar left us to solve. He knew his ancient texts by heart : he was perfectly familiar with the works of such modern authorities as d'Anville, Walckenaer, Rüstow, and von Göler : but of the enormous mass of articles which are scattered among the transactions of the numerous French archaeological societies and other periodical publications, as well as of the numberless monographs and pamphlets which have been published independently, and of the mediaeval chronicles which bear upon the subject, he knew very little. No doubt ninety-nine hundredths of the printed matter contained in these works are valueless : but amid the dross of verbiage and declamation with which too many of them abound there lie embedded grains of solid information. Moreover, since Long wrote, light has been thrown upon various matters which, in his time, were obscure.

It is to be wished rather than hoped that the appalling mass of printed matter which, for four centuries, has been accumulating round the *Commentaries*, may not be swelled in the future by mere verbiage. If only the editors of German periodicals would restrain the ardour of the emendators who inundate them with futile conjectures, they would be setting a good example. The *Tabula Coniecturarum* which Meusel prints at the end of his great *Lexicon Caesarianum* fills thirty-six pages super royal octavo, closely printed in double columns ; and of all these conjectures those which really deserve the name of emendations would not fill a single page ; while those which have been unanimously adopted might be counted upon the fingers of one hand. In the Greek state of Locri there was a rule that whoever proposed a new law should do so with a rope round his neck, and, if his proposal were rejected, should be strangled on the spot. It would be a good thing if editors

would combine to deal with emendators in a like spirit. Death would perhaps be an excessive penalty even for a bad conjecture; but whoever proposed an emendation which failed within a certain period to win general acceptance might be forbidden ever to contribute to a learned periodical again.[1] We have not yet got, nor will conjectural emendation give us, a final critical edition of the *Commentaries*; but for the purposes of history, in the most comprehensive sense of the word, the text is good enough. Very few of the passages in which it is uncertain offer a stumbling-block to the historian; and those mainly in points of minute detail. Many of the geographical and other problems are now solved; and I hope that I have succeeded in contributing something to the result. Others, as I have tried to show, are at present insoluble, and must remain so unless and until fresh discoveries throw light upon them. But excavation, carried out regardless of cost and intelligently directed, has already been so active in France that I doubt whether, for the period of Caesar's campaigns, it has many surprises in store for us. It is perhaps conceivable that the future may reveal some lost memoirs which may supplement Caesar's own narrative. But even if our positive knowledge is not destined to be increased, we know enough already for essential purposes; and the most that further research or happy chance can bring to light is very little in comparison with what has been already discovered. And when the catalogue of 'programs' and dissertations is complete, when modern research and modern literary skill shall have combined to produce the final history of the Gallic war, the unpretending little book which Caesar wrote two thousand years ago in the scanty leisure of a busy life will outlive them all.

[1] If these remarks had not been misunderstood, I should have thought it unnecessary to say that they were directed not against the use but against the abuse of conjecture. [26.8.1903.]

11 Douro Place, Kensington, W.
July 23, 1899.

THE BUSTS OF JULIUS CAESAR

WHOEVER wishes to know all that can be known about the busts of Caesar should read, first of all, Bernoulli's learned and beautifully illustrated *Römische Ikonographie*. That work will tell him what busts are generally regarded as authentic : but what we really want to know is which of the authentic busts offers the most faithful likeness ; and this is what neither Bernoulli nor any one else can certainly tell. It comes to this, that every one must study for himself Caesar's history, form his own idea of his character, and then use his own judgement ; and if a man distrusts his own judgement and finds a learned treatise tiresome, perhaps he might do worse than take Mr. Baring Gould for his guide. It is true that the author of *The Tragedy of the Caesars* sometimes lets his imagination run away with him. He has, I think, idealized the character of Caesar, and read his ideal in, or rather into, his favourite busts. But it is impossible for him to take pen in hand without being interesting ; and, accurate or not, a man of his calibre cannot fail to throw light upon any subject with which he deals.

A portrait which has done duty in many works on Caesar is taken from the colossal bust of Naples. This seems to me, not indeed, as Mr. Baring Gould [1] thinks, characterless, but, at any rate, no true presentment of the character of Caesar. The face is powerful, but heavy if not brutal.[2]

Mr. Warde Fowler [3] has suggested that the real Caesar may be represented by the green basalt bust of Berlin. The breadth of skull which characterizes the marble bust in the British Museum, and, in varying degrees, all the others, is absent from this ; but Mr. Baring Gould [4] supposes that the block of basalt which the sculptor used may have been too narrow. Surely this is pushing conjecture too far. M. Salomon Reinach,[5] on the other hand, points out that the type of the basalt bust is not to be found on any of the coins of Caesar,[6] and that it is similar to the type represented in the bust of an Alexandrian Greek in the Imperial Museum of Vienna. Mr. J. C. Ropes,[7] indeed, speaks of ' a mark by which one can generally recognize the authentic busts of Caesar, namely a scar or furrow on the left side of the face ' ; and he adds that this mark is to be found on

[1] *The Tragedy of the Caesars*, i, 1892, pp. 3, 116.

[2] The illustrations of this bust in Mongez's *Iconographie romaine* (ii, 1824, pl. 17 [1]) are idealized. Compare them with Taf. xiii in Bernoulli's book.

[3] *Classical Review*, vii, 1893, p. 108.

[4] *The Tragedy of the Caesars*, i, 106.

[5] *Gazette des Beaux-Arts*, 3e pér., vii, 1892, pp. 474–6.

[6] See the beautiful illustrations of the coins in H. Cohen's *Description générale des monnaies de la république romaine*, 1857.

[7] *Scribner's Mag.*, i, 1887, pp. 132, 135.

the bust in the British Museum, and also on the basalt bust. There is certainly a furrow on the left side of the bust in the British Museum: but there is a corresponding, though shorter, furrow on the right side; and I used to think that both of them simply represented lines such as are to be seen on the faces of many men who have passed middle life. I have, however, since noticed that some of the coins[1] show a furrow on the right cheek with great distinctness. But, whatever may be the worth of the furrows as evidence, Bernoulli, as well as M. Reinach, questions the authenticity of the basalt bust; and only an enthusiast could detect any similarity between it and any of the other busts the authenticity of which is admitted.

M. Geffroy, the Director of the École française de Rome,[2] remarks that Signor Barracco possesses a bust of Caesar, the genuineness of which is proved by its bearing on the crown of the head the star mentioned by Suetonius. Undoubtedly this bust was intended to represent Caesar; but what proof is there that the artist ever saw Caesar, or even worked with an authentic portrait before him? If any one thinks this question vexatious, I beg him to suspend his judgement until he has finished reading this note. Suetonius[3] says that, on the occasion of the first games which Augustus held in honour of Julius, a comet appeared; that the comet was regarded as a sign that Caesar's soul had been received into heaven; and that, in consequence, the image of a star was placed upon the head of his bust. Now M. Geffroy cannot prove that the bust in Signor Barracco's possession is the very bust of which Suetonius speaks, or even a replica of it; for it is probable that posthumous busts were produced with a star upon the head; and if Signor Barracco's bust was posthumous, as he himself believes that it was,[4] it must either have been a copy of an original or simply a work of memory or of imagination. It was found in the delta of the Nile; and two photographs of it are reproduced in a volume entitled *La collection Barracco*, by G. Barracco and W. Helbig. The face is covered with a beard of about a fortnight's growth.[5] The shape of the head is strikingly different from that of the bust in the British Museum, and its relative breadth is much less; though in both the forehead, as distinguished from the head itself, is remarkably narrow. In expression the two busts have hardly any resemblance.

Mr. Baring Gould has a very high opinion of the bust in the British Museum: so has Bernoulli;[6] and, given the authenticity

[1] See Bernoulli, Nos. 53 and 62.

[2] *Rev. arch.*, 3e sér., xx, 1892, p. 256. I do not know whether M. Geffroy is still Director.

[3] *Divus Iulius*, 88. Cf. *Archaeol. Zeitung*, xix, 1867, pp. 110–3.

[4] 'Nous pouvons conclure que la statue dont provient notre tête fut exécutée après la consécration de César.' G. Barracco and W. Helbig, *La collection Barracco*, 1893–4, p. 51.

[5] The authors of *La collection Barracco* conjecture that Caesar had let his beard grow as a sign of mourning for Pompey, just as, according to Suetonius (*Divus Iulius*, 67), he did while he was avenging the massacre at Atuatuca.

[6] 'Among those busts,' says Bernoulli (p. 171), 'which recommend themselves by their resemblance to the coins, this is the one which most suggests Caesar.'

of the bust,[1] I do not think that any one could doubt that it was the work of a sculptor who, as Mr. Baring Gould says, 'knew Caesar and loved him,' or at least understood and admired him.[2] But Mr. Baring Gould tells us that Mr. Conrad Dressler, the sculptor, who shares his admiration for the bust, has pronounced that Caesar could not have sat to the artist, because the extraordinary breadth of the skull above the ears is anatomically impossible.[3] When I read this it struck me as unlikely that a sculptor who is assumed to have known Caesar well would have cared to model his bust from memory, or that his memory would have been so defective; and it seemed incredible that a sculptor who was capable of producing such a work of art should have lacked an elementary knowledge of anatomy. I asked Mr. Hope Pinker, whose bust of Sir Henry Acland is a speaking likeness, for his opinion. It confirmed my own. Have Mr. Baring Gould and Mr. Dressler forgotten the bust of the youthful Augustus which stands in the British Museum, within a few feet of the bust of Caesar? Let them look at it again, and they will admit that its breadth above the ears is just as remarkable as that of its neighbour.[4]

Mr. Baring Gould considers a bust in the Louvre, of which he gives an illustration, as good in its way as the bust in our national collection; but it seems to him to represent the militant rather than the reflective side of Caesar's character.[5] To my mind the bust in the British Museum represents, as a bust should do, not one side of the man's character, but the whole. The bust in the Louvre has features of the Caesarian type; but the expression is quite different. Mr. Dressler has remarked that, in default of direct evidence, there is no better test of the fidelity of a portrait than the impression which it leaves upon the mind of an intelligent observer.[6] The test is obviously imperfect; but it is worth pages of discussion. Nor would I hesitate to apply that test, according to the measure of my intelligence, if only it were certain that the bust in the British Museum

[1] The late Professor Adolf Furtwängler (*Neuere Fälschungen von Antiken*, 1899, p. 14) condemned the bust as a forgery,—'a modern work with skilfully imitated corrosion [of the marble], and an expression the very reverse of ancient.' But Furtwängler was fond of laying down the law; and Mr. A. H. Smith, the Keeper of Greek and Roman Antiquities in the British Museum, who unhesitatingly accepts the bust as a work of classical art, thinks that it has been *de*corroded. 'The marble,' he says, 'appears to have suffered from a drastic cleaning with acid, but portions at the back show the original surface' (*A Catalogue of Sculpture*, &c., iii, 1904, p. 146). M. Salomon Reinach, in a review of the first edition of this book, asserted that the bust is 'modern'; but Professor Percy Gardner (*Eng. Hist. Rev.*, xix, 1904, p. 326) still regards it as ancient. If the sculptor was a forger, he was also a genius; but no forger would have thought of portraying that narrow forehead in combination with a broad head.

[2] 'It is the man himself,' says Professor Ernest Gardner (*Handbook of Greek Sculpture*, 1905, pp. 513–5), 'that the sculptor brings before us.'

[3] *The Tragedy of the Caesars*, i, 114–5.

[4] Only the other day I saw a child, whose head, extraordinarily broad, projected above the ears as much as that depicted by the bust in the Museum. [16.11.97.] The bust is not more brachycephalic than the heads of many living Auvergnats and inhabitants of the department of the Jura.

[5] *The Tragedy of the Caesars*, i, 115.

[6] *Ib.*, pp. 9–10.

is really an authentic bust of Caesar. But even this certainty is wanting. There is not in existence a single bust of which it can be said, with absolute certainty, both that the sculptor intended it to be a portrait of Caesar, and also that either Caesar sat for the likeness or the sculptor had personal knowledge or an authentic likeness to guide him. Some years ago I asked the late Dr. Alexander Murray, who was then Keeper of Greek and Roman Antiquities in the British Museum, whether there was any doubt of the authenticity of the marble bust. 'Oh! no,' he answered; 'no doubt whatever.' But he could not give me any proof. The bust was once believed to represent Cicero. If physiognomy is any index to character, it is certain that that calm face bore no resemblance to his; but the conjecture, absurd as it was, would never have been made if there had been direct evidence that the bust was intended for Caesar. Evidence, however, there is none for the authenticity of this or of any one of the so-called busts of Caesar, except such evidence as is to be got from the study of the texts and of the coins. The evidence of the texts is very scanty; and most of the coins differ widely among themselves.[1] The contemporary coins which bore Caesar's effigy were the work of five different agents,—L. Aemilius Buca, L. Flaminius Chilo, M. Mettius, P. Sepullius Macer, and C. Cossutius Maridianus. None of them were struck before 44 B.C., the year of Caesar's death. Others, known as the Voconian group, were executed a few years later.[2] In the *Description of the collection of Ancient Marbles in the British Museum*[3] it is affirmed that there is an agreement among the Aemilian and Voconian coins 'which is perfectly satisfactory', and that with all of them the bust in the Museum 'exhibits a striking similarity'. Well, the reader should look through Cohen's *Description générale des monnaies de la république romaine*, and judge for himself. The Aemilian coins are numbered 14, 15, 16, and 17 on Plate ii; the Voconian 1 and 2 on Plate xlii. No. 2 certainly resembles 15, but differs widely from 1; 17 is about as much like the others as Gladstone was like Beaconsfield; and, in expression, none of the six resembles any of the busts.[4] All that can be said is that, in profile, there is a general resemblance between No. 15, No. 2, Nos. 2 and 3 on Plate xvi, 3 on Plate xviii, and 4 on Plate xxxvii; that the type of face depicted on these six coins is not unlike that of the bust in the British Museum; and that the lean muscular neck shown in the former resembles that of the latter. When one looks at different portraits of any well-known modern face, one can always tell at a glance whom they were intended to represent. Similarly, the portraits of Queen Elizabeth, for instance, are all unmistakable. And, to go back to ancient times, it does not

[1] The face on a coin in the British Museum, an illustration of which is given in Mr. Warde Fowler's *Caesar*, is that of an imbecile buffoon.

[2] E. Babelon, *Descr. hist. et chron. des monn. de la république rom.*, 1886, i, 497, ii, 560.

[3] Part xi, 1861, pp. 39–40.

[4] Notice the varieties in form and expression in the Sepullian group,—xxxvii, 4–9.

need an expert to tell that the busts of Augustus were all intended to portray the same face. But the busts of Caesar differ from each other so much in expression, and some of them even in feature, that, although there is a certain vague 'Caesarian' type common to all, an untrained eye, if the inscriptions were removed, would probably take them for portraits of different men. The conclusion appears to be either that most of the sculptors were unable to catch a likeness, or that most of them worked from memory or imagination, or, finally, that some of the busts were not meant to represent Caesar at all. But this much is certain :—if the original of the bust in the British Museum was not Caesar, he was a very great man ; and who ? The experts cannot help us to arrive at a definite conclusion ; and for my part I am content to accept as the likeness of Caesar the noble bust which has approved itself to Bernoulli, to Mr. Baring Gould, and to other well-qualified judges.[1]

This bust represents, I venture to say, the strongest personality that has ever lived, the strongest which poet or historian, painter or sculptor has ever portrayed. In the profile it is impossible to detect a flaw : if there is one in the full face, it is the narrowness of the forehead as compared with the breadth of the skull. The face appears that of a man in late middle age. He has lived every day of his life, and he is beginning to weary of the strain ; but every faculty retains its fullest vigour. The harmony of the nature is as impressive as its strength. No one characteristic dominates the rest. Not less remarkable than the power of the countenance are its delicacy and fastidious refinement. The man looks perfectly unscrupulous ; or, if the phrase be apt to mislead, he looks as if no scruple could make him falter in pursuit of his aim : but his conduct is governed by principle. Passion, without which, as Mommsen truly said, there can be no genius, inspires his resolve and stimulates its execution ;

[1] In the *Description of the collection of Ancient Marbles in the British Museum* (Part xi, pp. 39–40) it is asserted that 'the general character of the features of Caesar are as well known and as clearly marked as those of any personage of Roman times,' and that 'the features of the marble bust agree with them.' If this statement requires some qualification, it may, I think, be affirmed that the marble bust agrees as well as any other with the coins. It is interesting to compare it with the illustrations in Mongez's *Iconographie romaine*, ii, pl. 17 (1, 3), pl. 18 (1–2) of the Neapolitan, Capitoline, and St. Cloud busts. These three, though they differ in expression, represent, I feel sure, the same man. The lines of the forehead in them and in the British Museum bust are alike ; and there is a certain resemblance in the profile and the shape of the head, though the jaw in the St. Cloud bust is squarer, and the chin more prominent than in the other three. The ear of the former is very like that of the British Museum bust, and, like it, lies very close to the head.

Professor Percy Gardner (*Eng. Hist. Rev.*, xix, 1904, p. 326) says that 'the forehead [of the bust in the British Museum], which slopes backward, is certainly not the forehead of Caesar. This,' he adds, 'is guaranteed by the coins . . . it requires long familiarity with coins fully to appreciate their testimony.' No doubt ; but even a layman may be allowed to point out that the angle formed by the forehead differs widely in different coins ; and that, among the coins illustrated by Cohen (*Descr. gén.*, &c.) the slope in pl. ii, 15, pl. xviii, 3, pl. xxxvii, 4–8, and pl. xlii, 1, is as great or greater than in the marble bust, the forehead of which could not fairly be called retreating.

but passion, in the narrow sense, is never suffered to warp his action. He is kindly and tolerant; but, to avoid greater ills, he would shed blood without remorse. 'The mild but inexorable yoke of Caesar,' —so Mr. Strachan-Davidson[1] describes the ascendancy to which Cicero reluctantly submitted; and mild inexorability is apparent in the expression of this man. He can be a charming companion to men; and, though he is no longer young, he knows how to win the love of women. He sees facts as they are, accepts, and makes the best of them. Knowledge of men has made him cynical; but the cynicism is dashed by humour. Look at the profile from the left, and you will note an expression of restrained amusement, as of one who is good-naturedly observant of the weaknesses of his fellows. If his outlook passes beyond mundane things and strains after the unknown, he does not let us into the secret of his thoughts. But if the ordinary observer is unable to discern that look of faith, that 'far-off look' which Mr. Baring Gould[2] loves to fancy that he can read in the expression, he cannot fail to recognize the stamp not only of will and of intellect, but also of nobility. The bust represents a man of the world, in the fullest meaning of the term. It alone represents a man such as Caesar has revealed himself in his writings, and as his contemporaries have revealed him in theirs; and that is why I have chosen it to illustrate this book.

[Mr. Frank J. Scott, of Toledo, U.S.A., has recently published a book, called *The Portraitures of Julius Caesar*,[3] which contains illustrations of all or nearly all the busts, coins, and gems that have been regarded as meant to portray Caesar's features. That many of them were so meant is certain; but which of them was the best likeness, and whether any one of them was executed from life, are problems that remain unsolved.]

[1] *Cicero*, 1894, p. 268. [2] *The Tragedy of the Caesars*, i. 114–5.

[3] For criticisms of Mr. Scott's book see *Eng. Hist. Rev.*, xix, 1904, pp. 325–7, and *Class. Rev.*, xviii, 1904, pp. 183–5.

COLONEL STOFFEL'S EXCAVATIONS

The contributions which Napoleon III made to our knowledge of the history of the Gallic war were due to excavations carried out by his principal collaborator, the late Colonel Stoffel. I reprint here part of a letter which the colonel wrote to me before the publication of my first edition. Substantially, he confirmed my own preconceived notions, and his method was identical with that which is followed by Professor Haverfield and other well-known investigators. 'Vous désirez,' he writes, 'savoir par quelle méthode j'ai retrouvé les traces des camps que l'armée de César construisit dans la guerre des Gaules. Il est nécessaire de commencer à indiquer quelques



notions préliminaires. Les terrains dans lesquels ces camps furent établis présentent, comme tous les terrains cultivés, une couche supérieure de terre végétale, appelée *humus*, laquelle varie d'épaisseur selon les différentes contrées, et peut avoir depuis un ou deux pieds jusqu'à quatre ou cinq pieds et plus. Au-dessous de cette couche de terre végétale se trouve le terrain vierge (ou le sous-sol), qui est, selon les contrées, ou marneux, ou siliceux, ou calcaire. A Alesia (dans la plaine des Laumes) c'est de la marne épaisse et ferme ; à Berry-au-Bac c'est une marne plus légère ; à la Roche-Blanche (en face de Gergovia) c'est un calcaire ferme et blanc. Lorsque, après une bataille, ou après un siége, l'armée romaine quittait son camp, les habitants du pays en détruisaient les retranchements afin de pouvoir de nouveau cultiver leurs champs. Ils rejetaient les terres du parapet dans le fossé. Ce fossé était, de la sorte, plein d'*une terre mélangée*, composée de terre végétale, de terre vierge, et souvent d'objets que les soldats romains avaient pu laisser sur le parapet, tels que débris d'armes, boulets en pierre, monnaies, ossements, etc. Pendant quelque temps la partie supérieure du fossé comblé présentait la forme AB [slightly convex], à cause du foisonnement des terres ; mais avec le temps, et grâce à la culture de chaque année, elles se tassaient au niveau du sol avoisinant, ce qui fait que partout

les traces des camps de César ont disparu. En tout cas, la terre de remplissage des fossés est une *terre meuble* et, fait important à remarquer, elle reste meuble, sans jamais reprendre la consistance du terrain vierge, si bien qu'aujourd'hui, après 2000 ans écoulés, elle se détache aisément à la pioche. C'est là ce qui permet de retrouver les fossés lorsqu'on a su déterminer l'emplacement d'un camp. C'est là, comme vous le dites très bien, la première condition. Il faut donc, avant tout, étudier le terrain où on suppose que le camp était placé, ce qui exige une connaissance parfaite des *Commentaires* de César et des connaissances militaires spéciales.

Cela posé, voici comment j'ai toujours procédé pour retrouver les fossés d'un camp. Soit ABCD une étendue de terrain dans laquelle je supposais placé le camp qu'il s'agissait de découvrir ; et admettons, pour fixer les idées, que la couche de terre végétale ait 70 centimètres d'épaisseur. Je plaçais les ouvriers, avec pelles et pioches,



sur plusieurs files *fff*, dans une direction perpendiculaire à un des côtés supposés du camp, les ouvriers de chaque file à 20 ou 30 mètres les uns des autres. Chacun d'eux était chargé d'enlever la couche de *humus* sur deux pieds de largeur. Si, après avoir enlevé cette couche sur 70 centimètres de profondeur, ils sentaient que leurs pioches frappaient un terrain résistant, c'est que celui-ci n'avait jamais été remué et qu'on n'était pas sur le fossé romain. Les ouvriers continuaient alors à avancer, et cela tant qu'il ne se produisait rien de nouveau. Mais lorsqu'ils arrivaient, sans s'en douter, sur le fossé en *xy*, c'était autre chose. Alors, après avoir enlevé la terre végétale jusqu'à la profondeur de 70 centimètres, ils ne trouvaient plus, comme précédemment, un sol vierge résistant ; au contraire, ils rencontraient une terre meuble qui se détachait facilement, ce qui permettait de supposer qu'elle avait été autrefois remuée. Je faisais alors élargir la tranchée en lui donnant six pieds de largeur (*cd*) au lieu de deux pieds (*xy*), afin que les ouvriers pussent travailler plus commodément ; et ils approfondissaient la tranchée jusqu'à

ce qu'ils rencontrassent le sol naturel. D'ailleurs on reconnaissait bientôt si on était, oui ou non, sur le fossé romain ; car, si on y était réellement, on distinguait sans peine sur les deux bords *ec* et *fd* de la tranchée, à droite et à gauche des ouvriers, le profil du fossé qui se détachait par la couleur de la terre mêlée (celle de l'ancien parapet) sur la couleur du terre vierge qui l'encadrait.



Je n'ai rien vu de plus curieux que les profils des petits fossés du petit camp que j'ai mis à découvert sur la colline de la Roche-Blanche. Là, la couche de terre végétale, épaisse tout au plus de 50 à 60 centimètres (si j'ai bonne mémoire), repose sur un sol de calcaire dur et blanc comme de la craie : aussi les fossés du camp, remplis d'une terre mélangée de humus et de craie, présentaient-ils des profils qui tranchaient sur la terre dont ils étaient entourés aussi nettement que le triangle ABC ci-contre tranche sur le papier blanc. L'Empereur, qui était venu visiter mes fouilles à Gergovia, fut tellement frappé et émerveillé en voyant ces profils, qu'il songea à acheter la colline de la Roche-Blanche pour les conserver. Il abandonna cette idée lorsqu'il sut que les habitants désiraient ne pas être dépossédés, et il m'ordonna de combler mes tranchées et de tout mettre dans l'état primitif.



Pour en revenir aux recherches nécessaires pour déterminer l'emplacement d'un camp, il est à peine besoin d'ajouter que quand j'étais parvenu à retrouver un des points par le profil du fossé, je me bornais à en retrouver cinq ou six autres dans la longueur de chaque côté, ce qui suffisait pour délimiter le camp et en connaître la forme exacte. . . . A Alesia, les recherches ont duré plus de deux ans, parce qu'il fallait retrouver non seulement les traces des camps, mais encore celles des lignes de contrevallation et de circonvallation. J'y ai employé plus de 300 ouvriers.'

I do not at all mean to imply that Napoleon's maps are all trustworthy. On the contrary, it will be shown in Part II of this volume that some of them are largely conjectural, and that several are either wholly or in part erroneous.

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[I hope that readers who use the map and plans will turn to the article in Part II on 'The Map of Gaul' (pp. 345–8). Those who may wish to test their accuracy should also consult the Geographical Index (pp. 351–503) and various notes in Section VII (pp. 613 ff.), which are referred to in footnotes to the Narrative.]

GAUL
IN THE TIME OF CAESAR
See note on page xl
The eastern frontier of the Provincia in Cæsar's time can only be traced approximately: the Allobroges and Redonians are probably to be reckoned among the Alpine tribes which were then independent (Plinv, NAT. HIST., iii. 4 § 37).
Cicero's camp in 54 B.C. (see pages 105 n2 383, 456) was probably in territory belonging to one of the small "client" tribes of the Nervii.
Various maps, differing widely from each other profess to restore the course of the lower Meuse, as it existed in Cæsar's time. The writer has not made the attempt, because he believes that the data are insufficient. See page 348, note 5, and pages 604–6.
BRITANNIA
GERMANI CISRHENANI
MORINI
MENAPII
EBURONES
CONDRUSI
EBURONES
ATREBATES
NERVII
AMBIANI
CALETI
VELIOCASSES
BELLOVACI
REMI
TREVERI
MEDIOMATRICI
LEUCI
SUESSIONES
CATUVELLAUNI
PARISII
SENONES
CARNUTES
AULERCI DIABLINTES
AULERCI CENOMANI
LINGONES
SEQUANI
HELVETII
OSISMI
CORIOSOLITES
VENETI
NAMNETES
ANDES
TURONI
AEDUI
BITURIGES
SANTONI
PICTONES
LEMOVICES
ARVERNI
ALLOBROGES
SEBUSIANI
SEGUSIANI
VOCONTII
SALLUVII
CAMPESTRES
NANTUATES
SEDUNI
VERAGRI
TRICASTINI
VOCONTII
TRIBOCCI
VANGIONES
NEMETES
RAURACI
SEQUANI
PETROCORII
CADURCI
RUTENI
VOLCAE ARECOMICI
VOLCAE TECTOSAGES
TOLOSATES
AUSCI
TARUSATES
CONSORANNI
TARBELLI
SOTIATES
VOCATES
BIBERACTE
Portus Itius
SCALE 1 2,850,000
English Statute Miles
Kilometres
Roman Miles
West 1
0
1 East

CAESAR'S CONQUEST OF GAUL

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

THREE centuries before the birth of Caesar, while patrician was still struggling with plebeian, while both were still contending with rival peoples for supremacy, the Gauls first encountered their destined conquerors. For a generation or more,[1] the Celtic wanderers, whose kinsmen had already overflowed Gaul, crossed the Pyrenees, and passed into Britain and into Ireland, had been pouring, in a resistless stream, down the passes of the Alps. They spread over Lombardy. They drove the Etruscans from their strongholds in the north. They crossed the Po, and pushed further and further southward into Etruria itself. At length they overthrew a Roman army in the battle of the Allia, and marched unopposed through the Colline Gate. The story of the sack and burning of the city was noised throughout the civilized world; yet the disaster itself, though it was never forgotten, hardly affected the history of Rome. It probably tended to rivet the bonds of union between her and the other cities of Latium, and to strengthen her claim to supremacy in Italy. From time to time during the next century the Gauls returned to plunder: but their incursions were repelled; and the champion of Italian civilization was Rome.

Gallic invasion of Italy: battle of the Allia and its results.

390 B.C.

But the Roman dread of the Gauls long remained; and more than once Rome's enemies enlisted their services against her. In the last Samnite war, one of the most crucial events of Roman history, Samnites, Etruscans, and Gauls made a desperate effort to crush the rising power; and after this

Gallic tribes assist the enemies of Rome.

295 B.C.

[1] Regarding the date of the Gallic invasion of Italy, and the place from which the invaders came, see pp. 542–6.

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attempt had been frustrated, the Etruscans once again rose in revolt, and their Gallic mercenaries destroyed a Roman army under the walls of Arretium. It was not until the
283 B.C. Senones had in their turn been defeated and expelled from Italy, and the Boi, who hastened to avenge them, had been
282 B.C. crushed near the Lake of Vadimo, that the republic was finally released from the fear of Gallic invasion.

The Romans fight their way to the Po;

Years passed away. Rome became mistress of the peninsula, and determined to vindicate her natural right to the rich plain on her own side of the Alpine barrier. The Gauls offered a strenuous resistance, and even assumed the offensive. Reinforced by a swarm of free-lances from the valley of the upper Rhône, they boldly crossed the Apennines and plundered Etruria. The Romans were taken by surprise: but in
225 B.C. the great battle of Telamon they checked the invasion; and within two years they fought their way to the right bank of the Po. The Insubres on the northern side still held out: but before the outbreak of the second Punic war Mediolanum,
222 B.C. or Milan, their chief stronghold, was captured; and the fortresses of Placentia and Cremona were founded.

and conquer Cisalpine Gaul.

But the work of conquest was only half completed when Hannibal descended into the plain, and the exasperated Gauls rallied round him. When Rome emerged, victorious,
218 B.C. from her great struggle, they knew what was in store for them, and made a last attempt to win back their liberty.
200 B.C. Placentia was sacked, and Cremona was invested. The Roman army which marched to its relief gained a victory,
199 B.C. but was in its turn almost annihilated by the Insubres. The Gauls, however, could never long act together: their countrymen beyond the Alps gave them no help: the league of the northern tribes was rent by discord and treachery;
196 B.C. and the Insubres and Cenomani were compelled to accept a peace, which allowed them indeed to retain their constitution, but forbade them to acquire the Roman citizenship. South of the Po the Boi strove frantically to hold their own: but in a series of battles their fighting men were well nigh
191 B.C. exterminated: the Romans insisted upon the cession of half their territory; and on both sides of the river the survivors were gradually lost among Italian settlers.

Eastward and southward and westward the empire of the Romans spread. They conquered Greece. They conquered Carthage. They conquered Spain. But between the central and the western peninsula they had no means of communication by land save what was afforded by the Greek colony of Massilia. It was an entreaty from the Massiliots for protection that gave occasion to the wars which resulted in the formation of the Province of Transalpine Gaul; and the natural willingness of the Senate to support their most faithful allies was doubtless stimulated by the desire to secure possession of the indispensable strip of coast between the Alps and the Pyrenees, partly also perhaps by the idea of creating a Greater Italy for the growing Italian population. In 155 B.C. the Romans stepped forward as the champions of Massilia against the Ligurian tribes between the Maritime Alps and the Rhône. The highlanders who inhabited the forest-clad mountains above the Riviera were crushed in a single campaign; after an interval of thirty years their western neighbours, the Salyes, were forced to submit; and their seaboard, like that of the other tribes, was given to the Massiliots. But the Romans had come to stay. The Aedui, who dwelt in the Nivernais and western Burgundy, calculated that the support of the Republic would help them to secure ascendancy over their rivals; and by a treaty, fraught with unforeseen issues, they were recognized as Friends and Allies of the Roman people. The Allobroges, on the other hand, whose home was between the Lake of Geneva, the Rhône, and the Isère, refused to surrender the king of the Salyes, who had claimed their protection; and Bituitus, king of the Arverni, with all the hosts of his dependent tribes, marched to support them. Just twenty years before the birth of Caesar a great battle was fought at the confluence of the Rhône and the Isère.[1] The Gauls were beaten; and the bridges over the Rhône broke down beneath the multitude of the fugitives.

Formation of the Roman Province in Transalpine Gaul.

[Marseilles.]

123 B.C.

121 B.C.

This victory was, in the strictest sense, decisive. The Romans were now masters of the lower Rhône; and if they

[1] M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, iii. 17, n. 4), rejecting the tradition, argues that the battle took place on the Rhône at Pont-St. Esprit.

were ever to penetrate into Further Gaul, their base could be advanced some hundreds of miles. The Arverni, whose hegemony had extended to the Rhine and the Mediterranean, had received a blow from which they never recovered.

The Province which was now formed stretched from the Maritime Alps to the Rhône. Succeeding consuls rapidly extended the frontier until it ran along the Cevennes and the river Tarn down into the centre of the Pyrenees. The tribes were obliged to pay tribute and to furnish troops; and, although they were of course permitted to retain their own forms of government, their subjection was assured by the construction of roads and fortresses. The heavy exactions of the conquerors, aggravated by the greed of usurers, provoked frequent insurrections; but year by year the Provincials became steadily Romanized. Roman nobles acquired estates in the Province, and sent their stewards to manage them. Roman merchants built warehouses and counting-houses in the towns; and the language and civilization of Rome began to take root.[1] Narbo with its spacious harbour was not only a powerful military station, but in commerce the rival of Massilia. Nor was the activity of the Romans confined to their proper sphere. Catamantaloedis, king of the Sequani, whose territory lay north of the Allobroges, received from the Senate the title of Friend; and the same honour was bestowed upon an Aquitanian noble and upon Ollovico, king of the Nitiobroges, who ruled the upper valley of the Garonne.[2] For what services these distinctions were conferred, we do not know; but events were already paving the way for the conquest of the great country that stretched beyond the Rhône and the Cevennes to the Rhine and the Atlantic Ocean.

[Narbonne.]

Gaul and its inhabitants.

The aspect of this region was, of course, very different from that of the beautiful France with which we are familiar. The land of gay cities, of picturesque old towns dominated by awful cathedrals, of cornfields and vineyards and sunny hamlets and smiling chateaux, was then covered in many

[1] Cicero, *Pro Fonteio*, 5, § 11.

[2] *B. G.*, i, 3, § 4; iv, 12, § 4; vii, 31, § 5. Cf. C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 28–9.

places by dreary swamps and darkened by huge forests. Gaul extended far beyond the limits of modern France, including a large part of Switzerland, Alsace, Lorraine, and the Rhenish Provinces, Belgium, and Southern Holland. The people were divided into three groups, differing in race, language, manners, and institutions. Between the Garonne and the Pyrenees were the Aquitani, of whom certain tribes were akin to the Iberians of Spain. North-east of the Seine and the Marne, in the plains of Picardy, Artois, and Champagne, on the mist-laden flats of the Scheldt and the lower Rhine and in the vast forest of the Ardennes, dwelt the Belgae, who may have partially mixed and were continually at war with their German neighbours. The lowlands of Switzerland, Alsace, Lorraine, and part of the Rhenish Provinces, the great plains and the uplands of central France, and the Atlantic seaboard, were occupied by the Celtae.

Prehistory of Gaul.

Modern science, however, has established a more detailed classification. Neither in Aquitania nor in Celtica nor in the land of the Belgae were the people homogeneous. During the last fifty years the classical texts, which were once the only source of knowledge, have been supplemented by geological, archaeological, and anthropological research ; and it has become possible to reconstruct the prehistory, the very existence of which had hardly been suspected, of every European land. Skeletons have yielded information about the physical characters of the people : their implements and weapons, their clothing and ornaments, their art, and even their religion, have been revealed by relics extracted from the river-drift, from caverns and sepulchres, from villages, hill-forts, and buried hoards. The Celts were but the latest invaders of Gaul ; and their life was profoundly influenced by the Ligurians, the Iberians, and the nameless tribes who, during countless millenniums, had dwelt in Gaul before them.[1] To what era is to be assigned the first appear-

[1] The very brief sketch of the prehistory of Gaul to which, in conformity with the plan of this book, I have restricted myself, rests upon copious materials. The evidence for the purely ethnological parts will be found in the essay on 'The Ethnology of Gaul' (pp. 257–338). For the rest I have erased my bibliographical notes since the appearance of M. J. Déchelette's *Manuel d'archéologie* (1908, 1910),—a synthetical work of the first rank, which deals in the fullest

ance of man, is still a disputed question. Some enthusiasts insist that even in the Tertiary Period, myriads of years ago, the country was inhabited by men, if men they could be called, who wrought for themselves flint implements which remain as their sole memorial; but the more cautious experts who have handled these stones are unable to admit that they were chipped, or hacked, by the hand of man. Even after the close of that period our own country was still part of the continent, and the great ice-age had hardly begun. Thenceforward uncertainty disappears. In the Quaternary Period came the palaeolithic races, whose existence is attested not only by their weapons but by their own remains. These men maintained themselves in Gaul during the last interglacial epoch, and sheltered in caves throughout the countless centuries in which the glaciers were once more spreading and at length receding over the uplands of Central Europe.[1] Earliest of all were the Neanderthal, or, as they are sometimes called, the Canstadt race, with their low brutish foreheads and huge beetling brows, whose skeletons have been found in the basin of the Meuse and between Croatia and the Dordogne. Although the oldest is not earlier than the second of the stages, marked by successive types of implements, into which the Palaeolithic Age has been divided, there is reason to believe that the men who fashioned the more primitive tools belonged to the same stock. That race saw the volcanoes of Auvergne, which during countless centuries have slumbered, belching forth flame and discharging lava;[2] but for them all Nature was animated, and lava and flame were demoniacal. Mammoths and rhinoceroses, lions, bears, and hyaenas, bisons, gluttons, wolves were their fellows; and over the vast expanse of the forest-cumbered land, where they roamed in

detail with Gaul. The first volume, which was ably reviewed by M. Boule in *L'Anthropologie*, xix, 1908, pp. 451–2, is devoted to the Palaeolithic and the Neolithic Age; the second, which is even better, to the Bronze Age. The concluding volume, treating of the Iron Age, will probably be published before the end of 1911.

[1] See *L'Anthropologie*, xix, 1908, pp. 5, 7–10, 12–3, 615.

[2] *Bull. de la Soc. de géogr.*, xiii, 1906, pp. 291, 365–7; *Association franç. pour l'avancement des sc.*, 37e sessn, 1908, pp. 664, 692–4.

quest of food, there was no sign, save their rude handiwork, that they would rise superior to the beasts which the primitive savage regards with mingled fear and veneration.[1] Yet they buried their dead with scrupulous care, sometimes placing tools beside them ; and we may perhaps infer that they fancied that the soul would still endure. But they were not the only race who then inhabited Gaul. In the caves of Mentone have been found human remains little later than the oldest of the Neanderthal stock, which show negroid characteristics, and also gigantic skeletons with well-developed skulls, belonging to a type whose most famous representative was unearthed many years ago beneath the rock-shelter of Cro-Magnon in the Dordogne ; and before the end of the Quaternary Period there were living in the caves of Laugerie-Basse and Chancelade a people who, if we may judge from their well-formed and capacious skulls, possessed an intellectual faculty not inferior to that of their modern descendants. They have indeed left evidence of their powers ; for late in the Palaeolithic Age appeared the dawn of pictorial art. From the caves of the Tarn-et-Garonne and the Dordogne have been recovered bones and antlers, engraved or carved with likenesses of mammoths, reindeer, and other animals, of fishes, and of men. Those who have seen the specimens of their work preserved in the museums of France, in which the essential alone is depicted with sure touch, or the frescoes with which, by the dim light of their rude lamps,[2] they covered the walls of the Pyrenean caves, will hardly believe that they were not inspired by a love of beauty for its own sake ; but it is not improbable that their motive was also magical : the animals which they portrayed may in certain cases have been totems, and the sudden extinction of palaeolithic art, which has caused so much perplexity to archaeologists, may perhaps be explained by the decay of totemism in neolithic times.[3] The palaeolithic races

[1] See E. B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, 4th ed., 1903, i, 467–9 ; ii, 229.

[2] See *Rev. arch.* ; 4e sér., xiv, 1909, p. 126.

[3] See Rice Holmes, *Ancient Britain*, &c., 1907, pp. 47–8, and J. Déchelette, *Manuel d'archéologie*, i, 1908, pp. 268–71. There is an authoritative and interesting article in *Rev. arch.*, 4e sér., xiii, 1909 (see especially pp. 407, 409–11), on the successive phases of palaeolithic art.

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were all dolichocephalic : their heads, that is to say, were long in proportion to their breadth ; and the same characteristic is found in the skulls of the slender stunted people of l'Homme Mort and Baumes-Chaudes, who, though they were descended from the older inhabitants, belonged to the Neolithic Age. These peoples, who are called after the caverns in which the first specimens were found, appear to have been diffused over the length and breadth of Gaul. But as the new epoch advanced, new races began to appear ; and the invaders who came from the east, and gradually mingled with the aborigines, were a short but sturdy folk, characterized by brachycephaly, or great breadth of skull. The palaeolithic hunters had been forced to wander in search of game : their successors, who learned to domesticate cattle and ultimately to till the soil, settled in the tracts which they had found. Among the neolithic tribes were some whose chiefs erected dolmens, or vast structures of stone, to cover the sepulchres of their dead. Some are of enormous size, and could only have been erected by the toil of multitudes, controlled and organized by chiefs whose motive was to honour and propitiate the spirits that they believed to survive. At Pérotte, in the department of the Charente, a stone was set up which weighed forty tons and had been quarried twenty miles away : the tumulus of Mont St. Michel in the Morbihan is a veritable hill, and contains more than forty thousand cubic yards of stone. The dolmens are not all of one pattern : some of them contained implements of bronze as well as of flint ; and the skeletons which have been found in them belong to more than one race. The era in which they were constructed was marked by considerable commercial activity ; for some of them have yielded ornaments of a mineral resembling turquoise, which must have been imported ; amber beads had already been conveyed from the Baltic by way of the Elbe, the Moldau, and the Danube ; and flint from the factory of the Grand-Pressigny in the Indre-et-Loire was diffused as far as Switzerland. The huge stone monuments which Caesar doubtless saw when his legions entered Brittany, were only one of many groups which extended along the coast from the Pyrenees to the Channel, and were scattered over Central

Gaul ; but not a single dolmen has been found on Gallic soil east of the great barrier formed by the Jura and the Vosges. Their source is still uncertain ; but their distribution in Gaul, in Africa, and in the islands of the Mediterranean, combined with resemblances which can only be explained by community of origin, suggests that the types were derived from the Aegean region and reached Gaul by coastal navigation, which even then linked west to east. In Gaul, as in Britain, the investigator is perplexed by relics of superstition which appear also in far distant lands, but which cannot be explained by any theory of common origin. Red hands were painted in Pyrenean, as they are in Australian, caves ; skeletons are disinterred in Europe and in America with the knees drawn up towards the chin ; cup-markings appear on megalithic monuments in every quarter of the globe.

Slowly, insensibly, civilization moved onward. There is evidence to show that the Neolithic Age set in nearly ten millenniums before our era ; the Bronze Age, which succeeded it, began before 2000 B. C. ;[1] and it was not until more than a thousand years had passed that the culture which derives its name from the Tyrolese settlement of Hallstatt, and in which bronze, as material for tools and weapons, gradually gave place to iron, spread westward across the Rhine.[2]

With the commencement of the Bronze Age, although history is still unborn, our knowledge becomes more precise, and absolute, not merely relative chronology may be attained. The Bronze Age and the Hallstatt period are each marked by well-defined stages, dated by the correspondence and in later cases by the association of the objects that represent them with works of Mediterranean craftsmen, the dates of which are approximately known. The knowledge of metals penetrated into Gaul by two routes, of which the starting-point was in the Aegean. South-Eastern Gaul was served by the route that led through Central Europe ;

[1] The early Bronze Age in Southern Gaul was, as might have been expected, contemporary with the late Neolithic in the north. This accounts for the discovery of bronze in southern dolmens and its absence in those of Brittany.

[2] Relics of the earlier part of the Hallstatt period have been found in France only in the north-eastern and central districts. Probably, therefore, the Bronze Age lasted in the rest of the country till about 700 B. C.

Western Gaul borrowed from Spain. It must not, indeed, be supposed that the Gallic tribes were merely imitative. The types which were introduced from the more favoured East developed along national lines. But side by side with the products of their own manufacture they continued to use many that came from abroad. Although the memory of inter-tribal war is preserved by the earthworks and stone forts which, even in the Neolithic Age, had been erected upon the hills, commerce, internal and external, advanced with rapid strides. Forests were gradually cleared; and trackways were laid out from village to village. Caravans began to cross the Alps from the valley of the Po. Gold crescent-shaped ornaments, intended to be worn round the neck, and fancifully decorated with geometrical figures, were brought from Ireland: comparison of the types of pottery, of knives and axes, razors and swords, of bracelets, pins, and brooches, shows that many were derived from Italy and Germany; and before the end of the Hallstatt period trade was established with the Greeks, while wine was imported and distributed by the merchants of Massilia.

But, whatever the cause may have been, the sterility of art was remarkable in the land which had produced the schools of the Dordogne and the Pyrenees. The art of the Bronze Age, if art it can be called, represented, with insignificant exceptions, neither movement nor life: the decoration was merely geometrical. Even sepulchral architecture decayed. The chambered tombs of the Neolithic Age, which in Greece gave birth to the noblest forms, were succeeded in Gaul and throughout the west by structureless mounds. Such art as existed was inspired principally by religion. Stone idols, quaintly sculptured in the form of female breast and face, whose worship is traceable through Spain to the Aegean, have been observed in the departments of the Gard, the Aveyron, the Hérault, and the Tarn.[1] In Gaul, as in other lands, though religion was doubtless intertwined with sorcery, the forces of nature were adored; and the worship of the sun, which naturally arose with agriculture, was symbolized in decorative forms. Sepulchral customs also

[1] These idols probably belonged to the Copper Age.

bear vague testimony to religious beliefs ; and it may be that cremation, which prevailed throughout the greater part of the Bronze Age, was partly due to a fancy that the burning of the body would hasten the liberation of the soul.

The Ligurians and Iberians.

The earliest inhabitants of Gaul about whom history has anything to tell were the Ligurians. According to the ancient geographers, the land which originally belonged to them in Gaul was the mountainous tract between the Rhône, the Durance, and the Cottian and Maritime Alps : but by the fifth century before Christ they were mingled with Iberians on the west of the Rhône ; and from the evidence of certain geographical names as well as of archaeology, it would seem that they once possessed the whole of Eastern Gaul as far north as the Marne. The culture of this region in the Bronze Age differed from that of the west, but closely resembled that of Northern Italy, where we know that Ligurians lived. The vast number of sickles which have been discovered in the south-east show that the Ligurians were industrious tillers of the soil ; and they may have been descended, at least in part, from Swiss lake-dwellers of the Stone Age, who probably introduced cereals and domestic animals into Gaul. The origin of the Iberians remains uncertain : but when they came under the notice of the Greeks they occupied the eastern part of Spain as well as the country between the Pyrenees and the Rhône ; and it should seem that they had crossed the Pyrenees and made conquests in Aquitania as well as on the Mediterranean coast. The ' Iberian question ' is one of the problems which amuse and baffle ethnologists ; for there can be little doubt that in the land which belonged to the Iberians of history, in Spain as well as in Southern Gaul, there once existed, besides Celtic, at least two forms of speech,—Basque and the uncouth, undeciphered language or languages in which were engraven the so-called Iberian inscriptions. But if the Iberians were not one race, the bulk of them were small and dark, and not unlike the neolithic people of l'Homme Mort. In Caesar's time Liguria, as well as the land of the Iberians, was also peopled by the descendants of Celtic invaders. It was perhaps in the seventh century before the Christian era

The Celts.

that the tall fair Celts began to cross the Rhine :[1] but it is unlikely that even they were homogeneous ; and those to whom belonged the characteristics which the ancient writers associated with the Gallic or Celtic type may have been accompanied by the descendants of aliens who had joined them during their long sojourn in Germany. Successive swarms spread over the land, partly subduing and mingling with the descendants of the palaeolithic peoples and of their neolithic conquerors, partly perhaps driving them into the mountainous tracts. Physically, they resembled the tall fair Germans whom Caesar and Tacitus describe ; but they differed from them in character and customs as well as in speech.[2] The Belgic Celts were the latest comers ; and among the Belgae of Caesar's time the aboriginal elements were comparatively small. If Caesar was rightly informed, the languages of the Belgae and the Celtae were distinct. Both, it is needless to say, were Celtic, and the difference may not have been great ; for if a Goidelic dialect was spoken anywhere in Gaul, the vestiges of Gallic that remain belong, for the most part, to the Brythonic branch of the Celtic tongue.[3] In Aquitania the natives remained comparatively pure, and formed a separate group, which, in Caesar's time, stood politically apart from the Celtae as well as from the Belgae. They are generally spoken of as an Iberian people ; but the name is misleading. The conquering Celts, as the evidence of nomenclature shows, had advanced, though probably in small numbers, beyond the Garonne ; and evidence supplied by recent measurements of living inhabitants appears to show that in certain parts of Aquitania the round-headed element was considerable. But it is certain that the Celtic language was not generally spoken in Aquitania ; and the Iberian type was sufficiently conspicuous to give some colour to the popular theory.

Thus when Caesar entered Gaul, the groups whom he called Belgae, Celtae, and Aquitani were each a medley of different races. The Belgae were the purest and the least civilized

[1] See p. 274 and Rice Holmes, *Anc. Britain*, pp. 432–3.
[2] See my essay on 'The Ethnology of Gaul,' pp. 325–37.
[3] See pp. 281–2. 319–21.

of the three ; and both in Belgic and in Celtican Gaul the Celtic conquerors had imposed their language upon the conquered peoples. Even in a political sense, the Belgae and the Celtae were not separated by a hard and fast line ; for the Celtican tribe of the Carnutes was among the clients of the Belgic Remi, while on the other hand the Celtican Aedui claimed supremacy over the Belgic Bellovaci. But if not scientifically complete, the grouping adopted by Caesar was sufficient for the purpose of his narrative. Just as a modern conqueror, without troubling himself about recondite questions of ethnology, might say that the people of Great Britain were composed of Englishmen, Scotsmen, and Welsh, so Caesar, knowing and caring nothing about ethnical subdivisions, divided the people of Gaul into Belgae, Celtae, and Aquitani.

But who would be content with the mere knowledge of the physical characteristics of the races of which a people was composed, or even of their arts and crafts, their implements and weapons, their dwellings and their tombs ? Measurements of skulls, tables of stature, inventories of archaeological discoveries,—these things have their uses ; but they leave our curiosity unsatisfied. Even the arrows and the harpoons that have been found in the caves of Perigord and the Dordogne, the pottery, the tools, and the ornaments that have been taken from the dolmens to enrich the museums of France—all the unwritten documents which patient thought has classified—have only enabled the most diligent of antiquaries to piece together an outline of the culture of prehistoric men. I have attempted to describe its course in our own island : here I desire only to show that Gallic history had its roots in the remote past ; and the primitive life of Gaul, in its main features, though more advanced, was not very different from that of Britain. Human interest, indeed, there is for the student whose learning is quickened by imagination : but the personal element is lacking ; and when the races have amalgamated into the three groups of Belgae, Celtae, and Aquitani, and the epoch of Roman conquest is approaching, we desire to know more. What manner of men were the inhabitants of

Gaul ? If this question can be answered, the answer can only come from a mind subtle and powerful no less than well-informed. Every man has his own character. Yet, with all the idiosyncrasies which distinguish them one from another, Yorkshiremen have a common type of character which differentiates them from the men of Kent : Englishmen have a common type which differentiates them from Scotsmen ; and finally Englishmen and Scotsmen have something in common, which, in the eyes of foreign observers, differentiates the people of Great Britain, morally and intellectually, from the other nations of the earth. For in our own, as in other lands, long association, intermarriage, the prolonged influence of common conditions of life, have given to originally distinct groups, without destroying the individuality of any, a common recognizable, if indefinable, mental, and even physical, type. To some, though for obvious reasons a less degree, the same causes must have operated in Gaul. Setting aside the Aquitani, of whom Caesar had little to tell, and perhaps also the Belgae, the medley of peoples whom he called ' Galli ' had probably so far coalesced that they had acquired certain common traits of character. Perhaps when he described the features of the Gallic temperament which had most impressed him in the course of the war, he took little note of the lowest class, the cultivators and the shepherds, who had not much to do with political life ; but we can hardly suppose that his remarks applied only to the ruling class or to the purer Celts.[1] To attempt the portrayal of national character is often as misleading as it is tempting ; but guided by Caesar's observations, we cannot go far astray even if we do not go very far. The Gauls were an interesting people, enthusiastic, impulsive, quick-witted, versatile, vainglorious and ostentatious, childishly inquisitive and childishly credulous, rash, sanguine, and inconstant, arrogant in victory and despondent in defeat, submissive as women to their priests, impatient of law and discipline, yet capable of loyalty to a strong and sympathetic ruler.

The notices which Caesar and other writers have left of

[1] See especially *B. G.*, ii. 1. § 3 ; iii. 19. § 6 ; iv. 5. §§ 2–3. 13, § 3 ; vii. 20–1 ; and compare Strabo, *Geogr.*, iv, 4, §§ 2–6.

Civilization of the Gauls.

their civilization have been supplemented by the more informing evidence of archaeology. Five centuries before the birth of Christ the culture of Hallstatt had given place to that which takes its name from the village of La Tène, at the northern end of the lake of Neuchâtel, where, some sixty years ago, was discovered a precious series of antiquities. The art, essentially Celtic, characterized by the tasteful use of curves, which was practised in the design and decoration of these objects, was in part an outgrowth of that of Hallstatt, but also owed much to classical and even to oriental influences. Imported into Britain by the Brythonic invaders, it there shook itself free from all trammels, and attained an even higher level than in Gaul, culminating in the graceful and exquisitely decorated shield of bronze and red enamel which adorns the Central Saloon of our National Museum. Specialists have determined three periods, known as La Tène I, II, and III, of which the last began about forty years before the proconsulship of Caesar.[1] By that time the Gallic peoples had all risen far above the condition of barbarians ; and the Celticans of the interior, many of whom had already fallen under Roman influence, had attained a certain degree of civilization and even of luxury. Their trousers, from which the Province took its name of Gallia Braccata, and their many-coloured tartan shirts and cloaks excited the astonishment of their conquerors. The chiefs wore rings and bracelets and necklaces of gold; and when those tall fair-haired warriors rode forth to battle with their helmets wrought in the shape of some fierce beast's head and surmounted by nodding plumes, their chain armour, their long bucklers, and their clanking swords, they made a splendid show.[2] About fifty years before Caesar's time, war-chariots, which had excited the astonishment of

[1] Pending the publication of the final volume of M Déchelette's *Manuel d'archéologie*, readers who do not care to consult the articles in the *Revue archéologique* and other learned periodicals will find a good account of the culture of La Tène in the *Guide to the Antiquities of the Early Iron Age* (British Museum), with which compare G. Dottin's *Manuel de l'antiquité celtique*, 1906. pp. 119–65.

[2] Diodorus Siculus, v, 28. § 3 ; 30 ; Livy, vii, 10, §§ 7, 11 ; Virgil, *Aen.*, viii. 660, 662 ; Strabo, iv, 4, §§ 3, 5 ; Tacitus, *Hist.*, ii, 20 ; *Journal des Savants*, 1880, pp. 76–8 ; *Bull. monumental*, 6e sér., ii, 1886, pp. 175–96.

the Romans in the battle of Telamon,[1] and which were still used in Britain, had fallen into disuse, probably because the wealthy natives had begun to import horses powerful enough for a charge of cavalry ;[2] but from the older graves of the Marne, which have yielded numerous remains of these cars, bronze horse-trappings of most delicate open-work and bronze flagons which had been fetched from Greece, have been unearthed.[3] The arts of building and of fortification had made a considerable advance. Walled towns or large villages, the strongholds of the various tribes, were conspicuous on numerous hills.[4] The plains were dotted by scores of open hamlets. The houses, built of timber and wattle-work, were large and well-thatched.[5] Tweezers and ornamented mirrors of bronze lay on the tables of Gallic dames. Painted pottery, decorated with spirals or symmetrical curves, was used everywhere, except, apparently, in the remote Aremorican peninsula.[6] The fields in summer were yellow with corn. The vine was not yet cultivated : but the merchants of Massilia imported wine from Italy ; and wealthy Gauls would eagerly barter a slave for a jar.[7] Roads, suitable for wheeled traffic, ran from town to town. Rude bridges spanned the rivers ; and barges, laden with merchandise, floated along them. Ships, clumsy indeed but larger than any that were seen on the Mediterranean, braved the storms of the Bay of Biscay and carried cargoes between the ports of Brittany and the coast of Britain. Tolls were exacted on the goods which were transported on the great water-ways ; and it was from the farming of these dues that the nobles derived a large part of their wealth.[8] The Aeduans were familiar with the art of enamelling.[9] The miners of Aquitaine, of Auvergne, and of the Berri were celebrated for their skill.[10]

[1] Polybius, ii, 28, §§ 5–6. [2] Rice Holmes, *Anc. Britain*, pp. 342–3.

[3] *Guide to the Ant. of the Early Iron Age* (Brit. Museum), pp. 50–1 ; *Association franç. pour l'avancement des sc.*, 36ᵉ sessⁿ, 1907, pp. 281, 875–9.

[4] See *Congrès archéol. de France*, lxixᵉ sessⁿ, 1902 (1903), p. 181.

[5] Strabo, iv, 4, § 3 ; A. Grenier, *Habitations gaul.*, &c., 1906, pp. 23–48.

[6] *Guide to the Ant. of the Early Iron Age* (Brit. Museum), pp. 67–8, 75.

[7] Diodorus Siculus, v, 26, §§ 3–4. [8] *B. G.*, i, 18, §§ 3–4.

[9] J. G. Bulliot and H. de Fontenay, *L'art de l'émaillerie chez les Éduens*, 1875. Cf. p. 20, *infra*. [10] *B. G.*, iii, 21, § 3 ; vii, 22, § 2.

Every tribe had its coinage ; and the knowledge of writing, in Greek and in Roman characters, was not confined to the priests. Diodorus[1] remarks that the Gauls threw letters, addressed to the dead, on to the funeral pile ; and Caesar, after he had defeated the Helvetii, found in their encampment a schedule, on which were recorded in Greek characters the names of individuals, the number of emigrants capable of bearing arms, and the numbers of old men, women, and children. It would seem, indeed, that some knowledge of Latin had penetrated even to the rudest tribe of the Belgae.[2] When Caesar was marching to relieve Quintus Cicero, who was besieged by the Nervii, he wrote to him in Greek characters, for fear the letter might be intercepted and read.[3] At an earlier time there were natives, at least in the Province, who acquired a smattering of Greek. Rich enthusiasts resorted to Massilia as a school of learning, and became so enamoured of Greek culture that they wrote their contracts in the language of their teachers.[4] Indeed in all that belonged to outward prosperity the peoples of Gaul had made great strides since their kinsmen first came in contact with Rome, and the enormous fortunes which Caesar and his staff amassed are evidence of their wealth.

Coins.

The coins which have just been mentioned require special notice ; for none of the antiquities of the Later Iron Age have thrown more light upon the culture of the Gauls. The oldest were copied in the earlier half of the third century before Christ from gold staters of Philip of Macedon, which had been introduced through Massilia. For some time they bore no inscription, except the name of Philip, more or less deformed ; but about the middle of the following century—more than a hundred years before the same change was made in our island—they began to be stamped with the names of the rulers by whom they were issued, among whom are to be recognized some who have been commemorated by Caesar,—notably the great Vercingetorix, whose coins are worth about

[1] v, 28, § 6.

[2] On the other hand, it must be remembered that Caesar conversed with Diviciacus through an interpreter (*B. G.*, i, 19, § 3).

[3] See pp. 730–1.

[4] Strabo, iv, 1, § 5.

fifty times their weight in gold. Greek characters are sometimes quaintly jumbled with Latin, which gradually became familiar after the Romans had established their footing in the land. Many Roman coins, indeed, must have been circulated in Gaul after the colonization of Narbo ; and Roman influence is apparent on many Gallic coins, for example in a figure of Pegasus, which appears on one that bears the name of Tasgetius, king of the Carnutes. For many years gold coins, which gradually deteriorated in weight, and, through successive copying, in form as well,[1] were the only medium of exchange ; but, as commercial needs increased, silver and bronze passed gradually into use,[2] the coins of the latter metal being imitated from those of Massilia, and, in the case of certain Belgic specimens, even from those of Campania. The coins, indeed, illustrate not only the commerce of the Gauls, but also their inter-tribal relations, their manners and customs, and perhaps occasionally their religion. Thus, while the extreme rarity of Arvernian coins in the great mart of Bibracte may perhaps be explained by the traditional enmity between the Arverni and the Aedui, the discoveries of British coins in Gaul and of Gallic coins in Britain attest the maritime trade which Caesar notices ;[3] coins of Central Europe found as far west as Saintonge and Gallic coins found in the Bohemian stronghold of Stradonić prove that the Gauls had intercourse with the valley of the Danube ; Massilian coins found in various parts of Gaul bear witness to the enterprise of the Greek colony ; and numerous hoards of silver coins of one type, apparently copied from those of Rhoda, all of which have been found in the basin of the Garonne, confirm the impression which we derive from the *Commentaries* that the relations of Aquitania were mainly with Spain. Again, when we notice that horses and swine are figured on Gallic coins more

[1] 'M. R. Forrer,' says M. Blanchet (*Traité des monn. gaul.*, 1905, p. 186, n. 2), 'a eu l'ingénieuse idée de faire exécuter par des enfants des copies successives de tétradrachmes de Thasos. Les résultats obtenus sont très analogues, pour la barbarie, aux types des imitations frappées par les peuples du Danube,' &c.

[2] Silver and bronze coins were hardly used before the time of Caesar. See V. Tourneur, *La monnaie de bronze des Tongrois*, 1909, p. 10, and cf. *Rev. celt.*, xxxi, 1910, p. 57.

[3] Cf. Rice Holmes, *Anc. Britain*, p. 250.

frequently than any other animals, we are reminded of the passage [1] in which Caesar observes that the Gauls imported well-bred horses at great cost, and of the passage in which Strabo [2] speaks of the hams which the Sequani exported to Italy. Shields and trumpets remind us of Diodorus's [3] description of Gallic arms ; and the lyre, which is figured on certain coins, may represent the instrument with which the bards accompanied their songs.[4] It is remarkable that all the coins which have been found in the great strongholds are of late date—not earlier than about a hundred years before the Christian era—which tends to show that none had been founded more than half a century before Caesar entered Gaul. Probably Avaricum, Bibracte, Lutecia, and the other towns which he mentions were fortified during the invasion of the Cimbri and Teutoni, which devastated Gaul between 113 and 109 B.C.[5]

Bibracte.

Of all these towns the one which is best known to us was Bibracte, described by Caesar as ' by far the wealthiest and most important town of the Aedui ', which stood upon Mont Beuvray, a few miles west of Autun. If Cicero had visited it he might perhaps have spoken with less disdain of the urban life of the Gauls.[6] Streets, workshops, ramparts have been revealed by excavation. Fifteen hundred coins, nine-tenths of which belonged to the period of independence, testify to the manifold commercial relations of the inhabitants. The houses show that the round conical wooden huts which Strabo described were only the more primitive productions of Gaulish domestic architecture. Like them, indeed, the houses at Bibracte were partly subterranean, this form having been adopted as a precaution against cold on such a high altitude, and probably, like the modern cottages of the Morvan, they were thatched with straw ; but their shape was rectangular, they were built of stone

[1] *B. G.*, iv, 2, § 2.
[2] iv, 3, § 2 ; 4, § 3.
[3] v, 30, §§ 2–4.
[4] *Ib.*, 31, § 2.
[5] See A. Blanchet's excellent work, *Traité des monnaies gauloises*, 1905, especially pp. 30, 34–5, 46, 51, 68–9, 75–6, 94, 161–3, 165, 167, 178, 187, 193, 195–6, 224, n. 4, 476–7, 484, n. 1, 498, n., 3, 515, 517–20 ; and *Rev. numism.*, 4e sér., xi, 1907, p. 475.
[6] See Cicero's speech, *De prov. cons.*, 12, § 29.

compacted with clay, and they were entered by an interior staircase. The crucibles, moulds, and polishing-stones of enamel-workers, broken tools, brooches, and pottery, all belong, like the coins, to the latest period of the Celtic Iron Age. Besides these relics of native workmanship were painted vases, imported from Italy, which Gallic artificers soon learned to imitate.[1]

Stradonić. Even more remarkable than the revelation of the buried industry of Bibracte is the discovery of the fortified town of Stradonić, about twenty miles south-east of Prague, which is a duplicate of the Aeduan capital five hundred miles away. Pottery, enamel, implements, ornaments are the same ; and the coins are closely analogous. The explanation of this coincidence is still obscure ; but, since certain links between the twin strongholds have been found in the valley of the Rhine and in Switzerland, it seems not improbable that the same industrial types were conveyed by commerce towards the east and towards the west.[2]

But the growth of material prosperity had not been matched by true national progress. The Aquitani, indeed, the maritime tribes, and the Belgae were untouched by foreign influences ; but the Celticans of the interior had been enfeebled by contact with Roman civilization. Much nonsense has been written about the enervating effect of luxury. Its effect, however, when it is suddenly introduced among a half-civilized people, is quite different from its effect when it is a natural growth. The Gauls had lost the strength of barbarism, and had not gained the strength of civilization. They had once, as Caesar remarked, been more than a match for the Germans ; but enervated by imported luxury, and cowed by a succession of defeats, they no longer pretended to be able to cope with them.

Political and social organization. Their constitution was based upon the tribe, if that word may be applied to the political unit which Caesar called a *civitas*. The tribe was generally an aggregate, more or less compact, of communities to which he gave the name of *pagi*,

[1] J. G. Bulliot, *Fouilles du Mont Beuvray*, 1899, i. 123–6, 129–46 ; ii. 3–44 ; *L'Anthr.*, xiii, 1902, pp. 74–83. Cf. *Rev. arch.*, 4ᵉ sér., xv, 1910, p. 164.

[2] *Congrès archéol. de France*, lxvi[e] sess[n], 1899 (1901), pp. 119–82.

the members of which had originally been related by blood or by near neighbourhood ; but it would seem that some of the smaller tribes consisted each of one *pagus* only. Each *pagus*, under its own magistrate, appears to have enjoyed a certain measure of independence, and to have contributed its separate contingent to the tribal host.[1] Each tribe had its council of elders, and had once had its king : but in certain tribes the king was now superseded by an annually elected magistrate ; while in others perhaps the council kept the government to itself. A rule which prevailed among the Aedui illustrates the jealousy which was felt of monarchical power. In that state the chief magistrate, who was known as the Vergobret, was forbidden to stir beyond the frontiers of the country, from which it may be inferred that it was not lawful for him to command the host. The executive was generally weak. Some of the smaller communities of which a tribe was composed occasionally acted on their own account, in opposition to the rest or to the policy of the tribal authorities.[2] Like the Anglo-Saxon thanes and the Norman barons, the nobles surrounded themselves with retainers,—loyal followers or enslaved debtors ;[3] and none but those who became their dependants could be sure of protection. On the other hand, none but those who were strong enough to protect could be sure of obedience. The oligarchies were no more secure than the monarchs whom they had supplanted. These men or their descendants sullenly plotted for the restoration of their dynasties, and, reckless of the common weal, they were in the mood to grasp the hand even of a foreign conqueror, and to reign as his nominees. Here and there some wealthy noble, like Pisistratus in Athens, armed his retainers, hired a band of mercenaries, won the support

[1] Sir Henry Maine (*Early Hist. of Institutions*, 1875, p. 30) speaks of 'Caesar's failure to note the natural divisions of the Celtic tribesmen, the families and septs or sub-tribes'. See, however, F. de Coulanges, *Hist. des inst. pol. de l'ancienne France,—la Gaule rom.*, 1891, pp. 8–9, and pp. 507–8, *infra*. As M. Jullian has shown in a most interesting and suggestive article (*Revue des études anciennes*, iii, 1901, pp. 77–97), the *pagi* were themselves 'natural divisions'.

[2] *B. G.*, iv, 22, §§ 1, 5.

[3] *B. G.*, i, 18, §§ 4–5 ; ii, 1, § 4 ; vi, 11, § 4 ; 13, §§ 1–2 ; 15 ; vii, 40, § 7. Cf. F. de Coulanges, *Hist. des inst. pol. de l'ancienne France,—la Gaule rom.*, pp. 37–8.

of the populace by eloquence and largess, and, overthrowing the feeble oligarchy, usurped supreme power. Thus the oligarchies lived in perpetual unrest : if no one noble was conspicuously strong, there was intestine strife ; if one could make himself supreme, the government was overthrown.[1] The populace were perhaps beginning to have some glimmering of their own latent strength ; but there is no evidence that anywhere they had any definite political rights. The Druids and the nobles or, as Caesar called them, the knights, enjoyed a monopoly of power and consideration : the bulk of the poorer freemen, ground down by taxation and strangled with debt, had no choice but to become serfs.

And if in individual tribes there was anarchy, want of unity was the bane of them all. It was not only that Belgian and Aquitanian and Celtican were naturally distinct. This distinction might have been as readily overcome as that between English and Scotch and Welsh. But the evil was more deeply seated. It is of course true that disunion is the normal condition of half-civilized peoples. The Old English tribes showed no genius for combination : it was the strong hand of an Egbert, an Edgar, an Athelstan, that laid the foundations of the English kingdom. Nor was the kingdom united, except in the loosest sense, even on the eve of the Norman Conquest. If Harold was formally king over all England, his subjects felt themselves Yorkshiremen or men of Kent rather than Englishmen. Moreover, the circumstances of the Gauls were peculiarly unfortunate. Their patriotism, if it was latent, was real : they were proud of what their fathers had achieved in war ; and the sense of nationality was stirring in their hearts. Caesar himself allows that some of the tribes were comparatively well governed ;[2] and even clientship, which after all menaced our own government until Henry the Seventh stamped it out, had its noble side. Who does not respect the ' six hundred devoted followers ' of Adiatunnus,[3] the four squires whom neither fear nor favour could induce to betray Ambiorix,[4]

[1] C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, ii, 82.
[2] *B. G.*, vi, 20. [3] *Ib.*, iii, 22. [4] *Ib.*, vi, 43, § 6.

and those attendants of Litaviccus who remembered that 'Gallic custom brands it as shameful for retainers to desert their lords even when all is lost'?[1] Assuredly the Gauls had not, as Mommsen in his youth affirmed, 'reached their maximum of allotted culture.'[2] If they had been unmolested or had been exposed to attack only from a single enemy, it seems probable that, in the fullness of time, a Vercingetorix would have welded them into a united nation. But menaced as they were by the Germans on the one hand and by the Romans on the other, their tendency to disunion was increased. This much we may safely conclude,—that the Gauls were not well fitted for developing from their own resources a coherent polity. If the Englishman was provincial and unpatriotic, the Gaul was factious and impracticable. Much glib generalization has been hazarded regarding the hypothetical defects of the Celtic character; but only a very rash or a very discerning historian would undertake to say how far the evil was due to circumstances, how far to an inherited strain. Organism and environment are for ever acting and reacting upon one another. While, however, it is foolish to pass sweeping judgements upon a people, of whom, except during the few years that preceded the loss of their independence, we have only the scantiest knowledge, it would be a great mistake to leap to the conclusion that, in political capacity, one race is as good as another. No one would deny that the Greeks were endowed with a genius for art and literature which their environment doubtless helped to develop; and it may be that the Celts were but poorly endowed with political talent, and that circumstances had helped to stunt its growth. The important fact is, explain it as we may, that

[1] *B. G.*, vii, 40, § 7.

[2] *Hist. of Rome*, v, 1894, p. 28 (*Röm. Gesch.*, iii, 1889, p. 241). 'If,' says Sir Henry Maine (*Early Hist. of Institutions*, 1875, pp. 54–5), 'the country [Ireland] had been left to itself, one of the great Irish tribes would almost certainly have conquered the rest. All the legal ideas which . . . come to us from the existence of a strong central government lending its vigour to the arm of justice would have made their way into the Brehon law; and the gap between the alleged civilization of England and the alleged barbarism of Ireland during much of their history, which was in reality narrower than is commonly supposed, would have almost wholly disappeared.'

the tribal rulers of Gaul had not achieved even that initial step towards unity which the kings of Wessex, Mercia, and Northumberland achieved when they swallowed up the petty kingdoms of the heptarchic period. Or perhaps it would be more true to say that, when the Romans first established themselves on the west of the Alps, the Arvernian king had achieved that step; but that first his defeat on the banks of the Rhône, and afterwards the revolution which subverted the royal power, had broken the supremacy of his house and dealt a fatal blow to the political development of Gaul. There, as in Latium, the downfall of the monarch inevitably weakened the power of the tribe; and the oligarchies, if they had the power, were not granted the time to work out their own salvation. It is true that able leaders arose who attempted to follow the example of Bituitus. Celtillus, the father of Vercingetorix, acquired a loose supremacy over Gaul; and Diviciacus, king of the Suessiones, who had already mastered the neighbouring Belgic tribes, actually made himself overlord of South-Eastern Britain. But from some unknown cause his successor failed to retain his power; and Celtillus fell a victim to his own self-seeking. Individual tribes, such as the Aedui and the Arverni, did indeed achieve some sort of supremacy over their weaker neighbours; and in certain cases two tribes, for example the Senones and the Parisii, formed one state. There were leagues of the Belgae, the Aquitani, and the maritime tribes. But supremacy had not hardened into sovereignty;[1] and the leagues were loose, occasional, and uncertain. If some powerful baron, stimulated by ambition or impressed by the evils of disunion, succeeded in clutching the power of a Bretwalda, he was forthwith suspected by his brother nobles of a design to revive the detested monarchy, and was lucky if he escaped the stake. The country swarmed with outlawed criminals, who had fled from justice, and exiled adventurers, who had failed to execute *coups d'état*. Nobles and their clients lived sword in hand; and hardly

[1] Certain 'client' tribes appear to have paid tribute and rendered military service. But hegemony was not firmly grasped, and client tribes transferred their allegiance from one overlord to another. See pp. 517–9.

a year passed without some petty war. Every tribe, every hamlet, nay every household was riven by faction. One was for the Romans and another for the Helvetii: one for the Aedui and another for the Arverni: one for a Diviciacus and another for a Dumnorix; one for the constitutional oligarchy and another for the lawless adventurer. All, in short, were for a party; and none was for the state.[1]

One must not lightly acquiesce in the belief that the course of history is always for the best; but often it has happened that a conquered people conserved what was most vital in its own culture, and was quickened by the new. '*Ἀπωλόμεθ' ἄν*,' said Themistocles, '*εἰ μὴ ἀπωλόμεθα*': [2] like the English, whom the Normans chastened, the Gauls needed the discipline of foreign conquest.

Unifying influences.

Yet, besides the memory of their glorious past, which, as Caesar once remarked,[3] both saddened the Gauls and spurred them to desperate enterprises, there were certain influences which tended to make every man feel that he and his fellows belonged to one nation. That favoured land was formed by Nature to tone down distinctions of race and to foster the growth of nationality. If the French are the most united of all peoples, they owe this fortune to their country, whose unifying tendency has ever been the same. France, says Vidal de la Blache,[4] who of all geographers knows best how to make his readers feel the tie between motherland and people,—France is a country whose regions are naturally connected, and whose inhabitants learned early to mingle with and to know one another. No country of equal extent comprises such diversities; but they pass off into each other by insensible gradations. 'There is', says this writer, 'a beneficent force—a *genius loci*—which has guided our national life,—an indefinable power which, without obliterating varieties, has blended them in a harmonious whole.' The wayfarer who roams from the sand-hills of the Channel

[1] See various notes in Part II, Section IV.

[2] 'We should have been undone if we had not been undone.' Plutarch, *Themistocles*, 29.

[3] *B. G.*, v, 54, § 5.

[4] E. Lavisse, *Hist. de la France*, t. i, 1 (by P. Vidal de la Blache), pp. 49, 51–2 *Bull. de géogr. hist. et descr.*, 1902, pp. 119, 124.

to the mountains of Auvergne, from the uplands of the Morvan to the plain of the Berri, conversing with peasant and townsman in turn, who is touched by the spirit of prehistoric life wafted from the rude stone monuments of Brittany and by the spirit of imperial Rome which broods over the mediaeval glories of Bourges and over that ancient town which is being revealed by the excavator on Mont Auxois—who feels how one influenced the other and both survive in our Mechanical Age—will comprehend what the geographer means ; and for him the tale which Caesar told will become real.

Religion. And in Gaul, as in England before the Norman Conquest, there was another influence which tended to make every man feel that he and his fellows belonged to one nation,—community of religious ideas, controlled by one ecclesiastical organization.[1] Local cults of course abounded : but the great gods whom Caesar noticed, however variously they may have been conceived by various tribes, were common to Gaul ; while every rite and every sacrifice was recognized and regulated by Druidism.

The religion of the Gauls, like every other, was rooted in animism,—that habit of mind, common to savages and children, which peoples the universe with spirits, which ascribes to sun, moon, and stars, to earth and sea, to fire and water and everything that moves—even to many things that are inert—the life and will which they feel within themselves. It was not merely the religion, influenced perhaps by contact with the Greeks of Massilia, of the Celtic conquerors of Gaul : much of it was Ligurian, Iberian, even aboriginal. Solar symbols, as we have seen, pervaded the decoration of the Bronze Age ; and to this day omelettes are offered to the sun on the bridge in the village of Andrieux in Dauphiny, when, on the 10th of February, he reappears, after four months of gloom, above the mountains that imprison the valley.[2] The spirits of springs, of lakes, of rivers, of moun-

[1] In regard to the religion of the Gauls in general see Rice Holmes, *Anc. Britain*, pp. 271–86 ; C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, ii, 113–81 ; *Trans. . . . Third Internat. Congress . . . Hist. of Religions*, ii, 1908, pp. 218–20, 222 ; and S. Reinach, *Orpheus*, 1909, pp. 162–83.

[2] *L'Anthr.*, xix, 1908, p. 701.

tains, and of woods were worshipped in the Iron Age as they had been for millenniums before, and as they continued to be after what was called Christianity had become the official creed. The Marne and the Dives were called after the goddesses Matrona and Deva; Épone in the department of the Seine-et-Oise marks the cult of Epona; *Bourbon* and *La Bourboule* are derived from one of the spirits which suggested Caesar's description of the Celtic Apollo,—Borvo, or 'the boiling one', the god of hot springs. The eponymous deities of towns were worshipped long before the first foundations were laid: the goddess Bibracte was the spirit of a well reverenced by the peasants of the mountain upon which the Aeduan capital was built.[1] And perhaps we may suppose that the heads of his slain enemies, which the Celtic warrior fastened upon the walls of his cottage, were dedicated to his household gods or to the spirits of his ancestors.

Celtic religion, in so far as it was descended from the religion of the undivided Aryan stock, was fundamentally one with the religions of Italy and Greece; but our imperfect knowledge of the classical religions hardly helps us more to understand the inwardness of Celtic religion than the remark of Caesar, that about their deities 'their notions are much the same as those of other peoples'.[2] What is certain is that, like every other polytheistic religion, that of the Celts, except perhaps where it was moulded by Druidical doctrine, had no definite theology, but was an ever-expanding, ever-shifting, formless chaos, alike in its main developments in Britain, Gaul, and Spain, yet differing in every tribe and household, and in every age;[3] that, on its practical side, it was a performance of traditional rites; and that it concerned the individual most as a member of a family, a community, or a tribe. Like all other polytheists, too, the Celts were ready to believe in gods who were not theirs: in the reign of Tiberius the boatmen of Paris set up an altar on which, side by side with their own Esus and Tarvos Trigaranus, were

[1] *Rev. celt.*, i, 1870–2, pp. 306–19.

[2] *B. G.*, vi, 17, § 2.

[3] See *Rev. des études anc.*, vi, 1904, p. 329, and cf. Sir A. Lyall, *Asiatic Studies*, 1899, pp. 2–3, 6.

figured Jupiter and Vulcan. Perhaps the Celts, like the Romans,[1] gave more thought to the ritual by which their gods might be persuaded to grant them their hearts' desire than to the gods themselves. Doubtless to the Celt, as to the Roman, however little his religion may have fostered nobility of life, dread of the mysterious was a salutary discipline.[2] But what we want to apprehend is this,—wherein the spirit of Celtic religion differed from that of the religion of ancient Latium, of Greece, of the Semitic tribes ; and we may only hope to attain a distant and hazy view.

Every student of Caesar knows the passage which enumerates the national deities, whom alone he deemed worthy of mention :—'The god whom they most reverence is Mercury, whose images abound. He is regarded as the inventor of all arts and the pioneer and guide of travellers ; and he is believed to be all-powerful in promoting commerce and the acquisition of wealth. Next to him they reverence Apollo, Mars, Jupiter, and Minerva. Their notions about these deities are much the same as those of other peoples : Apollo they regard as the dispeller of disease, Minerva as the originator of industries and handicrafts, Jupiter as the suzerain of the celestials, and Mars as the lord of war.'[3] Now one of the most sagacious of Celtic scholars has related that when the musician, Félicien David, was invited by the Viceroy of Egypt to instruct his wives, etiquette compelled him to give the lessons to a eunuch, who passed them on as best he could. Caesar, he remarks, was in the position of the eunuch.[4] No Gallic writings show how the Gauls thought of their own gods. Inscriptions and altars supply names of deities which are names and nothing more, or bewilder us by coupling with the name of a Roman god the names or epithets of divers Celtic gods. Anonymous statues are attributed to various deities by various archaeologists, though some of them may not be deities at all. Inscriptions, altars, and statues alike belong to the period of the Roman Empire, when the introduction of Roman gods and goddesses

[1] W. Warde Fowler, *The Roman Festivals*, 1899, p. 333.
[2] *Ib.*, p. 347.
[3] *B. G.*, vi, 17, §§ 1-2.
[4] H. Gaidoz, *Études de mythol. gaul.*,—*Le dieu gaul. du soleil*, 1886, p. 91.

had thrown the Celtic pantheon into wellnigh inextricable confusion. And merely to ascertain the Celtic names of the five great gods would profit little unless the names were significant of their attributes. It does not greatly matter whether Teutates was Mercury, and Taranis Jupiter, and Esus Mars, or whether, as some have persuaded themselves, the famous trio, in whose honour Lucan says that dreadful rites were performed, were insignificant objects of local worship.[1] We must be content to know that there was a Celtic Mars, a Jupiter, and a Mercury ; for we cannot learn much that is worth knowing besides what Caesar has told. Originally, we may be sure, the great gods were simply the elemental forces of Nature, as in his time they were still among the Germans ; but gradually they had come to be personified.

Why was the god whom Caesar equated with Mercury honoured above all others by the Gauls ? Some centuries earlier, when the Celts were ' the most warlike of all peoples ',[2] the war-god had been the most conspicuous figure in their Olympus ; and his subsequent degradation is regarded, perhaps justly, as an indication of the progress which they had made meantime in the arts of peace.[3] One religious custom, however, of which Caesar witnessed examples, proves that Mars, however inferior he may have been to Mercury, had still many fervent worshippers in Gaul. When tribesmen had made a successful raid, they used to sacrifice to Mars the cattle which they had captured ; the rest of their booty they erected in piles on consecrated ground. It rarely happened that any one dared to keep back part of the spoil ; and the wretch who defrauded the god was punished, like Achan, by a terrible death.[4]

Borvo, the healing god, was certainly an equivalent of Apollo ;[5] but in inscriptions Apollo's name is found also with other epithets,—Maponus, ' the ever youthful,' Grannus,

[1] *Rev. celt.*, xviii, 1897, pp. 140–1 ; *Rev. arch.*, 4e sér., xi, 1908, p. 152. Cf. *Rev. des études anc.*, v, 1903, pp. 217–9, and C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, ii. 118, n. 2.

[2] *B. G.*, 54, § 5.

[3] Mercury was also reverenced more than any other god by the Germans of whom Tacitus wrote (*Germ.* 19).

[4] *B. G.*, vi, 17, §§ 3–5.

[5] See *L'Anthr.*, xx, 1909, p. 196.

'the brilliant,' and Belenus, 'the shining one,' in other words, the sun. Again, among the gods who in imperial times were assimilated to Jupiter, besides Taranis or Tanarus, 'the Thunderer,' was one whose statues depict him as a man bearing upon his shoulder or grasping a wheel; and, since the wheel was a solar symbol, it would seem that Jupiter and Apollo were alike assimilated to the sun.

One must not, indeed, imagine that the great gods had always been distinct, or even that in Caesar's time their physiognomies, except perhaps in Druidical theology, were sharply outlined. In polytheism attributes of deity tend to become separate deities, and some of the Celtic epithets which are attached to Minerva, Mars, and the rest may mean that they were assimilated by this or that tribe to topical divinities.[1] Dis Pater, from whom the Gauls believed themselves to be descended, was certainly near of kin to Saturn;[2] and Dis Pater and Teutates, 'the god of the people,' who was perhaps primarily conceived as a kind of Saturn, may once have been one. Again, if Teutates in Britain remained Mars, while in Gaul the Romanized Celts seem to have identified him here with Mars and there with Mercury, one is tempted to conjecture that he may have been the common ancestor of both.[3]

The worship of animals, to those who have not felt the fascination of anthropology, appears merely unintelligible and absurd. Animals were worshipped because they were formidable or wonderful or possessed powers that man had not; because men fancied that they were incarnations of deity; because they might be tenanted by the souls of forefathers;[4] and animal-worship, or a decaying remnant of animal-worship, has left vestiges in Celtic art. The boar was especially sacred. Like the Romans, the Gauls had military standards, which were invested with sanctity: like the Romans also, they carried not a flag but the figure of an

[1] *Rev. des études anc.*, iv, 1902, p. 221.

[2] *Ib.*, vi, 1904, pp. 111, n. 1, 134, n. 4; A. Holder, *Alt-celtischer Sprachschatz*, ii, 1805–6.

[3] *Rev. des études anc.*, iv, 1902, pp. 110–4.

[4] See E. B. Tylor, *Prim. Culture*, ii, 1903, pp. 229–34, and Mr. Edward Clodd's admirable little book, *Animism*, 1905, pp. 75–8.

animal, and with them this animal was commonly the boar.[1] Traces of animal-worship indeed survive in Gallic tribal names : the Brannovices were the people of the raven, the Eburones the people of the boar. Sucellus, ' the hammerer ' —the local epithet of a god whose statue, discovered at Sarrebourg, is attributed to Dis Pater—was clad in a wolf-skin, and perhaps was originally thought of as a wolf. With Borvo was associated the bull, probably because the activity of the medicinal springs suggested the idea of a powerful animal ; and, as Salomon Reinach has acutely seen,[2] the name of the goddess Epona—the fountain of the mare—finds its counterpart in Hippocrene, the spring of Mount Helicon, from which the horse of Apollo sprang. A relic of animal-worship is also discernible in the horned head of Cernunnos, a god who is figured on one of the altars of Paris, and in Tarvos Trigaranus—' the bull with the three cranes '—which fills the back of another.[3] Originally perhaps Epona was the spirit of some gushing spring, who came to be symbolized as a swift steed ; at last, as her worship was diffused, she was represented in statues by a woman riding on a mare. And so deities would be figured with horns because the horn was a symbol of strength.

But votive altars, statues, and temples, although they enshrined older beliefs, belong, as we have seen, to the period when the Celts had fallen under the dominion of Rome. The Cisalpine Gauls, if Livy [4] and Polybius [5] are to be believed, worshipped in temples ; but, like the oldest sanctuary of Jupiter on the Alban Mount, the holy places of the Western Celts were groves.[6] Caesar indeed says that the Gallic Mercury was represented by numerous *simulacra* : but if these were statues, it is inexplicable that none of them has ever come to light ; and perhaps we may accept the

[1] *B. G.*, vii, 2, § 2 ; 88, § 4 ; S. Reinach, *Répertoire de la statuaire grecque et rom.*, ii, 746-7 ; H. d'Arbois de Jubainville, *La civilisation des Celtes*, 1899, pp. 390-1 ; *Rev. des études anc.*, vi, 1904, p. 48.

[2] *Rev. arch.*, 4e sér., ii, 1903, p. 349.

[3] *Corpus inscr. Lat.*, xiii, 3026 b, c. Cf. Rice Holmes, *Anc. Britain*, p. 284, n. 5.

[4] xxii, 57, § 10 ; xxiii, 24, § 11. [5] ii, 32, § 6.

[6] *B. G.*, vi, 13, § 10 ; 17, § 5 ; Tacitus, *Ann.*, xiv, 30 ; Dion Cassius, lxii, 7, § 3. Cf. Rice Holmes, *Anc. Britain*, p. 285, n. 3.

suggestion that Caesar was thinking of menhirs, which had been erected long before the first Celt set foot in Gaul,[1] but which, like the formless stones that the Greeks venerated as figures of Hermes,[2] were, he supposed, regarded as possessed by the spirit of the great national deity. On the menhir of Kernuz in Finistère a rude Mercury was sculptured in Roman times.[3] The conjecture may be well founded that the Druids, like the priests of Israel, condemned anthropomorphism ;[4] but it is not needed to explain the lack of native statues of Celtic gods. The Romans, according to Varro, had for many years no sacred images :[5] like the Celts, like the Germans, who also, even in the time of Tacitus,[6] deemed it derogatory to the majesty of the gods to ascribe to them human form, they were content to recognize manifestations of divine will ; and even when their temples were adorned with the creations of Greek art, their ancient Vesta remained wrapt in awful mystery. But, while the Druids may have been as hostile as Israel to Gentile abominations, the Celts in general were as receptive as the Romans, and, after they fell under Roman influence, welcomed the services of foreign sculptors.

The Druids.

The question of the origin and affinities of Druidism has given rise to superabundant speculation, which has led to no certain result. Caesar was informed that the system was believed to have been imported from Britain. At all events there is no evidence that it was known to the Celts of Cisalpine Gaul ; and the Germans, with whom the Celts were long in contact and to whom they were ethnically akin, had no Druids. If, then, Druidism originated in Gaul, it probably did not appear until after the Celtic invasion of Italy ; and yet in Britain, the civilization of which was more backward than that of Gaul, it was apparently of long standing. The

[1] Rice Holmes, *Anc. Britain*, p. 285, n. 6 ; *Rev. celt.*, xiii, 1892, pp. 190–3. M. Jullian (*Rev. des études anc.*, iv, 1902, pp. 284, n. 6, 285, n. 1), referring to the passage in which Lucan (iii, 412–3) describes the Druids' grove near Massilia,—*simulacraque maesta deorum Arte carent caesisque exstant informia truncis*, argues that Caesar's *simulacra* 'ne peut signifier que des objets ayant déjà vaguement l'aspect de forme humaine'. Cf. M. Jullian's *Hist. de la Gaule*, ii, 153, n. 6, 154.

[2] Pausanias, vii, 22, § 4.

[3] *Rev. celt.*, xiii, 1892, p. 191.

[4] *Ib.*, p. 199. Cf. J. Déchelette, *Manuel d'archéologie*, ii, 409.

[5] Augustine. *De civ. dei*, iv, 31.

[6] *Germ.*, 9.

prevalent opinion is that the Celtic conquerors of both Gaul and Britain found it existing, and that it was strong enough to secure terms, and finally to make itself supreme. Caesar's words are sometimes explained in the sense that in his time Druidism was more vigorous in Britain than in Gaul, and that Gallic Druids travelled to Britain in order to be initiated into its mysteries : but no sufficient reason can be given for not accepting them in their literal sense ; and if they are true, the Celtic invaders of Britain did not create Druidism, and, neolithic or not, it was at all events pre-Celtic.[1] But all that we know for certain about the Gallic branch of this strange hierarchy we learn from the brief notices of Caesar and other ancient writers ; and Caesar has told us all that was essential for the subject of his narrative. The Druids formed a corporation, admission to which was eagerly sought : they jealously guarded the secrecy of their lore ; and full membership was only obtainable after a long novitiate. They were ruled by a pope, who held office for life ; and sometimes the succession to this dignity was disputed by force of arms. They were exempt from ordinary taxation [2] and from service in war. The ignorance and superstition of the populace, their own organization and submission to one head, gave them a tremendous power. The education of the aristocracy was in their hands. The doctrine which they most strenuously inculcated, if Caesar was not misinformed, was that of the transmigration of souls. 'This belief,' he said, 'they regard as a powerful incentive to valour, because it inspires a contempt for death.' [3] They claimed the right of deciding questions of peace and war. Among the Aedui, if not among other peoples, at all events in certain circumstances, they exercised the right of appointing the chief magistrate. They laid hands on criminals, and, in their default, even on the innocent, imprisoned them in monstrous idols of wicker-work, and burned them alive as

[1] See pp. 523–5.

[2] M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, ii, 55 and n. 1), who translates *neque* (tributa) *una* (cum reliquis pendunt [*B. G.*, vi, 14, § 1]) by 'non dans le même rôle que', and refers to H. Meusel, *Lex. Caes.*, ii, 2365–7, holds that the Druids did pay taxes, but separately and at a lower rate than the laity. Cf. C. E. C. Schneider's edition of *B. G.*, vol. ii, p. 230.

[3] *B. G.*, vi, 14, § 5.

a sacrifice to the gods. They immolated captives in order to discover the divine will in the flow of their blood or their palpitating entrails ;[1] they lent their ministrations to men prostrated by sickness or going forth to battle, who trusted that heaven would spare their lives if human victims were offered in their stead ; and one form of sacrifice which they appear to have countenanced—the slaughter of a child at the foundation of a monument, a fortress, or a bridge—has left traces in European folklore and been practised in Africa, Asia, and Polynesia in modern times.[2] They practically monopolized both the civil and the criminal jurisdiction ; and if this jurisdiction was irregular, if they had no legal power of enforcing their judgements, they were none the less obeyed. Every year they met to dispense justice in the great plain above which now soar the spires of Chartres cathedral.[3] Those who disobeyed their decrees were excommunicated ; and excommunication meant exclusion from the civil community as well as from communion in religious rites. Nor did their power extend only to individuals : contumacious states were laid under an interdict,—a warning that they had forfeited the protection of their gods.

Did the Druids owe their doctrine of immortality, as Diodorus[4] and Timagenes[5] imply, to the influence of Pythagoras ? The testimony of these writers has been contemptuously rejected : but it seems not improbable that Druidism may have absorbed tenets of Pythagorean origin through the medium of the Greeks of Massilia ;[6] and this conjecture gains some support from numismatic evidence. Coins have been found both in Gaul and Britain, bearing on the reverse side the figure, formed by five interlacing lines, which is known as the pentagram and was a well-known Pythagorean

[1] Diodorus Siculus, v, 31, § 3 ; Tacitus, *Ann.*, xiv, 30.

[2] *Chronica minora*, ed. Th. Mommsen, iii, 1898, p. 182, ll. 14–7. Cf. Sir A. Lyall, *Asiatic Studies*, ii, 1899, pp. 312–3, E. B. Tylor, *Prim. Culture*, i, 1903, pp. 104–8, and *Rev. celt.*, xxvi, 1905, p. 289.

[3] The disputes of humble litigants were probably settled by their lords ; and only suitors who could afford the expense of the journey would appeal to the Druids. See pp. 528–9.

[4] v, 28, § 6. [5] Ammianus Marcellinus, xv, 9, § 8.

[6] H. Gaidoz, *Esquisse de la rel. des Gaulois*, 1879, p. 18.

symbol.[1] It would seem, however, that if metempsychosis was really a Druidical doctrine, it had no firm hold upon the Celts in general; and their sepulchral customs were not consistent with it. They believed that there was an Elysium somewhere in the west, where they were to live again, feasting, carousing, and duelling, a life like that which they had lived before, but free from care.[2] If the Druids, as Caesar said, taught that souls passed 'from one body to another', they meant perhaps that after death the soul entered a new body,—the ethereal counterpart of that which it had left behind.[3] Immortality was an idea, more or less vague, common to many peoples: for the Celts the Druids made it an article of faith. But what that theory was which, as Caesar says, they inculcated in regard to 'the heavenly bodies and their motions, the size of the universe and of the earth, the origin of all things,'[4] it is useless to inquire. We only know that as they traced the descent of the Gauls to Dis Pater, they regarded night as older than day, and reckoned time by nights; and that in common with all the peoples of antiquity, they computed years by the revolutions of the moon.[5]

The facts of historical import which stand out as certain are these. Like the Brahmans, who, so long as their authority is acknowledged, recognize the Protean manifestations of Hindu religious fancy, the Druids kept control over the manifold forms of aboriginal and Celtic worship. Being a sacerdotal caste, not, like the priests of Rome, popularly elected, but self-constituted and self-contained, they were of course opposed to all innovation. It has been said that

[1] J. Evans, *Coins of the Anc. Britons*, 1864, p. 98; A. Blanchet, *Traité des monn. gaul.*, pp. 331, 360, 378, 385–6. Perhaps Prof. E. B. Tylor was too positive when he called the pentagram 'an interesting proof of tradition from the Pythagoreans' (*Ency. Brit.*, xv, 1883, p. 203). Cf. *Globus*, xcv, 1909, pp. 7–9.

[2] *Rev. de l'hist. des religions*, xiv, 1886, p. 61; G. Dottin, *La rel. des Celtes*, 1904, pp. 35–7; *Rev. celt.*, xxix, 1908, p. 103.

[3] M. Salomon Reinach (*Orpheus*, p. 178) believes that the Druids did once teach metempsychosis, which afterwards meant simply that souls migrated to a region in the west. Cf. Rice Holmes, *Anc. Britain*, p. 295, n. 1.

[4] *B. G.*, vi, 14, § 6.

[5] *Ib.*, 18, § 2, Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, xvi, 43 (95), § 250.

ancient writers regarded as peculiar to the Druids beliefs and practices which were common to them and other priests of antiquity ; but while every ancient people had its priests, the Druids alone were a veritable clergy.[1] Celtic religion, in so far as it had the same ancestry as that of Rome, would easily harmonize with it ; but Druidism, with its more definite theology, might be expected to counteract this tendency, and would therefore be a danger to Roman dominion.[2] And it was Druidism that formed one of the strongest ties between Gauls and Britons and between the warring tribes of Gaul.

Invasions of the Cimbri and Teutoni.

But though religion might perhaps foster the idea, it could not supply the instant need of political union. Over the vast wooded plains of Germany fierce hordes were roaming, looking with hungry eyes towards the rich prize that lay beyond the Rhine. Moreover, the danger of Gaul was the danger of Italy. The invader who had been attracted by 'the pleasant land of France' would soon look southward over the cornfields, the vineyards, and the olive-gardens of Lombardy. When Caesar was entering public life, men who were not yet old could remember the terror which had been inspired by the Cimbri and Teutoni,—those fair-haired giants who had come down, like an avalanche, from the unknown lands that bordered on the northern sea. They descended into the valley of the Danube. They overthrew a
113 B.C. Roman consul in Carinthia ; crossed the Rhine and threaded the passes of the Jura ; and overran the whole of Celtican
109 B.C. Gaul. Four years after their first victory they defeated another consul in the Province. Then they vanished : but four years later they reappeared ; and two more armies were
105 B.C. destroyed on the banks of the Rhône. The panic-stricken Italians dreaded another Allia : but, while Italy lay at their mercy, the Cimbri turned aside ; and when, after three years' wandering in Spain and Gaul, they rejoined the Teutoni, and the two swarms headed for the south, Marius was waiting for them on the Rhône, and his brother consul in Cisalpine Gaul. Once more the host divided ; and while the Teutoni encoun-

[1] See Rice Holmes, *Anc. Britain*, p. 298, n. 4.

[2] See H. d'A. de Jubainville, *Les Druides*, 1906, pp. 60, 64.

tered Marius in the neighbourhood of Aix, the Cimbri threaded the Brenner Pass, and descended the valley of the Adige. The ghastly appellation of the Putrid Plain commemorated 102 B. C.
the slaughter of the Teutoni: the Cimbri were annihilated at Vercellae, near the confluence of the Sesia and the Po.[1] 101 B. C.

But if this danger had been averted, the movements of the other German peoples might well cause anxiety. Pressing resolutely onward, they fought their way through the outlying Celtic territory, up to the right bank of the Upper Rhine. Some years before the conspiracy of Catiline[2] an 71 B. C.
opportunity was afforded them of making good their footing in the heart of Gaul. A bitter enmity had for many years existed between the Aedui and the Arverni, each of whom were overlords of a group of tribes. The Aedui were the stronger; and they enjoyed the countenance of Rome. The Arverni, in conjunction with the Sequani, hired the aid of Invasion of Ariovistus.
a German chieftain, Ariovistus, who crossed the Rhine with fifteen thousand men. They were enchanted with the country, its abundance, and its comparative civilization; and fresh swarms were attracted by the good news. After a long struggle the Aedui were decisively beaten, and had to cede territory[3] and give hostages to the Sequani, who apparently usurped the hegemony which had been exercised by the Arverni. One of the leading Aeduans, the famous Druid, Diviciacus, went to Rome and implored the Senate for help. His aim was not merely to get rid of Ariovistus and to free his country from the yoke of the Sequani, but also to regain his own influence, which had been eclipsed by that of his younger brother, Dumnorix. He was treated with marked distinction, made the acquaintance of Caesar, and discussed religion and philosophy with Cicero;[4] but the Senate did not see their way to interfere on his behalf. 61 B. C.
All that they did was to pass a vague decree that whoever might at any time be Governor of Gaul should, as far as

[1] See pp. 548–9.

[2] See pp. 553–4.

[3] M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 155) conjectures that the cession was of territory on the left bank of the Saône which had been a subject of dispute between the two peoples. See pp. 352–3, *infra*.

[4] Cicero, *De Div.*, i, 41, § 90.

might be consistent with his duty to the republic, make it his business to protect the Aedui and the other allies of the Roman people.[1] Meanwhile the Sequani had found that their ally was their master. He was not going to return to the wilds of Germany when he could get a fertile territory for the asking. He compelled the Sequani to cede to him the fertile plain of Alsace. At length they and their Gallic allies, including, as it should seem, even the Aedui, mustered all their forces and made a desperate effort to throw off the
60 B.C. yoke: but they sustained a crushing defeat; and their conqueror was evidently determined to found a German kingdom in Gaul.

Revolt of the Allobroges.

Meanwhile the Allobroges, who had never yet fairly accepted their dependent condition, had risen in revolt.
61 B.C. They were still embittered by defeat when the Roman
60 B.C. agents in the Province were alarmed by the appearance of bands of marauders on the right bank of the Rhône. They had been sent by the Helvetii, a warlike Celtic people, who

Threatened invasion of the Helvetii.

dwelt in that part of Switzerland which lies between the Rhine, the Jura, the lake of Geneva, and the Upper Rhône. The Romans had already felt the weight of their arms. A generation before, the Tigurini, one of the four Helvetian tribes, had thrown in their lot with the Cimbri. They had
107 B.C. spread desolation along the valley of the Rhône, defeated a consular army, and compelled the survivors to pass under the yoke. Now, in their turn, they were hard pressed by the Germans; they had reason to fear that the victorious host of Ariovistus would sever them from their Celtic kinsmen; and they had formed the resolution of abandoning their country and seeking a new home in the fertile land of Gaul.

The author of the movement was Orgetorix, the head of the Helvetian baronage. His story throws a vivid light upon the condition of the Gallic tribes. He persuaded his brother nobles that they would be able to win the mastery over Gaul, and undertook a diplomatic mission to the

[1] I agree with Long (*Decline of the Roman Republic*, iii, 477) that the senatorial decree was aimed against Ariovistus; for there is no evidence that the Helvetii entered Gaul before 60 B.C.

leading Transalpine states. Two chiefs were ready to listen to him, Casticus, whose father had been the last King of the Sequani, and Dumnorix, brother of Diviciacus, who was at that time the most powerful chieftain of the Aedui.[1] If Diviciacus saw the salvation of his country in dependence upon Rome, his brother regarded the connexion with abhorrence. He was able, ambitious, and rich; and the common people adored him. Orgetorix urged him and Casticus to seize the royal power in their respective states, as he intended to do in his, and promised them armed support. The three entered into a formal compact for the conquest and partition of Gaul; and, if they had any aim beyond their own aggrandizement, they may have hoped that their success would not only checkmate Ariovistus, but stop the anarchy which paralysed their country and avert the encroachments of Rome.[2] Their purpose threatened the republic with a twofold danger. Once they had gone, the lands which they left vacant would be overrun by the Germans, who would then be in dangerous proximity to Italy; and there was no telling what mischief they might do in Gaul. Above the din of party strife at Rome the note of warning was heard.[3] Men talked anxiously of the prospects of war; and the Senate sent commissioners to dissuade the Gallic peoples from joining the invaders. But the ambitious triumvirate had still to reckon with the Helvetii. They heard that their envoy had broken his trust, and immediately recalled him to answer for his conduct. He knew that if he were found guilty, he would be burned alive; and accordingly, when he appeared before his judges, he was followed by his retainers and slaves, numbering over ten thousand men. The magistrates, determined to bring him to justice, called the militia to arms; but in the meantime the adventurer died, perhaps by his own hand.

Thus the scheme of the triumvirate was destroyed; and probably Cicero was thinking of the death of Orgetorix when he wrote to Atticus that tranquillity was restored in Gaul.

[1] See pp. 555–6.

[2] Cf. C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 162.

[3] Cicero, *Att.*, i, 19, § 2.

Nevertheless the consul, Metellus, favoured a forward policy: 'the only fault I have to find with him,' said Cicero, 'is that he is not much pleased with the news that Gaul is calm.' [1]

But the idea which Orgetorix had conceived did not die. The Helvetii had no intention of abandoning their enterprise, nor Dumnorix of abandoning his. He had married a daughter of Orgetorix; and he was quite ready to help them if they would make it worth his while. They resolved to spend two years in preparing for their emigration; bought up wagons and draught cattle; and laid in large supplies of corn. Diplomacy was powerless to shake the purpose of a brave and desperate nation. Perhaps the Senate failed to realize the gravity of the crisis. Perhaps they shrank from putting the sword into the hands of the man who might ultimately turn it against themselves.

Consulship of Caesar.

But the hesitation of an effete Senate was soon to give way to the energy of a leader of men. One of the consuls for the year 59 was Julius Caesar. About the time of the election Ariovistus, who had already paid court to Caesar's predecessor, Metellus,[2] made overtures for an alliance with Rome; and doubtless with the object of securing his neutrality in view of the threatened Helvetian invasion, the Senate conferred upon him the title of Friend of the Roman People. They had already half promised to protect their Gallic allies. They now practically guaranteed to the conqueror of those allies the security of his conquest. And in this latter policy Caesar, if we may believe his own word, fully concurred. He must have seen the impending troubles. But he was not yet free to encounter them; and he doubtless approved of any expedient for keeping the barbarian chief inactive until he could go forth in person to confront him.

How he attempted to provide against the Helvetian danger.

He is appointed Governor of Gaul.

That time was at hand. In the year of his consulship Caesar was made Governor of Illyricum, or Dalmatia, and of Gaul, that is to say of Gallia Cisalpina, or Piedmont and the Plain of Lombardy, and of Gallia Braccata, or, as it was usually called, the Province. If Suetonius [3] was rightly informed,

[1] *Att.*, 20, § 5.

[2] Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, ii, 67, § 170. Cf. *Hermes*, xlii, 1907, pp. 509–10.

[3] *Divus Iulius*, 22.

his commission gave him the right to include Gallia Comata —'the land of the long-haired Gauls'—that is to say the whole of independent Gaul north of the Province, within his sphere of action.[1] He had already gained distinction in Spain both as a general and as an administrator; but hitherto he had had no chance of showing the full measure of his powers. He was at this time forty-three years old.[2] In person he was tall and slight, but well-knit; and, if he was as licentious as the mass of his contemporaries, his constitution, fortified by abstemious habits, was capable of sustaining prodigious efforts. His broad dome-like skull; his calm and penetrating eyes; his aquiline nose; his massive yet finely moulded jaw, expressed, like no other human countenance, a rich and harmonious nature,—intellect, passion, will moving in accord. And, if his vices were common, his generosity, his forbearance, his equanimity, his magnanimity were his own. He believed, with an unwavering faith, that above himself there was a power, without whose aid the strongest judgement, the most diligent calculation might fail. That power was Fortune; and Caesar was assured that Fortune was ever on his side.[3] But it would be impertinent to this

[1] It has been objected (*Athenaeum*, Jan. 13, 1900, p. 42) that 'in another passage (*Gram.*, c. 3) Suetonius applies the expression "Gallia Comata" to a portion [only] of Transalpine Gaul'. Suetonius (ed. C. L. Roth, p. 289, l. 23) there says that 'Munatius Plancus, when he was Governor of Gallia Comata, founded Lugdunum' (*Munatius Plancus, cum Galliam regeret Comatam, Lugdunum condidit*), which surely does not prove that the Province could properly be called Gallia Comata. Still Suetonius may have used the expression incorrectly.

[2] See pp. 556–7.

[3] Cicero, *Att.*, x, 8 B; Caesar, *B. G.*, v, 58, § 6; vi, 30, § 4; 35, § 2; 42, §§ 1–2; vii, 89, § 2; *B. C.*, iii, 10, § 6; 68, § 1; 95, § 1, &c. In the *Classical Review* of April 1903, pp. 153–6, Mr. Warde Fowler did me the honour of devoting an article to a criticism of the statement which I made in the first edition of this book as to Caesar's belief in Fortune. In the present edition I have allowed the statement to stand, merely substituting the words 'an unwavering faith' for 'the faith of a devotee', which was certainly open to criticism; and I believe that it is supported by the evidence to which I have referred. I cannot help thinking that Mr. Warde Fowler misunderstood me. I really was not so credulous as to suggest that Caesar believed in a personal goddess called *Fortuna*. What I meant to convey was simply that, in common with many men of action, he believed that fortune may wreck the most wisely planned and most diligently executed operations, while she may rescue her favourites from the penalties of their own mistakes; and that, in common

narrative to attempt to analyse the character—to which our greatest poet has done less than justice—of the greatest man of action who has ever lived. Whatever quality was lacking, the want in no wise affected his fitness for the task which he had now to perform.

His army. [The 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th.]

His appointment carried with it the command of an army consisting of four legions, perhaps about twenty thousand men.[1] One of them was quartered in Transalpine Gaul : the other three were at Aquileia, near the site of the modern Trieste. He could also command the services of slingers from the Balearic isles, of archers from Numidia and Crete, and of cavalry from Spain ; but, as the narrative will show, he raised the bulk of his cavalry year by year in Gaul itself. The number of the auxiliary infantry was perhaps generally about one-tenth of that of the regulars : [2] the number of the cavalry varied greatly, but four hundred for each legion was near the average.[3] Various military reforms had been introduced by Marius ; and the legions of Caesar were, in many respects, different from those which had fought against Hannibal. They were no longer a militia, but an army of professional soldiers. Each legion consisted of ten cohorts ; and the cohort, formed of three maniples or six centuries,[4] had replaced the maniple as the tactical unit of the legion. From the earliest times the legion had been commanded by an officer called a military tribune. Six were assigned to each legion ; and each one of the number held command in turn. But they now often owed their appointments to interest rather than to merit ; and no tribune in Caesar's army was ever placed at the head of a legion. They still had administrative duties to perform, and exercised subordinate commands. But the principal officers were the *legati*, who might loosely be called generals of division. Their powers

with Sulla, Napoleon, and other great commanders, he had a firm faith, touched perhaps by mysticism, in his own star.

[1] See pp. 559–63. [2] *Klio*, vii, 1907, p. 318. Cf. *B. C.*, iii, 4.

[3] Cf. *B. G.*, i, 15, § 1 with iv, 12, § 1 ; v, 8, § 2 ; 9, § 1 ; vi. 32. § 2.

[4] The writer of the article *Cohors* in the *Dict. des ant. grecques et rom.* (i. 1287–8) of MM. Daremberg and Saglio believes that the reason for this change was that the individual soldiers were generally inferior to the old burghers, and that the only way of giving them confidence was by forming them into comparatively large bodies.

were not strictly defined, but varied according to circumstances and to the confidence which they deserved. A *legatus* might be entrusted with the command of a legion or of an army corps ; he might even, in the absence of his chief, be entrusted with the command of the entire army. But he was not yet, as such, the permanent commander of a legion. The officers upon whom the efficiency of the troops mainly depended were the centurions. They were chosen from the ranks ; and their position has been roughly compared with that of our own non-commissioned officers. But their duties were, in some respects, at least as responsible as those of a captain : the centurions of the first cohort were regularly summoned to councils of war ; and the chief centurion of a legion was actually in a position to offer respectful suggestions to the legate himself.[1] Every legion included in its ranks a number of skilled artisans, called *fabri*, who have been likened to the engineers in a modern army ; but they were not permanently enrolled in a separate corps.[2] They fought in the ranks like other soldiers ; but when their special services were required, they were directed by staff-officers called *praefecti fabrum*. It was their duty to execute repairs of every kind, to superintend the construction of permanent camps, and to plan fortifications and bridges ; and it should seem that they also had charge of the artillery,[3]—the *ballistae* and catapults, which hurled heavy stones and shot arrows against the defences and the defenders of a besieged town.

The legionary wore a sleeveless woollen shirt, a leathern tunic protected across breast and back by bands of metal, strips of cloth wound round the thighs and legs, hob-nailed shoes, and, in cold or wet weather, a kind of blanket or military cloak. His defensive armour consisted of helmet, shield, and greaves : his weapons were a short, two-edged, cut-and-thrust sword and a javelin, the blade of which, behind the hardened point, was made of soft iron, so that, when it struck home, it might bend and not be available for return. These, however, formed only a part of the load which he carried on the march. Over his left shoulder he bore

[1] See *B. G.*, iii, 5, § 2.

[2] See p. 579.

[3] See Long's *Decline of the Roman Republic*, ii, 19.

a pole, to which was fastened in a bundle his ration of grain,[1] his cooking vessel, saw, basket, hatchet, and spade. For it was necessary that he should be a woodman and navvy as well as a soldier. No Roman army ever halted for the night without constructing a camp fortified with trench, rampart, and palisade.

The column was of course accompanied by a host of non-combatants. Each legion required at least five or six hundred horses and mules to carry its baggage ;[2] and the drivers, with the slaves who waited on the officers, formed a numerous body. Among the camp-followers were also dealers who supplied the wants of the army, and were ready to buy booty of every kind.[3]

His intentions.

What line of policy Caesar intended to follow, he has not told us. While he was going forth to govern a distant land, the government of his own was lapsing into anarchy. He must have seen that the Germans would soon overrun Gaul unless the Romans prevented them ; and that the presence of the Germans would revive the peril from which Marius had delivered Rome. We may feel sure that he had determined to teach them, by a rough lesson if necessary, that they must advance no further into Gaul, nor venture to cross the boundaries of the Province or of Italy. Confident in himself and supported by his fellow triumvirs, he was prepared to act without waiting for senatorial sanction ; and it can hardly be doubted that he dreamed of adding a new province to the empire, which should round off its frontier

[1] See p. 585.

[2] Caesar nowhere mentions that he used wagons or carts during the Gallic war, though it seems certain that he must have used some, to carry artillery and material for mantlets and the like. See *Bell. Afr.*, 9 ; *B. C.*, iii, 42, § 3 ; and Daremberg and Saglio, *Dict. des ant. grecques et rom.*, i, 929. The larger pieces of artillery were of course not conveyed entire, but in parts, which were put together as occasion required (Sir R. Payne-Gallwey, *The Crossbow*, &c., 1903, p. 257).

[3] W. Smith, *Dict. of Gk. and Roman Ant.*, i, 346 ; ii, 588–9 ; F. Fröhlich, *Das Kriegswesen Cäsars*, 1891, pp. 56–7, 62–4, 66–7, 75 ; Daremberg and Saglio, *Dict. des ant. grecques et rom.*, ii, 1605–6 ; iv, 482–3 ; Frontinus, *Strat.*, iv, 1, § 7. See also various notes in Section VI. There is no evidence that there was any medical staff in Caesar's army or under the Republic at all, though it may perhaps be inferred from a passage in Suetonius (*Divus Augustus*, 11) that wealthy officers were attended by their private surgeons.

and add to its wealth. But whether he had definitely resolved to attempt a conquest of such magnitude, or merely intended to follow, as they appeared, the indications of Fortune, it would be idle to conjecture. Ambitious though he was, he only courted, he never tempted her. The greatest statesman is, in a sense, an opportunist. When Caesar should find himself in Gaul, he would know best how to shape his ends.

CHAPTER II

CAMPAIGNS AGAINST THE HELVETII AND ARIOVISTUS

58 B.C.

Caesar hears that the Helvetii are about to march through the Province.

ABOUT the middle of March a startling announcement reached Caesar. The Helvetii had actually begun to move; and their hordes would soon be streaming over the Roman Province. Three neighbouring tribes, the Rauraci, the Tulingi, and the Latobrigi, and also the Boi, who had long ago migrated into Germany, had been induced to join them; they had laid in sufficient flour to last for three months; and, to stimulate their resolution and enterprise, they had deliberately cut themselves off from all prospect of return by burning their homes. On the 24th[1] of that very month the whole vast multitude, numbering, according to their own muster-rolls, three hundred and sixty-eight thousand,[2] was to assemble opposite Geneva, ready to cross the Rhône.

He hastens to Geneva and destroys the bridge.

Caesar instantly left Rome, and, hurrying northward ninety miles a day,[3] crossed the Alps, took command of the Provincial legion, ordered a fresh levy, and reached Geneva at the end of a week. He immediately destroyed the bridge by which the Helvetii intended to cross the river. They sent ambassadors to say that they only wanted to use the road through the Province, and would promise to do no mischief. Would Caesar give them permission? Caesar had of course no intention of granting their request; but, as he wanted to gain time for his levies to assemble, he told the ambassadors that he would think over what they had said, and give them an answer on the 9th of the following month.[4]

Helvetian envoys ask his leave to use the road through the Province.

[1] March 28 of the unreformed calendar.

[2] See pp. 237–41.

[3] Plutarch, *Caesar*, 17. See also *B. G.*, i, 7, § 1; Suetonius, *Divus Iulius*, 57; and the map of Gaul.

[4] F. Eyssenhardt (*Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie und Paedagogik*, lxxxv, 1862, p. 760) accepts Dion Cassius's statement (xxxviii, 31, § 4) that Caesar

He made good use of the interval. The legion was with him ; and the Provincial levies arrived in time to join in executing the design which he had formed. The road by which the Helvetii desired to march led through Savoy ; and the river was at certain points fordable. It should seem that they had not yet had time to assemble in force. Along the southern bank of the Rhône, between the lake and the Pas de l'Écluse —a distance of about seventeen miles—Caesar threw up lines of earthworks in the few places where the banks were not so steep as to form a natural fortification.[1] The soldiers were posted in redoubts behind the works. When the ambassadors returned, Caesar plainly told them that he would not allow the Helvetii to pass through the Province. Undeterred by this rebuff, the emigrants made several attempts to force the passage of the river. Some of them waded ; others made bridges of boats, and tried to storm the ramparts : but, rapidly concentrating, the soldiers pelted them with missiles and sent them staggering back.

58 B.C.

He promises to reply in a fortnight, and meanwhile fortifies the left bank of the Rhône.

He prevents the Helvetii from crossing.

Only one route now remained,—the road that winded along the right bank of the Rhône, beneath the rocky steeps of the Jura, through the Pas de l'Écluse. The emigrants might, it would seem, have made their way into Gaul by the route that leads to Pontarlier or one of the other passes in the Jura ; but either because they shrank from encountering Ariovistus or for some other reason, of which Caesar took no

held out to the Helvetian envoys the hope that he would allow them to pass through the Province. Otherwise, he insists, it is impossible to explain why the Helvetii waited for the day which Caesar had appointed. Caesar neither says nor implies that he did not hold out such a hope to the envoys. On his own showing, indeed, he intended to deceive them. I suspect, however, that this is one of Dion's embellishments, because I believe that Caesar would have kept the fact to himself instead of blurting it out to any of the 'excellent authorities' whom Dion is assumed to have followed (see pp. 215–7). But Dion may have hit upon the truth. Caesar would of course have held out such a hope to the Helvetii, if it had been worth his while to do so. 'As a nation,' writes Lord Wolseley (*Soldier's Pocket-book*, 5th ed., 1886, p. 169), 'we are bred up to feel it a disgrace even to succeed by falsehood . . . we will keep hammering along with the conviction that "honesty is the best policy" and that truth always wins in the long run. These pretty little sentences do well for a child's copy-book, but the man who acts upon them in war had better sheathe his sword for ever.' Again, the general 'can, by spreading false news among the gentlemen of the press, use them as a medium by which to deceive an enemy' (*ib.*, 4th ed., p. 337).

[1] See pp. 614–5.

58 B. C. The Sequani allow them to march through the Pas de l'Écluse.

account, these routes were out of the question.[1] The road that led through the Pas de l'Écluse was so narrow that there was barely room for a single wagon to move along it at a time: beyond the pass, it led into the territory of the Sequani; and if they offered the slightest opposition, it would be hopeless to attempt to get through. They refused at first to grant a safe-conduct; but Dumnorix, at the request of the Helvetii, willingly acted as mediator. He had established his influence with the Sequani by wholesale bribery; and, after a little negotiation, he succeeded in procuring for his friends the favour which they sought. The Helvetian leaders undertook to restrain their people from plundering; and hostages were exchanged for the fulfilment of the compact. The ultimate object of the emigrants was to settle in western Gaul, in the fertile basin of the Charente. Thence they would be able to make raids upon the open corn-growing districts of the Province; and their mere presence, with Dumnorix in the background, would be a standing menace to Roman interests in Gaul. But first they would have to make their way along the valley of the Rhône, across the plain of Ambérieu, and over the plateau of Dombes to the Saône. Caesar calculated that while their huge unwieldy column was crawling along the muddy tracks, he would have time to raise a new army, strong enough to cope with them. Leaving his ablest lieutenant, Labienus, to guard the lines on the Rhône, he hastened back to Cisalpine Gaul: enrolled two new legions[2] on his own responsibility; withdrew the other three from their winter-quarters; and marched back by the road leading along the valley of the Dora Riparia and over Mont Genèvre. The mountain tribes, who doubtless hoped to plunder his baggage-train, attempted to stop his advance; but again and again he dashed them aside until, descending into the valley of the Durance, he pushed on through the highlands of Dauphiny, past Briançon, Embrun, and Gap,[3] crossed the Isère and the Rhône, and

Caesar goes back to Cisalpine Gaul, returns with reinforcements and encamps above the confluence of the Rhône and the Saône.

[The Graioceli, Ceutrones, and Caturiges.]

[1] See pp. 613–4.

[2] The 11th and 12th. We may suppose that, as M. Jullian says (*Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 202), Caesar had given orders in advance for the assemblage of the recruits.

[3] Between Briançon (Brigantio) and the Rhône the itinerary is not abso-

encamped on the heights of Sathonay, near the point where the rushing current is swelled by the tranquil stream of the Saône. 58 B.C. About June 7 ?[1]

He was only just in time. The bulk of the Helvetii had crossed the Saône and descended, like a swarm of locusts, upon the cornfields and homesteads of the Aedui. Envoys came to beg Caesar to remember the loyalty of their countrymen, and help them to get rid of the invaders. His arrival had wrought a change in Aeduan politics. Liscus, who belonged to the Romanizing party, had been elected Vergobret; and Diviciacus had regained his prestige. Liscus concluded an agreement with Caesar, and undertook to feed his army. Labienus with his legion had already rejoined him. The rearguard of the Helvetii, numbering about a fourth of the entire host, were gathered on the eastern side of the river, in the valley of the Formans, eleven miles to the north.[2] Caesar left his camp soon after midnight, marched quietly up the valley of the Saône over ground which masked his approach, and launched his legions upon the unsuspecting multitude, as they were crowding into their boats. Those who escaped the slaughter vanished in the surrounding forests. They and their slain kinsfolk belonged to the tribe called the Tigurini,[3] by which, fifty years before, a Roman army, under the consul Lucius Cassius, had been defeated and compelled to pass under the yoke.

The Aedui solicit his aid against the Helvetii.

He defeats and disperses the rearguard of the Helvetii.

Within twenty-four hours Caesar had thrown a bridge of boats[4] over the river, and transported his entire army to the right bank. The Helvetii, who had taken three weeks over the passage, were greatly alarmed, and sent an embassy to meet him. The principal envoy was an aged chief named Divico, who, in his youth, had commanded the army which defeated Cassius. He said that his countrymen were willing to settle wherever Caesar pleased, if he would only leave them unmolested. But if he was bent upon war, they were ready; and he would do well to remember that they had already

His passage of the Saône.

The Helvetii attempt to negotiate, but reject Caesar's terms.

lutely certain; but Caesar must have gone either by the route indicated in the text or by the valley of the Romanche and Grenoble. See *Carte de France* (1 : 200,000), Sheet 60, and pp. 615–6.

[1] See Napoleon, *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 57, n. 2.

[2] See pp. 617–9. [3] See p. 38. [4] See p. 612.

58 B.C. defeated a Roman army. Caesar replied that he remembered the treacherous exploit of which they boasted, and remembered it with indignation. Besides, even if he were inclined to let bygones be bygones, he could not overlook the outrages of which they had just been guilty. Still, he was ready to make peace with them, upon certain conditions. They must compensate the Aedui and the Allobroges for the damage which they had done, and give hostages for their future good behaviour. Divico haughtily replied that the Helvetii, as the Romans had the best of reasons to know, were accustomed to receive hostages, not to give them.

They march northward, followed by Caesar.

Next day the emigrants broke up their encampment. To reach the valley of the Charente, it was necessary to cross the Loire. The direct line intersected that river near Roanne. But the rugged country between the basins of the Saône and the Loire was, in this direction, impassable; and beyond Roanne the mountains of Le Forez barred the way. The only course was to move up the valley between the Saône and the hills of Beaujolais until a practicable route could be found. Caesar sent on his cavalry, four thousand strong, to watch the enemy's movements. They were composed of levies from the Province and from the Aedui; and the Aeduan contingent was commanded by Dumnorix. Caesar, if he was already acquainted with his character and aims, probably did not think it expedient to challenge his appointment; and indeed he may have welcomed the opportunity of keeping him under his eye.[1] The cavalry ventured too near the Helvetian rearguard, and lost a few men in a skirmish. As the victors were only five hundred, Caesar must have suspected that something was amiss. For a fortnight the two armies continued to advance, northward and then north-westward, never more than five miles apart. The Helvetii turned off from the Saône near Mâcon, and moved up the valley of the Petit Grosne,[2] along the line of the road which leads from Mâcon to Autun; near Mont St. Vincent they struck westward in the direction of Toulon-

[1] See *Class. Quarterly*, iii, 1909, pp. 213–14, and C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii. 205–6.

[2] See pp. 620–1.

sur-Arroux.[1] Their vast column must have extended at least fifteen miles in length.[2] The advanced guard was followed by the train of wagons, which was protected in the rear by the Boi and Tulingi,[3]; and last of all came the Helvetian fighting men.[4] Elated by their recent success, the Helvetii occasionally faced about and challenged their pursuers; but Caesar would not allow his men to be drawn into a combat. He was looking for a favourable opportunity to fight a decisive battle; but for the time he had enough to do in trying to prevent the enemy from plundering his allies. Nor was this his only anxiety. He depended upon the Aedui for his supplies; but day followed day, and no supplies came. On the Saône indeed he had a flotilla of barges laden with corn; but the necessity of following the Helvetii had led him far away from that river. The Aeduan notables in his camp promised, protested, and poured forth excuses, till he lost all patience and accused them of deliberate breach of faith. This challenge elicited a full disclosure. Liscus spoke on behalf of his brother chiefs. It appeared that there were certain individuals whose power was actually greater than that of the Government. They had exerted their influence over the people to prevent them from sending supplies, telling them that if the Romans succeeded in defeating the Helvetii, they would use their victory to enslave the Aedui as well as the other tribes. Liscus concluded by telling Caesar that he had revealed the truth at the risk of his life, and had only spoken under compulsion. Caesar had no doubt that by 'certain individuals' he meant Dumnorix. But he had no intention of discussing matters of state in the presence of men whose discretion could not be trusted. He therefore told all the chiefs, except Liscus, that they might go. Liscus then spoke out frankly. He admitted that Dumnorix and no other was the man. He had amassed great wealth, and had

58 B.C.

Caesar pressed for supplies, owing to the intrigues of Dumnorix.

[1] See pp. 620–1, 624–7.

[2] See Stoffel, *Hist. de Jules César,—Guerre civile*, ii, 1887, p. 451, and my essay on 'The Credibility of Caesar's Narrative' (pp. 237–41).

[3] See pp. 629–30.

[4] May we suppose that some of the fighting men marched parallel with the wagons? See Lord Wolseley, *The Soldier's Pocket-book*, 1886, p. 408.

58 B.C. spent it lavishly in buying popular support. He had acquired great influence with the Bituriges and other tribes by arranging marriages between the women of his family and powerful chieftains. Not only was he politically connected with the Helvetii, but he privately detested Caesar, because Caesar had set him aside and restored his brother Diviciacus to power. In his own country he was the leader of the anti-Roman faction. The interests of the Helvetii were his interests. If they succeeded, they would help him to mount the throne; if they failed, he would be worse off than before. He had kept them regularly supplied with information; and in the cavalry skirmish, a few days before, he had set the example of flight.

Caesar hardly knew how to act. Dumnorix was evidently one of the most powerful and implacable enemies whom he had to fear. He could not afford to overlook such flagrant hostility; but he was afraid of offending Diviciacus, whom he particularly desired to conciliate. Perhaps the astute Druid had no great love for his brother; but it would not do to exasperate the whole patriotic party. Caesar summoned him to his tent, and, addressing him through the medium of Gaius Valerius Troucillus, a distinguished Provincial, his principal interpreter and trusted friend, earnestly pressed him to consent to his punishing Dumnorix. Diviciacus, with a burst of tears, begged him not to be too hard upon his brother; or it would be said that it was he who had advised the infliction of the punishment, and public opinion would brand him as a monster. Caesar pressed his hand kindly, and bade him dismiss his fears. His regard for him, he said, was so great that he was willing to condone the insult which had been offered to his Government and the provocation which he had himself received. The truth was that he had no choice. He had not yet won the prestige that would only come from victory; and with powerful enemies before him, and doubtful allies around him, upon whose goodwill he depended for the means of subsistence, it would be folly to raise a hornet's nest about his ears. He contented himself therefore with sending for Dumnorix, and giving him a severe rebuke and a stern warning. This

To face p. 53.

DEFEAT OF THE HELVETII.*

(After Col. Stoffel)

See pages 625 627



REFERENCE

S . . . Summit of hill of Armecy
C . . . Entrenchment for protection of baggage
RR . . . 4 legions in line of battle
HH . . . Helvetii
HH' . . . Helvetii forced to retreat to a hill
TT . . . Boii & Tulingi
rr . . . Roman 3rd line facing Boii & Tulingi
hh . . . Helvetii renewing attack
Roman line of march
Helvetian „ „ „
The contours denote intervals in altitude of 10 metres.

Scale 1 56000
Kilometres

0 1 2 3 4

* Col. Fircher's modifications of Stoffel's theory, which are adopted by the author and by M. Jullian, are shown by red lines. See pages 626-627

once, he said, for his brother's sake, his conduct should be overlooked. At the same time he gave secret orders that Dumnorix should be watched, and his movements reported. 58 B.C.

His abortive attempt to surprise the Helvetii.

Next morning Caesar made an attempt to surprise the enemy, which only failed through the stupidity of an officer. They had encamped, his patrols reported, at the foot of a hill eight miles distant, probably Sanvigne, about six miles east of the river Arroux.[1] He at once sent a party to reconnoitre the hill, and ascertain whether it would be possible to ascend it from the rear. They reported that such an ascent was easily practicable. In the middle of the night Caesar sent Labienus with two legions, under the guidance of the exploring party, to climb the hill and swoop down upon the enemy's rear, while he should himself attack them in front, About two hours after the departure of Labienus, he sent forward his cavalry, and followed along the track by which the enemy had advanced. Publius Considius, a centurion of experience and reputation, was sent on ahead with patrols to reconnoitre. Shortly before sunrise Caesar was within a mile and a half of the enemy, who suspected nothing. Suddenly Considius rode back at a gallop and told him that all had gone wrong : not Labienus, but the enemy occupied the height; he had recognized them by their arms and crests, and was sure that he had made no mistake. Caesar at once led his troops on to another hill close by, and formed them in line of battle. Labienus meanwhile was wondering why he did not come; and when it was too late, Caesar learned that Considius had been the dupe of his own fears.

About June 28 ?

He marches for Bibracte, to get supplies.

The legions moved on in the afternoon, and encamped about three miles in the rear of the Helvetii, near the site of Toulon-sur-Arroux.[2] The day after, as no corn-carts had appeared and only two days' rations were left, Caesar struck off to the right, and marched for Bibracte, the capital of the Aedui, about sixteen miles to the north, where he knew that he would find granaries stored with corn. The route ran along the watershed between the Arroux and one of its affluents, a rivulet called the Auzon. The Helvetii were far on their way, the head of the column having passed Luzy

[1] Stoffel, *Guerre civile*, ii, 445. [2] See pp. 625–7.

58 B.C. and turned westward down the valley of the Alène, when some deserters from Caesar's cavalry brought them the news. Fancying that he was afraid of them, or hoping to prevent him from reaching Bibracte, they turned likewise, marched back rapidly, and attacked his rearguard near the hill of Armecy, about three miles north of Toulon. Caesar sent his cavalry to retard their advance, while he ordered the infantry to retrace their steps and ascend the slopes of Armecy. The whole movement must have occupied about two hours. Half-way up the hill, the four veteran legions were ranged in three lines of cohorts, each line being eight men deep.[1] The soldiers' packs were collected on the top, under the protection of the auxiliaries and the two newly-raised legions, who were ordered to entrench the position. The baggage-train may either have been parked on the ridge along which it was moving or have continued its march towards Bibracte. It was exposed to no danger from the Helvetii ; and a slender escort might have sufficed to protect it against the Aeduans who favoured Dumnorix.[2] The opportunity for which Caesar had been waiting had at last come. Although the enemy were now between him and Bibracte, the hill of Armecy was the best position which he could have chosen. If he won, the road would of course be open. If he lost,—but he did not intend to lose. It was his first pitched battle ; and he knew that for him and his army defeat would be destruction. The Helvetii would fight desperately : his legions, except perhaps the 10th, had not yet come to know him ; and he could not fully trust all his officers. He therefore dismounted and made his staff do the same, so that the men might see that their officers shared their dangers ; and then, in accordance with custom, he harangued the expectant troops. The wagons of the Helvetii were parked, as they came up, on rising ground to the left of the road ; and about one o'clock in the afternoon the whole mighty host, congregated in compact masses, flung back Caesar's horsemen and with shields closely locked pressed up the hill against the Roman line. The men in the front rank held their shields before their bodies, while those behind bore theirs

[1] See p. 588. [2] See p. 628.

horizontally above their heads.[1] The legionaries in the front ranks stood with their javelins in their hands, ready to throw. On the plateau above, recruits and auxiliaries were hard at work with their entrenching tools. When the enemy were within a few yards, the centurions gave the word. Down flew a shower of javelins; and the mass began to break. The blades of the javelins, composed of soft iron, had bent as the points penetrated the shields. Sword in hand, the cohorts of the first line charged: many of the Helvetii, finding their shields nailed together by the javelins, which, pull and wrench as they might, were not to be torn out, flung them away, and parried the thrusts as best they could; but they were soon overborne, and fell back to a hill about a mile south-west of Armecy on the further side of the road by which they had marched. One cannot but suspect that their first attack had been a feint, designed to entice Caesar from his strong position; for the Romans were following when the Boi and Tulingi, who had just arrived upon the field, rushed upon their right flank and rear. The Helvetii took heart and returned to the attack; and, while the first two lines of the Romans closed with them, the third faced about, and confronted their fresh assailants. 58 B.C.

Defeat of the Helvetii near Bibracte.

Long and fiercely the battle was fought out. In due time the men of the rear ranks relieved those in front, advancing between the files as the latter withdrew, and again the men who had been relieved, relieved in turn their comrades; while the cohorts of the second line reinforced those of the first, and the groups thus formed an unbroken whole.[2] Gradually the Helvetii were forced further up the hill; while the Boi and Tulingi retreated to their baggage. Standing behind the wall of wagons, they hurled down stones and darts upon the advancing Romans, and thrust at them between the wheels with pikes when they attempted to storm the laager. Even the women and children took part in the defence.[3] The struggle was prolonged far into the

[1] See W. Smith, *Dict. of Greek and Roman Ant.*, ii, 808; and Stoffel, *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, 1890, p. 69.

[2] These details are conjectural. The reasons are given on pp. 588–98.

[3] Plutarch, *Caesar*, 18.

58 B.C. night ; and meanwhile the Helvetii, covered by the resistance of their allies, were making good their retreat.[1] At length the legionaries burst through the barrier. Women and children who could not escape were slaughtered ; and the flying remnant of the invading host disappeared in the darkness of night.[2]

Before the sun went down, evil tidings must have reached the non-combatants who were still wending their way towards the field. It is certain that many of the wagons never came into the laager.[3] What despair fell upon the baffled emigrants ; how the jaded cattle were headed round again towards the north, and goaded through that night ; how those who escaped the slaughter tramped after, and told the tale of the calamity ; the din, the confusion, the long weariness of the retreat,—these things it is easy to imagine, but those only who have shared the rout and ruin of a beaten army can adequately realize.

Caesar's treatment of the fugitives.

Caesar was unable to pursue. His troops were exhausted, his cavalry were untrustworthy ; and he had to give the wounded time to recover, and to bury the teeming corpses that might have engendered a pestilence among his allies : but he sent mounted messengers to warn the Lingones, through whose country the fugitives would have to pass, to give them no help. The Lingones occupied the country round Tonnerre and Bar-sur-Aube as well as the plateau of Langres and the neighbourhood of Dijon. At the end of three days Caesar started in pursuit. On the way he was met by envoys, whom the Helvetii, now reduced to utter destitution, had sent to arrange terms of surrender. He bade them tell their countrymen to halt, and await his arrival. When he overtook them, he ordered them to give hostages, and to surrender their arms and a number of slaves, who had escaped to them. Six thousand Helvetians slipped away in the night, and took the road towards the Rhine :

[1] Cf. Col. H. Bircher, *Bibracte*, 1904, p. 26.

[2] If the official estimate (see p. 46) of the number of the emigrants was correct, and unless a considerable proportion had dispersed on the march, over 100,000, as Colonel Stoffel calculates, must have perished in the battle. See pp. 222–5. All questions relating to the campaign are discussed on pp. 616–34.

[3] See p. 239.

but Caesar sent peremptory orders to the inhabitants to hunt them down and bring them back ; and on their return, they were ' treated as enemies '. The Boi were allowed, at the request of the Aedui, who appreciated their martial qualities, to settle in Aeduan territory. It would seem that the tract assigned to them was in the neighbourhood of St. Parize-le-Châtel, between the Allier and the Loire.[1] The Helvetii and the other tribes, who would be most useful as a barrier between the Germans and the Province, were sent back to their own land ; and the Allobroges were directed to supply them with grain.

58 B.C.

Settlement of the Boi.

The news of this brilliant victory produced its natural effect. The success of the Helvetii would have been a calamity to all, except Dumnorix and his following ; and this calamity Caesar had averted. He appeared as the conqueror, not of Gaul but of the invaders of Gaul ; the oligarchies who dreaded ambitious upstarts welcomed his support ; and the Aedui might expect that their old pre-eminence would be restored. At the worst, his rule would be preferable to the tyranny of Ariovistus ; and he would doubtless be glad to aid in expelling his rival. The patriots in the tribal councils, if they offered any opposition, were outvoted. Chieftains came from all parts of central Gaul to congratulate the conqueror. They told him that they had certain important proposals to lay before him ; and, with his express sanction, they then and there convoked a council to arrange details. The meeting took place some days later. After the council had broken up, Caesar consented, at the pressing request of the chiefs, to give them a private interview. They earnestly begged him to keep what they were going to say a close secret ; for if it were to get abroad, they would be made to suffer cruelly. Diviciacus, who spoke for them, related how Ariovistus had established his footing in the land of the Sequani, defeated the Aedui and their dependants, and finally overthrown the combined forces of the Aedui, the Sequani, and their respective allies.[2] At that moment there were a hundred and twenty thousand Germans in their midst ; and within a few

Envoys from Celtican Gaul congratulate Caesar, and solicit his aid against Ariovistus.

[1] See pp. 425–30. [2] See pp. 554–5.

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58 B.C. years the Gauls would be expelled from their own country. The Sequani had already been forced to cede a third part of their territory, and would soon be forced to give up another third ; for a fresh horde, the Harudes, numbering four and twenty thousand, had recently crossed the Rhine. Ariovistus was a cruel bloodthirsty tyrant ; and, if Caesar would not help them, they must all go forth, like the Helvetii, and seek some new home.

Failure of his attempts to negotiate with Ariovistus.

Caesar assured the chiefs that they might rely upon his support. Their interests indeed coincided with his. He saw that it was absolutely necessary to stop the flow of German invasion. Like the Cimbri and Teutoni, these fierce hordes might, if they were not checked, soon overrun the whole of Gaul, and thence pour into Italy. Moreover, the interest as well as the honour of Rome required that she should protect her allies ; and the Aedui were allies of long standing, whose fidelity had been rewarded by the title of 'Brethren'. And there was another reason why Caesar should interfere. Like Clive, when he found himself confronted by Dupleix, he could not stand still. He must either advance or retreat. If he were to shrink from espousing the cause of the Gauls, he would lose the credit which his victory had won, and perhaps force them to make common cause with Ariovistus against him. If he boldly confronted their oppressor, he himself would become the arbiter of Gaul. Peaceful methods, however, might be tried first. The Roman army was comparatively weak. Ariovistus was master of a formidable host ; and it would be foolhardy to attack him without absolute need. He had been treated with distinction by the Senate ; and there was just a chance that he might listen to reason. Besides, it would be impolitic for the proconsul to levy war against the King and Friend upon whom those titles had been conferred with his sanction, without preliminary diplomacy, which he must so conduct as to justify himself before his countrymen. Ariovistus was then probably in the plain of Upper Alsace ; and Caesar sent ambassadors to ask him to name some intermediate spot for a conference. He told them to say that if their master wanted anything from him, he must take

the trouble to come to him in person. He could not risk his safety by moving outside his own territory without his army; and to move and feed his army would involve an amount of exertion which he did not care to undergo. Meanwhile he should like to know what business Caesar had in a country which the Germans had won by their own swords. 58 B.C.

Caesar now assumed a more peremptory tone. Ariovistus had rejected his invitation. Very good! Then these were his terms. Not another man must set foot across the Rhine: the hostages of the Aedui must be restored; and Ariovistus must positively cease to molest that people or their allies. If he obeyed, Caesar would be his friend. If not, he should know how to avenge the wrongs of the Aedui. The Senate had decreed, three years before, that the Governor of Gaul for the time being should protect the Aedui and the other allies of the Republic; and he intended to obey his instructions.

Ariovistus haughtily replied that he was a conqueror; and, as a conqueror, he had a right to treat his subjects as he pleased. The Romans invariably acted on the same principle. He did not interfere with them: what right, then, had they to interfere with him? He would not molest the Aedui so long as they paid their tribute: but most certainly he would not give up the hostages; and if the Aedui did not pay, much good would their alliance with the Romans do them! For Caesar's threats he cared nothing. No man had ever withstood Ariovistus and escaped destruction. Let Caesar choose his own time for fighting. He would soon find out what mettle there was in the unbeaten warriors of Germany.

With this message came the alarming news that a host of Suebi had appeared on the eastern bank of the Rhine, and that the Harudes were actually harrying the lands of the Aedui. Caesar, the most reticent of writers, has told us that he was seriously alarmed.[1] The Gauls were waiting to see whether he or Ariovistus was to be master. If he suffered any reverse, they would probably rise in his rear; and

[1] *B. G.*, i, 37, § 4.

58 B. C. between them and the Germans his army might perish. Not a moment was to be lost if the formidable Suebi were to be prevented from reinforcing the army of Ariovistus. With all possible speed Caesar made arrangements with the Aedui, the Sequani, and the Lingones for the forwarding of supplies, and immediately put his army in motion. Three days later he heard that Ariovistus was hurrying to seize Vesontio, now Besançon, the chief town of the Sequani, a strong place well stored with all munitions of war. Marching night and day at his utmost speed to anticipate him, he encamped on the outskirts, and threw a strong garrison into the town.

He marches against Ariovistus and seizes Vesontio.

Vesontio, which now became Caesar's base, was an ideal Gallic stronghold. The town stood on a sloping peninsula, round which the Doubs swept in a curve that nearly formed a circle; while the isthmus, little more than five hundred yards wide, rose from either bank into a steep and lofty hill, girt by a wall, which gave it the strength of a citadel, and connected it with the town. During the short time that Caesar stayed there to collect supplies, his soldiers had plenty of opportunities for gossiping. The people of the place, and especially the traders, whose business had brought them into contact with the Germans, told marvellous stories of their great strength and superhuman valour:—one could not bear even to look them in the face, so terrible was the glare of their piercing eyes. The Roman soldiers were brave: but they remembered their desperate struggle with the Helvetii; they were liable to fits of panic; and they were very credulous. The idle chatter of their new acquaintances completely demoralized them. The mischief began with the tribunes, the officers of the auxiliary corps, and others who formed the personal following of the General. Many of them were soldiers only in name. Like every other Roman governor, Caesar had been obliged, for political reasons, to find places in his army for fashionable idlers and disappointed professional men, who had had no experience of war, and simply wanted to mend their fortunes by looting.[1] Now that there was a prospect of real stern fighting, they began

Panic in the Roman army.

[1] *B. G.*, i, 39, § 2. See also Cicero, *Fam.*, vii, 5–6, 8, 10, 18; *Q. fr.*, ii, 13, § 3.

to tremble. They whispered that the campaign was not authorized by the Senate, but undertaken simply to gratify Caesar's ambition.[1] Some invented excuses for asking leave of absence. Others felt bound, for very shame, to stay ; but they could not command their countenances enough to look as if they were not afraid. Sometimes indeed, in spite of themselves, they gave way to tears. Gradually even centurions and seasoned veterans were infected by the general alarm. Some of them indeed made an effort to disguise their fears. They told each other that it was not the enemy, but only the forests between them and the enemy and the probable failure of supplies that they dreaded. All over the camp men were making their wills ;[2] and Caesar was actually told that, when he gave the order to march, the men would refuse to obey. 58 B.C.

How Caesar restored confidence.

He immediately sent for the tribunes and centurions, and gave them a severe lecture. What business had they to ask where he intended to march ? It was most unlikely that Ariovistus would be mad enough to fight ; but supposing that he did, what was there to be afraid of ? Had they lost all confidence in themselves, all faith in their General ? What had these terrible Germans ever really done ? The crushing defeats which Marius had inflicted upon the Cimbri and Teutoni, the defeats which had been inflicted upon the gladiators, trained though they were in Roman discipline, in the recent servile war, gave the real measure of their prowess. Even the Helvetii had often beaten them ; and the Helvetii had gone down before the legions. No doubt Ariovistus had defeated the Gauls ; but what of that ? He had tired them out by avoiding a battle for months, and then attacked

[1] Dion Cassius, xxxviii, 35, § 2. I do not believe that Dion is inventing here.

[2] Meusel (*Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xxxvi, 1910, pp. 44–5), following W. Paul, argues that the words *vulgo totis castris testamenta obsignabantur* (*B. G.*, i, 39, § 4), on which my sentence is founded, are an interpolation. The reason which he gives—that they break the context and, in their existing position, can only refer to *non nulli* ('a few') in § 3, with which they are inconsistent—appears to me inadequate. Any one who reads the chapter in my translation of the *Gallic War* (pp. 34–5) will, I think, admit that the suspected words fit naturally into their place. Besides, as A. Klotz observes (*Caesar-studien*, 1910, p. 24, n. 2), they are substantially repeated by Florus (i, 45, § 12), who probably copied Livy ; which suggests that they are genuine.

58 B.C. them when they had dispersed and were off their guard. This did not mean that Germans were braver than Gauls; and Ariovistus himself must know that Roman armies were not to be trapped by such transparent devices. To talk about the difficulty of the country or the difficulty of getting supplies was downright impertinence. It was as much as to assume that the General did not know his own business. Supplies were coming up to the front from the friendly tribes; and the croakers would soon see that their alarm about the forests was absurd. As for the story that the army was going to mutiny, he did not believe it. Armies did not mutiny unless generals were incapable or dishonest. His integrity had never been called in question; and the late campaign proved that he could command. Anyhow on the very next night he intended to march; and if nobody else would follow him, he would go on with the 10th legion alone; for it, at all events, was faithful to its commander.

This vigorous little speech had a marvellous effect upon the troops. From despair their spirits bounded to the highest pitch of confidence; and they were only impatient to cross swords with the enemy. The men of the 10th, flattered by Caesar's trust in them, sent him a message of thanks through their officers; while the other legions asked theirs to tell him that they were sorry for what had occurred.

[About Aug. 31.] He resumes his march against Ariovistus.

At the hour which he had fixed Caesar struck his camp. He left a detachment to hold Vesontio. Before him all was unknown: but he had full faith in Diviciacus; and Diviciacus undertook to be his guide. To avoid the broken wooded country between Besançon and Montbéliard, he made a circuit northward and eastward, of about fifty miles, and then, threading the pass of Belfort, debouched into the plain of the Rhine, and pushed on rapidly past the eastern slopes of the Vosges till he reached a point within twenty-two miles of the German encampment. He has not told us where he formed his own camp: probably it was on the river Fecht, between Ostheim and Gemar.[1] Ariovistus, who was on the north, sent messengers to say that, as Caesar had come nearer, he had no objection to meeting him. Caesar

[1] See pp. 648–52.

accepted his proposal ; and the conference was fixed for the fifth day following. Ariovistus, who knew that Caesar's cavalry were weak, pretended to be afraid of treachery from the legions, and insisted that they should each bring with them a cavalry escort only. Caesar was unwilling to raise difficulties ; but, as all his cavalry were Gauls, and he did not care to trust his safety to them, he mounted the 10th on their horses. The place of meeting was a knoll,[1] rising above the plain, nearly equidistant from the Roman and the German camp. Caesar stationed the bulk of his escort about three hundred yards off : Ariovistus did likewise ; and each rode up with ten horsemen to the knoll. Ariovistus had stipulated that they should hold the conference without dismounting. Caesar began by reminding Ariovistus of the honours which the Senate had conferred upon him ; and afterwards repeated the demands, which he had already made through his envoys, on behalf of the Aedui. Ariovistus replied that he had only crossed the Rhine in response to Gallic appeals. The country which he occupied in Gaul had been formally ceded to him by Gauls : it was not he who had attacked them, but they who had attacked him. He had overthrown their entire host in battle ; and, if they cared to repeat the experiment, he was ready to fight them again. As for the friendship of the Romans, it was only fair that he should get some solid advantage out of it ; and if he could only retain it by giving up the tribute which he received from his subjects, he would fling it aside as readily as he had asked for it. He had entered Gaul before the Romans. Caesar was the first Roman Governor who had ever passed beyond the frontier of the Province. What did he mean by invading his dominions? That part of the country belonged to him just as much as the Province belonged to Rome. Caesar talked a great deal of the titles which the Senate had bestowed upon the Aedui ; but he knew too much of the world to be imposed upon by such shams. The Aedui had not helped the Romans in the war with the Allobroges ; and the Romans had not stirred a finger to help their ' Brethren ' against himself. He had good grounds for suspecting that

58 B.C.

His conference with Ariovistus.

[1] Or perhaps an earthen mound. See pp. 639–40.

58 B.C. the friendship which Caesar professed for him was another sham,—a mere blind under cover of which Caesar was plotting his ruin. He happened to know what was going on in Rome; and there were prominent men there who would be glad to hear of Caesar's death. If Caesar did not withdraw from his country, he would expel him by force of arms; but if he would only go away and leave him in peace, he would show his gratitude. Caesar quietly answered that it was impossible for him to go back from his word or to forsake the allies of his country; and, he added, if history were to be appealed to, the claim of the Romans to supremacy in Gaul was better founded than that of the Germans. He was still speaking when a soldier rode up and warned him that a number of Germans were edging up towards the knoll and stoning his escort. Riding back to his men, he withdrew them without attempting to retaliate; for, though he was confident that his splendid legion could easily beat the Germans, he was determined not to give them any pretext for accusing him of foul play.

Exasperated by this outrage, the Romans became more than ever impatient for battle. Two days later Ariovistus requested Caesar to meet him again, or else send one of his generals. Caesar saw no reason for further discussion, and did not care to expose his lieutenants to the tender mercies of a treacherous barbarian; but he sent his interpreter, Troucillus,[1] and a man called Metius, whom, as he believed, Ariovistus could have no motive for injuring. They were instructed to hear what Ariovistus had to say, and bring back word. The moment he saw them, Ariovistus flew into a passion. 'Why have you come here,' he shouted: 'to play the spy?' and when they attempted to explain, he cut them short and put them under arrest.

Mission of Troucillus and Metius.

On the same day he made a long march southward, and halted about six miles north of Caesar's camp, at the very foot of the Vosges. He had conceived a daring plan. Next morning his column ascended the lower slopes, marched securely along them past the Roman army, and took up a position two miles south of Caesar's camp. As he looked up

Ariovistus cuts Caesar's line of communication.

[1] See p. 652.

at the huge column winding leisurely by, Caesar saw that he was being outmanœuvred : to send the legions up the hill-side would be to court destruction ; and he could only wait, a passive spectator, while Ariovistus was cutting his communications and barring the road by which he expected his supplies.[1] 58 B.C.

How Caesar regained command of it.

Next day Caesar formed up his army immediately in front of the camp, under the protection of his artillery. Ariovistus might attack if he liked : but if he attacked, it would be at his peril ; if he declined the challenge, the legionaries would be assured that the Germans were not invincible.[2] Ariovistus remained where he was. On each of the four following days Caesar offered battle ; but the enemy would not be provoked into leaving their camp. Cavalry skirmishes indeed took place daily, but without any decisive result. The Germans had light-armed active footmen, who accompanied the cavalry into action, each one of them selected by the rider whom he attended : they were trained to run by the horses' sides, holding on to their manes ; and if the troopers were forced to retreat, they supported them and protected the wounded. As the infantry remained obstinately in their camp, and it was necessary for Caesar to win back communication with his convoys, he resolved to take the initiative. Forming his legions in three parallel columns, prepared, at a moment's notice, to face into line of battle, he marched back to a point about a thousand yards south of Ariovistus's position, and there marked out a site for a camp. One column fell to work with their spades, while the other two formed in two lines to protect them. Ariovistus sent a detachment to stop the work ; but it was too late : the fighting legions kept their assailants at bay, and the camp was made. Two legions with a corps of auxiliaries were left to hold it ; and the

[1] See pp. 649–50. Napoleon (*Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 89, n. 2) infers from Caesar's narrative (*B. G.*, i, 48, § 2) that Ariovistus only succeeded in cutting Caesar's communication with the convoys that were coming up from the Aedui and the Sequani, not with those which he expected from the Leuci and the Lingones.

[2] See Stoffel, *Hist. de Jules César,—Guerre civile*, ii, 342–5 ; *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, p. 64 ; and Caesar, *B. C.*, iii, 55, § 1 ; 84, § 2.

58 B. C. other four returned to the larger camp. Next day Caesar led his men into the open, but not far from his camp, and again offered battle. Ariovistus again declined the challenge; but, as soon as the legions had returned to their entrenchments, he made a determined attempt to storm the smaller camp, and only drew off his forces at sunset. The Romans had suffered as heavily as the Germans; but Caesar now learned from prisoners that the enemy had been warned by their wise women, whose divinations they accepted with superstitious awe, that they could not gain the victory unless they postponed the battle until after the new moon.

The Germans from superstition delay to fight a pitched battle.

Sept. 18. Caesar saw his opportunity. He waited till the following morning; and then, leaving detachments to guard his two camps, he formed his six legions, as usual, in three lines, and marched against the enemy. They had no choice but to defend themselves.[1] Their wagons stood in a huge semicircle, closing their flanks and rear; and, as they tramped out, their women stretched out their hands and piteously begged them not to suffer their wives to be made slaves. The host was formed in seven distinct groups, each composed of the warriors of a single tribe. As the Romans were numerically weaker than their opponents, the auxiliaries were drawn up in front of the smaller camp, to make a show of strength. Each of the *legati* was placed at the head of a legion, in order that every one might feel that his courage in action would not be overlooked. Caesar commanded the right wing in person, and, noticing that the enemy's left was comparatively weak, directed against it his principal attack, in the hope of overwhelming it speedily and thus disconcerting the rest of the force. But before the Romans in the front ranks could poise their javelins, the Germans were upon them; and they had barely a moment to draw their swords. Quickly stiffening into compact masses, the Germans locked their shields to receive the thrusts: but some of the Romans flung themselves right on to the phalanxes; they tore the shields from the grasp of their foes, and dug their swords down into them; and, after a close struggle, they broke the formation, and their weapons got freer play. The unwieldy

Caesar attacks them.

[1] See pp. 230, 650.

masses, unable to manœuvre or to deploy, reeled backward, dissolved, and fled. But the Roman left, overpowered by numbers, was giving ground. Young Publius Crassus, son of the celebrated triumvir, who was stationed in command of the cavalry, outside the battle, saw the crisis, and promptly sent the third line to the rescue. The victory was won, and the whole beaten multitude fled towards the Rhine. But the Rhine was some fifteen miles away ;[1] the Ill had first to be crossed ; and in that weary flight many fell under the lances of the cavalry. Only a few, among whom was Ariovistus, were lucky enough to swim the river or find boats. Caesar, in the course of the pursuit, came upon his interpreter, who was being dragged along in chains by his captors, and had only escaped death by the accident that, on drawing lots, they had decided to postpone his execution. There is nothing in Caesar's memoirs more full of human interest than the passage in which, breaking his habitual reserve, he tells us of the joy he felt on seeing this man, for whom he had the greatest respect and regard, alive and unhurt. It gave him, he tells us, a pleasure as great as he had felt in gaining the victory.

58 B. C.

They are defeated and expelled from Gaul.

The victory was decisive. The Suebi, who were on the point of crossing the Rhine, lost heart and set out homewards ; but the people in whose territory they had encamped, and whom they had doubtless plundered, pursued them and slaughtered many of the stragglers. And Caesar,—where was he to go ? What use was he to make of his victory ? If he had exceeded his authority in crossing the frontier of the Province,[2] it would be fatal to withdraw. That would be to invite the German to attempt a new invasion ; to confess weakness to the Gaul. Fortune beckoned him on. Gaul was disunited : her foremost state was on his side ; and others felt the spell of his success. To bring those gifted peoples under the civilizing sway of Rome, to open their broad lands to Italian enterprise,—that was a work to satisfy the most soaring ambition. For the present indeed he must return to Cisalpine Gaul, to conduct the civil duties of his government and watch the politics of Italy ; but leaving

[1] See pp. 655–7.

[2] See pp. 40–1, 41, n. 1, and 220.

58 B. C. his legions under the command of Labienus, he quartered them for the winter in the stronghold of Vesontio.[1] In that last act of his we may read the registration of a great resolve; and doubtless he reflected, as he travelled southward, upon the magnitude of the undertaking to which he had committed himself. For to all who had eyes to see and ears to hear he had made it evident that his purpose was nothing less than the conquest of Gaul.

Caesar quarters his legions at Vesontio.

Significance of this step.

[1] So Napoleon conjectures with probability (*Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 97): we only know for certain that the winter-quarters were in the country of the Sequani (*B. G.*, i, 54, § 2). But Napoleon's conjecture is supported by the fact that Caesar had garrisoned Vesontio (*ib.*, 38, § 7).

CHAPTER III

THE FIRST CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE BELGAE

57 B.C. Results of the first campaign.

THE results of the campaign which Caesar had just concluded may be summed up in a few words :—he had secured, at least for a time, the virtual submission of Central Gaul ; he had paved the way for the conquest by destroying or expelling the barbarian hordes who threatened to anticipate him ; he had restored the credit of the Aedui, who would serve him best ; and at Vesontio he had established a post, commanding Central Gaul, from which he could advance in any direction and to which, in case of need, he could retreat.[1]

The Belgae conspire against Caesar.

But the Gauls were not yet ready to bow their necks beneath the Roman yoke. Caesar's victories were doubtless talked of in every village from the Rhine to the Atlantic ; and it needed less than the Celtic quickness to perceive their significance. Before the close of winter he heard rumours that the warlike Belgae were conspiring ; and these rumours were confirmed by dispatches from Labienus. The tribes were binding each other by the interchange of hostages to mutual fidelity. They were fearful that Caesar would first conquer the rest of Gaul,[2] and then conquer them. Moreover, they were egged on to fight by certain influential chiefs from Celtican Gaul. The motives of these counsellors were various. Some simply desired to make their country free. It was all very well, they argued, to have got rid of the Germans ; but these new intruders were not a whit more welcome. If Caesar had expelled Ariovistus, he was evidently determined to take his place. The legions had settled down in the

[1] See G. Veith, *Gesch. d. Feldzüge C. J. Caesars*, 1906, p. 93.

[2] *Omni pacata Gallia* (*B. G.*, ii, 1, § 2). These words have sometimes been taken to mean 'as the whole of Gaul was [already] subdued' : but their position in the sentence excludes such an interpretation ; and Meusel's *lex. Caes.*, i, 717–29, shows that they mean 'if the whole of [Celtican] Gaul were subdued'.

57 B.C. country; and they intended to make the country support them. Others, merely because they were Gauls, longed, above all things, for revolution. Then there were princely adventurers, who were plotting to seize royal power, and who foresaw that, if Gaul became a Roman province, they would be obliged to submit to law, and would no longer be allowed to hire troops for the gratification of their ambition.

Caesar returns to Gaul, and marches against them.

On his own responsibility and at his own cost, Caesar instantly raised two new legions in Cisalpine Gaul, and sent them in the early spring to join Labienus. As soon as the herbage was sufficiently forward to make it safe to take the field, he crossed the Alps and rejoined his army at Vesontio. The tribes nearest to the Belgae, whom he charged with the duty of collecting information, reported that they were busily raising and concentrating levies. Having arranged for supplies of corn, Caesar pushed on and, after another fortnight's marching, appeared on the northern bank of the Marne.

The Remi submit, and help Caesar.

The Belgae were taken completely by surprise. Engrossed in their preparations against Caesar, they had never dreamed that Caesar might anticipate them. One tribe, the Remi, who occupied the country round Reims, Laon, and Chalons, were shrewd enough to perceive that his patronage would strengthen their own position. They were subject to the overlordship of their neighbours, the Suessiones, and wanted to shake off the yoke.[1] Two of their leading men, Iccius and Andebrogius, presented themselves in Caesar's camp, and not only submitted on behalf of the tribe, but promised to render him every assistance. Nothing could have been more opportune. He saw that it would be easy to establish in the heart of Belgium a power as devoted to his interests as the Aedui in Central Gaul. He gave the envoys a gracious welcome, only stipulating that the Reman senate should

[1] The Reman envoys told Caesar (*B. G.*, ii, 3, § 5) that the Suessiones and the Remi formed one political community. Now Galba was the king of the Suessiones; and therefore, it should seem, had been overlord of the Remi. Mommsen then is doubtless right in affirming that the Remi 'discerned in this invasion of the foreigners an opportunity to shake off the rule which their neighbours, the Suessiones, exercised over them'. *Hist. of Rome*, v, 1894, p. 50 (*Röm. Gesch.*, iii, 1889, p. 259).

OPERATIONS ON THE AISNE (According to Col. Stoffel)

The alternative site (see pages 660-665) is shown on the accompanying map (Carte de l'Etat Major [1:80,000], part of sheet 34.)
The numbers denote the heights in metres above the level of the sea.

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Scale 1,60,000

Kilometres 1 ½ 0 1 2

Roman Miles 1 ½ 0 1

Stanford's Geogl Estabt

Scale of Kilometres 0 1 2 3 4 5 kilometres

present themselves before him, and that the sons of the leading men should be delivered up as hostages. The envoys gave him full information. The Belgae, they said, were full of confidence. They boasted that the Cimbri and Teutoni, who had overrun the rest of Gaul, had never been able to get a footing in their land. The Remi had done their utmost to prevent the Suessiones from taking part in the movement, but in vain : indeed their king, Galba, had been unanimously elected commander-in-chief. Every other tribe had joined the league ; and Galba was prepared to put nearly three hundred thousand men into the field.[1] The estimate was certainly exaggerated : but Caesar could muster little more than forty thousand ; and his enemies were the stoutest and the most stubborn of all the warriors of Gaul. His only chance of success was to force their huge host to divide. With this aim, he asked Diviciacus to raise a levy of Aeduans and ravage the lands of the Bellovaci, which lay beyond the Oise, in the region now dominated by the huge choir of Beauvais. The entire armament was now in full march against him. They were moving down a road which led from La Fère, on the Oise, past Laon to Reims.[2] Caesar determined to choose his own battle-field. Marching rapidly northward from Reims, he crossed the Aisne by a bridge, and encamped on rising ground between that river and a small morass. The site is still disputed : we only know that it was either on the plateau of Pontavert or four miles higher up the stream on the gentle slope of Mauchamp, about a mile and a half north-east of Berry-au-Bac. This might seem to be the point where Caesar would naturally have crossed the Aisne ; but neither the slope nor the trenches which have been discovered upon it correspond satisfactorily with his description. The rampart of the camp, eight feet high, was faced with sods and revetted with timber, to keep its slope of the requisite steepness : along the top of it was set a palisade of interlacing branches ; [3] and the ditch which surrounded it was eighteen feet in width.

57 B.C.

He sends Diviciacus to ravage the lands of the Bellovaci.

Marches to encounter the advancing host, crosses the Aisne, and encamps on rising ground near the bank.

[1] See pp. 241–2.

[2] See pp. 658–9.

[3] Rampart and palisade combined were 12 feet high (*B. G.*, ii, 5, § 6, with which cf. A. Klotz, *Caesarstudien*, p. 220, n. 2). See pp. 586–7.

57 B. C. Caesar's rear was protected by the Aisne ; and his supplies could be brought up in safety by the Remi. At the northern end of the bridge he established a *tête de pont* ; and, to guard its further extremity, he left a detachment about two thousand strong under one of his generals, Titurius Sabinus.

The Belgae attack Bibrax. Towards midnight a messenger came into camp with the news that the Belgae were making a furious attack upon Bibrax, or Vieux-Laon, a Reman stronghold about seven miles to the north, and that Iccius, who commanded the garrison, despaired of being able to hold out unless he were promptly reinforced.

Caesar sends his auxiliaries to the rescue. Caesar instantly dispatched his Numidian and Cretan archers and Balearic slingers to the rescue. The Gauls knew nothing of the scientific methods by which the Romans captured fortified towns. When their numbers were sufficiently great, they used to drive the defenders from the rampart by showers of missiles, and then, locking their shields over their heads, to demolish a portion of the wall.[1] But Bibrax was defended on the south by impregnable escarpments : it would seem that Galba had neglected to invest this side ; and when Caesar's light troops appeared, the impatient and undisciplined host abandoned their attempt.[2] They only lingered long enough to ravage the lands and fire the hamlets within reach of the town.

The Belgae encamp opposite Caesar. On the following night the sudden blaze of a line of watch-fires, extending some seven miles in length beyond the further side of the morass, revealed to Caesar their encampment.

Caesar makes his position impregnable. So formidable was the appearance of the huge host, so great was their reputation as fighting men, that Caesar did not care to risk a battle until he had seen enough to judge whether he would have a reasonable chance of success. A few cavalry skirmishes convinced him that he had nothing to fear. The position which he had chosen may be described in his own words. 'The hill on which the camp stood,

[1] Here again Meusel (*Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xxxvi, 1910, pp. 40–1) sees an interpolation in Caesar's text (*B. G.*, ii, 6, §§ 2–3) ; but as he admits that the sentences may nevertheless be true, and as I cannot conceive that any interpolator would have invented them, I leave the text of my first edition unchanged. [A. Klotz (*Caesarstudien*, pp. 243–4), who generally agrees with Meusel, does not suspect this passage.]

[2] See p. 241, n. 6, and note on BIBRAX, pp. 399–400.

rising gradually from the plain, extended, facing the enemy, over the exact space which the line would occupy: on either flank its sides descended rapidly; while in front it gradually merged in the plain by a gentle slope.'[1] The legions were protected in front by the morass; but the vast numbers of the enemy might outflank them. To prevent this, Caesar made his men dig two trenches, each about three furlongs in length, transversely on either side of the hill; and at the extremity of each trench he caused forts to be constructed and armed with *ballistae* and catapults. Along the whole length of the hill, in front of the camp, he drew up six of his legions in battle array; while the other two remained to guard the camp. The enemy's masses were ranged on the further side of the morass. Each of the two armies obstinately waited for the other to cross. Meanwhile Caesar's cavalry were scattering the Belgic squadrons. At length, tired of waiting, he led his legions back into camp. There was a ford on the Aisne, about two miles from the *tête de pont*, which he had either failed to notice or had not thought it necessary to guard. Presently an orderly came from Sabinus, who reported that a body of the enemy were moving down to the bank, evidently intending to cross over, attack his camp, and destroy the bridge. Even if they failed, the corn-fields of the Remi would be at their mercy: the convoys would be cut off; and then the legions would starve. Taking his cavalry, light-armed Numidians, archers, and slingers, Caesar hurried down the hill, crossed the bridge, and pushed along the bank towards the ford. There were the enemy, splashing through the water. The archers and slingers attacked them, and did terrible execution. The survivors clambered over the fallen bodies, and staggered on, but were beaten back by showers of stones and arrows; while the leading division, who had crossed already, were surrounded by the cavalry and cut to pieces.[2]

57 B.C.

The Belgae attempt to cut his communications, but are defeated.

The Belgae were thoroughly disheartened. They had no organized commissariat; and their supplies were running out. Galba had not the genius to control a vast multitude

They disperse.

[1] *B. G.*, ii, 8, § 3.

[2] Regarding Caesar's operations on the Aisne see pp. 659–68.

57 B.C. made up of hordes without discipline, with conflicting interests, and distracted by mutual jealousies. Caesar's position was impregnable ; and he evidently had no intention of quitting it. His allies would soon be swarming over the frontier of the Bellovaci ; and the chiefs of that tribe insisted on returning to defend their families. It was decided, therefore, that each tribe should go back to its own country, and that, whatever district the Romans might invade, all should rally to its defence. But this resolution was merely to save their self-respect. In the night the whole multitude poured out of their encampment with great uproar and confusion, each man struggling to get in front of his fellows. Caesar at first suspected that this movement was merely a ruse ; but at daybreak he received positive information that the enemy had really gone, and immediately sent his cavalry, supported by three legions under Labienus, in pursuit. The rear ranks, when they were overtaken, stood at bay, and resisted resolutely ; but those in front, hearing the shouts of the combatants, made haste to escape. The slaughter was instant ; and the pursuers raced on. As long as daylight lasted they hung on the rearguard, slaying, pursuing, and slaying again ; and at sunset they returned to camp. Caesar left the disorganized host no time to rally. The Suessiones, Bellovaci, and Ambiani had diverged from their natural route, in order to fetch their baggage ; and by a great effort he might be able to surprise their forts.[1] Next morning he pushed on westward down the valley of the Aisne. In a single forced march he reached Noviodunum, near the modern Soissons, the chief stronghold of the Suessiones, and at once attempted an assault ;[2] but though the garrison was weak, the moat was so wide and the wall so high that his troops were repulsed. In spite of their fatigue, they proceeded to fortify their camp and make preparations for a siege. Sappers' huts were constructed for protecting the workers : earth and fascines were shot into the moat ;[3]

Caesar's cavalry pursue them.

He marches westward, and receives the submission of the Suessiones, Bellovaci, and Ambiani.

[Probably Pommiers, about two and a half miles west of Soissons.]

[1] See p. 670. [2] See pp. 464–6.

[3] *Aggere iacto* (*B. G.*, ii, 12, § 5). See Napoleon III, *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 105 and n. 2. Von Göler (*Caesars gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 73) takes *aggere* in the sense of 'a terrace' (cf. p. 81, *infra*), the construction of which would have required many days.

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THE BATTLE OF NEUF-MESNIL.

The numbers denote the heights in metres above the level of the sea

and movable towers were erected to carry the artillery which was to play upon the defenders of the wall.[1] During the night the whole host of the fugitive Suessiones thronged into the town and reinforced the garrison ; but they were so confounded by the formidable appearance of the siege works that they surrendered without striking a blow.[2] Marching on westward, Caesar crossed the Oise. Bratuspantium, the chief town of the Bellovaci, opened its gates on his approach; and when he drew near Samarobriva, where now rises the colossal pile of the cathedral of Amiens, the Ambiani likewise tendered their submission. Caesar treated the three tribes with equal clemency and firmness. He punished no one; but he disarmed the garrisons of Noviodunum and Bratuspantium, and required the surrender of hostages of noble birth. Diviciacus, who had rejoined him, interceded for the Bellovaci ; and, as his policy was to strengthen the influence of the Aedui, he gave out that it was his regard for those loyal allies which led him to show mercy. But now he learned that his progress was about to be disputed. On the north-east, among the inhospitable forests of the Sambre and the marshes of the Scheldt, dwelt a tribe whose primitive virtues had not yet been enfeebled by contact with civilization. No traders were suffered to cross their frontier, for fear the luxuries of which the rude warriors were still ignorant might sap their manhood. Bitterly taunting their neighbour tribes for having so tamely surrendered, they vowed that for their part they would accept no terms of peace. This people, whom of all his enemies Caesar most respected, and of whom he wrote with one of those rare touches of enthusiasm that here and there relieve the severity of his narrative, were the Nervii.

57 B.C.

[Breteuil?][3]

The Nervii resolve to resist.

A couple of marches brought the legions to the Nervian frontier. The road led through Hainaut, past the site of the modern Cambrai. Three days later Caesar gathered from some rustics, who had been taken prisoners, that the warriors

Caesar marches against them.

[1] Livy, xxi, 11, § 7.

[2] Long (*Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv, 52, note) thinks that there would not have been time to complete the construction of the sappers' huts until after the Suessiones had arrived.

[3] See pp. 400–2.

57 B.C. He learns that they and their allies are encamped on the right bank of the Sambre.

of the tribe were encamped only nine miles off, on the further bank of the Sambre, with their allies, the Viromandui and the Atrebates; and that another tribe, the Atuatuci, were marching from the east to join them. They were waiting for him near Maubeuge, where they expected that he would cross the river.[1] He immediately sent on a party of centurions and pioneers to choose a camping ground. It happened that some of his prisoners had escaped to the enemy in the night. They told them that each of the Roman legions was separated on the march from the one that followed it by a long baggage-train; and that, when the foremost legion, encumbered with their heavy packs, reached the camping ground, it would be easy to overwhelm them and plunder the baggage before the others could come to the rescue. The centurions selected for the site of the camp the heights of Neuf-Mesnil, about three miles south-west of Maubeuge. The ground sloped evenly and gently towards the left bank of the Sambre; but from a point opposite the front of the camp to the bend of the river at Boussières, nearly a mile and a half further up, the slope terminated near the water's edge in a steep escarpment. The depth of the river was not more than three feet. From the opposite bank an open meadow, over which were scattered a few cavalry piquets, rose into a hill covered with woods. The space for the camp was measured and marked out. Meanwhile the Roman army was toiling up from behind, its march being delayed by thick hedges, which the inhabitants had planted long before to check the raids of their neighbours' cavalry. The formation was different from that which had been described to the Nervii; for when close to an enemy, Caesar always changed his order of march. In front came six legions in column. Then followed the entire baggage-train, protected by the two newly raised legions, which closed the rear. The cavalry, who had gone on in front, rode across the shallow stream, and, supported by archers and slingers, engaged the enemy's piquets. The piquets fell back into the wood, whither the cavalry dared not follow them; and there leisurely re-forming,

His pioneers mark out a camp on the heights of Neuf-Mesnil.

See p. 675.

they charged again and again. As the infantry arrived upon the ground, some began to dig the trenches for the camp, while others scattered over the country to cut down wood. Caesar neglected to take the precaution of keeping a part of his force under arms.[1] At length the head of the baggage-train appeared. Ambushed among the trees, the Gauls caught sight of it. Suddenly they darted forth from the wood and came pouring down the open ; their rush swept away the terrified cavalry ; now they were across the river and racing up the slope ; and now they fell upon the half-formed line. 57 B.C.

The confusion was overwhelming. From the moment when the onrushing host was seen there were hardly ten minutes for preparation. The Romans flung aside their tools. Caesar had to give all his orders in a breath. The red battle-ensign was quickly hoisted over his tent. The blast of the trumpet recalled the men who were working at the further side of the camp, while messengers ran to fetch those who had scattered far afield. They had not a moment even to cram on their helmets or pull the coverings off their shields. The generals were obliged to act without waiting for orders ; and Caesar was glad that he had forbidden them to leave their respective legions while the camp was being made. He could not direct them ; for the hedges which crossed the field obstructed his view. Want of time as well as the nature of the ground prevented them from forming a regular line of battle : along the brow of the hill a number of isolated combats were beginning at once ; and all that could be done was to make each legion face its immediate assailants. Disciplined, and self-reliant from the experience which they Battle of Neuf-Mesnil.

[1] As he had done when constructing his smaller camp in presence of the hostile force of Ariovistus (*B. G.*, i, 49). The great Napoleon blames him for having allowed himself to be surprised. 'Il est vrai,' he says, 'que sa cavalerie et ses troupes légères avaient passé la Sambre ; mais, du lieu où il était, il s'apercevait qu'elles étaient arrêtées à 150 toises de lui, à la lisière de la forêt ; il devait donc ou tenir une partie de ses troupes sous les armes, ou attendre que ses coureurs eussent traversé la forêt et éclairé le pays. Il se justifia en disant que les bords de la Sambre étaient si escarpés qu'il se croyait en sûreté dans la position où il voulait camper.' *Précis des guerres de César*, 1836, p. 45, with which cf. Turpin de Crissé, *Comm. de César*, i, 1785, pp. 154–6. It should be noted that '150 toises' is a mistake ; the distance from the Roman camp to the edge of the wood was about 7 furlongs.

57 B.C. had gained, the soldiers instinctively grasped the situation : they did not trouble themselves to join their respective companies, but one after another, as they hastened up, they fell into the ranks by the standards nearest them. Hurrying down at haphazard to cheer them on, Caesar found himself close to the left of the line. There was the 10th,—his favourite legion. 'Keep cool, men,' he cried, 'and remember the honour of the legion. Stand up against that rush!' He had no time to say more ; for the enemy were within a javelin's cast, and, as he hurried on, both sides were engaged.

Hurling their javelins, the 10th and, on their left, the 9th fell, sword in hand, upon the Atrebates, who, panting from their headlong rush, soon gave way. Hunted down the slope, they plunged into the stream, but the Romans dashed after, sword in hand ; and when the survivors clambered up the further bank and tried to rally, fell upon them again and chased them up the hill. At the same time the 11th and 8th drove the Viromandui from the front of the camp right down to the water's edge. But the very success of these four legions was disastrous to their comrades—the 12th and 7th—on the right. The left and front of the camp were exposed ; Boduognatus, the commander-in-chief, seized his opportunity ;[1] and the Nervii, compacted in one mighty column, climbed the steep bluff, swarmed up the heights, and while some outflanked the two legions on their right, the rest pressed on for the defenceless camp. The beaten cavalry came full upon them and again took to flight : the officers' servants, who had gone out to plunder, looked back, and ran for their lives : the baggage-drivers, who were coming up, scattered in all directions, shrieking with terror; and a body of horse from the Treveri, who formed part of the auxiliary force, rode off homewards to announce Caesar's defeat.

Caesar saw it all as he made his way from the left to the right wing. The men of the 12th, who had never before fought in a pitched battle, were huddled together so closely that they could hardly use their swords ; and nearly every officer was either killed or wounded. The standard-bearer

[1] Capt. Veith (*Gesch. d. Feldzüge C. J. Caesars*, p. 109) compares his manœuvre to that of Epaminondas at Leuctra.

of the 4th cohort had fallen : the standard—to Roman soldiers a holy emblem—was lost. Sextius Baculus, the chief centurion of the legion, was so weakened by loss of blood that he could no longer stand. From the rear ranks men were slinking away to escape the showers of missiles. There were no reserves ; and the numbers of the enemy were inexhaustible. Fresh swarms kept pressing up the hill, and closing in on either flank. Seizing a shield from a man in the rearmost rank, Caesar pushed his way through to the front : he called to his centurions by name : he told the men to open up their ranks—so they would be able to use their swords better—and charge. At the sound of his voice their spirits rose ; and each man of them hoped that the General would see how bravely he could fight. But the 7th also, on their right, were hard pressed. Caesar told the tribunes to bring the two legions gradually closer together, and form them up so as to face the enemy on every side.[1] And now, as the men were relieved from the dread of being attacked in the rear, they fought with renewed confidence. The two legions which guarded the baggage had heard of the fight, and were marching up at their utmost speed. Suddenly above the ridge of Neuf-Mesnil they appeared ; and presently the 10th, dispatched by Labienus, recrossed the river, hurried up the hill-side, and threw themselves upon the enemy's rear. The effect of their appearance was electrical. Even the wounded leaned on their shields, and plied their swords : the scattered camp-followers plucked up courage and turned upon the enemy ; while the cavalry did all they could to atone for their flight. The Nervii in their turn were hemmed in. But in their last agony they made good their proud boast. Man by man, beneath the javelin and the thrust of the short sword, their front ranks fell. Higher rose the heap of prostrate bodies ; and leaping on to them, the survivors snatched up the fallen javelins and flung them back, till they too fell ; and all was still.[2] 57 B.C.

[1] See pp. 676–7.

[2] See pp. 671–7. Caesar's narrative (*B. G.*, ii, 27, §§ 3–5, 28, §§ 1–2) implies that a few of the Nervian contingent escaped ; but whether they ran away from the fighting line or had not come into action at all, he does not say.

57 B.C. So ended this wild fight,—a soldiers' battle, but withal the battle of a great man. Within an hour it was over, fought and wellnigh lost and won.[1]

The power of the Belgae was broken. What remained to be done was only matter of detail. The old men of the Nervian tribe, with the women and children, had gathered before the battle in the midst of the marshes formed by the estuary of the Scheldt. Within a few days a deputation came from them to ask an audience of the conqueror. They were shrewd enough to exaggerate their losses.[2] Their army, they said, was all but annihilated. Only five hundred fighting men remained out of sixty thousand; and of six hundred senators no more than three. Wishing to establish a reputation for clemency, Caesar permitted the survivors to retain their lands and even their fortified villages, and warned the neighbouring tribes to refrain from molesting them. He then marched eastward against the Atuatuci. This people were different in origin from the rest of the Belgae. Fifty years before, the Cimbri and Teutoni, marching for the south, had left some of their number, under the protection of six thousand warriors, in Belgic Gaul, to herd the cattle and guard the booty which they could not take with them. After the destruction of their kindred, these men and their descendants had continued to maintain themselves against the enemies who surrounded them: they had achieved, by prolonged fighting, a commanding position; and they now occupied the broad plain of Hesbaye on the northern bank of the Meuse.[3] On hearing of the defeat of their allies, they had returned home and concentrated in one town of great strength, situated on Mont Falhize, opposite the modern fortress of Huy. The Meuse, winding in the shape of a horse-shoe, flowed through the meadows beneath the southern slopes of the hill; and the town, perched above its rocky heights, seemed inaccessible, save by one gentle ascent on the north-east, where a high wall[4] frowned down upon the

Caesar treats the survivors with clemency.

[1] See p. 677. [2] See pp. 205–7.

[3] In 57 B.C. they may also have possessed lands on the right bank. See pp. 385–7.

[4] Caesar (*B. G.*, ii, 29, § 3) calls it 'a double wall of great height' (*duplici*

besiegers. Heavy stones and pointed beams were ranged upon the wall; and in front of it was a deep moat. At first the garrison made a succession of sorties: but Caesar threw up a rampart from one reach of the river, round the north of the hill, to the other; and, as was usual in regular sieges, a terrace, composed of a core of earth and timber, supported by walls of logs piled cross-wise, was built up at right angles to the wall.[1] On this terrace was erected one of the wooden towers from the stories of which archers, slingers, and artillery used to shower missiles among the defenders of a besieged town. It was intended that, as soon as the terrace approached the wall, a battering-ram should be employed to effect a breach. The garrison, confident in the strength of their fortress, watched these operations with ignorant contempt. They despised the Romans for their small stature, and asked them if they imagined that such pygmies as they could get a huge tower like that on to the wall. But the laugh was soon turned against them. When they saw the tower actually moving on its rollers and steadily nearing the wall, they fancied that there must be some supernatural power at work, and in great alarm sent out envoys to beg for terms. They would surrender, the envoys said; only they entreated to be allowed to keep their arms, without which they could not defend themselves against their neighbours. Caesar insisted on unconditional surrender. He would take care that their neighbours did not molest them. The chiefs could only submit; and swords, spears, and shields were pitched down into the moat until the heap almost reached the top of the wall. Towards sunset all the Roman soldiers who had gone into the town were withdrawn, for fear they might commit any excesses. The garrison had kept about a third of their weapons in reserve, and had improvised shields of bark and wattle-work, covered with

57 B.C. He besieges the stronghold of the Atuatuci.

They surrender.

altissimo muro). The meaning of *duplex* has been much discussed; and Colonel De La Noë (*Bull. de géogr. hist. et descr.*, 1887, p. 253) understood it as simply 'gros, large, épais': but M. J. Déchelette (*L'Anthr.*, xvii, 1906, pp. 393–5) points out that M. Saint-Venant has discovered ancient forts in Provence and the Maritime Alps, the ramparts of which were formed each of two distinct walls.

[1] The difficult questions relating to the construction of the siege-terrace (*agger*) are discussed on pp. 599–607. See also pp. 140, 144.

57 B.C. skins. They calculated that the Romans would be off their guard, and laid their plans accordingly. The contravallation was traced along rising ground. In the middle of the night the Atuatuci poured out of the gates, and advanced to attack it where the ascent was easiest. But Caesar had provided against the chance of treachery. Piles of wood, all ready laid, were set ablaze ; and, warned by the signal, the troops came streaming from the nearest redoubts. The Gauls fought with the courage of despair ; but missiles rained down upon them from the rampart and from the towers which had been erected upon it ; and they were driven back with heavy loss into the town. Next day the gates were burst open, and the Romans rushed in. Caesar was neither vindictive nor cruel ; but to those who defied him, and especially to those who broke faith, he was absolutely ruthless. Fifty-three thousand of the Atuatuci—all who were found within the town—were sold as slaves.[1]

But afterwards make a treacherous attack.

Their punishment.

The campaign was over. The prestige which it had won for Caesar was so great that more than one German tribe sent envoys across the Rhine to offer submission. One partial failure alone marred the general success. Amid the clash of arms, Caesar did not forget the commercial advantages which his conquest might secure for Rome. On his way back to Italy,[2] he sent one of his generals, Servius Galba, to open up the road leading from the Valais over the Great St. Bernard into Italy, which traders had only been able to use hitherto at great risk and by the payment of heavy tolls. The tribes with which Galba had to deal were the Nantuates, who occupied the Chablais and the southern bank of the Rhône as far as St. Maurice ; the Veragri, whose chief town, Octodurus, stood upon the site of Martigny, near the confluence of the Rhone and the Dranse ;[3] and the Seduni, whose name is preserved in the modern Sitten, or Sion. His force consisted only of the 12th legion, which had suffered so severely in the battle with the Nervii, and a body of cavalry. Skirting the northern shore of the Lake of Geneva, the little column entered the broad valley of the

Galba's campaign in the Valais.

[1] See p. 44, and note on ATUATUCORUM OPPIDUM, pp. 387–93.

[2] Schneider's *Caesar*, i, 210, note.

[3] See pp. 677–8.

upper Rhône, walled in on right and left by wooded mountains. 57 B.C.
Having inflicted several defeats upon the mountaineers, captured several of their strongholds, and compelled the chiefs to surrender their sons as hostages, he posted two cohorts in the neighbourhood of St. Maurice, and took up his own quarters in Octodurus. The Dranse, which then flowed in a different channel, down the middle of the valley, divided the village into two parts, the eastern of which he allowed the inhabitants to occupy, while he reserved the vacant quarter for the legion, and proceeded to fortify it. The encampment thus formed was between Martigny-la-Ville and the more southerly Martigny Bourg. Besides the two cohorts which he had detached, Galba was obliged to send out a number of small parties for supplies. The camp was dominated on either side by the heights which border the valley of the Dranse ; and the force which remained was insufficient for its protection. The mountaineers resented the deprivation of their children ; and, as Caesar half naïvely remarked, they believed that the Romans, not content with occupying the roads, intended to annex their country. One morning Galba was informed that the heights were covered by armed men. They were evidently determined to cut his communications, and to bar his exit from the valley. The fortifications were still unfinished, and the supply of corn was insufficient ; for, as the mountaineers had submitted and given hostages, Galba had never dreamed that he might have to fight. A council of war was called. Some of the officers urged Galba to abandon the baggage and fight his way out ; but he resolved, with the concurrence of the majority, to defend the camp. The troops had only just time to man the rampart before the enemy rushed down to the attack. They hurled stones and darts from every side. The Romans offered a vigorous resistance ; and not a missile which they threw from their commanding position missed its mark. But the enemy's numbers enabled them to bring down fresh men as often as they were wanted ; while the Romans had to fight on without relief. For six hours they fought at bay till their stock of missiles was nearly spent, and the enemy were beginning to fill up the trench and to

57 B.C. break down the rampart. Just in time, Sextius Baculus, who had fought so gallantly on the Sambre, and a tribune named Gaius Volusenus, ran to the chief, and convinced him that the only chance of averting destruction was to make a sortie. The men were told to stand quietly on the defensive for a few minutes, and rest themselves. Suddenly, at a given signal, four compact little columns dashed out from all four gates, and cut their way through the loose ranks of the astounded mountaineers. There was no time to rally. Discipline prevailed over numbers; and the mountaineers were driven with heavy loss out of the plain, and chased over the hills. But Octodurus was plainly untenable; and it appeared impossible to obtain supplies. Next day therefore Galba burned all the houses in the village, and returned to spend the winter in the country of the Allobroges.

It is easy to find fault with Galba; and nobody would contend that he made the best of the situation. But his circumstances were extremely difficult. The merest tiro who spends a day in the valley of the Dranse will see that he could not have chosen a worse position than Octodurus. But the force which Caesar allotted to him was inadequate: it was hard to resist the temptation of occupying the village, where substantial dwellings already existed; and if he had selected a suitable site, he might have been obliged to build a large number of huts, which would have increased the labours of his weakened legion.

The other legions had already been distributed in their winter-quarters. One, under Publius Crassus, the young general whose promptitude had contributed so much to the defeat of Ariovistus, had been sent, after the battle with the Nervii, to receive the submission of the maritime tribes of Normandy and Brittany.[1] This legion and certain others were cantoned along the valley of the Loire, from Angers to Orléans; while the rest were quartered near the theatre of the recent Belgic campaign.[2] Commius, a chief of the Atrebates, whom Caesar had marked as a capable diplomatist,

Submission of the tribes of Brittany and Normandy.

[1] The Veneti, Venelli, Osismi, Coriosolites, Esuvii, Aulerci, and Redones.

[2] The exact position of these legions cannot be fixed. See p. 709, n. 14.

was made king over his own people; and apparently his appointment was acceptable to them. 57 B. C.

Rejoicings at Rome.

In Italy the news of Caesar's victories was received with an outburst of enthusiasm.[1] Men felt that he had avenged the disaster of the Allia; and even the Senate gave expression to the popular feeling. After his dispatches had been read, it was decided to hold a thanksgiving service of fifteen days,—an honour which no Roman citizen had ever received before.

[1] Plutarch, *Caesar*, 23.

CHAPTER IV

CAMPAIGNS AGAINST THE MARITIME TRIBES AND THE AQUITANI

56 B.C. Delusive prospects of peace.

THE barbarian invaders of Gaul had been destroyed or driven back; the Belgae had been chastised; and many of the other states had proffered their submission. The Aedui and the Remi were still friendly; and the countenance of Caesar had greatly increased their renown, and therefore the influence which they were able to exert on his behalf. The Remi, indeed, had succeeded to the position from which the Sequani had been deposed: numerous tribes acknowledged their ascendency; and, though their prestige was still inferior to that of the Aedui, a time might come when they would be useful as a counterpoise to them. The Gallic peoples had little consciousness of national unity: they were familiar with the idea of Roman dominion; and, while Caesar did not interfere with their domestic affairs, they were not prepared to make any serious effort to throw off his supremacy. So confident was Caesar in the prospect of tranquillity that he set out on a political tour to Illyricum, —the most distant quarter of his province. But Gaul was still a long way from being subdued. The legion under Publius Crassus had been quartered in the northern part of Anjou. The most considerable of the neighbouring tribes were the Veneti, who dwelt in the storm-beaten tract of western Brittany which comprises the department of the Morbihan and the southern part of the department of Finistère. Like the modern Bretons, they were the stoutest and the most skilful seamen in Gaul; they had a powerful fleet of large vessels, the model of which had, we may suppose, been originally borrowed from that of the merchantmen of the Carthaginians, whose commerce in the Atlantic and

[The country of the Andes.]

in British waters they had inherited ; and their prosperity depended upon the carrying trade with Britain, of which they possessed the monopoly. They, however, as well as the more distant tribes of Brittany and Normandy, professed to submit ; and Crassus sent a number of officers to arrange with them for a supply of corn. But the chiefs of the Veneti were beginning to repent of their tame surrender. Besides their natural impatience of foreign ascendency, they had, we are told, a business-like motive for resistance. They had heard, it should seem, that Caesar was contemplating an invasion of Britain ; and they were naturally determined to prevent him from interfering with their trade.[1] The rumour which had reached them was true. The subjection of the Veneti was a necessary prelude to the invasion of Britain. For Caesar could not safely embark his army unless he had command of the Channel ; and at the time when he planned the invasion the masters of the Channel were the Veneti.[2] Hoping to induce Crassus to restore their hostages, they detained as prisoners the officers who had come to them. With the rash precipitancy of Gauls, the tribes of the Côtes-du-Nord and the Orne followed their example : presently the whole north-western seaboard was sworn to resist the encroachments of Rome ; and an embassy was sent to Crassus, to demand the restoration of the hostages.

56 B.C.

Rebellion of the Veneti, Coriosolites, and Esuvii.

[The Coriosolites and Esuvii.]

Messengers were soon posting with dispatches for Caesar, who was still in Illyricum. He had studied the character of the Gauls to some purpose ; and he knew that, if they soon lost heart, their blood was up on the slightest stimulus. Like other peoples, they preferred independence to subjection ; and, above all things, their restless spirit craved variety. If he were to overlook the conduct of the Veneti, the other tribes of Gaul would fancy that they might defy him with impunity. The Belgae indeed were only half subdued ; and they were said to have solicited the support of the Germans. Accordingly Caesar sent instructions to his officers to have a

Caesar prepares for a naval war.

[1] Strabo, *Geogr.*, iv, 4, § 1.

[2] See Rice Holmes, *Ancient Britain and the Invasions of Julius Caesar*, pp. 301–3.

56 B.C. fleet built in the ports at the mouth of the Loire, to raise oarsmen from the Province, and to collect as many pilots and seamen as they could.

The conference at Luca.

Throughout his proconsulate Caesar was in a position different from that of a modern viceroy, who, if his work is almost beyond his strength, may securely concentrate upon it all the power of his mind. He was ever obliged to look back towards Rome, to look forward to the uncertain but stormy future, when he would have to struggle for political supremacy ; and whenever an enemy attempted to weaken his position, he was obliged to parry the blow. His old enemy, Domitius Ahenobarbus, who was a candidate for the consulship, openly declared that when he came into office he would deprive him of his command. Even Cicero manifested an inclination to oppose him ; and he had reason to fear that Pompey would join Cicero. His term of office would expire in about two years, on the 1st of March, 54 B.C. If he were recalled then, his work in Gaul would be left unfinished ; and he would go back, too soon,—to chaos or civil war. From Illyricum he had returned to Ravenna, where the elder Crassus met him. Hearing of Cicero's measures, he moved southward, about the middle of April, to Luca, and invited Pompey to come thither as his guest. At this little town the fortunes of the world were decided. Caesar offered terms of such startling liberality that an agreement was come to at once. It was arranged that his term of office should be prolonged for another five years, and that Pompey and Crassus should exert their influence with the Senate to secure to him the right of increasing his legions to ten, and of charging the state-chest with the pay of those which he had raised on his own responsibility.[1]

Caesar returns to Gaul.

From Luca he hastened to join his army, and took up his quarters in the neighbourhood of Nantes.[2] His first step

[1] Cicero, *Fam.*, i, 7, § 10 ; 9, §§ 9–10 ; *Q. fr.*, ii, 6. § 2 ; *De prov. cons.*, 11, § 28 ; Suetonius, *Divus Iulius*, 24 ; Appian, *B. C.*, ii, 17 ; Plutarch, *Crassus*, 14, *Caesar*, 21, *Pompeius*, 51.

[2] M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 290) believes that Caesar, on returning from Italy to Gaul, went to Belgium, ' where he rejoined the bulk of his army.' But there is no evidence that the bulk of the army was in Belgium : on the contrary, four legions at least out of the eight which then composed the army

was to distribute the legions more widely. Labienus was sent to the country round Trèves, to keep an eye upon the Belgae and to prevent the Germans, whose aid they were said to have solicited, from crossing the Rhine. Sabinus was directed to disperse the allies of the Veneti in the Calvados, the Cotentin, and the Côtes-du-Nord; while Crassus marched for Aquitania. It is most unlikely that the Aquitanians would have taken up arms on behalf of their alien neighbours; but Caesar may not have been aware of the want of sympathy between the two peoples; and, with or without provocation, he would of course have compelled the former as well as the latter to acknowledge the supremacy of Rome. The Veneti and their allies, who saw that they had irretrievably committed themselves, were equally active.[1] They repaired and provisioned their fortresses, assembled their ships in the Venetian ports, and even sent across the Channel to ask for help. But more significant of the alarm which Caesar's designs had aroused was that they succeeded in securing the alliance of the Morini and the Menapii,—two Belgic tribes whose territory was four hundred miles from their own, but who commanded the north-eastern coast, from which he would have to embark for Britain. The Veneti knew the strength of their country, and had little doubt of success. The coast of the Morbihan was pierced by long estuaries and broken by numerous inlets, which would greatly hinder the progress of an invading army. Little corn was grown in those parts; and the granaries had been emptied to supply the forts. Want of food therefore must soon force the Romans to beat a retreat; and, if the worst came to the worst, those born sailors knew that they could take to the stout ships which had weathered so many storms; while the frail Roman vessels would be sure

56 B. C.

[The territory of the Treveri.]

[The Lexovii, Venelli, and Coriosolites.]

Preparations of the Veneti.

were encamped elsewhere (see *B. G.*, ii, 34, 35, § 3; iii, 11, § 2; and p. 84); and why should Caesar have taken this very roundabout way of getting to Venetia? Surely he could have sent orders to Labienus (*B. G.*, iii, 11, § 2) instead of adding several hundred miles to the length of his march in order to convey them in person.

[1] M. A. Blanchet (*Traité des monn. gaul.*, pp. 524–5, with which cf. 519–20) infers from the discovery of forty-two Aremorican hoards of late coins that the Veneti and their allies buried their treasure in view of the campaign.

56 B.C. to run aground among the shoals, or to founder in the tempestuous seas that buffeted the rock-bound shore.

The Roman fleet weather-bound in the Loire.

The Roman fleet, which included ships impressed from the maritime tribes[1] between the Loire and the Garonne, was soon assembled, under Decimus Brutus, in the estuary of the Loire; but the weather was too stormy for it to put to sea. Meanwhile Caesar crossed the river Vilaine and entered the Morbihan, hoping, by the time the gales moderated, to get possession of the enemy's strongholds. This, however, as he soon found, was a work of extreme difficulty. The forts were situated at the ends of spits or promontories, connected with the mainland by shoals, which, at high tide, were completely submerged. Caesar constructed dykes across the shoals, along which the troops marched to attack the town. Before they could deliver the assault, however, the garrison took to their ships, and sailed away to the nearest fort. The greater part of the summer was frittered away in these tedious sieges; and Caesar was obliged to confess that all his labour had been expended in vain. Accordingly he resolved to wait for his fleet, and encamped on the heights of St. Gildas, south-east of Quiberon Bay. Hard by, in the river Auray, which discharges itself into the bay, the whole Venetian armada was assembled.[2]

Caesar's fruitless campaign against the Veneti.

Sea-fight between the Veneti and Brutus.

At length the wind moderated; and one morning the long-looked-for fleet was descried in the offing. Forthwith, gliding out from the mouth of the Auray, appeared the hostile squadron, numbering two hundred and twenty sail. They stood out of the water like floating castles. The great sails were made, not of canvas but of leather, to withstand the force of the Atlantic gales. Clustering on the cliffs, the legionaries had a good view of the two fleets as they approached one another. Brutus and his officers were at their wits' ends to know what to do. The rams of the light galleys would fail to make any impression on those huge hulls. The

[1] The Pictones and Santoni. M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 292) thinks that the ships which Caesar borrowed from these two tribes were used for transport [of grain?] and auxiliary services; but is it not likely that he thought it advisable to include in his armada some vessels of native build?

[2] See pp. 679–85.

deck-turrets were run up ; but even then the Romans were overtopped by the lofty poops, and could not throw their javelins with effect. But the Roman engineers had prepared an ingenious contrivance. Two or more galleys rowed up close to one of the enemy's ships. Then, with sharp hooks fixed to the ends of long poles, the Romans caught hold of the halyards, and pulled them taut : the rowers plied their oars with might and main ; and the sudden strain snapped the ropes. Down fell the yards : the troops clambered on to the helpless hulk ; and the struggle was soon ended by the short sword. When several ships had been thus captured, the rest prepared to escape. But they had hardly been put before the wind when there was a dead calm ; and, as they had no oars,[1] they could not stir. The swift little galleys ran in and out among them, and captured them one after another. When the evening breeze sprang up, a few slipped away in the dusk, and ran for the shore ; but all the rest were taken.[2] 56 B.C.

This battle decided the war. All the chiefs and all the warriors of western Brittany had taken part in it. They had no reserves. They had staked everything upon a single throw, and had lost. Deprived of their ships, the survivors had no means of defending their forts. There was nothing for them therefore but unconditional surrender. They had made a very gallant fight for freedom ; and Caesar respected a brave enemy : but he always took the straightest path to gain his end. He determined to teach the whole Gallic people, by a terrible lesson, that it was dangerous to rebel. As the Venetian senate were responsible for the act of violence which had led to the war, every man of them was put to death ; and all the rest of the tribe, or all that could be caught, were sold into slavery. Punishment of the Veneti.

About the same time dispatches arrived from Sabinus. His force consisted of three legions, probably about twelve thousand men, with a due proportion of cavalry, archers, and slingers. The allies of the Veneti, commanded by a chief named Viridovix, had mustered in the peninsula of the Campaign of Sabinus against the northern allies of the Veneti.

[1] Except perhaps sweeps, which they may have used occasionally to help them in tacking. See *Class. Quarterly*, iii, 1909, p. 37.

[2] See pp. 236–7.

56 B. C. Cotentin. The tribes of the Calvados and the Eure, in their feverish eagerness for war, had massacred their senators, simply because they counselled peace. Bandits and desperadoes from every part of Gaul flocked to join the host. Sabinus encamped on a hill; and, having a wholesome respect for their numbers, he could not be provoked to come out and fight. The enemy put him down as a coward, and his own men grumbled at his inaction. But he was simply biding his time. He bribed a Gaul belonging to his auxiliary corps to go over to the enemy, in the guise of a deserter, and tell them that Caesar was in great straits, and that he himself was on the point of going to his assistance. The man had a ready wit and a glib tongue, and played his part well. The Gauls eagerly swallowed the tale, and clamoured to be led to the attack. Their commissariat had, as usual, been neglected; and they were impatient to finish the campaign at a blow. Viridovix and his brother chiefs were obliged to let them have their way. Their plan was to fall upon the Romans before they had time to man the ramparts. The ascent from the plain to the camp was about a mile. The Gauls ran up the slope at the top of their speed, each man carrying an armful of brushwood to fill up the trench. But Sabinus was ready for them. Sallying from the right and the left gate,[1] the disciplined cohorts fell upon the flanks of the panting multitude, and sent them flying. The cavalry allowed few to escape. No second blow was needed. The league fell to pieces at once. As inconstant as they had been impetuous, the tribes abandoned the struggle, and laid down their arms.

[The Lexovii and the Aulerci Eburovices.]

Brilliant campaign of Crassus in Aquitania.

Meanwhile Crassus was carrying all before him in Aquitania. He was determined not to forfeit the reputation which he had gained in the battle with Ariovistus, and he remembered that two Roman generals, Lucius Valerius Praeconinus and Lucius Manlius, had suffered defeat[2] in the country which was to be the theatre of the campaign. Before crossing the Garonne, he halted to complete his preparations in the fertile lands of the Nitiobroges[3]; and, unlike Galba, he

[1] See Long's *Caesar*, p. 176, note.

[2] In the war with Sertorius.

[3] See *Rev. de Gascogne*, xxxvi, 1895, pp. 230–4, 240, and *B. G.*, iii, 20, § 2; vii, 31, § 5.

took the greatest pains to ensure the regular delivery of supplies. Caesar had only been able to spare him twelve cohorts, or about five thousand men : but he had a powerful body of cavalry, which he now strengthened by fresh levies ; and he also raised auxiliaries and summoned a number of Roman veterans from Tolosa, Carcaso,[1] and Narbo to join him. Crossing the Garonne, he defeated the Sotiates near the source of the Ciron, and captured their stronghold, the site of which is now occupied by the town of Sos. Thence he penetrated into the basin of the Adour. The Aquitanians, in great alarm, obtained reinforcements from their kinsmen, the Iberians of the Pyrenees.[2] The leaders who were chosen had learned the art of war under the famous Sertorius, and their operations showed some degree of skill. They carefully selected a position for their encampment, and fortified it in the orthodox fashion. They sent out detachments to block the roads. Relying on their numbers, which were daily augmented, they hoped to gain a bloodless victory by cutting off the invader's supplies, and harassing his rear as soon as he should be obliged to retreat. But Crassus had no intention of retreating. He could not spare a man to secure his supplies, but he knew that sheer audacity will often work wonders. His men were in great heart, emboldened by the enemy's inaction, and confident in their young leader. Having offered battle in vain, he boldly assaulted the enemy's camp. They resisted stoutly, and threw their javelins from the high rampart with great effect : but they had neglected to secure the rear gate ; and some fresh

56 B.C.

[Toulouse, Carcasonne, and Narbonne.]

[1] In the β MSS. the text stands *Tolosa Carcasone et Narbona* ; in the α *Tolosa et Narbonae*. H. Meusel, following β, formerly supplied *et* for grammatical reasons before *Carcasone* ; but now, influenced by Mommsen (*Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xx, 1894, p. 203), who thinks that the absence of *et* in β proves that *Carcasone* was interpolated, he omits that name. A. Klotz, however (*Caesarstudien*, p. 35, n. 3), very acutely remarks that χ (see p. 202, *infra*) has *Tolosae* instead of *Tolosa*, which suggests that in α something has dropped out. I have no doubt that Caesar wrote *et Carcasone*.

[2] M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 307, n. 2) believes that Caesar postdates the preparations of the tribes of Southern Aquitania and their Spanish neighbours against Crassus. Do not the opening sentences of *B. G.*, iii, 23, in which Caesar states not only the time but also the motive—the alarm of the tribes on hearing that Crassus had captured the strong fort of the Sotiates—militate against this view ?

56 B.C. cohorts managed to get round by a circuitous way, break down the feeble defences, and steal in unobserved while the battle was raging at the opposite end. The imprisoned Aquitanians and Spaniards rushed pell-mell out of the entrenchment, and made a desperate effort to escape : but the country was one vast open plain ; and they were ridden down and slaughtered in thousands. Forthwith all except the remoter tribes tendered their submission, and voluntarily sent hostages.

Fruitless campaign of Caesar against the Morini.

The conquest of the maritime peoples was all but complete. The Morini and the Menapii—those Belgic tribes who had formed an alliance with the Veneti—alone refused to submit. Their country, which extended from the neighbourhood of Étaples to the lower Rhine, comprised the northern parts of the Pas-de-Calais and the Nord, Flanders, Zeeland, and North Brabant. Caesar had over four hundred miles to march, and the summer was nearly at an end ; but he felt confident that he would be able to subdue the recalcitrant tribes in one brief campaign. He traversed Brittany and Normandy, joining Sabinus on the way ; crossed the Seine and the Somme ; and then pushed northward through Artois. Taught by the sad experience of their impetuous countrymen to avoid a pitched battle, the Morini sought refuge, on the approach of the legions, in their vast forests. While the legionaries were fortifying their camp, the enemy, who had not yet been seen, suddenly dashed out of the woods and attacked them ; and although they were driven back with heavy loss, a few Romans, who chased them too far, were cut off and killed. This mishap made the legionaries more careful. They spent some days in cutting down the trees, piling them up on both flanks, as they advanced, to guard against surprise. The enemy's cattle and part of their baggage fell into their hands. But now the wind blew and the rain fell with such violence that the work of felling the trees had to be suspended : the troops could no longer live safely in tents ; and it was necessary to abandon the campaign. The cultivated lands of the Morini were harried and their hamlets burned ; and the legions returned to winter in the newly conquered districts between the Seine and the Loire.

CHAPTER V

THE MASSACRE OF THE USIPETES AND TENCTERI

Gaul was now, to all appearance, conquered. Throughout these three years the central tribes, influenced by the example of the Aedui, distracted by intestine rivalries, awed by the genius of the Roman Governor, had remained simply passive. But it was not enough merely to conquer: the conquest had also to be secured against foreign invasion. A fresh incursion of hungry Germans was imminent. The defeat of Ariovistus had alarmed the Teutonic races; but it had not stilled the inward throes by which they had so long been convulsed. The Suebi had swept before them the lesser tribes of the Usipetes and Tencteri: a land to dwell in and food to eat the fugitives must needs obtain; and now, after three years' wandering, a vast horde of emigrants appeared in the neighbourhood of Emmerich, on the right bank of the lower Rhine.[1] The Menapii occupied lands on both banks of the river. Those who dwelt on the right bank, terrified by the appearance of the huge host, hurriedly abandoned their villages, crossed to the southern side, and, joining their kinsmen, prepared to dispute the passage. Baffled in their attempts to cross, the Germans made a feigned retreat, which lasted three days: then marched rapidly back; surprised and massacred the Menapii, who had returned; seized their boats and crossed over; and for the rest of the winter lived at free quarters in the Menapian territory on the west of the Rhine.

55 B.C. The Usipetes and Tencteri invade Gaul.

The news reached Caesar in Cisalpine Gaul, while he was discharging the civil duties of his government. He knew the character of the Gauls,—the frivolity and craving for excitement that impelled them to rush blindly into new con-

[1] See pp. 689–90.

55 B.C. Caesar fears that some of the Gallic tribes may join them.

nexions without counting the cost. There was, indeed, no reason why they should trouble themselves to repel one invader for the benefit of another. But the chances were that some of the tribes might be impelled by jealousy of their rivals or hostility to the Romans to welcome the new-comers. Determined to prevent such a coalition or crush it in the making, Caesar returned to Gaul earlier than usual, and proceeded to join the legions, which had concentrated at some point near the lower Seine, probably in the neighbourhood of Évreux.[1] His apprehensions were justified. Certain tribes had entered into negotiations with the Germans ; and they had by this time moved as far southward as the territories of the Eburones and the Condrusi. The former included portions of the provinces of Limbourg and Liège : the Condrusi inhabited the district of Condroz, between the Meuse and the Ourthe. Caesar summoned the Gallic chiefs, including those who had committed themselves, to a council ; and, pretending to be ignorant of the negotiations, told them that he was going to make war upon the common enemy, and called upon them to furnish their regular contingents of cavalry. When the contingents arrived, he made a selection from the whole number, and, having provided for the delivery of his supplies, marched towards the distant country in which he heard that the Germans were encamped. It is impossible to say where he crossed the Meuse, or what route he followed afterwards ; but the general trend of his march was towards the neighbourhood of Coblenz. Apparently the Germans were in no aggressive mood. Tired of their enforced wanderings, they only wanted to settle down peaceably in some fertile part of Gaul. When Caesar was still some days' march from their encampment, their envoys met him. The Germans, they said, had no desire to fight ; but, if Caesar attacked them, they would not flinch. All they asked was that he should assign them lands, or at all events leave them to enjoy those which their swords had

He returns to Gaul, and summons a Gallic council.

He marches against the Usipetes and Tencteri ;

and negotiates with their envoys.

[1] The legions had wintered ' in the territories of the Aulerci, the Lexovii, and the other tribes which had recently been in arms ' (*B. G.*, iii, 29, § 3). M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 326, n. 2), assuming that Caesar met the Gallic council at Samarobriva (Amiens), as he did in the following year (*B. G.*, v, 24, § 1), conjectures that the concentration was effected there.

won. They acknowledged no superiors but the Suebi ; and against the Suebi the gods themselves could not contend. Caesar replied that he could make no terms with them while they remained in Gaul. People who could not defend their own country had no right to encroach upon others : besides, there were no lands to spare in Gaul sufficiently extensive to support so vast a multitude. They were welcome, however, if they cared to recross the Rhine, to settle in the country of the Ubii, who had just put themselves under the protection of Rome. The territory of this people—the only German tribe which had definitely submitted to Caesar [1]—extended from the neighbourhood of Coblenz to the neighbourhood of Bonn. The envoys said that they would refer Caesar's proposal to their principals, and return with an answer in three days. Till then they hoped that he would advance no further. This request he rejected ; for he felt sure that it was simply a pretext to gain time for the German cavalry, who had crossed the Meuse in quest of corn and plunder, to return. 55 B.C.

Marching on steadily, he was only eleven miles from the German head-quarters when the envoys returned. Again they begged him to halt ; and again he refused. They then asked for three days' grace, to arrange terms with the Ubii. What they really wanted, as Caesar saw, was to gain more time. He meant to do the same. He promised, however, not to advance that day beyond a river, four miles distant, where he intended to water ; and told them to come back again on the morrow, that he might decide on their request, and to bring with them as many of their leaders as could come. What he desired was to get those leaders into his power, so that their formidable host might be helpless in his hands. Perhaps he knew that his offer to let the Germans settle in the country of the Ubii was impracticable : perhaps indeed he had only made that offer in order to gain time, and to put the Germans off their guard : certainly he

[1] No doubt the Ubii were one of the German tribes which had sent envoys to Caesar two years before (see p. 82, and *B. G.*, ii, 35, § 1). As he was on the point of starting for Italy, he had then ordered the embassies to return in the following spring ; but apparently the Ubii alone had obeyed.

55 B.C. believed that they were trying to outwit him, and he was determined to outwit them,—determined, by hook or by crook, to secure the essential object of ridding himself and Gaul of these dangerous immigrants, and to secure it at the least possible cost to his own army. Meanwhile, at the urgent entreaty of the envoys, he sent orders to his Gallic cavalry, who had gone on in advance, to refrain from provoking a combat. The envoys took their leave. The cavalry, five thousand strong, were riding quietly along, on the faith of the truce, when, without a moment's warning, a band of horsemen swept down, and scattered them right and left. As they tried to rally, the enemy leaped to the ground, and stabbed their horses in the belly. An Aquitanian noble, named Piso, did his best to save the credit of the Gallic cavalry, hazarding his life to rescue his brother, and when he was unhorsed, fighting against desperate odds till he fell. His brother, who had escaped, would not survive him, and galloped back into the press to die. But their example was wasted. The Gauls were six to one: but they were thoroughly unnerved; and, while many lay dead, the rest galloped away, and never drew rein till they came within sight of the Roman column.

Their cavalry, in violation of a truce, attack his.

Caesar made up his mind. Those Germans were treacherous savages; and he saw no reason why he should make any terms with them. Besides, this paltry triumph they had stolen would make them heroes to the feather-pated Gauls. To hold his hand until they were reinforced would be sheer madness. Next morning the German chiefs came to his camp,—to apologize, as they said, for the unauthorized attack by their cavalry. Caesar was delighted. He determined to end the business by a single blow, bloodlessly,—for his own men. He refused to hear what the chiefs had to say. Believing, or professing to believe, that they only wanted to cajole him into granting an extension of the truce, he ordered them to be put under arrest, and then, placing his demoralized cavalry in the rear, marched on rapidly against the Germans. They were taking their ease among their wagons, with their wives and children, when the legions appeared. Confounded by the sight, not knowing what had become of their leaders,

He resolves to attack them at once:

arrests their chiefs, who had come, ostensibly to explain;

55 B.C. and virtually annihilates the host.

they lost all presence of mind, and crying aloud in their terror, ran hither and thither about the camp. The infuriated Romans burst in. The few Germans who were quick enough to seize their weapons, clustered behind the wagons and tried to resist : but, distracted by piercing shrieks, they turned and saw their wives and children flying before the emboldened cavalry ; and flinging aside their arms, they rushed pell-mell to overtake them. Many were slain in the pursuit. Others scattered over the country and escaped. At length the panting remnant reached the confluence of the Moselle and the Rhine.[1] Worn out and desperate, they plunged in ; and the swift current swept them away.

His conduct condemned in the Senate.

The conduct of Caesar was fiercely condemned by Cato and others in the Roman Senate. The refusal to listen to the explanation of the German chiefs ; their detention, contrary, as it appeared, to the law of nations ; and then the virtual extermination of an entire people,—these things perhaps shocked sensitive consciences, and certainly gave a handle to political opponents. Cato actually proposed that the perfidious Governor should be given up to the Germans.[2] Caesar pursued his course unmoved, and emphasized in his narrative the comprehensiveness of the massacre :—' the host of women and children began to flee in all directions ; and Caesar sent his cavalry to hunt them down.' The object for which their blood was spilt was gained. Thoroughly cowed, the Germans thenceforward ceased to disturb the tranquillity of Gaul.

He bridges the Rhine, punishes the Sugambri, and returns to Gaul.

But Caesar determined to make assurance doubly sure. As the Germans thought so little of crossing the Rhine, he would cross it too, and teach them that invaders might in their turn be liable to invasion. Besides, it was necessary to chastise the Sugambri, the northern neighbours of the Ubii, in whose country the cavalry of the Usipetes and Tencteri had just found a ready welcome. When he sent to demand their surrender, the Sugambrian chiefs asked with what face he, who complained so loudly of the Germans' crossing the Rhine, could claim the right to dictate to the

[1] See pp. 691–706.

[2] Plutarch, *Caesar*, 22 ; Suetonius, *Divus Iulius*, 24.

55 B.C. Germans in their own country. The Ubii, on the other hand, besought him to come and help them against the Suebi : his prestige, they said, was so great that the mere appearance of his army would be enough to secure them from attack ; and they would gladly undertake to find boats to cross the stream. But Caesar did not think it safe to trust to boats ; and he intended to make the passage in a way that would produce a greater moral effect. Broad, deep, and swift as the river was, he would throw a bridge across it, to teach the Germans what Roman science could effect. He selected for the spot a site between Coblenz and Andernach, which was opposite the territory of the Ubii.[1] The Roman engineers were accustomed to bridge rivers ; but this was an undertaking of unprecedented difficulty. But Caesar had inspired every man with faith in his star ; and all ranks worked with extraordinary energy. Within ten days from the time when the first tree was felled, the great river was spanned by a firm bridge of piles, buttressed to withstand the force of the flood ;[2] and the legions were encamped on the German bank. Leaving a strong guard at either end, Caesar marched rapidly northward against the Sugambri. Their country extended eastward of Crefeld, Düsseldorf, and Cologne. Envoys from various tribes met Caesar on the way, and solicited his friendship. He answered them courteously, and directed them to bring hostages to his camp. The Sugambri, on the advice of the Usipetes and Tencteri, had taken refuge in the outlying forests ; and, after burning their villages and cutting their corn, Caesar returned to the country of the Ubii. The Suebi had sent their wives and children into the secure recesses of the vast forest of Central Germany, and were banded together somewhere in the heart of their country, ready for battle. But Caesar had neither the force nor the inclination to undertake the conquest of Germany. Having accomplished every object for which he had entered the country—punished his enemies, reassured his friends, and made the name of Rome respected—he recrossed the Rhine and destroyed his bridge.

[1] See pp. 706–10.

[2] See pp. 711–24.

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CHAPTER VI

THE DISASTER AT ATUATUCA AND ITS RESULTS

55–54 B. C.

Caesar's invasions of Britain.

Caesar's attention was now diverted for a time from the affairs of Gaul. During the few weeks of summer that followed his passage of the Rhine and the latter part of the ensuing season he made his two famous expeditions to Britain. He went to Illyricum in the intervening winter, to punish a tribe which had been making raids upon Roman territory, and did not return to Gaul until the close of the following May. Quintus Cicero, a younger brother of the orator, joined him on the road, and took up the post of a *legatus*. Caesar had offered him the appointment, and he accepted it in the hope of securing his political position ; but he had no zest for the work. He complained to his brother that his duties were onerous ; yet he had leisure in camp to compose four tragedies in sixteen days.[1] Caesar himself often found time to write to the elder Cicero, and even to read his verses. Cicero, indeed, who had atoned for his former opposition by celebrating Caesar's victories in his speech ' On the consular Provinces ', was at this time more friendly to him than he had ever been ; and Caesar, knowing the value of his support, neglected no opportunity of conciliating him. Their correspondence shows us what manner of men Caesar had to entertain in his army when friends or political associates asked favours of him. Cicero begged him to give a place of some sort to a lawyer named Trebatius ; and Caesar, who knew how to render such appointments innocuous, good-naturedly consented in a letter, the kindliness and the humour of which are reflected in one which Cicero wrote to Trebatius himself.[2]

[1] See Mr. H. W. Garrod's interesting paper in *Journal of Philology*, xxxi, 1908, pp. 79–80.

[2] Cicero, *Fam.*, vii, 5–6, 8, 10, 18 ; *Q. fr.*, ii, 13 (15 A) ; iii, 5–6, § 7 ; 8, § 1.

54 B. C. Caesar's avowed objects in invading Britain were to inform himself about the island and its inhabitants, and to punish the southern tribes, who had helped their kinsmen in Gaul to resist him. Fortunately several clans of the Morini, from whose country he was obliged to embark, spontaneously submitted before his first voyage; and although they attacked an isolated body of his troops on his return, they were instantly punished by Labienus. The first expedition was a mere reconnaissance: the second, made with a far stronger force, was planned for conquest; and although this task was too great for the force and the time which Caesar could spare, the avowed objects were effectually gained,—the Britons ceased to abet the resistance of their kinsmen beyond the strait. On each occasion Caesar left behind him a force sufficient to keep open his communications and to overawe intending rebels; and on the second expedition he took with him all the chiefs whom he had the slightest reason to suspect. The one of all others whom he had been most careful to summon was the notorious Dumnorix, who was as popular with the masses and as determined an enemy of Rome as when he had been detected in his intrigues with the Helvetii. Quite recently he had caused great alarm and indignation to the Aeduan council by giving out that Caesar intended to make him king.[1] Nothing could have provoked Caesar more; for the success of his policy depended largely upon his keeping the Aeduan government in good humour. Dumnorix was most reluctant to leave the country. He doubtless saw that he might never again have such an opportunity as Caesar's absence afforded of furthering his schemes; and he begged for leave to stay behind. He was terrified, he said, at the prospect of crossing the sea: besides, he had religious duties, which he could not fulfil unless he remained in Gaul.[2] Caesar was of course deaf to his entreaties

Intrigues of Dumnorix.

[1] Various writers have suggested that Caesar really had made the offer to Dumnorix, in order to purchase his support. It seems to me more likely that, as Schneider conjectures (*Caesar*, ii, 26), Dumnorix had made the statement in question in order to exasperate the Aedui against Caesar. Still, I am not indisposed to believe that Caesar may have thrown out some vague hint which led Dumnorix to expect that if he proved himself loyal he would be rewarded.

[2] See Schneider's *Caesar*, ii, 27.

and his pretended scruples. Dumnorix then tried to induce his brother chiefs to join him in refusing to go. He assured them that Caesar was only taking them to Britain that he might put them all to death, and called upon them to swear that they would unite with him in working for the interest of Gaul. Caesar kept himself informed of his intrigues, and did his best to prevent him from rushing on his doom. All this time the fleet was weather-bound in the Portus Itius, which may possibly have lain between Cape Blanc-Nez and Cape Gris-Nez, although one would not hesitate to identify it with the harbour of Boulogne, from which Caesar sailed on his first expedition, if his narrative did not suggest that he had chosen a new point of departure, and if it were certain that his enormous fleet could have cleared the estuary without undue delay.[1] At length the wind shifted; and Dumnorix took advantage of the confusion that attended the embarkation to ride off with the Aeduan cavalry. Instantly stopping the embarkation, Caesar sent a strong body of horse in pursuit with orders to kill him at once if he attempted to resist. He fought desperately for life and liberty: but the troopers failed to support him; and he fell, passionately asserting with his dying breath the independence of his tribe. 54 B.C. His fate.

The death of this resolute adventurer was a temporary relief to the Roman Governor; but it probably helped to kindle into a flame the discontent which had long been smouldering in the breasts of the Gauls. Doubtless the Aedui were glad enough to be rid of the Helvetii: doubtless others besides the Aedui rejoiced at the overthrow of Ariovistus. But it was not to be expected that they should feel any gratitude to Caesar. Individuals like Diviciacus, tribes like the Remi, had of course gained something by his friendship. But Gaul, as a whole, had so far gained nothing. Not only were the constant presence of the legions and the endless requisitions of corn an intolerable burden,[2] but to the The Gallic nobles in a dangerous mood.

[1] See pp. 432–8. The balance of probability is greatly in favour of Boulogne.

[2] It may perhaps be inferred from *B. G.*, vii, 76, § 1—*pro quibus meritis civitatem eius* [Commii] *immunem esse iusserat, iura legesque reddiderat*—that tribute also was exacted (see p. 838). Possibly, however, as M. Jullian remarks (*Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 278, n. 1), *immunem* may mean free from the burden of

54 B.C. high-spirited Celtic knights the fact of subjection was more galling still. They had indeed partly themselves to blame. Weakness of purpose, mutual jealousy, petty ambition had been their bane. They had not realized, or had not valued their national unity enough to make a united effort for its preservation. The Nervii indeed had fought like heroes; but the bulk of the Belgae had been too selfish, too faint-hearted, too distrustful of each other, above all, too feebly organized to support them. The Veneti had made a gallant resistance; but the enthusiasm of their allies had vanished at the first reverse. The states of the interior had acquiesced in the domination of Caesar, without a blow, nay even without a protest. It would, of course, be unjust to ignore the difficulties with which they had to contend. If Caesar was justified in the severity with which he criticized the infirmities of their national character, it would have been unreasonable to expect from a medley of tribes, which had hardly had time to outgrow their political infancy, the harmonious action which could only have been the fruit of ages of discipline. Rome herself repelled invasion only because fate deferred it until, favoured by geographical position and after many centuries of struggle, she had been able to unite the divers forces of Italy: the Gallic tribes were attacked by a matured power while they were still in the stage through which every great people has been forced to travel before it could become a nation. They were heavily weighted by the selfishness or the astuteness, call it which one will, of the Aedui and the Remi; and above all, no leader had appeared whose personality was sufficiently commanding to rally the patriots of every state round his standard. But the steady pressure of the conqueror was

paying tribute to some other Gallic tribe; or may it mean free from the burden of supplying corn? What conclusion is to be drawn from the words *iura legesque reddiderat* I cannot tell. *Prima facie* they would seem to imply that Caesar had already begun to legislate for Gaul, which is hardly credible. They clearly imply that 'the rights and laws' (*iura legesque*) of certain tribes had been infringed, as they of course were in cases where oligarchy was superseded in favour of a king. But perhaps the Atrebates, like the Remi (*B. G.*, ii, 3, § 5), had been subject to some other tribe; and if so, Caesar may only have meant that he had restored their independence.

producing its natural effect upon a people who, notwithstanding their intestine quarrels, were animated by the recollection of ancient renown, who spoke one language, and who venerated one divine ancestor. The chiefs were in a dangerous mood; and the populace were ready to back them. Caesar was perfectly aware of their temper: indeed he had returned prematurely from Britain because he was warned that disturbances were impending. The harvest in Gaul this season was very scanty; and he was obliged therefore, in order to ensure an adequate supply of grain, to distribute his legions for the winter over a wide extent of territory. As the Belgic states appeared to be the most restless, their country was selected for the occupation. One legion, under Gaius Fabius, was quartered among the Morini; another, under Quintus Cicero, who was allowed to choose,[1] among the Nervii, in the neighbourhood of Namur; a third, under Labienus, not improbably at Mouzon, some ten miles south-east of Sedan, near the western frontier of the Treveri. Three, under Trebonius, Marcus Crassus,[2] and Plancus respectively, were stationed close together at Samarobriva and in the plain round Beauvais. One, consisting entirely of recruits,[3] with five veteran cohorts, was sent to Atuatuca, in the country of the Eburones. The site of this famous camp has never been determined; for, although it is generally identified with Tongres, Caesar's narrative would seem to imply that it was east of the Meuse, and not very far from Liège.[4] The garrison was commanded by Sabinus and Aurunculeius Cotta, the former of whom, as the senior officer, had the superior authority.[5] One legion only, under Roscius, was sent outside Belgic territory to the country of the Esuvii, in the Orne. The services of the younger Crassus, one of the most capable of Caesar's officers, who was very near his heart, and whose noble nature captivated Cicero,[6] were no longer available: he had accompanied his father, the triumvir, to Syria, where he was destined to perish on

54 B.C.

Distribution of the legions for the winter of 54–53.

[Amiens.]

[1] Cicero, *Att.*, iv, 19, § 2.
[2] Marcus Crassus was Caesar's quaestor and an elder brother of Publius.
[3] See p. 732, n. 1. [4] See pp. 371–84. [5] See p. 726.
[6] *Fam.*, xiii, 16, § 1; *Brutus*, 81, § 282.

54 B.C. the field of Carrhae. Caesar fixed his head-quarters at Samarobriva ; and in view of the prevailing discontent, he determined not to leave Gaul for the winter until the various camps were fortified.

Divide et impera.

About this time an incident occurred which Caesar may have regarded as a sign of a coming storm. His motto was *Divide et impera.* The Aedui and the Remi had both been faithful to him ; and with the object of strengthening their influence and thereby diminishing the chances of revolt, he had always treated them with distinction. Moreover, he had elevated chiefs who had done him service to the thrones of their ancestors in states where monarchy had been overthrown by oligarchy ; his object doubtless being not only to put a premium upon loyalty, but also to use the loyal as instruments for keeping the anti-Roman party in check.[1]

Assassination of King Tasgetius, Caesar's nominee, by the Carnutes.

One of his nominees, Tasgetius, had, for three years, been king of the Carnutes, a tribe which dwelt in the country round Orléans and Chartres. How he used his power, we are not told ; but soon after Caesar's return from Britain he was assassinated. Caesar instantly sent Plancus with his legion, to arrest all who were concerned in the deed, and to terrorize intending rebels.

Intrigues of Indutiomarus against Caesar.

All this time one chief in particular, whose pride Caesar had humbled, was busily intriguing against him. In the spring of every year he convened a diet of the Gallic chieftains, partly, it should seem, to test their temper, partly to fix the strength of the cavalry contingents which their respective tribes were to provide. Since the battle with the Nervii, the Treveri, whose cavalry had witnessed the desperate struggle of his legions, had refused to send their representatives ; and it was said that they were intriguing with the Germans. Just before the second expedition to Britain, Caesar entered their country at the head of a strong force with the view of re-establishing his authority. Two chiefs, Cingetorix and his father-in-law, Indutiomarus, were struggling for supremacy. Cingetorix at once presented himself before Caesar, promised fidelity to Rome, and gave full information of what was going on in the country.

[1] See pp. 521-3.

Indutiomarus collected levies, and prepared to fight. Many of the leading men, however, influenced by Cingetorix and appreciating the power of the legions, came into Caesar's camp and made terms for themselves. Indutiomarus soon found that he had miscalculated his strength, and hastened to excuse himself. Caesar, who had no time to spare, contented himself with taking hostages for his good behaviour. At the same time he of course did everything to strengthen the influence of his supporter; and Indutiomarus smarted under the feeling that his credit with his countrymen was gone. It is probable that during Caesar's absence he was concocting schemes of revenge. The isolation of the various camps gave him his opportunity. A few days after the legions had taken up their quarters he instigated Ambiorix and Catuvolcus, each of whom ruled one half of the country of the Eburones, to attack the camp of Sabinus and Cotta. Caesar was a hundred and fifty miles away: the nearest camp, that of Cicero, at least forty-five miles: at Atuatuca there were barely six thousand legionaries, all told, and two-thirds of them were unseasoned men. Success seemed certain. Ambiorix and Catuvolcus, who had only just taken their quota of corn to the generals, mustered their tribesmen in great force, surprised and overpowered a fatigue party, who were engaged in felling wood outside the camp, and then made a sudden onslaught upon the camp itself. But the camp was strongly fortified, and stood upon rising ground of great natural strength. The troops promptly manned the rampart: a squadron of Spanish horse made a successful sally; and the assailants fell back in discomfiture. Their leaders shouted out that they would like some one to come and talk over matters, so that all disputes might be peaceably settled. Two deputies accordingly, one of whom had regularly conveyed instructions from Caesar to Ambiorix, were sent out to hear what they had to say. Ambiorix had made himself useful as a political agent; and, in acknowledgement of his services, Caesar had relieved him from the burden of paying tribute to the Atuatuci, and had restored to him his son and nephew, whom they had detained as hostages. Ambiorix began by speaking of Caesar's kindness,

54 B.C.

The Eburones, under Ambiorix, make a futile attack on the camp of Sabinus and Cotta.

54 B.C. Ambiorix advises Sabinus to withdraw to one of the nearer camps.

and said that he was most anxious to prove his gratitude. He protested that he had not attacked the camp of his own free will, but simply because he could not resist the pressure put upon him by his tribesmen. Nor would they have stirred if they had not been forced to join in the national movement. His very weakness proved that he was speaking the truth. He was not such a fool as to imagine that his feeble levies could stand against the Romans. But the leading powers of Gaul were banded together to recover their independence ; and on that very day all the Roman camps were to be simultaneously attacked. He most earnestly entreated Sabinus to be on his guard. A host of German mercenaries had crossed the Rhine, and would be upon him in a couple of days. If the two generals would take his advice, they would abandon their camp at once, and make the best of their way to the quarters of Cicero or of Labienus. He would pledge his word that they should not be molested on the road. He would not merely be making some return for Caesar's kindness : it was to the interest of his people to be relieved from the burden of supplying the camp.

The advice discussed in a council of war.

The deputies returned to camp, and reported what they had heard. Sabinus and Cotta were inclined to think that, whether Ambiorix were sincere or not in his professions of friendship, his warning was not to be despised. One thing was certain :—a single petty tribe like the Eburones would never have dared to pit itself against the power of Rome unless it had been strongly supported. The tribunes and centurions of the first rank [1] were summoned to attend a council of war. It took place in the middle of the camp, in full view of the soldiers. Cotta spoke first. He argued that, without Caesar's express command, they had no right to leave the camp. Behind its defences they could defy any force that could be brought against them. Had they not already beaten off the enemy, and inflicted heavy loss upon them into the bargain ? They were not pressed for supplies ; and doubtless they would soon be relieved. Anyhow, nothing could be more unsoldierlike, more puerile, than to take a step fraught with the gravest issues, by the advice of an enemy.

[1] See pp. 567–79.

Most of the officers warmly supported this view. But Sabinus was only irritated by their unanimity. Speaking loudly and passionately, he insisted that it was not a question of being guided by the advice of an enemy, but by hard facts. Caesar had doubtless gone back to Italy, or the Eburones would never have attacked them : so they need not expect help from him. The Rhine was close by. Both Germans and Gauls had many an old score to wipe out ; and they were naturally burning for revenge. The course which he recommended was safe either way. If the whole thing turned out to be a false alarm, then they risked nothing by going to the nearest camp. If, on the other hand, Gauls and Germans were really leagued against them, their one chance of safety was to retreat at once. To follow Cotta's advice would involve, at the best, the miseries of famine and blockade. 54 B.C.

The dispute waxed warm. In spite of all that Sabinus could say, Cotta and the centurions remained inflexible. Sabinus rapidly lost all patience. Raising his voice so that the men might hear, 'Have your own way,' he shouted, 'have your own way ! Death has no terrors for me ! These men will judge between us, and, if any disaster happens, they'll call you to account for it. If you would only let them, they could reach the nearest camp the day after to-morrow, and join hands with their comrades.' The generals stood up. Their friends crowded round them, took them by the hand, and entreated them not to quarrel. Go or stay, all would be well if only they could agree. The strife of words was prolonged till midnight. At length, overborne by the authority of his senior, Cotta gave up his point. All ranks were warned that they would have to quit the camp at dawn. The soldiers spent the small hours in looking over their belongings to see what they could carry away, and told each other that, after all, Sabinus was in the right. 'They thought,' wrote Caesar, 'of every argument to persuade themselves that they could not remain without danger, and that the danger would be increased by protracted watches and consequent exhaustion.' [1] The drivers had enough to do in loading their cattle. Everybody was too agitated to think of sleep.

In spite of the protests of Cotta, Sabinus decides to abandon the camp.

[1] *B. G.*, v, 31, § 5. See pp. 726–7.

54 B.C. Meanwhile Ambiorix and his followers, hearing the hum of voices in the camp, concluded that the Romans had determined to follow their advice. Whether Sabinus intended to make for the camp of Labienus or for that of Cicero, the first stage of his route would be the same.[1] Ambiorix prepared to execute his plan.

The Romans march out. Just as day was breaking, the Romans marched out of camp, in an extended column encumbered by a heavy baggage-train. It seemed as if Sabinus had implicit confidence in the good faith of Ambiorix ; for he could not have adopted a more dangerous formation. He had decided to make for the camp of Cicero.[2] After marching about two miles, the head of the column plunged into a defile shut in between wooded hills. Company after company tramped after. The last was just entering the valley when, rushing from the woods, the Gauls threw themselves upon the vanguard : the rear was hustled forward : before, behind, to right, to left, everywhere the enemy's masses were pouring down. Sabinus hurried about from place to place, and feebly attempted to make his dispositions. Cool and collected, Cotta did his best to rally the men ; and, as the length of the column made it unmanageable, he agreed with his colleague to abandon the baggage, and form in a hollow square.[3] It was perhaps the only course to adopt : yet the result was that the Romans lost heart, and the enemy were emboldened ; for both knew that such an expedient could only have been resorted to by leaders who despaired. Rough soldiers were actually weeping : confusion was worse confounded ; and many contrived to slip away, and ran to save their valuables in the baggage-train while there was yet time. The Gauls, on the other hand, showed extraordinary steadiness ; for their leaders told them that they had only to win the battle, and they should have plunder to their hearts' content. Still the square remained unbroken. Now and again a cohort dashed out ; and beneath their short swords many of the Gauls sank down. Observing this, Ambiorix ordered his men to fall back some paces, and hurl their

They are surrounded by the Eburones;

[1] See p. 373.

[2] See p. 373 and n. 5.

[3] The term 'square' is used loosely. See the note on *Orbis*, p. 728.

missiles from a safe distance. He reminded them that they were in good training, and with their light equipment could easily keep out of harm's way.[1] If the Romans charged them, they were to retreat: when the Romans attempted to return to the square, they were to pursue. Maddened by the volleys which they were powerless to return—for they had no slingers and no archers—one cohort and then another charged. Back darted the nimble Gauls. The right flank of the Romans was exposed, and missiles rained in on their unshielded bodies. The moment the baffled cohort retired, the enemy swarmed all round it; and then followed a swift butchery. The rest stood shoulder to shoulder in the square: but now their courage was of no avail: the enemy would not come to close quarters; and stones and arrows made havoc in the dense ranks. Yet, facing such fearful odds, after seven hours' fighting, they still held out; and, as Caesar put it, throughout that trying time they did nothing unworthy of themselves. Quintus Lucanius, a centurion whom Caesar singled out for special mention, was killed in attempting to rescue his own son. Cotta himself was struck in the face as he was cheering on the men. The sun was sinking. The battle could only end in one way; and Sabinus, catching sight of Ambiorix some way off haranguing his men, sent his interpreter to ask for quarter. Ambiorix replied that Sabinus might come and speak to him if he liked: he would answer for his personal safety; and he hoped that his men might be prevailed upon to be merciful. Sabinus asked Cotta to go with him; but Cotta, true to Roman traditions, said that nothing would induce him to treat with an armed enemy. 54 B.C.

[1] The words upon which this sentence is founded—*levitate armorum et cotidiana exercitatione nihil his noceri posse* (*B. G.*, v, 34, § 4)—are certainly suspicious. *Levitas*, says Meusel (*Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xxxvi, 1910, p. 52), is not used in classical prose in the sense of lightness (of weight), and, even if it were, Caesar would have written not *levitate*, but *propter levitatem*. The former reason appears to me weak: *brevitas*, which Caesar (ii, 30, § 4) unquestionably uses in the sense of shortness (of stature), does not occur elsewhere in that sense before the time of the elder Pliny (*Thesaurus ling. Lat.*, ii, 2189-90), though Livy once (viii, 19, § 8) speaks of *brevitate loci*; and when I read *B. G.*, ii, 1, § 3, iii, 21, § 3, I doubt whether Caesar would necessarily have written *propter levitatem*. Still, as Meusel argues, the words *levitate . . . posse* might well be dispensed with.

54 B.C. Accordingly Sabinus and a few tribunes and centurions went out alone. Sabinus was ordered to lay down his arms, and obeyed, bidding his officers to do the same. A parley followed; and Ambiorix purposely spun out what he had to say. While he was speaking, a number of Gauls crept stealthily behind Sabinus; and in a moment he fell dead. Then with a yell of triumph the Gauls rushed into the exhausted legion; and Cotta and the bulk of his men were destroyed. The rest fled for the camp. The standard-bearer, Lucius Petrosidius, finding himself hotly pursued, flung his eagle inside the rampart, and died fighting like a Roman soldier. His surviving comrades defended themselves till nightfall. Then, seeing that hope was gone, they fell upon each others' swords.

and virtually annihilated.

A handful of men, more fortunate than their comrades, had managed to escape into the woods. They made their way to the camp of Labienus, and told him the whole story.

Ambiorix persuades the Atuatuci and Nervii to join him in attacking Q. Cicero.

Ambiorix instantly followed up his victory. Bidding his infantry follow, he rode off westward with the horsemen. All that night and the day after he sped over the plateau of Herve and the plain of Hesbaye: just pausing to enlist the Atuatuci in the cause, he pressed on, and next day crossed the frontier of the Nervii. This people had not forgotten how their brethren had been slaughtered, three years before, on the banks of the Sambre. Ambiorix told the chiefs exultingly of his success. Here was such a chance as they might never have again. Cicero's camp was close by. Why should they not do as he had done,—swoop down upon the solitary legion, win back their independence for good, and take a glorious revenge upon their persecutors. The chiefs caught at the suggestion. The small tribes that owned their sway flocked to join them: the Eburones, flushed with victory, were there to help; and the united host set out with eager confidence for the Roman camp. Their horsemen, hurrying on ahead, cut off a party of soldiers who were felling wood. Not the faintest rumour of the late disaster had reached Cicero; and the Gallic hordes burst upon him like a bolt from the sky. Their first onslaught was so violent that even the disciplined courage of the Romans barely

Siege of Cicero's camp.

averted destruction. Messengers were instantly dispatched 54 B.C.
to carry the news to Caesar ; and Cicero promised to reward them well if they should succeed in delivering his letters. Working all night with incessant energy, the legionaries erected a large number of wooden towers on the rampart, and made good the defects in the fortifications. The Gauls, who meanwhile had been strongly reinforced, returned in the morning to the attack. They succeeded in filling up the trench ; but the garrison still managed to keep them at bay. Day after day the siege continued ; and night after night and all night long the Romans toiled to make ready for the morrow's struggle. The towers were furnished with stories and embattled breastworks of wattle-work : sharp stakes, burnt and hardened at the ends, were prepared for hurling at the besiegers, and huge pikes for stopping their rush if they should attempt an assault. Even the sick and the wounded had to lend a hand. Cicero himself was in poor health : but he worked night and day ; and it was not until the men gathered round him and insisted on his sparing himself, that he would take a little rest. His complaints, his Epicurean studies, his abortive tragedies were forgotten ; he remembered only that he was a Roman general. Meanwhile the Nervian leaders, who had expected an easy triumph, were becoming impatient. They asked Cicero to grant them an interview. Some of them knew him personally ; and they doubtless hoped that he would prove compliant. They assailed him with the same arguments that Ambiorix had found so successful with Sabinus. They tried to frighten him by describing the massacre at Atuatuca, and assured him that it was idle to hope for relief. But they would not be hard upon him. All that they wanted was to stop the inveterate custom of quartering the legions for the winter in Gaul. If he and his army would only go, they might go in peace whithersoever they pleased. Cicero calmly replied that Romans never accepted terms from an armed enemy. They must first lay down their arms : then he would intercede for them with Caesar. Caesar was always just, and would doubtless grant their petition.

Disappointed though they were, the Gauls were not dis-

54 B.C. heartened. They determined to invest the camp in a scientific manner. From the experience of past campaigns they had got a rough idea of the nature of Roman siege works; and now, with the quickness of their race, they proceeded to imitate them. Some prisoners who had fallen into their hands gave them hints. Having no proper tools, they were obliged to cut the turf with their swords, and use their hands and even their cloaks in piling the sods; but the workers swarmed in such prodigious numbers that in three hours they had thrown up a rampart ten feet high and nearly three miles in extent.[1] They then proceeded, under the guidance of the prisoners, to erect towers, and to make sappers' huts, ladders, and poles fitted with hooks for tearing down the rampart of the camp. The huts, which were intended to protect the men who had to fill up the trench and demolish the rampart, were partially closed in front, and had sloping roofs, built of strong timbers, so as to resist the crash of any stones which might be pitched on to them, and probably covered with clay and raw hides, as a protection against fire.[2] On the seventh day of the siege there was a great gale. The besiegers took advantage of it to fling blazing darts and white-hot balls of clay,[3] which lighted on the straw thatch of the men's huts; and the wind-swept flames flew all over the enclosure. With a yell of exultation, the enemy wheeled forward their towers and huts, and planted their ladders: in another moment they were swarming up: but all along the rampart, their dark figures outlined against the fiery background, the Romans were standing, ready to hurl them down: harassed by showers of missiles, half scorched by the fierce heat, regardless of the havoc that the flames were making in their property, every man of them stood firm; and hardly one so much as looked behind. Their losses were heavier than on any previous day. The Gauls too went down in scores; for those in front could not retreat because of the masses that pressed upon them from behind. In one spot a tower was wheeled right up to the rampart. The centurions of the 3rd cohort coolly withdrew

[1] See pp. 728–9.

[2] See Caesar, *B. C.*, ii, 10, and pp. 609–10.

[3] See pp. 729–30.

their men, and with voice and gesture dared the Gauls to come on: but none dared stir a step: a shower of stones sent them flying; and the deserted tower was set on fire. Everywhere the result was the same. The assailants were the bravest of the Gauls: of death they had no fear: but they had not the heart to hurl themselves upon that living wall; and, leaving their slain in heaps, they sullenly withdrew. 54 B.C.

Still the siege went on; and to the wearied and weakened legion its trials daily increased. Letters for Caesar were sent out in more and more rapid succession. Some of the messengers were caught in sight of the garrison, and tortured to death. There was, however, in the camp a Nervian named Vertico, who, just before the siege, had thrown himself upon the protection of Cicero, and had been steadfastly true to him. By lavish promises he induced one of his slaves to face the dangers which to the Roman messengers had proved fatal. The letter which he had to carry was fastened to a javelin and concealed by the lashing.[1] He passed his countrymen unnoticed, made his way safely to Samarobriva, and delivered his dispatch. None of the other messengers had arrived; and so close was the sympathy between the peasants and the insurgents that Caesar had not heard a rumour of the siege.

A messenger from Cicero carries a dispatch to Caesar.

It was about four o'clock in the afternoon. Within a few minutes messengers were spurring to the camps in the surrounding country. Crassus was ordered to come in to Samarobriva at once, and take the General's place. It was most important to leave Samarobriva in safe keeping; for there were collected the hostages of the various states, the winter's supply of corn, the heavy baggage of the whole army,[2] and the General's papers and accounts. Fabius was

Caesar marches to relieve Cicero.

[1] *B. G.*, v, 45, § 4. The reading of α (see p. 201) is *in iaculo inligatas*, of β *iaculo inligatas*. If, as Long suggests (*Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv, 227), the letter was inserted *in* the hollowed shaft of a javelin, lashing (*inligatas*) was obviously both superfluous and impossible.

[2] *Impedimenta exercitus* (*B. G.*, v, 47, § 2). Perhaps the word 'material' would be more accurate than 'heavy baggage'; for the troops at Atuatuca, and doubtless also the legions in the other camps, had heavy baggage with them. It is impossible to say with certainty what the *impedimenta* to which Caesar alludes was; but it may have included siege material.

54 B.C. to join Caesar on the road. A letter went to Labienus, expressing the hope that he would be able to march direct to the relief of the besieged camp ; but this able officer was trusted to use his own discretion. Plancus and Roscius were too far off to be able to help. About nine o'clock next morning, hearing that Crassus was close at hand, Caesar set out with Trebonius's legion and about four hundred cavalry. No baggage-train accompanied the column : the men carried all that they required upon their backs. The first march was more than eighteen miles. Fabius joined his chief on the way ; but Labienus did not appear. An express came from him instead, from which Caesar learned, for the first time, the fate of Sabinus and Cotta. It is said that, in his first burst of grief and wrath, he swore that he would not shave his beard or cut his hair until he had avenged their deaths.[1] Labienus went on to say that he was himself hard pressed by the Treveri, and thought it foolhardy to leave his camp. Caesar approved his decision, though it left him with barely seven thousand men. Everything now depended upon speed. Passing through the Nervian territory, Caesar learned from some peasants who fell into his hands that Cicero's situation was all but desperate : immediately he wrote a letter in Greek characters, assuring him of speedy relief, and offered one of his Gallic horsemen a large reward to deliver it. He told him, in case he should not be able to get into the camp, to tie the letter to the thong of a javelin and throw it inside. Dreading the risk of apprehension, the man did as Caesar had directed ; but the javelin stuck in one of the towers, and remained unnoticed for two days. A soldier then found it and took it to Cicero, who read the letter to his exhausted troops. As they gazed over the rampart, they saw clouds of smoke floating far away over the west horizon, and knew that Caesar was approaching and taking vengeance as he came.

That night Caesar received a dispatch [2] from Cicero, warn-

[1] Suetonius, *Divus Iulius*, 67.

[2] This dispatch was carried by one of Vertico's slaves ; *Cicero*, says Caesar (*B. G.*, v, 49, § 2), *data facultate Gallum ab eodem Verticone quem supra demonstravimus repetit, qui litteras ad Caesarem deferat.* These words imply that

ing him that the Gauls had raised the siege, and gone off to intercept him. Notwithstanding their heavy losses, they numbered, it was said, some sixty thousand men.[1] Caesar made known the contents of the dispatch to the troops, and encouraged them to nerve themselves for the approaching struggle. A short march in the early morning brought the legions to a rivulet, running through a broad valley, beyond which the enemy were encamped. Caesar had no intention of fighting a battle against such heavy odds on unfavourable ground. Cicero was in no danger; and he was therefore not pressed for time. He sent out scouts to look for a convenient place to cross the river. Meanwhile he marked out his camp on a slope, and constructed it on the smallest possible scale in the hope of seducing the enemy to attack him. But the enemy were expecting reinforcements, and remained where they were. At dawn their horsemen ventured across the river, and attacked Caesar's cavalry, who promptly retreated in obedience to orders. Sitting on their horses, the Gauls could see inside the camp. An attempt was apparently being made to increase the height of the rampart, and to block the gateways. There was every appearance of panic. Caesar had told his men what to do; and they were hurrying about the camp with a pretence of nervous trepidation. The enemy hesitated no longer; and in a short time they were all across the stream. They had to attack up hill; but that mattered nothing against such craven adversaries. Not even a sentry was standing on the rampart. Criers were sent round the camp to say that if any man cared to come out and join the Gauls, he would be welcome,—till eight o'clock. The gates looked too strong to be forced, though there was really only a mock barricade of sods, which could be knocked over in a moment. The Gauls walked right up to the ditch, and began coolly filling it up, and actually tearing down the rampart with their hands,—when from right and left and front the cohorts

54 B.C. The Gauls abandon the siege, and march to encounter him.

the slave who carried Cicero's first dispatch had returned, just as the spy Ungud returned again and again to Lucknow during the Mutiny. W. Nitsche, however, needlessly supplies *alium* after *Gallum*.

[1] The estimate was doubtless greatly exaggerated. See pp. 242 and n. 10.

54 B.C. Defeat of the Gauls.

charged : there was a thunder of hoofs ; and reeling backward in amazement before a rush of cavalry, they flung away their arms and fled.

Caesar joins Cicero.

Caesar prudently stopped the pursuit, lest his troops might become entangled in the outlying woods and marshes ; but about three o'clock that afternoon the legions reached Cicero's camp without the loss of a man. With keen interest Caesar asked for details of the siege, and gazed with admiring wonder at the enemy's deserted works. When the legion was paraded, he found that not one man in ten was unwounded. Turning to Cicero, he heartily thanked him for the magnificent stand which he had made, and then, calling out, one by one, the officers whom he mentioned as having shown especial bravery, he addressed to them a few words of praise. From some prisoners, who had served under Ambiorix, he gleaned details of the massacre at Atuatuca. Next day he again assembled the men, and described to them what had befallen their comrades. The culpable rashness of a general officer had entailed a disaster ; but they must not be downhearted ; for Providence and their own good swords had enabled them to repair the loss.[1]

Immediate effects of his victory.

Meanwhile the news of the relief had spread like wildfire. Before midnight it was known in the neighbourhood of Labienus's camp, more than fifty miles away. A number of loyal Remans hurried to congratulate the general ; and a shout of joy at the gates of his camp told him what had occurred. Indutiomarus, who was on the point of attacking him, beat a hasty retreat. A large force from the maritime tribes of Brittany and Normandy was advancing against the camp of Roscius, when an express came to warn them of Caesar's victory, and they precipitately fled.

But even Caesar could not undo the effect of the annihila-

[1] Caesar has been blamed for having quartered a comparatively weak force under a bad general in the camp which was most exposed to attack. Probably he knew that Sabinus, although he had done his work satisfactorily so far, was not a strong man : but it was necessary to employ him somewhere ; and I doubt whether Caesar ought to be called a bad judge of character because he did not foresee that Ambiorix, whom he had probably never met, would rebel. But I admit that his temperament was over-sanguine. Indeed he virtually admitted it himself (*B. G.*, iii, 7, § 1).

tion of a Roman legion. The Gauls lacked perseverance: they wanted a great leader; but they had broken the spell of Roman success. Except among the Aedui and the Remi, there was hardly a chieftain in Gaul who did not dream of similar victories. Nocturnal meetings were held in secluded places; and embassies passed from tribe to tribe. As Caesar frankly remarked, it was all perfectly natural: the Gauls had once been the most dreaded warriors in the world, and to be forced to submit to Romans was most galling to their self-esteem. The state of affairs was so alarming that Caesar determined to break through his usual practice and spend the winter in Gaul. He ordered Fabius to return to his camp in the country of the Morini. His own quarters were at Samarobriva; and in the neighbourhood of that town he cantoned in three separate camps the legion of Cicero, that of Crassus, and the one with which he had gone to the relief of Cicero. He sent for all the chiefs who were in any way compromised, and when he had thoroughly frightened them by letting them know that he was aware of their intrigues, he tried to convince them that it was their interest to keep the peace. The bulk of the tribes were thus deterred from actually rebelling. The Senones, however, a powerful people occupying the country round Sens and Montargis, were in grim earnest. Their council condemned to death Cavarinus, whom Caesar had set over them as king, and, as he contrived to escape, declared him an exile. When Caesar ordered them to come to Samarobriva and answer for this outrage, they flatly refused to obey. But of all the malcontents the most daring and the most dangerous was Indutiomarus. Rebuffed by the German chiefs, who answered his appeals for aid by reminding him of the fate of Ariovistus and the Tencteri, he raised troops and drilled them, bought up horses from the neighbouring peoples, and offered rewards to all the outlaws and exiles in Gaul who would join his standard. His prestige rapidly increased; and all the patriots began to look to him for guidance. He summoned the warriors of his own tribe to muster in arms at a stated place; and, in accordance with Gallic custom, the unhappy wretch who arrived last was tortured to death in sight of his comrades. Indutiomarus

54 B.C. Many of the nobles continue to intrigue.

Schemes of Indutiomarus.

54 B.C. began by declaring Cingetorix a public enemy, and confiscating his possessions. He then addressed the assembly. His plan was to make a raid into the country of the Remi, and punish them for their desertion of the national cause: then to join the Carnutes and the Senones, and raise a revolt in the heart of Gaul. First of all, however, he determined to make one more attempt against Labienus. But the Roman general was too strongly posted to fear any attack; and he determined to make an end of Indutiomarus and his schemes. He called upon the neighbouring tribes to furnish him with cavalry, which were to arrive on a fixed date; and, like Caesar, he did his best to lure on the enemy by a pretence of fear. Their horsemen rode up to the camp, hurled missiles over the rampart, shouted every insulting epithet at the Romans, and challenged them to come out if they dared. Labienus would not allow his men to reply. The cavalry which he had summoned arrived punctually; and in the night, thanks to the carelessness of the Treveran sentries, they were admitted into the camp. Caesar afterwards noted with admiration the extraordinary precautions which Labienus had taken to prevent a single man from going outside, lest the enemy should hear that he had been reinforced. Next day, as usual, Indutiomarus and his men spent their time in swaggering round the rampart and abusing the Romans. In the evening, when they were scattered and off their guard, two of the gates were opened: the cavalry, supported by several cohorts, charged; and the astounded Gauls fled. Labienus had given orders that every one should pursue Indutiomarus, and him alone; and he promised a large reward to the man who should kill him. He was caught in the act of fording a river; and his head was cut off. Forthwith the assembled bands of the Nervii and Eburones dispersed; and for a time Gaul was comparatively still.

He is outwitted by Labienus, defeated, and slain.

Only for a time, however. Caesar had reason to believe that the chiefs were hatching a more formidable conspiracy; and he saw that the best way to counteract it was to convince them that, whatever successes they might gain, the fighting strength of Italy was inexhaustible. He accordingly raised two new legions in Cisalpine Gaul, and asked Pompey,

[The 14th and 15th.]

with whom his relations were still amicable, to lend him a third. Pompey was at that time pro-consul, charged with the government of Spain; but, as Caesar explained with politic reticence, 'though vested with the command of an army, he remained on public grounds in the neighbourhood of the capital.' Rome, whither Caesar must soon return, was convulsed by the throes of anarchy, and the civil war that was coming cast its shadow before; but it was necessary that he should shut out from his mind all distracting thoughts, and perfect his work in Gaul. 53 B.C. Caesar raises two new legions, and borrows a third from Pompey.

Peace did not last out the winter. The Treveri, notwithstanding the death of Indutiomarus, succeeded in persuading, by promises of gold, some of the more distant tribes of Germany to join them, and made a formal alliance with Ambiorix. The Nervii, the Atuatuci, the Menapii, and the Eburones were all in arms: the Senones and the Carnutes were still defiant. But Caesar, as usual, was the first to strike. While it was still winter, he left Samarobriva with four legions; made a sudden raid into the country of the Nervii; took numbers of prisoners before the bewildered tribesmen could either muster their forces or flee; drove away their herds, ravaged their lands, and compelled the cowed chiefs to submit. When he convened his annual council at Samarobriva in the early spring, every Celtican tribe except the Senones, the Carnutes, and the Treveri, sent its representatives.[1] The contumacy of the Treveri was comparatively of little moment; but Caesar has recorded what he thought of the attitude of the other tribes:—'regarding their absence as the first step in rebellion, he determined to mark his sense of its paramount importance, and accordingly transferred the council to Lutecia, a town belonging to the Parisii.' The Carnutes possessed the great cornfield from which Caesar drew much of his supply; and the 'hallowed spot' in their country where the Druids held their annual synod was the religious centre of Gaul. The rebellion must not spread. Immediately after the council adjourned Caesar again took the field. A rapid march southward so disconcerted the Senones that they surren- Continued troubles in North-Eastern Gaul. Caesar punishes the Nervii: [Paris.]

[1] See p. 395.

53 B.C. forces the Senones and Carnutes to submit;

dered at once, and begged the Aedui to intercede for them. The Carnutes, without waiting to be attacked, induced their overlords, the Remi, to do them a like service, and, as time pressed, Caesar accepted, without inquiry, the excuses of both peoples, took hostages for their good behaviour, and, after dispatching the business of the council, turned northward to deal with the Treveri and the Eburones. The exiled king of the Senones, with his contingent of cavalry, accompanied the column; for Caesar would not attempt to reinstate him, lest the odium which he had incurred should provoke a fresh outbreak and impede the legions in their punitive campaign. He had not forgotten the shame and the suffering which Ambiorix had brought upon his soldiers; and he was determined to inflict upon him a most signal and awful retribution.

and prepares to punish Ambiorix.

As a preliminary step, he crushes the Menapii.

The first step was to deprive him of his allies, the Menapii, the Treveri, and the Germans. Caesar had ascertained that he did not intend to fight; and the object was to bar against him every way of escape. The Menapii, alone of all the Gallic tribes, had never formally submitted to Rome. During Caesar's first expedition to Britain, Sabinus and Cotta had mercilessly ravaged their lands; but it was impossible to follow them into their fastnesses. Caesar took his measures with extreme deliberation. He sent all the heavy baggage to Labienus, and at the same time reinforced him with a couple of legions. He then marched in overwhelming force against the Menapii. Without attempting to resist, they again took refuge in their forests and marshes; but this time they were not to escape. Caesar bridged the rivers, constructed causeways over the marshes, and threw three separate columns into their country; and when their flocks and herds were driven away, their villages ablaze, and prisoners taken by scores, they were constrained to surrender. Caesar left a body of horse to watch them under Commius, the king of the Atrebates, who had done good service in Britain; and warning them, as they valued the lives of their hostages, to give no refuge to Ambiorix or his lieutenants, he pushed southward to deal with the Treveri. Before he could arrive, however, Labienus marched out to meet them,

enticed them by a feigned flight across a river, and then, suddenly wheeling round, sent them flying into the woods. Their German allies, who had not had time to join them, returned home; and within a few days the whole tribe submitted. Their leaders fled the country; and Caesar's adherent, Cingetorix, was appointed chief magistrate.

53 B.C. Labienus disperses the Treveri.

About this time Caesar joined Labienus; and with the twofold object of punishing the Germans and preventing Ambiorix from seeking an asylum in their country, he again threw a bridge across the Rhine, a little above the site of the former one. He left a force to hold the Gallic end of the bridge and keep the Treveri in awe. The Ubii immediately sent envoys to explain that none of the Germans who had reinforced the Treveri were countrymen of theirs, and, offering to furnish more hostages if he required them, begged him not to make the innocent suffer for the guilty. Finding on inquiry that they had told the truth, he directed them to inform him about the routes that led into the enemy's country. A few days later he learned that the Suebi, who had been active in sending reinforcements against Labienus, were massing their warriors and warning their dependent tribes to send in their contingents. He immediately entrenched himself in a strong position, and ordered the Ubii to remove their stores from the open country into their strongholds, to drive in their cattle from the pastures, and to send out scouts to watch the enemy's movements. His hope was that, finding themselves short of supplies, they might be enticed to venture a battle at a disadvantage; but the scouts, after a few days' absence, reported that the entire host had fallen back to the outskirts of a huge forest near the mountains of Thuringia. To follow them thither through a wild country, where little or no corn was to be had, would simply be to court destruction. There was nothing for it but to return. But, in order to keep the Germans in constant fear of a fresh invasion, he only destroyed that part of the bridge which touched their bank of the Rhine; built a wooden tower of four stories on its extremity; and detailed twelve cohorts[1] to hold the other end.

Caesar again crosses the Rhine, and threatens the allies of Ambiorix.

[1] Caesar makes no further mention of these cohorts, which were probably

53 B.C Returning unsuccessful to Gaul, he marches against Ambiorix.

And now, having made every preparation that forethought could suggest, Caesar bent all his energies to destroy Ambiorix. The crops were beginning to ripen; and if he could not count upon the granaries of unfriendly tribes, there would still be no danger of famine. The road ran westward through the vast forest of the Ardennes. An officer named Minucius Basilus was sent on ahead with the cavalry. His orders were to march as rapidly as possible, so as to catch the Eburones unprepared, and on no account to allow any fires to be lighted in his camp, lest Ambiorix should be warned of his approach. Caesar followed with the infantry till he reached the deserted camp which, a few months before, had witnessed the self-slaughter of the remnant of Cotta's legion. The entrenchments were still intact. There he left his heavy baggage and one of the newly raised legions to guard it, under the command of Cicero. He promised to return at the end of a week, and charged his lieutenant on no account to allow a single man to venture out of camp until then. The army was divided into three corps, each consisting of three legions or, not counting auxiliaries, about ten thousand men. Labienus was sent to the northern part of the country of the Eburones, in the direction of the coast between the Scheldt and the Rhine; and Trebonius to the south-western, in the direction of Huy. They were to harry the enemy's country, to ascertain his designs, and to return, if possible at the end of a week, to concert measures with Caesar for a final campaign. Caesar himself marched towards the lower Scheldt, in the hope of catching Ambiorix, who was said to have retreated to the extremity of the Ardennes.

The Eburones keep up a guerrilla warfare.

Meanwhile that unhappy chief was being driven, like a hunted animal, from lair to lair. Basilus and his cavalry, guided by some peasants whom they had caught in the fields, rode through a wood till they came to a cottage, in a small clearing, where he was said to be hiding; but his retainers,

detachments from various legions; and I suppose that they were withdrawn from the Rhine when the army went into winter-quarters. Their services would certainly have been required in the seventh campaign. Guischard (*Mém. crit. et hist.*, 1774, p. 303) conjectures that they were supernumeraries; but this is a mere guess.

taking advantage of the contracted space, gallantly flung themselves upon the Romans, while their chief threw himself on horseback and disappeared among the trees. Catuvolcus, the aged prince who had shared his counsels, was too infirm to bear the hardships of a hunted fugitive, and, invoking every curse upon the author of his ruin, committed suicide. The Eburones were less civilized than their neighbours, and had no walled towns to retreat to. Ambiorix sent word over the country-side that every one must shift for himself. Many fled the country altogether: others dived into the recesses of the forest: others lurked in the marshes or the islets in the estuary of the Scheldt. Caesar found that there was no regular force to oppose him; but every glen, every bog, every clump of trees held its nest of armed skulkers. Massed in their cohorts and companies, the legionaries were powerless against such foes: the only way to get at them was to send out small flying parties in every direction. But in those narrow woodland tracks it was not easy for even the smallest party to keep together. The enemy knew every inch of the ground: they were wary; and they were desperate: and a few legionaries who strayed in search of plunder were cut off and killed. Always careful of his men's lives, Caesar was especially careful now, when their thirst for revenge tempted them to be rash. In order to spare them as much as possible, he invited the surrounding tribes to come and destroy the Eburones, and to enrich themselves with booty. He intended, as he tells us, 'that Gauls should risk their lives in the forests, and not his legionaries, and at the same time to surround the people with a mighty host, and, in requital for their signal villainy, to destroy them, root, branch, and name.'[1] Multitudes of eager plunderers were attracted by the prospect; and Caesar's old enemies, the Sugambri, actually crossed the Rhine with two thousand horse and their attendant light-armed footmen,[2] in the hope of sharing in the spoil. The wretched Eburones were captured by scores, and their cattle driven off. But the Sugambri were soon tempted by a richer prize. One of their captives told them that Caesar was far away, and they need

53 B.C.

Caesar invites the neighbouring tribes to harry them.

[1] *B. G.*, vi, 34, § 8.

[2] See pp. 735–6, and *B. G.*, i, 48, §§ 5–7.

53 B.C. not be afraid of him. Atuatuca was within a three hours' march. Why should they not pounce upon Cicero's camp, and carry off all the stores and the loot which it contained ?

It happened that on this very day Caesar was expected in the camp. But Cicero had heard nothing of or from him, and was beginning to fear that he would not be able to keep his promise. Hitherto he had carefully obeyed his instructions, and had not allowed a man to stir outside the rampart. But fresh rations were due : there were cornfields within three miles of the camp : it was absurd to suppose that the persecuted Eburones would venture an attack so near ; and besides it stung him to hear that the men were sneering at his caution. Accordingly he allowed half the legion, with three hundred convalescent veterans, who were under a separate command, two hundred cavalry, and a number of slaves, to go out and cut corn. They were hardly out of sight, when a host of horsemen broke from an outlying wood, swept down upon the camp, and tried to burst in through the rear gate. The dealers who accompanied the army were massacred in their tents outside the rampart ; and the cohort on duty barely sustained the first shock. The enemy spread round the camp, looking for an entrance ; and it was all that the guards could do to prevent them from breaking through the gates. The commanding nature of the site and the strength of the fortifications forbade any attempt to enter elsewhere. Within, all was confusion and panic ; and the superstitious recruits remembered with horror that, on the very spot where they stood, the soldiers of Cotta and Sabinus had perished. Even Cicero lost his presence of mind. But it happened that there was in the camp an invalided centurion, whose deeds of daring Caesar was never tired of extolling,—Sextius Baculus. Ill and weak, he had not tasted food for five days. As he lay in his tent, he heard the uproar, and walked out to see what was the matter. Without a moment's hesitation, he snatched sword and shield from the men close by, and planted himself in the nearest gateway. The centurions on guard rallied round him ; and alone they kept the enemy at bay. Severely wounded, Sextius fell down in a faint, and was with difficulty rescued :

The Sugambri surprise Cicero.

but his splendid courage shamed the trembling recruits into action ; and the camp was saved. 53 B.C.

Meanwhile the harvesters were on their way back. They heard the uproar. The cavalry rode on, and saw the enemy. The rest followed. The recruits had never seen a sword drawn in anger : there was no cover near ; and they were simply confounded by the apparition. They looked passively to their officers for orders ; but the bravest of their officers were for the moment unnerved. The Germans, descrying infantry and cavalry in the distance, took them for Caesar's legions and abandoned their attempt on the camp ; but presently, seeing how few they had to deal with, rode off to attack them. The slaves, who had rushed up a knoll for refuge, were speedily dislodged, and, flying pell-mell into the maniples, increased their alarm. A hurried consultation was held. The recruits, in spite of all warnings, ended by clustering together on a ridge, where they fancied that they might be safe. The handful of veterans who had accompanied the detachment kept their presence of mind, and, followed by the cavalry and slaves, charged boldly through the enemy's loose array. The recruits stood watching them in helpless hesitation. They could not make up their minds to stay where they were ; and they knew that they could not follow the example of the veterans. At length they tried to reach the camp anyhow ; and two entire cohorts were surrounded and slain. Those who escaped owed their lives to their centurions, who threw themselves upon the enemy, for a moment forced them back, and died, fighting to the last man. The Germans rode away with the booty which they had left in the woods. Caesar's advanced guard reached the camp that night, and found the young soldiers almost beside themselves with panic. They were positive that the General himself and his army must have perished ; and nothing could quiet them till they actually saw him arrive. But nobody knew better than he how much fortune has to do with war ; and he contented himself with telling Cicero that he ought to have followed his instructions to the letter, and not to have run the smallest risk.

One more effort was made to catch Ambiorix. Fresh

53 B.C. Caesar ravages the country of the Eburones.

plunderers from the surrounding tribes were hounded on by Caesar to hunt down his people and to harry his land. Every hamlet, every building was burned down; everything worth plundering was carried off; and every ear of corn that was not sodden by the rain was devoured; for it was Caesar's deliberate intention that every man, woman, and child who escaped the sword should perish of hunger. The soldiers knew that he had set his heart upon getting Ambiorix into his hands; and they made incredible exertions to win his favour. Cavalry in small parties scoured the country in pursuit of the king. From time to time they captured peasants, who declared that he was hardly out of sight. But, in spite of the desperate efforts of his exasperated pursuers, he was never caught. With four retainers, who would have suffered anything rather than betray him, he was lost in the dark recesses of the Ardennes.

Ambiorix eludes pursuit.

The legions distributed for the winter.

The legions were distributed for the winter,—two on the western frontier of the Treveri, two among the Lingones, and the remaining six at Agedincum, now Sens, the chief town of the Senones. The twelve cohorts, detached from various legions, which had guarded the bridge over the Rhine, were doubtless now recalled. One other task Caesar had to perform before he started for Italy. He summoned a Gallic council to meet at Durocortorum, the modern Reims. An inquiry was held regarding the rebellion, which at the time he had necessarily condoned, of the Carnutes and the Senones. Acco, a Senonian chieftain, was convicted of having originated the movement; and, in accordance with Roman custom, he was flogged to death.[1]

Execution of Acco.

[1] *B. G.*, vi, 44, § 2; viii, 38, § 5; Suetonius, *Nero*, 49.

CHAPTER VII

THE REBELLION OF VERCINGETORIX

'GAUL was now tranquillized; and Caesar, in accordance with his determination, started for Italy to hold the assizes.' So runs the first sentence of the book in which he narrated the events of the most momentous year of his command. But the stillness that lay upon Gaul was not peace; and he had hardly turned his back when agitation was renewed. The Celts had not forgotten that they were the descendants of Dis Pater, and that their kinsmen had once humbled Rome. The fierceness with which the sporadic revolts of the last two years had been repressed was at length constraining tribes that were all embittered to combine; and even in Central Gaul, which had submitted so tamely, the Senones and Carnutes formed a nucleus of common action. Meetings were held in the recesses of forests and other secluded places. The death of Acco was keenly discussed. The formality of his execution seemed a sign that Caesar intended to make Gaul into a Roman province. Chieftains told each other that their own turn might come next. They must make a supreme effort to save their unhappy country. Even Commius was swept away on the wave of enthusiasm, and attempted to engage the Belgic tribes; but Labienus heard of his intrigues, and sent Gaius Volusenus, the tribune who had won recognition at Octodurus, with a band of centurions to assassinate him. He escaped with a wound; but for the time his plans had miscarried. His brother nobles were more fortunate; and early in the new year a gleam of hope shone out. A rumour ran through Gaul that Rome was a prey to sedition. The notorious Clodius had been murdered by Milo and his bravoes. Furious riots followed; temples were in flames; and streets ran with blood. The story was of course embellished by the eager imagination of the Gauls. They

52 B.C.

Agitation renewed.

News of the murder of Clodius reaches Gaul.

52 B.C. persuaded themselves that Caesar would be detained in Italy, and that his legions would be at their mercy. At the final gathering a definite plan was formed. The great object was to prevent Caesar from rejoining his army. The conspirators persuaded themselves that there would be no difficulty in doing this; for the generals who commanded the legions would not venture to leave their quarters in Caesar's absence, and Caesar could not make his way to the legions for want of a sufficient escort. At the worst, it would be better to die in battle than to fail in recovering their ancient renown and the freedom which was their heritage from their forefathers. The question was put:—who would take his life in his hand, and strike the first blow for fatherland and freedom? He might count upon receiving a liberal reward. The chiefs of the Carnutes instantly responded to the appeal, and their declaration was received with loud applause. All that they asked was a solemn assurance that their brother chiefs would not leave them in the lurch. The pledge would naturally have been confirmed by interchange of hostages; but this would inevitably betray the secret; and it was resolved to invoke the sanction of religion. Making a sheaf of their military standards—a ceremony of the most awful import—the assembled chiefs swore to be true to their countrymen; and a date was fixed for the insurrection to begin.[1]

The Carnutes massacre Roman citizens at Cenabum.

Cenabum, one of the chief towns of the Carnutes, stood upon the site now occupied by Orléans.[2] It was thus fitted to be the depot for the grain that came from the plain of La Beauce, and down the Loire from the fertile Limagne d'Auvergne. Some Roman merchants were settled there, and one of Caesar's commissariat officers. When the appointed day came round, a band of the Carnutes, led by two desperadoes, Cotuatus and Conconnetodumnus, rushed into the town, massacred the Romans, and plundered their stores. The tidings sped swiftly through the length and breadth of Gaul; for whenever an important event occurred, the bystanders made it known by loud shouts, and those who heard them passed on the cry over the country-side. When

[1] See p. 736. [2] See pp. 405–15.

Cenabum was attacked, it was just sunrise. By eight o'clock that night the news, flying from man to man, had reached the country of the Arverni—the modern Auvergne—a hundred and forty miles to the south.[1] 52 B.C. The news reaches the Arverni.

Gergovia, the chief town of this people, was situated on a mountain, some two thousand four hundred feet above the sea, about eight miles south-east of the Puy de Dôme. It was equally fitted for a place of refuge and for a capital. Streamlets watered the meadows which compassed it round : forage was abundant ; and the town commanded a view ranging over a vast tract. Four miles to the north appeared the gently sloping eminence above which now soar the sombre lava spires of Clermont cathedral : the vast plain of the Limagne, watered by the Allier and backed by the distant range of the Forez, extended on the north-east : above wooded hills and valleys on the west, its summit crowned by the holiest sanctuary of Gallic worship,[2] towered the huge blunt cupola of the Puy de Dôme ; and all around, as far as the eye could reach, rose the cones of the volcanic land where the Arvernian mountaineers had made their home. Gergovia.

At that time there was living in the town a young noble named Vercingetorix, who had shared in the counsels of the conspirators, and had perhaps been chosen as their head. Caesar had already discerned his ability and attempted to purchase his support. His father, Celtillus, had been the most powerful chief in Gaul ; but he had tried to restore the detested monarchy, and had paid for his ambition with his life. The boy, we may believe, like other youths of gentle birth, had been schooled in Druidical lore ; and doubtless his imagination had been fired by the bards who at his father's table sang the brave deeds of Arvernian heroes.[3] For six years his fellow-tribesmen had watched the conquest of Gaul, doing nothing which the conqueror thought worthy of record, only sending their yearly contingent to swell his cavalry. But the Arvernians had been the first to withstand Roman invasion ; and he would lead them in a last effort Vercingetorix, notwithstanding the opposition of the Arvernian government, rouses popular enthusiasm for rebellion.

[1] See pp. 736–7.

[2] See an interesting article in the *Revue historique*, xxxvi, 1888, pp. 1–28.

[3] See Rice Holmes, *Anc. Britain*, p. 266 and n. 4.

52 B.C. to shake off the Roman yoke. We may be sure that, like Hannibal, he prayed his gods to bless his mission; for religion had its part in every act of Gallic life. When the news from Cenabum arrived he summoned his retainers, and communicated to them his plans. Their passions were easily inflamed, and they answered with alacrity the call to arms. The leading men, however, among whom was Gobannitio, a brother of Celtillus, regarded the movement as quixotic, and ordered the young chief to leave the town. But Vercingetorix persevered. He took into his pay all the outcasts and desperadoes in the district. He went from village to village, and harangued the people; and all who listened caught the fire of his enthusiasm. At the head of his levies he returned to Gergovia, and banished the chiefs who had lately banished him. His adherents saluted him as king. He sent out his envoys in all directions: soon nearly every tribe in Western Gaul from the Seine to the Garonne joined the movement; and the impressionable Celts, recognizing Vercingetorix as the man of destiny who was to save their country, unanimously bestowed upon him the chief command.[1] He levied from each state a definite quota of troops and of hostages, and ordered each to manufacture a definite quantity of weapons by a fixed day. He knew that the tribal militiamen would be of little use except for guerilla warfare, and therefore devoted all his efforts to strengthening his cavalry. Waverers and laggards he soon brought to their senses by ruthless severity. Torture or the stake punished grave breaches of discipline;[2] while minor offenders were sent home, with their ears lopped off or an eye gouged out, to serve as a warning to their neighbours. These methods were effective. An army was speedily raised; and the bulk of the Celtican patriots were united, for the first time, under one great leader.

Most of the tribes between the Seine and the Garonne join him, and elect him Commander-in-Chief.

How he raised an army.

It must not, however, be supposed that even now the

[1] Caesar does not say that the conspirators chose Vercingetorix as their head, though his narrative suggests that they did. It is possible that mutual jealousy may have prevented them from choosing any one: if they chose Vercingetorix, their choice was evidently confirmed by a general council.

[2] M. Jullian (*Vercingétorix*, p. 131), thinking of *B. G.*, vi, 16, §§ 4–5, conjectures that these victims were offered as a sacrifice to the gods.

movement was general. Even in the insurgent tribes—even among the Senones and Carnutes—the Nationalists must have had to reckon with adherents of Rome. The Aedui, jealous of their old rivals, the Arverni, and not prepared to break with Caesar, still kept aloof : the tribes who looked up to them remained passive. The Remi and the Lingones had long since made their choice ; and from them and their dependants no help was to be expected. The Treveri, enfeebled by the chastisement which Labienus had inflicted upon them, were distracted by German raids ; and the other eastern tribes, if their hearts were with the insurgents, were severed from them by the Roman army. The Aquitanians naturally took no heed of what was going on among the aliens beyond the Garonne. The Belgae had been terribly punished for their late rebellion ; and either for this reason or because they were jealous of their Celtican kindred, they left them alone. It remained to be seen whether Vercingetorix would be able, by the spell of his personality, or by the victories which he might gain, to rouse the whole people into united action.

52 B. C. The dissentient tribes.

His first step was to send a chief, named Lucterius, the most daring of his lieutenants, to deal with the Ruteni, who dwelt in the district, bordering on the Roman Province, which is now called the Aveyron. If they and their neighbours, the Nitiobroges, could be induced to join, the Province would be exposed to invasion ; Caesar would be obliged to succour it ; and his separation from his army would be indefinitely prolonged. Vercingetorix himself marched northward, with the remainder of the force, into the great plain of the Berri, which belonged to the Bituriges, hoping to detach them from the Aedui, whose supremacy they recognized, and to link them with the Carnutes, the Senones, and his other allies in the north. The Bituriges at once sent envoys to the Aedui to ask for help ; and the Aedui, acting on the advice of Caesar's generals, dispatched a force of infantry and cavalry to their assistance. The force marched to the banks of the Loire, which separated the two peoples, halted there for a few days, and then returned. They excused themselves to the Roman generals, on the plea that they had

The mission of Lucterius.

52 B.C. had reason to fear that, if they crossed the river, the Bituriges would combine with the Arverni to surround them. Caesar could never find out whether their plea was true or false. Directly after they had turned their backs the Bituriges threw in their lot with Vercingetorix.

The Bituriges join Vercingetorix.

But what was Labienus doing? Did he make no attempt to crush the rebellion before his chief could return? No responsibility could appal him; and, as the second-in-command, he was entitled to act in the Governor's absence. He had already paralysed the activity of Commius; and if he did not stir, it was not from lack of initiative. Perhaps, as he expected that Caesar would arrive soon, he judged it best to do nothing that might derange his plans. But there is a sentence in the narrative of Hirtius, Caesar's friend, which may supply the clue.[1] At the very outset of the revolt, Drappes, a chieftain of the Senones, called his slaves to arms, reinforced them with a band of outlaws and brigands, and succeeded in cutting off the Roman convoys. Caesar never mentions him; and it is clear that he struck before Caesar returned. May we infer that in the short space in which Labienus was free to act he could not take the field because the supplies on which he counted did not come?

Why did Labienus not take the field?

By the time that the news of the rebellion reached Italy, Rome, in the strong hands of Pompey, was quieting down; and Caesar was able to start for Gaul without delay. He took with him a number of recruits, whom he had raised in Cisalpine Gaul, to repair the losses of the late campaigns. His first difficulty, on arriving in the Province, was to rejoin his army. The legions were quartered at Agedincum, on the plateau of Langres, and in the neighbourhood of Trèves, two hundred miles and more to the north. If he were to send for them, they would be compelled to fight a battle as they marched southwards; and he was unwilling to trust the issue to his lieutenants.[2] On the other hand, it would be foolhardy for him, with only a slender escort, to attempt to make his way to them. Even the Aedui were believed to

Caesar returns with recruits to the Province.

How shall he rejoin his legions?

[1] *B. G.*, viii, 30, § 1.

[2] See *B. G.*, vii, 6, §§ 2–3, and A. von Göler, *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 234. Did Caesar distrust the generalship of Labienus?

be untrustworthy ; while Lucterius had just won over the Ruteni and the Nitiobroges, taken hostages from the Gabali, who were dependants of the Arverni, and, having raised fresh levies, was threatening to cross the Tarn and descend upon the opulent city of Narbo. Caesar saw that before all things it was necessary to safeguard the Province. Hastening to Narbo, he assured the anxious provincials that there was no cause for alarm, and posted detachments, drawn from the native troops who garrisoned the Province, in the surrounding country and also in the districts round Toulouse, Albi, and Nîmes. Having thus checkmated Lucterius, he went to join his new levies, which had been ordered to concentrate in the country of the Helvii, a Provincial tribe who dwelt in the Vivarais, on the eastern side of the Cevennes. He now saw his way to reach the army. Beyond the Cevennes lay the country of Vercingetorix,—undefended, for Vercingetorix was in the Berri, a hundred miles away. But the mountain tracks were buried beneath snow ; and no one had ever before attempted the journey under such conditions. Nevertheless Caesar advanced. Moving up the valley of the Ardèche, he made for the watershed between the sources of the Allier and the Loire.[1] By prodigious efforts the men shovelled aside the snow ;[2] and the Arverni, who had never dreamed that any one would venture to cross their mountain barrier, were astounded to see the Romans descending into the plains. Caesar's horsemen swept over the country in small parties, carrying fire and sword. The news soon spread ; and Vercingetorix, reluctantly yielding to the entreaties of his tribesmen, hurried to the rescue. This was just what Caesar had anticipated. Now that the rebel army was out of the way, he might, with comparative safety, travel northward to join his legions ; and so confident was he in the soundness of his forecast that, before he learned that Ver-

52 B.C.

[Narbonne.]

He rescues the Province from a threatened invasion :

crosses the Cevennes, invades Auvergne, and forces Vercingetorix to come to its relief :

[1] See *Archaeological Journal*, xviii, 1861, p. 369, and Napoleon, *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 244. M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 430, n. 2) gives reasons for believing that Caesar crossed the Cevennes by the Col du Pal.

[2] There is a photograph in the *Rev. des études anciennes* (xii, 1910, p. 85) of a snow-drift, taken in the Col du Pal, which shows that we need not suspect Caesar of exaggeration when he says (*B. G.*, vii, 8, § 2) that the snow was six feet deep.

52 B.C. cingetorix had commenced his march, he acted as though he had done so. He left Decimus Brutus, who had commanded in the sea-fight with the Veneti, to occupy the enemy's attention; and for fear his design might get abroad, he announced that he was only going to procure reinforcements,

then seizes the opportunity to rejoin his legions.

and would be back in three days. Then, recrossing the Cevennes, he hastened to Vienna on the Rhône; picked up there a body of Provincial cavalry,[1] which he had sent on to wait for him; pushed on up the valley of the Saône as swiftly as horses could carry him, hoping to elude the Aedui, in case they were hostile; rejoined the legions which he had left near Langres; and, before Vercingetorix knew where he was, concentrated the whole army in the neighbourhood of Agedincum.[2]

[Early in March?]

Vercingetorix besieges Gorgobina [St.Parize-le-Châtel?]

Vercingetorix, however, quickly recovered from this surprise. In the south of the Nièvre, near the confluence of the Allier and the Loire,[3] there was a town called Gorgobina, belonging to the Boi, whom, it will be remembered, Caesar had placed in dependence upon the Aedui. To strike at Caesar's allies would be equivalent to striking at Caesar himself. Vercingetorix accordingly prepared to besiege the stronghold. Again Caesar was in a dilemma. If he left Gorgobina to its fate, the tribes that still remained loyal would conclude that he could not be relied upon to protect his friends, and would therefore probably join the rebels. If, on the other hand, he undertook a campaign so early in the year, the army would be in danger of starving; for, owing to the severity of the weather, it was very difficult to transport supplies. But anything was better than to lose the confidence of his allies. He must trust to the Aedui to supply him with corn. Leaving two legions at Agedincum

[1] See p. 581.

[2] Caesar does not tell us what became of Brutus after he had fulfilled his mission. Probably he retreated to the Province. He took part in the operations at Alesia,—the closing scene of the campaign.

If Caesar was accompanied by his cavalry to Agedincum, his speed was limited by theirs. I conjecture that he took the risk of pushing on in advance and travelling by relays of horses, as he did when he crossed the Alps. Money will always procure horses, and similar risks were taken repeatedly in the Indian Mutiny.

[3] See note on GORGOBINA, pp. 425–30.

to guard his heavy baggage,[1] and sending messengers to tell the Boi that he was coming and encourage them to hold out, he marched for Gorgobina. Instead, however, of taking the direct route southward, he intended to go round by way of Cenabum; for, although time was precious, it was of paramount importance to punish, first of all, the people who had been the first to rebel, and who, by the massacre of Roman citizens, had outraged the majesty of Rome.[2] Moreover, by ravaging the lands of the Carnutes and Bituriges, he might count on forcing Vercingetorix to relax his hold on Gorgobina. His cavalry were comparatively weak, for some of the tribes which in former years had furnished contingents were now in revolt; but he had reinforced his Gallic and Spanish horsemen by four hundred Germans, whose value he had recognized in the campaign against the Usipetes and Tencteri. At the close of the second day's march he laid siege to Vellaunodunum, a stronghold of the Senones, probably on the site of the modern Montargis, in order to avoid leaving an enemy in his rear, and to facilitate the transport of his supplies. In three days the place surrendered, and, leaving Trebonius to disarm the inhabitants and take hostages for their good behaviour, he pushed on for Cenabum. The road crossed the great forest of Orléans; and Caesar accomplished the distance in two long marches. It was evening when he arrived,—too late to begin the siege; but the troops at once began to make the necessary preparations. The Loire was spanned by a bridge, the northern end of which could only be reached from within the town. The Carnutes, who had expected that Vellaunodunum would hold out longer, were not prepared for resistance, and tried to escape in the night over the bridge: but Caesar, foreseeing their attempt, had kept two legions under arms; the gates

52 B.C. Caesar marches from Agedincum (Sens) to relieve Gorgobina:

captures Vellaunodunum:

[1] The recruits, who had been temporarily left behind with Brutus in the country of the Arverni, were ordered to march to Agedincum, though Caesar does not say so, doubtless to learn their drill; for Labienus left them there when he started on his campaign against the Parisii and the Senones. See p. 161, and *B. G.*, vii, 57, § 1.

[2] This seems a sufficient explanation of Caesar's having made a *détour* (see my note on CENABUM, p. 408). But it is also possible that, if there were any bridges over the Loire above Cenabum, Vercingetorix had destroyed them.

52 B.C. captures and punishes Cenabum: were instantly fired, and the town seized; and, as the thronging masses were struggling forward through the narrow streets, the legions fell upon them, and almost all were taken prisoners.[1] The booty was given up to the soldiers; the town was set ablaze; and the army passed over the bridge,

crosses the Loire, and captures Noviodunum [Villate, near Neuvy-sur-Barangeon ?]; and pushed on to relieve Gorgobina. Noviodunum, which lay on their line of march, promptly surrendered. Hostages had been delivered up, and centurions were collecting arms and horses when the cavalry of Vercingetorix, who had hurriedly raised the siege of Gorgobina, were descried in the distance. Seizing the weapons which they had begun to pile, the townsmen manned the walls and tried to shut the gates; but the centurions were too quick for them, and with swords drawn withdrew their men unharmed. The rebel cavalry, who were beginning to overpower Caesar's Gallic levies, scattered before the charge of the German squadron; the

and marches to besiege Avaricum. baffled townsmen again surrendered; and Caesar marched southward for Avaricum, the capital of the Bituriges, now occupied by the famous cathedral city of Bourges.

Vercingetorix persuades the Bituriges to burn their towns and granaries. So far Vercingetorix had met with a succession of disasters. But his spirit was indomitable, and he knew how to learn from experience. He saw that the war must be conducted on a totally different principle. Nothing was to be gained by defending towns which could offer no resistance; and it was hopeless to encounter the Romans in the open field. But he had thousands of light horse who could scour the country and cut off their supplies. The grass was not yet grown, nor the corn ripe; and although Caesar had probably found grain in the towns which he had captured,[2] he could only replenish his stores by sending out detached parties to rifle the granaries. Vercingetorix called his officers together, and told them his plans. They must hunt down the Roman

[1] This seems to me the meaning of Caesar's words,—(oppido potitur) *perpaucis ex hostium numero desideratis quin cuncti caperentur, quod pontis atque itinerum angustiae multitudini fugam intercluserant* (*B. G.*, vii, 11, § 8); but M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 436, n. 12) thinks that the southern end of the bridge was connected with the road beyond by a narrow causeway, which he identifies with the *itinerum angustiae*. He does not explain why Caesar used the plural, *itinerum*.

[2] *B. G.*, vii, 14, § 9. Cf. C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 441.

foragers wherever they could find them, and attack the baggage-train. They must make up their minds to sacrifice their own interests for the national weal. Every hamlet, every barn where the enemy could find provender must be burned to the ground. Even the towns must be destroyed, save those which were impregnable, lest they should tempt men who ought to be in the field to go to them for shelter, and lest the Romans should plunder their stores. This might sound very hard : but it would be far harder for them to be slain while their wives and children were sold into slavery ; and, if they were beaten, this would inevitably be their doom. This uncompromising speech was greeted with unanimous applause. For such a leader men would consent to any sacrifice. Within a single day more than twenty villages in the Berri were burned down. All round the great plain, wherever the Romans looked, the sky was aglow.[1] The wretched inhabitants told each other that they were going to win, and would soon recover what they had lost. But Vercingetorix could only govern by character and tact. He had not the powers belonging to the general of an established commonwealth. He might venture to be severe ; but he could not afford to lose his popularity. The question was raised, whether Avaricum should be defended, or destroyed like the lesser towns. The Bituriges were not restrained by the sense of discipline ; and their spokesmen eloquently pleaded their cause. Their capital was the finest town almost in the whole of Gaul ; and, moreover, its position was so strong that they could easily defend it. Vercingetorix strongly opposed their appeal ; but they pleaded so pathetically, and their brother chiefs showed such sympathy with them, that he was obliged to give way. Following Caesar by easy stages, he finally halted about fourteen miles north-east [2] of Avaricum, on a strong position, from which he could communicate with the garrison and harass the besiegers.

52 B.C.

The Bituriges, contrary to his advice, resolve to defend Avaricum.

[1] M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 441) remarks that Vercingetorix ought to have adopted the plan of devastation at the outset of the campaign ; but could he have induced even the Bituriges to make such a sacrifice—and apparently they were the only tribe who at that time did so (see p. 741, n. 6)—until they had been taught by bitter experience ?

[2] See pp. 742–3.

52 B.C. Siege of Avaricum.

Avaricum was surrounded, on every side except the south, by marshes intersected by sluggish streams. On the south-east it was approached by a natural causeway, which, about a hundred yards from the wall, suddenly shelved down so as to form a kind of huge moat.[1] Behind this neck of land Caesar pitched his camp. As the marshes rendered it impossible to invest the position, he proceeded to construct a terrace, by which picked troops were ultimately to advance to the assault. The flanking parts were to serve as viaducts, to carry the towers in which artillery were placed; and it is probable that the platform intended for the columns of assault occupied only the front portion of the intervening space. First of all, in order to provide a secure foundation, the ground was cleared of obstructions and levelled as far as possible by men working inside stout huts.[2] The sides of each viaduct were constructed of parallel tiers of logs, the interstices between which were probably packed with earth and rubble. The workmen brought up the material through lines of sheds, which, being contiguous to one another and open at both ends, formed covered galleries; and they were further protected in front by a fence of high wooden shields moving on rollers. Between the walls of timber, which served as lateral supports, they built up the core of the viaduct, which was composed of earth, stones, and timber. The artillerymen who manned the tower kept their catapults playing upon the defenders of the wall. As the structure rose daily higher, the elevation of the tower was correspondingly augmented.[3] When the viaduct was completed, the tower could be moved backwards or forwards along the surface; while the sheds were ranged on either side, and served as a means of safe communication. The central mound was probably raised higher than the other two,[4] in order to facilitate the assault; and sheds were placed upon it also, to screen the assailants from observation and attack.

[1] See Napoleon, *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 255, and Planche 20.

[2] See Stoffel, *Hist. de Jules César,—Guerre civile*, ii, 357, and Caesar, *B. C.*, ii, 2, § 4.

[3] See p. 746.

[4] Forming what is technically called a 'cavalier'. See my note on 'The *Agger*', pp. 602–6.

Meanwhile the new policy of Vercingetorix was beginning 52 B.C.
to make itself felt. Organized patrols kept him informed of Caesar's movements, and conveyed his instructions to the garrison. Whenever the Romans went out to forage or procure corn, his horsemen kept them in sight, and handled them severely if they ever ventured to disperse. Caesar did all that ingenuity could suggest to baffle him, sending the men out at odd times and in varying directions ; but the enemy seemed ubiquitous. Supplies were running short, and Caesar called upon the Aedui and the Boi for corn ; but the Aedui were half-hearted ; and the Boi, though they did their best, had little to give. For several days the soldiers had no bread, and were obliged to kill the cattle, driven in from distant villages, in order to subsist at all. Yet, as Caesar proudly related, not one of them uttered a word that was unworthy of their own victorious record or of the majesty of the Roman people. The terrace was steadily nearing the wall, for gangs of legionaries, who took duty in turns, were engaged upon it night and day. Caesar went among them as they worked, and did all that he could to keep up their spirits. He would abandon the siege, he told them, if they found the pangs of hunger too hard to bear. But they would not hear of such a thing. They reminded him that they had fought under his command for six years with untarnished honour, never abandoning any operation which they had undertaken ; and they would cheerfully endure every hardship if only they could avenge the massacre at Cenabum.

Vercingetorix, when his provender was consumed, moved several miles nearer the town. Some prisoners reported that he had left his infantry in their new encampment, and gone with his cavalry to lie in wait for the Roman foragers in the place where he expected that they would be found on the following day. Caesar saw an opportunity, and marched at midnight to attack the encampment. But the enemy were well served by their patrols. They removed their wagons and baggage out of harm's way into the recesses of a wood ; and in the early morning Caesar found them securely posted on a hill surrounded by a belt of morass, not more than fifty feet wide. They had broken down the

52 B.C. causeways which spanned the morass, and posted piquets opposite the places where it was fordable. The legionaries clamoured for the signal to advance; but Caesar told them that victory could only be purchased by the slaughter of many gallant men, and that their lives were more precious to him than his own reputation. They allowed themselves to be consoled: but now for the first time they had been forced to abandon an operation which they had begun; and perhaps when Caesar led them back to resume the labour of the siege, he suspected that he had been duped.[1]

Vercingetorix, on returning to the encampment, was accused of treachery. His officers told him to his face that he would never have left them without a leader, exposed to that well-timed attack, if he had not intended to betray them. He ought never to have moved from his original position. It was plain enough that he wanted to reign as Caesar's creature, not by the choice of his countrymen. Vercingetorix was at no loss for an answer. He had moved, he reminded them, at their own request, simply in order to get forage. They had not been in the slightest danger; for the position in which he had left them was impregnable. He had purposely refrained from delegating his command to any one, for fear they should worry his substitute into risking a battle; for he knew that they had not resolution enough to adhere to a system of warfare which required patient toil. They ought to be thankful that the Romans had tried to attack them, because they could now see for themselves what cowards the Romans were. He had no need to beg Caesar for a kingdom which he could win for himself by the sword; and they might take back their gift if they imagined that they were doing him a favour, and not indebted to him for their safety. 'And now,' he said, 'to satisfy yourselves that what I say is true, listen to Roman soldiers.' Some camp-followers, whom he had captured a few days before, and had kept on starvation diet, were told to step forward. They had been carefully drilled in the part which they were to play. Questioned by Vercingetorix, they stated that they were legionaries, and had secretly left the camp in the hope of

[1] See pp. 744–5.

finding something to eat ; that their comrades, one and all, 52 B.C.
were half-starved, and too weak to get through their work ; and that Caesar had made up his mind, unless within three days he had achieved some tangible results, to abandon the siege.[1] 'You see,' said Vercingetorix, 'I—I whom you call a traitor—have brought this mighty army, without the loss of a drop of your blood, to the verge of starvation. No course is open to them but an ignominious retreat ; and I have arranged that not a single tribe shall give them refuge.' Clashing their weapons, as their custom was, the tribesmen swore that Vercingetorix was the greatest of generals, and that they would trust him through thick and thin. They realized how much was staked upon the safety of Avaricum ; and ten thousand picked men were sent into the town. But jealousy had much to do with this decision. If the Bituriges succeeded in holding the fortress [2] unaided, the glory of the triumph would be theirs.

In devising expedients to baffle the operations of the besiegers, the Gauls showed a resourcefulness which astonished Caesar. 'They are a most ingenious people,' he remarked, 'and always show the greatest aptitude in borrowing and giving effect to ideas which they get from any one.' The wall, compacted with transverse balks and longitudinal beams of timber, was too tough, so to speak, to be breached by the battering ram ; and, being also largely composed of stone and rubble, it was proof against fire.[3] The Roman engineers used powerful hooks, riveted to stout poles, to loosen and drag down the stones. These hooks the garrison seized with nooses ; and then, by means of windlasses, pulled them up over the wall. They made daily sorties, fired the woodwork of the terrace, and harassed the workers by frequent attacks. They erected towers along the wall, in

[1] A careful reader of *B. G.*, vii, 20 will, I think, conclude that in the army of Vercingetorix there were individuals who understood Latin.

[2] I have followed the reading *penes eos* (*B. G.*, vii, 21, § 3), which is in all the good MSS. and is approved by Mommsen (*Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xx, 1894, p. 209). The other reading—*paene in eo* (si id oppidum retinuissent)—is only found in two inferior MSS. If it were right, the meaning would be that the Gauls reinforced the garrison because they realized 'that final success depended almost entirely upon their holding the town'.

[3] See pp. 746–8.

52 B.C. imitation of those of the besiegers, and filled them with archers and slingers. They drove galleries under the terrace, and dragged away the timber of which it was composed; and, assailing the Roman sappers with sharp stakes, heavy stones, and boiling pitch, they stopped the galleries by which they were approaching to undermine the wall.[1]

The siege had lasted twenty-five days; and, in spite of numbing cold and drenching rains and harassing opposition, the indefatigable Romans had built up the terrace, three hundred and thirty feet wide and eighty feet high,[2] till it almost reached the wall. To complete the final section of the work was always a difficult and troublesome operation. It was no longer possible to rear a compact and uniform structure, as the enemy, standing right above on the wall, could pitch heavy stones and other missiles on to the workmen. Huts of extraordinary strength, the sloping roofs of which were protected against fire by bricks, clay, and raw hides, were therefore placed near the edge of the terrace; and, screened by them, the men shot earth, timber, and fascines into the vacant space until the mass reached the necessary height.[3] About midnight, when they were putting the finishing touches to the work, a cloud of smoke was seen rising above it. Some miners had burrowed underneath, and set the woodwork on fire. A yell of exultation rang from the town. Flaming brands shot down from the wall and illumined the figures standing above: pitch and logs were flung on to the fire; and the enemy's masses came streaming through the gates. If the Romans were confused, it was only for a moment. Caesar himself was on the spot; for he had been personally superintending the workmen. Two legions regularly bivouacked in front of the camp, ready for emergencies; and while some cohorts threw themselves upon the enemy, others drew back the towers out of reach of the flames or dragged asunder the woodwork of the terrace to save the hinder part of it from catching fire; others again ran to extinguish the flames. The small hours dragged

[1] See pp. 600–2.

[2] See pp. 748–9.

[3] See pp. 606 and 608–10, and Stoffel, *Hist. de Jules César,—Guerre civile*, ii, 359.

by; and in the grey dawn the battle was still raging. The mantlets that screened the workmen who moved the towers had been burned; and it was therefore hazardous to wheel the towers to the front.[1] More than once it seemed that the Gauls were winning; and Caesar himself was moved to admiration by their stubborn valour. He saw a man taking lumps of fat and pitch from his comrades, and flinging them into the flames. A bolt from a catapult pierced him; and he fell dead. Another man stepped across his prostrate body, and took his place. He too was struck: but in a moment a third was doing his work, and presently a fourth; nor was the post deserted until the Romans finally extinguished the flames, and the Gauls, beaten at every point, were forced back into the town. 52 B.C.

Vercingetorix knew that it was useless now to prolong the defence. He therefore sent word to the garrison to slip out in the dark and come to his camp. They were confident that the marshes would prevent the Romans from getting at them. Night came on; and the men, gathered in the streets and open places, were just starting. Suddenly there was a rush of women: weeping, they flung themselves at their husbands' feet, and besought them not to abandon them and the children who belonged to father and mother alike to the vengeance of the Romans. Deaf to their entreaties, the men pressed on. Frantic with terror, the women screamed and gesticulated, to put the besiegers on their guard; and the men, fearing that the Roman cavalry would block the roads, abandoned their attempt.

Storming of Avaricum.

Next day Caesar completed the repair of the terrace,[2] and moved forward one of the towers. Rain fell in torrents; and noticing that the guards on the wall were posted carelessly, he determined to deliver the assault. The workmen were told to loiter, in order to put the garrison off their guard. The troops were concealed within and in the rear of the sheds

[1] See pp. 610–1.

[2] I read *perfectis* (que operibus), which has good MS. support (*B. G.*, vii, 27, § 1). If *dcrectis* is read, *operibus* must mean the sheds (*vineae*) and artillery (*tormenta*), a meaning for which there is little or no authority; and, moreover, the words 'which he had begun' (*quae facere instituerat*) would be meaningless.

52 B.C. which stood upon the terrace.[1] Cæsar harangued them, and promised rewards to those who should be the first to mount the wall. The artillerymen in the tower made play with their engines, to give their comrades every chance.[2] The signal was given. Instantly the columns, darting forth from their cover, streamed over the front of the terrace and swarmed up the ladders; and, panic-stricken and confounded, the defenders were overborne and driven down on to the space below. Quickly rallying, they formed up in compact wedge-shaped masses, resolute to fight it out if they should be attacked. But the Romans were too wary to attack them. They lined the wall all round; and not a man of them would come down. Throwing away their weapons, the Gauls ran for their lives through the town to its furthest extremity; and there many, jostling one another in the narrow gateways, were slaughtered, while others, who shouldered their way out, were cut down by the cavalry. Plunder was forgotten.

Indiscriminate massacre.

Exasperated by the long weariness of the siege, burning to avenge the massacre at Cenabum, the Romans slew the aged, they slew women and infants, and spared none. Some forty thousand human beings—all but eight hundred who made their way to the camp of Vercingetorix—perished on that day.

It was late at night when the fugitives approached the camp. Vercingetorix had a turbulent host to control. They were not a regular army, but an aggregate of tribal levies, each commanded by their tribal chiefs. He had reason to fear that the pitiable plight of the fugitives might excite their emotions, and lead to disturbance and subversion of discipline. He therefore sent out his trusted friends and the leading men of the several tribes to which the fugitives belonged, who waited for them on the road, and conducted them in separate groups to their several quarters in the camp.

Vercingetorix consoles his troops.

Next day Vercingetorix called the remnant of his people together, and made them a speech. They must not, he said, be disheartened; for no experienced warrior could expect

[1] See pp. 749–51.

[2] See *B. G.*, vii, 27, § 1; Stoffel, *Hist. de Jules César,—Guerre civile*, ii, 361; and Guischard, *Mém. mil. sur les Grecs et les Romains*, ii, 7.

invariable success. The Romans had not beaten them in fair fight : they had merely stolen an advantage over them by superior science. As they all knew, he had never approved of defending Avaricum. But he would soon repair the loss. He would gain over all the dissentient tribes to the cause ; and against an united Gaul the whole world could not stand in arms. Meanwhile he had a right to expect that in future they should adopt the Roman custom of regularly fortifying their camps. 52 B.C.

This speech made an excellent impression. The multitude could not but admire the cheery courage of their leader : they could not but admit that the event had proved his foresight. They respected him too because he had had the courage to confront them in the hour of defeat, when another leader might not have dared to show his face. So far then from lessening, the disaster only increased the estimation in which he was held.

He immediately set to work to fulfil his promise. Agents, chosen for their eloquence and tact, bore lavish bribes and still more lavish promises to the dissentient chiefs. New weapons and new clothing were provided for the survivors of the siege. New levies, including large numbers of bowmen, were speedily raised ; and Teutomatus, king of the Nitiobroges, though his father had been honoured by the Senate, hastened to join Vercingetorix with his own cavalry and with others whom he had hired from the Aquitanians. Thus the losses which had been incurred at Avaricum were made good ; while those who had already fought under Vercingetorix had learned a salutary lesson, and, in spite of their natural laziness and impatience of discipline, were in the humour to do or to suffer whatever he might command. He raises fresh levies.

The hungry Romans found an abundance of corn in Avaricum ; and Caesar remained there a few days to recruit their strength. Winter was nearly over ; and he was about to open his campaign in earnest. The Gauls, in their newborn zeal, had entrenched their camp, and he was too prudent to attack their strong position ; but he hoped either to lure them into the open or else to blockade and force them to surrender. Suddenly his attention was distracted

52 B.C. Caesar, at the request of the Aedui, decides between rival claimants for the office of Vergobret.

by serious news from the Aedui. Two chiefs, Cotus and Convictolitavis, were contending for the first magistracy, each insisting that he had been legally elected: their retainers were up in arms; and a civil war was imminent. A deputation of leading men begged Caesar to arbitrate. He saw that it was of vital importance to prevent the weaker side from appealing for aid to Vercingetorix. Accordingly, though he was most reluctant to delay his operations, he summoned the rivals and the council to meet him at Decetia, or Décize, on the Loire. This town was in Aeduan territory, and nearly sixty miles from Avaricum: but it was illegal for the Vergobret to cross the frontier; and Caesar was too wise to offer a needless slight to native custom. He was informed that Cotus had been nominated by his brother, the late Vergobret, in defiance of an Aeduan law which prescribed that no man should hold office or even sit in the senate while any member of his family who had done so survived. He accordingly settled the dispute in favour of Convictolitavis, who, as was the custom when the magistracy remained vacant, had been appointed by the Druids.[1] Before dismissing the council, he urged them to forget their differences, and told them that, if they wanted to share in the spoils of victory, they must honestly help to put down the rebellion.[2] He should require ten thousand foot to guard his convoys, and all their cavalry. He then divided the army into two parts. Labienus was sent northward with four legions, including the two that had been left at Agedincum, to crush the rebellion of the Senones and Parisii; while Caesar himself, with the remaining six, marched southward, up the eastern bank of the Allier, to strike a blow at Gergovia, —the heart of the rebellion.

He sends Labienus to suppress rebellion in the basin of the Seine, and marches himself to attack Gergovia. He establishes a magazine at Noviodunum (Nevers):

On the hill now crowned by the cathedral of Nevers, which rises above the Loire, in the peninsula formed by its confluence with the Nièvre, was an Aeduan town called Noviodunum. Caesar had marked the strength of the

[1] The meaning of the passage (*B. G.*, vii, 33, § 4) on which the sentence in the text is based has been disputed. See p. 528, n. 2.

[2] Leaving out of account the troops which Caesar raised in the Province, this was apparently the only occasion in the war on which he employed Gallic infantry.

GERGOVIA

REFERENCE
C Col des Goules
P Q Gates
A Hill abandoned by Gauls
D E Line fortified by Gauls
The numbers denote the heights in metres above the level of the sea
Letrest is at the eastward termination of the Montagne de la Serre
Mont Rognon
Bésance Ch.
Romagnat
Clémensat
Pt. Pérignat
ANCIEN LAC DE SARLIÈVES
Route Impériale de Paris
GERGOVIA
Wall
Ditch
Wall & Ditch of town
Dom. de Gergovia
Merdogne
Large camp
Hauteurs de Risolles
Opme
Puy de Marmant
Puy Giroux
Puy de Jussat
Jussat
Sextius
Small camp
Donnezat
la Roche-Blanche
Pt. Orcet
Orcet
Puy de Chignat
Ch. Julia
Chanonat
Montagne de la Serre
le Crest
Pt. Pardines
Pt. Persignan
Kilometres
SCALE 1 : 30,000
Roman Miles
Stanford's Geog. Estabt. London

position, and here he established his chief magazine ; but he could not spare a force sufficient to make it secure. 52 B.C.

Vercingetorix was still on the western bank of the Allier. As soon as he heard of Caesar's advance he broke down all the bridges, but left the lower parts of the piles intact. The two armies moved in full view of one another, with the river between them. The Gallic patrols were so vigilant that Caesar found it impossible to repair any of the bridges ; and he began to fear that he might be barred by the river during the entire summer. But Vercingetorix had not learned the necessity of watching his rear. One evening, Caesar encamped on a wooded spot, opposite one of the bridges. Next morning he took forty out of the sixty cohorts composing his force ; arrayed them in six divisions, so that, seen from a distance, they would look like the six legions ; [1] and ordered them to make a long march on with the entire baggage-train. Vercingetorix suspected nothing. Caesar remained behind with the rest of the force, waiting for the hour when, as he calculated, the four legions and the enemy should have encamped for the night. Then he set the men whom he had kept behind, to work at the repair of the bridge. When it was finished, he made them cross over, and sent for the other cohorts. Vercingetorix, finding that he had been outwitted, and unwilling to risk a battle, hurried on southward by prodigious marches.

crosses the Allier by a stratagem ;

Caesar followed more leisurely : and moving across the level expanse of the Limagne, found himself, early on the fifth day, approaching the mountain of Gergovia. He had neglected or had failed to estimate the magnitude of the enterprise to which he had committed himself.[2] Rising on his right front, fully twelve hundred feet above the plain, the northern face, with its upper terraces broken here and there by precipices, manifestly defied attack ; and, as he moved on past the long spurs, he saw that the eastern side, steep, rugged, and scored by deep ravines, was equally unassailable. Presently, observing on his left front a suitable spot for a camp, he halted near the foot of the south-eastern slope. His cavalry were soon engaged in a skirmish ; and

[1] See pp. 751–4. Cf. C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 466.

52 B.C. in the afternoon he reconnoitred the stronghold from the south. The town stood on an oblong plateau, which formed the summit, extending about seven furlongs from east to west, and six hundred yards wide. The higher terraces, and also the outlying heights of Risolles, linked by a col or saddle to the south-western angle of the plateau, were bristling with the tents of the Gauls ; and the tribal camps were protected by a wall of loose stones, which, about half-way up the slope, ran along the whole southern side. From the very foot of the mountain, below the central point of the wall, rose a low but steep hill, now called La Roche Blanche, which projected southward at right angles, and terminated in an almost sheer precipice. A small stream, the Auzon, flowed eastward through the meadows which extended past the base of the hill ; and two miles beyond the valley, on the left as one looked up the stream, the view was closed by a long ridge, the Montagne de la Serre. Beyond the heights of Risolles was the high pass of Opme, which at one point gave access to them by a comparatively easy slope, and separated them from the distant Puy Giroux.

The result of the reconnaissance was not encouraging. The ascent to the stronghold appeared less difficult on the south than on the other sides ; but even on the south the ascent was not easy. Moreover, the Gauls held the whole space between the outer wall and the town ; and their appearance, as Caesar remarked, was truly formidable. Even if the Romans could gain the col on the south-west, they would still be confronted by a steep though short incline. All round the plateau ran a natural glacis, to climb which, in the face of a determined enemy, would be hopeless ; and the usual expedient of approaching by a terrace was obviously impracticable. To besiege or to assault the town was therefore out of the question ; and Caesar resolved to make sure of his supplies before proceeding even to blockade it. Meanwhile

and encamps before Gergovia. he pitched his camp on a low plateau north of the Auzon, about half a mile north-west of the modern village of Orcet and three thousand yards from the south-eastern corner of the town.

For some days no event occurred more important than

a cavalry combat. Vercingetorix kept his troopers busy, interspersing archers among their ranks; and frequent skirmishes took place in the plain between the south-eastern spurs and the Roman camp. He made the tribal chiefs repair daily to his quarters before sunrise, to furnish their reports and receive his instructions. But one detail escaped his vigilance. Caesar had detected a weak point in the enemy's position. The Roche Blanche, which commanded the only descent from the town to the rich meadows of the Auzon, was inadequately garrisoned;[1] and his antagonist had either neglected to fortify it or been prevented by want of time. If only he could get possession of this hill, he would cut off the Gauls from the chief source of their supplies. The ascent on the eastern side was practicable. In the dead of night Caesar stole out of camp with two legions, drove out the startled garrison before reinforcements could arrive, and occupied the hill. There he constructed a small camp, and connected it with the larger one by a pair of parallel trenches, so that men might pass unobserved from camp to camp under cover of the ramparts formed by the excavated earth.[2] Even now, however, he had cause for anxiety; for his entire force was hardly more than five-and-twenty thousand men,—too few to invest a position more than twelve miles in extent.

52 B.C. First operations at Gergovia.

Just at this time the alarming news arrived that the Aedui were on the brink of revolt. They had not embraced the cause of Rome with the same unanimity, the same resolution as the astute and far-seeing Remi. Diviciacus had been Caesar's best friend: but he had not been able to silence the anti-Roman party; and even the Caesarians were no longer staunch. If they adhered to Caesar, they would no doubt be rewarded,—if Caesar gained the day. But was it certain that he would? Vercingetorix was a formidable antagonist.

Defection of the Aeduan Vergobret.

[1] *B. G.*, vii, 36, § 6. I accept the MS. reading, (praesidio) *non nimis firmo*, on which see Schneider's *Caesar*, ii, 444–5. Meusel adopts Zucker's emendation, *non infirmo*, which would mean that the garrison was strong.

[2] Napoleon, *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 271. 'Si l'on s'étonnait,' says Napoleon, 'que les Romains eussent creusé deux petits fossés de 6 pieds de largeur chacun et de 4 pieds de profondeur, au lieu d'en faire un seul de 8 de largeur sur 6 de profondeur, ce qui aurait donné le même déblai, on répondrait que les deux petits fossés étaient bien plus vite faits qu'un seul grand fossé.'

52 B.C. He might perhaps succeed after all ; and then their old rivals, the Arverni, would supplant them. If, on the other hand, they threw in their lot with him, their strength would surely turn the scale. To them would belong the glory of liberating Gaul from the invader ; and then they would hold sway, not as his servile nominees, but as the champions of a great and independent confederation. Caesar had suspected them from the outset of the revolt : but the story which he now heard must have taken him by surprise. The ringleader was no other than Convictolitavis, the Vergobret, whose election he had himself secured. Vercingetorix had offered him a bribe ; and he promptly responded to that most potent spur of Gallic patriotism. He in turn talked over some of the younger chiefs, and gave them part of the money. But the senate would certainly think twice before venturing to turn upon their powerful patron. The chiefs took counsel together. The infantry contingent, which Caesar had demanded, was just starting for Gergovia. A chief named Litaviccus was placed in command of it ; and, to avert suspicion, his brothers were sent on ahead to join Caesar. About half-way to Gergovia, near the site of the modern village of Serbannes,[1] Litaviccus halted the column, and delivered an inflammatory harangue. The troops were horrified to hear that all the Aeduan cavalry with Caesar, and among them two chiefs named Eporedorix and Viridomarus, had been massacred on a trumped-up charge of treachery. Some men, who were in the secret, came forward and swore that the story was true : they themselves, they declared, were the sole survivors of the massacre. The thoughtless Aeduans drank in the lying tale and put themselves in the hands of their leader. It was settled that as soon as they reached Gergovia, they should join Vercingetorix and avenge the slaughter of their countrymen. Some Roman citizens were travelling under the Aeduan escort with grain and stores for Caesar. Litaviccus had them tortured and killed ; and, before resuming his march, he sent off messengers to spread the news of the pretended massacre among the Aedui, and urge them to arm.

An Aeduan contingent, marching to join Caesar, persuaded by its leader to declare for Vercingetorix.

Rumour flew fast. The intrigue was soon known at

[1] See pp. 767–8.

Gergovia. Eporedorix himself came to Caesar in the middle of the night, and told the whole story. He entreated him not to allow a few wrong-headed men to drag a friendly people into revolt : if Litaviccus and the ten thousand succeeded in joining Vercingetorix, the Aeduan authorities would have no choice but to support them. Caesar was intensely anxious ; but he did not hesitate. He determined to go and intercept the deluded infantry at once, though he knew that the large camp would, in his absence, be exposed to a most serious risk. The camp on the Roche Blanche, in the hands of a few resolute men, would be virtually impregnable.[1] Before starting, Caesar ordered the arrest of Litaviccus's brothers ; but they had already fled. He took with him all the cavalry and four legions, leaving two only to hold the camps. The defence was entrusted to Fabius, who, two years before, had joined in the relief of Cicero. Caesar told his men that he must call upon them to make a most trying effort ; but, he added, the occasion was urgent, and they would not grumble. They were in the best of spirits and ready for anything. They had marched twenty-three miles down the valley of the Allier when the Aeduan column was descried. Caesar sent on the cavalry to stop them, but warned them to do violence to no man. At the same time he made Eporedorix and Viridomarus show themselves and converse with their countrymen. The Aedui were overawed ; and they saw that they had been duped. They grounded their arms and begged for mercy ; but Litaviccus managed to escape with his retainers, and made his way to Gergovia. Caesar knew that his action was sure to be misrepresented. He therefore took the precaution of sending messengers to give the Aeduan authorities a true account of what had passed, and to impress upon them that he had treated the mutinous contingent with forbearance. Three hours were allowed for rest,[2] and then the Aedui went back quietly with the legions. Darkness was now closing in. On the march

52 B.C. Caesar makes a forced march, overawes the contingent, and returns just in time to rescue his camp.

[1] See pp. 757–8.

[2] I read *tribusque horis exercitui ad quietem datis castra ad Gergoviam movet* (*B. G.*, vii, 41, § 1), deleting *noctis* after *horis* with von Göler (*Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 274, n. 3) and Meusel. If the three hours' rest had been taken in the night, there would not have been time to march back to Gergovia.

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52 B.C. a party of horsemen came to meet the column, and reported that Vercingetorix had been attacking the large camp with desperate fury. The artillery had alone enabled the little garrison to hold out; but many had been wounded by sling-stones and arrows; and Fabius was busily erecting breastworks upon the rampart, in view of a renewed attack. The news stimulated the tired men to do their utmost. Pressing on all through the small hours, Caesar reached the camp before sunrise, having accomplished the extraordinary march of forty-six miles in little more than twenty-four hours, just in time to avert the destruction of his exhausted legions.

Outrages of the Aedui against Roman citizens.

Had his policy been miscalculated? Perhaps the event may have convinced him that he had been imprudent in trying to reconcile the Aeduan factions, and that, if he had left them to fight out their quarrel and adhered to his purpose of following up the success of Avaricum, one or the other would have been forced to take his part. Perhaps he may still have felt that, on the information which was available at the time, he had not done wrong in trying to keep the entire people on his side. But he must forget those things that were behind. For the moment the danger was over: but there were unmistakable signs that the Aedui would soon go over to the rebels. The ignorant populace took for granted the truth of the news about the massacre of the cavalry. Some were exasperated; others simply rapacious. They burst open the dwellings of Roman residents, robbed them, murdered them, sold them as slaves. Convictolitavis worked upon their passions. Once they had committed themselves, he saw, they would feel that Caesar would never forgive them, and that they had everything to gain and nothing to lose by taking up arms. The Aedui took care of course to send apologies and explanations to Caesar, as soon as they heard that their contingent was in his power. The Government, they said, had not sanctioned the outrages which had been committed: the property of Litaviccus had been confiscated; and full restitution should be made. But they had tasted the sweets of plunder: they had little hope of being forgiven; and they secretly commenced preparations for

war. Caesar received their envoys with all possible politeness; but he was not for a moment deceived. He doubtless wished to leave the door of repentance open for his old allies. There was perhaps just a chance that, if he affected to believe that the authorities were not responsible for the excesses of the rabble, they might be wise enough to draw back. Meanwhile he would prepare for the worst. The defection of so powerful a state would inevitably give a fresh stimulus to the rebellion; and it seemed probable that, if he delayed where he was any longer, he might find himself hemmed in. Yet, besides the humiliation of failure, to abandon the siege would of itself encourage waverers to turn against him. How was he to get away and rejoin Labienus without leaving the fatal impression that he was obliged to flee?

52 B.C.

Anxiety of Caesar.

While he was considering this problem, he ascended the Roche Blanche in order to inspect the works of the camp. Standing upon the plateau, he noticed with astonishment that a hill forming part of the mass of Risolles was abandoned. What could this mean? Some deserters explained the mystery. Vercingetorix was greatly alarmed for the safety of the saddle which connected Risolles with Gergovia. If the Romans captured this place as well as the hill on the south which they already occupied, it would be hardly possible for foragers to get out; and the garrison would be starved into surrender. Every available man therefore had been called away to fortify the western approach to Risolles, where alone the ascent was practicable.

He attempts to take Gergovia by a *coup de main*.

Caesar immediately devised a stratagem. About midnight he sent several squadrons of cavalry up the valley of the Auzon, whence they struck off to the left along the lower slopes of the Montagne de la Serre, as though they intended to make for the pass of Opme. In obedience to orders they moved with a show of excitement and made a noise, in order to attract attention. At daybreak a number of baggage-drivers, equipped to look like troopers, rode after them, accompanied by a few regular cavalry, who were to roam further afield, in order to increase the effect. One of the legions followed, and, after advancing a short distance, crossed the Auzon, and concealed itself in a wood near the

52 B.C. hamlet of Chanonat. Vercingetorix, who, from his commanding position, could just discern these movements, became thoroughly alarmed, and sent the rest of his forces to push on the work of fortification. Now was Caesar's opportunity. He made the soldiers move in small parties, so that they might not be observed, from the larger camp to the foot of the Roche Blanche.[1] Some cohorts of the 13th legion were detailed for the protection of the smaller camp; while the 10th was to remain as a reserve under Caesar's personal command, and the Aedui were dispatched from the larger camp to ascend the mountain from the right.[2] When all was ready, Caesar explained his plans to his generals. The ground, he said, being so unfavourable, he did not want to fight a battle, but to effect a surprise: their one chance of success was to ascend with all possible speed; and he particularly warned them not to allow the men, in their eagerness for plunder, to get out of hand. Once in possession of the camps, he doubtless hoped that they would have time to cut off the Gallic troops from the town.

The legions were formed up on nearly level ground, on the right of the Roche Blanche. Their path ascended a hollow or gentle depression. From where they stood the actual distance to the town was rather more than two thousand yards; while the place which the Gauls were fortifying was barely five furlongs from the nearest gate. The legionaries advanced rapidly until they came to the outer wall: over it they clambered, and took possession of three of the camps. The few men who had been left in them fled up the hill. The king of the Nitiobroges, roused from his siesta, had but just time to spring up half naked, scramble on to his horse, and gallop away. Caesar was with the 10th legion on the hill-side, on the right of the valley by which the column had ascended. Perhaps he had reason to believe that it would be impossible to follow up his advantage: possibly he intended to re-form the scattered

[1] Though Caesar does not say so, I suppose that a sufficient force was left to hold the large camp and protect the baggage.

[2] M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 474) supposes that this force was the Aeduan cavalry! Surely the words *similitudine armorum* (*B. G.*, vii, 50, § 2) prove that it was infantry.

legionaries, retain possession of the camps, and force Vercingetorix to fight : anyhow he made his trumpeter sound the recall.[1] Separated from him by the valley, the troops did not hear the blast of the trumpet, and, heedless of the commands of their officers, pressed on still higher up the slope, close to the southern gate of the town. A centurion, named Lucius Fabius, had reminded his comrades of the rewards which Caesar had offered before the assault of Avaricum, and boasted that no one should get into Gergovia before him. He was hoisted on to the wall by three of his men, and then hauled them up in turn. A cry of terror rose from the town. Women threw down money and clothes to satisfy the soldiers, and, craning over with bare breasts and outstretched hands, besought them not to treat them as they had treated the women and children at Avaricum ; others were let down from the wall and offered themselves a sacrifice to lust ; while many in the distant parts of the town, fancying that the Romans were inside, ran for their lives. Now, however, the men who had been engaged in fortifying Risolles, hearing the uproar and stimulated by a succession of messengers, came hurrying back and formed up at the foot of the wall. The women held up their little ones in their arms and screamed to their men-folk to fight for them. Standing high above, these dense and ever-growing masses were too much for the tired legionaries ; and they had to fight desperately to hold their ground. Anxiously watching the struggle, Caesar sent an order to Sextius, the officer whom he had left in command of the smaller camp, to lead out his cohorts and form them up at the foot of Gergovia, so that, in case the legions were repulsed, he might fall upon the right flank of their pursuers. He himself moved with the 10th a little nearer to the outer wall. Meanwhile the panic in the town had subsided. The centurion and the soldiers who had got in first were killed, and their bodies pitched over the wall. Another centurion, Marcus Petronius, while attempting to hew down one of the gates, was surrounded and severely wounded. The men of his company had followed him. ' I cannot save myself and you too,' he

52 B.C.

[1] See pp. 245–8.

52 B.C. cried : ' but it was I in my lust for glory who led you into danger, and so help me Heaven, I'll save you. You have your chance : use it ! ' With these words, he flung himself into the thick of the enemy, killed two of them, and beat off the rest from the gate. His men rallied round him. ' It's useless,' he cried : ' I am dying : you cannot help me. Go while you can, and return to your legion.' Fighting to the last, Petronius fell ; but he saved his men.

The battle was still raging when the Romans caught sight of a column moving over the shoulder of the hill on their right flank. It was the Aedui, whom Caesar had sent up the eastern slope to create a diversion : but the Romans, deceived by their armour, took them for enemies : the Gauls were closing in upon them on every side ; and now thoroughly unnerved, they were hurled back, and fled headlong down the valley. Blindly pursuing them, the Gauls were roughly checked, on right and left, by the cohorts of Sextius, and by the 10th, who had moved lower down the slope. As soon as they reached level ground, the runaways halted and faced the enemy, who then moved off ; but forty-six centurions and nearly seven hundred privates lay dead upon the hill.[1]

The attack repulsed with heavy loss.

Next day Caesar assembled the troops, and lectured them severely for their disobedience. He admired their spirit, he told them ; but discipline was as necessary to a soldier as courage ; and it was the height of presumption in them to imagine that they knew how to gain a victory better than their general. At the same time they must not be disheartened ; for they had only been beaten because they had been rash enough to fight on unfavourable ground. To give effect to his words, he formed them up in line of battle on the most advantageous position which he could select ; but Vercingetorix naturally refused to walk into the trap. On that day, however, and the next, there were slight cavalry skirmishes, in which the Romans had the advantage. Then, feeling that he had done enough to abate the exultation of the enemy and to restore the confidence of his men, Caesar abandoned the siege, and marched once more down the valley of the Allier.

Caesar marches to rejoin Labienus.

[1] Regarding the operations at Gergovia, see pp. 756–67.

The situation was serious indeed. The Gauls had found out that he was not invincible. He had under-estimated their force and deliberately weakened his own. The division which he had assigned to Labienus, could not now crush rebellion in the north : the legions which he had kept for himself were doomed from the first to waste their strength against the strongest fortress in Gaul. For the first time in all these years he had been beaten ; and his defeat would inevitably weaken his prestige and act like a tonic upon the spirits of his enemies. Fortunately Vercingetorix did not venture to pursue him : he was too wary to hazard the fruits of his victory by launching his levies against the legions on the open expanse of the Limagne ; and probably his purpose was to let the Romans starve between his own force and the insurgents of the north.[1] On the third day of the retreat Caesar repaired one of the bridges over the Allier. He had only just recrossed the river when Eporedorix and Viridomarus told him that Litaviccus had left Gergovia with the Gallic cavalry, and gone to recruit for Vercingetorix among the Aedui. Might they go too ? It was of the last importance that they should reach home first, so that they might persuade their brother chiefs to return to their allegiance while there was yet time. Caesar was convinced that the Aedui were lost irretrievably, and he believed that the departure of the chiefs would precipitate the rupture ; still he thought it best to let them go, as it would be wiser not to betray any anxiety or to give the slightest ground for saying that he had treated his allies as enemies. When they took their leave, he reminded them of all that he had done for their people, and made a last earnest appeal to their loyalty. It is just possible that they may have meant what they said ; but when they reached Noviodunum, and found that Litaviccus had been officially welcomed at Bibracte and that the Vergobret and the council had definitely declared for Vercingetorix, they saw their opportunity. Two or three days after their departure, Caesar learned that they had seized Noviodunum, where all his hostages, his stores,

52 B.C. His critical position.

Eporedorix and Viridomarus

[1] See C. Jullian, *Vercingétorix*, p. 223, and G. Veith, *Gesch. der Feldzüge C. J. Caesars*, p. 186.

52 B.C. seize Noviodunum, and try to prevent Caesar from crossing the Loire.

treasure, and cavalry remounts were collected, plundered and burned it to the ground, sent off all the hostages to Bibracte, thrown into the river all the corn which they could not carry away, and massacred the slender garrison and the Italian traders who had settled in the town.[1] Cavalry were scouring the country to cut off his supplies, and infantry threatening to prevent him from crossing the Loire. The water, swollen by the melting of the mountain snows, was rushing like a torrent. Caesar saw that the crisis of the war had come. The Aeduan infantry had deserted him. The Arverni, elated by their victory, were on his rear; on his left the Bituriges, exasperated by the bitter memory of Avaricum: the perfidious Aedui barred the road in front. His chief magazine was destroyed; and his supplies were fast running out. The Province itself was insufficiently protected. The object of the Aedui was to hem him in between the Allier and the Loire, and there starve him into surrender; or if, in desperation, he should make a dash for the Province, to cut him off from the easier way over the Loire, and drive him back towards the Cevennes into the clutches of Vercingetorix. Retreat, however, was not to be thought of: with the mountains barring the way, it would be very difficult as well as disgraceful; and above all, he could not leave Labienus and his four legions to perish.[2] Probably it would be necessary to build a bridge; and at any cost, he must reach the Loire before the Aedui had had time to assemble in strength. They had not burned their granaries in accordance with Vercingetorix's plan; and he might perhaps get supplies in their country. Night and day he marched till he reached the river a few miles south of Nevers.[3] Some troopers rode to look for a ford, and found one which was just practicable,

He saves himself by a series of

[1] Merivale's narrative of this episode (*History of the Romans under the Empire*, ii, 1850, p. 24) is remarkable. He says that Caesar 'arrived in front of Noviodunum in time to hear the last crash of the sinking bridge, and to see the devouring flames rise triumphantly beyond it'. Now *after* Caesar heard that Noviodunum had been burned, he made a series of forced marches in order to reach the Loire. Yet, when he reached it, according to Merivale, he found the fire still blazing and the bridge still falling! There is not a word in the *Commentaries* about a bridge at Noviodunum; and there is no evidence that Caesar went to Noviodunum at all after its destruction. See p. 774.

[2] See pp. 769–74.

[3] See p. 774.

LABIENUS'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST CAMULOGENUS.

To face page 161.



the water being breast-high. The cavalry rode into the river, and formed a line from bank to bank, to break the force of the current :[1] then the infantry, holding their weapons above their heads, waded across the stream. Once more Caesar was saved by his marvellous speed. The Aedui were so confounded by his unexpected arrival that they fled without attempting to hinder the passage : the soldiers took all the grain and all the cattle that they needed ; and the army marched on towards the valley of the Yonne to succour Labienus.

52 B. C. extraordinary marches.

That officer meanwhile was in great peril. Leaving the heavy baggage at Agedincum in charge of the recruits who had accompanied Caesar from Italy, he had marched with his four legions down the left bank of the Yonne and of the Seine, for Lutecia, the capital of the Parisii. Master of this central position, he would be able to overawe those old offenders, the Senones and the Carnutes. A large force assembled to oppose him. Their leader was Camulogenus, an Aulercan from the neighbourhood of Évreux, who, though weighed down by extreme old age, was looked up to as a soldier of extraordinary skill. On the approach of the Romans, he encamped on the edge of a far-reaching morass, about twenty miles south of Paris, through which the Essonne crept sluggishly to join the Seine. Labienus tried to construct a causeway across the slush : but finding this impossible in the face of the enemy, he silently quitted his camp in the night ; marched back as far as Metlosedum, or Melun, a town standing on an island in the Seine ; seized some fifty barges and rapidly lashed them together ; threw a detachment across ; chased away the panic-stricken inhabitants ; repaired the bridge, which they had demolished ; transported his army to the opposite bank ; and then moved down the valley in the direction whence he had come. The townsmen who had fled from Metlosedum hurried with the news to Camulogenus. He at once sent messengers to order the destruction of Lutecia, and then moved northward from the marsh. The barges accompanied

Labienus's campaign against the Parisii.

[1] I am inclined to infer from a passage in the *Civil War* (*B. C.*, i, 64, §§ 5–6) that the cavalry may have been formed in two lines, one above the infantry, the other below, to rescue any soldiers who might be carried off their feet.

52 B. C. the Roman column ; and with their aid Labienus crossed the Marne. Lutecia was situate upon the island in the Seine on which now stands the cathedral of Notre-Dame. When Labienus arrived, the bridges had been broken down and the town burned to the ground. He encamped just opposite the island ; and the enemy established themselves over against his army on the southern bank.

Just at this time the news arrived that Caesar had been forced to retreat from Gergovia, and that the Aedui had joined the rebellion. The story lost nothing in the telling. Labienus was dependent on Gallic peasants for his information ; and their statements were positive.[1] Caesar had tried to cross the Loire and had failed. He could get no supplies. He was in full retreat for the Province. The Bellovaci immediately rose in arms. Labienus found himself threatened by this warlike people on the north-east : on the south the Parisii and their allies confronted him ; while the broad flood of the Seine separated him from his base at Agedincum. Back to that town he must somehow find his way ; for he saw that, in his altered circumstances, it would be folly to think of an offensive campaign. But how to return ? That was a problem that would tax all the force of his mind ; and, as Caesar said, who so appreciated his worth, he knew that he must rely upon the force of his own mind alone. He might have gone, as he had come, by the right bank of the Seine : but he had never yet fled before the face of an enemy ; and to flee at such a crisis would shatter the enfeebled prestige of the Roman arms. Besides, to reach Agedincum, he must, sooner or later, recross the river ; and, hurry as he might, cross where he would, the enemy would be there to dispute his passage. There was nothing for it but to cross there and then by some skilful stratagem ; and, if he must fight, to clear the way by victory.[2]

[1] See C. E. C. Schneider's ed., vol. ii, p. 515. Possibly he may be wrong in saying that the Romans conversed [through interpreters] with non-combatants (*cum pacatis*) ; for *B. C.*, iii, 48, § 2 suggests that the gossip to which Caesar refers (*B. G.*, vii, 59, § 1) may have passed between Labienus's Gallic cavalry and their countrymen of the enemy's outposts.

[2] I doubt whether the threatening attitude of the Bellovaci deterred Labienus from returning by the right bank of the Seine ; for he had a long start.

In the evening he assembled his officers, and urged them to carry out his instructions to the letter. The barges were lying under the bank, ready for use. A number of small boats were also collected. Labienus placed each of the barges under the charge of an officer, and ordered them to drop down the stream about ten o'clock for a distance of four miles, and there await his arrival. He left half a legion to protect the camp; sent the other half with the baggage-train up the bank, bidding them make as much noise as possible; and ordered the boats to be rowed alongside of them with a loud splashing of oars. Soon after midnight he moved stealthily in the opposite direction with his remaining legions, till he came to the spot where the barges were waiting, near the southern end of the Bois de Boulogne. A furious storm was sweeping over the valley; and in the rush and roar of wind and rain the enemy's outposts were surprised and cut down; and the troops were ferried across the river. The stratagem, however, only partially succeeded. About daybreak messengers hurried one after another into the Gallic encampment, and reported that there was a great uproar in the Roman camp, soldiers tramping and oars splashing up the stream, barges crossing below. Camulogenus was perplexed. He fancied that the Romans were crossing the river in three places, and would soon be in full retreat. Sending a small detachment in the direction of Metlosedum, and leaving another to watch the Roman camp, he marched in person against Labienus. 52 B.C.

He extricates himself from a perilous position by victory

It was about half an hour before sunrise. The Roman general harangued his troops. He reminded them of the glorious victories which they had won in the past, and told them that he expected them to fight as they would have fought if Caesar had been there to command them. The Gallic left broke before the first charge: but the right fought with extraordinary resolution; and for a long time the issue was doubtful. The aged Camulogenus was in the forefront of the battle, cheering on his men. At length, however, the victorious Roman right fell upon their rear. Even then not a man would give way; but all were surrounded and slain. Camulogenus shared their fate. The troops which had been

52 B. C.

detached to watch the Roman camp hurried to the rescue, and established themselves on the hill of Mont Parnasse, but were speedily dislodged, and, mingling with the runaways from the left wing, were slaughtered—all who failed to find shelter in the woods and on the hills—by the Roman cavalry. The road to Agedincum was again open. Labienus returned thither to take up the heavy baggage ; and thence marched southward to rejoin Caesar.[1]

and marches to rejoin Caesar.

The rebellion stimulated by the adhesion of the Aedui.

Still the rebellion was rapidly gaining ground. The defection of the Aedui was a turning-point in the war. Other tribes were won over by their influence and their gold. Waverers they terrified by threatening to put to death the hostages whom Caesar had left at Noviodunum. But discord and jealousy even now made themselves felt. The Aedui asked Vercingetorix to come to them and concert operations ; and he readily consented. Forthwith they claimed the right of directing the campaign : but their demand was disputed ; and a general assembly was convened at Bibracte to settle the question. The Remi and the Lingones, who steadily adhered to the stronger side, and the Treveri, who were themselves hard pressed by the Germans, alone failed to appear. All the other tribes, even the most distant, sent their representatives to the mountain city.[2] It was the supreme moment in the life of Vercingetorix. A few weeks before, while they were still smarting under defeat, he had told his men that he would win over the rest of Gaul to the cause, and that against an united Gaul the whole world could not stand in arms. And now his promise seemed about to be fulfilled. With a fraction of the people he had vanquished the invincible conqueror ; and the whole people was rallying to his side. Chieftains and their retainers defiled through

They claim the direction of the war.

[1] See pp. 775–85.

[2] It will of course be understood that the Aquitanian tribes were not represented. I am inclined to infer from certain significant omissions in the list (*B. G.*, vii, 75) of the tribes which sent contingents for the relief of Alesia that the Remi, the Lingones, and the Treveri were not the only tribes that were unrepresented in the council at Bibracte, and that others, particularly the Suessiones and the Leuci, were influenced by the two former to hold aloof. It seems unlikely, moreover, that the Eburones and the other 'Cisrhenane Germans' sent delegates.

the busy streets, and thronged the open terrace where affairs of state were discussed. The question was put to the vote; and, without one dissentient, the representatives of the Gallic nation chose Vercingetorix as their General. Bitterly chagrined, the Aedui repented the rashness with which they had flung aside the friendship of the Romans: but it was too late now to draw back; and Eporedorix and Viridomarus reluctantly submitted to the Arvernian king.

52 B.C. Vercingetorix re-elected Commander-in-Chief by a general council.

Vercingetorix determined to adhere to his original plan of campaign. His numerical superiority was indeed largely illusory. Five years before, the huge Belgic host had melted away; and he knew that he must limit his force to the number which could act without losing that mobility which was its strength.[1] His infantry—eighty thousand chosen men—were sufficient for a guerrilla warfare; and he contented himself with levying fifteen thousand horse from his new allies.[2] Relying on his superiority in this arm, he intended simply to cut off his enemy's supplies; and once more he appealed to his countrymen to destroy their crops and to burn their granaries that they might achieve their liberty. He forced the peoples who had just joined the movement to give hostages for their fidelity. That he might have a stronghold to retreat to in case of necessity, he fortified and provisioned Alesia,[3] a town belonging to the Mandubii, which covered the plateau of Mont Auxois, in the highlands of the Côte-d'Or. But he intended also to carry the war into the enemy's country. The Roman Province was a tempting prize. If he could seize it or could seduce the Provincials to join him, would not the triumph of his cause be assured? He hounded on the neighbours[4] of the Helvii and the Volcae Arecomici to attack them; and, believing that the Allobroges were still smarting under the punishment which Rome had inflicted upon them a few years before, he sent envoys to bribe the chiefs and to hold out to the government

His plan of campaign.

He hounds on the neighbours of the Provincial

[1] See G. Veith, *Gesch. d. Feldzüge C. J. Caesars*, p. 496.

[2] See *B. G.*, vii, 64, § 1,—*omnes equites, XV milia numero, celeriter convenire iubet.* I am not quite sure whether Caesar means that Vercingetorix levied 15,000 additional cavalry, or that the cavalry which he had already, amounted with the new levies to 15,000.

[3] See *B. G.*, vii, 69, § 5; 71, § 7.

[4] The Gabali, Arverni, Ruteni, and Cadurci.

52 B.C. tribes to attack them.

the prospect of supremacy over the Province, and raised a levy of ten thousand Aeduans, whom he reinforced with eight hundred cavalry, to coerce them if persuasion should fail.

It was a master-stroke; and Caesar knew that, if it succeeded, he would be in extreme peril. Everything depended upon the Allobroges. They had been badly treated by former Governors; and before Caesar entered Gaul they had been the most disaffected subjects of Rome. But Caesar had rescued them from the Helvetii: he had distinguished two of their leading men, who had rendered him signal services, by special marks of favour;[1] and, doubtless by the exercise of his unerring tact, he had taught them to believe that his cause was theirs. The Province was fairly satisfied with Roman rule. The Allobroges formed a chain of piquets on the Rhône and presented an impenetrable front to the enemy; while ten thousand men, raised in the Province itself and commanded by Lucius Caesar, a kinsman of the Governor, were posted at various points on the threatened frontier. The Helvii, however, who risked a battle, were defeated with heavy loss and driven into their strongholds. Meanwhile Caesar contrived a plan for counteracting the enemy's superiority in cavalry. No reinforcements could be expected from the Province; for the roads were blocked. He therefore sent across the Rhine to the tribes which he had reduced to submission,[2] and procured from them numbers of horsemen with their attendant light infantry, who eagerly welcomed the chance of sharing in the plunder of Gaul. But the German horses, though hardy, were small and light; and Caesar saw that his new allies would be at a disadvantage when they encountered Vercingetorix's well-mounted troopers in the shock of battle. He therefore remounted them on the horses of his tribunes and body-guard and of the time-expired centurions and legionaries who, on his invitation, had volunteered for service, and were accordingly privileged to ride on the march.

Caesar enlists German cavalry.

Some weeks had passed since Caesar had rejoined Labienus. The meeting had taken place on the south of Agedincum,

[1] *B. C.*, iii, 59, § 3.

[2] See p. 249.

near the confluence of the Armançon and the Yonne ; and, as Agedincum itself had been abandoned, the united army took up its quarters not far from Troyes, among the friendly Lingones.[1] It was the most convenient breathing-place that Caesar could have found. The Remi, steadily loyal to him and steadily false to their countrymen, were close by on the north, to support him and to receive his support : the Aedui were on the south ; and, while he was near enough to watch their movements, he could collect fresh stores and rest his troops in comparative security. But the Province was still threatened ; and he saw that he must march to its relief. Probably he intended also to reinforce his troops there, and then to return and make an end of the rebellion. Accordingly he moved down the valley of the Tille, intending to cross the Saône near St. Jean-de-Losne, and to take the road through the country of the Sequani. Vercingetorix with his infantry and his fresh hosts of horsemen moved off from Alesia to intercept him, and took up a position behind a stream, not far north of Dijon,[2] about ten miles from the spot where the Romans were encamped. His line of retreat was secure ; and he was protected in front by the slopes of the valley. He made up his mind to risk an action, although, only a few weeks before, he had declared that he would not tempt fortune ; so much harder is it to pursue than to adopt a wise plan of campaign. It would be rash, however, to affirm that he consciously departed from his original resolution.[3] He did not contemplate a regular engagement. He was proud of his own cavalry ; and he was perhaps ignorant that Caesar had been reinforced by those doughty squadrons from beyond the Rhine. The legions were of course too strong to be attacked : but they were hampered by an immense baggage-train ; and they must either lose precious time in defending it, or abandon it at the cost of their honour, nay of their means of subsistence. He would draw up his infantry in front of his encampment, to encourage his cavalry and to overawe the Romans. If he allowed Caesar to reach the Province, he would soon come back stronger than ever ; and then all hope of liberating

52 B. C. He marches to succour the Province.

[1] See pp. 785–90. [2] See pp. 791–801. [3] See pp. 790–1.

52 B. C. Gaul would be at an end. Such, we are told, were the arguments by which he tried to animate his officers. With one voice they cried, in an outburst of enthusiasm, that every man must be sworn, by a solemn oath, to ride twice through the enemy's ranks, or never again be admitted to hearth and home, never again be suffered to come nigh unto father or mother or wife or child. Vercingetorix assented; and the oath was taken. Next morning the Roman column was discerned beyond the stream, each legion followed by its own baggage-train.[1] Vercingetorix must have exulted at this sign of carelessness. But between him and Caesar was a hill, which a leader gifted with the intuition that can divine an enemy's intentions would have seized. Vercingetorix ranged his infantry in front of his encampment, in an imposing array; while the cavalry swept down upon the Roman vanguard and on either flank. Caesar was surprised as completely as in the battle on the Sambre. The lie of the ground had prevented him from observing the approach of the Gauls; and, marching securely through a friendly country, he had neglected to send out patrols. He made his dispositions, however, with his usual calmness. He sent his cavalry, in three divisions, to repel the triple attack; and the legions formed a hollow square outside the baggage, ready to support them if they were hard pressed.[2] For a time the Gauls had a slight advantage; but the legions prevented them from following it up. And where were the Gallic infantry,—those eighty thousand chosen men, with whom Vercingetorix had promised to support his cavalry? Were they inferior to the levies of the Seine, who had so borne themselves against Labienus as to merit Caesar's praise? Why did Vercingetorix, since he had risked a battle, not throw them into the scale? We cannot tell. The knights, who had tried to redeem their pledge, fought on without

Vercingetorix attacks Caesar's cavalry,

[1] Cf. *B. G.*, ii, 17, § 2 and 19, § 2 with vii, 66, § 4, and see C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 498, n. 3.

[2] To effect this formation would of course have required a considerable time; and M. Masquelez (*Spectateur militaire*, 2e sér., xlvi, 1864, p. 54) infers that the army was marching 'en plusieurs colonnes séparées par des intervalles dans lesquels Jules César fit entrer les bagages'. This seems to me more than improbable. See n. 1, *supra*, and C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 500, n. 2.

ALESIA

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support. At length from the hill on the Roman right the German horse came thundering down on their flank,[1] and drove them with heavy loss towards the stream. The rest of the Gauls, fearful of being surrounded, galloped for their lives; the infantry, passive spectators of the slaughter, fell back upon their camps; and Vercingetorix, ordering his baggage-drivers to follow him, hastened westward towards Alesia. All that he had achieved in six months by sustained effort was lost in a day. With his beaten force he could not keep the field, lest his disheartened followers should fall away and disperse.[2] Either he must submit to the fate of Ambiorix, or he must again plant himself in a stronghold and defy his enemy to dislodge him. But Caesar was pressing upon his rear; and at nightfall, when the pursuit ceased, three thousand of the fugitives were slain.

52 B. C. and retreats, beaten, to Alesia (Mont Auxois).

Next day the Romans arrived at Alesia, where Vercingetorix was preparing to make his final stand. Their baggage, which had been parked on a hill near the battlefield, was following, escorted by two legions. The column descended a valley closed on the right and the left by the hills of Bussy and Pevenel. On their left front, connected with Pevenel by a broad neck of land, rose a hill, much lower than Gergovia, but still too steep to be taken by assault. The Gauls were swarming on the eastern slope, beneath the scarped rocks of the plateau, on which stood the town; and Vercingetorix had made them build a wall and dig a ditch to protect their encampment. Just at their feet the legions saw a stream, the Oze, winding like a steely thread through the greenery that fringed the north of the hill; and beyond its southern side, parallel to the Oze, but invisible, flowed the little river Ozerain. Moving down past the hill of Réa, the soldiers came to a miniature plain, which extended, three miles in length, beneath the western slope of Alesia, and was bounded on its further side by a range of heights: the river Brenne, which received the waters of the Oze and the Ozerain, meandered through it from south to north; and

[1] 'The charge of 10 horsemen on the flank is more effective than that of 100 on the front.' Lord Wolseley, *The Soldier's Pocket-book*, 1886, p. 376.

[2] See p. 801.

52 B. C. beyond the Ozerain the steep declivities of Flavigny completed the zone of hills.

Caesar invests Alesia. Caesar harangued his troops and encouraged them to brace themselves for a toilsome effort. As it was evident that the place could not be taken except by a blockade, he drew a line of investment, fully nine miles in length, along which a ring of camps was constructed. Those intended for the cavalry[1] were on low ground,—three in the plain and one in the valley of the Rabutin, which entered the Oze from the north. The rest were strongly placed upon the slopes of the outlying hills. Close to the camps redoubts or block-houses,[2] twenty-three in all, were thrown up; and strong piquets were placed in them, to guard against any sudden sortie.

The Gallic cavalry make a sortie, but are beaten. Soon after the commencement of the works, Vercingetorix sent all his cavalry down the hill; and a desperate combat was fought in the western plain. Caesar's Gallic and Spanish horse were soon in trouble; and he sent his Germans to reinforce them. The legions were drawn up in front of their camps, to support the cavalry and to deter the enemy's foot from attempting a sortie.[3] The Gauls were beaten, and galloped back along the valleys of the Oze and the Ozerain, hotly pursued by the Germans: but the gates of the camp being too narrow, many of the thronging fugitives were cut down; while others threw themselves off their horses and tried to scramble over the wall. The legions, by Caesar's

[1] Commandant J. Colin (*Pro Alesia*, 1907, pp. 269–70), remarking that cavalry has always needed the support of infantry, doubts whether any of the camps that have been revealed by excavation were exclusively occupied by cavalry. He admits, however, that the bulk of the cavalry encamped on the plain, small detachments only being kept on the heights for reconnoitring.

[2] Commandant Colin (*ib.*, p. 270) thinks that some of these *castella* (*B. G.*, vii, 69, § 7) may have been block-houses, without trenches; but cf. Stoffel, *Guerre civile*, i, 225–6.

[3] Meusel (*Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xxxvi, 1910, p. 54) may be right in arguing that the words *ne qua subito inruptio ab hostium peditatu fiat* ('to prevent any sudden attack by the enemy's infantry') in *B. G.*, vii, 70, § 2, are spurious; for, as he remarks, the words that follow them—*praesidio legionum addito nostris animus augetur* ('supported by the legions, our men gathered confidence')—show that the legions were intended to support the cavalry. Cf. vii, 66, § 4. But it does not follow that they were not also intended to check any attempt which Vercingetorix might make to support his cavalry; and although the words in question are suspicious, it would be rash to delete them.

order, moved forward a little. The Gauls inside the wall were smitten with panic : ' To arms,' they cried, ' to arms ' : many of them fled helter-skelter up the hill-side ; and Vercingetorix was obliged to shut the gates of the town, for fear the camp should be left unprotected. 52 B. C.

He saw with dismay that the toils were closing around him. He had hoped, perhaps, that Caesar, who had failed so ignominiously at Gergovia, would not be strong enough to enforce a systematic blockade. But there were now ten legions instead of six ;[1] and wherever he looked, over the plain or down in the valleys, there were soldiers at work with axe or spade. There was nothing for it but to appeal to the whole Gallic people to extricate him from the trap in which he was caught. The ring of redoubts was not yet complete ; the Romans were far too few to guard the whole circuit of the mountain ; and the cavalry might steal out in the dark without attracting notice. He charged them to go, each to his own country, and bring back with them every man who could wield a sword. He reminded them of all that he had done for the good cause, and adjured them not to abandon him to the vengeance of the Romans. Everything depended on their using all speed : if they left him to perish, the whole garrison would perish with him. By reducing the rations, he reckoned that he might make the provisions last a little over a month. Silently up each river valley sped the shadowy cavalcade, until it was lost to view.[2] Vercingetorix sends them out to fetch succour.

Caesar learned the whole story from some deserters. Its only effect was to stimulate his inventive genius. If he could keep the army of Vercingetorix from breaking out, he could also keep the relieving force from breaking in ; and unless they could break in quickly, they would be forced to disperse for want of food. The most vulnerable part of his position was the open meadow on the western side of the mountain. Across this expanse, from the Oze to the Ozerain, a trench was dug, twenty feet wide with perpendicular sides, to prevent the enemy from attacking the troops while they were constructing the proper works. Such trenches were extremely rare ; and that Caesar Caesar constructs lines of contravallation and circumvallation.

[1] See pp. 802–4.

[2] See p. 806.

52 B. C. should have imposed upon his men the enormous labour of making the sides vertical shows how much depended upon the preliminary portion of the defences. About four hundred yards behind the ends of this trench, but bending outwards, was traced the line of contravallation, which was prolonged so as to surround Alesia, and ran along the lower slopes of the encircling hills and across the valley of the Rabutin. First of all, two parallel trenches were dug, each fifteen feet wide and eight feet deep, the outer of which extended only across the plain, while the inner, embracing the whole circuit of the hill, was filled, where the level permitted, with water drawn from the Ozerain and the Rabutin. Just behind the outer trench, and also behind that portion of the other which encompassed the rest of the position, a rampart was erected, surmounted by a palisade, with an embattled fence of wattle-work in front, from the bottom of which projected stout forked branches. The combined height of rampart and palisade was twelve feet. Wooden towers were erected upon the western section of the rampart at intervals of one hundred and thirty yards,[1] and also at certain points along the rest of the contravallation.

To repel the reinforcements for which Vercingetorix had sent, a line of works somewhat similar to these, forming the circumvallation, was traced along the heights of Flavigny, Pevenel, and Bussy, and across the intervening valleys and the plain. The circuit of this line was about twelve miles.

But even these works were not deemed sufficient. The Gauls made frequent and furious sallies. Comparatively few of the Romans were available as combatants ; for many had to go in quest of corn and timber, while others were labouring on the works. Caesar therefore invented various subsidiary defences. Ditches, five feet deep, were dug just inside the large moat that was filled with water ; and five rows of strong boughs were fixed in each, with one end protruding above ground, sharpened and with the branches projecting so as to form a kind of abatis. In front of them and rising a few inches above the ground, but purposely concealed by brushwood, were sharp-pointed logs embedded in small pits.

[1] See p. 810, n. 7.

In front of these again, concealed, but barely concealed, beneath the turf, were barbed spikes fixed in pieces of wood. Fringed by these formidable defences, Caesar expected that contravallation and circumvallation would be alike impregnable. 52 B. C.

Nevertheless, the struggle was likely to be prolonged ; and it would certainly tax to the utmost the endurance and the fighting power of the men. As soon as the relieving army should arrive, the Romans would be hemmed in between two desperate enemies. Every moment for preparation was precious. Flying parties scoured the country for corn and provender : but they could not collect a sufficient supply ; and the rations had to be reduced.[1] Every day—even by night, when the moon was up, or in the glow of the watch-fires—the besieged could see the indefatigable legionaries labouring to finish their works before the time for the great hazard should arrive.

Meanwhile Vercingetorix had abandoned his camp, and withdrawn the troops who occupied it into the town. He took every precaution to husband his scanty resources. He ordered the whole of the grain to be thrown into one common stock and brought to him for safe keeping ; and he let it be known that disobedience would be punished with death. From time to time each man received his scanty ration. Meat was tolerably abundant ; for the Mandubii had driven large numbers of cattle into the stronghold.

Organization of an army of relief.

The appeal of Vercingetorix had meanwhile been answered. A council of chieftains met to consider the situation. Probably the Aeduan delegates were minded to wreck the plan ; but there is no reason to doubt that the majority were wholehearted in supporting the leader who, a few weeks before, had been unanimously acclaimed. Vercingetorix, in his great need, had asked for a universal levy ; but the cooler judgement of the council rejected his demand. So vast a multitude would become unmanageable ; and it would be impossible to find food for so many mouths.[2] It was resolved, therefore, to call upon each tribe for a limited contingent. Several, however, were finally omitted, doubtless because it was

[1] Cf. *B. C.*, iii. 47, § 6.

[2] See p. 822.

52 B. C. known that they could not or would not help. The Treveri were still struggling with the Germans. The Eburones had been wellnigh exterminated; the smaller tribes around them had made their peace with Rome; the Atuatuci and the Menapii, who had suffered much, were naturally excused. The Remi and the Lingones were of course obdurate; the Suessiones had been placed by Caesar in dependence upon the Remi, and were content to follow their lead. But it is surprising that the Viromandui, who had fought side by side with the Nervii on the Sambre, now kept aloof, and that while the Mediomatrici sent six thousand men, their neighbours, the Leuci, whose territory was close to Alesia, contributed none. Probably the Viromandui were influenced by the Remi, and the Leuci by the Lingones. Forty-three tribes in all were named. The summons was obeyed with alacrity; and from north and south and east and west, from the Seine, the Loire, and the Garonne, from the marshes of the Scheldt and the Sambre and the mountains of the Vosges and the Cevennes, from the Channel and the Atlantic Ocean, horse and foot came swarming to save the hero of Gaul. His fame had travelled to remote Helvetia; and six thousand devoted men—a remnant of the host which had bled on the hill of Armecy—once more set their faces towards the west. But even in this supreme moment, in one instance, tribal jealousy prevailed over patriotism. The Bellovaci peremptorily refused to send a single man. They intended, they said, to attack Caesar on their own account, and had no intention of being dictated to by any one.[1] They consented, however, as a personal favour to Commius, king of the Atrebates, who had great influence with them, to dispatch a small contingent. Four generals were chosen; for, except Vercingetorix himself, there was no one leader of sufficient eminence to command universal respect. And, as if this weakening of authority were not enough, the generals were fettered by civil commissioners, whose instructions they were to follow in the conduct of the campaign. One of the four

[1] M. Victor Tourneur (*Une monnaie de nécessité des Bellovaques*, 1906, p. 10) conjectures that the Bellovaci were also actuated by a desire to punish the Remi for their desertion of the national cause.

was Commius, who had good reason to abhor the Roman name, and now saw a prospect of taking his revenge. His brother generals were Eporedorix and Viridomarus, representing the Aedui, and Vercassivellaunus, a cousin of Vercingetorix. The vast host mustered in the country of the Aedui, eight thousand horsemen and nearly two hundred and fifty thousand foot, and marched for Alesia in the certain confidence of victory. 52 B. C.

Famine in Alesia.

By this time the garrison were in great straits. Their grain was all consumed.[1] Day after day they strained their eyes, trying to catch a glimpse of the relieving army; but there was never a sign. At length the chieftains called a council of war. Some advised surrender: others were clamorous for a grand sortie: but one proposal equalled in atrocity the worst that has been told of Jerusalem or Samaria. An Arvernian chieftain, called Critognatus, reminded his hearers that their fathers, when driven into their fastnesses by the Cimbri and Teutoni, had sustained life by feeding upon the flesh of those who were useless for warfare; and he urged that, to give the garrison strength to hold out to the last against the tyrants who made war only to enslave, this glorious precedent should be followed. Finally it was decided that all who were too old, too young, or too feeble to fight should be expelled from the town; that those who remained should try every expedient before having recourse to the desperate remedy of Critognatus; but that, if the relieving army failed to arrive in time, they should even follow his counsel rather than surrender. Accordingly the Mandubii, to whom the town belonged, were compelled to depart, with their wives and children. They presented themselves before the Roman lines. Many of them were weeping. They piteously begged the soldiers to receive them as slaves, —only give them something to eat. To grant their prayer was impossible; and a line of guards, whom Caesar posted on the rampart, forbade any attempt to escape.

Critognatus proposes cannibalism.

The fate of the Mandubii.

But suspense was nearly at an end. It was just after

[1] According to Napoleon I (*Précis des guerres de César*, 1836, p. 110), more than fifty days must have elapsed between the departure of Vercingetorix's cavalry and the arrival of the relieving army.

52 B. C. Arrival of the army of relief.

the expulsion of the Mandubii when the anxious watchers on the hill saw, moving over the plain, a multitude of cavalry. The infantry were on the heights of Mussy-la-Fosse behind. In a fever of exultation men ran to and fro, exchanging congratulations. The garrison descended the hill, prepared for a sortie. Vercingetorix had forgotten nothing. His men were provided with fascines for filling up the trenches, and movable huts to protect their approach. Soon a fierce combat of horse was raging over the plain. The legionaries were posted, ready for emergencies, along the outer and the inner lines. Archers were scattered among the Gallic ranks; and the arrows fell so thick and fast that scores of wounded horsemen were seen riding off the field. Every man fought like a hero; for they knew that from the heights around friends and enemies alike were anxiously watching. The numbers of the Gauls began to tell; and their countrymen, behind and before, encouraged them by loud yells. All through the afternoon the battle raged uncertain. But Caesar had kept his best troops in reserve. Towards sunset the ever-victorious Germans charged in a compact body, and threw the division opposed to them into disorder: the archers were exposed and killed: the rout was general; and the besieged who had sallied forth turned in despair, and reascended the hill.[1]

The final struggle.

But Commius and his brother generals were still hopeful. Next day their men were hard at work, making fascines, scaling-ladders, and grappling-hooks for a grand assault on the Roman lines. About midnight they quitted their camp, and moved in silence across the plain. As they approached the works, they raised a simultaneous shout, to put the besieged on the alert; and, as they flung their fascines into the ditch, the trumpet was heard, calling the garrison to arms. Stones flew from slings: arrows whizzed through

[1] 'In all Cavalry encounters with Cavalry,' says Lord Wolseley (*The Soldier's Pocket-book*, 1886, p. 376), 'the side that is able to bring up a fresh reserve when his opponent has exhausted all his, will, as a rule, win the day.'

It has been said that the Gallic cavalry, unaided, could not rescue Vercingetorix, and that the infantry, on the day of their arrival, never stirred. This judgement seems hardly fair. The infantry could not hope to storm the Roman lines before they had made the necessary fascines and other implements.

the air ; and, though the Romans too plied their slings, and supports hurried from the neighbouring redoubts to the relief of any point that was too hardly pressed, the enemy were too many for them, and they suffered heavily : but when those ghostlike companies pressed on to storm the entrenchment, they trod upon the spikes, or, stumbling into the pits, impaled themselves on the pointed logs, while heavy pikes were hurled from rampart and towers into the seething multitude. The Roman artillery made great havoc. The losses on either side were very heavy ; for they were fighting in the dark, and shields were of little use. Towards dawn the Gauls retreated, fearing an attack in flank ; and the besieged, who had lost much valuable time in attempting to cross the outer trenches,[1] went back before they could strike a blow. 52 B.C.

One more chance remained. The leaders of the relieving army questioned the rustics about the lie of the ground on the north and the nature of the Roman defences. Mont Réa, which bounded the plain and rose above the further bank of the Oze, extended so far to the north that Caesar had not been able to enclose it in his line of circumvallation.[2] On the southern slope, close to the stream, stood one of the Roman camps. It was held by two legions—perhaps about eight thousand men—under Reginus and Caninius. In order to avoid observation, it would be necessary to approach the camp by a wide détour. The Gauls sent scouts to reconnoitre. It appeared that Mont Réa was connected by a ridge with a further group of heights. Soon after dark sixty thousand picked men, under the command of Vercassivellaunus, left the Gallic camp, and, passing right round the sweep of the northern hills, halted before daybreak for a rest in a hollow north-east of Mont Réa. About noon, just as they were moving down on the camp, the cavalry, by a preconcerted arrangement, streamed over the plain towards the Roman lines : the rest of the infantry showed themselves in front of their encampment ; and Vercingetorix, observing these movements from the citadel, descended the hill and moved towards the plain.

This time there was no delay. The inner trench had been

[1] See pp. 813–5.

[2] See pp. 361–2.

52 B.C. filled up, where necessary, with earth and fascines : stout sappers' huts, destined to protect the men when they should approach to storm the lines, poles fitted with hooks for tearing down the rampart, long pikes, and other implements which Vercingetorix had provided, were carried across ; and the besieged moved on to make their last effort.

A desperate struggle then began. Wherever there was a weak spot in the defences, the Gauls threw themselves upon it ; and the Romans, comparatively few in numbers, and scattered owing to the vast extent of their lines, found great difficulty in massing themselves upon the exposed points. Moreover, they were painfully distracted by the roar of battle in their rear ; for both on the inner and the outer line men felt, as they fought, that they must perish if their comrades behind suffered the enemy to break through. Yet, agitated as they were, they combated with a nervous eager energy ; and the besieged struggled as desperately as they ; for both knew that that day's fight would decide all :— the Gauls were lost unless they could break the line ; the Romans, if they could but hold that line, saw their long toil at an end. From the slope of Flavigny, south of the Ozerain, the view from which embraced the whole plain, Caesar directed the battle, and sent supports to every point where he saw his men hard pressed. The attack on the circumvallation in the plain was comparatively feeble ; for the bulk of the relieving force was formidable only in numbers. Nor were those numbers wisely directed. The Aedui may have been treacherous : the generals may have disagreed, or they may have been fettered by the civil commissioners ; anyhow the Gauls made no serious attempt, except on Mont Réa and in the plain.[1] The fighting was fiercest on Mont Réa. The Gauls were so numerous that Vercassivellaunus could always send fresh men to relieve their comrades. Coming down on the camp from a higher level, the assailants hurled their missiles with fatal momentum : they shot earth in heaps over the pointed logs and the spikes, and, locking their shields over their heads, passed unscathed to the rampart ;

[1] It is not absolutely certain that the relieving army did more than make a demonstration even in the plain. See p. 816.

and then their numbers began to tell. The Roman cavalry 52 B.C.
were unable to create a diversion ; for they were kept inactive by the Gallic troops in the plain.[1] Suddenly a galloper rode up and told Caesar that the garrison were worn out, and their stock of missiles failing.[2] He immediately sent Labienus with six cohorts to the rescue, telling him to hold on as long as he could, and, when he could hold on no longer, to sally forth, and fight it out in the open. Then, riding down between the lines on to the plain, he harangued his weary soldiers and adjured them not to give in : just one short hour, and the prize was won. At last the besieged abandoned in despair the attempt to break through, and, wheeling to the left, crossed the Ozerain, and flung themselves against the works at the foot of Flavigny. They drove the artillerymen from the towers with volleys of missiles ; they shot earth and fascines into the ditch, and made their way across ; they tore down rampart and breastworks with their grappling-hooks ; six [3] cohorts, then seven [3] more were sent down to help, and still they pressed on,—till Caesar himself hurried to the spot with fresh reinforcements, and drove them away. Everywhere, except at Mont Réa, the victory was won. Caesar called out four cohorts from the nearest redoubt, told his cavalry to follow him, and sent a horseman galloping to the northern cavalry camp to send another detachment down upon the enemy's rear.[4] They were now swarming over the rampart ; and, as a last resource, Labienus summoned every available man from the neighbouring redoubts to his aid. By good luck these reinforcements amounted to eleven cohorts,—perhaps four thousand men. And now, conspicuous in his crimson cloak, Caesar was descried, hurrying across the plain. The enemy made a supreme effort ; but they were left without support. Labienus and his men took heart, and rushed into the thick of the stormers. As Caesar approached, he heard the shouts of the combatants : he saw the camp abandoned and the short swords flashing over the slopes beyond. Suddenly the cavalry appeared on the

[1] See *Pro Alesia*, 1909, p. 582.
[2] See p. 819.
[3] The numbers are uncertain, and those which I have given have no other authority than the Aldine edition.
[4] See pp. 818–9.

52 B. C. heights above the enemy's rear : Caesar's reserves came up to attack them in front ; and they fled in bewilderment,—into the midst of the hostile squadrons.[1] Vercassivellaunus himself was captured, and seventy-four standards ; and of the sixty thousand chosen men who had marched out of camp the night before only a remnant returned. The whole scene was visible from the town ; and in despair the officers left in command sent to recall their comrades from below. The vast host without vanished in the gathering darkness. The legions were too tired to follow, or all might have been destroyed : but at midnight the cavalry were sent in pursuit ; and when day broke, they were still hunting the fugitives and capturing or slaying them in scores.[2]

The self-sacrifice of Vercingetorix.

All was lost : so Vercingetorix clearly saw. In the night he formed his resolve. Next morning he gathered the tribal chiefs around him. He told them that he had fought, not for himself but for national liberty ; and, since they must needs all bow to fortune, he was ready to place himself at their disposal,—to die, if they wished to appease the Romans by his death, or to yield himself up as a prisoner of war. They accepted his offer, and consented to purchase life by sacrificing the leader of their own choice. Ambassadors were sent to learn the pleasure of the conqueror. He ordered the chiefs of the garrison to be brought out, and all the arms to be surrendered. The chiefs were led forth ; and Caesar, seated on his tribunal, received their submission. Vercingetorix, mounted on a gaily caparisoned charger, rode round the tribunal, and then, leaping to the ground, took off his armour, laid down his sword, and bowed himself at Caesar's feet.[3] He was sent to Rome, and imprisoned in a dungeon. Six years later he was brought out, to adorn Caesar's triumph ; and then he was put to death.[4]

Surrender of the garrison.

[1] M. Pernet (*Pro Alesia*, 1909, p. 582), remarking that the Roman cavalry in the northern camp (G) were left free to act, conjectures that the leaders of the relieving army were unaware that the camp existed. But even if this squadron had been neutralized, Vercingetorix would not have been saved.

[2] All questions relating to the operations at Alesia are discussed on pp. 804–20.

[3] See p. 820. M. Jullian (*Vercingétorix*, pp. 306, 310) regards Vercingetorix's surrender as ' un acte de dévotion religieuse. . . . Il s'offrit à César et aux dieux suivant le rite mystérieux des expiations volontaires '.

[4] See p. 821.

Two thousand years have passed away; and still the name of Vercingetorix retains its hold upon the imagination. Our neighbours think of him as the Germans think of Arminius and the Scots of Wallace; and the traveller who stands upon the wind-swept plateau of Gergovia and looks down upon the vineyards that cover the slopes over which he drove Caesar's legions, or, speeding on his way to the Swiss mountains, looks out, as the train whirls him past the station of Les Laumes, upon the colossal statue which marks the western promontory of Mont Auxois, must be dull indeed if he does not sympathize with the nation's veneration for the great Gaul. Looking back across that vast gulf of time, we behold him, as he appears by the testimony of his conqueror, not only a chivalrous patriot, but also a born leader of men. In this character he is the equal of Caesar himself. The Gauls and their descendants have sometimes mistaken a charlatan for a hero; but the hero to whom they are loyal while they are still smarting under a defeat, must be a hero indeed. When Vercingetorix at Avaricum regained his ascendancy over the fickle Celtic multitude, he showed a knowledge of human nature as profound as Caesar when he quelled the mutiny of the Tenth Legion. If he knew how to use flattery as an instrument for fortifying self-respect, he never condescended to the arts of the demagogue: he could tell wholesome truths, however unpalatable; and with the most winning persuasiveness he possessed a capacity for being terribly severe. He recognized the softness of moral fibre, the *mollities animi*, which in the Gauls coexisted with personal bravery; and with springing energy he stimulated them to transmute that weakness into strength, to undergo toils from which they had ever shrunk, and to sacrifice their particular interests for the national weal. Who shall imagine the intensity with which he lived?—within that year the youth became a veteran. Those only who have some experience of affairs can appreciate the genius for organization, the unremitting toil, the sleepless vigilance that were needed to force those diverse levies into the field, to arm and clothe and feed them, to direct their operations, to procure information, to raise money, to negotiate, to

52 B.C. Vereingetorix and his place in history.

52 B. C. bribe, to persuade. It must, moreover, be remembered that his power depended upon sheer unaided force of character: he might control only so long as he could please: his commission was held at the pleasure, nay the caprice, of the most inconstant of the races of men. Yet, alone among the Gallic leaders, he united the discordant elements of the greater part of Celtican Gaul; and, by his tact in gaining over the dissentient tribes, he drove one of the greatest generals of the world, whose army was in all but numbers far superior to his, to the point of withdrawing from the theatre of war. That he was compelled at last to 'bow to fortune' was due to the jealousy of rivals, to the self-seeking of the Remi, to the treachery of the Aedui, who 'prevented Gaul from making sure of success', to the littleness of those who could not face the sacrifice that would have forced the Romans either to retreat or to starve, to the master-stroke by which Labienus saved his chief from the results of his own error, above all to the fatal weakness that opened the way to Alesia. Then, and then only, Vercingetorix was not himself; and the errors of the general in his first and last campaign are forgotten when we contemplate the man. In him idealism was steadied by vision of the real; imagination was served by mastery of detail; enthusiasm was sustained by resolution; the brain was fellow-worker with the heart. He fought to make Gaul free by making her one; and what though this endeavour, almost successful, did ultimately fail? Gaul had to work out her salvation in another way, because she was not ripe to obey her leader's voice. To be great, and yet to fail, is tragical; but Nature sees to it that her noblest children shall not waste their strength. If Vercingetorix, like Hannibal, was the hero of a lost cause, his influence also is inexhaustible. For the achievement is less than the quest of the ideal; and no heroic deed was ever done in vain.

. . . . .

Caesar distributes his legions for the winter.

Caesar determined, instead of going to Italy, to spend the winter in the Aeduan capital; for he knew that though Gaul was sore smitten, it was not yet tranquillized. For the moment, all was still. The Aedui were ready and eager to return to their allegiance. The Arverni, who had given no

trouble in former years, were quite cowed, and promised implicit obedience for the future. Caesar was too politic to bear hardly upon either. He therefore restored to them the prisoners whom he had made, though he demanded a large number of hostages. But the soldiers had to be rewarded for their protracted labours; and every man received, by way of booty, a prisoner, whom he might sell as a slave. Caesar was generous as well as politic; and doubtless his officers were not overlooked. The fortunes which had been amassed by Labienus and the notorious Mamurra disgusted Cicero,[1] though Caesar was willing to provide for any friend whom he might recommend.[2] For himself, there was no law of prize to limit the general's share.[3] When he came to Gaul, he was poor and in debt: when he quitted Gaul, he was rich enough to lend and to bribe.[4] The legions were quartered for the winter among the Remi, the Sequani, the Aedui, the Ambivareti, the Bituriges, and the Ruteni, that is to say, around Reims, Besançon, Mont Beuvray, Chalon and Mâcon, Bourges, and Rodez.[5] By this arrangement the friendly Remi would be protected from the vengeance of the Bellovaci: the submission of the Aedui was assured: the legions quartered among them could easily communicate, on the east, through the territory of the friendly Lingones, with their comrades in Sequania, on the north-east with those quartered among the Remi: the Arverni were hemmed in on the north by the legion which menaced the Bituriges, on the south by that which watched the Ruteni; and this last was on the borders of the Province, whence it could, if necessary, summon aid. Thus the troops were distributed in such a way as to safeguard the loyal, to overawe the disaffected, to cover the Province, and to be ready for mutual support. 52 B. C.

[1] *Att.*, vii, 7, § 6. [2] *Fam.*, vii, 8, § 1; 17, § 3; *Q. fr.*, ii, 14, § 3.

[3] In strict law of course the whole booty belonged to the state: but the general had the right to retain what he deemed necessary for the successful conduct of the war; and the results were what might have been expected. See Daremberg and Saglio, *Dict. des ant. grecques et rom.*, iv, 610–1, s.v. PRAEDA, and cf. Cicero, *De prov. cons.*, 11, § 28.

[4] See Long's *Decline of the Roman Republic*, v, 475; Cicero, *Att.*, vii, 3, § 11; 7, § 6; and Suetonius, *Divus Iulius*, 54.

[5] The habitat of the Ambivareti is uncertain. See p. 368.

CHAPTER VIII

THE END OF THE STRUGGLE

52 B.C. Effects of Caesar's victory at Alesia.

THE victory at Alesia was decisive. Their great leader gone, their entire host shattered, like a billow surging against a rock, by the little army which it had marched to destroy, the confederacy was dissolved as quickly as it had been formed.

Various tribes prepare to renew the struggle.

Nevertheless some of the more resolute patriots were preparing to renew the struggle. They knew, indeed, that all the men whom they could muster had no chance of standing against Caesar in a pitched battle; but they allowed themselves to hope that, if they all rose simultaneously, his forces would not be strong enough to engage them all at once in detail. Such is the account, based probably upon the reports of Caesar's spies, which Aulus Hirtius[1] has given us. But it may perhaps be doubted by those who have analysed his narrative whether the rebellious tribes had any such definite and concerted plan. It is probable that they were actuated, not jointly but severally, by sheer abhorrence of a foreign yoke, by sullen despair, by desire for plunder, perhaps by the vague hope that when Caesar was gone, his successor would leave such obstinate rebels to themselves.

Caesar disperses the Bituriges and Carnutes. 51 B.C.

The Bituriges, who had not forgotten the slaughter at Avaricum, were the first to stir. The single legion which had been quartered in their country was powerless to restrain them. Caesar was anxious to give a long rest to his soldiers, who were tired out by the extraordinary duration and severity of the late campaign: but before the year was out he took the field; and while the chiefs were still talking over their

[1] The last book of the *Commentaries on the Gallic War* was written, not by Caesar, but by his friend Aulus Hirtius.

plans, another legion was upon them. Thousands of peasants were captured while they were working in the fields : others had just time to flee : but hurry where they might, Caesar was too quick for them ; and his swiftness so impressed men's minds that the friendly tribes saw that it was their interest to remain loyal to a Governor who was strong enough both to protect and to punish, while waverers hastened to sue for peace. Caesar sent the legions back to quarters with the promise of a substantial present for every officer and man ; while he himself returned to his civil work at Bibracte. But in little more than a fortnight his rest was interrupted. When the humbled Bituriges begged for his aid against the Carnutes, who had turned upon them, he called out the legions at Chalon and Mâcon ; and, on the mere rumour of his coming, the Carnutes fled in every direction. Chased from place to place by cavalry and auxiliary infantry, numbed by the cold and drenched by the rains, they finally dispersed among the neighbouring tribes ; and their pursuers returned, laden with plunder. The lesson sufficed for the time ; but the legions were left at Cenabum, to keep the tribesmen in awe. 51 B.C.

Campaign against the Bellovaci.

Still, there was another tribe to be reckoned with, the warlike Bellovaci, who, six years before, had headed the Belgic league. They had some grudge against the Suessiones, whom Caesar had placed in dependence upon his steady allies, the Remi, and were mustering their forces and those of the neighbouring tribes to attack them. The confederacy comprised the Atrebates, the Ambiani, the Veliocasses, the Caleti, and the Eburovices, who inhabited the districts round Arras, Amiens, Rouen, Lillebonne, and Évreux. The leaders were a Bellovacan chief called Correus, and Commius, whose spirit was not subdued by his defeat at Alesia. On Caesar's approach they established themselves in the forest of Compiègne, on Mont St. Marc, a hill protected by a marshy watercourse, which oozed northward into the river Aisne.[1] Caesar's force consisted of four legions, which, without reckoning auxiliaries, probably numbered about fifteen thousand men ; and, remembering the tactics of Ariovistus, he

[1] See pp. 826–30.

51 B.C. had hired a corps of German light infantry to support his cavalry. One legion had already served against the Bituriges; two, under Fabius, were withdrawn from the neighbouring camp in the country of the Remi; while the other had marched from Labienus's quarters at Vesontio. Caesar was very anxious to bring on a battle, and advanced in a formation which partly concealed his strength: but the enemy were too wary to quit their vantage ground; their numbers were great; and the hill, rising abruptly above the further side of the deep valley, was hard to ascend. Accordingly he encamped on Mont St. Pierre, the height just opposite theirs. The fortifications which he constructed were of extraordinary strength; for he hoped that the enemy would be emboldened by his caution to attack him, and, as his foragers were obliged to go long distances, it was necessary that the camp should be defensible by a comparatively small force. During the next few days frequent skirmishes took place with varying results; but nothing would induce the enemy to come out and hazard a general action. They succeeded, however, in surrounding some foraging parties, which were unavoidably isolated. These reverses were magnified by rumours, which gladdened Caesar's enemies at Rome. They told each other that his cavalry had been annihilated, that the 7th legion had suffered a defeat, and that he himself was hemmed in by the Bellovaci. The Gauls indeed were elated by their success; and their elation was increased by the arrival of five hundred German horsemen, whom Commius had induced to serve. It was impossible to storm the camp without excessive loss; and, as a large force was needed to invest it, Caesar sent for the three legions which he had left at Cenabum and in the country of the Bituriges.

When the rebel leaders heard of their approach,[1] they remembered the dismal fate of Alesia, and determined to send off their non-combatants and baggage in the night. The long line of wagons was barely in motion when day broke, and the Romans caught sight of them. The enemy formed up in front of their camp to cover the retreat,

[1] Cicero, *Fam.*, viii, 1, § 4.

intending to follow as soon as possible. Caesar was too wary to attempt to fight his way up that steep ascent; but he determined not to let the enemy move off unscathed. On their left and separated from their camp only by a narrow depression, was a plateau with gently sloping sides. Caesar rapidly bridged the marsh, led his troops across, ascended the plateau, and just on its edge placed engines to throw missiles against the enemy's masses. They dared not send off their troops, for fear they might become confused as they broke into detachments, and fall victims to the Roman cavalry. For some hours, therefore, they remained under arms. Caesar made a new camp on the plateau, formed up the legions in front of it, and kept the troop-horses bridled, ready to charge at a moment's notice. Towards nightfall, as the enemy could not remain where they were any longer without food, they had recourse to a stratagem. Bundles of straw and sticks were laid in front of the line and set ablaze. In a moment a vast wall of flame hid the entire multitude, and they instantly fled. Suspecting, though he could not see what they had done, Caesar made the legions advance cautiously, and sent his cavalry up the hill in pursuit. But the cavalry were afraid to ride through the fiery barrier; and a few bold troopers who spurred in could hardly see their horses' heads for the smoke. Meanwhile the enemy were well on their way down the valley of the Aisne; and having crossed the Oise, of which it is a tributary, they encamped on Mont Ganelon in the plain beyond. 51 B.C.

On the southern bank of the Aisne, in the angle formed by its confluence with the Oise, there was a large meadow, the luxuriance of which, Correus expected, would attract the Roman foragers. In the woods which encompassed this meadow he posted a strong force of horse and foot. Having learned his design from a prisoner, Caesar sent his foragers down the valley of the Aisne, escorted by cavalry and light-armed auxiliaries, and, following in support with the infantry, took post as near the meadow as he could without being perceived. Discerning the cavalry as they approached, the Gauls rode out from the wood and charged: but the disciplined squadrons sustained the shock with admirable

51 B.C. coolness: supported by the auxiliaries, they baffled every effort to outflank them; and they had already won the day when the infantry appeared. The flying Gauls, caught in their own trap, were hunted down and slaughtered in the woods and by the banks of the Oise. But Correus would neither yield nor fly. Standing alone upon the field, refusing to accept quarter, he struck fiercely at his opponents and wounded numbers of them, until, infuriated by his obstinacy, they hurled a volley of javelins into his body, and he fell dead.

This was the expiring effort of the Bellovaci. Commius escaped to wage a guerrilla warfare, but ultimately made his peace with the conqueror, stipulating only that, as a concession to his well-grounded fears, he might never again look upon the face of a Roman.[1] Those who had remained in camp appealed to Caesar's clemency, and obtained a contemptuous forgiveness. Their excuse was that Correus had stirred up the populace to rebel, in defiance of the senate. Caesar reminded them that they had borne arms against him before: it was easy to blame the dead, but no single man could raise a revolt with the support of a mere rabble if the friends of order were determined to prevent him. The allies of the Bellovaci, who had been waiting to see what terms they would obtain, submitted likewise and gave hostages. From many parts people were actually emigrating, so intense was their reluctance to submit to the authority of Rome; but Caesar distributed his legions in such a way as to bar their escape. Caninius, who had wintered near Rodez, had been transferred to Poitou, the country of the Pictones, where with two weak legions he could barely hold his own; and Fabius was sent with twenty-five cohorts to reinforce him. Caesar himself, accompanied by Labienus, and reinforced by a legion under Mark Antony, marched against the remnant of the Eburones, and sent out flying columns everywhere to ravage, burn, and slay. Ambiorix evidently was not to be captured; but Caesar resolved that the wretched man should never dare to show his face again

[1] An account of the successful close of his career will be found in my *Anc. Britain*, pp. 361, 365–6, 371.

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UXELLODUNUM.

among the people upon whom he had brought such a terrible doom. 51 B.C.

The end was at hand. Labienus, who had been commissioned to deal the irreconcilable Treveri a final blow, captured their chieftains, and among them an Aeduan noble, Surus, who, scorning the tergiversations of his countrymen, remained a brave, unwavering, incorruptible patriot. The most warlike states were now subdued or overawed : only some tribes in the west were still restless. A rebel chief named Dumnacus, with a motley force from Brittany and the country round Orléans and Chartres, was besieging Lemonum, on the site of the modern Poitiers, in which an adherent of Caesar had taken refuge. Caninius, who was too weak to relieve the town, entrenched himself hard by ; and Dumnacus wasted several days in trying to dislodge him. After he had returned to Lemonum, Fabius, who had received the submission of various tribes, marched up rapidly, compelled him to raise the siege, and while he was hurrying to escape across the Loire, pounced upon him and defeated him twice with heavy loss. Flying alone from the battlefield, he wandered to the uttermost parts of Gaul ; and history knows him no more. Two thousand of the fugitives, rallied by the Senonian adventurer, Drappes, and Lucterius, the chief who had so ably supported Vercingetorix, went off to plunder the Province ; but, finding themselves hotly pursued by Caninius, they took refuge in the fortress of Uxellodunum, the modern Puy d'Issolu,[1] of which, before the great rebellion, Lucterius had been the over-lord.

Caninius and Fabius compel Dumnacus to raise the siege of Lemonum.

Drappes and Lucterius take refuge in Uxellodunum.

They had hardly shut the gates before their pursuers arrived. The hill overlooked the left bank of the river Tourmente, which, about two miles to the south-west, emptied itself into the Dordogne. It rose fully six hundred feet above the valley ; steep rocks on every side forbade any attempt to assault : and to approach by an embankment was utterly impracticable. Caninius, therefore, proceeded to invest the town. On the west, rising above the valley of the Tourmente, and on the north-east, linked to the stronghold by a broad neck of land, there were hills of considerable

Blockade of Uxellodunum.

[1] See pp. 483–93.

51 B.C. height. Caninius made two camps on the former and one on the latter, and began to connect them by a line of contravallation. Watching the progress of the works, the garrison remembered the story of Alesia : Lucterius had been there, and knew how Vercingetorix and his people had suffered ; unless his own men bestirred themselves at once, they too would be starved into surrender. It was agreed that Lucterius and Drappes should make an attempt to procure supplies. On the following night, leaving two thousand men to hold the town, they stole out with the rest of the force. For several days they scoured the surrounding country, collecting corn. During this time they occasionally attacked the Romans by night with such vigour that Caninius was obliged to suspend the construction of his lines. One morning, in the early twilight, the Roman sentries heard an unusual noise : scouts were sent out, and returned with the news that a string of pack-horses was moving up a narrow path leading to the town. The troops instantly turned out : the drivers rushed helter-skelter down the hill ; and the escort were slaughtered almost to a man. Lucterius with a few followers escaped. Within a few hours another division under Drappes, encamped about ten miles off, was surprised ; and every man who escaped the sword was made prisoner. But Drappes did not remain a captive long. Resenting the indignity of bonds, or dreading the penalty of obstinate rebellion, he starved himself to death.

Meanwhile Caninius was reinforced by the legions of Fabius, who had just concluded a most successful expedition along the valley of the Loire. Promptly following up his victory over Dumnacus, he had fallen upon the Carnutes, who, having suffered severely in that battle, were ill prepared to resist. This warlike people, who had never been thoroughly subdued, were now completely cowed and forced to give hostages ; and the maritime states of Brittany, which, like them, had supported Dumnacus, hastened to follow their example. Caesar, who had been making a political progress, and trying to conciliate the humbled chiefs, was now at Cenabum ; while Mark Antony, whom he had left behind with five thousand men, was holding the Belgae in

awe. The Carnutes were still uneasy at the remembrance of the provocation which they had given in the great revolt; and it seemed likely that despair might drive them to fresh excesses. Caesar saw that the only way to restore their confidence was to make an example of the chief who had led them astray, and frankly to forgive the rest. He therefore demanded that Cotuatus, who had been the author of the massacre at Cenabum in the preceding year, should be delivered up to him for punishment; and the people, eager to purchase the favour of the conqueror, hunted him down and brought him a prisoner into the Roman camp. Caesar, if Hirtius is to be believed, was unwilling to order his execution, but could not afford to disregard the clamours of the soldiery. But Caesar knew how to silence any clamour; and, if he had told the story himself, he would have told it without excuse. The wretched man was flogged till he was insensible; and his head was cut off. 51 B.C. Execution of Cotuatus.

Caesar now received a series of dispatches informing him of the obstinate resistance of Uxellodunum. Contemptible as were the numbers of the rebels, their example might encourage other states to renew the wearing struggle. Only one more summer had to pass, as the malcontents had doubtless reckoned, and his government would be at an end.[1] But Caesar determined that, before that time, they should be for ever subdued. Taking his cavalry with him, he hurried southward, followed by two legions, for Uxellodunum. Caesar marches for Uxellodunum.

He instantly detected the weak point in the enemy's position. His lieutenants had merely intended a blockade. But the garrison were amply provisioned;[2] and the only effectual way of reducing them was to cut off their supply of water. Archers, slingers, and artillery were posted on the western bank of the Tourmente, so as to command every approach to the stream. Thus menaced, the enemy were afraid to descend; and thenceforward they could get no water except from a spring on the western slope of the hill. He cuts off the garrison from their supply of water.

[1] See pp. 832–4.

[2] It must be remembered that, although the attempt to procure fresh supplies had failed, the numbers of the garrison had been greatly reduced, and therefore there were far fewer people to feed.

51 B.C. Opposite this spring, Caesar proceeded to construct a terrace. From the heights above, the enemy hurled down missiles, and many of the Romans were struck: but the rest toiled doggedly on; and the terrace was built up nearer and nearer still. A tower was erected upon it, of the extraordinary height of ten stories, high enough to overtop the spring; and the garrison dared not approach under the shower of stones and arrows which its engines rained down. Men and cattle alike were parched by thirst. Torture and death stared them in the face. But there was the spring, still gushing forth. As a last resource, the garrison set fire to a number of barrels, filled with pitch, grease, and shavings, and rolled them on to the terrace. The woodwork and the sheds were presently in a blaze. The garrison with desperate energy flung down missiles to deter the Romans from advancing to put out the fire. But right up against the roaring flames, undaunted by the missiles, unheeding the sight of their falling comrades, the Roman soldiers pressed steadily on: with a mighty shout they answered their enemy's yells; and each man, eager that his valour should be observed, fought as he had never fought before. Still the flames shot up; and precious lives were sacrificed in vain. In this extremity, Caesar sent a number of cohorts to climb the hill and feign an assault upon the town. Panic-stricken, the garrison recalled their comrades from below; and the moment they had turned their backs, the Romans ran forward and extinguished the flames. Still the Gauls held out; for the spring itself was still untouched. At length, however, a party of sappers crept through a gallery which had been secretly driven into the hill-side to the source of the spring, and diverted its flow. Then at last, feeling that Heaven was fighting against them, the garrison surrendered.

Surrender of the garrison.

Their punishment.

Caesar saw that, if these rebellions were to break forth again and again, his work would never be at an end. He was aware, says Hirtius, that his clemency was notorious, and had no fear that any measures which he might be forced to adopt would be misunderstood. He determined, therefore, to inflict upon the garrison a punishment so appalling that all malcontents should in future remain quiet. He

would not put his prisoners to death, because, if he did, their fate, though it might be talked of for a time, would soon be forgotten. They were to remain as a living warning to intending rebels. He ordered their hands to be cut off, and sent them forth to exist as they best might. 51 B.C.

The fate of Lucterius.

One notable survivor of the great rebellion was still at large. Lucterius, the lieutenant of Vercingetorix, a man who, as Caesar said, was ready to dare anything, had wandered far from Uxellodunum. He knew that for him there was no forgiveness ; and he went from place to place in fear of betrayal. At length he fell into the hands of a renegade Arvernian, who brought him in chains to Caesar ; and what was his fate we can only guess.

Caesar follows up coercion by conciliation.

But Caesar knew that conquest can never be complete until coercion has been followed by conciliation. In little more than a year he would be leaving the country ; and he must contrive to leave it at peace. The time had not come, nor had he the authority, to organize a government : it would be enough if his successors could enter upon that task without encountering opposition. He had no wish to oppress the Gauls, or to hurt their national pride : on the contrary, he desired that they should learn to feel themselves really citizens of Rome. He fixed their tribute at a moderate amount.[1] He did not interfere with their institutions, though he doubtless used his influence to promote his own adherents to power. He loaded the chiefs with presents : he won their hearts by the charm of his address ; and when he quitted Gaul, and threw down the gauntlet, on a wider arena, to a mightier foe, they sent their bravest warriors to fight under his flag.[2]

[1] 40,000,000 sesterces or about £400,000. See p. 838.

[2] *B. G.*, viii, 49 ; Cicero, *Att.*, ix, 13 ; *B. C.*, i, 39, § 2. See pp. 835–8.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

The conquest of Gaul, fraught with illimitable issues, was at last complete.[1] Destiny had decided that Gaul was to be either German or Roman ; and Caesar did not hesitate to grasp the gift of destiny for Rome. The Gallic warriors were perhaps as brave, man for man, as the Roman legionaries ; and their numbers were far greater. But, whatever may have been their political capacity, when Caesar came among them they were only feeling after political union : they did not combine to expel him until it was too late, and not with a whole heart even then. With all their dash and nervous enthusiasm, they lacked the tenacity of the Roman : rushing vehemently to the attack, they fell away at the first reverse. This weakness, which Caesar so often notices, may have been inherent in the race : it may have been wholly or in part the result of a want of mutual confidence : [2] but whatever the cause, the fact remained. Their naïve credulity was observed by Posidonius ; [3] and, unwarned by experience,

[1] This statement will naturally be taken in a general sense. The subjugation of the north-western part of the country was doubtless, as Mommsen says (*Röm. Gesch.*, v, 1894, p. 72 [*Hist. of Rome,—The Provinces*, i, 79]), comparatively superficial : there was fighting in Aquitania in 38 and 28–27 B. C. ; and there was a partial insurrection in the reign of Tiberius. Still, the thoroughness with which Caesar had done his work was demonstrated, first by the peace which prevailed during the civil war, when Gaul was almost entirely denuded of troops, and secondly by the facts that, during the long reign of Augustus, notwithstanding the disturbances in Germany, Gaul remained submissive, and that, as Mommsen puts it (*ib.*, pp. 73–4 [80–1]), Vercingetorix found no successor. See also F. de Coulanges, *Hist. des inst. pol. de l'ancienne France,—la Gaule rom.*, pp. 71–84, and Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, iii, 49–50.

[2] The numerous host of the warlike Baluchis was defeated by Sir Charles Napier's little force at Miani principally because it was a loose aggregate of tribal levies which had not been trained to act in concert (see my article on the battle of Miani in *Macmillan's Magazine*, January, 1900) ; and it is probable that the defeats which the Gauls suffered were partly due to the same defect.

[3] Strabo, iv, 4, §§ 2, 5.

they precipitated themselves eagerly, again and again, into the simplest traps. Nor, for the most part, were the heterogeneous levies who opposed Caesar the equals of the purer Gauls who had routed a Roman army on the banks of the Allia. The Helvetii, the Parisii, the Senones, and a few of the Belgic tribes alone maintained the ancient renown of the Celtic infantry. The Gauls had no regular army : they had no science : they had no discipline ; and, until Vercingetorix arose, they had no great leader. Their conqueror, on the other hand, was master of a compact, disciplined, and well-equipped army, the finest in the world : [1] he was free to pursue a definite aim in opposition to the sporadic efforts of his enemies ; and, while he became a general only to achieve higher ends, he was one of the greatest generals that have ever lived. His writings leave so much to the intelligence of the expert that few can conceive how hard it was to conduct the operations which, in the narrative, appear so easy ; what resolution was needed to adhere, in the face of unforeseen obstacles, to plans readily formed, to banish distracting doubts, to preserve equanimity under the friction of accumulating difficulties, to sustain the military virtue of the army in privation and in the bitterness of defeat, to carry out combinations when calculations were disturbed.[2] How Caesar did these things the war-bred soldier can alone realize ; but we can all form some conception if we rightly study what he wrote. He knew that a well-organized commissariat is the foundation of success in war ; and the truth of this maxim is borne in at every turn upon the reader of his memoirs. While his enemies were more than once obliged to strike prematurely or to disperse because they had not

[1] It has been asserted that the legionaries with whom Caesar conquered Gaul were themselves Gauls. No one could make a statement so misleading who had any knowledge of ethnology, or who had noted the emphasis with which Caesar marks the distinction, in regard to stature, between the Gauls and his legionaries (*B. G.*, ii, 30, § 4). All the legions which he raised during the Gallic war, with one exception (see pp. 802–3), were levied from the mixed population, composed of Italian, Gallic, Ligurian, and doubtless also Etruscan and aboriginal elements, which inhabited Piedmont and the Plain of Lombardy.

[2] ' Everything,' says Clausewitz (*On War*, translated by Col. J. J. Graham, i, 1873, p. 40), ' everything is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult.'

secured their means of subsistence, he was always able to keep his army together and to choose his own time. For a few days' raid the legionaries could carry their food on their backs; but whenever his operations were likely to be protracted, he stored his grain in magazines and provided for its transport and protection. His secret service was perfectly organized. His geographical intuition was as unerring as that of Napoleon. He knew both how to govern and how to fascinate his soldiers, so that they would strain every nerve to win his praise,—all the more because they saw that he was more careful of their lives than of his own. Emergencies the most sudden and alarming, even when they resulted from his own mistakes, seemed only to make him more calm. He was not only master of all the science of his time, but he showed an inexhaustible fertility in inventing expedients. He concentrated his strength upon the vital point : he was always ready to put everything to the hazard for a great end. He knew the rashness of his enemy, and lured him on by an affectation of fear. He confounded him by the swiftness of his marches : he used his reserves with decisive effect ; and when he had won the victory, he followed it up with an energy that overwhelmed.

Nor would it be just to forget the support which the general received from his lieutenants. Few of them failed to do what was required ; and one may fairly rank among the great marshals of the world. The genius of Labienus has not been adequately appreciated ; but it needs little insight to see that Caesar placed him in a class by himself. Caesar trusted him to the full ; and, so long as his engagement lasted, that faithless man was true. The most difficult enterprises were imposed upon him ; and he accomplished them all. He fulfilled his instructions to the letter : he assumed responsibilities without fear. Beset by dangers the most appalling, his judgement was unerring, his decision unfaltering. In the crisis of the most critical campaign he avenged his chief's defeat by victory ; in the crisis of Alesia he repelled the fiercest onslaught, and struck the decisive blow ; and throughout those eight years, from first to last, he never made a single mistake.

But Caesar's was the directing mind. And Caesar was much more than a great general. He was a far-seeing statesman and withal a dexterous politician. Many historians have affirmed that the oligarchies in the Gallic states supported him, and that the adventurers who aimed at winning royal power were his opponents. There is some truth in this view ; but it needs qualification. No generalization can be safely made about the attitude of the various parties in Gaul. Caesar shaped his policy according to circumstances ; and if Dumnorix and Indutiomarus were his enemies, he himself, as we have seen, set up kings, perhaps not always wisely, in various republican states. In two notable instances, indeed, this policy miscarried : but the Senones and Carnutes were Caesar's most persistent antagonists ; and we do not know enough to judge whether by any other means he could have kept them on his side. Commius served him well until the great rebellion ; and he had no reason to repent of the choice which he had made. With cool calculation he took advantage of the fears, the necessities, the jealousies, the intestine broils, the spasmodic revolutions, the petty ambitions of those incoherent multitudes. For it must never be forgotten that, as we conquered India with the aid of Indians, Caesar conquered Gaul with the aid of Gauls. Fortune, which, as he so often said, 'is a great power in war, as in all other affairs,' was no fickle friend to him. The aristocracies broke up the triumvirate which threatened to anticipate him, and deprived the Helvetii, who, unaided, were almost a match for him, of allies who would have been irresistible. At first he was welcomed as a deliverer ; and when he had expelled the Helvetii and the Germans, it is doubtful whether he was generally feared as a conqueror. It was only when the presence of his legions was felt as a burden, and when ambitious chieftains saw reason to fear that he would blast their schemes, that he awakened partial opposition. The Romanized Provincials supported him throughout ; and in the great rebellion their assistance was indispensable. The Gauls were not devoid of patriotism : but it was choked by the tares of jealousy ; and when Vercingetorix was fighting for the fatherland, it is probable that there were many who

had as much to fear from his success as from his failure. Those who courted Caesar's friendship and espoused his cause were distinguished by every mark of favour, and might reckon with certainty upon his support. The Aedui adhered to him for six years, and when they changed their minds they found that they had served his turn :[1] the Remi saw from the first that he was going to win, and, having made their choice, they abided by it to the end. The Aquitanians cared nothing for the Gauls, and their isolated resistance was paralysed in a single campaign. The Arvernian oligarchy executed the chief who had restored the traditional glory of Bituitus and Luernius, and while his son was still too young to play his part, reduced the state which had been the rival of Rome's strongest ally to such insignificance that for five years it remained unnoticed in the record of the war. Indutiomarus and Ambiorix and Acco struck too soon ; and when their help was needed, one had vanished and two were slain. The Celticans, with the exception of the Senones, the Carnutes, and the maritime tribes, submitting, for the most part, without an effort, looked on, with folded hands, until, at the eleventh hour, Vercingetorix roused them to a convulsive resistance ; and then the Belgae, who had hitherto borne the brunt of the struggle, held aloof until it was too late. Lucterius and Drappes, Correus and Commius, all the chiefs who had been inspired by Vercingetorix, were doomed to fail ; for to reanimate enthusiasm would have needed one who had inherited a double portion of his spirit ; and the Gauls, who were but men, had not the heart to make that sacrifice which, on the required scale, even he could not enforce. And there was one other factor in Caesar's success which we must never forget. Even his fortune and his genius might have failed against Vercingetorix if the hereditary enemies of Gaul had not crossed the Rhine to his aid.

It has been said that it is impossible to conquer a people who are determined to be free. Perhaps, in our modern

[1] ' Ces chefs éduens,' says M. Jullian (*Vercingétorix*, p. 236), ' qui n'embrassaient une cause que pour en regretter une autre, étaient toujours traîtres à la trahison même.'

age ; and doubtless in every age, when the people dwell in a country which nature has fortified, and when they are brave, numerous, and of one mind. But Caesar succeeded, as William the Conqueror succeeded, not merely because the people with whom he had to deal were disunited, but also because he was prepared to go any lengths rather than fail. The Gauls were willing to sacrifice myriads of lives, so they might preserve their liberty ? Then he would slay a million, aye and slay women and children, and ravage their lands, and burn their houses over their heads, and lop off their limbs, so he might at last subdue them ! And, though he was ruthless, he was also merciful.[1] When he had beaten down opposition, he held out his hand in friendship ; and the Gauls took it, and bore him no grudge.

And when he had gone, what motive had they to rebel ? Many of the states retained administrative independence ; and none had exchanged independence for servitude. National independence they had never had ; for they had never been a united nation. As a nation, they could make no effort to throw off the Roman yoke ; for there was none among them who could command the confidence of the nation, or weld it into a coherent whole. Many of the smaller peoples had already been in subjection to powerful neighbours ; and it was less humiliating to obey an alien master than one of their own race. Rome was distant ; and her glory wrought upon the imagination. Rome was the resistless power which, for centuries, had been bringing, one after another, the nations of the earth within her empire. Jealousies were hushed beneath her sway. Her yoke was easy ; and her rule brought peace, security, and prosperity. If adventurers in Gaul, as in India, regretted the good old days when they could win thrones by their wits and their swords, the many gained more than they had lost ; and so it happened that the few spasmodic outbreaks which followed Caesar's departure were foredoomed to failure, and that his conquest was effected once for all.

[1] *In Caesare haec sunt : mitis clemensque natura.* So wrote Cicero in 46 B. C. (*Fam.*, vi, 6, § 8).

PART II

QUESTIONS OF GALLIC AND GALLO-ROMAN HISTORY RELATING TO THE FOREGOING NARRATIVE

SECTION I.—FUNDAMENTAL

THE MSS. OF THE *COMMENTARIES ON THE GALLIC WAR*

For my own satisfaction I have studied the correlation and the value of the various MSS.; but, as I am not here editing the *Commentaries*, I should be wasting time and space if I were to discuss the question in detail. For the number of passages in which, for historical purposes, textual criticism is important, is small; and all those passages will be found fully discussed in subsequent articles. It is sufficient to say that the MSS. which are alone worth considering are generally divided into two classes known as α and β, derived from a common original or archetype, not now extant, called *X*. The β MSS. were rated very low by C. Nipperdey in his *Quaestiones Caesarianae* (pp. 37–46), which form the introduction to his famous edition of the *Commentaries*: but in framing his text he himself was often compelled to have recourse to them; and the best modern critics, including H. J. Heller, H. Walther, R. Richter, Rudolf Schneider, B. Kübler, and H. Meusel, agree that Nipperdey greatly under-estimated their value.[1]

In referring to the MSS. I generally use the symbols adopted by Meusel, namely

A = codex Bongarsianus (or Amstelodamensis 81) of the 9th or 10th century.

[1] None of the extant β MSS. were written before the eleventh century; but it is certain that Orosius, who wrote in the early part of the fifth century, used a MS. which belonged to a time when α and β did not yet exist, but which commonly agreed with the latter. See R. Schneider in *Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xi, 1885, p. 154; H. Meusel (*ib.*, xx, 1894, p. 216); and A. Klotz, *Caesarstudien*, 1910, p. 215. When Orosius (vi, 7, § 2) said that the authority whom he followed for the Gallic War was Suetonius, he did not, I think, mean, as Prof. J. S. Reid supposes (*Classical Philology*, iii, 1908, p. 443), that he had used an epitome of the *Commentaries*: surely he was misled by the superscription of his copy of Caesar, which must have been identical with, or analogous to that of *A*,—*incipit liber Suetonii*.

B = Parisinus I (Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, 5763, 9th or 10th century).
M = Vaticanus (Vatican, 3864, 10th century).
Q = Moysiacensis (Paris, Bibl. nat., 5056, 12th century).
S = Ashburnhamianus (Bibl. Laurent. R. 33, 10th century).
a = Parisinus II or Thuaneus (Paris, Bibl. nat., 5764, 11th century).
f = Vindobonensis I (Bibl. Vindob. [Vienna], 95, 12th century).
h = Ursinianus (Vatican, 3324, 11th century).
l = Riccardianus (Bibl. Riccard. [Florence], 541, 11th or 12th century).

Meusel traces the pedigree of these MSS. as follows[1] :—



I have myself collated with Meusel's edition the best MS. in the British Museum—Add. MSS. 10,084—of the eleventh century (known as Lovaniensis and quoted as L), which agrees generally, though not invariably with a, and belongs to the group ϕ.[2] Meusel's great *Lexicon Caesarianum* (1887–93) I have found absolutely invaluable.

Those who wish to study the problems presented by the MSS. should read C. E. C. Schneider's edition, vol. i, 1840, pp. xxxvi–lii, C. Nipperdey's edition, 1847, pp. 37–49, B. Kübler's edition, 1893, pp. iii–x, H. Meusel's edition, 1894, pp. v–ix, the prefaces to vols. i and ii of Meusel's *Lexicon*, *Philologus*, xvii, 1861, pp. 492–509, H. Walther, *De Caesaris codicibus interpolatis*, 1885, R. Richter, *Kritische Bemerkungen zu Caesars Comm. VII. de b. G.*, 1889, four articles by H. Meusel in *Jahresberichte d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xi, 1885, pp. 173–204, xii, 1886, pp. 262–93, xx, 1894, pp. 214–398, and xxxvi, 1910, pp. 1–75, H. Schiller, *Über Entstehung und Echtheit d. Corpus Caes.*, 1899, and A. Klotz's article in *Rheinisches Museum*, N.F., lxiv, 1909, pp. 224–34.

WHEN DID CAESAR WRITE THE *COMMENTARIES ON THE GALLIC WAR*, AND WHEN WERE THEY PUBLISHED?

The common view is that Caesar wrote the *Commentaries on the Gallic War* after the conclusion of his Seventh Campaign, which took place in 52 B. C.[3] It is certain that the book was published not later than 46 B. C.; for it is noticed in Cicero's *Brutus* (75, § 262), which

[1] A. Klotz, in a very interesting paper (*Rhein. Mus.*, N.F., lxiv, 1909, pp. 224–34), has constructed a somewhat different pedigree, which I hope to notice in an edition of the *Bellum Gallicum*, but which does not affect any of the questions that are discussed in the following pages.

[2] Meusel in his admirable edition of the *Civil War* (p. viii) calls Lovaniensis the 'twin-brother' of Ashburnhamianus, and so it is in the *Civil War*; but, as he has acknowledged after reading my collation, not in the Gallic. The collation will, at his suggestion, be printed in the *Classical Quarterly*.

[3] See *Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xvii, 1891, p. 258.

appeared in that year. There is no direct evidence that it was either written or published earlier: but it is most unlikely that Caesar would have had time or inclination to write it during the intense labour and distraction of the civil war; and probably, as Mommsen says,[1] it was intended [at least in part] 'to justify . . . before the public the formally unconstitutional enterprise of Caesar in conquering a great country and constantly increasing his army for that object without instructions.' [2]

Schneider argues [3] that if Caesar had been writing his *Commentaries* during the successive years of the Gallic war, Cicero, whose brother, Quintus, and whose intimate friend, Trebatius, were serving on Caesar's staff, and who himself corresponded with Caesar, could not have been kept in ignorance of the fact; and that, if Cicero had been aware of it, he would certainly have let it out. To which I answer that Caesar knew how to keep his own counsel.

Schneider also argues that Caesar probably published his book in the spring of 51 B. C., as a counter-stroke to the attack of M. Marcellus, who had just brought forward a motion in the Senate that he should be superseded before the expiration of his term of office. I agree with Nipperdey that this argument is weak. Schneider [4] concludes that the book was written in the latter part of 52 and the early part of 51.

M. P. Fabia [5] holds with Schneider that the *Commentaries* were written after the Seventh Campaign, in the winter of 52–51 B. C.; first, because Caesar then had abundant leisure; secondly, because his enemies at Rome were then very active, and he would have been anxious to counteract their machinations; and thirdly, because, on this hypothesis, we can understand why he omitted to describe the Eighth Campaign. None of these reasons is conclusive. From the very beginning of 51, Caesar was hard at work, campaigning against the Bituriges, the Carnutes, the Bellovaci, and the Cadurci. In the last two or three months of 52 he was comparatively at leisure; but the winter must have been one of the busiest that he spent during the whole war. Secondly, if his enemies were active then, they were also active before and afterwards. Thirdly, to account for his not having described the Eighth Campaign, we need only suppose that he was called away to more pressing duties when he had only just finished his narrative of the Seventh.

Nipperdey [6] believes that the book was written after the war, in the leisure of winter-quarters, and, so to speak, in one heat; and in support of this opinion, he quotes Hirtius, who writes *ceteri enim quam bene atque emendate, nos etiam quam facile atque celeriter eos perfecerit scimus.*[7] The quotation is, I think, apposite; for if the statement that the *Commentaries* were written 'easily and rapidly'

[1] *Hist. of Rome*, v, 1894, p. 499 (*Röm. Gesch.*, iii, 1889, p. 615).
[2] See, however, my essay on 'The Credibility of Caesar's Narrative', p. 220.
[3] Wachler's *Philomathie von Freunden d. Wissenschaft und Kunst*, i, 1818, pp. 180–2.
[4] *Caesar*, vol. i, p. xxxi.
[5] *De orationibus quae sunt in Comm. Caesaris de B. G.*, 1889, pp. 19–20.
[6] *Caesar*, pp. 3–5.
[7] *B. G.*, viii, Praef. § 6.

is not absolutely inconsistent with the view that each book was written during the comparative leisure of the winter following the campaign which it described, the natural meaning is that the whole work was the result of a continuous effort.

Nipperdey[1] goes on to say that, even during the winter of 52–51 B.C., which followed the rebellion of Vercingetorix, Caesar had his hands full;[2] but that in the year 50 he had nothing to disturb him. He concludes that the first seven books were written during the year that preceded the outbreak of the civil war; and, believing that Caesar would certainly have finished his narrative if he had had time, he argues that he was interrupted by the outbreak of hostilities, and published the book in the first stage of the war.

Schneider[3] maintains that no one who has read the remarks which Caesar made about Pompey in his *Commentaries on the Civil War* can believe that he would have had the magnanimity to praise him, as he did, in his *Seventh Commentary on the Gallic War*,[4] if he had written the latter after his breach with Pompey. I confess that I have a higher opinion of Caesar's magnanimity than Schneider.[5] The true reasons for deciding that the *Commentaries on the Gallic War* were written before the outbreak of the civil war are, first that Caesar would not have had time to write them during that war, and secondly that it was to his interest to bring them out before the war began.

Professor E. G. Sihler[6] argues that the book could not have been written before the winter of 52–51 B.C., because nearly all the speeches are thrown into the form of *Oratio Obliqua*,—'a literary peculiarity utterly at variance with the literary habit of Greece and Rome and with the culture and training of the day.' The one important exception, he continues—the speech of Critognatus—was a 'recent matter when Caesar wrote'. This is a very weak argument. Caesar was no more able to report Critognatus's speech accurately *verbatim* than those of any of the other persons the gist of whose utterances he professed to give. Does Sihler suppose that he had a special correspondent, who could write short-hand, in Alesia, or that he could have learned more from prisoners than the drift of what Critognatus said? He

[1] *Caesar*, p. 4.

[2] I am not convinced of the truth of this view. Throughout the autumn of 1842 and the first six months of 1843 Sir Charles Napier was occupied in Sind with political and military work of the most engrossing kind. He was an old man, and he often complained that his power of work was not what it had been. Yet, over and above the anxious and heavy labour of negotiation and campaigning, which, for some months, was carried on in a most trying climate, over and above the task of writing frequent dispatches to Lord Ellenborough, he found time to write up an exhaustive journal and long letters to his brother William. Caesar was in the prime of life: his power of work was enormous: he had at all events some weeks of comparative leisure at Bibracte; and therefore I doubt whether Nipperdey is justified in saying that he could not have found time to write his book in the winter of 52–51.

[3] *Caesar*, ii, 342.

[4] 6, § 1.

[5] So also, I find, has Nipperdey. See pp. 3–4 of his *Quaestiones*. Caesar does not abuse Pompey in the *Civil War*: he simply narrates.

[6] *Class. Rev.*, May, 1890, p. 199.

wrote this speech in *Oratio Recta* not because he remembered or had ever known what Critognatus said, but because he thought fit, once in a way, to study rhetorical effect. As to the other speeches, he could easily have thrown them into the form of *Oratio Recta*, if he had cared to do so.[1]

Long,[2] on the other hand, believes that Caesar wrote his *Commentaries* during his campaigns. 'There are inconsistencies in the work,' he says, 'which are not inconsistencies if the books were written as the events happened. There is a brevity, sometimes an incompleteness in the narrative, which I have observed in many writers, who are writing of things before them, which are plain enough to them then, but would not seem so plain to them if they wrote afterwards. They would feel certain difficulties themselves and try to remove them for others. It is impossible to understand the attack on Gergovia, unless a man has seen the place or has a perfect map of it.' Nor is this his only argument. Speaking of the three chapters[3] which Caesar devotes to the geography of Britain and the manners and customs of its inhabitants, he says, 'It has been remarked that this digression would have been just as appropriate in the fourth book as here; and so it would if Caesar had been writing a history. But he wrote his Commentarii as the events occurred, and according to the plan of his work it would have been absurd to insert in the fourth book what he did not know when he wrote it. If we compare the little that he could learn about Britain before he sailed on his first expedition (iv. 20) with what he tells us here, it is plain that in his fourth book he wrote down what he knew at that time; and in this, his fifth, he wrote down what he learned in his second expedition.'[4] Alluding to Caesar's report of the exaggerated statement of the Nervian old men regarding the losses which their people had suffered in the battle on the Sambre, Long says, 'In ii. 23 it is said that nearly all the fighting men of the nation were destroyed. Schneider thinks that what is said in the second book could hardly have been written by a man who knew the fact of this fresh rising of the Nervii and remembered it. But the evidence that the same man wrote both is the same as the evidence that he wrote either, or any other part of these *Commentarii*. The true conclusion is, that he wrote both at the time of the events. In the second book he wrote that he had nearly destroyed the Nervii, and he might suppose so.'[5] Finally, commenting on a passage which occurs in Caesar's description of his decisive movement at Alesia—*Eius adventu ex colore vestitus cognito . . . turmisque equitum et cohortibus visis, quas se sequi iusserat, ut de locis superioribus haec declivia et devexa cernebantur, hostes proelium committunt*—Long observes that the phrase *haec declivia*, &c., 'is the true expression of

[1] See my essay on 'The Credibility of Caesar's Narrative', p. 213. There are brief speeches in *Oratio Recta* in *B. G.*, iv, 25, § 3; v, 30, §§ 2–3; 44, § 3; vi, 8, §§ 3–4; 35, §§ 8–9; vii, 20, §§ 8, 12, 38, §§ 1–3, 7–8; 50, §§ 4, 6.

[2] *Caesar*, p. xiii.

[3] *B. G.*, v. 12–4.

[4] Long's *Caesar*, pp. 229–30.

[5] *ib.*, p. 254.

a man who writes with the facts fresh in his recollection : he speaks of these movements along the descent to the level ground being seen by the enemy from the higher ground.' [1]

Long's arguments are always interesting ; but I do not think that these are conclusive. Caesar does not say himself in his Second Book that the Nervian militia had been reduced from 60,000 to 500 ; he only says that their representatives said so. It is true that he says that the Nervian people had been well-nigh exterminated (*prope ad internecionem gente ac nomine Nerviorum redacto*) ; but perhaps this was only a flourish.[2] Again, whether he wrote his *Commentaries* year by year, or all at once, he did not profess to write a regular history ; and it does not seem to me incredible that, if he wrote them rapidly in one heat, he should have described the manners and customs of the Britons in his Fifth instead of in his Fourth Book. And, with regard to the passage in the Seventh Book, on which Long lays so much stress, it must be remembered that, even if Caesar wrote all the *Commentaries* at once, the facts connected with the siege of Alesia, which took place in 52 B.C., must have been fresh in his memory.

De Belloguet[3] takes the same view as Long. He asserts that various statements which Caesar makes about Britain[4] are inconsistent. I can only discover one instance of inconsistency ; and that one is, I think, more apparent than real. In *B. G.* iv, 20, § 3, Caesar says that none of the Gauls readily undertook a journey to Britain, except merchants (*neque enim temere praeter mercatores illo adit quisquam*). In vi, 13, § 11, he says that those who desired to make a special study of Druidical lore generally went to Britain for the purpose (*disciplina in Britannia reperta atque inde in Galliam translata existimatur, et nunc qui diligentius eam rem cognoscere volunt plerumque illo discendi causa proficiscuntur*). But there is no real inconsistency between these statements. No one undertook the journey readily (*temere*) or as an ordinary affair except the merchants. Students did undertake the journey, but not *temere* : they had a serious object in view. Besides, even if there were any inconsistency between the two statements, that would only prove that in the former, Caesar, writing rapidly, as he did, made a slip.

Again, in support of the theory of intermittent authorship, de Belloguet says that Caesar's narrative does not bear out the statement which he makes, in his opening chapter, regarding the difference

[1] Long's *Caesar*, p. 405.

[2] It must be remembered that many of the Nervians who fought at the end of 54 B.C. were doubtless too young to fight at the beginning of 57.

[3] *Ethnogénie gauloise*, 1858–68, iii, 157–8.

[4] *B. G.*, ii, 4, § 7 ; iii, 8, § 1 ; iv, 20–1 ; v, 12 ; vi, 13, § 11. Meusel (*Jahresb d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xxxvi, 1910, pp. 29–31) argues that the description of Britain in *B. G.*, v, 12–4, is an interpolation. It would be irrelevant to examine his arguments here : but the fact that numerous hoards of the iron 'currency-bars' (*taleis ferreis*) which are mentioned in 12, § 4, have been discovered seems to me to suggest that the writer was Caesar ; for it is more than unlikely that they were in circulation at the very late date to which Meusel ascribes the alleged interpolation. See Rice Holmes, *Anc. Britain*, pp. 250–1.

between the Celtae and the Belgae; and therefore that we may conclude that, when he made that statement, he was ill informed. But it may be replied, first, that we have no right to expect that Caesar should furnish instances in detail of the difference which he states as a broad fact; and secondly that, in regard to some at least of the Belgic tribes—the Nervii, the Morini, the Menapii, and the Eburones—his narrative *does* bear out that statement.

A. Köhler[1] has revived the theory of intermittent authorship, in a modified form. Caesar, he says, in the Fourth Book, describes as peculiar to the Suebi manners and customs which, in the Sixth, he describes as common to the Germans generally. As, moreover, there are [apparent] inconsistencies, regarding the Nervii, between the Second Book and the Fifth and Sixth, Köhler concludes that the *Commentaries* were written in two instalments, the former comprising the first four books, and the latter the last three.

The argument relating to the Nervii has been already noticed. There is certainly a resemblance between Caesar's descriptions of the Suebi and of the Germans generally; but the description in the Sixth Book omits statements which are contained in the Fourth, and adds others which are not contained in it.

F. Vogel[2] has lately attempted to reinforce the arguments which have just been reviewed. Pointing to the passage in which Caesar, after remarking on the want of cavalry among the Nervii, says that 'to this day they pay no attention to that arm, their whole strength being in infantry' (*neque enim ad hoc tempus ei rei student, sed quicquid possunt, pedestribus valent copiis*[3]), he observes that in the last sentence of the same book—'a thanksgiving service of 15 days was appointed to celebrate his achievements, an honour which had not hitherto fallen to the lot of any one' (*dierum XV supplicatio decreta est, quod ante id tempus accidit nulli*[4])—the words *ante id tempus* explain the preceding *ad hoc tempus*, and at first sight look like proof that Caesar did not write the book until after the conclusion of the war. But only at first sight: *ad hoc tempus* must be regarded as a late interpolation; for how could Caesar, at the beginning of a description which ends with the statement that the Nervii had been virtually annihilated, have said that 'to this day . . . their whole strength is in infantry'? I have answered this argument by anticipation; but Vogel has others in reserve. He notices that in *B. G.* iv, 6, § 4, Caesar says that the Eburones '*are* dependents of the Treveri' (*sunt Treverorum clientes*), whereas in vi, 43 their annihilation is described. But is it? Let Vogel read again, and he will see that it was desired and anticipated, but not described; and in fact two years later (viii, 24, § 4; 25, § 1) it was still incomplete. When Vogel contrasts the two descriptions of the Ardennes (the latter of

[1] *Blätter f. d. bayer. Gym.*, xxvii, 710–5, reviewed by R. Schneider in *Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xvii, 1891, pp. 257–9.

[2] *Neue Jahrb. f. d. klass. Altertum*, v, 1900, p. 219.

[3] *B. G.*, ii, 17, § 4.

[4] *Ib.*, 35, § 4.

which, by the way, Meusel[1] regards as an interpolation) in v, 3, § 4 and vi, 29, § 4, I ask him to look at his map, which will show that they are not inconsistent: when he contrasts Caesar's 'almost tender treatment' of Sabinus in iii, 17–9 with 'the relentless manner in which he is pilloried' in v, 33, § 1 and 52, § 6, I reply that on the former occasion Sabinus succeeded, on the latter he failed.[2]

I doubt whether restless disputants will ever hold their peace; but I find no difficulty in assenting to the conclusion that has satisfied the best critics. The arguments that have been advanced in favour of intermittent composition are inconclusive; for even real inconsistencies, which are very few, can be fully explained by thoughtless handling of discordant materials, lapse of memory, or simple carelessness. On the other hand, what has been called the strongest argument in support of the prevalent theory is equally abortive. In *B. G.*, i, 28, § 5, Caesar says that the Aedui assigned lands to the Boi, and *afterwards* admitted them to equal rights. If the *First Commentary* was written immediately after the first campaign, this passage must have been added at some later time.[3] But is there the slightest

[1] *Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xxxvi, 1910, pp. 31–2. Cf. A. Klotz, *Caesarstudien*, 1910, pp. 53–4.

[2] H. Walther (*Über d. Echtheit und Abfassung d. Schr. d. Corpus Caes.*, 1903) has recently argued that the *Commentaries* were composed year by year; but H. Schiller (*Berl. phil. Woch.*, 1903, col. 1417) points out that many of the discrepancies on which he relies are only apparent, and that others are consistent with the theory that the book was written continuously. A. Klotz also (*Caesarstudien*, 1910, pp. 18–25), noticing Chr. Ebert's *Über die Entstehung von Caesars B. G.*—the most recent statement of the case for the theory of intermittent authorship—easily confutes various objections, similar to those which I have examined, that have been raised against the view which is authorized by Hirtius. Cf. *Blätter f. d. Gymnasialschulwesen*, xlvi, 1910, p. 369.

There is an inconsistency between vi, 2, § 3 and 31, §§ 1–2 which, if we accepted Vogel's reasoning, would tend to show that Caesar wrote this or that chapter whenever he had an hour to spare. In the former passage Caesar says that 'all the Cisrhenane Germans', who included the Segni and Condrusi, were in arms against him; in the latter he implies that the Segni and Condrusi proved their innocence. But this inconsistency should warn us not to draw hasty conclusions as to Caesar's method of composition: it only proves that he did not thoroughly revise his work.

[3] Some critics indeed, notably H. Schiller (*Über Entstehung und Echtheit d. Corpus Caes.*, 1899, pp. 28–32), pointing to the unusual repetition of the relative pronoun in a demonstrative sense, contend that the passage was not written by Caesar at all, but by an early editor. If so, remarks Schiller, the strongest argument that has been advanced for continuous composition collapses. Strongest indeed? But Schiller cannot even slay the slain; and I am glad to see that his criticism has not imposed upon Meusel, whose knowledge of Caesar's diction is supreme. Granted that the passage is inelegant, do great writers never fall below their own standard? In Matthew Arnold's *Obermann Once More* (*Poems*, vol. ii, 1869, p. 243) the following deplorable stanza occurs in the midst of many noble lines. I quote the stanza which precedes it as well:—

> (Wellnigh two thousand years have brought
> Their load and gone away,
> Since last on earth there lived and wrought
> A world like ours to-day.)

difficulty in supposing that it was ?[1] In default of internal evidence, then, let us accept the only original testimony that we have,—the testimony of Caesar's most intimate friend. Hirtius's words show that he had himself witnessed the rapidity with which Caesar wrote his *Commentaries*: therefore it is morally certain that they were written at one time; for the other theory, besides involving a forced interpretation of the Latin, would oblige us to assume that Hirtius regularly spent his winters with Caesar in Cisalpine Gaul.

Mommsen[2] argues that the work must have been not only written but published before the end of 51 B. C., because in *B. G.*, vii, 6, § 1, Caesar 'approves the exceptional laws of 702 (52 B. C.). This he might and could not but do, so long as he sought to bring about a peaceful accommodation with Pompeius, but not after the rupture, when he reversed the condemnations that took place on the basis of those laws injurious for him'. But why should not the publication have taken place in 50 B. C.? Even in 49 Caesar tried to bring about a peaceful accommodation.[3]

THE AUTHORSHIP OF THE *COMMENTARIES*

Recent German criticism has been much exercised in striving to determine how far Caesar can be credited with the authorship of the books which for many centuries had been attributed to him without question. Did he incorporate, more or less verbally, the reports of his lieutenants in his narrative, or did he use them as a modern historian uses such materials? Was he the actual writer of the *Commentaries*, or were the records wrought into shape under his supervision by a secretary? To discuss the literature of these questions would be irrelevant to the purpose of this book, because they hardly affect the value of the *Commentaries* as evidence. Max Strack in a recent article[4] recommends the perusal of the various works which he enumerates,—as a soporific.[5] His own paper is lively enough. He remarks that the five books which constitute the *Corpus Caesarianum*—the *Bellum Gallicum* and *Bellum civile*, the *Bellum Alexandrinum*, the *Bellum Africanum*, and the *Bellum Hispaniense*—have this in common, that they are generally limited to the narrative of military events[6]: he points out[7] that Hirtius wrote an invective

> Like ours it looked in outward air!
> But of that inward prize,
> *Soul*, that we take more count and care,
> Ah! there our future lies.

Some centuries hence perhaps this stanza will be deleted or bracketed by restless editors; but we know that it was written by the author of *The Forsaken Merman*.

[1] A. Klotz (*Caesarstudien*, p. 18) agrees with me.
[2] *Hist. of Rome*, v, 1894, p. 499, n. 1 (*Röm. Gesch.*, iii, 1889, p. 616, note).
[3] *B. C.*, i, 9–10; 24, §§ 5–6, &c.
[4] *Bonner Jahrbücher*, cxviii, 1909, pp. 139–57.
[5] *Ib.*, p. 147. [6] *Ib.*, p. 144. [7] *Ib.*, p. 151.

against Cato, which Cicero[1] called a πρόπλασμα—a model or prototype—of Caesar's *Anticato*, and argues that he was regarded by Cicero as Caesar's literary mouthpiece: he urges that Caesar, under the enormous pressure of his work, had need of a literary secretary as much as of officers to execute the movements which he planned;[2] and he observes[3] that Hirtius was Caesar's most intimate friend,[4] that he accompanied him in many of his campaigns, that his ability is proved by Caesar's having designated him as consul for the year 43 B. C., and yet that he was never appointed, though others of inferior capacity were, to a military command. Strack concludes that Hirtius was wanted for other work. He did for Caesar what Lothar Bucher did for Bismarck in the editing of his *Gedanken und Erinnerungen*. He collected and assorted dates, names, facts of every kind, and submitted this material to Caesar, who winnowed out the essential, and gave it form. Hirtius threw into semi-final shape what Caesar dictated, and Caesar afterwards corrected his work. In spirit and largely in actual words the result was Caesar's own. If Hirtius was the editor, the unity of the *Corpus Caesarianum* is explained.[5] But Strack, who is troubled by a sense of humour, can criticize his own conjectures; and he concludes that we shall never know the nature of the relations between Caesar and his friend.[6]

Much that Strack has said is probable enough; but does he not go too far? He admits, nay he insists, that the Eighth Book of the *Gallic War*, of which Hirtius was the sole author, is far inferior to the first seven. But, says he, this only shows that the mind which created the Eighth Book was more concerned with petty details than with what was really important. Does it not also show that Hirtius was in no sense the author of the other seven, but only, at the most, Caesar's collaborator? We may well believe that he 'devilled' for Caesar: he may conceivably have compiled a preliminary narrative of the war; but to a man who has made the *Commentaries* his intimate companion nothing can be more certain than this:—apart from a few passages which were probably interpolated, the first seven books are characterized by one style, and bear the impress of one master mind. The material once collected and arranged, it would have given Caesar less trouble to write the whole narrative himself than to reconstruct, and prune, and vivify the work of Hirtius. And did not Hirtius himself testify that the actual writer was Caesar?

[1] *Att.*, xii, 41, § 4. Cf. Tyrrell and Purser, *The Correspondence of Cicero*, vol. vi, p. ciii.
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 152.
[3] *Ib.*, p. 148.
[4] Cicero, *Att.*, vii, 4, § 2.
[5] *Op. cit.*, pp. 156–7.
[6] *Ib.*, p. 157.

THE CREDIBILITY OF CAESAR'S NARRATIVE

I

For the history of the first seven years of Caesar's conquest of Gaul our principal authority is Caesar himself. It is, of course, as I have shown in the Preface, impossible to grasp the full meaning of his narrative unless one has studied the works of the modern scholars who have contributed so much to the task of solving the various problems which the *Commentaries* present. It is true, moreover, as I have also remarked, that later writers, such as Suetonius, Plutarch, and Dion Cassius, make certain statements, true or false, which are not to be found in Caesar. But Caesar is the authority; and if he is a bad one, all the commentators in the world can do little to mend his work. It becomes necessary, then, to inquire how far Caesar's narrative is worthy of credit. From this point of view, the earliest extant criticism is that of Asinius Pollio, who died A. D. 4. According to Suetonius,[1] Asinius Pollio thought that the *Commentaries* were written carelessly and with little regard for truth; that Caesar accepted, without due inquiry, the accounts of his lieutenants; and that, either intentionally or from failure of memory, he was inaccurate in describing what he had done himself. Of course it is impossible to say with certainty how far Pollio was right;[2] but one who has had considerable experience in writing contemporary history from original sources may perhaps form a tolerably just idea of the significance of his opinion. When Sir William Napier published his *History of the Peninsular War*, officers who had taken part in the events which he described hastened to point out mistakes in his narrative; and he himself, half humorously, half despairingly remarked that, after all the care which he had taken, his book was 'full of lies'.[3] Many of his brother-officers, however, bore testimony to his general accuracy. Sir John Kaye, Mr. Kinglake, all in fact who have written history which was open to the criticisms of the actors, must have had a similar experience. Possibly the opinion of Pollio, who took no part himself in the Gallic war, was founded upon

[1] *Divus Iulius*, ch. 56.—Pollio Asinius parum diligenter parumque integra veritate compositos putat, cum Caesar pleraque et quae per alios erant gesta temere crediderit et quae per se vel consulto vel etiam memoria lapsus perperam ediderit.

[2] F. Seck (*De C. I. Caesaris comm. fide*, part ii, 1864, pp. 8–10) maintains that Pollio's criticisms on Livy and Sallust (for which see C. L. Roth's edition of Suetonius, 1893, pp. 261–2) were fair, and argues that we may therefore accept his criticism of Caesar. But the two former judgements refer only to style; and we do not even know whether the criticism of Caesar was directed against the *Gallic War*.

[3] *Life of Gen. Sir William Napier*, edited by H. A. Bruce, 1864, i, 448.

criticisms like these. Caesar inevitably made mistakes; and Pollio may have conversed with eye-witnesses who pointed out these mistakes, who were perhaps aggrieved by them, and who, exaggerating their significance, as men devoid of the sense of historical proportion will always do, shrugged their shoulders and exclaimed, 'Such is history.' It may even be true, as Mezger[1] thinks, that Pollio's criticism was only directed against the *Commentaries on the Civil War*, the history of which he himself wrote. Anyhow, as Mezger goes on to observe,[2] the only other contemporary criticisms of the *Gallic War* that we possess—those of Cicero and Hirtius—are favourable; and if Caesar had been a dishonest or grossly inaccurate writer, it would be remarkable that there should be absolutely no evidence that any of his statements was ever expressly contradicted. His accuracy, as a narrator of details, has been confirmed, on various points, by modern investigations. When he is writing military history, pure and simple, for example chapters 39 to 84 of the First Book of the *Civil War*, his general trustworthiness is as self-evident as his skill. No one who reads his book can deny that he was gifted, in an extraordinary degree, with the faculty of observation. Most of the operations which he describes were performed under his own eye: he had opportunities for observing what took place in a battle or a siege which a modern general, whose operations extend over a vast area, cannot have; and it is important to notice that he rarely indulges in that sort of detailed description which gives rise to most of the mistakes that occur in modern military history. This is a point which I could not make perfectly clear to a 'general reader' unless he would bear with me while I explained to him the labour which I have myself undergone in writing an account of a modern battle, and the process by which I have been enabled to correct mistakes which had crept into my original draft. But all who have tried their hands at writing military history from original sources will understand what I mean. As a rule, Caesar gives us only the outline of a battle,—he tells us just so much as may enable us to understand the moves, to differentiate his account from his accounts of other battles, and no more.

It may perhaps be impertinent to remark that lapse of time does not breed mistakes in a historical narrative. But nothing would be more natural than for the general reader, especially if he had been taught to believe that history is a 'Mississippi of falsehood', to say in his haste, How can we know anything about the details of battles that happened 2000 years ago? Well, if Caesar was an honest writer, when we are reading his *Commentaries*, we are in much the same position as we should be if, for our knowledge of the Peninsular war, we depended mainly upon a volume of Memoirs by the Duke of Wellington. Caesar sent dispatches to the Senate, and it may be assumed that he kept copies of them: his generals sent dispatches to him; and if he did not write his commentary on each campaign

[1] *Über d. Abfassungszeit von Cäsar's Comm. über d. gall. Krieg*, 1874–5, p. 5.
[2] *Ib.* See Cicero, *Brutus*, 75, § 262, and *B. G.*, viii, Praef. § 5.

as he fought it, he certainly finished the whole work within two years after the close of the war.[1] His account, therefore, was strictly a contemporary account by the eye-witness who had the best eyes and the most favourable point of view; and it remains as accurate to-day as when it was first penned.

II

But one may accept his narrative as generally trustworthy without claiming for him immunity from error. The speeches which he puts into the mouths of Vercingetorix and others may have been composed from information supplied by Vercingetorix himself or by prisoners; but when one remembers the licence which was assumed by ancient historians in this respect, one naturally asks whether all his speeches are even substantially true. P. Fabia[2] argues that, as Caesar undoubtedly drew upon his imagination in writing some of them, for instance the one which he put into the mouth of Critognatus,[3] we are justified in believing that he did not always tell the simple truth even when he knew it. But there is no proof that he drew upon his imagination for the outline even in writing the speech of Critognatus. The words in which he clothed it being, contrary to his custom, cast in the form of *Oratio Recta*, were of course his own. But the substance is another matter. Fabia says that Caesar could not have known anything of what Critognatus said, except his proposal to kill the non-combatants for food.[4] But, if he was informed of this, why should he not also have been informed of the drift of the orator's arguments? As Fabia himself admits, it was not Caesar's manner to set down anything merely for literary effect;[5] and his critic forgets that he could have questioned Vercingetorix, who had been in Alesia with Critognatus, and who would doubtless have been glad, after his surrender, to talk over the events of the war. Still I can conceive that, on this occasion, Caesar did give the rein to his imagination. He was conscious of his own oratorical powers; and very likely he was tempted to show, for once, that he could do something in the style of Thucydides, which even Cicero might read with admiration.

Again, Fabia contends that Caesar, in writing his speeches, must have trusted almost entirely to his memory, because, if he had caused any memoranda to be made, they were certainly very brief.[6] This is a pure assumption; and are not the speeches themselves very brief?

At the same time, Fabia remarks with justice that, in composing his speeches, Caesar was far more careful of truth than any other ancient historian, as may be inferred from the fact that most of the speeches were written in *Oratio Obliqua*, which proves that he only professed to give the drift of what was said.[7]

[1] See pp. 202–9.
[2] *De orationibus quae sunt in Comm. Caesaris de B. G.*, 1889, pp. 91–2.
[3] *B. G.*, vii, 77.
[4] *De orationibus*, &c., pp. 23–4.
[5] *Ib.*, pp. 13, 39.
[6] *Ib.*, p. 21.
[7] *Ib.*, p. 92.

III

So much for the speeches. More serious charges have been brought against the general tone of his narrative. It has been alleged that he wrote with a political purpose; and that he was consequently led to omit facts which would have told against himself, to invent plausible motives for his more questionable actions, and to bring false charges against his enemies. The popular judgement at Rome, argues the Duc d'Aumale, whose criticism is singularly fair and on the whole highly favourable, was sure to be indulgent to and not over-critical of an account of victory over Rome's ancient enemies; while Caesar's lieutenants, even those who opposed him in the civil war, 'étaient intéressés à ne pas diminuer la valeur d'un livre qui était pour eux aussi un monument de gloire.'[1] The critic, I may remark in passing, fails to notice that, if the popular judgement was sure to be so favourable, that was the very reason why Caesar could afford to tell the truth. I am quite ready to believe that one of his motives was to conciliate public opinion in view of the civil war. But I believe that this object was to be attained by a truthful just as well as by a distorted narrative.[2]

In the first edition of this book I adopted a method of testing the credibility of Caesar's memoirs which, by some critics in this country, though not on the Continent, was condemned as over-scrupulous. I took every charge, at all colourable, of inaccuracy, of misrepresentation, or of mendacity that had been brought against him, and had been supported by argument, and examined it as impartially as I could. I thought that it would be useless to select a few charges and dismiss the rest, on the ground that the names of their authors carried no weight, because, though hardly one of the assailants of Caesar's veracity has a European or even a national reputation, their united assaults have made an impression. Although the utility of this minute investigation has been spontaneously and generously acknowledged by a French historian,[3] I intend now to take account only of such specimens of destructive criticism as may seem either well grounded or not safely to be ignored.

Readers who take an interest in the question will of course not rest satisfied with merely examining charges of untrustworthiness. They will read Caesar's *Commentaries* and his letters for themselves, read the letters that Cicero wrote to and about him, and form at first hand an opinion of the character of the man. They will of course discriminate between the narrative which he composed from personal knowledge and those chapters which were based upon the reports of his marshals. But their judgement will be liable to error unless they have some knowledge of the operations of war. Not even a trained historian, unless he is also a soldier, or unless his training has included diligent study of military history, fortified by

[1] *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, 2e pér., xv, 1858, p. 120.
[2] See p. 224, n. 1.
[3] C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 1909, pp. 150–1.

intimate converse with military men, can appreciate, unaided, the military sections of Caesar's narrative.

The charges which have been brought against Caesar's good faith may be grouped in two classes, according to the motives which his accusers impute to him. These motives are, first, the desire to put the best construction upon unconstitutional or unrighteous acts, and secondly, the desire to magnify his own exploits, to take to himself the credit of the exploits of his lieutenants, and to conceal everything that might have injuriously affected his reputation as a general.

IV

The assailants of Caesar's credibility, for the most part, attach a high value to the authority of Plutarch, Appian, Florus, Orosius, Eutropius, and above all Dion Cassius, whenever they differ from or supplement Caesar. Their theory is that these later writers used other sources of information besides the *Commentaries*. About the first five there is very little to be said. Anybody who prefers the authority of Plutarch to that of Caesar must be so credulous or so wrong-headed that it would be useless to argue with him. Plutarch is a delightful writer, who is read not because he was a critical historian, but because he is readable. But, like some other readable biographers, he was a romancer; and, as F. Eyssenhardt,[1] one of Caesar's sternest critics, admits, his *Lives* abound with monstrous blunders.

Florus dismissed the whole Gallic war in a single rhetorical chapter filling about two pages; and the value of that scrap may be gauged from the fact that he confounded Gergovia with Alesia.[2]

The epitome of Appian's narrative of the Gallic war[3] is shorter even than that of Florus; and although it is not so pretentious, it is a wretched blundering piece of work. For example, Appian says that the Nervii were descended from the Cimbri and Teutoni; that Caesar defeated the Allobroges; and that the Sugambri with 500 routed Caesar's 5,000 Gallic troopers.

Orosius was a Spanish presbyter of the fifth century, who compiled a history of the world from the creation, in defence of Christianity. That part of it which deals with the Gallic war is contained in the seventh and the four following chapters of the Sixth Book. In this small space Orosius makes several gross mistakes. Immediately after reproducing from the *Commentaries* the list of the Belgic contingents which Caesar encountered in 57 B. C., he says that they emerged from ambush in a wood and threw Caesar's army into confusion, but were subsequently defeated and all but annihilated.[4] Here he is evidently confounding the entire Belgic host with the

[1] *Neue Jahrb. f. Philologie*, &c., lxxxv, 1862, pp. 760–1.

[2] i, 45 (iii, 10).

[3] *Celtica*, i, 2–5.

[4] His repente silva erumpentibus, exercitus Caesaris perturbatus atque in fugam actus, plurimis suorum amissis, tandem hortatu ducis restitit, victoresque aggressus usque ad internecionem paene delevit. vi, 7, § 16.

Nervii.[1] Speaking of the leaders of the Veneti, he says, with a Froudian embellishment, that Caesar *tortured* them to death.[2] Caesar's object, he says, in crossing the Rhine was to relieve the Sugambri—the very people whom he marched to attack—from blockade.[3] Lastly, he confounds Cenabum with Avaricum and Gergovia with Alesia.[4] But Orosius is not an irritating romancer like Dion Cassius. Excepting that one little flourish about the Veneti, he does not try to dress up and embellish Caesar's narrative. In general, he follows the *Commentaries* closely enough; and there is only one passage in which I can discover any trace of his having consulted an authority who differed from or attempted to correct Caesar. This passage, which deals with the numbers of the Helvetii, will be referred to later on.

Eutropius's account of the Gallic war is comprised in one paragraph of his epitome of Roman history (vi, 17 [14]). As a specimen of his accuracy, I will quote one sentence,—'Caesar attacked the Germans on the further side of the Rhine, and defeated them in a series of bloody battles' (*Germanos trans Rhenum aggressus immanissimis proeliis vicit*).

Dion Cassius was rated at his true value by George Long.[5] He was nearly as great a romancer, in his way, as Plutarch; but his way was dull. How far he used other authorities besides Caesar for his narrative of the Gallic war, we shall never know;[6] but at all events Caesar was his chief authority. In following him he gave as free play to his imagination as Mr. Froude, but with this difference: Mr. Froude's was the imagination of an artist, who had a sense for the fitness of things, Dion's of a tasteless newspaper reporter; Dion wrote bad Greek, and Mr. Froude wrote good English. As I shall often have occasion in this book to examine Dion's statements, I shall give a few specimens of his work. First, instead of summarizing or reproducing the vigorous little speech with which Caesar[7] quieted the panic that seized his army before their campaign against Ariovistus, he puts into Caesar's mouth a sermon, which fills eleven chapters of his book,[8] which would have had no effect in reassuring his hearers, and which Long[9] aptly characterized as 'a rambling and unmeaning piece of fustian, worthy of Dion's age'. Secondly, describing the attack which Viridovix made upon the camp of Sabinus, he says that the Gauls 'took firewood and other wood, some on their shoulders and some dragging it after them, in order to burn the Romans'.[10] Caesar says simply that the Gauls 'collected brushwood and faggots to fill up the Roman trenches'.[11] Thirdly, Dion, by way of embellishing

[1] See *B. G.*, ii, 19–28.
[2] Cunctis principibus *per tormenta* interfectis. vi, 8, § 17.
[3] vi, 9, § 1. [4] vi, 11, §§ 3–4, 7. [5] *Caesar*, p. xi, n. 5.
[6] See M. Jullian's *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 151, note.
[7] *B. G.*, i, 40. [8] xxxviii, 36–46. [9] *Caesar*, p. 85.
[10] φρύγανα καὶ ξύλα τὰ μὲν ἀράμενοι, τὰ δὲ ἑφελκόμενοι, ὡς καὶ καταπρήσοντες αὐτούς . . . προσέβαλον (xxxix, 45, § 4). See Long's *Caesar*, p. 165.
[11] Sarmentis virgultisque collectis, quibus fossas Romanorum compleant. *B. G.*, iii, 18, § 8.

his account of Caesar's campaign against the Morini, says that there were 'great mountains'[1] in their country,—that is, great mountains in the neighbourhood of Calais. Fourthly, whereas Caesar[2] tells us that Sabinus and Cotta quitted Atuatuca at dawn, Dion[3] changes dawn into evening. Fifthly, he says that when Caesar heard the news of the fate of Sabinus and Cotta, he was on his way to Italy.[4] But Caesar's narrative[5] shows that he was at Amiens (Samarobriva); and Dion's blunder was evidently the outcome of a vague reminiscence of the words which Caesar puts into the mouth of Sabinus:—'My belief is that Caesar has started for Italy' (*Caesarem arbitrari profectum in Italiam*).[6] Sixthly, Dion says that Caesar crossed the Allier on rafts;[7] whereas we know that he crossed by a bridge, which he had repaired.[8] These instances —and the list might be considerably extended—are sufficient to justify the opinion which I have expressed of Dion's work. A dull accurate historian and an interesting inaccurate historian both have their uses; but tedious fiction is intolerable.[9]

To sum up, it is clear that Plutarch, Appian, Florus, Orosius, Eutropius, and Dion Cassius followed Caesar, more or less inaccurately, as their authority. It is possible that some of them may have referred, on certain points which will be noted in the course of this essay, to some other authority or authorities as well. But if they did, there is not the slightest reason for preferring those unknown authorities to Caesar. To appeal to Orosius or Plutarch against Caesar is much the same thing as it would be to appeal against Wellington's despatches to John Richard Green. If Caesar is to be arraigned for mendacity, the appeal must be to internal evidence alone.[10]

V

The principal accusations which fall within what I have called the first group[11] are (1) that Caesar misrepresented the motives which prompted the Helvetii to emigrate and those which impelled him to attack Ariovistus; (2) that he invented the story of the attempt of the Helvetii to cross the Rhône; (3) that, in relating the intention of the Helvetii to settle in the country of the Santoni, he minimized the distance between the frontier of that tribe and the frontier of the Tolosates, in order to make the danger that threatened the Province appear greater than it really was; and (4) that 'the whole drift of his own report is that he was continually *forced* to enter

[1] ἐπεχείρησε μὲν γὰρ ὁ Καῖσαρ καὶ ἐς αὐτὰ τὰ ὄρη τὴν ὕλην τέμνων προχωρῆσαι· ἀπειπὼν δέ, διά τε τὸ μέγεθος αὐτῶν . . . ἀπανέστη (xxxix, 44, § 2).

[2] *B. G.*, v, 31, § 6. [3] xl, 6. [4] xl, 9, § 1.

[5] *B. G.*, v, 46–7. Cf. Long's *Caesar*, p. 261.

[6] *B. G.*, v, 29, § 2. [7] xl, 35, § 3. [8] *B. G.*, vii, 35, §§ 5–6.

[9] See, in confirmation of my estimate of Dion, Heller in *Philologus*, xxii, 1865, pp. 108–11; *Neue Jahrb. f. Philologie*, &c., cliii, 1896, pp. 269–71; *Rev. celt.*, xxii, 1901, p. 87; and p. 237, n. 3, *infra*.

[10] I am not speaking here of the *Commentaries on the Civil War*, from which we can appeal, on certain points, to Cicero's Letters.

[11] See p. 215.

upon new enterprises and campaigns against his own wish and expectation '.

1. The first charge has been formulated in various terms again and again ; but only one of the advocates has gained a wide hearing, —the well-known historian, Guglielmo Ferrero, who has conducted his case with more ability than his predecessors and on entirely new lines. His method involved a drastic reconstruction, which I criticized in the *Classical Quarterly* of July, 1909,[1] of Caesar's *First Commentary*. I need only repeat here that his whole case depends upon four assumptions :—first, that the main object of the Helvetii in invading Gaul was to drive out Ariovistus ; secondly, that while Caesar's countrymen would have approved his attacking the Helvetii in order to prevent them from founding a Gallic ' empire ', they would have condemned him for preventing them from seizing a fertile tract in Gaul and from dispossessing its occupants ; thirdly, that when he charged them with having raided the lands of the Aedui, the Ambarri, and the Allobroges, he lied ; and lastly, that he made an ' alliance ' with Ariovistus in order to purchase his aid against the Helvetii.[2] In the *Classical Quarterly* of January, 1910, Signor Ferrero replied to my criticism.[3] He thinks that I failed to seize his main point, which, he says, is represented by this question : Why did Caesar conclude an alliance with Ariovistus in 59 B.C. and break it in the following year ?[4] Any one who may have read my article with care will have seen that I recognized that this point was capital.

In the first edition of this book[5] I conjectured that the Senate conferred upon Ariovistus the title of Friend of the Roman People ' with the object of securing his neutrality in view of the threatened Helvetian invasion ', and in the article to which Signor Ferrero replies I said that Caesar ' foresaw that when he went to Gaul he would have to deal both with the Helvetii and with Ariovistus ; and to dispose of two formidable hosts separately would be quite as much as he could manage '.[6] ' L'explication,' Signor Ferrero remarks, ' paraît d'abord satisfaisante ; mais la lecture attentive des Commentaires nous prouve que ni les Helvètes ni Arioviste ne désiraient que de vivre en paix avec César (cf. *B. G.* i, 13 ; i, 44), et bien loin d'avoir songé à une alliance contre César, regardaient une guerre contre lui comme une chose presqu'impossible.' [7]

The passages to which Signor Ferrero refers are speeches, which Caesar puts into the mouths of Divico, the Helvetian leader, and Ariovistus respectively, and in which the former declared that ' if the Roman People would make peace with the Helvetii, they would go wherever Caesar fixed their abode ', but warned him not to

[1] Pp. 203–15.

[2] Cf. F. Fröhlich, *Die Glaubwürdigkeit Caesars in seinem Bericht über d. Feldzug gegen d. Helvetier*, 1903, pp. 4–7.

[3] What follows is reprinted, with certain omissions and additions, from my rejoinder (*Class. Quarterly*, October, 1910).

[4] *C. Q.*, 1910, p. 28. [5] P. 21. [6] *C. Q.*, 1909, p. 213.

[7] *C. Q.*, 1910, p. 28.

'suffer the place where they stood to derive its name from a Roman reverse and from the annihilation of a Roman army', and the latter, after telling Caesar that 'unless he took his departure and withdrew his army from the neighbourhood, he should treat him not as a friend but as an enemy', and hinting that 'he could purchase the gratitude and friendship' of 'many of the nobles and leading men of Rome' 'by killing him', ended by genially assuring him that if he 'withdrew and left him in undisturbed possession of Gaul, he would reward him handsomely'. Signor Ferrero apparently now thinks that Caesar ought to have accepted these assurances, although in the article which I criticized he maintained that Caesar ought to have adopted an 'anti-German' policy. At all events the passages which he quotes are hardly sufficient to refute my contention, that Caesar bestowed a title upon Ariovistus 'with the object of securing his neutrality in view of the threatened Helvetian invasion'. But, says Signor Ferrero, Caesar, by making an alliance with Ariovistus, risked losing the support of the philo-Roman party in Gaul. Nothing, he adds, in the First Book of the *Commentaries* is more striking than the weakness of that party; for the words of Diviciacus when he begged Caesar not to punish Dumnorix, as otherwise 'the result would be that the feeling of the whole country would turn against him' (*qua ex re futurum uti totius Galliae animi a se auerterentur*),[1] prove that 'le parti nationaliste représentait la presque totalité de la Gaule'. Why, asks Signor Ferrero, were the philo-Romans reduced to impotence? 'L'alliance avec Arioviste est la seule explication possible; mais c'est une explication suffisante. En s'alliant avec l'ennemi national de la Gaule, Rome s'aliénait toutes les sympathies des Gaulois. La question de savoir pourquoi César a fait cette alliance est donc plus complexe et difficile que M. Holmes ne le suppose.'[2]

I confess that Signor Ferrero seems to me to build too much upon the rhetorical phrase, *totius Galliae*. Still I am willing to admit, for the sake of argument, that the philo-Roman party was temporarily weakened by the fact that a title had been bestowed upon Ariovistus.[3] But what then? Caesar knew that he must run risks in order to solve a difficult political problem; and he solved it triumphantly. Signor Ferrero thinks that he ought to have rejected the overtures of Ariovistus, and resolutely embraced the cause of the pro-Helvetian party,—in other words, of the Nationalists. But the inevitable result would have been that he could only have got rid of Ariovistus, who, remember, according to Signor Ferrero, was only anxious to live on friendly terms with him: the Helvetii would have remained, and he would have been obliged to tolerate their permanent settlement in Gaul. Consider what that would have involved. Dumnorix was in league with the Helvetii, and intended

[1] *B. G.*, i, 20, § 4. [2] *C. Q.*, 1910, p. 29.

[3] As I remarked in my former article (*C. Q.*, 1909, p. 211), Caesar did exactly what the philo-Roman party wanted,—first expelled the Helvetii, and then Ariovistus.

to use them as instruments of his ambition.[1] Caesar would have been obliged either to look on helplessly at the development of their schemes, or to attack the Helvetii at some future and less propitious time. I cannot help thinking that he understood Gallo-Roman politics better than his critic. The radical difference between Signor Ferrero's view and mine is this: he believes that both the Helvetii and Ariovistus 'only desired to live in peace with Caesar', but that Caesar ought nevertheless to have joined with the Helvetii and the Nationalists in expelling Ariovistus from Gaul; I believe, as Caesar's narrative obliges me to do, that Caesar regarded the presence both of the Helvetii and of Ariovistus as dangerous to Roman interests. Is Signor Ferrero really prepared to maintain that Caesar would have served Rome and Gaul better if in 58 B. C. he had only expelled Ariovistus, and had permitted the Helvetii to remain? If he is, I can only admire his hardihood. If he is not, how can he help admitting that Caesar's policy was right?

Signor Ferrero tells me that I have forgotten that Caesar was not authorized by the laws of his country to defend Roman prestige in Gaul according to his personal views; that the right of declaring war belonged not to him, but to the Senate; that Ariovistus was a Friend of the Roman People; and that consequently the war which Caesar waged against him was *illegal*.[2] I have never denied any of these propositions; but I do deny their relevancy. Granted that Caesar's action was illegal; it does not follow that his sole motive for attacking Ariovistus was to recover the sympathies of the Gauls. If he was prepared to break the law in order to please the Gauls, why should it be deemed incredible that he was prepared to break it in order to do what Signor Ferrero himself insists ought to have been done, namely to rid Gaul and Rome of a dangerous enemy? Were not illegal and unconstitutional acts frequent in those revolutionary times? Did not Pompey show his contempt for legality in 52 B. C.?[3] Does Signor Ferrero maintain that Caesar consulted the Senate before he undertook the campaigns of 57 B. C. and the six years that followed? Did he not 'defend Roman prestige in Gaul', and make war from first to last 'according to his own personal views' just as the Marquess Wellesley did in India?

But it is at least questionable whether Caesar's action was even illegal. The decree of the Senate to which he appealed was surely a sufficient justification. If he could prove that he had been called upon, in accordance with that decree, to 'protect the Aedui'[4] the charge of illegality would collapse. Ariovistus himself, by his headstrong arrogance, flung away the advantage which his title had given him, and played into the hands of his wary antagonist.

There is one fact which alone pulverizes Signor Ferrero's reconstruction. If Caesar conferred titles upon Ariovistus, not, as I maintain, in order to secure his neutrality, but in order to obtain his active co-operation against the Helvetii, why did he never avail

[1] *B. G.*, i, 18, § 9.
[2] *C. Q.*, 1910, p. 29.
[3] Dion Cassius, xl, 56.
[4] *B. G.*, i, 35, § 4.

himself of it ? It was as much as he could do, unaided, to defeat the Helvetii : why, then, did he not call upon Ariovistus to join him ? Obviously because he had never contemplated a proceeding which would have paralysed his policy. If he had accepted the assistance of Ariovistus against the Helvetii, it would have been impossible for him, however cynical he may have been, to turn round afterwards and expel Ariovistus from Gaul. And that was what he intended to do.[1]

Signor Ferrero attributes to Caesar a lack of foresight and a simplicity—nay, innocence—which are both ludicrous and incredible. He says that after the Helvetian war Caesar saw, for the first time, that if he rested satisfied with his victory, he would only have played the game of Ariovistus, forfeited the sympathies of the philo-Roman party, and destroyed Roman prestige ; and that, as he had not yet thought of conquering Gaul, the result would have been a veritable disaster, to avoid which he was forced to turn against his own ally.[2] How does Signor Ferrero know that Caesar had not yet thought of conquering Gaul ? Is it conceivable that he would not have foreseen that sooner or later he would have to deal with Ariovistus ?

Signor Ferrero, as is well known, goes so far as to reject Caesar's statement that the Helvetii intended to settle in the country of the Santoni. Confessing that he does not know how or when they proposed to drive Ariovistus into Germany, he goes on to say, ' Ce qui me semble le plus probable, c'est que le parti de Dumnorix cherchait à transporter cette population belliqueuse dans des territoires situés dans le nord-est de la Gaule, de l'établir dans ces territoires, pour pouvoir recruter un jour dans cette population une armée contre Arioviste.' [3] But is not this an afterthought ? In the article which I criticized Signor Ferrero did not say that the Helvetii were marching towards the north-east of Gaul with the intention of settling there and at some future time attacking Ariovistus : he said, ' the Helvetii had already [after their defeat] turned eastwards. The Helvetii therefore were marching towards the Rhine ' ; and he added that they marched ' towards the country in which the army of Ariovistus was encamped ? ' [4] The army of Ariovistus was not encamped in the north-east of Gaul, but in the plain of Alsace. To march from Geneva towards North-Eastern Gaul by way of the valley of the Saône and Mont Beuvray would have been a sufficiently

[1] According to Appian (*Celtica*, 16), Ariovistus, after he had finally defeated the Aedui, promised not to molest them further, and in return received the title which he sought. This may be true ; but Appian is a bad authority (cf. C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 158, n. 3). M. Jullian, who agrees with me in rejecting Signor Ferrero's reconstruction, nevertheless supposes (*ib.*, p. 165) that it was intended, in case of need, to utilize the forces of Ariovistus against the Helvetii. For the reasons which I have given this seems to me more than unlikely, unless indeed the Senate alone was responsible for the grant of the title. Mommsen apparently thinks that it was ; for he attributes the grant of the title to ' ignorance and laziness in statesmen ' (*Hist. of Rome*, v, 1894, p. 36 [*Röm. Gesch.*, iii, 1889, p. 247 n. **]). But Caesar assumed joint responsibility.

[2] *C. Q.*, 1910, p. 30.

[3] *Ib.*, p. 31.

[4] *The Greatness and Decline of Rome*, ii, 345–6.

inexplicable proceeding; but to march by the same route, with the intention of turning 'eastwards' 'towards the Rhine' and 'towards the country in which the army of Ariovistus was encamped' would have been more Gilbertian still. Accordingly I made an objection, which Signor Ferrero quotes and endeavours to answer. 'Ariovistus,' I said, 'was in the plain of Alsace. Let Signor Ferrero look at his map, and ask himself whether a movement more insane than a trek from Geneva to the neighbourhood of Lyons, across the Saône, up the valley of the Saône to the neighbourhood of Mâcon, then westward towards Toulon-sur-Arroux, then northward to the plateau of Langres, and then back again eastward a hundred miles or more "towards the Rhine"—a trek in bullock-carts full of non-combatants, against a powerful host which there was no motive for attacking—was ever planned outside Bedlam.'[1] Appealing from his former to his present self, Signor Ferrero says, 'Il n'est point nécessaire de supposer que l'émigration des Helvètes allait, comme une armée en formation complète, attaquer immédiatement Arioviste : elle allait occuper les territoires qu'on lui donnait, comme les Germains qu'Arioviste faisait venir d'outre-Rhin, pour s'y tenir prête à fournir une armée. Il n'est donc non plus nécessaire de supposer que les Helvètes se dirigeaient vers l'endroit où Arioviste campait.' Very well; but how does he explain the startlingly devious character of the 'trek'? Read on. 'Quant à la route prise par les Helvètes, elle peut sembler "insane" à celui qui l'étudie sur une carte de l'Europe moderne. Évidemment ceux qui veulent aujourd'hui se rendre du territoire situé entre les Alpes et le Jura dans la France du nord-est n'ont pas besoin de passer par Mâcon, Autun, et Langres. Pourquoi les Helvètes ont-ils pris, il y a dix-neuf siècles, ce chemin? Parce qu'ils voulaient passer par le riche territoire des Éduens, qui étaient leurs amis et qui pouvaient leur donner des vivres.'[2]

It appears, then, that although we must not believe Caesar when he says that the Helvetii forcibly took supplies from the Aedui, although Dumnorix's popularity would be 'difficult to understand' if they had done any such thing,[3] the Aedui were ready and willing to *give* them supplies. But if so, why did the Helvetii move *westward* from the Saône when *ex hypothesi* their goal was in North-Eastern Gaul? If they had pushed on up the valley of the Saône, would they not still have been in Aeduan territory, and would not supplies have been still forthcoming? And since Signor Ferrero assures us that all the Nationalists in Gaul were their friends, why did they not draw their supplies from friends who were not remote from their alleged natural route? Why go a hundred miles out of the way to feed at the expense of the Aedui when the eastern and north-eastern tribes were available? No, Signor Ferrero, your explanation is a little too far-fetched. If Divico really planned that circuitous 'trek', a Bedlamite he must have been!

But, despite the stubborn fact that the Helvetii struck westward from the Saône in the last stage of the march that preceded their

[1] *C. Q.*, 1909, p. 209. [2] *Ib.*, 1910, p. 31. [3] *Ib.*, p. 33.

defeat, Signor Ferrero contends that their goal could not have been the country of the Santoni, because 'Si les Helvètes allaient leur chemin avant la bataille, quand ils étaient talonnés par les Romains, il est au moins téméraire de supposer qu'ils se sont jetés à l'aventure, dans la Gaule, sur la première route qu'ils ont trouvée, quand ils avaient réussi à immobiliser l'ennemi pour trois jours et à le distancer de toute la marche qu'ils avaient pu accomplir en trois jours.' [1]

I supposed no such thing : the Helvetii did not march at random. After their defeat they abandoned the hopeless enterprise of marching to Saintonge : they knew that Caesar could, as he did, overhaul them, and their prestige was shattered. From the direction which they took after their defeat Signor Ferrero formerly concluded that they were marching 'towards the Rhine' with the object of attacking Ariovistus ; he is now forced to amend this conclusion and to say that they were marching towards North-Eastern Gaul : is the second inference more valuable than the first ? And, once more, I ask, if Caesar had had any interest in deceiving his countrymen as to the place in which they originally intended to settle, would he have hit upon the country of the Santoni, the mention of which was not unlikely to excite suspicion ? Would it not have served the purpose of a liar better to say that they intended to settle in the country of the Aedui ?

'M. Holmes,' says Signor Ferrero, 'me demandera probablement sur quoi je m'appuie pour affirmer que César a altéré la vérité, quand il nous a décrit les Eduens implorant son aide contre les Helvètes qui menaçaient de *omnes fortunas sociorum consumere*. Sur ce fait : que quelques chapitres plus loin (au XVII^me^) César est obligé d'admettre que Dumnorix, le protecteur des Helvètes, était si populaire, qu'il tenait en échec tout le gouvernement et que celui qui toucherait à lui serait détesté par toute la Gaule. Il serait difficile de comprendre une telle popularité, si les Helvètes avaient mis la Gaule à fer et à feu, comme on le raconte dans le onzième chapitre.' Then does Signor Ferrero also deny the truth of *B. G.*, i, 15, § 4, where Caesar tells us that while he was following the Helvetii through Aeduan territory 'he thought it enough to prevent the enemy from looting, foraging, and ravaging the country' (*satis habebat in praesentia hostem rapinis pabulationibus populationibusque prohibere*) ? Does Signor Ferrero believe that a host numbering over three hundred thousand souls could have been prevented by their leader from attempting to plunder ? In his eleventh chapter Caesar says nothing about 'fire and sword' : he only says that the Helvetii ravaged (*populabantur*) Aeduan territory. According to Signor Ferrero, they had gone far out of their way to that territory for the sole purpose of procuring food, which the Aedui were willing to give them ; but if they had plundered it (for aught we know, from philo-Romans), Dumnorix's popularity would be incomprehensible ! Yet it would

[1] *C. Q.*, 1910, p. 32. I explain on pp. 50, 232, why the Helvetii, in order to reach Saintonge, marched through Aeduan territory.

seem that he managed somehow to retain his popularity with the unhappy people of North-Eastern Gaul, whose fertile lands, according to Signor Ferrero, he had promised to assign to them.[1]

I venture to say that the famous historian has entered a path which does not lead to historical truth. It is dangerous to mate scepticism with imagination; for the offspring thereof will be illegitimate fiction.

2. Caesar tells us that the date [according to the unreformed calendar] fixed for the muster of the Helvetii on the right bank of the Rhône was the 28th of March, 58 B. C. When he reached the neighbourhood of Geneva, Helvetian envoys presented themselves, and asked him to allow the host to march through the Province. Wishing to gain time, he told them that he would take a few days to consider their request, and would give them an answer on the 13th of April. Meanwhile he constructed entrenchments along the left bank of the Rhône between Geneva and the Pas de l'Écluse. On the 13th of April the envoys returned; and he told them that he could not allow the host to pass through the Province.[2]

Now, observes H. Rauchenstein, according to Caesar's narrative, the Helvetii were fools. They must have seen his entrenchments in process of construction. Yet they were so simple as to wait patiently for the date which he had fixed. He lies when he says that they tried to storm his entrenchments. Dion Cassius does not mention anything of the kind; and the Helvetii would not have needlessly exasperated the Romans and endangered the success of their enterprise by defying Caesar. The truth is that he invented the story of their attempt to cross the Rhône in order to excuse himself for having afterwards attacked them.[3]

I reply that, on Rauchenstein's theory, Caesar was a fool; and, whether he was a knave or not, he was assuredly a great captain. He would not have constructed his lines unless he had had good reason to believe that he could either do so unobserved or in spite of detection, and good reason to fear that otherwise the Helvetii might

[1] Mr. Heitland has sent me a MS. note, which ends with the words, 'I have only to express my belief that in rejecting the reconstruction of Caesar's story by Signor Ferrero Mr. Rice Holmes is right. That story I believe to be true in the main, though I agree with the clever Italian critic that in it the instances of artful colouring are not far to seek.' Granted. Caesar naturally made out the best case that he could for himself, not falsifying facts, but emphasizing, as he had a right to do, impersonal motives. 'No doubt,' as Mr. Heitland says, 'it suits his purpose to lay stress on the order of the Senate commending the Aedui . . . to the protection of the Governor of Roman Gaul. Still, unless this order be a fiction, there it was. . . . On nearer acquaintance Ariovist turned out to be a Friend whose presence in Gaul was incompatible with Roman overlordship. Therefore he had to go, and the pitiful entreaties of the pro-Roman nobles served as an excuse or pretext for undertaking what had in any case to be done if Rome was to justify her position as protector.' Perhaps A. Klotz (*Caesarstudien*, pp. 22–5) is right in saying that Caesar took pains to justify his first two campaigns because in crossing the frontier of the Province he had acted without senatorial sanction. The campaigns of 57–52 B. C. followed as a matter of course.

[2] *B. G.*, i, 6, § 4; 7, §§ 3–6; 8, §§ 1–3.

[3] *Der Feldzug Cäsars gegen d. Helvetier*, 1882, pp. 51–4.

succeed in forcing a passage. Napoleon III has shown that the lines could have been made in two or three days. Rauchenstein assumes that the Helvetii assembled on the 28th of March,—the date which their leaders had fixed. But this is not proved: nor is it proved that, even if they did, they were aware that the lines were in process of construction; for, as Colonel Stoffel has explained,[1] the banks of the Rhône, in the first nine miles[2] of its course below Geneva, were so steep that no lines were there required. Dion Cassius does not, it is true, expressly say that the Helvetii attacked the lines: but his narrative[3] implies either that they did attack them or that they did not know of their existence until they saw them; and either alternative is fatal to Rauchenstein's theory. If they had shrunk from offending the Romans, they would not have emigrated at all; and, as I have already shown, it was quite unnecessary for Caesar to resort to fiction in order to justify his attack upon them.[4]

3. With regard to the third charge, what Caesar wrote was, *Caesari nuntiatur Helvetiis esse in animo per agrum Sequanorum et Haeduorum iter in Santonum fines facere, qui non longe a Tolosatium finibus absunt, quae civitas est in provincia. Id si fieret, intellegebat magno cum periculo provinciae futurum ut homines bellicosos, populi Romani inimicos, locis patentibus maximeque frumentariis finitimos haberet* ('Caesar was informed that the Helvetii intended to march through the territory of the Sequani and the Aedui, and to make for the country of the Santoni, which is not far from that of the Tolosates, a Provincial tribe. He saw that, if this happened, it would be very dangerous to the Province to have a warlike population, hostile to the Roman People, close to its rich and defenceless cornfields').[5] '*Non longe*, indeed!' says Professor Sihler. 'About 200 miles.'[6] The map shows that the distance from the nearest frontier of the Santoni to Tolosa (Toulouse) is 210 kilometres, or 130 miles.[7] But let that pass. The point is that, as Long says,[8] 'there is no obstacle to an army marching from Saintes to Toulouse; the road is open; and the Helvetii would have been dangerous neighbours to the Provincia, if they had planted themselves on the lower Garonne.' The Gauls had, for centuries, been the dreaded enemies of Rome. To say nothing of the probability that Caesar may have been misinformed as to the distance, the Senate had just done its best, by diplomatic means, to compass the exclusion of the Helvetii from Transalpine Gaul.[9] Can

[1] Napoléon III, *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 49–53, note. Cf. F. Fröhlich, *Die Glaubwürdigkeit Caesars*, &c., p. 20.

[2] 14 kilometres, or $8\frac{3}{4}$ miles nearly. [3] xxxviii, 32, § 1.

[4] M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 199 and n. 5) accepts Caesar's statement literally, and remarks that 'le mur a pu être placé sur le rebord des plateaux et servir surtout à relier les différents corps depuis Genève jusqu'à l'éperon du Vuache, face au pas de l'Écluse.' But was such a rampart required? See pp. 614–5, *infra*.

[5] *B. G.*, i, 10, §§ 1–2. [6] *Class. Rev.*, iv, 1890, p. 154.

[7] See Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 603, n. 2, and Napoleon, *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 55, n. 3.

[8] *Caesar*, p. 49. [9] Cicero, *Att.*, i, 19, § 2.

any one honestly argue, on the bare evidence of the words *non longe*, that Caesar was so afraid lest public opinion at Rome should condemn him if he repelled the invasion of the Helvetii, that he thought it necessary to tell a lie in order to smooth over his iniquity ?

But M. Jullian,[1] who defends the general trustworthiness of the *Commentaries*, scoffs at this particular passage. Were not the Arverni, he asks, as dangerous neighbours as the Helvetii would have been ? Were the Helvetii less dangerous behind the lake of Geneva than they would have been near the Atlantic ? ' Toutes ces paroles de César n'étaient que des formules à l'usage du peuple romain.' But was the presence of one danger a reason for ignoring another ? The time had not yet come for dealing with the Arverni : while the Helvetii remained beyond the lake they had enough to do in repelling the Germans ; and so long as they did not threaten Rome, a Roman general could not attack them. Was Caesar to look on passively while they and Dumnorix were maturing their schemes ?

4. Finally, we are told that ' the whole drift of his own report . . . is that he was continually *forced* to enter upon new enterprises and campaigns against his own wish and expectation.' [2] This criticism has no point unless it means that ' his own report ' was so far false, and that he hypocritically endeavoured to disguise the fact that his purpose from first to last was to conquer Gaul. Whether, when he first crossed the Alps in the spring of 58 B. C., he had definitely made up his mind to undertake the conquest, we cannot tell. But that, before the end of the same year, he saw his way clear to doing so, he has left us in no doubt. Has he not told us that he quartered his legions, for the winter of 58–57 B. C., at Vesontio (Besançon), outside the Roman Province ? Has he not frankly avowed—or rather related as a matter of course—that in 57 B. C. he sent one of his lieutenants to receive the submission of a group of tribes which had offered him no opposition, but which his policy required him to subdue. In *B. G.*, ii, 34 I read, *Eodem tempore a P. Crasso, quem cum legione una miserat ad Venetos, Venellos, Osismos, Coriosolitas, Esuvios, Aulercos, Redones, quae sunt maritimae civitates Oceanumque attingunt, certior factus est omnes eas civitates in dicionem potestatemque populi Romani esse redactas* (' At the same time he was informed by P. Crassus, whom he had sent with a single legion to the territories of the Veneti, Venelli, Osismi, Coriosolites, Esuvii, Aulerci, and Redones, maritime tribes, whose country reaches the Ocean, that all of them had been brought completely under the dominion of the Roman People '). Could anything be plainer ? Is there the least attempt, in this part of his ' report ', to make us believe that ' he was forced to enter upon a new enterprise against his own wish and expectation ? ' Therefore, when he tells us, as he sometimes does, that he was forced to undertake a campaign unexpectedly, it seems natural to conclude, not that he is lying, but that he is showing us

[1] *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 201.

[2] *Class. Rev.*, iv, 1890, p. 198.

how much more arduous the conquest of Gaul turned out than might have been anticipated. Having made up his mind to conquer the country, he naturally desired to do so at the least possible expenditure of valuable lives. Why then should we suspect him of hypocrisy when he tells us that, after the whole country had apparently submitted, he was again forced to take the field? Does his accuser mean to argue that he was not forced to 'enter upon fresh campaigns' at all, in other words, that his descriptions of the circumstances which led to the campaigns are fictitious or distorted? If so, the charge is simply gratuitous. Or does he, without impugning the accuracy of Caesar's narrative, simply mean that he intended, whether he were 'forced' or not, to conquer Gaul? If so, he has told us no more than Caesar has enabled us to see for ourselves. Supposing that Caesar had directly avowed his design, instead of leaving us to infer it, would there be anything surprising in his having told us that he was forced to undertake fresh campaigns against his wish and expectation? Let me give a brief analysis, which any one can verify for himself, of the causes which he assigns for his successive campaigns. He tells us that the Helvetii invaded Gaul and refused to give hostages for their good behaviour; and he implies that he thereupon determined to eject them. He tells us that Ariovistus intended to settle permanently in Gaul, and refused to restore the hostages whom he had taken from the Aedui, or to pledge himself to bring no more Germans across the Rhine. He tells us that the Belgae conspired against him because they were afraid that he intended to conquer their country, and because they were egged on to fight by influential Gauls who objected to the Roman legions' wintering in Gaul, and by others who feared that the establishment of Roman rule would upset their plans for seizing supreme power in their respective states. He frankly avows, as I have already remarked, that he sent Publius Crassus to reduce the maritime tribes to submission; and he does not pretend that those tribes had given him any provocation. He goes on to relate that they revolted; that he suppressed their revolt without mercy; that he sent Crassus to prevent the Aquitanians from helping, if they intended to help, the tribes of Gaul; that the Aquitanians combined to resist Crassus; and that Crassus defeated them.[1] In the Fourth Book he relates

[1] Mommsen remarks (*Hist. of Rome*, v, 1894, p. 500, note [*Röm. Gesch.*, iii, 1889, p. 616, note]) that Caesar's attempt to justify Crassus's invasion 'as a defensive measure which the state of things had rendered inevitable' breaks down. Read Caesar's statement (*B. G.*, iii, 11, § 3) of his reason for having sent Crassus on this errand:—*P. Crassum . . . in Aquitaniam proficisci iubet, ne ex his nationibus auxilia in Galliam mittantur ac tantae nationes coniungantur* ('P. Crassus . . . was directed to march for Aquitania, in order to prevent the dispatch of reinforcements to Gaul from the peoples of that country, and the junction of two powerful races'). It is generally assumed that the danger which Caesar professed to fear did not exist, because the Aquitani had apparently no political connexion with the Celtae or the Belgae, and were ethnologically distinct from both; but is it quite certain that the alleged danger, which, as may be gathered from *B. G.*, vii, 31, § 5, did exist, was not removed by the severe lesson which Crassus gave the Aquitani? and, if the danger was really imaginary,

that the Usipetes and Tencteri, expelled from their own country, crossed the Rhine with the intention of settling in Gaul; that he warned them to recross the Rhine; and that, in consequence of their having violated a truce, he attacked and destroyed them. The remainder of his work, in so far as it relates to Gaul, is devoted to a narrative of the insurrection of the Eburones and their allies in 54–53 B. C. and of the great rebellion of 52 B. C.

This is a fair summary of the reasons which Caesar gives for having undertaken his successive campaigns. Those reasons appear to me perfectly natural and perfectly consistent with the theory that what he intended from first to last was the conquest of Gaul. I can hardly believe that those who have impugned his good faith imagine that the moral sense of Roman society was likely to be shocked by the conquest, and that therefore it was necessary for him to veil it as decently as he could. There are Little Englanders; but if there were Little Romans, I never heard of them. The conquest awoke the deepest enthusiasm in Italy. Possibly Cato and his followers may have been genuinely indignant at such acts as the slaughter of the Usipetes and the Tencteri; but it was precisely his most appalling acts of severity which Caesar related with the greatest emphasis and the greatest precision. The *Commentaries* were an *apologia*: they were not an apology.

It must be remembered, moreover, that Caesar had already taken care, by his negotiations with Pompey and Crassus at Luca, to secure absolution from the Senate even while the war was going on. Mommsen [1] thinks that the *Commentaries* were designed partly 'to justify as well as possible before the public the formally unconstitutional enterprise of . . . conquering a great country and constantly increasing his army . . . without instructions'. This may be true; but in the conference at Luca Caesar had played his cards so well that the Senate had easily been induced to vote pay for the legions which he had raised on his own responsibility,[2] and Cicero, in his speech *De Provinciis Consularibus*, had celebrated the glories of Caesar's exploits in Gaul. Too much has been made even of Caesar's anxiety to defend himself in his Memoirs on purely constitutional grounds. His book was not likely to win him many new adherents. He relied principally upon other means,—gold and the powerful advocates whom gold kept on his side. When Mommsen insists upon the necessity under which Caesar found himself of arguing that he had been justified in acting without the sanction of the Senate, does he not forget that the Senate, by the repeated 'thanksgivings' which it had decreed in honour of his victories,[3] had virtually sanctioned

is it certain that Caesar knew it to be so? Mommsen may be right; but if so, why did Caesar take no pains to apologize for having sent Crassus to reduce the maritime tribes, who had offered him no provocation, to submission? Why did he simply record the fact? Surely because it never occurred to him that his conduct required an apology.

[1] *Hist. of Rome*, v, 1894, p. 499 (*Röm. Gesch.*, iii, 1889, p. 615).

[2] Cicero. *Fam.*, i, 7, § 10.

[3] *B. G.*, ii, 35, § 3; iv, 38, § 5; vii, 90, § 8.

his action in advance ?[1] Such argument was really needed only in connexion with the campaigns of 58 B. C. ; and, as I have already shown, Caesar was able to justify himself without departing from the truth.

VI

Now to deal with the critics who complain that Caesar lied from motives of vanity. The Duc d'Aumale observes that Caesar was not as candid as Turenne, who frankly told an indiscreet questioner that he had lost the battles of Mariendal and Rethel by his own fault.[2] I freely admit it. Caesar did not think it necessary to anticipate the censure of military critics ; and he was quite right. He made mistakes, like every other general ; and if he does not call our attention to them, neither does he conceal them. He tells us quite enough to enable us, if we know our business, to see where he went astray.[3]

The charges which I propose now to examine are—(1) that Caesar concealed certain reverses which he had sustained ; (2) that he took to himself the credit, which really belonged to Labienus, of having defeated the Tigurini ; (3) that his account of the later stage of his battle with the Helvetii is incredible ; (4) that he suppressed important facts in his account of the sea-fight with the Veneti ; (5) that he constantly exaggerated the numbers of his enemies ; (6) that his account of the predatory expedition of the Sugambri in 53 B. C. is garbled ; (7) that he disguised the defeat which he had sustained at Gergovia ; (8) that he pretended to have subdued several German peoples, whereas only the Ubii had in fact submitted ; and finally, that he was unjust and ungenerous in his notices of the services of his lieutenants.

1. Rauchenstein contrasts the story which Caesar tells in *B. G.*, i, 48–51 of the operations which preceded the defeat of Ariovistus and of the outset of the battle itself with Dion Cassius's narrative. Caesar says that, for five days after Ariovistus made the flank march by which he hoped to cut off the Romans from their supplies, he daily offered battle, but that Ariovistus remained shut up in his camp and only ventured upon cavalry skirmishes ; that afterwards, when he himself had regained communication with his convoys by constructing a smaller camp, Ariovistus made an unsuccessful attempt to storm it, in which both sides suffered heavy loss ; and that, having learned that Ariovistus had been warned by the German

[1] A generous reviewer of the first edition (*Athenæum*, Jan. 13, 1900, p. 41) who acknowledges the 'substantial fairness' of this essay, remarks that 'the honour of the *supplicatio* was sometimes good-humouredly granted to commanders who were known to have hugely exaggerated their achievements'. No doubt; but the *supplicationes* which were granted to Caesar were *pro tanto* a justification of his policy. Moreover, if, as Suetonius apparently means (see pp. 40–1), the Senate had given Caesar the whole of Transalpine Gaul for his sphere of action, the grant, as Long says (*Decline of the Roman Republic*, iii, 433), was 'equivalent to a commission to make war in that country'.

[2] *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, 2e pér., xv, 1858, p. 119.

[3] For an instance in which an acute critic has detected that Caesar was outwitted by Vercingetorix see pp. 744–5.

matrons not to fight a pitched battle before the new moon, he forced Ariovistus's hand by attacking him on the very next day. Dion Cassius, on the contrary, says Rauchenstein,[1] tells us that the Romans were defeated in minor engagements by Ariovistus, and that, setting at nought the warnings of the matrons, he attacked them when they were drawn up in battle array. What Dion Cassius really says is that Ariovistus greatly harassed (ἰσχυρῶς ἐλύπει) the Romans with his cavalry; that he nearly took Caesar's smaller camp; and that, emboldened by this success, he paid little attention to the warnings of the matrons, and on the next day, when the Romans moved out of camp and formed in line of battle, he made his troops do the same.[2] Having regard to the general character of Dion's narrative, which is throughout, for the most part, obviously a condensed paraphrase of Caesar's, to his love of rhetorical embellishment and to the monstrous blunders into which this taste occasionally hurries him, I see no reason to believe that, in the present instance, he used any independent authority. The phrase ἰσχυρῶς ἐλύπει and the statement that Ariovistus nearly took Caesar's smaller camp I regard as mere flourishes or hasty inferences.

Rauchenstein says that Caesar's narrative of the commencement of his battle with Ariovistus is not only improbable but impossible. Caesar tells us that he marched right up to the German camp (*usque ad castra hostium accessit*); and that the Germans then perforce (*necessario*) led their troops out of camp, and formed them up in groups composed of their several tribes.[3] Upon which Rauchenstein remarks, 'Caesar is so polite as to wait until his opponents form up. I cannot see why the Germans were *obliged* to come out and attack Caesar. Why could not Ariovistus have waited securely in his camp and left the initiative to Caesar?'[4]

Now all this is mere quibbling. Rauchenstein lays undue stress on the words *usque ad* (castra). Caesar does not mean that the Germans waited until the Romans were near enough to be able to touch the wagons. When they saw the Romans advancing with the evident intention of forcing on a battle, they were compelled to defend themselves. Being brave, in spite of their superstition, and seeing that they could no longer defer the battle, as their wise women had advised, they determined, as fight they must, to put themselves between the Romans and their helpless women and children, to fight manfully in the open, and not merely to defend themselves but to beat the Romans. Rauchenstein forgets that their wagons were on their flanks and in their rear; and therefore Caesar would not have been obliged to storm a laager.[5]

. . . . . .

According to Rauchenstein, Caesar's account of his operations against the Atuatuci is equally disingenuous. Caesar says that when

[1] *Der Feldzug Cäsars gegen d. Helvetier*, pp. 26–7.
[2] xxxviii. 48–9.
[3] *B. G.*, i, 51, § 2.
[4] Cf. G. Ferrero, *Grandezza e decadenza di Roma*, ii, 28, note (*The Greatness and Decline of Rome*, ii. 24, n. †).
[5] *B. G.*, i, 51, § 2. Cf. p. 653.

his army first encamped before their stronghold, they made frequent sorties (*crebras excursiones*) and had skirmishes (*parvulis proeliis*) with his troops ; but that afterwards, when he had regularly invested the place, they did not venture out any more.[1] Dion Cassius says that they repulsed Caesar's attacks for many days until he had recourse to the construction of regular siege works.[2] Dion's account, says Rauchenstein, is the more credible of the two, because it was only natural that Caesar should try to storm the town before he undertook a regular siege.[3]

Here is a cobbler who flings his last out of window, and must needs set up for a professor of the art of war. The idea that Caesar should have tried to storm out of hand a town strongly situated upon a rocky height and defended, in the only place where it was open to attack, by two high walls, is so delicious that it almost ceases to be absurd. Caligula would not have done such a thing ! And Rauchenstein asks us to believe that Caesar, not content with making one attempt and getting badly beaten, tried again day after day ! Now let us turn to Dion Cassius. Any one who is familiar with the Greek's book can see that here, as usual, he is simply paraphrasing and trying to embellish Caesar's plain narrative. He infers from Caesar's expression, *parvulis proeliis*, that he tried to take the town anyhow ; and he puts in, as a touch of his own, that he was repulsed.

. . . . . .

2. According to Appian[4] and Plutarch,[5] it was not Caesar who defeated the Tigurini, but Labienus ; and Rauchenstein argues that Plutarch's words—οὐκ αὐτὸς ἀλλὰ Λαβιηνός—show that he intended to correct Caesar. Caesar, says Rauchenstein, according to his own account, acted like a fool. His object was to prevent the Helvetii from reaching the country of the Santoni. On his return from Italy he encamped in the neighbourhood of Lyons. The vanguard of the Helvetii was much further south ; for, 20 days previously, it had crossed the Saône about 9 miles north of Lyons ; and the column must in that time have marched a considerable distance in a south-westerly direction. Yet Caesar, according to his own account, now marched northward, destroyed the Tigurini, crossed the Saône, and then made a flank march of at least two days in order to force the Helvetii to turn towards the north. This would have been a strategical absurdity. What really happened was this. While Caesar remained encamped on the right bank of the Rhône in the neighbourhood of Vienne, Labienus attacked and defeated the Tigurini, crossed the Saône, and marched on in pursuit of the Helvetii. Caesar barred the south-western route towards the country of the Santoni ; and the Helvetii, finding themselves outmanœuvred, sent Divico to negotiate.[6]

Now Caesar gave all his lieutenants, and especially Labienus, full

[1] *B. G.*, ii, 30, §§ 1–2.
[2] xxxix, 4, § 2.
[3] *Der Feldzug*, &c., p. 28.
[4] *Celtica*, 1, § 3.
[5] *Caesar*, 18.
[6] *Der Feldzug*, &c., pp. 65–70.

credit for their exploits. Even if he had been minded to rob Labienus of his due, he must have known that every officer who had served under him would detect his lie, and would make the truth known privately if not publicly; in short that he would gain nothing and lose much.

Rauchenstein's argument is based upon erroneous assumptions. First there is no evidence that Caesar encamped near Vienne or at any point on the right bank of the Rhône, below its confluence with the Saône; and on pages 617–9 I show that he encamped, probably on the heights of Sathonay and certainly in the angle formed by the confluence of the Saône and the Rhône. Napoleon conjectures that he posted a detachment on the right bank of the Saône, at or near Lyons, to intercept the road which led into the Province. But it is more than doubtful whether the Helvetii would have taken this road in any case:[1] as Long and Napoleon have shown, the south-western was far more difficult than the north-western route, by which they marched when Caesar was pursuing them; and Napoleon observes that 'at an epoch very near to our own, before the construction of the railways, the public conveyances, to go from Lyons to La Rochelle . . . took the direction to the north-west, to Autun, and thence to Nevers, in the valley of the Loire'.[2] Moreover, during the whole of the 20 days which had elapsed since the head of the Helvetian column gained the right bank of the Saône successive sections of the column were crossing the river; and it is very unlikely that the vanguard would have endangered its own safety by moving away before the whole column got safely across.

I believe that Plutarch and Appian either drew hasty inferences from the fact that Labienus had been left by Caesar on the east of the Saône,[3] or that, like Rauchenstein, they made the mistake of assuming that Caesar was encamped on the west of that river. Blunders far more gross than theirs are to be found in Mr. Froude's *Caesar*.[4] At all events on this point, Dion Cassius,[5] to whom Rauchenstein so often appeals against Caesar, confirms him; and, as Rauchenstein maintains that Dion used other authorities besides Caesar for his narrative of the Gallic war, one would think that, if Caesar falsified this part of his narrative, Dion would have been able and eager to correct him.[6] Moreover, it must be remembered that Labienus had been left with only one legion, whereas the attack on the Tigurini was made with three. Therefore on Rauchenstein's theory, Caesar must have sent two legions from the right to the left

[1] See Long's *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv, 11.
[2] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 61.
[3] *B. G.*, i, 10, § 3.
[4] See *Westminster Review*, Aug., 1892, pp. 174–89.
[5] xxxviii, 32, § 4.
[6] The defeat of the Tigurini is mentioned not only in the epitome of Appian's narrative of the Gallic war, but also in an excerpt from Appian (*Celtica*. 15). In this passage he says that the Helvetii and the Tigurini were two distinct nations, whereas we know that the Tigurini were only one of the four Helvetian tribes; and he says that the attack on the Tigurini took place after and in consequence of the failure of Caesar's negotiations with the Helvetii. These two gross blunders do not dispose one to believe Appian when he contradicts Caesar.

bank of the Saône to co-operate with Labienus. In order to cross the river, they must have made a bridge. Then why did they make another in order to return ? Rauchenstein's theory refutes itself.[1]

3. Rauchenstein regards Caesar's account of the later stages of the battle with the Helvetii[2] as purely fictitious. He says that, according to von Göler and Napoleon, Caesar's auxiliaries probably numbered not less than 30,000 men,[3] while the two legions which were detached with them to defend the Roman baggage must have numbered about 10,000. If Caesar is to be believed, says Rauchenstein, these 40,000 men did not stir hand or foot to help their comrades, the four veteran legions, in their hard-fought struggle. Caesar tells us that the Helvetii, after the repulse of their attack on the four veteran legions, retreated to a hill about a mile off, and there renewed the battle. This second episode, says Rauchenstein, Caesar dismisses in a few words. He does not say that the Helvetii were driven from their position ; and from his own statement that throughout the whole battle not one of the enemy turned his back upon the Romans, we may infer that they were not. It therefore appears that they looked quietly on while Caesar's third line was destroying the Boi and Tulingi, who had taken refuge behind the laager of wagons. As, Rauchenstein continues, Caesar's account of the retreat of the Helvetii to the hill is questionable, it follows that his account of the capture of the laager is incredible. According to that account, the Romans surrounded and stormed the laager. Yet, although surrounded, 130,000 persons managed to escape. No prisoners were made, except two of Orgetorix's children. The Romans were so obliging as to open their ranks, and let all the rest pass through !

Finally, Rauchenstein offers us a narrative of his own in place of Caesar's fiction. (Has the worthy man no sense of humour ?) Caesar's auxiliaries, he tells us, as soon as they saw the attack of the Boi and Tulingi, assumed that the battle was lost, and ran for their lives. Thereupon Caesar retreated to his camp on the hill. The Helvetii returned to the attack, but failed to storm the camp, and accordingly marched for Bibracte. Subsequently the Verbigeni thoughtlessly separated themselves from the main body of the Helvetii ; and Caesar destroyed them. But why did the Helvetii, in spite of the fair measure of success which they had gained, return home? Rauchenstein finds no difficulty in devising an explanation. They had already become sick of wandering in Gaul. They had consumed all their provisions ; and, although they had not been defeated, they had suffered heavy losses in the battle. They were afraid that Caesar would get reinforcements and revenge himself for his failure ; and therefore they decided that their wisest course would be to abandon

[1] See *B. G.*, i, 8, § 1 ; 10, § 3 ; 12, § 2 ; 13, § 1, and cf. F. Fröhlich, *Die Glaubwürdigkeit Caesars*, &c., pp. 21–4. Is it not possible that, as M. Jullian suggests (*Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 207, n. 4), Labienus may have accompanied Caesar or commanded a division under him ?

[2] See *B. G.*, i, 24–6.

[3] Napoleon (*Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 73, n. 1) really says 20,000,—on the evidence of Appian ! 2,000 would be nearer the mark : see p. 42.

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their expedition. Finally Rauchenstein assures us that Caesar's officers and legionaries would not have contradicted his account of the campaign, because they would have been delighted at the cleverness with which he managed, by a few dexterous phrases, to transform a drawn battle into a brilliant victory.[1]

It might be a sufficient answer to Rauchenstein to say that if Caesar had really sustained a severe check at the hands of the Helvetii and had concocted a false account of the battle, the facts must, in spite of his cleverness, have leaked out. Surely Dion Cassius, by whom Rauchenstein sets such store, would not have failed to give us the true version.[2] But I will examine Rauchenstein's arguments. There is no evidence, and it is to the last degree improbable that Caesar's auxiliaries numbered 30,000 men,[3] but that point is quite immaterial. If they and the newly raised legions merely protected the baggage, the reason was that Caesar did not think it wise to expose them in his first battle, or that he felt able to win the battle without their help, or, possibly, that he had reason to fear that the hostile party among the Aedui might attack the baggage.[4] Secondly, Caesar implies, if he does not expressly say, that the Helvetii were driven from the hill. He describes the last stage of the action in a few vivid sentences. Two battles, he says, went on simultaneously, —one between the first two Roman lines and the Helvetii, the other between the third Roman line and the Boi and Tulingi. The Helvetii were forced further and further up the hill: the Boi and Tulingi withdrew to their wagons, from which they were at last driven; and about 130,000 souls in all survived the battle. These 130,000 were not all in the laager, as Rauchenstein absurdly pretends: they included the Helvetii. Otherwise, what became of the Helvetii? The statement of Caesar, to which Rauchenstein refers, that throughout the whole battle not one of the enemy turned his back upon the Romans, interpreted as he perversely chooses to interpret it, would prove too much: it would prove that neither the Helvetii nor the Boi nor the Tulingi ever retreated from the battle-field at all. Obviously Caesar means that, while the battle lasted, the Gauls all fought like men: he does not mean that, when they were at last overpowered, they even then refused to retreat; for he says that they did retreat. He does not say that the Romans surrounded the laager: he merely says that they stormed it; and therefore Rauchenstein's sarcasm falls flat. Nor does he say that no prisoners were taken, except Orgetorix's children. He simply mentions those two, because they were worthy of mention.[5] According to Rauchenstein's estimate, Caesar's force equalled, if it did not outnumber the force of

[1] *Der Feldzug*, &c., pp. 92–101. Cf. G. Ferrero, *Grandezza e decadenza di Roma*, ii, 16, n. 2 (*The Greatness and Decline of Rome*, ii, 14, n. †).

[2] I find that R. Schneider (*Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xiii, 1887, pp. 386–7), in a review of Petsch's *Die hist. Glaubwürdigkeit d. Comm. Cäsars vom gall. Kriege*, 1885–6 (which I have tried in vain to procure), remarks that Petsch has rightly pointed out that the later historians, with various deviations, arrive at the same results as the *Commentaries*, which tends to show that where they differed from Caesar, they misunderstood or perverted his statements.

[3] See p. 42. [4] See p. 628. [5] *B. G.*, i. 24–6.

the Gauls : it was better armed and better disciplined ; and it was commanded by one of the great generals of the world. Is it incredible that, after a hard-fought battle, it should have gained a decisive victory ?

It is hardly necessary to point out the absurdity of Rauchenstein's guess about the Verbigeni. Why should they have separated themselves from the main body of the Helvetii, if they had not intended, as Caesar says, to make a dash for liberty, after the main body had surrendered ? If Caesar destroyed the Verbigeni—and Rauchenstein admits that he did—it is obvious that he pursued the Helvetii. Is it credible that he would have pursued a host which had virtually beaten him ?

Caesar alleges, as his reason for not having pursued the Helvetii at once, that he was obliged to remain three days on the field of battle, in order to bury the dead and to allow his wounded time to recover.[1] Rauchenstein refuses to accept this reason. It was Caesar's custom, he says, to follow up a victory ; and a single legion would have sufficed to bury the dead. He remained on the battle-field although, according to his own statement, he had only enough food for a single day ; and if he had found stores in the deserted Helvetian encampment, he would have said so. Evidently therefore he must have feared that the Helvetii would rally, and, finding themselves unpursued, would march to Bibracte and there lay in fresh stores of provisions.[2]

Now Caesar frankly avows that he suffered heavy loss in the battle : his cavalry were weak and untrustworthy ;[3] and, as Stoffel points out, he was in the country of his allies, the Aedui, and was therefore bound, out of consideration for them, to bury the vast heaps of dead, in order to avoid a pestilence.[4] These appear to me sufficient reasons for his inaction ; and evidently he implies that after a hardly won victory his troops were unfit for a fresh effort. He unquestionably remained master of the field of battle ; and he knew that he could overtake the unwieldy and shattered host whenever he pleased. It is probable that, during his three days' stay on the battle-field, he obtained stores from Bibracte ; and, if he had found stores in the deserted Helvetian encampment, it would have been quite in accordance with his laconic manner to omit all mention of the fact. Anyhow that he did get stores somewhere and somehow needs no demonstration. Finally, the causes which Rauchenstein invents for the return of the Helvetii are totally inadequate.[5]

Colonel Bircher,[6] indeed, asserts that troops who fight as the

[1] *B. G.*, i, 26, § 5.
[2] *Der Feldzug*, &c., pp. 92–4.
[3] *B. G.*, i, 15, § 1 ; 18, § 10 ; 26, § 5.
[4] *Guerre civile*, ii, 452.
[5] Cf. F. Fröhlich, *Die Glaubwürdigkeit Caesars*, &c., p. 38.
[6] *Bibracte*, 1904, p. 27. Signor Ferrero (*Grandezza e decadenza di Roma*, ii. 19, n. 1 [*The Greatness and Decline of Rome*, ii, 15, n. †]) agrees with Bircher :— 'The conditions of peace which Caesar . . . says that he *imposed* upon the Helvetii are such as to belie his whole account of the war. It is altogether unlikely that the Helvetii surrendered because the Lingones . . . refused to grant them supplies. They were clearly in a position to take what was not given them.' Now the standing corn was not yet ripe (*B. G.*, i, 16, § 2) ; and during

Helvetii fought do not run away, especially when they are not pursued. But they do retreat: the colonel himself admits that the Helvetii retreated; and when he rejects Caesar's account of their surrender and substitutes a story of his own about negotiation, I cannot follow him.

4. Caesar says that the Roman ships had no advantage over those of the Veneti, except in speed and in the use of oars.[1] I quote from my translation his account of the battle.[2]—'Brutus, who commanded the fleet, and the tribunes and centurions, each of whom had been entrusted with a single ship, did not quite know what to do, or what tactics to adopt. They had ascertained that it was impossible to injure the enemy's ships by ramming. The turrets were run up; but even then they were overtopped by the foreigners' lofty sterns, so that, from the lower position, it was impossible to throw javelins with effect, while the missiles thrown by the Gauls fell with increased momentum. Our men, however, had a very effective contrivance ready,—namely, hooks, sharpened at the ends and fixed to long poles. . . . By means of these the halyards were seized and pulled taut: the galley rowed hard; and the ropes snapped. When they were cut, the yards of course fell down. . . . When, as we have said, the yards fell down, the Roman ships, two or three at a time, closed round one of the enemy's; and the legionaries clambered aboard with the utmost vigour. Several ships had been captured, when the natives, seeing what was happening and realizing that there was no help for it, hastened to save themselves by flight. And now, just as the ships had been put before the wind, there was suddenly a dead calm, and they could not stir. . . . Our men gave chase and captured the ships one after another,' &c.

M. Le Moyne de la Borderie[3] objects that in order to cut the halyards, the Romans would have had to use hooks fastened to poles of prodigious length; and that so long as the wind lasted, other Venetian ships could easily have come to the rescue of those which were attacked, and rammed Caesar's small galleys. Evidently, he concludes, the account of Dion Cassius is the true one. Dion's account[4] is much longer than Caesar's. The part which is relevant to the present discussion may be summarized as follows:—Brutus came ἐκ τῆς ἔνδοθεν θαλάσσης, that is to say from the Mediterranean, with 'the swift ships'. The Veneti were confident that they would be able to sink these ships τοῖς κοντοῖς,—'with the boat-hooks.' As long as the wind lasted, Brutus dared not attack: in fact he intended to abandon his ships and repel the enemy's onslaught on land. Suddenly, however, the wind dropped. Thereupon Brutus proceeded to attack the Venetian fleet in detail. In some cases he

the few days that elapsed before Caesar overtook the shattered and demoralized host the Lingones could very well prevent them from seizing sufficient grain to enable them to pursue their retreat. Anyhow, unless they were prepared to fight again, they were not in a position to negotiate. Signor Ferrero should leave cavilling to smaller men.

[1] *B. G.*, iii, 13, § 7.

[2] *Caesar's Comm. . . . translated into English*, 1908, pp. 86–8 (*B. G.*, iii, 14–5).

[3] *Hist. de Bretagne*, i, 1896, pp. 74–6.

[4] xxxix, 40–3.

surrounded one of the hostile ships with several of his own : in others he attacked several ships with an equal or even a less number. Some of the Venetian ships were rammed, shattered, and sunk : others were burnt ; and some of the Veneti committed suicide. Finally, the Romans cut the rigging of the Venetian ships 'from a distance' (πόρρωθεν) with hooks fixed to long poles.

Now the reader will have observed that the very statement of Caesar which M. de la Borderie refuses to accept is repeated by Dion ! The Romans, according to both writers, did cut the rigging of the Venetian ships. Is it likely that Brutus, who had sailed from the mouth of the Loire for the very purpose of attacking the Veneti, would have determined, as soon as he sighted them, to abandon his own ships because the wind was still blowing ? Is it conceivable that the Venceti would have been mad enough to believe that they could sink the Roman galleys with boat-hooks ? Is it credible that the light galleys would have been able to ram, shatter, and sink the Venetian ships, which, as Dion, following Caesar, himself admits, were far superior to them both in size and strength ? If M. de la Borderie had known anything about the rigging of ancient [1] or modern ships, he would not have committed himself to the statement that it was impossible for the Romans to reach the Venetian rigging with their grappling-hooks. As Mr. Froude, a practical yachtsman, remarks, 'It was not difficult to do if, as is probable, the halyards were made fast, not to the mast, but to the gunwale' ; [2] and Lieut. K. Foote, R.N., in conversation with me, has endorsed Mr. Froude's statement. When M. de la Borderie asserts that other Venetian ships could have come to the rescue of those which were attacked, he forgets that the Roman ships had the advantage of the enemy in speed, and, as they had oars while the enemy had none, could attack them from whichever side they pleased. It is certain, and M. de la Borderie admits, that Caesar won the battle. What conceivable motive could he have had for telling a lie about the manœuvre by which he gained the victory ? [3]

5. Max Eichheim, who has achieved notoriety by the eccentricity and virulence of his invective, insists in a comparatively lucid interval that Caesar's estimate of the numbers of the Helvetii and their allies is grossly exaggerated. The length of a column numbering 368,000 persons would have been about 99 miles : [4] they could not have found provender for their cattle ; and they could not have quitted their encampment, as Caesar says in *B. G.*, i, 22 that they did, in the short space of three hours. Again, Caesar says that, when the decisive battle was fought, all the Helvetian wagons were parked in one place,—an obvious lie, because, on his estimate of the numbers of the host, the wagons would have numbered 36,000, which could

[1] See C. Torr's *Ancient Ships*, 1894, pp. 78, 81, 94.

[2] *Caesar : a Sketch*, ed. 1886, p. 290.

[3] I am glad to find that my criticism of Dion has been anticipated by J. Melber (*Commentationes Woelfflinianae*, 1891, pp. 291–7), who tears his account of the battle to shreds and shows that it has no independent value.

[4] 161 kilometres.

not have assembled on one spot in less than three days.[1] Rauchenstein, who, in the main, agrees with Eichheim, calculates that, if two wagons had moved abreast, the length of the column would have been 165 kilometres, or about 103 miles. Caesar, he says, could easily have attacked such a column in flank, and broken it up before the enemy could come to the rescue. According to Plutarch, the emigrants numbered 300,000 ; according to Appian, 200,000 ; according to Strabo, about 408,000 ; according to Orosius, 157,000. Rauchenstein concludes that Orosius's estimate is the most credible.[2] He also argues that if the Helvetii had emigrated *en masse*, they must have known that hordes of Germans would promptly occupy their country ; and, as Caesar does not say that they had to reconquer it when they were sent back, he concludes that a large number never emigrated at all.[3]

I admit that there is some force both in Rauchenstein's and in Eichheim's arguments. It is difficult to believe that the Helvetii left their country absolutely deserted. Still, it must be remembered that other ancient writers besides Caesar describe universal migrations ;[4] nor does Caesar's narrative compel us to assume that the Helvetii were the only inhabitants of Helvetia. He may conceivably have left out of account tribes with which they had not coalesced.[5] Moreover, even if the ordinary interpretation of his narrative is correct, it is not certain that the German neighbours of the Helvetii would or could have taken possession of their territory in the few months that elapsed between their departure and their return. If the Helvetii required two years to complete the preparations for their emigration, is it likely that the Germans could have transferred themselves, their women and children, their cattle, and their goods from one country to another in three months ? If Caesar's narrative was incorrect, either he intended to mislead his readers, or he was led astray by false information, or, when he said that the Helvetii were induced to undertake a *national* emigration (*ut de finibus suis cum omnibus suis copiis exirent*) he used the word *omnibus*,[6] as he often did, loosely. It must be remembered that he does not say that the Helvetii did actually emigrate *en masse* ; and I cannot see what motive he could have had for trying to deceive. On the other hand, nothing is more likely than that he should have been misled by the rhetorical or blundering statements of his spies. I have myself worked through many reports embodying the information which had been furnished to intelligence officers in India by spies ; and, on the faith of such reports, erroneous statements were frequently made by

[1] *Die Kämpfe der Helvetier und Sueben gegen C. J. Cäsar*, 1876, p. 31, nn. 13, 20.

[2] Orosius generally follows Caesar's numbers with scrupulous accuracy ; and it is curious that his statement (vi, 7, § 5) of the number of the Helvetii who returned home—110,000—agrees exactly with Caesar's.

[3] *Der Feldzug Cäsars gegen d. Helvetier*, pp. 44–5, 47.

[4] See, for instance, Strabo, ii, 3, § 6. 'Ces émigrations en masse,' says the writer of the article *Helvetii* in *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, ii, 15, 'entraient évidemment dans les habitudes traditionnelles des Gaulois.' The writer refers to Polybius, ii, 17.

[5] Cf. *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, ii, 15.

[6] *B. G.*, i, 2, § 1.

British officers, for example by Sir Charles Napier. We do not accuse them of mendacity because they were misled.

According to Napoleon's calculations,[1] based on the reasoned conjecture that the Helvetii had 8,500 wagons, the length of such a column as Caesar describes would have been 128 kilometres, *when the wagons were moving in single file.* But it was not necessary for the wagons to move in single file, except when they were threading the Pas de l'Écluse.[2] Professor Delbrück,[3] indeed, who admits that several wagons might have moved abreast, nevertheless reminds me that when they met with an obstacle such as a bridge, they must have moved in single file. Obviously this would depend upon the width of the defile ; and after it had been passed the column would resume its usual formation. Besides, a moment's thought will show that the crossing of a bridge would simply have caused delay : it would not have increased the length of the column by one yard more than the length of the bridge. After the Helvetii emerged from the country of the Sequani, they provided for their cattle by plunder :[4] while they were in the country of the Sequani, we must assume that they arranged with that people for a supply. In *B. G.*, i, 21, § 1, Caesar says that they encamped at the foot of a hill. Eichheim, in his comment on the passage, absurdly attributes to Caesar the statement that the Helvetian wagons were all parked there. If he had known anything of military movements, he would have understood that most of the wagons were in front, and that only the fighting men who formed the rearguard, were encamped at the foot of the hill.[5] Moreover, Caesar says nothing about ' three hours ' : he only says that ' late in the day ', or ' when it was broad day ' (*multo die*) he learned that the Helvetii had struck their camp. His narrative of the battle certainly presents a difficulty,—to those who are determined to make difficulties. What he says is that the Helvetian infantry ' with all their wagons ' (*cum omnibus suis carris*[6]) followed their cavalry, and parked their baggage in one spot. But this is not the same thing as saying that all the wagons were parked in one spot. Wagons were of course coming up all through the day ; and doubtless many wagons had not come up when the battle was over.[7] Caesar wrote for sensible readers. They know that thousands of wagons cannot arrive at one spot simultaneously ; and, when the sense is clear, they do not demand rigid precision of statement in every line.

To return to Rauchenstein. For the sake of argument I will accept his figures. He holds that the entire host, after the defeat of the Tigurini, numbered only 100,000 souls. On his own showing, the length of the column would then have been at least 43 kilometres, or about 27 miles. Is he prepared to argue that Caesar could have broken up a column 103 miles long, but could not have broken up

[1] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 59, note.
[2] See Lord Wolseley's *The Soldier's Pocket-Book*, 5th ed., p. 408.
[3] *Gesch. d. Kriegskunst*, i, 1900, p. 442.
[4] *B. G.*, i, 15, § 4.
[5] See Stoffel, *Guerre civile*, ii, 445, and *B. G.*, i, 15, § 3 ; 25, § 6.
[6] *B. G.*, i, 24, § 4.
[7] See Stoffel, *Guerre civile*, ii, 451.

a column 27 miles long ? The truth is, as Napoleon has pointed out,[1] that Caesar could not venture to attack the column at all, because the country through which it was moving was too broken and confined to admit of his attempting any offensive operation ; and because, as Rauchenstein has failed to see, before he could have struck a single blow at the wagon-train, he would have had to reckon with the tens of thousands of fighting men who composed its rearguard. It is idle for Rauchenstein to appeal to Orosius ; for it requires no critical acumen to see that, where Plutarch and Appian and Strabo and Orosius differ so widely, one would not be justified in accepting Orosius's estimate merely because it is the lowest. Rauchenstein's estimate, based upon the absurd assumption that the wagons moved in single file, of the length to which a column composed of 368,000 persons must have extended, is a gross exaggeration. Stoffel, who knows what he is writing about, estimates the length of the column, after the loss of one-fourth of its number by the defeat of the Tigurini, at not less than 30 kilometres, or about 19 miles ; and he accepts Caesar's figures.[2] Veith,[3] who also holds that the length of the column has been exaggerated, remarks that the Helvetii remained in the neighbourhood of Geneva at least six weeks,[4] and that their stock of provisions was therefore reduced by at least one-half (and a corresponding number of wagons rendered superfluous) before they began to move. Even these, he believes, were probably abandoned after the Helvetii were disheartened by the defeat of the Tigurini ; and thenceforward they may have supported themselves by requisitions alone.[5] If so, all the wagons, except such as were necessary to form the laager and convey those who could not walk, would have been left behind. At all events the reasons which Eichheim and Rauchenstein have adduced are not sufficient to prove that Caesar's figures are incorrect.

Caesar tell us that the host which he sent back to Helvetia numbered 110,000.[6] Let us provisionally accept his figures. Assuming that the Tigurini amounted to one-fourth of the entire host, the number of the remainder would have been 276,000. The rate of mortality in a vast multitude travelling under such conditions would, I suppose, have been high ; and we may safely assume that in the two months which elapsed between their departure from Switzerland and the battle at least 2,000 died. The Verbigeni, numbering 6,000, were killed or sold as slaves after the battle.[7] The Boi, who originally numbered 32,000, were allowed to settle in the country of the Aedui.[8] 126,000 remain to be accounted for ;[9] and, if Caesar's figures are correct, this number must have perished in the battle or have dis-

[1] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 63, note.
[2] *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, 1890, p. 36.
[3] *Gesch. d. Feldzüge C. J. Caesars*, 1906, p. 493.
[4] This estimate is apparently based upon *B. G.*, i, 6, § 4 ; 7, § 6 ; and 9.
[5] Cf. *B. G.*, i, 11, §§ 1–5 ; 15, § 4.
[6] *Ib.*, i, 29, § 3.
[7] *Ib.*, 28, § 1.
[8] *Ib.*, 28, § 5 ; 29, § 2.
[9] Caesar himself says (*ib.*, 26, § 5) that about 130,000 survived the battle, which would leave 144,000 to be accounted for. But of course a good many of the Boi perished in the battle.

persed, besides those of the Boi who were slain. This is an enormous number. Stoffel finds no difficulty in believing that 143,000, including old men, women, and children, were killed in the battle.[1] I can hardly share his faith ; and, if Caesar's figures are correct, I can only assume that large numbers must have dispersed on the march before the battle was fought. Professor C. Wachsmuth,[2] however, regards it as suspicious that the original number of the fighting men, according to Caesar's statement, was exactly one-fourth of the whole ; and he concludes that the latter was merely a rough estimate, based upon the ascertained number of the men, whose individual names were recorded.[3] Of course, as the professor observes, Caesar was not himself responsible for the calculations, and if the estimate was too high, his good faith remains unimpaired.

There remains the possibility that some part of the host whose numbers were recorded in the schedule which was found in the Helvetian encampment after the battle had, at the eleventh hour, resolved to remain in Helvetia. At all events, the number of the emigrants must have been very large ; for with all his advantages in generalship, discipline, and superiority of weapons, it was all that Caesar could do to win the battle. I cannot believe that, from the mere desire of enhancing his own glory, he fabricated an exaggerated estimate of their numbers.

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Caesar, says Eichheim,[4] estimates the numbers of the confederate Belgae, whom he encountered in 57 B. C., at 296,000,—a gross exaggeration ; for a wooded and merely cattle-rearing country could not have sustained such an enormous host.

Now it is not true that Caesar offers any estimate of the numbers of the confederates : he merely reports the estimate that was furnished to him by the Remi ; [5] and it is probable that the numbers which actually took the field fell short of those which the confederates had promised to furnish. It is not true that the country of the Belgae was ' merely cattle-rearing ' ; and it is certain that the population of Gaul, considering the condition of the country, was large.[6] Still, I do not deny that there is some ground for suspecting

[1] *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, p. 77.

[2] *Klio*, iii, 1903, pp. 283, 287.

[3] . . . *quibus in tabulis nominatim ratio confecta erat, qui numerus domo exisset eorum qui arma ferre possent, et item separatim ⟨quot⟩ pueri*, &c. *B. G.*, i, 29, § 1. B. A. Müller (*Klio*, ix, 1909, p. 73), relying upon modern statistics, concludes that the percentage of fighting men would have been between 28·4 and 31. Assuming that it was 30, the entire host, as the number of fighting men was 92,000, would have been originally 307,000. I agree with J. Beloch (*Rhein. Mus.*, N. F., liv, 1899, p. 423) that there is not the slightest reason for suspecting the accuracy of the number 92,000.

[4] *Die Kämpfe*, &c., 1866, pp. 71, 72, n. 1 ; 1876, p. 88.

[5] *B. G.*, ii, 4.

[6] See pp. 340–3. Ihne (*Röm. Gesch.*, vi, 414, n. 2) remarks that if the 296,000 Belgae had been in earnest, the light-armed troops whom Caesar sent to the relief of Bibrax (*B. G.*, ii, 7, §§ 1–2) could not have succeeded in their mission. He means of course to imply that the Roman estimate of the Belgic force was

that the numbers of the Bellovaci, the Suessiones, and the Nervii may have been exaggerated; for the contingent of the Bellovaci would have represented a population almost as great as that which now inhabits their country;[1] and, moreover, as Beloch[2] observes, the contingents of the three tribes in question are said to have amounted to more than half of the entire Belgic force, whereas their territories were only about one-fourth of the whole. Allowance must, however, be made for greater fertility; and if the figures are wrong, the Remi were responsible.[3]

. . . . . .

General Lamarque[4] denies that the country of the Nervii, Atuatuci, and Eburones, covered as it was with dense forests, could have supported a population of half a million, which, he argues, is implied by Caesar's statement that the camp of Quintus Cicero was beleaguered by 60,000 men of those tribes;[5] and he thinks it equally incredible that such an army would have fled before Caesar's seven thousand. He also denies[6] that the barren country of Les Landes could have sustained 50,000 warriors,—the host which, according to Caesar,[7] was encountered in the Third Campaign by Crassus.

In the case of half-barbarous tribes, the raising of a host of 60,000 men does not necessarily imply the existence of a population of half a million;[8] and the expression 'covered with forests' is a gross exaggeration. The host which Crassus encountered came from many other places besides Les Landes.[9] Still I have little doubt that the numbers, in both cases, are far in excess of the truth. Caesar must have derived them from the reports of Cicero and of Crassus respectively, and, if they did not guess, they probably got their information from hearsay; for it is not likely that their enemies kept muster-rolls.[10]

very much in excess of the truth. Still, the great size of the Belgic encampment and the elaborate precautions which Caesar took to render his position on the Aisne impregnable, prove that the Belgae were very numerous. How then was Bibrax relieved? The explanation is not difficult. Napoleon points out that it would have been easy for the relieving force to enter the stronghold (which he identifies with Vieux-Laon) on the south, as on this side the Belgae could not have attacked it with any hope of success. The archers and slingers could have effectively replied to the Belgic missiles. The Belgae had no scientific methods of besieging a fortress; and unless they could succeed in driving the garrison from the wall by their missiles, they were helpless. They were undisciplined and impatient to move on against Caesar: their commissariat was ill organized; and therefore they abandoned the attempt to take the town. Or again, if Bibrax is to be identified not with Vieux-Laon but with Beaurieux (see pp. 398–9), to which Napoleon's remarks would not apply, it may be that, as M. Jullian suggests, the relieving force were able under cover of night to penetrate the lines of the careless assailants. A modern historian would have explained these things: Caesar left them to the intelligence of his readers.

[1] *Rhein. Mus.*, 1899, p. 423. [2] *Ib.*

[3] A. Klotz (*Caesarstudien*, p. 101, n. 2) thinks that Caesar reproduced the statements of the Remi in order to impress his readers.

[4] *Spectateur mil.*, iii, 1827, pp. 263–4. [5] *B. G.*, v, 49, §§ 1–2.

[6] *Spectateur mil.*, iii, 1827, p. 267. [7] *B. G.*, iii, 26, § 6.

[8] See *ib.*, i, 29. [9] *Ib.*, iii, 26, § 6; 27.

[10] Col. G. F. R. Henderson (*Stonewall Jackson*, i, 1898, p. 158) says that in the American Civil War 'Patterson reported to his Government that he had been opposed by 3,500 men, exactly ten times Jackson's actual number'.

Commenting on the implied statement of Caesar[1] that nearly 430,000 persons, exclusive of the cavalry who took refuge with the Sugambri, perished in the rout of the Usipetes and Tencteri, Desjardins[2] observes 'toujours la même exagération et la même invraisemblance dans les chiffres des *Commentaires*. A moins que les manuscrits, au lieu de XXXXIII, ne portent par erreur CCCCXXX.'

Perhaps Desjardins would have been wiser if he had confined himself to scepticism, and not attempted conjectural emendation.

. . . . . .

According to a speech[3] which Caesar puts into the mouth of Vercingetorix, 80,000 men, exclusive of the Mandubii, remained in Alesia after the departure of the Gallic cavalry. The great Napoleon, who, if he is not foully calumniated, lied so systematically himself that he was not likely to give Caesar credit for disinterested accuracy, gives professional reasons for rejecting his figures. He says that if Vercingetorix's force had been so strong, he would have sent out 60,000 men along with his cavalry, as the remaining 20,000 would have been able to hold the fortress. The 60,000, he says, could have harassed the besiegers; and the provisions of the garrison would have been virtually multiplied fourfold.[4]

It looks presumptuous to question the opinion of such an authority; but is it certain that the 60,000 would have been able to get out? The Duc d'Aumale remarks that Vercingetorix could not have foreseen that even the cavalry would escape unobserved, although he might reasonably hope that, if they encountered one of the Roman piquets, their speed would enable them to get away. But the Duc d'Aumale himself gives reasons for believing that Caesar exaggerated the forces of his enemy. He finds it hard to believe that Vercingetorix could have collected enough corn to feed 80,000 men, as well as the Mandubii, for nearly two months. He also remarks that, if he had had so large a force, he would have harassed the besieging army far more than he did, and that, after the arrival of the relieving army, he would not have been so foolish as to concentrate the whole of his available force along that small section of the contravallation which crossed the plain, but would have made simultaneous sorties at various points. He concludes that, after the manner of conquerors, Caesar exaggerated the numbers of his enemy.[5]

None of these objections appears to be conclusive. Vercingetorix had plenty of time to collect stores, and abundant resources to draw upon. He did make frequent and furious sallies:[6] but Roman discipline and Roman science kept him at bay; and surely his only chance of breaking the lines was to concentrate his strength. Anyhow Veith[7] has acutely seen that the passage in which Caesar relates how he disposed of the captives after the fall of Alesia[8] confirms his

[1] *B. G.*, iv, 15, §§ 1–3; 16, § 2.
[2] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 652.
[3] *B. G.*, vii, 71, § 3. Cf. 77, § 8.
[4] *Précis des guerres de César*, pp. 109–10.
[5] *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, 2e pér., xv, 1858, pp. 110–7.
[6] Non numquam opera nostra Galli temptare atque eruptionem ex oppido pluribus portis summa vi facere conabantur. *B. G.*, vii, 73, § 1.
[7] *Gesch. d. Feldzüge C. J. Caesars*, p. 498.
[8] *B. G.*, vii, 89, § 5; 90, § 3.

estimate of the numbers of the garrison. He gave every man in his force, which comprised ten legions, besides cavalry, archers, and slingers, one prisoner by way of prize; and from motives of policy he restored 20,000 prisoners to the Aedui and Arverni. As his army could hardly have numbered less than 40,000 men, 60,000 prisoners are thus accounted for; and the garrison had doubtless suffered heavy loss.[1]

6. Ihne [2] argues that Caesar's account of the predatory expedition of the Sugambri in 53 B. C. is a perversion of the truth. 'Caesar,' he says, 'represents that the invitation to the neighbouring peoples to lay waste the land of the Eburones had reached the other side of the Rhine. Thereupon two thousand Sugambri crossed the Rhine in boats and took part in the plundering, and were then informed by an Eburonian prisoner that the Roman camp contained much richer booty; and this it was that caused them to make the attack. This account is highly improbable for the following reasons. If Caesar needed seven days for the raid'—in the direction of the Scheldt—'and the invitation to the neighbours of the Eburones preceded the march of the Romans by one or two days, yet this time is not sufficient to organize and carry out so considerable a campaign from the east of the Rhine to the west of the Meuse. It must be assumed that the Sugambri were already on the left bank of the Rhine when Caesar made his raid into the land of the Eburones. From this it follows that their intention was some other than to plunder the Eburones. Their attack on the camp and on the five cohorts outside the camp, from which no booty was to be expected,[3] has much rather the appearance that it was made in secret understanding with the Eburones than with the view of injuring them. If this was the case, it is a proof that the Germans had been in no way intimidated by Caesar's inroad into their land, in other words that the campaign beyond the Rhine had been without result. Caesar wished to hush this up, and hence the misrepresentation.'

I reply, first, that the Sugambri, who, as Caesar says,[4] were born freebooters, no more needed a considerable time to organize a border raid than did the moss-troopers of the Middle Ages.[5] Secondly, to assume that 2,000 undisciplined horsemen would have deliberately crossed the Rhine with the purpose of attacking a Roman legion entrenched within a fortified camp, is to assume what is both groundless and absurd. Thirdly, if the Sugambri had come to help the Eburones, Caesar would have detailed a force to destroy

[1] It has also been argued that the area of the plateau of Alesia—97 hectares, or about 240 acres—was too small to accommodate 80,000 men; but this objection has been easily disposed of by General Creuly (*Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., viii, 1863, pp. 507–8) and A. de Barthélemy (*Rev. des quest. hist.*, iii, 1867, p. 54). Cf. p. 586, *infra*.

[2] *Röm. Gesch.*, vi, 503, n. 1.

[3] To say nothing of the corn, there were several hundred horses to be taken. See *B. G.*, vi, 36, § 3; 39, § 1.

[4] *Ib.*, 35, § 7.

[5] The rapidity with which the Boers mustered to repel Jameson's raid will be fresh in the recollection of readers.

them. Fourthly, nobody, except Ihne himself, ever suggested that the attack on Cicero's camp was made with 'the view of injuring' the Eburones: it was made with the view of enriching the Sugambri.[1] Fifthly, all the evidence we have goes to prove that the German encroachments were 'emphatically checked by the terror which' Caesar's punishment of the Usipetes and Tencteri inspired.[2] Lastly, if, as Ihne maintains, Caesar had failed to terrorize the Germans and had wished to 'hush up' his failure, surely his wisest course would have been to say nothing.

. . . . . .

How, asks Eichheim, did Caesar learn that an Eburonian captive guided the Sugambrian freebooters to Atuatuca, since not one of the Sugambri fell into his hands, and 'the guide could scarcely have come back to him for a tip.'[3]

There is no proof that none of the Sugambri or of their captives fell into Caesar's hands: but Eichheim's joke is not so bad: and it may be that here, for once, he has hit a nail on the head. Caesar may have assumed that the Sugambri must have been guided to Atuatuca by some one, and if so, surely by a captive; and the little speech[4] which he puts into the mouth of the guide may have been an invention. But if it was, such a trifle does not affect the general trustworthiness of his narrative. Ancient writers were not scrupulous about inventing speeches; but Caesar, as one of his assailants admits,[5] allowed himself far less latitude in this respect than his predecessors.

But I must say a good word for Eichheim before I take leave of him. Unlike Caesar's other assailants, the fellow has a sense of humour; and for this much may be forgiven him. Caesar, he says, 'must have had more hostages than soldiers' (*überhaupt müsste Cäsar mehr Geiseln als Soldaten gehabt haben*).[6] Well, he certainly had a good many, though it was not his habit to carry them about with him; and he could have had no conceivable motive for exaggerating their number.

7. It has often been alleged that Caesar endeavoured to disguise his repulse at Gergovia.[7] I have described this episode in detail on pages 155–8 of this book. It is enough to say here that Caesar, having learned that Vercingetorix had sent a large body of Gauls to fortify the western approach to the heights of Risolles, which were linked by a col to the south-western angle of the plateau of Gergovia, succeeded in making him believe that he intended to attempt an attack on that side, and when the Gallic encampment on the southern slope of Gergovia was practically deserted, sent a column up that slope 'to effect a surprise'. At the same time the Aeduan auxiliary

[1] *B. G.*, vi, 35, §§ 4–5.
[2] Mommsen, *Hist. of Rome*, v, 1894, p. 61 (*Röm. Gesch.*, iii, 1889, p. 268).
[3] *Die Kämpfe*, &c., 1866, p. 145, n. 1.
[4] *B. G.*, vi, 35, § 8.
[5] See p. 213.
[6] *Die Kämpfe*, &c., 1866, p. 113, n. 1.
[7] See Napoleon's *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 281–2; W. C. Compton's *Caesar's Seventh Campaign in Gaul*, pp. 89, 92–5, 97; W. Drumann's *Geschichte Roms*, iii, 349 (312 of the new edition), &c.

infantry were sent up the eastern slope, to create a diversion. The point from which the Roman column started was rather less than 2,000 yards, in a direct line, from the wall of the town; and the position which the Gauls were fortifying was about 5 furlongs from the col. The column ascended the hill; crossed a wall which Vercingetorix had erected along the hill-side about half-way up; and captured three of the Gallic camps. Thereupon Caesar, who was with the 10th legion in reserve, sounded the recall (or retreat ?); but the troops, not hearing the sound of the trumpet and disregarding the orders of their officers, pressed on, in pursuit of the few Gauls who had been left in the camps, right up to the wall, from which, after a fierce struggle, they were driven with heavy loss by the Gauls who had hurried back from Risolles.

Mr. Compton, referring to the last sentence of *B. G.*, vii, 43, which, in his edition, runs: *ipse, maiorem Galliae motum exspectans, ne ab omnibus civitatibus circumsisteretur, consilia inibat, quemadmodum a Gergovia discederet ac rursus omnem exercitum contraheret, ne profectio nata a timore defectionis similis fugae videretur*, insists that 'to make his failure appear part of a preconcerted plan, he [Caesar] draws a fine distinction between *profectio* and *fuga*,' &c. Mr. Compton would not have made this charge if he had adopted the true reading—(ne profectio nata a timore defectionis similis)*que* (fugae videretur); for in that case his remarks would have lost any force that they may have had. Is there the least sign of disingenuousness in this translation :—'Anticipating that the insurrection in Gaul would spread, and desiring to avoid being surrounded by all the tribes, he began to think out a plan for withdrawing from the neighbourhood of Gergovia and once more concentrating the whole army in such a way that his departure might not be attributed to fear of a general defection and resemble a flight ?' Mr. Compton ought to have remembered that Caesar uses a similar phrase in four other passages with reference to the Belgae, the Aremorican tribes, and Labienus.[1]

At the beginning of chapter 47, Caesar, having described the capture of the three camps, writes, *consecutus id quod animo proposuerat, Caesar receptui cani iussit.* Whereupon Mr. Compton says, 'it cannot be seriously believed that Caesar never intended to do more than capture three empty encampments . . . is it to be credited that the retreat was sounded before Caesar saw the hopelessness of his undertaking ? If the signal was really given at this juncture, it must have been because he already knew that the alarm would be given and his attempt frustrated.' This criticism is substantially identical with that of Napoleon [2] and Drumann,[3] both of whom have been answered by Long.[4] If, he says, Caesar's 'design was only to surprise the camps . . . he knew better than his critic whether he gained any advantage by doing so'. He admits, however, in another

[1] *B. G.*, ii, 11, § 1; v, 47, § 4; 53, § 7; vi, 7, § 8.
[2] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 281–2.
[3] *Gesch. Roms*, iii, 349.
[4] *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv, 319–21.

passage,[1] that 'Caesar's ultimate object was to take the place'. 'It seems probable,' he suggests, 'that he had a further design . . . to plant his troops on the high ground immediately west of Gergovia, and the first thing necessary was to disperse the enemy who were below the walls on the south side of the city. . . . When Caesar had got possession of the site of the Gallic camps, he was very near to the ridge at the west end of Gergovia, and there was, as far as we can judge, a possibility that he might have seized this place, and kept it against any attack.'[2] Not, surely, unless he pushed on without delay; for, as he himself says, the difficulty presented by the unfavourable nature of the ground could only be overcome by speed, and it was certain that the Gauls would hurry back to seize the col: not, certainly, if, as Long says, he gave the signal for the legions who had occupied the camps *to return*, and thus withdrew them to a considerable distance from the ridge.

Let us examine Caesar's narrative dispassionately, and provisionally accept his statements. (*a*) As he sent the Aedui to climb the mountain by a different path on the right, in order to effect a diversion, it seems clear that he intended to do something more than capture the three camps: if that had been his only object, the services of the Aedui would not have been required. We may perhaps conclude that he hoped either to take the town by a *coup de main*, or to plant his troops on the col, and thus to cut off the Gauls from the town. The only possible alternative seems to be that he knew that it would be impossible to seize either the town or the col before the Gauls came to the rescue, and merely intended to engage Vercingetorix, while the Aedui distracted his attention, on the upper hill-side. (*b*) As he instructed his officers beforehand not to let the men advance too far from over-eagerness for fighting or love of plunder, it is clear that he did not wish them to advance, at least in the first instance, as far as the town or the col: doubtless he intended that, as soon as they had captured the encampment, they should push on at once if there were then reason to believe that they were likely to succeed. (*c*) As he gave the signal for recall when the troops had only captured the three camps, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that he saw that it would be impossible to capture the town by a *coup de main* or to seize the col before the Gauls returned thither; for surely the only chance of gaining either of these objects would have been to push on with all possible speed.[3] But on the other hand, by the capture of the three camps he had gained a solid advantage, if only he could follow it up: it would perhaps have been impossible for the Gauls to dislodge him from this position; it is possible that, as Long maintains, he intended, when he sounded the recall, to form his men again in order; and, if he had then thought it advisable to advance higher up the slope, it would be rash to deny that he might have worsted Vercingetorix in a fight under the wall of the town.

[1] *Caesar*, p. 371. [2] See pp. 156–7 of my narrative.

[3] Unless the Gauls in the town kept a very bad look out, they must have sent warning to their comrades the moment they saw the legions ascending the hill.

The truth is that everything turns upon the meaning of the words *consecutus id quod animo proposuerat* and *receptui cani iussit*. The obvious meaning of the former expression is 'having achieved his purpose': the latter may either mean 'ordered a retreat to be sounded' or 'ordered a recall to be sounded'.[1] Now, as I have already shown, it is certain that Caesar had not achieved the whole of his purpose; for the Aedui were employed for something more important than the capture of the three camps. The question, then, is whether, at the time when he *receptui cani iussit*, he had, as Long suggests, so far succeeded as to have achieved the first step towards the accomplishment of his real object, gained a *point d'appui* for further operations. If so, *receptui cani iussit* means 'ordered a recall to be sounded', Caesar's object being to re-form the legionaries, who had scattered over the camps. That he should have expected any one to believe that he had accomplished the whole of his purpose when he had only captured three half-empty camps is hardly admissible. But if he did already 'see the hopelessness of his undertaking', we can only suppose that he used the vague expression *consecutus id quod animo proposuerat* in the hope that his readers, like Long, might credit him with having intended to follow up his trivial success. It may, however, be said that he had in some measure achieved his purpose; for it was probably better to try and fail than to sneak away from Gergovia without trying at all. In spite of their heavy loss the men did not lose heart: when Vercingetorix on the following day declined to come down and fight, they were doubtless encouraged; and Caesar knew how to fortify their self-respect.[2] But, honest or not, his narrative is certainly unsatisfactory; and it is a pity that he did not think fit to say exactly what he intended to do.

Mr. Compton goes on to assert, or at least imply, that the legions were only 100 yards from Caesar's trumpeter at the moment when he sounded the recall. 'If,' he says, 'the advanced part of the army failed to hear the trumpet call from so short a distance, they must have been out of sight in the hollow, not beyond it. Either "intercedebat" is not accurate, or the signal was not actually sounded as stated.' Apparently Mr. Compton forgets that, whether the troops were 'out of sight in the hollow' or 'beyond it', they were on the further side of the wall which bounded the Gallic camps on the south, and, according to his own map, von Kampen's, and Napoleon's, at least 400 yards from Caesar's legion.

Finally, Mr. Compton insinuates that Caesar deliberately understated his losses. 'The number of officers killed,' he says, '(one out of every four) would be quite out of proportion to the whole loss

[1] See Mr. C. E. Moberly's note (*Caesar*, pp. 321–2); *Bell. Alex.*, 47, § 1; *Bell. Afr.*, 40, § 5; and Livy, xxx, 34, § 11. It has been asserted that the words mean 'ordered a *halt* to be sounded'; but this interpretation is inconsistent with the meaning of *receptus*. See *B. C.*, iii, 45, §§ 4–5; 46, §§ 1–4.

[2] See Professor Spenser Wilkinson's remarks in the *Morning Post*, Jan. 7, 1904, p. 2, col. 2.

given below at 700.' But in the first place it is incredible that Caesar, having stated the losses of his officers truly, should then, by a pitiful half-lie, have minimized the casualties among the rank and file; and secondly, as every student of military history knows, the loss of officers in a hard-fought battle is often out of all proportion to the loss of privates.[1]

8. Caesar says that, before the blockade of Alesia, he raised cavalry from the German tribes 'which he had reduced to submission in former years'.[2] Numerous critics have insisted that this is an intentional exaggeration; for, they say, Caesar tells us himself in another passage[3] that of all the Transrhenane peoples the Ubii alone had submitted to him. But the critics forget that in a subsequent chapter[4] Caesar states that, when he was marching to punish the Sugambri, several tribes made their submission.

9. In a long-winded and carping dissertation,[5] the tediousness of which is only relieved by one passage in which, Phormio-like, he takes Caesar to task for bad generalship, Otto Sumpff accuses him of having treated the services of his *legati*, in the *Commentaries*, in a manner equally ungenerous and unjust. The only generals, he says, whom Caesar does not blame are the two who died during the war,[6] young Crassus and Cotta. The former was no longer to be feared as a rival: the latter was praised simply in order to heighten the discredit which Caesar fastened upon his unfortunate colleague, Sabinus.[7]

Sumpff's inaccuracy is astounding. Two of the lieutenants and two only[8] are blamed; and one of the two is let off with a reproof so gentle that it can hardly be called blame. For while the facts show that Cicero wholly failed in his duty at Atuatuca, Caesar merely tells him that he ought not to have let any troops leave the camp, and does his best to exonerate him by throwing the larger share of the blame upon fortune.[9] Sabinus is certainly blamed for his conduct at Atuatuca; but no lieutenant who was responsible for a great disaster was ever less harshly spoken of by his chief. Caesar's actual comment upon his behaviour limits itself to this,—that he was wanting in foresight; that he lost his head and showed nervous trepidation in the action; and that the disaster was caused by his rashness.[10] The bare recital of the facts was his sufficient condemnation; and in Caesar's language there is not a trace of resentment. It must

[1] Mr. Compton ought to have remembered that in the battle of Pharsalia Caesar lost not more than 200 privates and yet about 30 centurions, and that he is careful to emphasize the disproportion. *B. C.*, iii. 99, § 1.

[2] *B. G.*, vii, 65, § 4. [3] *Ib.*, iv, 16, § 5. [4] *Ib.*, 18, § 2.

[5] *Caesars Beurteilung seiner Offiziere in den Commentarien vom gallischen Kriege*, zweiter Teil, 1893. I have not been able to obtain the first part, which I do not regret.

[6] Die zwei Offiziere ohne Tadel sind zwei Tote, &c. *Op. cit.*, p. 33.

[7] *Ib.*

[8] Or three, if it was blaming Galba to say that he had not made sufficient provision for his commissariat, because, as the tribes of the Valais had surrendered and given hostages, he did not expect that they would fight. *B. G.*, iii. 3, § 1.

[9] *Ib.*, vi, 42, §§ 1–2. [10] *Ib.*, v, 33, § 1; 52, § 6.

be remembered, moreover, that when Caesar was describing Sabinus's earlier campaign in Normandy, he was careful to imply his approval of the cautious tactics which he had adopted,[1] and thereby to supply an antidote, as it were, to any prejudiced judgement which might arise in the mind of the reader. If Caesar deviated from the line of strict impartiality in narrating the actions of his lieutenants, it was on the side of lenity. But of all those who served under him, the one to whom the greatest compliment is paid is Labienus. Even Georg Mezger, one of the sanest critics of the *Commentaries*, cannot forgive Caesar for the 'cold and businesslike' tone of the narrative of Labienus's campaign against the Parisii.[2] If by 'cold' Mezger means restrained, I accept the epithet. Caesar never suffers his enthusiasm to escape him; but it communicates its force to us, if our minds are attuned to his. Whenever he mentions Labienus, he makes us feel that Labienus stood in a class by himself,—the greatest of his lieutenants and one of the great marshals of history. But it is precisely in his narrative of this campaign that he impresses the features of the man's character most deeply upon the imagination. In four terse sentences he puts before us the difficulties, all but overwhelming, by which Labienus was beset. And then he says, 'With these formidable difficulties suddenly confronting him, he saw that he must look for aid to the force of his own character' (*tantis subito difficultatibus obiectis, ab animi virtute auxilium petendum videbat*).[3] We are made to feel that the character will be equal to the strain; and the next three chapters show us that it was. Could any finer compliment be desired by a soldier from his chief,—the more telling because it is conveyed not by praise but by suggestion?[4]

VII

The protagonist in the destructive criticism of the *Commentaries* was General Warnery. For the most part his work may safely be ignored; for, as Long says,[5] 'the foundation of nearly all his comment is a misunderstanding of the text.' He was hardly capable of construing easy Latin. But there were moments when he could discern the obvious. He denies that 120 towers could have been required for the defence of Cicero's camp when it was beleaguered by the Nervii and their allies;[6] and I believe that this objection is valid.

[1] *B. G.*, iii, 17, § 7.

[2] *Ueber d. Abfassungszeit von Cäsar's Comm. über d. gall. Krieg*, 1874–5, p. 18.

[3] *B. G.*, vii, 59, § 6.

[4] Read also what Caesar says of his great enemy after the fall of Avaricum: 'And so, while a reverse weakens the authority of commanders in general, his prestige, on the contrary, in consequence of the disaster, waxed daily greater' (*itaque ut reliquorum imperatorum res adversae auctoritatem minuunt, sic huius ex contrario dignitas incommodo accepto in dies augebatur* [vii, 30, § 3]). Yet Professor Tyrrell (*The Correspondence of Cicero*, vol. iv, p. xlvii) finds it 'amazing that he seems to have completely failed to recognize the nobleness of Vercingetorix'. Who, then, enabled the professor to recognize it?

[5] *Caesar*, p. xiv.

[6] *Mélanges de remarques, surtout sur César*, 1782, pp. 112–3.

Assuming that the towers were 80 feet apart, as at Alesia,[1] the perimeter of the camp, exclusive of the space required by the towers themselves, would have been 119 × 80, or 9,480 feet; and allowing for the space occupied by the towers, it could not have been less than two miles. The camp then would have covered an area of 160 acres, which is much too large for a single legion. But I see no reason to question Caesar's good faith. To exaggerate the number of the towers which the legionaries erected could hardly have enhanced the glory of the defence. I suspect then that the error, if there is one, is due to a copyist or to Cicero.[2]

VIII

A writer who undertakes to measure the credibility of the *Gallic War* is bound to ask himself whether the *Civil War* does not throw light upon his subject. Now German critics, followed respectfully by one or two in this country, have for some years been busy picking holes in Caesar's later work.

1. In *B. C.*, i, 6, §§ 7–8, Caesar says that, in 49 B. C., the newly appointed provincial governors, after performing the usual religious ceremonies in the Capitol, left Rome, wearing the dress of a military commander, although the legal form of giving them the power to command troops had been omitted; and that, contrary to all precedent, the consuls left the city although, being without this power, they were really only private individuals (*neque exspectant* [*quod superioribus annis acciderat,*] *ut de eorum imperio ad populum feratur, paludatique votis nuncupatis exeunt. Consules* [, *quod ante id tempus accidit numquam,*] *ex urbe proficiscuntur, lictoresque habent in urbe et Capitolio privati contra omnia vetustatis exempla*). I follow the reading of the MSS.; but the words enclosed in square brackets are rejected by Nipperdey[3] as spurious. Mr. Peskett,[4] following a conjecture of Davies, but omitting to say that it is a conjecture, prints *quod . . . numquam* in the first sentence, immediately after *exeunt*; and at the same time he only half follows Davies, for Davies, without any authority changed *exeunt* into the subjunctive, *exeant*. Mr. Peskett says that the statement *quod ante id tempus accidit numquam* 'is so demonstrably and even ludicrously untrue that Voss, Nipperdey and others would eject the words altogether. But Caesar . . . no doubt relied on his readers having short memories, and I do not see why he should be less likely to make a false statement, if

[1] If, as A. Klotz argues (see p. 810, n. 5, *infra*), *passus* ought to be substituted in *B. G.*, vii, 81, § 5, for *pedes*, the towers at Alesia were 400 feet apart.

[2] M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 385, n. 4) accepts the number *CXX*, remarking that the towers were 'sans doute très rapprochées et réunies par des ponts' (cf. *B. G.*, viii, 9, §§ 3–4). But M. Jullian supposes (*op. cit.*, p. 386, n. 1) that the perimeter of the camp was 1,730 metres. The interval between any two towers, then, would have been only 14 metres, or about 46 feet, *minus* the breadth of the tower. Where did the men who stood on the rampart (*B. G.*, v, 39, § 3; 43, § 4) find room?

[3] *Caesar*, pp. 132–3. Meusel puts *quod . . . numquam* after *proficiscuntur*.

[4] *B. C.*, i, ed. A. G. Peskett, 1890, p. 60.

it suited his purpose to do so, than a modern Christian statesman.' Nor do I; but I find it difficult to believe that a marvellously adroit and worldly-wise statesman would have made a statement which was 'ludicrously untrue'. 'Before the time of Sulla,' continues Mr. Peskett, 'it had been the regular thing for the consuls to leave the city during their term of office, and although in 81 the *lex Cornelia de provinciis* enacted that they should not leave it till the expiration of their year, yet between that date and 49 there had been five or six instances of the rule being contravened. Caesar, however, for his own purposes chooses to ignore these.' To which Dr. J. S. Reid appends this little note:[1]—'It was the going in and out of the city and yet retaining the *imperium* which Caesar declared unparalleled. He would never have said that breaking a usage which had only existed since Sulla was *contra omnid vetustatis exempla*. By this recrossing of the *pomerium*, after leaving it in military array, they became *privati*.'

Has not Mr. Peskett discovered a mare's nest? The text of the *Civil War* is, as he himself remarks,[2] in many places corrupt. If the words *quod ante id tempus accidit numquam* were not interpolated, and if they were written either before or after *ex urbe proficiscuntur*, Caesar was evidently thinking of Sulla's enactment, and either forgot or ignored the exceptional cases in which the Senate had disregarded it. This, I freely admit, was not what an impartial historian would have done.[3] If, on the other hand, *quod . . . numquam* is arbitrarily inserted in the preceding sentence, after *exeunt*, Caesar is made to write like a madman, unless the words are taken as referring to his charge that the magistrates had not had the *imperium* conferred upon them, or unless, as B. Kübler conjectures,[4] Caesar wrote *non nuncupatis*; and in either of these cases the other charge against him disappears. He had a right to say that, by going in and out of the city without having had the *imperium* conferred upon them, or without the observance of the usual religious rites, the consuls were acting contrary to all precedent.[5]

2. O. E. Schmidt[6] accuses Caesar of having distorted the sequence of the events which he narrates in *B. C.*, i, 8–11, in order to make it appear that he did not resort to force until Pompey had made it

[1] *B. C.*, i, ed. A. G. Peskett, p. 60. [2] *Ib.*, p. 47.

[3] Meusel in his edition of the *Civil War* (p. 23, note) points out that consuls had only been permitted [or enjoined] by the Senate to leave the city in exceptional circumstances. See Cicero, *Fam.*, viii, 10, § 2.

[4] *Philologus*, lv, 1896, pp. 157–8. Oudendorp, as Kübler remarks, had anticipated this conjecture. Kübler quotes a parallel passage from Cicero, *Phil.*, v, 9, § 24,—*Post autem, neque sacrificiis solennibus factis, neque votis nuncupatis, non profectus est, sed profugit paludatus.* Caesar's complaint would have lacked point, if he had said that the magistrates *had* fulfilled their religious obligations.

[5] See Nipperdey, pp. 131–4. Kübler, in his edition of the *Civil War* (p. xvi), abandons the passage in despair as 'miserably corrupt'. Mommsen, he says, has communicated to him the following conjecture, which perhaps substantially represents what Caesar wrote:—*Consules, quod ante id tempus accidit numquam, antequam ex urbe proficiscuntur, lictores habent in urbe et Capitolio paludatos, contra omnia vetustatis exempla.*

[6] *Rhein. Mus.*, N. F., xlvii, 1892, p. 263, n. 2.

evident that he would not consent to any reasonable accommodation. In chapter 10 we read that Caesar's envoy, Roscius, delivered his ultimatum to Pompey and the consuls, and brought back Pompey's answer to Caesar, who was at Ariminum. In chapter 11 Caesar states his objections to Pompey's proposed terms, and goes on to say that he sent Mark Antony to occupy Arretium, and three cohorts to occupy Pisaurum, Fanum, and Ancona respectively. Now Pompey's letter did not reach Caesar before January 29, 49 B. C.; and we know from letters of Cicero [1] that the news of the capture of Arretium, Pisaurum, Fanum, and Ancona had reached Rome on or before January 18. The facts are certain. Either Caesar made a mistake from haste or lapse of memory, as Stoffel assumes,[2] or he lied; if you like, told 'a monstrous lie' (*ungeheuerliche Lüge*), as Schmidt puts it. Schmidt [3] points out, in reply to Stoffel, that Caesar mentions Ariminum three times; [4] and he insists that no one who does not wilfully close his eyes can be blind to the elaborate art with which he told his story. Those who hold with Stoffel that he would have amended this portion of his work if he had had time to revise it, might argue that his case was too strong in itself to require embellishment. But it may be that anxiety to exhibit his own conduct in the most favourable light led him to represent the occupation of Arretium and the other towns as the consequence of Pompey's stubbornness, whereas it was really a justifiable measure of precaution.

3. Caesar says that when he was at Brundisium he was greatly astonished that a certain Magius, whom he had sent to Pompey with overtures for peace, was not sent back to him; that he accordingly sent Caninius Rebilus to Scribonius Libo on a similar errand; but that Libo sent back word that Pompey could not entertain any proposals for peace in the absence of the consuls.[5] But a letter of Caesar's to Cicero is extant, in which he says, 'I reached Brundisium on the 9th of March. Pompey is at Brundisium. He has sent N. Magius to me to treat of peace. I have replied as I thought fit. . . . As soon as I see a chance of being able to come to a settlement, I will let you know at once.' [6] F. Eyssenhardt regards this letter as a proof that, in the *Civil War*, Caesar told a deliberate falsehood with the intention of persuading his readers that he had been honestly anxious to avoid bloodshed, but that his efforts had been frustrated by the obstinacy of Pompey.[7]

Long has written a note on this question, which is worth considering. 'Caesar,' he says, 'arrived before Brundisium on the 9th of March, and Pompeius then sent Magius to him. Caesar, as he says in the letter, returned an answer to Pompeius by Magius. Now when Caesar (*B. C.*, i, 24) let Magius go and gave him a message to Pompeius, he was on his march to Brundisium, and, as far as we are told,

[1] *Att.*, vii, 14, § 1; ix. 10, § 4; *Fam.*, xvi, 12, § 2.
[2] *Guerre civile*, i, 213.
[3] *Der Briefwechsel des M. T. Cicero*, 1893, p. 382.
[4] *B. C.*, i, 10, § 3; 11, §§ 1, 4.
[5] *Ib.*, i, 26, §§ 2–6.
[6] Cicero, *Att.*, ix, 13 A, § 1.
[7] *Neue Jahrb. f. Philologie*, &c., lxxxv, 1862, pp. 763–4.

he received no answer until he had pitched his camp before Brundisium, when Magius came with the message to which C. alludes in his letter. C. gave his answer to this message, but he had no reply. This may be the true explanation, and there is no contradiction.' [1]

Schmidt, who does not in this case charge Caesar with misrepresentation, says 'A few days after Caesar's arrival at Brundisium, about March 12, Pompey sent Magius to Caesar, plainly only to gain time for his preparation for sailing. . . . Probably Caesar required a personal interview, but his opponent was too proud to grant it.' [2]

I am prepared to admit that Caesar's narrative of the civil war may be in certain respects disingenuous. If it is, we are justified in saying that he did not love truth with entire devotion,—which I, for one, have never for a moment supposed that he did ; but we are not justified in throwing doubt upon the honesty of his narrative of the Gallic war, unless it can be shown that he had an adequate motive for misrepresentation. Furthermore, I believe that any competent critic who reads the *Civil War* rapidly through—for it is impossible to judge it fairly piecemeal—will form a high opinion not only of the magnanimity, but also of the general trustworthiness of the writer.

IX

There is one fact in the history of Caesarian criticism which appears to me not without significance. So far as I am aware, no great writer, no great historian, no great statesman or general has ever thrown serious discredit upon the *Commentaries*. It is one thing to say that Caesar exaggerated the numbers of his enemies, that his narrative was not so impartial as that of a disinterested historian, and that he may have concealed facts which he thought it imprudent to disclose : it is quite another thing to charge him with a systematic mendacity that would deprive his memoirs of all historic value. To do this has been reserved for the Ihnes, the Eichheims, and the Rauchensteins : the Montaignes, the Mommsens, the Napoleons are satisfied of Caesar's veracity.

But after all, if we may believe—with the necessary reservation on occasional points of detail which we must make, in a greater or less degree, in reading every historian—the particular statements of definite fact which he makes,[3] as distinguished from his statements of motives and from the general tendency of his narrative, Caesar's standard of literary ethics is, for the present discussion, a matter of indifference. If any one believes that he made a clumsy effort to delude us into the belief that he was reluctant to conquer Gaul, we are not deluded ; and, whatever we may think of his sincerity, the

[1] *Decline of the Roman Republic*, v, 33, n. 2.

[2] *Rhein. Mus.*, N. F., xlvii, 1892, p. 267. Cf. Schmidt's *Der Briefwechsel des M. T. Cicero*, p. 152, where, however, he remarks that *B. C.*, i. 26 'contains at least a gross inaccuracy'. I would ask him to read Long's note.

[3] M. Jullian, in a paragraph which is well worth reading (*Rev. des études anc.*, x, 1908, p. 355), has called attention to various incidents in the recent French campaign in Morocco analogous to some recorded by Caesar the truth of which has been gainsaid.

cause of history does not suffer. If he meant to suggest what was false, he did it so clumsily that, even if he succeeded in deceiving his contemporaries, he has utterly failed, so they tell us, to deceive his modern critics. If, without saying what was untrue, he suppressed what was true, the suppression could hardly have been of such a kind as to affect our estimate of his conduct; for he said quite enough to shock modern humanitarians and modern professors of political morality; and he said it without a blush.

But the reader must not run away with the idea that I am so simple as to regard the *Commentaries* as absolutely true. No history is absolutely true; and Caesar assuredly made mistakes. He is often laconic to a fault: he often writes with a looseness of expression which was natural in a busy man who did not write for cavillers, who made large demands upon the intelligence of his readers, and who, moreover, had not the fear of modern critics before his mind: he was sometimes either uncritical or careless in reproducing the statements of his lieutenants: writing as a politician, not as a historian, he may have thought it discreet to withhold valuable and interesting information: he doubtless exaggerated, consciously or unconsciously, the numbers of his enemies and the losses which he or his lieutenants had inflicted upon them: he may have glossed over a mistake or two; he may have concocted a partial narrative of the one defeat which he himself sustained; and I am willing to believe that his memoirs leave upon the mind an impression of his prowess, if not of his character, more favourable than would have been produced by the narrative of an impartial and well-informed historian. I am also willing to believe that, if he had had a solid political object to gain, he would have had recourse, as we are told that Bismarck had recourse, to brazen mendacity. Mendacity is a weapon which, in this wicked world, no statesman can afford to despise. I do not claim for Caesar that he had the passion for truth that inspired Mr. Rawson Gardiner. Even Mr. Baring Gould would hardly maintain that if Caesar could have armed himself for his duel with Pompey by garbling the history of the Gallic war, he would have resisted the temptation. Only the temptation was not there. On the whole, he could afford to tell the truth. He did full justice to his lieutenants: he wrote generously of his enemies; and I see no reason for believing that he was ashamed of anything that he had done. But, as it is quite certain that my criticism is imperfect, I will quote the words with which a large-minded scholar, a man of arms, of affairs, and of the world, concludes a brief discussion of the same subject. 'Nous n'avons cherché,' says the Duc d'Aumale, 'à établir qu'une chose, c'est que, sans être nullement détracteur de César, en restant admirateur déclaré, non seulement de ses grandes actions, mais de la façon dont il les raconte, il était permis de soumettre à l'analyse certains passages de ses *Commentaires* et de discuter quelques-unes de ses assertions, alors qu'il avait un intérêt évident à dissimuler ou à exagérer la vérité; mais nous ne croyons pas que cette faculté puisse s'étendre jusqu'à changer le caractère de l'interprétation rigoureuse du texte dans tout ce qui regarde les descriptions

de lieux, d'ouvrages, de mouvemens.'[1] 'On ne peut contester,' affirms the same critic, 'que ses récits respirent la sincérité.'[2]

Finally Montaigne, in a note written on the margin of his copy of the *Commentaries*, calls the author 'le plus net, le plus disert, et le plus sincère historien qui fut jamais.'[3] Perhaps we shall hit the exact truth if we add the comment of the Duc d'Aumale—'le plus sincère de ceux qui ont écrit leur propre histoire.'[4]

NOTE.—The foregoing essay has dealt simply with the credibility of Caesar's *narrative*. The credibility of some of his statements about Druidism and the status of the Gallic *plebs*, in regard to which it has been alleged that he erred from defective information, will be dealt with in subsequent articles. See pp. 523–41.

[1] *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, 2e pér., xv. 1858, p. 121.
[2] *Ib.*, p. 119. [3] *Ib.*, p. 118. [4] *Ib.*

SECTION II.—THE PEOPLE

THE ETHNOLOGY OF GAUL

I

INTRODUCTION

'GAUL, taken as a whole, is divided into three parts, one of which is inhabited by the Belgae, another by the Aquitani, and the third by a people who call themselves Celts, and whom we call Gauls. These peoples differ from one another in language, institutions, and laws. The Gauls are separated from the Aquitani by the Garonne, from the Belgae by the Marne and the Seine.' With these words Caesar begins his narrative of the Gallic war; and every schoolboy, not only in Macaulay's but in a literal sense, is familiar with them. But Caesar was not an ethnologist. It was not his business to ask himself or to inform his readers whether the Belgae, the Celtae, and the Aquitani were homogeneous groups, or whether each group was an aggregate or a mixture of different races. We all know that the populations of England and Scotland, of Ireland and Wales, are each composed of various races, not one of which has remained pure; but for the purposes of daily life we speak of Englishmen and Scotchmen and Irish and Welsh.

Nevertheless, the problems which Caesar had no call to solve, and indeed no means of solving, are full of interest; and a modern historian of the conquest of Gaul is bound to grapple with them.

At the very outset of our inquiry we are confronted by a difficulty. Caesar tells us that the Gauls—and by the Gauls he means the Belgae and the Celtae—were big men.[1] Every other ancient writer who describes the physical features of the Gauls says the same; and some add that they had fair hair and blue eyes. But when we travel in France, we find that tall fair-haired men, though not uncommon in the north and north-east, are everywhere in a minority; and that, in certain districts, nearly every one is short and dark. Anthropologists assure us that the contrast between the physical features which we see and those of which we read cannot be ascribed, except in a limited sense, to the influence of climate or of physical environment.[2] History tells us that, since Caesar's time, the majority of

[1] *B. G.*, ii, 30, § 4.

[2] M. Topinard expresses the orthodox opinion when he says that, generally speaking, 'les grandes tailles sont la conséquence d'une hérédité de race, qui peut être légèrement modifiée par les milieux.' Stature is, as M. Mondière has shown, undoubtedly influenced to some extent by social conditions: the

the invaders and immigrants who have settled in those parts of France which were inhabited by the Belgae and the Celtae have belonged to the Teutonic race, of which the prevailing type was, like that of the Gauls of history, tall and fair. The conclusion is irresistible. Besides the Gallic warriors, who seemed so tall to the sturdy little legionaries, and whose red hair and fair skins attracted the attention of travellers who belonged to a swarthier stock, there must have been a short dark people, who passed comparatively unnoticed; and a third type had doubtless already developed itself from intermarriage between the two. These main conclusions, as we shall presently see, history, archaeology, and anthropology alike confirm.

Nevertheless, it is certain that, in Caesar's time, the tall fair men were more numerous in proportion to the whole population than they are at present. No modern invader could possibly describe the population of France as he and other ancient writers described the population of Gaul. We should expect, then, to find not only that the tall fair inhabitants were proportionally more numerous than they are now, but that, instead of being scattered among people of different types, they were, so to speak, grouped in masses, so as to leave a sharper impression upon the mind; and it may perhaps be inferred that the people of whom Caesar took special note, and whose physical features he described, were those with whom he was chiefly thrown in contact, that is to say the warrior class. On the other hand, it is not necessary to suppose that the armies which he encountered were composed exclusively, or even principally, of tall fair men; for the experience of anthropologists has shown that, when untrained observers enter a strange country, they take special note of the individuals whose physical features leave the deepest impression upon their minds, and ignore the rest.[1] Thus a modern English traveller hastily remarks that Frenchmen are dark, that Germans are fair, and that Scotsmen have high cheek-bones and red beards; while a trained observer, having carefully written down all the observations that he has been able to make, reports that a considerable proportion of Frenchmen are fair, that the fair Germans are in a minority,[2] and that in certain districts the majority of Scotsmen are dark. But how are we to account for the fact that the proportion of tall fair men among the population of ancient Gaul was greater than among the population of modern France? First

average height of males of the well-to-do classes in America was said, in 1883, to be 5 feet 9¼ inches, of the proletariat 5 feet 6½ inches. *Dict. des sc. anthr.*, 1883, p. 1035. See also *Mém. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, ii, 1865, pp. 232–3; *ib.*, 3e sér., i, 1895, p. 89; *Rev. mensuelle de l'École d'anthr.*, 1896, pp. 51–6; *L'Anthr.*, xi, 1900, p. 700; *Middlesex Hospital Journal*, xii, 1908, p. 43; and *Association franç. pour l'avancement des sc.*, 35e sessn., 1906, pp. 683–90.

[1] *Journ. Anthr. Inst.*, ii, 1873, p. 19. Cf. J. Beddoe, *The Races of Britain*, 1885, p. 244, and J. T. Thurnam and J. B. Davis, *Crania Britannica*, 1865, pp. 163, 207.

[2] Virchow reports that of 5,000,000 German school-children, 33 per cent were found to be blonde, 13 per cent dark, and 54 per cent of mixed type. *Congrès internat. d'anthr. et d'arch. préhist.*, 1876 (1877), p. 579.

of all, it must be remembered that a great many Gauls perished in Caesar's wars or were sold into slavery; and it is probable that of those who were thus lost to the country a number disproportionately large belonged to the race by whose great stature he was so impressed. Secondly, it is certain that, except in cold and comparatively cold climates, the tall fair type is less successful in the struggle for existence than the dark. Thirdly, it is believed by Dr. Beddoe that the tall fair type is less able than the dark to resist the unsanitary conditions of crowded cities. Fourthly, it is suggested by the same authority that the proportion of fair men in France, as well as in other countries of Europe, may have been diminished by the influence of what he calls conjugal selection; in other words, his researches have led him to believe that the proportion of dark women who are married is greater than the proportion of fair women. Fifthly, in families of which one parent is dark and the other fair, the proportion of dark children is generally greater than the proportion of fair.[1] In a word, there can be little doubt that, since the time of Caesar, the dark type in the country which was once called Gaul has been steadily gaining ground upon the fair.

The questions which I propose to ask myself are these:—First, what were the ethnic elements of the prehistoric population of Gaul? Secondly, what was the physical type of the Ligurians, and what portion of Gaul did they occupy? Thirdly, whether the Iberians were, in any sense of the word, a race: if so, whether they are now represented by the Basques; and what portion of Gaul they occupied? Fourthly, who were the Aquitani? Fifthly, who were the Celtae? Sixthly, who were the Belgae? Lastly, were the Gauls, properly so called, whether Belgic or Celtic—the tall fair conquerors, whose physical features are described by ancient historians and geographers—ethnically identical with or akin to the Germans?

The subject of the ethnology of Gaul is one of great difficulty. The literature is vast in amount, and the greater portion is scattered in the periodical publications of learned societies. In spite of the enormous labour which has been expended in collecting facts, the facts are insufficient; and regarding the conclusions which are to be drawn from them, there is much difference of opinion. But this is not all. The student is constantly encountering the word 'Celt'; and this word is used in so many different senses that he is obliged to exercise unflagging vigilance to avoid being misled. Before he began his studies, he had taken for granted that Irishmen and Welshmen and Scottish Highlanders were Celts. As his reading becomes more extensive, he learns that Celtic dialects are spoken by peoples of divers physical types; that the word 'Celt', as used by certain ancient writers, was hardly less vague than 'American' or 'Indian'; that Polybius and others used it as a synonym for 'Gaul'; that Caesar, while remarking that the people of Transalpine Gaul who

[1] *Bull. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, ii, 1861, p. 408; *Anthr. Rev.*, i, 1863, pp. 311–2; *Dict. encycl. des sciences médicales*, xiii, 1873, p. 766; *Scottish Review*, xix, 1892, p. 418; *L'Anthr.*, vi, 1900, pp. 702–3; *Journ. Anthr. Inst.*, xxxv, 1905, p. 237.

called themselves 'Celts' were called by the Romans 'Gauls', applied the former term only to a section of the population of Gaul, and not to the Belgae, who also spoke a Celtic language, and whom he also called Gauls; and that, even after his time, Dion Cassius spoke of the Germans as Celts. Next he finds that, according to certain French ethnologists, there have never been any Celts in the British Isles; that the word 'Celtic', as applied to the dialects in question, is a misnomer; and that Caesar's Celtae, the people who lived between the Seine and the Garonne and were not a pure race at all, were the only true Celts. Finally, he is warned to purge his mind of the notion that there has ever been, at least within historic times, a pure Celtic race, in the biological sense of the word 'race', or indeed any other pure race at all; and he is solemnly assured that 'the word "Kelt" has long ceased to have any ethnical significance'.[1] But if the perplexed student has the patience to reconsider these theories without bias, he will gradually discover that there is more of agreement among them than he had at first supposed, and that the disagreement is about words as much as about things; and if he has the courage to collect and sift all the facts that have been discovered, he will find that the data, though not sufficient for the solution of all the problems which confront him, are yet sufficient to establish important conclusions.

But the problems cannot even be approached until one has collated evidence drawn from every available source. Historians have marshalled every ancient text which bears upon the subject, and have offered solutions which Celtic scholars and anthropologists have contemptuously rejected. Celtic scholars have propounded theories which other Celtic scholars have refused to accept. Anthropologists, travelling, notebook in hand, from department to department and from town to town, climbing mountains and descending into plains, have jotted down and tabulated the physical characteristics of the unheeding individuals whom they passed: others have explored caves and groped in barrows, collected skulls, measured them, and referred them to various types; others again have recorded the stature and examined the heads of groups of living men; and all these observers have been told that their data are insufficient and their generalizations premature. The inquirer who is resolved to succeed will press into his service every science that bears upon his subject. He will bear in mind that the historians and geographers of antiquity were fallible; that some of them wrote at second-hand, and that none were trained in the exact methods of a scientific age; that the philological conclusions of one decade are often questioned, if not disproved, in the next; and that physical anthropology is a science which has hardly outgrown its infancy. On the other hand, he will remember that scepticism has its dangers as well as credulity: he will find that, side by side with much that is uncertain, there are facts established as securely as the conclusions of Kepler and Newton; and he will gather in the testimony of geographer, historian, philo-

[1] A. H. Keane, *Ethnology*, 2nd ed., 1896, p. 397.

logist, archaeologist, and craniologist with an open and yet guarded mind. Nor need he be afraid, even if he is not a Celtic scholar or a professional anthropologist, to form an opinion of his own. For he will observe that the specialists, in so far as they differ among themselves, are simply drawing their own conclusions from ascertained facts which are accessible to all.

Anthropologists are obliged to make use of technical terms, more or less uncouth ; and they are guided in their observations by very precise and minute rules, framed with the object of eliminating, as far as possible, the chance of error. But it is unnecessary for my purpose to trouble the reader with more than a few of these things. What I shall have to say about stature,[1] complexion, hair, and eyes, will need no explanation ; and in regard to the skull I shall, as a rule, only have to deal with that measurement which fixes the proportion between its length and its breadth. In this measurement the length is represented by 100 ; and the proportion which the breadth bears to the length is called the cephalic index. Thus, if the breadth is four-fifths of the length, the index is 80. According to the system formulated by the great French anthropologist, Paul Broca,[2] skulls are grouped, according to their cephalic index, in five classes. Skulls whose index exceeds 83·33 are brachycephalic ; those whose index falls between 83·33 and 80 are sub-brachycephalic ; those between 80 and 77·77 mesaticephalic ; those between 77·77 and 75 sub-dolichocephalic ; and those below 75 dolichocephalic.[3] It is necessary to bear in mind that measurements of living heads invariably yield a higher cephalic index—the average difference being as much as 2—than those of skulls.[4] The orbital index, which is also important, denotes

[1] The stature of prehistoric men, when their skeletons are found, can only be estimated by calculating the relations between the lengths of certain bones and the actual height of the individual ; and since these relations are obviously variable, the calculation can only lead to approximately true results. The error would no doubt be insignificant if the average relations were certain ; but various anthropologists have adopted various methods of calculation, which are explained in my *Ancient Britain* (pp. 379 and n. 2, 740). The most satisfactory seems to me to be that of Dr. Beddoe (*Journ. Anthr. Inst.*, xvii, 1888, p. 204),—'I take away from the length of the femur [or thigh-bone] one-quarter of the excess over 13 inches up to 19, and thereafter only one-eighth, and then multiply by four' ; but in the following pages I have of course accepted the calculations of French anthropologists. Even if, as Dr. Beddoe thinks, they are generally rather below the mark, the error is, for our purpose, unimportant.

[2] *Mém. d'anthr.*, iv, 1883, p. 243.

[3] According to the notation which is prevalent in this country, skulls whose indices exceed 80 are called brachycephalic, those between 80 and 75 mesaticephalic, and those under 75 dolichocephalic. Professor Gustaf Retzius (*Journ. Anthr. Inst.*, xxxix, 1909, pp. 290–1), who adheres to the simple classification established by the famous Anders Retzius, under which brachycephaly was separated from dolichocephaly by the index 80, considers that Broca's minute subdivision has 'made the whole study of the question complicated and obscure'. Many French anthropologists follow a system as simple as ours, the only difference being that they take 77 instead of 75 as the superior limit of dolichocephaly.

[4] Professor W. Z. Ripley, however, thinks that the difference is nearer 1·5 than 2 (*L'Anthr.*, vii, 1896, pp. 516–9) ; while Mr. Gray (*Man*, ii, 1902, no. 41,

the relation of the breadth of the orbit to its length; and another important character of the skull or head is *gnathism*, that is to say, the degree of projection of the upper jaw. The word *orthognathous* denotes that this projection is comparatively slight; for, as Professor A. H. Keane observes, 'absolute orthognathism does not exist. All races are more or less prognathous.'[1] The remaining technical terms which it is necessary for general readers to understand are those which describe the structure of the nasal skeleton. *Platyrrhinian* means that it is wide, *mesorrhinian* intermediate, and *leptorrhinian* narrow.[2]

The value of the cephalic index was for many years taken for granted in all ethnological treatises; and many anthropologists still lay great stress upon it.[3] But there has lately been a reaction.[4] Sergi[5] scoffs at 'the old and discredited method of the cephalic index, which only indicates artificial and conventional distinctions', and tells us that 'it is the forms alone that we have to take into consideration',[6] and that 'indices may serve to approximate the most diverse forms and to separate the most homogeneous'.[7] This last remark is unquestionably true: as Huxley said, 'in nine cases out of ten you may diagnose an Australian skull [among other dolichocephalic skulls] with certainty.'[8] Nevertheless the cephalic index, used with discrimination, retains the value which Broca, Beddoe, Collignon, Turner, and other anthropologists of the old school ascribe to it; and those who are familiar with Sergi's writings will not be surprised to learn that, when it suits his purpose, he lays great stress upon the distinction between dolichocephalic and brachycephalic skulls.[9] He considerably modifies his view when he

pp. 50–1) regards the method of subtracting 2 as illogical, and would subtract 8 mm. from the breadth and 10 mm. from the length.

[1] *Ethnology*, p. 182. See *L'Anthr.*, xx, 1909, pp. 35–50, 175–88.

[2] At the meeting of the *Congrès international d'anthropologie*, &c., held at Monaco in 1906, suggestions were formulated for an international unification of cranial measurements, and adopted unanimously (*L'Anthr.*, xvii, 1906, p. 572; *Rev. de l'École d'anthr.*, xvii, 1908, pp. 47–59).

[3] For instance, Professor Ripley (*The Races of Europe*, 1900, p. 37), Dr. Beddoe (*Journ. Anthr. Inst.*, xxx, 1900, no. 93), Sir W. Turner (*Trans. Roy. Soc. Edinburgh*, xl, part iii, 1903, pp. 547–614), Professor Symington (*Report of . . . the British Association*, 1903, p. 796); and Professor G. Retzius (*Journ. Anthr. Inst.*, xxxix, 1909, p. 288).

[4] See Professor C. S. Myers's article (*ib.*, xxxiii, 1903, pp. 36–40), and *Man*, iii, 1903, no. 13, pp. 28–32.

[5] *The Mediterranean Race*, 1901, p. 102. [6] *Ib.*, p. 104.

[7] *Ib.*, p. 195. [8] *Proc. Soc. Ant.*, 2nd ser., iii, 1864–7, p. 284.

[9] For instance, on pages 136, 138, 143, 160–2, 189–92, and 238. So also Dr. William Wright, after affirming (*Middlesex Hospital Journal*, xi, 1907, p. 263) that 'it is the shape which is instructive' and (*ib.*, xii, 1908, p. 40) that 'the cephalic index . . . has no intrinsic value', admits on second thoughts (*ib.*, p. 42) that 'both the cranial shape and index have a certain stability', and, like Sergi, appeals in support of his arguments to the cephalic index over and over again (*ib.*, pp. 45, 49, &c.). Moreover, when he finds it 'necessary to remind its adherents that unless we accept a dual origin of man [which, by the way, Klaatsch does] we must admit that all skulls are the result of variation from a single type' (*ib.*, p. 41), may not the said adherents, who really do not need this reminder, reply that if the admission which they are bound to make

affirms the truism that 'we cannot accept the evidence of the cephalic index when that evidence is contradicted by other important facts';[1] but if any one will spend a few days in walking through the department of the Jura or the mountainous parts of Auvergne, the contrast between the round heads which he will see everywhere and the totally different type which he has been accustomed to in his own country will convince him that the cephalic index has been 'discredited' in vain.[2]

The truth is that in general neither Sergi's method nor cranial measurement is sufficient in itself:[3] the rivals should combine. The former, as A. Mochi has pointed out,[4] when it is used exclusively, begets confusion, since different observers, judging by the eye alone, may disagree as to the particular one of Sergi's numerous categories[5] to which this or that skull should be referred; and, moreover, Sergi generally takes account of the *norma verticalis*—the view of the skull from above—alone: in other words, he characterizes a solid by one of its faces. Now Mochi has measured, with the object of ascertaining how far the two methods agreed, the skulls which had been previously studied by Sergi or his pupils; and his researches have shown that on the whole the correspondence is close, but that two of Sergi's groups—the ellipsoids and the ovoids—are not, apparently, homogeneous, the cephalic indices of the former ranging from 61 to 82.

But there are writers who regard the study both of indices and of cranial shapes as little better than waste of time. M. Salomon Reinach has observed that the hope of reconstructing the history of prehistoric migrations by means of skulls was one of the illusions of the nineteenth century;[6] and if the remark does not contain quite as much truth as he intended to put into it, it is not to be wholly ignored. Broadly speaking, there are two anthropological schools, one of which believes in heredity, the other in the influence of environment. Professor Ridgeway, who tells us that he holds

tells against reliance upon the cephalic index, it tells equally against reliance upon the shape? Any one who has a clear head will see that it tells against neither. The doctor allows (*ib.*, p. 42) that, 'unless the environment alters, a long-headed people breeds on the whole long-headed, a round-headed people round-headed descendants.' Precisely; and that is why the cephalic index remains useful, and will not mislead provided that we are careful to note the cases in which skulls that fall within the same group of indices differ, and those that fall within different groups are alike, in regard to shape.

[1] *The Mediterranean Race*, pp. 199–200.

[2] Cf. *L'Anthr.*, xix, 1908, pp. 478–9. Even Sergi, as Mr. Myers observes (*Journ. Anthr. Inst.*, xxxiii, 1903, p. 37), 'shows signs of yielding the isolated position which he originally took up as to the utter worthlessness of indices.'

[3] In France Sergi's grouping of skulls according to their shapes as viewed from above is generally discredited (*L'Anthr.*, xvii, 1906, p. 207), while Professor H. Klaatsch (*Weltall und Menschheit*, ed. H. Kraemer, ii, 1902, pp. 32–4) criticizes his methods and those of the old school with impartial vigour.

[4] In *Archivio per l'antropologia*, xxxviii, 1908, pp. 87–124,—a valuable paper, ably summarized by Dr. Rivet in *L'Anthr.*, xx, 1909, pp. 115–8.

[5] Ovoid, pentagonoid, sphenoid, ellipsoid, rhomboid, beloid, platycephalous, spheroid, and cuboid.

[6] *Rev. arch.*, 4e sér., ix, 1907, p. 486. Cf. *ib.*, xv, 1910, pp. 446–7.

'very strongly the doctrine of heredity',[1] nevertheless pushes the doctrine of environment to its extreme : [2] for him the three so-called European races—Mediterranean, Alpine, and Nordic—are not several groups, each sprung from a common stock, but simply products of environment; and cranial measurements and shapes are ethnologically useless. He observes that 'the change in the type of the American of New England from that of his English ancestor and his approximation to the hatchet face and thin, scraggy beard of the Red Indian has long been remarked'. Again, 'Starting from the Mediterranean, we meet in the lower parts a melanochrous race; but gradually, as we advance upwards, the population as a whole is growing less dark, until finally, along the shores of the Baltic, we meet the tallest and most light-complexioned race in the world . . . it is difficult to believe that the movements up or down of the people from the southern side of the Alps, or of those from the shores of the Baltic, have been so nicely proportioned as to give the general steady change from north to south in coloration without the aid of some other force. The case of America, which I have just cited, is in itself enough to raise a suspicion that climatic influences are at work all the time, and that environment is in reality the chief factor in the variation of both stature and pigmentation from the Mediterranean to the Baltic. The white race of the north is of the same proximate ancestry as the dark-complexioned peoples of the northern shores of the Mediterranean. . . . If we turn from man to the other animals we find a complete demonstration of this doctrine. For instance, the conditions which have produced a blonde race on the Baltic have probably produced the white hare, white bears, and the tendency of the stoat and the ptarmigan to turn white in the winter. It may be objected that the Lapps and Eskimo are not tall and blonde, but on the contrary short and dark; but they live within the Arctic circle in regions where the sun does not shine at all for a great part of the year, and consequently they are quite outside the conditions of environment under which the tall, blonde race of North Germany has long dwelt.' Further, 'the blonde element in the Berbers is not a survival from invasions . . . they rather owe their fair complexions and light-coloured eyes to the circumstance that they were cradled in a cool, mountainous region, and not along the low-lying border of the Mediterranean like their dark-coloured relations whose language and customs they share . . . although the fair-haired race of Upper Europe has age after age kept pouring over the Alps into Italy and the other southern peninsulas,[3] and have (*sic*) constantly intermixed with the indigenous populations, it is only in the upper part of Italy that the blonde race is able to hold its own.' And, lastly, the 'Alpine' type of skull does not 'mean any racial difference', but, 'on the analogy of the changes in the

[1] *Science Progress*, 1910, p. 131.
[2] *Nature*, Sept. 24, 1908, pp. 526–9.
[3] Into Spain at all events 'the fair-haired race' trickled rather than poured. Cf. pp. 282–3.

osteology of the Equidae' the professor urges that 'the roundness of the skulls was simply due to [Alpine] environment'.

Is the type of the American of New England really approximating to that of the Red Indian? May I suspect that if such New Englanders exist, they have Red Indian blood in their veins? Two years ago I heard Professor Ripley of Harvard University, who, as a trained observer, is presumably familiar with the features of his countrymen, deliver the Huxley Memorial Lecture before the Royal Anthropological Institute. Professor Ridgeway, the President of that society, was in the chair, and paid his American colleague many graceful compliments. 'It is amusing,' said Professor Ripley, 'to read in the older books on ethnology, and even in the files of this learned body, of the undoubted effect of the American climate upon Europeans in tending to produce the black wiry hair, the bronze skin and the aquiline features of the American Indian. Such conclusions are, of course, now understood to be a product, not of climate but of vivid imagination.'[1] The way in which Professor Ridgeway struggles to account for the inconvenient presence of the Lapps in Northern Scandinavia is hardly satisfactory:—'they live within the Arctic circle in regions where the sun does not shine at all for a great part of the year.' It would appear, then, that the great heat and brilliant sunshine of the Mediterranean produced darkness *plus* dolichocephaly; that in the same southern zone brilliant sunshine, tempered by mountain breezes, produced fairness *plus* dolichocephaly, although, according to the professor, mountains elsewhere produce brachycephaly; that the coolness and exiguous sunshine of mountainous Scandinavia produce fairness *plus* tall stature *plus* dolichocephaly; that either the very exiguous sunshine or the temporary absence of sunshine of Lapland produces darkness *plus* dwarf-like stature *plus* extreme brachycephaly; and that the very exiguous sunshine of 'Greenland's icy mountains' produces darkness *plus* dolichocephaly; while the Polar bears owe their whiteness to the same conditions, intensified, that have produced the swarthiness of the Eskimos and the Lapps. Is the professor serious? Is he not aware that side by side with the swarthy Lapps in the far north live blonde Norwegians; and that 500 miles south of Lapland, along the shores of the Sogne Fjord, an intensely dark group, whose presence is a standing puzzle to their blonde neighbours, has lived from time immemorial?

Let us first examine the anthropological chart of Europe with an eye to stature. There is no such regularity in the distribution as the professor's theory requires. There are two great areas of tall stature; one in the south-east, embracing Southern Dalmatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Servia, the other in the north and north-west, including Scotland, Ireland, Sweden, parts of Norway, and of the Baltic provinces, the south-west of Finland, the Netherlands, and Schleswig-Holstein. Again, there are three regions of short stature; the southern comprises Sicily and Southern Italy, Corsica,

[1] *Journ. Anthr. Inst.*, xxxviii, 1908, pp. 221–2. Cf. *Nature*, Nov. 3, 1910, p. 11. The effect of the climate has not yet been scientifically tested.

and Sardinia, South-western France, and part of Spain : the central comprises Hungary and Poland ; the northern North-east Russia and Northern Scandinavia. In the rest of Europe stature is medium ; but there are islets, so to speak, where the population is generally tall, and others where it is generally short.[1]

In regard to colouring and cranial shape Professor Ridgeway's generalization is disturbed by numerous exceptions. To say nothing of the dolichocephalic Berbers, whose fairness he attributes to a mountainous country, which, on his own theory, ought to have made them brachycephalic, fairness is not uncommon in Corsica, where also, contrary to the general rule, the tallest inhabitants are mountaineers, whose stature, as M. Verneau remarks,[2] cannot be attributed to environment. In the small area which coincides with Latium there are two types, differing from one another in every respect : one is dark, small, and dolichocephalic ; the other brachycephalic, tall, and comparatively fair.[3] When we find that in America environment has not produced the least modification in the negro type ;[4] that intensely dark groups are dwelling and have been dwelling for millenniums in foggy England as well as in sunny Sicily ; that short dark brachycephali abound in the mountains of Auvergne and tall fair dolichocephali in the mountains of Corsica ; that tall fair men are conspicuous in the district round Limoges, while in the adjacent department of the Dordogne the population is short and dark ;[5] that in the Perigord there is an isolated group of intensely dark dolichocephali;[6] that the people of Zeeland are dark and have round skulls, while those of Friesland and North Holland are 'extremely blonde';[7] that the Walloon frontier separates tall dolichocephali from short brachycephali ;[8] that the territory of the Czechs is surrounded on the chart by 'lighter-coloured tracts';[9] that the mountainous region in Central Europe is occupied by round-heads, in the southern peninsulas by long-heads ;[10] and, finally, that in Great Britain M. Deniker's shades of colouring are one and all represented ;[11]—we may, for our purpose, leave environment out of the question. I need hardly add that anthropologists who have specially studied the question of the Berbers, or Kabyles, have concluded that they are descendants of prehistoric European invaders who occupied the tracts that suited them best.[12] The

[1] *L'Anthr.*, xx, 1908, pp. 481–2 ; *Bull. et mém. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, 5e sér., ix, 1908, pp. 456–8. No anthropological map of Europe can adequately denote the complexity of the various groups ; and M. Deniker's map, being on a very small scale, would mislead readers who were not on their guard.

[2] *Bull. et mém. de la Soc. d'anthr.*, 5e sér., iii, 1902, pp. 360–1.

[3] *Atti d. Soc. Rom. d. antropologia*, xii, 1906, pp. 32–117 ; *L'Anthr.*, xviii, 1907, p. 730.

[4] *Bull. et mém. de la Soc. d'anthr.*, 5e sér., ii, 1901, pp. 152, 157.

[5] *Annales de géogr.*, v, 1896, p. 164. [6] *Ib.*, xii, 1903, p. 210.

[7] *Journ. Anthr. Inst.*, xxxv, 1905, pp. 230–1. [8] *Ib.*

[9] *Ib.*, p. 226. [10] *Ib.*, xxxiv, 1904, p. 206. [11] *Ib.*, p. 206 and pl. viii–ix.

[12] *Association franç. pour l'avancement des sc.*, 36e sessn., 1907, p. 1040 ; *Zeitschr. f. Ethn.*, xl, 1908, pp. 525–7 ; *Archiv f. Anthr.*, N. F., viii, 1909, pp. 249–86. Cf. *Bull. de la Soc. d'anthr.*, 2e sér., ix, 1874, pp. 125–6 ; xi, 1876, pp. 467–8.

truth is that Professor Ridgeway's generalization is both hasty and superficial.

But I must take note of a reply which he has made to an incompetent critic. Answering the objection that a dark race exists in the British Isles, he says, 'Yes . . . but very different from the dark race as seen in the southern peninsulas . . . the skin is beautifully fair, and the eyes are often blue. . . . In this type I maintain that we have the transition stage between the full, melanochrous . . . and the tall blonde Scandinavian.'[1] In other words, give the little dark people time, and (although the poor 'melanochrous' Lapps will remain melanochrous) they will become like tall fair Norwegians. I suppose that this is what the professor means; for the tall fair Scandinavians who migrated into Scotland more than a thousand years ago remain tall and fair; so presumably their environment is favourable. Well, time will be wanted,—time running into millenniums. For, although the professor assures us that osteological 'variations take place within very short periods',[2] although he affirms—perhaps on somewhat unsubstantial evidence—that the physical type of pygmies who had left the forests of the Congo was changed in three generations,[3] although less than three centuries have apparently sufficed to transform the Anglo-Saxon into the semblance of a hatchet-faced Red Indian, 'the weaker aboriginal dark race'[4] of the British Isles has remained dark ever since the beginning of the Neolithic Age. Admit that their 'beautifully fair' skin is due to environment, though it may be due partly to intermarriage; still, that is hardly sufficient to prove that 'the blond tall race . . . is identical in origin with the small dark long-headed race'.[5]

Here, as elsewhere, the *via media* is the path that will lead to truth. Imperfect though our knowledge is, no impartial anthropologist would deny that the influence of environment is considerable;[6] but, as Dr. Beddoe says, 'if geographical position be the warp, heredity, race, inherited type is the woof, and its threads are extremely tough and lasting.'[7] Short dark men were not transmuted into tall fair men by the climate of Scandinavia; but tall fair men found the climate of Scandinavia congenial. Assuming that, as Dr. Wright affirms,[8] 'the so-called three races of Europe are in the main the result of variation from a common European stock, a variation due to isolation and natural selection,' my argument is unaffected; for at the outset of the Neolithic Age, if not earlier, these three races did exist as distinct and permanent entities.

[1] *Science Progress*, 1910, p. 129.
[2] *Ib.*, p. 128.
[3] *Ib.*, p. 133.
[4] *Ib.*, p. 137.
[5] *Ib.*, p. 127.
[6] See *Nature*, Nov. 3, 1910, pp. 11–2.
[7] *Journ. Anthr. Inst.*, xxxv, 1905, p. 226.
[8] *Middlesex Hospital Journal*, xii, 1908, p. 44.

II

THE PREHISTORIC RACES

Until a very recent date not a single human skull had been found in any part of the world which could, with reasonable probability, be referred to an earlier period than the Quaternary, or Pleistocene. Even the *Pithecanthropus*, or 'monkey-man', of Java—the famous 'missing link' whose remains were discovered in 1894 by Dr. Dubois—although it was certainly of Pliocene Age,[1] is not unanimously regarded as an intermediate form between the simian precursor of Man and Man himself.[2] For many years past, indeed, certain geologists have insisted that flints of various well-marked forms which are known as 'eoliths', or stone implements of a dawning age, and which have been found in Tertiary deposits in France and perhaps also in England, show marks of intelligent workmanship; but this claim has never won general acceptance, and by many experts has been treated with contempt.[3] Nevertheless, just five years ago the eminent palaeontologist, Monsieur Marcellin Boule, avowed that he believed firmly in the existence of Tertiary Man: 'I do not doubt,' he added, 'that some day his traces will be found.'[4] Three years later we were startled by the announcement that this prophecy was fulfilled. Six miles south-east of Heidelberg, in a bed of sand which marks an abandoned channel of the river Neckar, was discovered an enormously massive lower jaw-bone, which resembles in profile the corresponding bone of a gorilla. Its age seemed certain: it was unhesitatingly assigned to the Pliocene, or latest division of the Tertiary Period. Had it, however, been less perfectly preserved, the anatomists who examined it would hardly have allowed their enthusiasm to seduce them into giving it the name by which it will be known,—*Homo Heidelbergensis*; for some of its characters are ape-like, and it is more primitive than any other known human specimen. But fortunately the teeth had escaped destruction; and their human character was beyond all doubt.[5] But what about its age? Professor Boule himself does not claim for it a date anterior to the early Pleistocene:[6] Klaatsch, asking

[1] *L'Anthr.*, xx, 1909, pp. 373–7. This paper corrects another in an earlier number,—xix, 1908, pp. 260–9.

[2] See *Archiv f. Anthr.*, N. F., v, 1906, p. 225, *Science Progress*, iii, 1908, p. 345, and Dr. A. C. Haddon's *Hist. of Anthropology*, 1910, pp. 76–7.

[3] Rice Holmes, *Anc. Britain*, pp. 25–30. See also *Archiv f. Anthr.*, N. F., iv, 1905, pp. 75–86; *Association franç. pour l'avancement des sc.*, 35e sessn., 1906, pp. 603–28; *Man*, viii, 1908, no. 26, pp. 49–53; and J. Déchelette, *Manuel d'archéologie*, i, 26, n. 3. There is also an article by Hoernes in *Mitteil. d. naturwiss. Vereines f. Steiermark*, xlv, 1909, which I have not yet been able to see.

[4] *L'Anthr.*, xvi, 1905, p. 267.

[5] O. Schoetensack, *Der Unterkiefer d. Homo Heidelbergensis*, 1908. Cf. *Rev. de l'École d'anthr.*, xix, 1909, pp. 105–8, and *L'Anthr.*, xx, 1909, pp. 81–6.

[6] *L'Anthr.*, xx, 1909, pp. 266–7.

whether it is to be assigned to that period or to the late Tertiary, remarks that there is no sure boundary between the two.[1] All that is certain is that *Homo Heidelbergensis* is the oldest known human fossil; and it is not unreasonable to suppose that in those incalculably remote days his fellow men—if men they are to be called—lived and hunted on the western side of the Rhine.[2]

Of the people who were living in Gaul in the earliest period of the Palaeolithic Age no fossil remains, except perhaps a skull unearthed from the volcano of Denise,[3] have yet come to light: our oldest examples belong to the second period, which derives its name from the cave of Le Moustier in the valley of the Vézère. Most of them are called after that famous specimen which was discovered about half a century ago in the valley of the Neander in Rhenish Prussia.[4] The skulls of this type are dolichocephalic;[5] and the people to whom they belonged had extremely low and retreating foreheads, heavy and projecting lower jaws, and amazingly prominent brow ridges, and were short, big-boned, and muscular. Representatives of the race have been found in the cavern of Spy in Belgium, as far east as Croatia, as far west as the valley of the Dordogne.[6] A skeleton which was found in the cavern of La Chapelle-aux-Saints in the Corrèze was in a nearly perfect state of preservation: like the other fossils of the Neanderthal type, it had a defective chin; and the stature was barely 1 metre 60 centimetres, or about 5 feet 3 inches. Between it and *Homo Heidelbergensis*, says Professor Boule, 'there are resemblances more considerable than one could have expected, and perhaps actual relationship.'[7]

At the end of the nineteenth century the Neanderthal skull was accepted by the most eminent anthropologists of Europe and America as the type of the most ancient of the known races of men. But in 1901 a German anthropologist, Dr. G. Schwalbe, wrote an article of appalling length,[8] which disturbed settled convictions. Huxley had pronounced the Neanderthal to be the most ape-like

[1] *Zeitschr. f. Ethn.*, xli, 1909, pp. 538–41.

[2] Mr. J. Reid Moir (*Times*, Oct. 17, 1910, p. 8, col. 2) states that he has discovered flint implements which were 'unhesitatingly acknowledged' by Miss Nina Layard—a well-known investigator—and other experts, in undisturbed Pliocene strata near Ipswich. This claim must be further tested.

[3] *Bull. de la Soc. de géogr.*, xiii, 1906, pp. 289–91, 366.

[4] The age of the Neanderthal skull itself is uncertain. See *L'Anthr.*, xvii, 1906, pp. 70–3.

[5] It has been said that one of the Mousterian skulls which have been found at Krapina in Northern Croatia, and which, in prominence of the supraciliary ridges, resemble the Neanderthal type, has an index of over 80; but these skulls were too fragmentary for accurate measurement (*L'Anthr.*, xvi, 1905, pp. 17–8).

[6] *L'Anthr.*, xvii, 1906, pp. 156–8; xix, 1908, pp. 106–7, 519–25; xx, 1909, pp. 220, 603–4; xxi, 1910, p. 85; *Philosophical Transactions*, cxcix B, 1907, pp. 281–339; *Archiv f. Anthr.*, N. F., vii, 1909, pp. 287–97.

[7] *Comptes rendus de l'Acad. des sc.*, cxlvii, 1908, no. 24, pp. 1349–52; no. 25, pp. 1414–5; *L'Anthr.*, xx, 1909, pp. 257–71. See also *ib.*, pp. 576–7; xxi, 1910, p. 84; and *Archiv f. Anthr.*, N. F., vii, 1909, pp. 287–97.

[8] *Bonner Jahrbücher*, cvi, 1901, pp. 1–72. See also *Globus*, lxxx, 1901, pp. 217–22; lxxxi, 1902, pp. 165–74; *Man*, ii, 1902, no. 129, pp. 186–9; and *L'Anthr.*, xiii, 1902, pp. 356–8; xvii, 1906, pp. 67–72.

of all known human skulls : Schwalbe refused to regard it as human, in the accepted sense, at all. For him it represents, or represented, a distinct species, *Homo primigenius*,[1] intermediate between *Pithecanthropus* and *Homo sapiens*. In the same class he placed the skulls of Spy (those of the Corrèze had not then come to light) ; and he insisted that all the other human palaeolithic skulls of Europe, however closely they might appear to resemble these, were in reality different.

Now it is universally admitted that between *Homo sapiens* and the men of Neanderthal, Spy, and the Corrèze there is no generic distinction : whether there is any specific difference depends upon the meaning which is to be attached to the word ' species.' [2] ' Having regard,' says Dr. William Wright, ' to . . . the bones other than the cranium [and] to the teeth, I prefer to speak of the skeletons constituting a type rather than a species—a type, however, characterized by numerous well-defined simian traits.' [3]

Did the men of the Neanderthal race leave descendants whose remains are recognizable among the later skulls of Gaul ? Opinions differ.[4] Professor Gustaf Retzius [5] remarks that ' as yet no genuinely transitional forms between the . . . Neanderthal race and . . . the race branches in Europe at the present day have been discovered ', and that ' the trend of opinion . . . favours the assumption that the real Neanderthal race became extinct '. It is true that, as Dr. Wright observes, none of the later skulls which approximate to the type [6] ' fulfil all the conditions necessary for their admission ' ; [7] but who would have expected that the type should have remained pure ? Since other palaeolithic races are unquestionably to be reckoned among the ancestors of modern Frenchmen, is it conceivable that the men of the Corrèze and the Dordogne should have utterly died out ?

But whether there was or was not any specific difference between the men of the Corrèze and *Homo sapiens*, there is not the slightest doubt that, despite the skill with which they fashioned their tools, they were intellectually far inferior not only to the earliest men of whom we read in history, not only to Man as he had become before the close of the Palaeolithic Age, but also to men who were their contemporaries. Many persons to whom anthropology is Abracadabra have heard of the Baoussé-Roussé caves near Mentone. Deep down in the Grotte des Enfants were found the skeletons of an aged woman and of a youth who were living in Mousterian times. Although

[1] Professor G. Retzius (*Journ. Anthr. Inst.*, xxxix, 1909, p. 296, note) thinks the term *primigenius* premature, as the Neanderthal race ' probably belonged to a lateral branch of the main stem and were preceded by other forms which would rather have merited that name '.

[2] *Comptes rendus de l'Acad. des sc.*, cxlvii, 1908, no. 24, pp. 1349–52 ; no. 25, pp. 1414–5. Cf. *L'Anthr.*, xix, 1908, p. 215.

[3] *Middlesex Hospital Journal*, xi, 1907, p. 98.

[4] *L'Anthr.*, xix, 1908, p. 469. Cf. *Archiv f. Anthr.*, N. F., vii, 1909, p. 247.

[5] *Journ. Anthr. Inst.*, xxxix, 1909, pp. 297–8.

[6] See *Scottish Review*, xx, 1892, pp. 148, 152–3, and Rice Holmes, *Anc. Britain*, pp. 385, 397.

[7] *Middlesex Hospital Journal*, xi, 1907, pp. 97–8.

the skulls of both had certain negroid characteristics, which reappear in a few dolichocephalic skulls of the Neolithic Age,[1] they were of a markedly higher kind than the skulls of Neanderthal and the Corrèze. The chin, indeed, was feebly developed: but the brow-ridges were unobtrusive; the cranium was symmetrically formed; and the forehead was almost vertical.[2] Thus comparatively early in the Palaeolithic Age there were living in Gaul men of two strongly contrasted types.

Before the end of the Quaternary Period the zoological evolution of Man had come to its end.[3] The dolichocephalic skulls that have been discovered at Laugerie-Basse and Chancelade in the valley of the Lozère are as different from those of the hunters of the Corrèze as the skull of Cuvier from that of a Hottentot.[4] More capacious than those of an average Frenchman of to-day, they have 'high and broad foreheads and brow-ridges which are hardly perceptible'. From their mere contour one would be justified in concluding that the intellectual power of the race which they represent was not inferior to our own;[5] and the work of that race remains to confirm this conclusion. For it is to the period which has been called after the cave of La Madeleine that belong the finest specimens of the carved antlers, the engraved stones and bones, and the frescoes, drawn on the walls of caverns, which are recognized by modern artists as true works of art.[6]

The rock-shelter of Cro-Magnon in Perigord has given a name to a type of men, related to that of Laugerie-Basse, representatives of which have been found in many parts of France and also in other European lands.[7] The famous skeleton which is known as 'the old man of Cro-Magnon' belonged to the later part of the Palaeolithic Age.[8] The Cro-Magnon race was long-headed and, unlike that of Laugerie-Basse, tall, the old man's stature having been estimated at 1 metre 90, or about 6 feet $2\frac{3}{4}$ inches.[9] His cranium was large, his forehead high with slight supraciliary ridges, and his chin well developed.[10] The characteristics of the type had probably been acquired at a time earlier than his; for in the Grotte des Enfants, about 16 feet below the level of the uppermost interment,

[1] *Bull. et mém. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, 5e sér., v, 1904, pp. 119–24.

[2] *L'Anthr.*, xiii, 1902, pp. 561–85; xvii, 1906, pp. 109, 291–320; xviii, 1907, p. 625. *Middlesex Hospital Journal*, xi, 1907, pp. 99–100. [3] *Ib.*, p. 103.

[4] The average height of the people of Laugerie-Basse and Chancelade was only 1 m. 60, or about 5 ft. 3 in. (*Bull. et mém. de la Soc. d'anthr.*, 5e sér., viii, 1907, p. 214).

[5] See *Anthropology and the Classics*, ed. R. R. Marett, 1908, p. 18.

[6] See p. 7. Palaeolithic art, which advanced through successive stages, began in the first division of the later Quaternary Period, known as the Aurignacian, developed in the Solutrean, and culminated in that of La Madeleine.

[7] Professor G. Retzius (*Journ. Anthr. Inst.*, xxxix, 1909, pp. 297–8) believes that the tall North European race is descended from that of Cro-Magnon.

[8] Strictly speaking, to the earliest of the three later divisions, which is called after Aurignac in the Haute-Garonne.

[9] According to Topinard, M. Rollet estimated it at 1 m. 80, or about 5 ft. $10\frac{7}{8}$ in., and M. Manouvrier at only 1 m. 75, or about 5 ft. $8\frac{9}{10}$ in. See *Mém. de la Soc. d'anthr.*, 2e sér., iv, 1893, p. 389; Rice Holmes, *Anc. Britain*, p. 379, n. 3.

[10] *Bull. de la Soc. d'anthr.*, 2e sér., iii, 1868, pp. 352–91.

which was itself palaeolithic, and little more than two feet above the negroid Mousterians, was found a gigantic skeleton, closely resembling the 'old man';[1] and similar skeletons were discovered in adjoining caves.[2] Indeed the chief value of the Mentone caves lies in the demonstration which they have furnished of an intimate connexion between the palaeolithic and the neolithic race in Southern France. The newest skeleton in the Grotte des Enfants approximates to the dolichocephalic type, presently to be considered, of the Neolithic Age.[3]

After the artists of South-western Gaul had ceased to flourish two widely different races, both of short or medium stature, one brachycephalic, the other dolichocephalic, were diffused over the length and breadth of the land. The type to which the latter belonged, characterized by remarkable elegance, gentle contours, and orthognathism, is called after two groups of skeletons which were discovered in the caverns of l'Homme Mort and Baumes-Chaudes in the department of the Lozère. The latter group comprised 35 skulls, every one of which was dolichocephalic, the indices ranging from 64·3 to 76·1: in the former two were mesaticephalic, having indices of 78·8 and 78·5 respectively, while the remaining seventeen varied between 68·2 and 76·7. The average height of each group, according to M. Manouvrier's method, was 1 metre 60, or barely 5 feet 3 inches.[4] Similar remains have been found in various parts of Britain, in Central and in Southern Europe.[5] Most English anthropologists, following Sergi, include these people under the so-called Mediterranean race: but in France this term is branded as misleading;[6] and French ethnologists with good reason regard the cave-dwellers of Baumes-Chaudes and l'Homme Mort as descended from the Quaternary race of Laugerie-Basse.[7] Whatever may have

[1] *L'Anthr.*, xvii, 1906, pp. 297–302.

[2] The average height of these men was 1 m. 87, or about 6ft. 1½in. *Ib.*, pp. 110–1.

[3] It has been maintained that another—the so-called steatopygous—race existed in Gaul in late palaeolithic times. The existence of this people is inferred from the discovery of certain 'statuettes' at Brassempouy in the department of the Landes (*L'Anthr.*, vi, 1895, pp. 129–51) and near Mentone. I have not seen them: but when I saw the woodcut of one which was selected for illustration (*Bull. et mém. de la Soc. d'anthr.*, 5e sér., iii, 1902, p. 775, fig. 4), it seemed to me that the carving was so villainous that no scientific conclusion could be drawn from it; and I found that this was also the opinion of M. Manouvrier (*ib.*, p. 778). See, however, J. Déchelette, *Manuel d'archéologie*, i, 217. Supposing that there was a steatopygous race in Southern Gaul, is there any reason to suppose that it was not identical with the negroid race?

[4] *Rev. d'anthr.*, ii, 1873, pp. 1–53; *Bull. de la Soc. d'anthr.*, 3e sér., i, 1878, pp. 213–4; *Mém. de la Soc. d'anthr.*, 2e sér., iv, 1893, p. 388; *Rev. mensuelle de l'École d'anthr.*, v, 1895, pp. 162–4, 171; *Bull. et mém. de la Soc. d'anthr.*, 5e sér., viii, 1907, pp. 150–2, 174, 305, 540–1; ix, 1908, pp. 723–5.

[5] Rice Holmes, *Anc. Britain*, pp. 393–401; *L'Anthr.*, xx, 1909, p. 212; *Archiv f. Anthr.*, vii, 1909, pp. 249–56, 266–7.

[6] *Bull. et mém. de la Soc. d'anthr.*, 5e sér., ix, 1908, p. 166.

[7] *Rev. mensuelle de l'École d'anthr.*, v, 1895, p. 408. The old theory of a 'hiatus' between the Palaeolithic and the Neolithic Age in Gaul has long since been exploded. See J. Déchelette, *Manuel d'archéologie*, i, 309–12.

been the original home of that race, its oldest known representatives lived, it should seem, in the neighbourhood of Mentone.[1]

In a tumulus, apparently of the Neolithic Age, on Cape Blanc-Nez, at Escalles, in the department of the Pas-de-Calais, a dolichocephalic skull has been found of a type widely different from the skulls of l'Homme Mort. The index is only 71·9; the skull has a strongly-marked occipital protuberance, a projecting chin, and prominent supraciliary ridges.[2] In fact, *tall* dolichocephalic people undoubtedly existed in France in the Neolithic Age;[3] and M. Verneau, whom one specimen reminded of the rugged skulls of Borreby in the Danish island of Falster, remarked, after he had examined the collection to which it belonged, that 'races already formed an almost inextricable medley'.[4]

The brachycephalic people, who are generally called after Grenelle, near Paris, where six typical specimens have been discovered,[5] were for the most part extremely short,[6] and differed widely, even in the shape of their skulls, from the comparatively tall and moderately brachycephalic round-headed people of the British Bronze Age,[7] who are generally known as the Round Barrow race. The characteristics of their modern descendants, which must have been noticed by many travellers, are clearly described by Dr. Collignon,—'taille plutôt petite, cheveux foncés, tête globuleuse, face ronde, courte, large, plate, nez large et court.'[8] They undoubtedly mingled with the dolichocephalic population; for in many of the neolithic settlements that have yielded human remains dolichocephalic, mesaticephalic, and brachycephalic skulls were associated, although in some only long skulls, in others only broad were to be found.[9] The

[1] *L'Anthr.*, vii, 1896, p. 687; xvii, 1906, p. 292. Cf. p. 272, *supra*, and Rice Holmes, *Anc. Britain*, p. 382. Some neolithic people of this type may have been immigrants.

[2] *Congrès internat. d'anthr. et d'arch. préhist.*, 1872 (1873), p. 308; *Bull. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, 2e sér., xi, 1876, pp. 140–1.

[3] Some ethnologists have argued that the tall dolichocephali of the Neolithic Age belonged to an early wave of blonde invaders, and were akin to the Tamahu, whose features are portrayed on the Egyptian wall-paintings which were executed about 1500 B. C. See J. Beddoe, *The Races of Britain*, p. 14.

[4] *L'Anthr.*, i, 1890, pp. 171–2, 184. Tall dolichocephalic individuals also existed in the Neolithic Age in our island (Rice Holmes, *Anc. Britain*, p. 395).

Various dolichocephalic skulls, characterized by considerable anterior elongation without the occipital protuberance which is common in skulls of the Homme Mort type, and belonging to individuals of medium stature, are classed by French anthropologists under the 'type de Genay' (*Bull. de la Soc. d'anthr.*, 2e sér., iv, 1869, pp. 89–98). M. Hervé (*Rev. mensuelle de l'École d'anthr.*, v, 1895, p. 145) assimilates them to the Hohberg and Row Grave skulls (see p. 327, *infra*); and they are commonly regarded as of northern origin.

[5] A. de Quatrefages and E. T. Hamy, *Crania Ethnica*, 1882, pp. 116, 120–4, 141.

[6] *Rev. mensuelle de l'École d'anthr.*, iv, 1894, pp. 396, 400; vi, 1896, p. 105. Still, in one station, where races were intermingled, the average height of 33 adult males was 1 m. 654 (about 5 ft. 5¾ in.), the limits being 1 m. 541 (about 5 ft. ⅛ in.) and 1 m. 752 (nearly 5 ft. 9 in.). *Bull. et mém. de la Soc. d'anthr.*, 5e sér., viii, 1907, p. 563.

[7] The Grenelle race was represented, though not largely, in the Bronze Age in Britain. See p. 329.

[8] *Ann. de géogr.*, v, 1896, p. 164.

[9] *Rev. mensuelle de l'École d'anthr.*, v, 1895, pp. 155, 161, 407. See also

departments in which brachycephalic skulls were fewest are west of a line drawn from Normandy to the sources of the Garonne, virtually coinciding with the area in which dolmens are most abundant; while skulls of this type were most numerous, on the one hand in Belgium and the valleys of the Seine and Marne, on the other in Alsace, the neighbourhood of the lake of Neufchâtel, and the valley of the Rhône below Geneva: and accordingly M. Philippe Salmon concludes that a brachycephalic race migrated into Gaul by two routes, one of which passed through Belgium, the other through Savoy.[1]

In a cave called the Trou du Frontal, near Furfooz, in the valley of the Lesse, which flows into the Meuse just below Dinant, two skulls have been found, one male, the other female, with indices of 79·31 and 81·39.[2] The male skull was rather low, with a low and retreating forehead and moderately developed supraciliary ridges; and the stature was only 1 metre 53, or about 5 feet ¼ inch. For many years hardly any similar specimens were discovered outside the basin of the Meuse; and it was commonly believed that they were a mere variety, due to crossing between the races of Grenelle and l'Homme Mort:[3] but early in this century about 60 neolithic skeletons were found in the Grotte des Bas-Moulins, near Monaco, of which the great majority belonged to the Furfooz type; and MM. R. Verneau and L. de Villeneuve, who examined them, concluded that they represented a distinct race.[4]

Owing to the prevalence of cremation in the Bronze Age, the data for ascertaining the physical type of that period are scanty; and if fresh immigrants appeared, there is no reason to suppose that they represented any new stock.[5] At the beginning of the Hallstatt Period, however, which was contemporaneous with the late Bronze Age in Western Gaul, tall men, whose skeletons have been found in *tumuli*, were living in the Jura and the Doubs. Some of them, like the Celtic invaders, of whom they may have been the advanced

Bull. et mém. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris, 5e sér., v, 1904, pp. 73–6; viii, 1907, pp. 150–2, 170, 174, 307–9, 539–41, 563. M. Philippe Salmon (*Rev. mensuelle*, &c., v, 1895, p. 159) shows that of 688 neolithic skulls found in Gaul 397 were dolichocephalic, 145 mesaticephalic, and 146 brachycephalic. Of 140 interments 55 contained only dolichocephalic skulls, and 20 only brachycephalic.

[1] *Rev. mensuelle de l'École d'anthr.*, v, 1895, p. 184.

[2] *Crania Ethnica*, pp. 105–9; A. de Quatrefages, *Hist. gén. des races hum.*, 1887–9, pp. 72–3, 448. The Furfooz skulls, which were wrongly assigned by de Quatrefages to the Quaternary Period, are now known to be neolithic.

[3] *Rev. mensuelle de l'École d'anthr.*, v, 1895, p. 100.

[4] *L'Anthr.*, xii, 1901, pp. 1–27. In the first edition (p. 254, n. 4) I criticized a theory, propounded by the late Canon Isaac Taylor (*The Origin of the Aryans*, 1889, pp. 66, 113, 115, 118–9), which implied that the Aquitanians, the Celtae, and the Belgae were each identical with one of three 'races' whose remains have been found in neolithic tombs, and that 'in the early neolithic age' Gaul was conquered by 'the ancestors of the Belgic Gauls'; but as it is unlikely that the theory has now any adherents, I refrain from reproducing the criticism. Everybody knows that the Aquitanians, the Celtae, and the Belgae were not races at all, but mixtures of races.

[5] See *Rev. mensuelle de l'École d'anthr.*, vi, 1896, pp. 102–3; *L'Anthr.*, xviii, 1907, p. 128; and *Rev. arch.*, 4e sér., xiii, 1909, pp. 217–9.

guard, were dolichocephalic ; others, apparently including individuals who resembled the tall ' Round Barrow race ' of Britain, as brachycephalic as the people of Grenelle.[1]

The prehistoric ethnology of Switzerland has been exhaustively treated by M. A. Schenk.[2] No palaeolithic skulls are known. Eighteen skeletons have been found in neolithic cists at Chamblandes, near Lausanne, comprising dolichocephalic and mesaticephalic specimens, the average height of which was 1 metre 582, or about 5 feet 2¼ inches. The skulls represented three types,—that of Baumes-Chaudes, a negroid type resembling that of Mentone, and another which is believed to be of northern origin.[3] Twenty-seven skeletons—all either dolichocephalic or mesaticephalic—have been found near Schaffhausen, and several others at Dachsenbüel in the canton of Schaffhausen. The two latter groups included individuals of very short stature, who, however, must not be called pygmies.[4] Forty-three skulls of the Neolithic Age have been found in lake-dwellings, of which 6 belong to the earliest period, 20 to the period when the art of fashioning stone implements was at its zenith, and 17 to the following period of transition. The earliest group is entirely of the brachycephalic Grenelle type: the second is composed of 10 Grenelle skulls, belonging to individuals whose stature, calculated by M. Manouvrier's method, varied from 1 metre 50 (barely 5 feet) to 1 metre 60 (about 5 feet 3 inches), 2 mesaticephalic and 8 dolichocephalic ; the third is likewise mixed, but here dolichocephalic skulls are predominant.[5] The Bronze Age is represented by 51 skulls of various types, dolichocephalic, akin to those of the Neolithic Age, being again the most numerous ; but in the period of transition, which has left 14 of the specimens, pure brachycephalic skulls once more form the majority.

That the original brachycephalic inhabitants of Gaul were invaders who came from the east is with most French anthropologists an article of faith.[6] M. Zaborowski observes that Sicily, which was already inhabited by a dolichocephalic people, was entered in the Copper Age by round-headed immigrants, coarse-visaged and short-nosed, like those who are figured on Assyrian monuments of about 3700 B. C.,[7] and that people of similar type appeared in Crete in the

[1] *L'Anthr.*, xi, 1900, pp. 382–4, 386, 388–9, 400.

[2] *Rev. de l'École d'anthr.*, xiv, 1904, pp. 335–78 ; xv, 1905, pp. 389–407 ; *Bull. et mém. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, 5e sér., viii, 1907, pp. 212–28. Cf. *Rev. mensuelle de l'École d'anthr.*, v, 1895, pp. 137–54, and *L'Anthr.*, x, 1899, pp. 281–9 ; xvii, 1906, pp. 547–57 ; xix, 1908, pp. 283–4.

[3] See p. 273, n. 4.

[4] *L'Anthr.*, xvii, 1906, pp. 78–9.

[5] The latest Swiss brachycephalic skulls of the Neolithic Age belong to the Disentis type—so called after a town in the canton of Grisons—which is simply a variety of the brachycephalic type of Middle Europe. They are very short and broad, having higher indices than those of the Grenelle type.

[6] *Rev. mensuelle de l'École d'anthr.*, vi, 1896, p. 105 ; viii, 1898, pp. 201–8 ; xiv, 1904, p. 378 ; xviii, 1908, pp. 394–6 ; *Bull. et mém. de la Soc. d'anthr.*, 5e sér., viii, 1907, p. 227 ; *L'Anthr.*, xx, 1909, p. 232. See also *Geogr. Journal*, xxviii, 1906, p. 554 ; *Archiv f. Anthr.*, N. F., vii, 1909, pp. 266–7.

[7] *Rev. de l'École d'anthr.*, xviii, 1908, pp. 394–6.

'Eneolithic' period [1]—the period of transition between the Neolithic and the Copper Age—which corresponded with the Neolithic Age of Northern Gaul.[2] Remarking that similar skulls have been found on the eastern coast of Spain, associated with objects of Asiatic origin, he concludes that the round-headed inhabitants of Spain and those of Central Europe were of Asiatic descent.[3]

Certain anthropologists, however, hold that the origin of the so-called Alpine race is uncertain ;[4] while others, notably Dr. William Wright, believe that the type 'was evolved on European soil'. Dr. Wright, indeed, apparently believes that brachycephaly was indigenous in Gaul. Admitting that its existence 'in Europe in the Palaeolithic period is doubtful',[5] he points out that 'some of the skulls from Furfooz, Grenelle, and the kitchen-middens of Portugal (all of which he apparently regards as mesolithic) are brachycephalic', and that nine of the eighteen Chamblandes skulls, which he would like to assign to the same period, are mesaticephalic ; and he concludes that 'on the whole the evidence points to the presence of brachycephalic individuals in Europe in Mesolithic, if not in Palaeolithic time'.[6] Why the Chamblandes skulls should be quoted, I cannot see ; for Dr. Wright himself justly admits that two of the implements that were found with them prove that they belong to 'the Neolithic or polished-stone Age'.[7] He goes on to remark that 'if Europe be charted according to the cephalic index of its inhabitants, it is found that a wedge-shaped area, having its base to the East and its apex to the West, contains the great mass of the round-headed population of Europe' ; but, allowing that 'the shape of the area is certainly suggestive of an intrusion from the East', he nevertheless insists that his opponents have fallen into the error of 'believing that the cephalic index was distributed in prehistoric times as it is to-day.'[8] As he observes, 'the great bulwark'—or one of the bulwarks—'of the theory is the statement that the earliest Swiss lake-dwellers were round-headed' ; but he urges that if 'instead of trusting to the cephalic index we take note of the shape of the brachycephalic crania, we find that they are pentagonoid . . . not round'.[9] Here speaks a loyal disciple of Sergi. His conclusion is that *historical* invasions from Asia 'are mainly responsible for the high cephalic index possessed by the Eastern parts of Central Europe'.[10]

[1] *Rev. de l'École d'anthr.*, xviii, 1908, p. 397.
[2] *Rev. arch.*, 4e sér., xii, 1908, pp. 230–1.
[3] *Rev. de l'École d'anthr.*, xviii, 1908, pp. 2, 18–9.
[4] *Archiv f. Anthr.*, N. F., vii, 1908, pp. 172–5.
[5] *Middlesex Hospital Journal*, xi, 1907, p. 190. [6] *Ib.*, pp. 189–90.
[7] *Ib.*, p. 180. Dr. Wright says in another place (*ib.*, xii, 1908, p. 46) that 'it is so difficult to assign a dwelling to its proper period . . . that it would be unwise to place too much reliance on the dating of various Swiss lake-dwellings'. But is not this what he does himself in regard to 'mesolithic' dwellings ? For proof that the Chamblandes skulls belonged to the close of the Neolithic Age see *Bull. et mém. de la Soc. d'anthr.*, 5e sér., v, 1904, p. 614, and J. Déchelette, *Manuel d'archéologie*, i, 464.
[8] *Middlesex Hospital Journal*, xii, 1908, p. 45. [9] *Ib.*, p. 46.
[10] *Ib.*, p. 47. In a review, which appeared in *Man*, viii, 1908, no. 109, pp. 191–2, of my *Ancient Britain*, Dr. Wright insists, further, on 'the presence

Perhaps ; but obviously not for that of Gaul. The brachycephalic skulls of the earliest Swiss lake-dwellings are unanimously assigned by Continental anthropologists to the Grenelle type ; in other words, they belong to the 'Alpine' race. Moreover, it seems difficult to reconcile Dr. Wright's theory with the facts that in the two oldest known neolithic stations in Gaul—those of Baumes-Chaudes and l'Homme Mort—almost every skull was dolichocephalic and not one brachycephalic, and that of other neolithic sites some yielded only brachycephalic, others only dolichocephalic skulls.[1] These facts seem to me and to all anthropologists, except Dr. Wright and Professor Ridgeway, to prove that in Gaul, as in Britain, the round-heads, wherever their cradle may have been, were originally invaders.[2]

III

THE LIGURIANS

1. From the statements of the ancient geographers and historians it appears that the Ligurians in Transalpine Gaul inhabited a tract between the Maritime Alps and the Rhône ; that they were intermingled with the Iberians on the west of the Rhône : and that their country was invaded by Celts.[3]

In the time of Hesiod the islands of Hyères were called Λιγυστίδες.[4]

of a sub-brachycephalic population in North Wales in Mesolithic time. This population', he says, 'was almost certainly earlier than that whose dead are found in the long barrows of Wiltshire, and yet it was well on its way towards brachycephaly.' But is it not a little rash to infer the presence of a 'sub-brachycephalic population' from the existence of three skulls, only one of which had an index as high as 80 ? These skulls, moreover, are generally classed as neolithic (*Anc. Britain*, pp. 395–6) ; and even if they were locally mesolithic, it does not follow, considering the remoteness of the district in which they were found, that they were older than the long barrows.

[1] See p. 273.

[2] In many neolithic interments of France skeletons have been found side by side which differed from one another in every respect. 'Par suite,' says M. R. Verneau (*L'Anthr.*, xii, 1901, pp. 547–8), 'on ne s'explique pas que le même milieu ait agi sur les uns de manière à les modifier dans un sens et sur les autres de façon à les modifier dans un sens opposé.' And again, 'Lorsqu'on reporte sur une carte de l'Europe les stations néolithiques dans lesquelles ont été trouvés des crânes brachycéphales, on voit se dessiner bien nettement un courant orienté à peu près de l'est à l'ouest. Dans cette dernière direction on constate avec non moins de netteté que le courant se divise et qu'entre ses branches existent des zones franchement dolichocéphales. Peut-on supposer un seul instant que le milieu ait présenté alors des variations absolument désordonnées sur un espace restreint ? . . . C'est là une hypothèse absolument inadmissible, tandis que la théorie des courants de migration acceptée par presque tous les anthropologistes explique ces faits de la façon la plus satisfaisante . . . ce qu'on peut dire c'est qu'il est infiniment vraisemblable que ce berceau [of brachycephaly] ne saurait être placé en France.' See also *L'Anthr.*, xviii, 1907, p. 127, and *Journ. Anthr. Inst.*, xxxix, 1909, p. 299.

[3] The earliest extant mention of the Ligurians, contained in a line borrowed by Eratosthenes from a *Periplus* of the 6th century B. C. and quoted by Strabo (vii, 3, § 7), is too vague to help us.

[4] *Argonautica*, ed. Didot, bk. iv, 554–5.

According to Festus Avienus,[1] a writer of the fourth century, whose *Ora maritima* was based ultimately upon the Carthaginian account of the voyage of Himilco,[2] the Rhône formed the boundary between the Ligurians and the Iberians; but Hecataeus,[3] who wrote about 500 B.C., says that the Elisyces, who dwelt in the neighbourhood of Narbonne, were Ligurians. In another passage, which will be examined presently, Avienus says that the northern part of Gaul also, and therefore presumably the whole, was once occupied by Ligurians, who were expelled by Celts.[4] Scylax[5] says that the Ligurians inhabited the country east of the Rhône as far as Antium (in Italy), and that the country west of the Rhône was occupied by Ligurians mixed with Iberians.[6] According to Aristotle,[7] Ligurians dwelt in the neighbourhood of Bellegarde, some 20 miles south-west of Geneva. Scymnus of Chios[8] says that Massilia was in Liguria, and that the easternmost town of Liguria in Gaul was Antipolis, or Antibes. Strabo[9] implies that in this part of Gaul Celts were mingled with Ligurians; and this is also proved by the discovery of Celtic inscriptions at Nîmes and Saint-Remy.[10] According to an inscription quoted by Gruter,[11] the Vocontii, who dwelt in the

[1] *Ora maritima*, 608–10.

[2] H. d'A. de Jubainville, *Principaux auteurs . . . à consulter sur l'hist. des Celtes*, &c., 1902, p. 42. Cf. *Rhein. Mus.*, N. F., l, 1895, pp. 321–47.

[3] *Hist. Graec. fragm.*, ed. Didot, t. i, p. 2, fr. 20. M. Philipon (*Les Ibères*, 1909, p. 121, n. 2) argues that this passage is an interpolation; for, he says, appealing to Herodotus, vii, 165, § 1, the Elisyces were not Ligurians, but Iberians. But Herodotus says no such thing: he differentiates the Elisyces both from the Iberians and from the Ligurians; and M. d'Arbois de Jubainville (*Les premiers habitants de l'Europe*, i, 1889, p. 377) infers that they were a medley of Ligurians and Iberians. [4] *Ora maritima*, 129–35. [5] *Geogr. Graec. min.*, ed. Didot, i, 15–7.

[6] It is important to decide whether in the country which was occupied by Ligurians mingled with Iberians the Iberians had invaded Ligurian or the Ligurians Iberian territory. M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, i, 265, nn. 2, 4) remarks that Hecataeus, who wrote about 500 B.C., mentions no Iberians on the north of the Pyrenees, whereas only a few years later, when the *Periplus* which Avienus copied appeared, Roussillon and the neighbourhood of Narbonne were inhabited by Iberians. But when we consider the admitted brevity of the interval which separated the *Periplus* from the work of Hecataeus, and the impossibility of fixing the date of either with precision, M. Jullian's inference seems to rest upon unsubstantial grounds. He appeals to Avienus (*Ora maritima*, 586–8) and Herodotus (*Fragm. hist. Graec.*, ed. Didot, vol. ii, p. 34) to show that the Ligurian kingdom of the Elisyces was conquered by Iberians; but in the former text the Iberians, in the latter the Elisyces are not mentioned. Scylax, as we have seen, states that Ligurians were mingled with Iberians west of the Rhône; whereas Avienus says that the Rhône separated the two peoples. Must we not conclude from a comparison of these two texts (with which compare H. d'Arbois de Jubainville, *Les premiers habitants de l'Europe*, i, 1889, p. 375) that Ligurians crossed the Rhône after the date of Avienus's *Periplus* and encroached upon Iberian territory? If we are to escape this conclusion, we must suppose either that Avienus's statement was not intended to be taken literally, or that it was derived from some authority later than the Carthaginian *Periplus*. See *Rhein. Mus.*, l, 1895, pp. 321–47, and Rice Holmes, *Anc. Britain*, p. 490. [7] *Meteorol.*, i, 13, § 30.

[8] *Geogr. Graec. min.*, ed. Didot, i, 204, vv. 211, 216.

[9] ii, 5, § 28; iv, 6, § 3. Cf. J. C. Zeuss, *Die Deutschen*, 1837, p. 163.

[10] *Rev. celt.*, xviii, 1897, p. 320.

[11] *Corpus inscr.*, ed. Graevius, t. i, pars 2, p. ccxcviii.

department of the Drôme, were Ligurians: but the names of the towns in their territory were Celtic; Strabo [1] clearly implies that they were not Ligurians; and, though there was doubtless a Ligurian stratum in the population, the Celts were indisputably predominant. Strabo [2] says that the Salluvii, in whose country Marseilles is situated, were called Ligurians by the old Greek writers; and Pliny [3] calls them by the same name. Livy,[4] not troubling himself about ethnological distinctions, speaks of them as Gauls; and Strabo [5] says that, in later times, they were known as Celto-Ligurians. Similarly Plutarch [6] says that the Ligurians were intermixed with Gauls and Iberians. Strabo [7] also says that the Taurini and the inhabitants of the kingdom of Cottius, that is to say the Alpine country between Embrun and Drubiaglio, were Ligurians; and Ligurians are said to have colonized Spain,[8] Corsica,[9] and Sicily.[10] Finally, Diodorus Siculus [11] describes the Ligurians as small and lean, but robust.

The passage in which Avienus says that the northern part of Gaul was once occupied by Ligurians is worthless. Desjardins,[12] who has minutely analysed it, remarks with grim humour that Avienus would have smiled if he could have foreseen that Müllenhoff and other scholars would take these lines seriously. When we remember how vaguely the word 'Celt' was sometimes used by ancient writers, we cannot be sure that the meaning of the word 'Ligurian' was constant.[13] Moreover, the lines are not strengthened by the statement which Avienus makes in another poem, that the whole of Gaul was once occupied by Iberians;[14] and they are inconsistent with the statement, which is supported by other writers, that (about 500 B.C., before the Celts reached South-eastern Gaul) the western frontier of the Ligurians was the Rhône.

2. M. d'Arbois de Jubainville [15] endeavours to prove, from the evidence of toponymy, that the dominion of the Ligurians in Gaul extended much further than is generally believed. Remarking the frequency with which the suffixes *-asco*, *-asca*, *-usco*, *-usca*, *-osco*, and *-osca* are found in the province of Cuneo in Piedmont, which was undoubtedly inhabited by Ligurians, he infers that these suffixes

[1] iv, 6, § 4.
[2] iv, 6, § 3.
[3] *Nat. Hist.*, iii, 5 (7), § 47.
[4] *Epit.*, 60. Cf. xxi, 26, § 3.
[5] iv, 6, § 3.
[6] *Aemilius Paulus*, 6.
[7] iv, 6, § 6. Dr. Lagneau says that, according to Strabo, the Salassi, the Veragri, and the Nantuates were Ligurians: but, as Desjardins points out (*Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 92–3, n. 5), Strabo nowhere makes this statement; and Polybius (ii, 15, § 8) calls these peoples Gauls. Still, their territory may have been occupied by Ligurians before Celts invaded it.
[8] See p. 280, n. 1.
[9] Seneca, *Dial.*, xii, 7, §§ 8–9.
[10] Dionysius of Halicarnassus, i, 22, § 2; Silius Italicus, xiv, 37. M. J. Déchelette (*Manuel d'archéologie*, ii, 8, n. 1) believes that their statements are confirmed by archaeological evidence.
[11] iv, 20, § 1.
[12] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 52–5, note.
[13] See the significant remarks of Strabo, i, 2, § 27.
[14] See p. 281, n. 1.
[15] *Rev. celt.*, xi, 1890, p. 156; *Les premiers habitants de l'Europe*, ii, 1894, p. 115.

were Ligurian;[1] and, after a further search, he finds that they occur also in the departments of the Alpes-Maritimes, Var, Bouches-du-Rhône, Gard, Hérault, Basses-Alpes, Vaucluse, Hautes-Alpes, Drôme, Ardèche, Savoie, Isère, Ain, Rhône, Jura, Saône-et-Loire, Côte-d'Or, Doubs, Haute-Saône, Yonne, Aube, Marne, Haute-Loire, Aveyron, and Ariège.[2]

M. d'Arbois[3] draws a further argument from the name *Rhodanus* (Rhône), which, like K. Müllenhoff,[4] he regards as Ligurian. The name, he remarks, was borrowed by the Greeks from their countrymen, the colonists of Massilia, who, as late as the fourth century B.C., had only Ligurians for neighbours.[5] If it were objected that *Rhodanus* might have been the name of the Rhône before the Ligurians entered Gaul, he would reply that the word comes from the root *Rot* or *Rod*, which is found also in *Rodumna*, a word undoubtedly Ligurian.[6] M. d'Arbois then points to the existence of 'des Rhodanus' near Trèves, Cahors, and Le Mans, and infers that, at some time or other, the districts which surround those towns were inhabited by Ligurians.

[1] M. E. Philipon (*Les Ibères*, 1909, pp. 150–1), who holds that Iberian and Ligurian were closely related, affirms that the suffixes in question were common to the two languages; for, he observes, they are found in Spain as well as in Gaul, and Ligurians never entered Spain. This reckless assertion implicitly contradicts Thucydides, vi, 2, § 2; and M. d'Arbois de Jubainville, who gives a curious reason (see p. 281, n. 1) for rejecting his statement, nevertheless infers that there were Ligurians in Spain from Avienus, *Ora maritima*, 284–5, with which cf. Strabo, ii, 1, § 40. M. Déchelette, however (*Manuel d'archéologie*, ii, 8, n. 1), argues on archaeological grounds that the Ligurian element was small.

[2] M. Maximin Deloche (*Rev. celt.*, xviii, 1897, pp. 366–71) argues in a similar strain. He says that in the department of the Basses-Pyrénées there is a hill called *Legorre*; that two forests in the basin of the Dordogne and the department of the Aisne were respectively called, in the Middle Ages, *silva de Ligurio* and *Ligurium*, and so on; and he agrees with M. d'A. de Jubainville (*Les premiers habitants de l'Europe*, ii, 207) in regarding the word *Liger* (the Loire) as probably of Ligurian origin. But, as one of his reviewers sensibly remarks (*Rev. arch.*, 3e sér., xxx, 1897, p. 424), the fact that the site of the ancient Epidaurus is now called *Ligourio* warns us to view such arguments with suspicion; and M. d'Arbois de Jubainville himself gives reasons (*Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., xxxi, 1876, pp. 379–88) for rejecting the derivation proposed by Artemidorus (cited by Stephanus of Byzantium, ed. A. Meineke, i, 416), of the name of the Ligurians from the river Λιγύρος (Loire).

[3] *Les premiers habitants de l'Europe*, ii, 1894, pp. 124–5.

[4] *Deutsche Altertumskunde*, i, 193–4.

[5] Scylax, § 4, in *Geogr. Graec. min.*, ed. Müller, i, 17–8.

[6] M. Philipon (*Les Ibères*, pp. 104, 119, 121) asserts that *Rhodanus* is not a Ligurian, but an Iberian word; for, he argues, the Ligurians would have written not *Rhodanus*, but *Rhodenus*, as in Λήμεννα,—the Greek form of the Ligurian name of the Lake of Geneva (see A. Holder, *Alt-celtischer Sprachschatz*, ii, 172–3); and, moreover, the Ligurians did not reach the Rhône until about 400 B.C., whereas the word *Rhodanus* was mentioned by Aeschylus and Avienus. Certainly it was: but Aeschylus (quoted by Strabo, iv, 1, § 7) implies that Provence was inhabited by Ligurians, and, as we have seen, Avienus expressly says that the Rhône was the boundary between the Iberians and the Ligurians. So also Herodotus (v, 9, § 3) speaks of the Ligurians who dwell above Massilia (Λίγυες οἱ ἄνω ὑπὲρ Μασσαλίης οἰκέοντες). The mode in which M. Philipon manipulates texts is not one of his strong points. As to his linguistic argument, what right has he to deny that in a language of which we know hardly anything the termination *-anos* was inadmissible?

Sequana, the Gallic name of the Seine, is also, he maintains, a Ligurian word ;[1] for if it were Celtic, we may be sure, from our knowledge of a phonetic law which influenced the development of Celtic speech, that the *q* would have been replaced by a *p* at a date anterior to the first Celtic invasion of Gaul.[2] The Ligurians, unlike the Celts, did not change *q* into *p* :[3] witness *Quadiates*,[4] the name of a Ligurian tribe who dwelt in the Cottian Alps.

Sir John Rhys, who formerly regarded *Sequana* not as Ligurian but as 'Celtican', that is to say, belonging to a dialect akin to Goidelic, the ancestor of Gaelic, now thinks that 'Celtican' was 'practically the same language as that which M. d'Arbois de Jubainville calls Ligurian'. Obviously it was, whether it was akin to Goidelic or not ; but the question is whether it was originally spoken by Ligurians and not by Celts. Sir John Rhys's reason appears to be simply that the same dialect was at a later time spoken, or at all events written, in territory which was inhabited by Ligurians. But, as we shall afterwards see, he still holds that this dialect was spoken by the Celtae before they were conquered by those Celts who imposed upon them the Gaulish (or Gallo-Brythonic) language, which was virtually identical with the Brythonic speech from which Welsh and Breton are sprung ; and it would therefore seem that in his opinion the Celtae, or rather that branch of the Celts who formed the conquering group among the Celtae, learned 'Celtican' from Ligurians.[5] This, as we shall afterwards see, is contrary to all

[1] It is amusing, if at first sight somewhat perplexing, to find that M. Philipon (*Les Ibères*, pp. 127–9) insists that *Sequana* must be an Iberian word, because it ends in *-ana* (see the preceding note) ; and, appealing to Avienus (*Descriptio orbis terrae*, 416–8), he argues that the Iberian empire(!) 's'étendait à travers la Gaule jusqu'à la mer du Nord.' Thus the authority of Avienus is invoked, on the one hand to show that the Ligurians occupied the whole of Gaul in the sixth century B. C., on the other hand to show that at the same period it was subject to Iberians ! Avienus's *Descriptio* was based upon the *Periegesis* of Dionysius, who flourished about 300 A. D., and whose work was itself derived largely from Eratosthenes.

M. d'Arbois de Jubainville (*Les premiers habitants de l'Europe*, i, 1889, pp. 28–9) likewise holds that the Iberians, in the wider sense of the word, were once masters of Gaul. He thinks that it would not be rash to search in Gaul for the river Sicanus, mentioned by Thucydides (vi, 2, § 2), and to identify it with the Sequana,—the Seine. The Sicanians of Sicily, as Thucydides informs us, 'were Iberians, and were driven from the river Sicanus in Iberia by Ligurians'. Thus, according to M. d'Arbois, Gallia was first Iberia and afterwards Liguria : *Sicanus* was the equivalent of *Sequana* ; and *Sequana* was a Ligurian word ! Are not these hypotheses as futile as they are bewildering ? Cf. Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 45, n. 3, and E. Hübner, *Monumenta ling. Iber.*, 1893, p. lxxxv.

[2] *Les premiers habitants de l'Europe*, ii, 1894, pp. 132–3, 282 ; *Les Celtes*, 1904, pp. 17–9. M. d'Arbois holds, however, that although the Celts had changed *q* into *p*—for instance, **Qarisii* into *Parisii*—they had 'recovered the faculty of pronouncing *q*', and that accordingly the Sequani called themselves after the Ligurian name of the Seine.

[3] See p. 319.

[4] *Corpus inscr. Lat.*, v, 7231, § 14.

[5] Or else that Ligurians and 'Q Celts' were one ! The Celts were sharply distinguished by the ancient writers from the Ligurians : would Sir John Rhys contend that the language of the 'Celticans', when they invaded Gaul, was identical with the language of the Ligurians ?

analogy; and I would ask Sir John Rhys whether he believes that the Goidels who invaded the British Isles learned Goidelic from Ligurians. I cannot help thinking that his partial recantation is weak; and with great respect I would suggest that he has thought himself into a muddle. Considering 'the great dearth of linguistic remains belonging to the older and subjugated people' on which he rightly insists, is it not more likely that *Sequana* was Ligurian *and pre-Celtic* than that a solitary tribe of 'Q Celts' should have appeared in the midst of 'P Celts', and retained their distinctive name although the existence of a town called *Epomanduodurum*[1] proves that even among them 'P Celts' were or became predominant?[2]

And now, if the reader is not too weary, let him listen to M. Camille Jullian.[3] This eminent scholar argues that the termination *-briga*, which is commonly regarded as Celtic, is probably Ligurian; for, first, most of the place-names which end in *-briga* belong to the Spanish peninsula, where the Celtic element was weaker than in any other part of Western Europe; secondly, many of these names are found in lands 'where the names of Celt or Celtiberian were never uttered'; thirdly, *-briga*, unlike *-dunum*, *-durum*, and *-magus*, is hardly ever compounded with a word which is unmistakably Celtic; fourthly, in the country of the Cantabri *-briga* is associated with Latin words, as in *Juliobriga*, which proves that it belonged to t language spoken in that country, and, says M. Jullian, if that language had been Celtic, Mela and Pliny would have said so; and, lastly, *-briga* is extremely rare in Gaul. May I remark in passing that this last statement hardly supports M. Jullian's contention that in pre-Celtic times the masters of Gaul were Ligurians, and, further, that *-briga* is extremely rare even in the area which was unquestionably Ligurian?

All over Gaul, however, and likewise in Spain, Corsica, Italy,

[1] *Itin. Ant.*, ed. Wesseling, p. 386.

[2] Sir John Rhys, in a paper (*Proc. Brit. Acad.*, vol. iv) which has just come into my hands, has given a fresh reason for believing that the famous calendar of Coligny (see p. 319, n. 11, *infra*) 'is in a Celtic language [which he still identifies with Ligurian] other than Gaulish.' See Addenda.

M. Alfred Maury (*Comptes rendus de l'Acad. des inscr.*, &c., 4e sér., v, 1877, pp. 208–11) argues that Ligurian was a dialect of Celtic, because *Bodincus*, the Ligurian name of the Po (Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, iii, 16, § 122), resembles *Agedincum*, and the names of various Ligurian tribes, mentioned by Pliny, 'affectent une physionomie celtique.' This is rather vague: but Celts had settled in Ligurian territory; and indeed M. Maury himself says (pp. 210–1), 'Il nous paraît hors de doute que les Ligyens étaient une population celtique ou tout au moins qui avait été celtisé.' As to *Bodincus*, Pliny made his statement on the authority of a Greek, who said that the word meant 'bottomless'; and if this is true, it is hard to see how *Bodincus* and *Agedincum* can have anything in common. Cf. *Bull. bibl. . . . du Musée belge*, 1908, p. 69.

Since the appearance of M. d'Arbois de Jubainville's *Les premiers habitants de l'Europe* the prevailing opinion has been that Ligurian was at all events an Indo-European language; but M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, i, 125) exercises a judicious reserve when he says that 'l'origine indo-européenne de cette langue est la moins invraisemblable des conjectures qu'elle a suggérées'.

[3] *Rev. des études anc.*, viii, 1906, pp. 47–50, with which cf. ix, 1907, p. 178.

Sicily, Germany, and Britain, M. Jullian[1] finds traces of the Ligurian language. A thousand names or more of rivers, lakes, springs, and mountains in France are of Ligurian origin, for instance, *Ardennes*, *Bièvre*, *Dive*, and *Divonne*; and so are various names of towns, such as *Alesia*, *Bibracte*, *Bibrax*, *Geneva*, and *Nemausus*.[2]

But M. Jullian's conclusions have not been allowed to pass unchallenged. M. Loth[3] tells him that few words are more certainly Celtic than *-briga*; M. Philipon, justly remarking that if all the forty-one names in the Spanish peninsula which ended in *-brica* or *-briga* were Celtic, it would be necessary to admit, against historical evidence, that the Celts were once masters of the whole country, argues that the Celtic *-briga*, which appears in *Magetobriga*, must be distinguished from another *-briga*, which was merely the Latin adaptation of an Iberian word, meaning 'town';[4] while M. d'Arbois[5] and Dr. Victor Tourneur[6] insist that *Ardennes*, *Bièvre*, *Dive*, *Divonne*, and the rest are not Ligurian, but Celtic; and M. Salomon Reinach, remarking that 'Pan-Ligurism' is an illusion, asks whether the predecessors of the Ligurians were dumb.[7]

Still, it is not sufficient to show that some of the names which M. Jullian cites are Celtic. He insists, with some exaggeration but not wholly without reason, that his examples 'se retrouvent presque tous dans des régions où l'influence celtique n'a jamais pénétré'.[8] Thus a *Deva*, which he equates with *Dive* and *Dee*, flowed through the territory of the Spanish Basques:[9] in the Portuguese *Douro* he sees an equivalent of the Italian *Duria*, which is likewise the name of a tributary of the Danube;[10] *Isara* is the common name of the Isère, the Oise, and the Bavarian Isar;[11] and *Cebenna*, the Cevennes, otherwise *Cimenice regio*,[12] is the counterpart of *saltus Ceminii*,[13] the forests north of the Tiber. But if these names were pre-Celtic, who can show that they were Ligurian?

Sieglin[14] contends that the Aquitanian tribal names ending in *-ates* are Ligurian; and although Schuchardt[15] suggests that they may be Celtic, it is remarkable that another group of such names—*Deciates*, *Desuviates*, *Ednates*, *Nantuates*, and *Quariates*—exists in Liguria, and nowhere else in Gaul.

The truth is that the linguistic data are insufficient; for, as Schuchardt[16] says, hardly anything of the Ligurian language is

[1] *Hist. de la Gaule*, i, 111–7. Cf. H. d'Arbois de Jubainville, *Les premiers habitants de l'Europe*, ii, 1894, pp. 46–215.
[2] *Hist. de la Gaule*, ii, 254.
[3] *Rev. celt.*, xxviii, 1907, p. 339. See also p. 356.
[4] *Les Ibères*, pp. 158–64. M. Vendryes (*Rev. celt.*, xxx, 1909, p. 204) commends M. Philipon's suggestion.
[5] *Rev. celt.*, xxix, 1908, p. 81.
[6] *Bull. bibl. . . . du Musée belge*, 1908, pp. 62, 69.
[7] *Rev. arch.*, 4e sér., xi, 1908, pp. 302–3.
[8] *Hist. de la Gaule*, i, 114, n. 3.
[9] Ptolemy, *Geogr.*, ii, 6, § 8. Cf. 3, § 4.
[10] Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, iv, 12 (25), § 81.
[11] A. Holder, *Alt-celtischer Sprachschatz*, ii, 72–5.
[12] Avienus, *Ora maritima*, 622.
[13] Livy, ix, 36, § 7.
[14] *Sitzungsberichte d. Königl. preuss. Akad. d. Wissenschaften*, 1896, p. 446, n. 3.
[15] *Die iber. Deklination*, p. 66.
[16] *Ib.*

known, and it is unlikely that rival philologists will ever agree. Conjecture is of course necessary for the progress of linguistic science; but when conjecture has no material to work upon, it reminds one of the scholastic *chimaera bombinans in vacuo*. The force of the argument from toponymy must not indeed be underrated; but if it is rigorously tested, I do not think that we can safely rely upon any names except *Rhodanus*, the terminations in *-asco* and the like,[1] and perhaps *Sequana*, *Isara*, and the tribal names in *-ates*. This evidence would lead to the conclusion that, besides the territory which the ancient writers assigned to them, the Ligurians also possessed the eastern region as far north as the Marne, which comprised Franche-Comté, Alsace and Lorraine, Burgundy, and a part of Champagne, and perhaps also Aquitania.[2]

3. We have next to inquire, with a view to solving the problem which we have just been considering, what were the physical characters of the Ligurians. Diodorus Siculus, as we have seen, says that they were small and lean, but strong; and the epithet 'lean' may possibly suggest that the individuals whom he or his informants had observed belonged to the slender long-headed stock rather than to the round-heads, who, though they were also small, were certainly of sturdy build.[3] A. Hovelacque has measured 70 modern skulls found in the mountains of Savoy, the inhabitants of which, he maintains, have been free from all admixture of foreign blood.[4] The average cephalic index of these skulls was 85·41, and the indices of seven exceeded 90,—that is to say, they were more brachycephalic than 88 Auvergnat skulls taken from St. Nectaire-le-Haut, which Broca examined.[5] There are other differences between the two series. The Savoyard skulls are mesorrhinian, those of Auvergne leptorrhinian.[6] The orbital index of the Savoyard skulls is 89·41, that of the Auvergnat 86·5; and the cranial capacity of the former is considerably less than that of the latter. The hair of the modern inhabitants of Liguria, adds M. Zaborowski,[7] is very dark brown, darker than that of the inhabitants of Central France, and so are their eyes. In fine, says this writer, they are a type of the small, dark, brachycephalic race at its purest.[8]

All this is the hastiest generalization. The Ligurians of Savoy were conquered by Celts; and Hovelacque's skulls, if they prove anything, can only be regarded as typical of the Ligurians or the

[1] If Festus Avienus, on whose testimony M. d'Arbois relies, were right, would it not be surprising that these names occur only in the eastern region, south of the Marne?

M. C. Jullian's article, 'De la nécessité d'un Corpus topographique du monde ancien' (*Klio*, ii, 1902, pp. 1–13), is well worth reading.

[2] Cf. p. 297, and J. Déchelette, *Manuel d'archéologie*, ii, 8–11.

[3] *Mém. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, 2e sér., i, 1873, pp. 285–6.

[4] *Rev. d'anthr.*, vi, 1877, pp. 226–52.

[5] See p. 309.

[6] See p. 262.

[7] *Dict. des sc. anthr.*, p. 247.

[8] See also *Rev. de l'École d'anthr.*, xvii, 1907, p. 365.

Celto-Ligurians, of a certain region.[1] R. Livi[2] has measured 7,951 soldiers—natives of Italian Liguria—whose mean index barely exceeded 82,—equivalent to 80 on the bare skull. It is impossible to tell how much or how little mixture of foreign blood there may have been in certain inhabitants of Italian Liguria—only eight[3] in all—whose skulls have been measured by MM. Nicolucci and Vogt ; and even admitting that they were pure Ligurians, it is impossible to tell what was the exact shade of their hair and eyes. Look at the three tables, giving particulars of the stature, cephalic index, and colouring of the inhabitants of the French departments, which have been prepared by MM. Broca, Collignon, and Topinard.[4] Taking the departments in which the Ligurian element, in Caesar's time, was probably strongest, we find that the Alpes-Maritimes, Var, and Bouches-du-Rhône have indices of 82·85, 82·77, and 81·43 respectively. The measurements on which these figures are based were all, it must be remembered, taken from the heads of living men : none of the figures represents a genuinely brachycephalic, and two only a sub-brachycephalic type of skull.[5] All these Ligurian departments are less brachycephalic than many of the departments of Central France. They are, indeed, marked by M. Topinard as ' very dark ' ; but the table of stature lends little support to the popular theory. The inhabitants of the Ligurian departments ought to be shorter than those of the Celtic. They are taller. The Var is 39th—comparatively high—and the Bouches-du-Rhône 19th ; while the Allier is 78th and the Puy-de-Dôme 84th. Taking the other departments which were inhabited by Ligurians, we obtain results more surprising still. Haute-Savoie, Savoie, the Isère, and the Drôme, have indeed high cephalic indices—87·39, 86·25, 85·32, and 84·89—but all four rank as fair : the Vaucluse, which is also fair, has the low index of 81·53 ; the Hautes-Alpes and Basses-Alpes, which are dark, have indices of 84·37 and 83·67 respectively.[6] If these departments are representatively Ligurian, it is clear that the Ligurians were greatly mixed : if, as is probable, their higher indices are due to an influx of the Celtae or the old round-headed population, the argument that the Ligurians were brachycephalic breaks down. In the three Ligurian departments of the coast there have settled, at different times and in different proportions, Greeks, Gauls, Italians, Jews,

[1] Pruner-Bey has written at great length about three ' Ligurian ' skulls, found in the neighbourhood of Hyères. But even supposing that they did belong to Ligurians, there is nothing to be learned from them. The index of one was 84·50 ; of another 80 ; and the measurements of the third are not stated. See *Bull. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, vi, 1865, pp. 458–74 ; 2e sér., i, 1866, pp. 442–67.

[2] *Antropometria mil.*, 1896, pp. 139–41, 251.

[3] Or fifteen, if Dr. Beddoe is right in saying that Nicolucci found an average index of 86·7 in ten old skulls from Liguria. *The Races of Britain*, p. 28, note. Cf. *Bull. de la Soc. d'anthr.*, vi, 1865, pp. 259–61 ; 2e sér., i, 1866, p. 84.

[4] See p. 305, n. 5.

[5] I am using Broca's terminology.

[6] The four departments—the Gard, Hérault, Aude, and Pyrénées-Orientales—in which Iberians were mingled with Ligurians, are all marked as very dark, and, as might have been expected, have comparatively low indices, ranging from 83·12 to 78·24.

Phoenicians, Saracens, and other peoples;[1] and it may be that this immigration has depressed the cephalic index below that of the old Ligurian population: but to say more would be to mislead.[2]

Recently, indeed, attempts have been made to prove that the Ligurians were a dolichocephalic people. M. Pompeo Castelfranco affirms that two dolichocephalic skulls of the Cro-Magnon type have been found in the Pollera cavern in the commune of Finale, and 20 similar skulls in the cavern 'des Arene Candide.'[3] Both of these caverns are in Italian Liguria; and M. Castelfranco quotes M. Morelli, the discoverer of the Pollera skulls, who argues that the whole collection probably belonged to genuine Ligurians, because, according to Florus[4] and Diodorus Siculus,[5] the Ligurians, in the second century B.C. and in the time of Caesar, dwelt partly in caverns.[6] Moreover, Sergi has exhumed 59 skulls, all dolichocephalic, in the valley of the Po; and he argues that 'if it is true that prehistoric Italy was occupied by the Mediterranean race and by two branches—Ligurian and Pelasgian—of that race, the ancient inhabitants of the Po valley, now exhumed in those 59 skulls, were Ligurian'.[7] Thus the 8 (or possibly 15) brachycephalic skulls of Nicolucci and Vogt are confronted with the 22 dolichocephalic skulls of Morelli and the 59 dolichocephalic skulls of Sergi. If the three groups were all Ligurian, the only conclusion is that the Ligurians were greatly mixed. If the collections of Morelli and Sergi alone deserve consideration, the most that we can safely infer is that dolichocephaly characterized the Ligurians of Italy.

4. And now, who were the Ligurians? According to Broca, their descendants are more brachycephalic than any of the palaeolithic or neolithic peoples; and he accordingly concludes that the Ligurian invaders did not appear in Gaul until towards the close of the Neolithic Age.[8] I do not question the conclusion; but it is needless to insist that Broca's arguments do not prove it. M. Déchelette[9] is inclined, for archaeological reasons, to regard the Ligurians as akin to the Illyrians and the Thracians. On the other hand, Sergi dogmatically affirms that they were simply a branch of the same 'Mediterranean' stock from which the Iberians sprang. If he is right, the Ligurians did not speak an Indo-European language; and I venture to say that his confidence is at least premature.[10]

[1] *Rev. d'anthr.*, 2e sér., ii, 1879, p. 484. Cf. *Atti d. Soc. ligure d. storia patria*, xl, 1908, pp. 215–8.

[2] See *Bull. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, 4e sér., i, 1890, pp. 748–9, vi, 1895, p. 342, with which cf. C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, i, 125–6. But see also *Bull. de la Soc. d'étude des sc. nat. de Nimes*, xxx, 1902 (1903), p. 50.

[3] *Rev. d'anthr.*, 4e sér., i, 1890, pp. 593–9. Cf. *Bull. de la Soc. d'anthr.*, 4e sér., i, 1890, p. 749.

[4] ii, 3.

[5] v, 39, § 5.

[6] The Pollera and Arene Candide skulls are assigned by Signor A. Issel (*Atti d. Soc. ligure d. storia patria*, xl, 1908, pp. 113–4, 650–3) to the Neolithic Age and the Bronze Age.

[7] *Arii e Italici*, 1898, p. 60.

[8] *Bull. de la Soc. d'anthr.*, 2e sér., ix, 1874, p. 713; *Rev. d'anthr.*, ii, 1873, pp. 597–8.

[9] *Manuel d'archéologie*, ii, 7, 16–9.

[10] M. J. Déchelette (*Manuel d'archéologie*, ii, 27, n. 2) shows that the theory that the Ligurians and the Iberians were two branches of the same stock,

My general conclusions are these :—Ligurians undoubtedly lived in South-eastern Gaul, where they were found at least as far north as Bellegarde in the department of the Ain ; and, mingled more or less with Iberians, in the departments of the Gard, Hérault, Aude, and Pyrénées-Orientales. Most probably they had once occupied the whole eastern region as far north as the Marne,[1] but had been submerged by Celts ; and perhaps they had also pushed westward as far as Aquitania. Were it possible to regard the theory of MM. d'Arbois de Jubainville and Jullian as more than an interesting hypothesis, we should have to conclude that the Ligurians were simply the long-headed and short-headed peoples who, reinforced perhaps from time to time by hordes of immigrants, had inhabited the whole of Gaul since the Neolithic Age, and of whom the former, or many of them, were descended from palaeolithic hunters ; in other words, that they were the same people who, after they had been conquered by, or had coalesced with, the Celtic invaders, called themselves *Celtae*: but to say which of them were first known as Ligurians or introduced the Ligurian language would be utterly hopeless. Finally, the little evidence that we possess tends to show that the people called Ligurians, when they became known to the Greek writers who described them, were a medley of different races.

IV

THE IBERIANS

1. The ' Iberian question ' is the most complicated and difficult of all the problems of Gallic ethnology.[2] The word ' Iberian ' is used by different writers in different senses ; and unless one can rely upon being followed with close attention as well as quick intelligence, one is occasionally obliged to pause and explain which of these senses is meant.

which has been defended by B. Modestov (*Intr. à l'hist. rom.*, 1907, pp. 126–43) and Mr. T. E. Peet (*The Stone and Bronze Ages in Italy*, 1909, pp. 167–74), is not confirmed by archaeological evidence. Nor, as we shall see, by the evidence of language.

Mr. Peet, who refers to Sergi in support of his conclusions, argues that all the neolithic peoples of Europe ' originally belonged to one vast race ', because they had four sepulchral customs in common,—painting the skeleton with red ochre, interment in the contracted position, breaking implements which were deposited in the grave, and secondary burial. But the contracted position, which is still adopted by many savages, was almost universal in prehistoric times ; and both it and the use of red ochre were common in Gaul even in the Palaeolithic Age. See J. Déchelette, *Manuel d'archéologie*, i, 204, 301.

[1] C. Mehlis (*Archiv f. Anthr.*, xxvi, 1899, pp. 71–94) comes to a somewhat similar conclusion. With his remarks on pp. 83–5 cf. J. Déchelette, *Manuel d'archéologie*, ii, 23, note.

[2] The origin of the Iberians was a subject of controversy 2,000 years ago, and is so still. Of the ancient geographers some, whom M. E. Philipon (*Les Ibères*, pp. 82–134) endeavours to support, believed that they were an offshoot from the Iberians of Asia ; others held the contrary opinion ; others again thought that the two peoples had nothing in common except their name. See H. d'A. de Jubainville, *Les premiers habitants de l'Europe*, i, 1889, pp. 24–5.

2. According to Festus Avienus,[1] the Iberians occupied the north-eastern part of the Spanish peninsula and the coast of the Mediterranean between the Pyrences and the Rhône. Herodorus of Heraclea, who wrote in the fifth century B. C., appears to regard the Cynetes, who lived near Cape St. Vincent, as the most remote of the Iberian peoples; and he too makes their territory extend eastward as far as the Rhône.[2] Scylax, whose *Periplus* is generally referred to the middle of the fourth century B. C.,[3] gives them the country between the Rhône and the Straits of Gibraltar, though he tells us that, along the coast of Gaul, west of the Rhône, Ligurians were mingled with Iberians.[4] Scymnus of Chios, who wrote about 90 B. C., locates the Iberians between the Rhône and the country of the Tartessi, which was north of Gibraltar and in the lower valley of the Guadalquivir.[5] Hecataeus[6] and Herodotus[7] also distinguish the Iberians from the Tartessi; while Herodorus loosely includes the latter among the Iberian tribes. Eratosthenes, whose views on geography are severely criticized by Strabo, describes the Spanish peninsula as 'the Ligurian' (Λιγυστικήν), and in another place as 'that to which Iberia belongs'.[8] Strabo tells us that the writers of his day (about 19 B. C.) restricted the name *Iberia* to the Spanish peninsula, but that it had formerly been applied also to the country between the Pyrenees and the Rhône; and he appears to affirm that the name was once confined to the eastern part of the peninsula, north of the Ebro.[9] He also remarks[10] that the people of Aquitania spoke a language akin to that of the Iberians, and resembled them rather than the Gauls in appearance. Finally Tacitus[11] says that the Silures of South Wales, who were dark and had curly hair, resembled the Iberians.

The conclusions which I draw from the foregoing items of evidence are these. The name 'Iberian' was probably applied, in the first instance, only to the people who dwelt between the Ebro and the Pyrenees. The Iberians once occupied the seaboard of Gaul between the Rhône and the Pyrenees; but Ligurians encroached upon this part of their territory.[12] They also probably occupied the whole eastern region of the Spanish peninsula. But we must bear in mind that the data are both insufficient and uncertain. Were the various languages or dialects that have been recognized in the so-called Iberian inscriptions all spoken by Iberians, properly so called, or did those inscriptions which have been found in the country of the Tartessi belong to them and not to Iberians who conquered them? Was the language of the Tartessi akin to that of the Iberians? Much depends upon where the Iberians came from; and that we cannot tell.

[1] *Ora maritima*, 248–53, 472, 552, 608–10. See p. 278, *supra*.
[2] *Fragm. hist. Graec.*, ed. Didot, ii, 34, fragm. 20.
[3] See Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 31, and Müller, Prolegomena to *Geogr. Graec. min.*, ed. Didot, pp. xxx–li.
[4] *Geogr. Graec. min.*, i, 15–7.
[5] *Ib.*, i, 203–4, vv. 198–202.
[6] *Ib.*, 1–2, fr. 4–5, 11–8.
[7] i, 163, § 1. Cf. Diodorus Siculus, xxv, 10, § 1.
[8] Strabo, ii, 1, § 40; 4, § 8.
[9] *Ib.*, iii, 4, § 19.
[10] *Ib.*, iii, 1, § 6.
[11] *Agricola*, 11.
[12] See p. 278, n. 6.

3. In spite of the coldness or positive hostility with which it has been received by certain scholars, the theory regarding the Iberians which still dominates the popular imagination is that with which Humboldt,[1] nearly a century ago, electrified the learned world. The great German scholar collected from the itineraries and the works of the ancient geographers all the names of towns, mountains, and the like, belonging to the Spanish peninsula and Southern France: he succeeded, as he thought, in proving that many of these names can be explained from the Basque language, and that some of them are analogous to modern names of places in the districts in which Basque is spoken; and he concluded that the whole peninsula, except those tracts in which Celts settled, and the adjacent part of France had formerly been occupied by a people who spoke one language or various closely allied dialects, the modern representative of which is Basque, and that this was the language of the Iberians.

But Humboldt's theory has of course been modified even by those who are on his side. All modern scholars are agreed that his knowledge of Basque was inadequate, and that many of the etymological explanations which he gave were forced. M. Vinson, in 1870, admitted, on the other hand, that many of those explanations were convincing, and that it was possible, though not proved, that the Basque country 'is the last refuge of the Euskarian peoples'.[2] M. Van Eys also, in 1874, admitted that Basque might possibly be descended, more or less directly from Iberian.[3] But M. Vinson now holds that it is impossible to explain Iberian—by which he means the language whose remains are preserved in the 'Iberian' inscriptions and the legends on the 'Iberian' coins—by means of Basque; and neither the legends on the coins nor the inscriptions have yet been interpreted.[4] On the other hand, an Austrian scholar, G. Phillips, M. Luchaire, Émile Desjardins, and the German epigraphist, Emil Hübner, accepted the essential part of Humboldt's theory; that is to say, while admitting that Humboldt made mistakes in detail, they all held that Basque was descended from the language, of which there were doubtless several dialects, spoken by the Iberians of Spain and Southern France. 'On the whole,' says Hübner,[5] 'Humboldt succeeded, by a most lucid train of reasoning, in establishing what he had set himself to prove, that is to say that names of places and of men which are undoubtedly Iberian are to be explained from the language of the Basques.'[6] The latest successors

[1] *Prüfung der Untersuchungen über die Urbewohner Hispaniens vermittelst der vaskischen Sprache*, 1821.

[2] *Rev. de linguistique*, iv, 1870, pp. 58, 62.

[3] *Association franç. pour l'avancement des sciences*, Lille, 1874, pp. 544–5.

[4] Even E. Hübner, the learned editor of *Monumenta linguae Ibericae*, 'does not confess to even an inkling of the meaning of more than some half a dozen words.' See *Class. Rev.*, viii, 1894, pp. 375–9.

[5] *Mon. ling. Iber.*, pp. xxiv–xxv.

[6] In the first edition (pp. 257–62) I examined the theory to which M. J. F. Bladé, one of Humboldt's principal opponents, devoted a large part of his *Études sur l'origine des Basques* (1869); but I have decided not to reprint my criticism. M. Bladé's view was that the word 'Iberia', as applied to Spain,

of Humboldt, however, have taken up a somewhat different position. They do not regard Basque as a direct descendant of Iberian: as M. Vinson remarks, the connexion which they endeavour to establish between the two is rather analogous to that which subsists between English and Gothic;[1] and Schuchardt is disposed to regard Basque as an offshoot from Aquitanian.[2]

4. I will begin by quoting a sagacious remark of Mr. Wentworth Webster. 'A great deal of the opposition to Humboldt's conclusions,' he says, 'arises from not observing the difference of the conditions of two very different problems,'—(1) whether certain names, for example *Iliberris*, in Spain and Southern France, which we find in a Greek and Latin dress in classical itineraries, &c., are Basque; and (2) what is the language of the so-called Iberian inscriptions. 'The two questions are often confounded, as if they must stand or fall together; whereas they are wholly distinct.'[3]

The inscriptions are divided by M. Vinson into three groups,—those of the south-western part of the peninsula, which are written in Roman characters; those of the south, written in characters adapted from the Phoenician alphabet, from right to left; and those of the north and east, written in the same characters, but from left to right. M. Vinson now believes that each group represents a different language.[4]

Let us now see what modern scholars have to say in support of

was 'only a geographical term', and that 'no proper Iberian race ever existed'; but, warning his readers not to strain his meaning, he says (*op. cit.*, p. 155, n. 1), 'J'admets, pour les temps préhistoriques et pour l'antiquité, la prédominance en Espagne et dans la Gaule méridionale de la race brune, de médiocre stature, et aux cheveux frisés ou ondés, à laquelle les ethnologues donnent le nom d'ibérienne. . . . A cette race s'appliquent la plupart des indications fournies par les auteurs classiques sur les populations de l'Espagne et de Ligurie.' I freely admit that M. Bladé has succeeded in proving that *Iberia* was simply a geographical expression: but this fact required no proof; and it was a sad waste of time and labour to expend half a volume in establishing it. No fair critic would, however, allow that this scholar has succeeded in proving that 'no proper Iberian race ever existed', or that those inhabitants of Southern Gaul whom the ancient geographers called Iberians were Celts or some other people. The word 'Iberian' was sometimes used to cover the Tartessi and other tribes with whom the Iberians had mingled; but I have already warned the reader to be on his guard against this confusion. The ancient geographers made mistakes; and from the standpoint of modern science the best of them were no doubt sadly deficient. But they were not fools.

But I must try to make my meaning perfectly clear. When I follow the ancient geographers and say that the southern seaboard of Gaul stretching westward from the mouths of the Rhône was inhabited by Iberians, I by no means intend to imply that the Iberians were a homogeneous people. There is no such thing as a homogeneous people; and if there ever was, the time was very remote. When we say that England is inhabited by the English and France by the French, we do not mean that the English and the French are homogeneous peoples. Nevertheless, the English and the French, mongrel though they both are, are each characterized by certain features which differentiate them, for the most part, from all other peoples.

[1] *Rev. de linguistique*, xl, 1907, p. 210.

[2] *Die iberische Deklination*, 1907.

[3] *Academy*, 1874, p. 588.

[4] *Rev. de linguistique*, xl, 1907, pp. 5, 211.

Humboldt's theory. Desjardins[1] points out the similarity between *Ausk-i* (spelt by Caesar *Ausci*), the name of one of the Aquitanian peoples, and *Euskara*, the name by which the Basques call themselves; and the well-known Basque scholar, H. Schuchardt,[2] derives the latter from the former. Other Aquitanian tribal names, moreover, namely *Tarbelli*, *Lactorates*, *Elusates*, *Bigerriones*, *Beneharnenses*, *Iluronenses* (which is obviously connected with *Iluro*, the name of an ancient town in Spain) and especially *Oscidates*, have 'une physionomie ibéro-euskarienne qu'on ne retrouve nulle part dans la Gaule chevelue': but, adds Desjardins,[3] they have not been identified with Basque words; and Luchaire[4] refuses to regard *Tarbelli* as a word of Basque origin. These words therefore, except perhaps *Oscidates*, which Schuchardt[5] assimilates to *Ausci*, do not amount to proof; and proof is what the sceptics, MM. Van Eys and Vinson, very properly require. Now there is a word which occurs, under various forms, nearly as frequently in Spain and Southern Gaul as *Noviodunum* in Celtic and Belgic Gaul. This word is *Iliberris*. The word *iri* in Basque means 'town'; and *berri* means new.[6] The letter *r* is often changed into *l*. The obvious meaning of *Iliberris* is 'New Town', or, in Gallic, *Noviodunon*, which Caesar Latinized into *Noviodunum*. There was an *Illiberris* in Roussillon, an *Elimberri* in Auch, and an *Illiberri* in Grenada (the ancient Baetica). 'Ces trois noms,' says M. Luchaire,[7] 'suffiraient à eux seuls pour établir que le basque fut parlé jadis dans l'Andalousie, en Gascogne et en Roussillon. Mais, si l'ancien nom *Illiberris* . . . représente exactement le nom euskarien moderne *Iriberri*, il devait signifier la même chose (villeneuve).' Moreover, the root *ili* or *iri* is found in many other geographical names scattered over the map of the Iberian peninsula.[8]

I am bound, however, to point out that even this solitary example—*Iliberris*—is rejected by M. Van Eys. 'Il est vrai,' he remarks,[9] 'que *l* est quelquefois pour *r*; mais *ili* ne se trouve jamais, autant que nous sachions, pour *iri*.' On which Mr. Webster very sensibly comments,[10] 'Perhaps not in Basque phonetics, but that is not the question, but whether the Greek or Latin authors would have represented the Basque *Iri* by the Greek and Latin Ἰλλι, Ἰλι, Illi . . . We have . . . no right to expect a much greater amount of literal

[1] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 403.

[2] *Die iberische Deklination*, 1907, p. 11. M. Vinson (*Rev. de linguistique*, xl, 1907, p. 235) urges that certain names 'à apparence basque', found in inscriptions in the region of the Pyrenees, which have been cited by Schuchardt (*op. cit.*, p. 10) to prove that Basque was formerly spoken over a wider area than it is now, may be only the work of travellers. Granting that this may be true of some of them, it is significant that M. Vinson virtually admits that the 'apparence basque' is real.

[3] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 404.

[4] *De lingua Aquitanica*, 1877, p. 10.

[5] *Die iberische Deklination*, p. 66.

[6] W. J. Van Eys, *Dict. basque-français*, 1873, p. 208.

[7] *Bull. de la Soc. des sciences, lettres et arts de Pau*, 1875, quoted by Desjardins, ii, 38–9.

[8] See Desjardins, ii, 49–50, and G. Phillips, *Sitzungsberichte d. Kaiserl. Akad. d. Wissenschaften*, lxvii, 1871, pp. 354–400.

[9] *Rev. de linguistique*, 1874, p. 7.

[10] *Academy*, vi, 1874, pp. 588–9.

accuracy in the Greek and Latin transcription of Basque names than we find in the French, German and English transcription of Oriental names. Even a word like Punjab . . . is written Punjab, Pendjab and Pandschab, in English, French and German atlases, besides innumerable variations.' And I would ask M. Van Eys this question. Would he deny that in the word *Iliberris* the element *berris* is Basque ? And if it is Basque, as it assuredly is, what does *Ili* mean if it does not mean the same as *iri* ? It will hardly be maintained that *Iliberris* is compounded of a Basque word and one which is not Basque. If it is admitted that *berris* is Basque, all that MM. Desjardins and Luchaire contend for is proved.[1]

But the strife which centred round *Iliberris* in the years that preceded the original publication of this book has lately broken out afresh. The specialists are ranged in opposite camps : their warfare is entertaining to the onlooker, even though he suspects that they will never agree ; and he is reminded of the controversy which is still raging between Professor Lowell and those other astronomers who insist that the Martian ' canals ' are the offspring of imagination. And, if I am not mistaken, Webster's warning is not less needed now than when he wrote : is there not still a tendency to confuse those two questions which are distinct—whether *Iliberris* and other place-names prove that a language akin to Basque was once spoken in Southern Gaul and a great part of the Spanish peninsula ; and whether it was the language of the ' Iberian ' inscriptions ?

M. E. Philipon, the author of an interesting volume,[2] whose main object was to give a death-blow to the theory of Humboldt, affirms, first, that Humboldt's modern supporters have arbitrarily divided the word *Illiberri* into *Illi-berri*, whereas a study of the place-names of Iberia proves that it ought to be divided into *Il-liberi* ; secondly, that the first *i* in the Basque *iri* is long and alternates with *u* (*iri* = *uri*), whereas the first *i* of *Illiberis* (*sic*) was short and alternated with *e*, *Illiberri* having a variant *Eliberri* ; and, lastly, that the Illiberri of Roussillon, so far from corresponding with the Basque

[1] It is unnecessary to frame a complete list of the names in Spain and the south of France which Humboldt explains from Basque sources. Two or three specimens, however, may be given. *Acha* and *aitza*, he says, mean ' rock ' ; and *asta* is a form of the same word. Livy (xxviii. 22, § 2) mentions Astapa in Baetica, and (xxxix, 21, § 2) Asta in the country of the Turdetani. (See Humboldt, pp. 23–4). Humboldt and M. Luchaire also regard Calagorris in Aquitania, which is mentioned in the *Itinerary of Antonine* (p. 457) as a Basque word. It should be noted that there was a town called Calagurris in Spain as well as in Aquitania. On the whole, it is sufficient to say that, while admitting the paucity of such words in Portugal, Humboldt (pp. 126–9) infers from toponymy that Basque was once spoken over the whole Iberian peninsula. Hübner also argues (pp. lviii–lix) from the similarity between geographical names which have a Basque-like physiognomy and are certainly not Celtic, that one language—split up, it may be, into various dialects—was spoken over the length and breadth of the peninsula ; and, he says, if Artemidorus, as reported by Strabo (iii, 1, § 6) appears to say the contrary, Artemidorus was thinking of the Phoenician, Greek, and perhaps Celtic languages, which were also spoken in the same area ; and perhaps he may have mistaken dialects for distinct languages.

[2] *Les Ibères*, pp. 17–21.

iri-berri, derived its name from the river on the banks of which it stood. Schuchardt, who has subjected his arguments to a merciless analysis,[1] affirms that the place-names beginning with *Il-* prove that *Ili*(berri) not *Il*(liberi) is the true form, and roundly tells him that in regard to the river the truth is just the reverse.[2]

It happens that in one of the inscriptions an 'Iberian' equivalent of *Iliberris* is recognized. As transcribed by Hübner,[3] the word is *ilurir*; but Schuchardt, who holds that the language of the inscriptions was akin to Basque, maintains that for *ilurir* should be substituted *ildurir*. This M. Vinson is willing to admit; but he cannot understand how either *ildurir* or *ilidurir*, which he suggests as an alternative, could have given birth to the Basque word *iliberi*.[4] It would be useless to summarize his arguments or those of his antagonist; for whether the Iberian *ilurir* or *ildurir* can or cannot be equated with the Basque *iri-berri* is not the question :[5] all that really matters is whether such an equation can be established between *iri-berri* and *Iliberris*;[6] and those who believe that it can, will welcome the support of Schuchardt as a set-off against the scepticism of M. Vinson. The name by which *Iliberris* was called in the language which was the ancestor of Basque may only have borne the same relation to *ildurir* as *Dover* to *Douvres* or *London* to *Londres*.

Now supposing that there is sufficient reason for recognizing a relationship between *iri-berri* and *Iliberris*, what are we entitled to infer? Only that Basque was once spoken in that part of Gaul which was inhabited by Iberians and in that part of Spain which was inhabited by the Tartessi. This, indeed, is no more than might have been expected; for no one who compares the present restriction of the Celtic languages with their ancient extension would contend that the Basques were always confined within a small region of the Western Pyrenees. Is it conceivable, asked Broca, that 'le basque ait pu naître, vivre, se développer isolément dans un coin de l'Europe sans qu'aucune langue voisine ait eu d'affinité avec lui ?'[7] Humboldt

[1] *Die iberische Deklination*, pp. 1–16. Cf. M. J. Vendryes's review in *Rev. celt.*, xxx, 1909, pp. 200–4.

[2] See also Müllenhoff's *Deutsche Altertumskunde*, i, 182, 184.

[3] *Mon. ling. Iber.*, pp. 113–4. [4] *Rev. de linguistique*, xl, 1907, p. 212.

[5] M. Philipon observes (*op. cit.*, pp. 77, 185) that Mela (iii, 15, § 1), who transcribed Iberian names, abandoned in despair the attempt to reproduce those of the Cantabri, doubtless because the latter were 'the last survivors of the Euskarian race'. This may show that the language of the 'Iberian' inscriptions was not related to Basque; but it does not show that the 'Euskarian race' had not founded Iliberris.

M. Philipon also argues (pp. 26–8, 182–93) that names of places and peoples in the lands that were occupied by Iberians were derived and declined like Indo-European names, whereas Basque is an agglutinative language,—that is to say, a language in which two or more words are united in one compound vocable; but M. Vinson, who agrees with M. Philipon in denying the affinity of *Iliberris* to Basque, regards the languages that were spoken in Northern and Eastern Spain as agglutinative (*Rev. de linguistique*, xl, 1907, pp. 21–2).

[6] MM. Jullian (*Rev. des études anc.*, viii, 1906, pp. 322–3) and J. Vendryes (*Rev. celt.*, xxx, 1909, p. 201) are among those who remain convinced that *Iliberris* is equivalent to *iri-berri*.

[7] *Association franç. pour l'avancement des sc.*, 1874, p. 548.

has a similar argument. There are at present eight main dialects of Basque, which fall into three groups; indeed there are probably no two villages where it is spoken exactly alike.[1] This infinite variety, says Humboldt, would be inexplicable if the Basque nation had not been composed of numerous tribes, dispersed over a vast area.[2] But if it is true that names of Basque origin are to be found within the country which we know to have been occupied by Iberians, it is also true that the 'Iberian' coins which we possess come only from the eastern, the southern, and the northern parts of the Spanish peninsula, and from the neighbourhood of Narbonne, that is to say from those districts in which the names in question occur, and that most of the 'Iberian' inscriptions come from the same places; while in Spain Celtic geographical names and Celtic names of men are only to be found in those districts which we know to have been inhabited by Celts and Celtiberians.[3]

Hübner claims to have proved that the Iberian language, though doubtless split into various dialects, was really one; that it was spoken all over the peninsula and in the adjacent parts of Southern Gaul which were once inhabited by Iberians; that it was not an Indo-European language; and that it was the ancestor of modern Basque (*restat una quae de linguae Ibericae vetustae origine et indole quaestionem absolvere possit lingua Vasconum hodierna*).[4]

But in a review[5] of Hübner's book M. Vinson has directly challenged this conclusion. Speaking of the most famous of the Iberian inscriptions—that of Castellon—he says that 'none of the readings which have been proposed allow one to discover in the inscription either Basque or any other known idiom'. Again, 'when I study the Iberian language thus partially restored'—by Hübner's collection of inscriptions—'I am unable, with the best will in the world, to discover therein a trace of Basque.' Hübner himself does not attempt to demonstrate by philological reasoning a connexion between the two; and in the teeth of expert evidence like that of M. Vinson, I do not see how one is justified in maintaining that the theory which correlates Basque with the language of the Iberian inscriptions is proved.[6] Even if Schuchardt's equation of *iri-berri* with *ildurir* should be established, we could only infer that Basque was related

[1] See *Rev. de linguistique*, xlii, 1909, p. 87.

[2] *Prüfung der Untersuchungen über die Urbewohner Hispaniens*, &c., p. 128.

[3] E. Hübner, *Mon. ling. Iber.*, pp. xxvi, lviii–lix, cxvii–cxxi.

[4] *Ib.*, pp. cxli, lviii–lix. [5] *Rev. de linguistique*, xxvii, 1894, pp. 248–53.

[6] The inscription of Castellon, like most of the Iberian inscriptions, is in peculiar characters, which the Spaniards call *desconocidas*,—'des adaptations,' as M. Vinson says, 'de l'alphabet phénicien.' According to the reading of Hübner (*Mon. ling. Iber.*, pp. 155–6), the inscription of Castellon is as follows:—(z)*irtaims. airieimth. sinektn. urcecerere. aurunikiceaiasthkiceaie. ecariu. aduniu. kduei. ithsm. eosu. shsinpuru. krkrhniu. qshiu. iithgm. kricarsense. ultthcraicase. argtco. aicag. ilcepuraies. iithsiniecarse.* M. V. Stempf, devising a totally different reading from that of Hübner, has attempted to prove that the inscription is Basque (*Rev. de linguistique*, xxx, 1897, pp. 97–111): but M. Vinson (*ib.*, pp. 112–25) has demolished his argument; and, as he says, Hübner is our best guide. [M. Vinson (*Rev. de linguistique*, xl, 1907, pp. 8, 13) has recently made a fresh study of this famous inscription. It contains, as he admits, only

to one of the three known Iberian dialects. M. Jullian,[1] indeed, who is inclined to accept the very novel doctrine that Basque is, after all, an Indo-European language, has avowed his conviction that its mysteries will one day be explained by Iberian and Ligurian; but since he rightly insists upon 'our almost absolute ignorance' of both these languages,[2] I fear that he is too sanguine. Very few Iberian names can be explained from Basque: notwithstanding diligent search no trace of Basque has been found in the British Isles, where, according to M. Jullian, the Ligurian element was strong; and if there is a similarity between certain place-names in the Iberian peninsula and others in Sardinia and Corsica,[3] no vestige of Basque has been discovered in those islands.[4]

In the theory of Humboldt there was this much truth. He and his successors have proved that in the Spanish peninsula and the south of France, which were inhabited by Iberians, a language akin to Basque was once spoken far more extensively than it is now; but that this was the only language of the Iberians (exclusive of the Celts and Celtiberians, who by Strabo were loosely called Iberians), they have failed to prove. The conclusion at which M. Vinson arrives is as follows:—'Before the arrival of the Phoenicians, the Celts, and the Romans in Spain, there was a number of indigenous peoples, each with a language of its own. One of these languages is still represented by Basque: another by the Iberian inscriptions.' Perhaps a myriad years hence ethnologists will be busy theorizing about the races which inhabit our own island. Scattered over its length and breadth they will find coins and inscriptions in the English language, and names of towns and rivers both English and

one word—*argtco*—of which the meaning is almost certain; but he cannot resist the temptation to attempt to translate the whole. Nor can I resist the temptation to quote Professor Tylor's description of etymologists,—'a race not wanting in effrontery' (*Primitive Culture*, 4th ed., 1903, i, 397).]

[1] *Hist. de la Gaule*, i, 276. [2] *Ib.*, p. 274.

[3] The instances which Hübner gives (*Mon. ling. Iber.*, pp. lxxxv–lxxxvi)—Celsitani (Ptol., *Geogr.*, iii, 3, § 6) in Sardinia, and Tarabenii and Palania (*ib.*, 2, §§ 7–8) in Corsica—are not convincing. Cf. Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 44, and E. Philipon, *Les Ibères*, p. 117–9.

[4] The late Canon Isaac Taylor argued in *The Origin of the Aryans*, 1889, p. 222, that Basque was the language of the Ligurians. His anthropological arguments, which are now obsolete, were examined in the first edition of this book (pp. 263–5); but he also affirmed that *asia* (Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, xviii, 16 [40], § 141), meaning grain of some kind—'the one undoubted Ligurian word [except proper names] which has come down to us'—had 'as yet been only explained from Basque sources'. Whitley Stokes, however, had already suggested that for *asiam* should be read *sasiam*, which would thus be equated with the Sanskrit *sasya*, 'corn' (J. Rhys, *Lectures on Welsh Philology*, 2nd ed., 1879, p. 8); and if so, the word could hardly have belonged to a non-Aryan language. Moreover, there was a town in North Africa called *Tillabari* or *Tillibari* (*Itin. Ant.*, ed. Wesseling, p. 75), which M. Salomon Reinach (*Rev. arch.*, 4e sér., xi, 1908, pp. 302–3) is disposed to assimilate to *Illiberri*; and if he is right, *Tillibari* was probably akin to Basque. But has any one ever contended that there were Ligurians in Africa? And can any one produce a single name which resembles Basque in Gallic or in Italian Liguria? It is now generally admitted that Ligurian was an Indo-European language. See p. 282, n. 2.

Celtic. They will conclude perhaps that English and Celtic were both spoken throughout the length and breadth of the island. But will they be able to tell that in the nineteenth century Celtic was spoken only in certain districts of the north and west, and that English was spoken in many towns whose names were of Celtic origin? May not the explanation be this? Since the great majority of the place-names in the countries that were inhabited by Iberians are not explicable from Basque, it is surely probable that the language of the Iberians, properly so called, was not related to Basque. Is it not likely that Basques were in Spain before the Iberians invaded it; that they were the founders of Iliberris, of Elimberri, and of Illiberri; but that before the time of Caesar they had been driven into the regions of the north-west?

5. Let us now approach the question from the standpoint of physical anthropology. The characteristics of the Iberian type, according to most ethnologists, were and are short stature, dark hair eyes and complexion, orthognathism, and a dolichocephalic skull. But ethnologists commonly use the word 'Iberian' in a loose sense. 'Iberian' is for them simply a term by which they find it convenient to designate a particular type of man. Were these the characteristics of the Iberians who, as the ancient writers tell us, lived in Southern Gaul?

The ancient writers have told us very little about the physical characteristics of the Iberians. Tacitus implies that they were short and dark. Jornandes says the same. Strabo implies that their physical type differed from that of the Gauls, who were tall and fair. No other ancient writer says anything about the matter. And when these writers spoke of the Iberians, they meant the mass of the inhabitants of 'Iberia',—the Spanish peninsula.

Let us now see what is the physical type of the modern inhabitants of the Gallic territory which was once inhabited by Iberians. This territory, it must be remembered, was also inhabited by Ligurians: it had been occupied since the Neolithic Age by nameless tribes, among whom there may have been a brachycephalic element; it was invaded by Celts, who, it should seem, were relatively few; and, since Caesar's day, there have settled in it, in small numbers, Saracens, Visigoths, and Jews.[1] Excluding, for the present, Caesar's Aquitania, the Iberian departments of France are the Bouches-du-Rhône, Gard, Hérault, Aude, Pyrénées-Orientales, Ariége, and Haute-Garonne. Speaking generally, the inhabitants of all these departments are very dark; those of all, except perhaps the Bouches-du-Rhône, are short; and those of all, except the Pyrénées-Orientales, which has the lowest cephalic index of any department in France, are mesaticephalic or sub-brachycephalic: but their index is considerably lower than that of many departments in the region which belonged to the Celtae.[2] In respect of stature and colouring, these departments correspond with what the ancient writers tell us about the Iberians: their comparatively high index—high as compared with that of

[1] *Rev. d'anthr.*, ii, 1879, p. 485.

[2] See pp. 306–7.

Spain—is possibly to be accounted for by the fact that they were inhabited by Ligurians as well as Iberians.[1] The question is whether their comparatively low index—low as compared with that of Central France—is to be accounted for by the fact that they were inhabited by Iberians as well as Ligurians. In the department of the Pyrénées-Orientales the prevailing type of skull is said to resemble that of Cro-Magnon. On the whole, the facts would seem to suggest that in Gaul, as in Spain,[2] the Iberian type of skull was narrow; and it may be that if the Iberian element could be isolated, the indices would be still lower than they are.

I have come to the conclusion that Basque was spoken in certain parts, at all events, of Aquitania; and I will assume provisionally that either the language of the Iberians was related to Basque or Basque was once spoken by some of the Iberians of Gaul. The former assumption is, I need hardly repeat, at least questionable; but, as it represents the dominant opinion, we must not leave it out of account. The departments which correspond with Caesar's Aquitania are the Landes, Basses-Pyrénées, Hautes-Pyrénées, Gers, and the western part of the Lot-et-Garonne. M. Collignon has published an article[3] which gives fuller details than his general table. While he emphasizes the fact that the majority of the inhabitants hardly differ from those of Central France, he shows that in the mountainous districts the index falls below 82. He concludes that the small dolichocephalic inhabitants were driven by brachycephalic invaders to take refuge in the mountains; and he points out that the districts which show evident traces of having been inhabited by peoples of the type which ethnologists call 'Iberian' are those which were occupied by the Tarbelli, the Cocosates, the Iluronenses, and the Oscidates. Now there is no historical evidence that there were Iberians in Aquitania at all, except Strabo's statement that the Aquitanians resembled the Iberians rather than the Gauls and spoke a language akin to that of the former. M. Jullian[4] indeed argues that the Iberians invaded Aquitania, which he believes to have been already inhabited by Ligurians, and that they took possession of the district of Bordeaux and of the region which extends round Oloron, Pau, Tarbes, and Auch. His conclusion is based upon toponymy. Following Sieglin,[5] he regards the tribes whose names end in *-ates* as Ligurian, and also the Medulli of the Medoc, because their name is identical with that of a tribe in the Maurienne; while the names *Iluro* (Oloron), *Bigerriones* (Bigorre), *Eliberre* or *Elimberri* (Auch), and *Calagorris* (near Toulouse) are, he says, undoubtedly Iberian. *Bigerriones* and *Elimberri* are, as Schuchardt[6] holds, related to Basque; and, except *Illiberris*—another form of *Elimberri*—not one of the names occurs either in that part of Gaul which was certainly occupied by Iberians or in the territory which

[1] See, however, p. 285. [2] *Scottish Review*, xxi, 1893, p. 352, n †.
[3] *Mém. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, 3e sér., i, 1895, pp. 67–129, especially pp. 73–4, 78–80, 83, 110–1.
[4] *Hist. de la Gaule*, i, 265, n. 1, 277–8.
[5] See p. 283. [6] *Die iberische Deklination*, p. 66.

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was originally occupied by the Iberians of Spain. The region in which they are found belonged almost exclusively to the Tartessi; and the language of the Tartessi may have differed from that of the Iberians. Therefore it seems possible that although Aquitania was undoubtedly invaded by tribes which had inhabited the country that was occupied in historical times by Iberians, the invaders did not all belong to the original Iberian stock. I do not dispute M. Jullian's view, indeed I think it highly probable; but it is hardly susceptible of proof.[1] Anyhow it is clear that, if there were Iberians, properly so called, in Aquitania, and if the Iberians were dolichocephalic, they were largely mixed with the dark brachycephalic people of the Grenelle type; for, since Caesar's time, there has been no brachycephalic immigration into Aquitania.[2]

It remains to examine the types of the French and the Spanish Basques. The well-known researches of Broca on this subject have been supplemented by Dr. Collignon. From a measurement of 60 skulls found in a cemetery at Zaraus in Guipuzcoa, the most brachycephalic of which showed an index of 83·24, while the average index was 77·67, Broca concluded that the typical Spanish Basque skull was dolichocephalic. These skulls exactly resembled six others taken from three different places in Bilbao and measured by Virchow;[3] and the results are confirmed by the measurements made by A. d'Abbadie of the heads of living Spanish Basques.[4] M. Collignon, though he insists that Zaraus was 'une ville cosmopolite par excellence depuis plusieurs siècles,'[5] affirms, like Broca, that the Spanish Basques are dolichocephalic and differ, in respect of head-form, from all other European peoples.[6] The dolichocephaly is due, Broca points out, to the development of the posterior portion of the skull, the front part being but slightly developed.

Dr. Telesforo de Aranzadi y Unamuno has written a monograph on the ethnology of the Spanish Basques. He finds that their average cephalic index (corrected) is 77·1; that their average stature is from 5 feet 3 to 5 feet 6 inches; that 19·2 per cent have blue eyes, 2·8 grey, 17·6 green, 18 greenish hazel, 0·8 bluish hazel, and 41·6 brown; and that 23 per cent have blonde hair, 13 medium, 40 dark brown, and 24 black.[7] M. G. Hervé regards them as 'a mixed race', the principal factor of which is 'the (so-called) Iberian race,—the old race of Baumes-Chaudes'.[8]

[1] Cf. C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, i, 258, n. 6.

[2] The only immigrants have been Spanish Basques, Saracens, gipsies, Jews, Irish, English, and a very few Dutch and Flemings. *Rev. d'anthr.*, i, 1872, pp. 603–4.

[3] *Bull. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, iii, 1862, pp. 579–82; *Congrès internat. d'anthr. et d'arch. préhist.*, 1867 (1868), p. 374.

[4] *Dict. des sc. anthr.*, p. 165.

[5] The Rev. W. Webster says much the same both of Zaraus and of Bilbao. *Journ. Anthr. Inst.*, v, 1876, p. 10.

[6] *L'Anthr.*, v, 1894, pp. 286–7.

[7] *El pueblo euskalduna*, 1889, pp. 27–30. See also *Scottish Review*, xxi, 1893, p. 351.

[8] *Rev. mensuelle de l'École d'anthr.*, x, 1900, p. 220.

The French Basques, on the other hand, are for the most part sub-brachycephalic, and their cranial capacity is considerably less than that of their Spanish brethren.[1] From an examination of 732 recruits in the French Basque-speaking cantons M. Collignon [2] found a cephalic index of 83·02,—'sur le vivant.' This comparative brachycephaly, however, he regarded as factitious and accidental, due to the head being ' prodigieusement gonflé au-dessus des tempes, précisément au niveau du point où se prend le diamètre transversal maxillaire,—caractère absolument propre à cette race.' The type of face was very long and narrow, resembling an inverted triangle, the forehead being narrow at the lower part and broad above. The hair of these recruits was, for the most part, brown and wavy. Their striking characteristics, which M. Collignon regards as ' de véritables caractères ethniques ', were ' le renflement de crâne au niveau des tempes et le prodigieux rétrécissement de la face vers le menton '. In the heart of the Basque country the pure type was found in 41 per cent of the recruits examined : outside the linguistic frontier, says M. Collignon, the race does not exist. M. Collignon remarks, further, that both French and Spanish Basques differ, in certain respects, from all other European peoples ; and that those features in regard to which the Spanish Basques differ from the French, are precisely those in regard to which they resemble the Spaniards generally. Finally, M. Collignon is inclined to assimilate the Basques to the Berber type.[3]

Mr. Wentworth Webster gives some interesting particulars regarding the French Basques. He points out that even at Saint-Jean de Luz, where the infusion of French, Gascon, and gipsy blood must have tended to darken the original tint, M. Argelliés found 22 out of 47 persons who had blue, green, or grey eyes ; that ' Arthur Young and Sir William Napier, who have no scientific theory to support, call the Basques a fair race ' ; that, according to his own observations, carried on all over the French Pays Basque, ' the fair type—especially with blue or grey or very light-brown eyes, with somewhat darkish hair—is the distinctive Basque type . . . and that it will be found more numerous in proportion to the distance from the neighbourhood of the sea and the great roads, where the chances of admixture are the greatest ; ' that the French Basques generally are taller ' than the average Frenchman and than the inhabitants of the surrounding plains ' ; and that even the dark Basques of Spain ' are not so dark as their Spanish neighbours '. ' If,' he concludes, ' the Basques had been originally a dark people, whence could they have obtained their present fairness ? The infusion of . . . English blood is manifestly

[1] *Dict. des sc. anthr.*, p. 165.

[2] *L'Anthr.*, v, 1894, pp. 276–87.

[3] See *Bull. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, 4e sér., vii, 1896, pp. 666–71. If any one should be tempted to regard G. von der Gabelentz's work, *Die Verwandtschaft d. Baskischen mit d. Berbersprachen Nord-Afrikas nachgewiesen*, as supporting this conclusion, let him note that in the opinion of M. Vinson (*Rev. de linguistique*, xxxviii, 1905, p. 111) ' no more absurd book on Basque has appeared of late years '.

inadequate to account for it.' [1] Mr. Webster's observations, combined with those which have established the existence of a large blonde element in the Spanish Basques, may possibly support M. Collignon's assimilation of the Basque to the Berber type; for, as Dr. Beddoe says,[2] fairness 'has been recognized among the inhabitants of Northern Africa for more than 3,000 years'.

Do the French Basques, as described by M. Collignon, represent the Iberian type? To this question only one answer can be given. If the French Basque type is nowhere to be found outside the limits of the French Basque-speaking country, it can hardly represent the type of a people who formed the bulk of the population in the eastern half, at all events, of Spain and a large part of the population in Southern France; and, as we have seen, there is sufficient evidence that the mass of that population belonged to a quite different type. But if M. Collignon is right in thinking that the type which he describes is the original Basque type[3]—and I do not see how this can be proved—it may have characterized a considerable number of the people whom the ancients called Iberians. This is the view of M. Collignon himself; but he denies that the Basques have any claim to be regarded 'comme le prototype de l'Ibère'.[4] The type which he describes is obviously different from that which ethnologists call 'Iberian'; and M. G. Hervé, who offers certain tentative suggestions as to the origin of the Basques, affirms that their physical characters entitle them to rank as a 'fourth European race',—different from the 'Iberian' or 'Mediterranean', the 'Alpine' or 'Grenelle', and the fair North European.[5] How it arose—whether from a fusion of dolichocephalic aborigines with brachycephalic invaders, or from some other cause—it would be idle to conjecture.

Dr. Beddoe [6] and others have pointed out the close resemblance which exists between the physiognomy of many of the dark inhabitants of South Wales and that of the Spanish Basques. If we accept the statement of Tacitus regarding the resemblance between the Silures and the Iberians, this similarity may perhaps lend some support to the view that the Spanish Basques represent, approximately, the type of the ancient Iberians. But it must not be forgotten

[1] *Journ. Anthr. Inst.*, ii, 1873, pp. 154–5; v, 1876, pp. 12, 14–5; W. Webster, *Les loisirs d'un étranger au pays basque*, 1901, pp. 14–6.

[2] *Journ. Anthr. Inst.*, v, 1876, p. 24.

[3] M. Vinson, remarking justly that there are great analogies between the French and the Spanish Basque types, says that it is impossible to decide which of the two is really Basque (*Dict. des sc. anthr.*, p. 165). Is either?

[4] *Mém. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, 3e sér., i, 1895, p. 74. It should perhaps be mentioned that M. Collignon, noting the absence of the French Basque type in Béarn and Gascony, argues that the ancestors of the French Basques did not dwell in Aquitania in Caesar's time, but that they were identical with the Vascones, who, coming from the north of Spain, invaded Aquitania in the sixth century of our era. If so, the fact is of course no proof that Basque was not spoken in Aquitania long before. M. Philipon, on the other hand (*Les Ibères*, pp. 29–31), argues that the ancestors of the French Basques were the Vaccaei, who accompanied the Vascones.

[5] *Rev. mensuelle de l'École d'anthr.*, x, 1900, pp. 225–7.

[6] *The Races of Britain*, pp. 25–6.

that, according to Dr. Collignon as well as Broca, the Spanish as well as the French Basques differ, in certain respects, from all other European peoples. Nor must it be forgotten that a considerable proportion of the Spanish Basques are fair, and that Tacitus used the word 'Iberians' loosely.

Reviewing the evidence collected by philologists and by craniologists, it seems to me probable that the Iberians comprised both people who spoke, or whose ancestors had spoken,[1] Basque and people who spoke the language or languages of the 'Iberian' inscriptions; that to observers who had not learned to measure skulls and knew nothing of modern scientific methods, they appeared to be homogeneous; that the prevailing type was that which is now called Iberian and is seen at its purest in Sardinia, Corsica, and Sicily; but that a certain proportion of the whole population may have been characterized by physical features more or less closely resembling those which the modern Basques—French and Spanish—possess in common, and which, as MM. Broca and Collignon tell us, distinguish them from all other European peoples. Finally, it seems probable that the true Iberians were the people who spoke the languages of the inscriptions, and that Basque was spoken by a people who occupied Spain and Southern Gaul before the Iberians arrived. But unless and until the key to those appalling inscriptions is found, the problem will never be solved.

6. We have next to inquire whether the Iberians occupied any other part of Gaul besides that which the ancient writers assigned to them. And first of all, let us consider the evidence of toponymy. Evidence of this kind there is none, except in that part of France which corresponds with Caesar's Aquitania.[2] Professor Boyd Dawkins,[3] however, argues that 'an ethnological connexion between Aquitaine and Brittany may be inferred from the remark of Pliny, "Aquitania Aremorica ante dicta."' An '*ethnological* connexion' of some sort there may have been; but Pliny's authority is worthless.[4] If the primitive name of Aquitania had been Aremorica—a Celtic word—the fact would tend to show that the primitive inhabitants of Aquitania had been Celts, which the professor certainly would not admit; and as, in Caesar's time, the name was certainly Aquitania, we should be driven, on the professor's theory, to conclude that the Celts had been conquered by Iberians! The only safe conclusion is that there is no sufficient evidence, linguistic or historical, that Iberians ever occupied any part of Gaul except the Mediterranean coast and Aquitania.

7. But was there elsewhere a people physically akin to the Iberians? This question has been answered already by implication. If the prevalent Iberian type was long-headed and orthognathous as well

[1] Assuming that *Illiberris* and *Illiberri* were Basque names, it does not follow that Basque was still spoken in Roussillon and Baetica in Caesar's time.

[2] See Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 44; *Mon. ling. Iber.*, p. xxvii; *Academy*, xl, 1891, p. 268; and E. Philipon, *Les Ibères*, pp. 79–81. Cf. pp. 297–8. *supra*.

[3] *Early Man in Britain*, 1880, p. 320.

[4] See p. 371.

as short, there were in the Neolithic Age—we cannot tell what proportion of them survived in Caesar's time—people who resembled the Iberians everywhere in Gaul. Even now there are traces of the same population.[1] The departments of the Charente, Dordogne, and Haute-Vienne, between the Cher and the Gironde, are inhabited by a people who are among the shortest in France, dark, though not extremely dark, and relatively dolichocephalic, their indices being as low as 80·93, 79·17, and 79·70. Dr. Beddoe conjectures that they represent the primitive dolichocephali, moderately crossed by 'Celtae' and by the blonde Gauls from the north. Professor Boyd Dawkins goes further, and argues that the reason why Augustus added the district between the Garonne and the Loire to Aquitania was that the population were more akin to the Aquitani than to the Celtae. Twenty out of these twenty-five departments, says Professor Boyd Dawkins, were very dark. But the professor had only Broca's researches to guide him; for he wrote before MM. Collignon and Topinard had published their maps. His conclusion is not borne out by modern statistics. As far as skull-form, stature, and colour go, the bulk of the modern inhabitants of Caesar's Aquitania differ but little from the descendants of the Celtae. Does the professor mean that the Aquitani were darker than the Celtae, or more dolichocephalic, or both? If he means any of these things, the facts do not support his conclusion. The Aquitani of Caesar's Aquitania, if we may judge from the indices of their modern descendants, were, as I have shown, for the most part, brachycephalic or sub-brachycephalic. They were darker than the inhabitants of some of the 'Celtic' departments which are not included in Augustus's Aquitania, and not darker than others; more brachycephalic than some, and less brachycephalic than others. The twenty-four departments show such various results that it is idle to group them together. Their cephalic indices range from 79·70 to 87·87; and their colouring varies as much. Some are very dark, others dark, and three are relatively fair.[2]

But enough of the Iberian question. If my conclusions are wrong, I have stated the essential facts correctly; and some critical reader may discern their true bearing.

[1] See *Rev. d'anthr.*, ii, 1879, p. 462.

[2] It would be interesting to learn how Professor Boyd Dawkins reconciles his theory with the fact, revealed by the famous inscription of Hasparren, that the *Novem Populi* of Caesar's Aquitania sought and obtained in the third century imperial recognition of their existence as a group distinct from the rest of Gaul. See Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 164; iii, 157, n. 2. For the reasons which led Augustus to enlarge the province of Aquitania see E. Lavisse, *Hist. de la France*, t. i (by G. Bloch), p. 130.

V

THE CELTAE

1. Caesar says that that part of Gaul which lay between the Garonne on the south-west and the Marne andthe Seine on the north-east was inhabited by a people 'who call themselves Celts and whom we call Gauls'. He further defines the area inhabited by the Celtae by telling us that it included the territories of the Sequani and the Helvetii;[1] and he either excludes or ignores the Roman Province. The Treveri, who inhabited the country round Trèves, are also generally believed to have been Celtae; but it is not absolutely certain in which group Caesar included them.[2]

In *B. G.*, ii, 30, § 4, Caesar remarks that the Gauls in general were tall men.[3] I shall afterwards examine the value of this statement: for the present it is enough to say that by *omnibus Gallis* he evidently meant the Celtae as well as the Belgae; for first, if he had been speaking of the Belgae only, he would certainly have said *omnibus Belgis*; and secondly, while he sometimes uses the word *Galli* in an extended sense, which includes Belgae, the people whom, in his opening chapter, he expressly designates as Galli are the Celtae.

Diodorus Siculus, who lived in the time of Augustus, says, in the chapter in which he describes the manners and customs of the Gauls,[4] 'It may be well to emphasize a fact of which many people are ignorant. The Celts are the peoples who live beyond Massilia, in the interior of the country, near the Alps and on the north of the Pyrenees. The peoples settled on the north of Celtica and those who inhabit all the countries extending along the ocean and the Hercynian forest as far as Scythia, are termed Gauls.' This passage, as I shall afterwards show, has given rise to much misapprehension.

Pausanias[5] says that the Gauls were originally called Celts by themselves and by their neighbours, and that the name of Gauls did not become general till later.

Strabo frequently speaks of the whole of Gaul as 'Celtica' (ἡ Κελτική); but, like Diodorus, he also uses the word 'Celtae' in a limited sense. 'The inhabitants of Gallia Narbonensis,' he says, 'were formerly called Celts; and I believe that the name was transferred by the Greeks from them to the Gauls in general.'[6] In another chapter[7] he says, quoting Caesar as his authority, that the Celtae were separated from the Aquitani by the Garonne and the

[1] *B. G.*, i, 1, §§ 2, 4.
[2] See pp. 394–5.
[3] 'plerumque omnibus Gallis prae magnitudine corporum suorum brevitas nostra contemptui est.'
[4] v, 32, § 1.
[5] i, 4, § 1.
[6] ταῦτα μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν νεμομένων τὴν Ναρβωνῖτιν ἐπικράτειαν λέγωμεν, οὓς οἱ πρότερον Κέλτας ὠνόμαζον· ἀπὸ τούτων δ' οἶμαι καὶ τοὺς σύμπαντας Γαλάτας Κελτοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων προσαγορευθῆναι (iv, 1, § 14).
[7] iv, 1, § 1.

Cevennes, which were at right angles with the Pyrenees, and that they inhabited the country on the east of the Cevennes as far as the sea in the neighbourhood of Massilia and Narbo, and as far as the Alps. All the other inhabitants of Gaul, he says, appealing to the same authority, were Belgae! In two other passages he says that the Belgae inhabited the country between the Rhine, the Loire, the ocean, and the central plain.[1] Needless to say, scholars generally recognize that, in his distribution of the Celtae and the Belgae, he blundered grossly.[2] It is important to notice that, while he distinguishes the Belgae from the Celtae, he says that all the inhabitants of Gaul, except the Aquitani, have a Gallic exterior, though they do not all speak the same language.[3]

Polybius,[4] like Caesar, describes the Gauls as tall: Virgil,[5] Manilius,[6] Silius Italicus,[7] and Claudian[8] describe them as fair or red-haired; and Livy,[9] Ammianus Marcellinus,[10] Diodorus Siculus,[11] and Strabo[12] describe them as tall and fair. Strabo, however, says that they were less tall and less fair than the Germans; and Manilius that they were less red. Polybius and Livy were only describing the Gallic invaders of Italy; but Diodorus Siculus, Strabo, and Ammianus referred to the Gauls of Transalpine Gaul. The qualifying remarks of Strabo and Manilius only mean, if I am not mistaken, that fairness and tall stature were less common among the people of Gaul than among the people of Germany.

2. The observations of MM. Broca, Boudin, Collignon, and Topinard on the stature, skull-form, and colouring of modern Frenchmen have thrown light on the ethnology of Gallia Celtica; but it would be misleading to examine the results of their observations without first inquiring what admixture of foreign blood the population of that country has received since Caesar's day.

Franks settled 'in a thin stratum', as Dr. Beddoe puts it,[13] over most of the country north of Burgundy and of the Loire, except Brittany; and both they and the Visigoths have left traces in Auvergne.[14] Colonies of the Alani, who, according to Ammianus Marcellinus,[15] were tall and moderately fair, settled near the mouth of the Sèvre. Saxons settled in large numbers in the country round Bayeux and Caen, between the rivers Orne and Dive, and in the

[1] *Ib.*, 3, § 1; 4, § 3.

[2] M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, i. 323, n. 1), who accepts Strabo's testimony, says that the westward extension of the Belgae as far as the Atlantic may also be inferred from Diodorus Siculus, v, 32, § 1, Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, xvi, 36 (64), § 158, and Plutarch, *Camillus*, 15. I could not accept their evidence if it contradicted that of Caesar; but I doubt whether any one who examines the texts will endorse M. Jullian's conclusion. Besides, what about the remaining lands which Strabo assigned to the Belgae?

[3] iv, 1, § 1. [4] ii, 15, § 7. [5] *Aen.*, viii, 659.

[6] *Astronomica*, iv, 710–11. [7] iv, 200. [8] xxii, 241.

[9] xxxviii, 17, § 3; 21, § 9. [10] xv, 12, § 1. [11] v, 28, § 1.

[12] iv, 5, § 2; vii, 1, § 2. M. Bertrand (*Les Celtes et les Gaulois dans les vallées du Pô et du Danube*, p. 36) has given one or two more references; but I have given enough.

[13] *Scottish Review*, xxi, 1893, pp. 177–8.

[14] *L'Anthr.*, xi, 1900, p. 695. [15] xxxi, 2, § 21.

peninsula of Batz. Burgundians occupied the department of the Jura, the country on the east of the Saône, the districts of Geneva and Lyons, and the country to which they gave their name. Britons invaded Brittany in the fifth century. Normans, described as tall, whose chiefs had red hair, settled in large numbers in Normandy, and in less proportions in the north-eastern part of Brittany and on the southern bank of the middle Loire. Saracens settled near Chatelus in the department of the Creuse.[1] Italians of course settled in the principal Gallic towns. The influence of Jews and other foreigners who have settled in France in modern times may safely be neglected; but it must not be forgotten that, early in the imperial epoch, the Ubii, the Vangiones, the Nemetes, and the Triboci—German tribes which may, however, have been mixed with Celts—were established on the left bank of the Rhine from the neighbourhood of Cologne to that of Strasburg.

3. I will now state the evidence which has been accumulated by the discovery of human remains and by the observations of modern ethnologists on living persons.

I have already spoken of the prehistoric races who inhabited this part of Gaul, and have shown that they were still represented among the Celtae in Caesar's time. As far as I have been able to discover, the skeletons, unearthed on French soil, that have been generally identified as the remains of warriors of the Celtic-speaking conquering race, and were sufficiently well preserved to be susceptible of measurement, were all found in the basin of the Marne—either in Belgic territory or close to the common frontier of the Belgae and the Celtae—in the Côte-d'Or, in Franche-Comté, and in Lorraine. They belonged to tall dolichocephalic men;[2] and two of them may be seen in Salles ix and x of the Musée de St. Germain, the former having been buried with his war-chariot, iron helmet, and long iron sword. But it should be noted that *tumuli* and cemeteries of the Iron Age, similar to those in which these skeletons were discovered, are quite as numerous in the territory of the Celtae as in that of the Belgae.[3]

I now come to the observations which anthropologists have made upon the population of that part of modern France which was inhabited by the Celtae.[4] For the purpose of comparison, I shall also

[1] Ammianus Marcellinus, xxxi, 2, § 21; Beddoe, *The Races of Britain*, pp. 73–4, 78; *Dict. des sc. anthr.*, p. 504; *Rev. d'anthr.*, 2e sér., ii, 1879, pp. 478, 481–3, 485; *Mém. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, 3e sér., i, 1895, pp. 113, 115–6; Sidonius Apollinaris, lib. viii, epist. ix, p. 316; *Notitia dignitatum*, ed. O. Seeck, 1876, p. 204 (xxxvii, 14); Gregory of Tours (*Hist. Franc.*, ii, 272, lib. v, cap. xxvii, ed. Guadet and Taranne); *Capitularia Regum Francorum*, ii, 69 (tit. xiv), ed. Baluze; Bouquet, *Recueil des hist. des Gaules*, vi, 50–1; Wace, *Le Roman de Rou*, i, 126–7, vv. 2509–10, ed. F. Pluquet.

[2] See pp. 310–1.

[3] See A. Bertrand's *Arch. celt. et gaul.*, 2nd ed., 1889, map facing p. 264; and *Rev. de l'École d'anthr.*, xv, 1905, pp. 217–30.

[4] Broca's article on stature will be found in *Mém. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, iii, 1868, pp. 147–209; Boudin's on the same subject in another volume of the same periodical (ii, 1865, pp. 221–59); Topinard's on colouring in *Rev. d'anthr.*, 3e sér., iv, 1889, pp. 513–30; and Collignon's on head-form in *L'Anthr.*, i, 1890, pp. 201–24. Collignon has published a valuable supplementary article in *Annales*

refer to the departments which lie within the tracts that correspond respectively with Belgic Gaul, Aquitania, and the Roman Province. But there is one fact which must be kept constantly in mind, because, as we shall see, it introduces an element of uncertainty into the results of the inquiries of Broca, Collignon, and Topinard, as far as they relate to particular districts, and, in one case at least, tends to stultify them. Not only has the French population been affected since Caesar's time by the infusion of foreign blood, but its distribution has undergone considerable change.

Roughly speaking, the inhabitants of the country on the north of a line drawn from Savoy to the extremity of Finistère are blonde or relatively blonde; those on the south of the same line are brown or relatively brown. This general statement is subject to two exceptions: the inhabitants of the Côte-d'Or are brown; those of the Charente-Inférieure fair.

Roughly speaking, again, the average height of the population is certainly greatest in the northern and eastern departments and least in those of the centre, the south, and the west. This statement is based upon the returns for thirty years (1831–60) of the number of males in every department who were exempted from serving in the army on the ground that their stature was below the minimum height of 1 metre 56, or about 5 feet $1\frac{1}{2}$ inches; and the assumption is that, roughly speaking, the average height of the whole population varied according to the number of exemptions. Returns have also been published for the years 1836–40 of the number of recruits in every department whose height exceeded 1 metre 732, or about 5 feet $7\frac{10}{11}$ inches. These returns correspond up to a certain point with the others; but there are striking discrepancies here and there. Thus the Doubs, the department which has the least percentage of exemptions, has also proportionally the greatest number of recruits above 1 metre 732; and the Haute-Vienne, the department which has the greatest percentage of exemptions, has also the smallest number of recruits above 1 metre 732: but, on the other hand, the Côte-d'Or, which is 2nd in the former list, is only 25th in the latter; the Loiret, which is as low as 55th in the former, is actually 14th in the latter; and, more remarkable still, the Meurthe and the Vaucluse, which are respectively 26th and 27th in the former, are 5th and 54th in the latter.

As regards cephalic index, if we adopt Broca's terminology, not a single department in the whole of France is dolichocephalic: but the adjacent departments of the Haute-Vienne and Dordogne are sub-dolichocephalic, with indices of 79·70 and 79·17 respectively, and the Charente, which is conterminous with both of them, is mesaticephalic, showing the only slightly higher index of 80·93;[1] while the adjacent departments of the Calvados (81·62) and Eure

de Géogr., v, 1896, pp. 156–66 on the departments of the Charente-Inférieure, Charente, Corrèze, Creuse, Dordogne, Gironde, and Haute-Vienne. See Addenda.

[1] M. Collignon's measurements were made 'sur les vivants', and therefore all the figures which I am about to extract from his table must be reduced by 2. See p. 261.

(81·34) in Normandy, and of the Seine-et-Oise (81·57) and Seine (81·59), Charente (80·93), and, in Central France, the Cher (81·77) and Indre-et-Loire (81·40) are also mesaticephalic. No less than thirty-two Celtican departments are sub-brachycephalic. The remaining Celtican departments are all brachycephalic, having indices which range between 85·50 and 88·20. They may be described as the southern central and the eastern group. Each of them covers a large tract of country, and is absolutely unbroken; and they are separated from one another by the sub-brachycephalic department of the Loiret. The southern central group comprises the departments of the Haute-Loire (87·57), Lot (85·92), Lot-et-Garonne (86·66), Lozère (87·87), Puy-de-Dôme (85·53), Aveyron (85·50), and Cantal (87·08): the eastern group comprises the Meurthe-et-Moselle (85·64), Vosges (86·68), Haute-Saône (87·37), Doubs (86·05), Jura (88·20), Rhône (86·01), Saône-et-Loire (87·11), and Ain (86·72).

Let us now inquire what relation subsists between the tables of Broca, Collignon, and Topinard. Taken in the mass, the people of the Ain, Aube, Doubs, Jura, Haute-Marne, Orne, and Haute-Saône are comparatively tall and fair, and brachycephalic or sub-brachycephalic; while tall, fair, and mesaticephalic people are found in the Calvados and Eure. The familiar combination of short stature, dark hair and complexion, and brachycephaly is found in the Aveyron, Cantal, Haute-Loire, Lot, Lot-et-Garonne, Lozère, and Puy-de-Dôme,—in other words, in a continuous tract of south-central Gaul. Medium or short stature, dark hair and complexion, and mesaticephalic or sub-brachycephalic skulls characterize the inhabitants of the Charente, Deux-Sèvres, Gironde, Indre, Indre-et-Loire, Vienne, and Haute-Vienne. But various cross-divisions have to be noted. The tall groups are not always fair; for instance, the coast between St. Malo and St. Brieuc is inhabited by tall dark men with sub-brachycephalic skulls. Nor are the short groups always dark. Short stature is found in union with a mesaticephalic or sub-brachycephalic type of skull and fair or relatively fair hair and skin in the Charente-Inférieure, Cher, Côtes-du-Nord, Creuse, Eure-et-Loir, Finistère and Morbihan, Loiret, Manche, Nièvre, Seine, and Yonne. Even the statement, generally true, that the short round-skulled people of Central France are generally dark, must not be taken too literally; for, if their hair is dark, their eyes are often grey or green; [1] and on the whole their darkness is much less intense than that of the less brachycephalic people of the Mediterranean.[2]

[1] V. de St. Martin, *Nouv. Dict. de Géogr. univ.*, ii, 1884, p. 345; *Bull. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, 3e sér., v, 1882, p. 151.

[2] *Rev. d'anthr.*, 2e sér., ii, 1879, p. 195. There is a significant difference, though it is not enough to affect this inquiry, between the results of Topinard's observations and those recorded by Dr. A. Bouchereau (*L'Anthr.*, xi, 1900, p. 696). According to the latter, the 'index of nigrescence' of the departments of the Loire, Puy-de-Dôme, Allier, Cantal, Corrèze, Aveyron, and Dordogne increases in the order named. Topinard, on the other hand, classes the Puy-de-Dôme and the Cantal among the twenty-two darkest departments, and the remaining five among the twenty-two which in nigrescence fall immediately below them.

Recent observations have shown that individuals of Mongoloid type are to be found on both slopes of the Cevennes,[1] where they form probably between 5 and 10 per cent. of the population, and also in Auvergne and Brittany.[2] M. Hervé regards them as pure representatives of what he calls the Ligurian,—that is, the Grenelle type. Finally, it must be borne in mind that, as Topinard remarks, types are found in every district which do not properly belong to them, and everywhere individuals are to be seen who combine in their own persons the characteristics of different types: thus the tall stature of the so-called 'Kymric' type is to be found associated with the features of the short sturdy Auvergnat and the black hair of the southerner; and the fair hair and complexion of the Norman with the aquiline nose of the Jew or the round skull of the Savoyard. In the towns especially, as might be expected, the characters of different types are inextricably confused, and the most various characters are exemplified within single families. Of two brothers, one will have black eyes and the other blue: one will have a long, and the other a round skull; the father and mother will be tall, and the children short.[3]

Is it then impossible to construct a theory out of the available data, which shall satisfy the reason? I do not think so. Broca made the attempt; and if the explanation which he offered was not satisfactory, we may be able, with the aid of information which has since been accumulated, to amend it.

Broca's theory has been so often misrepresented,[4] or at least stated in a way which was sure to mislead those who had not studied his writings, that it is necessary to be very careful in pointing out exactly what he said. In a paper called 'Qu'est-ce que les Celtes?'[5] he began by remarking that he aimed at putting a stop to the continual confusion which had been caused by the manifold senses in which the word 'Celt' had been used both by ancient and modern writers. The true Celts, the Celts of history, he concluded, were the mixed race whom Caesar called Celtae.

Broca's theory regarding the Celtae and their relation with the Belgae may be put briefly as follows. He remarks, referring to the official returns for 1831–60, which I have already quoted, that the height of recruits is greatest in the departments of the north and east, including parts of the country inhabited by the Belgae, and least in the departments of the centre, the south, and the west; while between these two groups there is a zone inhabited by men of middle height.[6] 'On the maps,' he says, 'on which I have noted the variations in stature by departments, the line of demarcation between tall men and short men reproduces exactly the line of demarcation fixed by Caesar between Belgae and Celtae. Consequently the two peoples so clearly distinguished by Caesar differed in respect

[1] *Rev. de l'École d'anthr.*, xvii, 1907, pp. 264–5.
[2] *Ib.*, viii, 1898, pp. 201–8.
[3] *Nouv. Dict. de Géog. univ.*, ii, 346.
[4] I find that what I have said is confirmed by M. Collignon (*Bull. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, vi, 1895, p. 342).
[5] *Mém. d'anthr.*, i, 1871, pp. 370–6.
[6] *Ib.*, pp. 391–2.

of stature. The Celtae were short, and the Belgae were tall (. . . observation teaches us that blondes predominate in the country once inhabited by the Belgae and brunets in the country once inhabited by the Celtae).'[1] But of course this division between big and little men is not to be taken literally. Broca himself corrects it[2] by pointing out that between the two groups there is a zone inhabited by men of middle height; and this fact, he remarks, is naturally to be explained by a mixture of the two races.[3] In support of this explanation, he argues that, whereas in the Belgic departments of the Seine-et-Oise, Oise, Aisne, Somme, and Marne, the prevalent form of skull is sub-dolichocephalic, and in the Celtic departments of the Puy-de-Dôme, Cantal, Lozère, Côtes-du-Nord, and Finistère brachycephalic or sub-brachycephalic, Paris in the intermediate zone is characterized by a mesaticephalic type.[4] He admits, indeed, that there are districts in Celtic Gaul in which, owing to a 'Kymric' admixture or to the survival of some prehistoric race, a dolichocephalic (or, strictly speaking, sub-dolichocephalic) type predominates; but, he insists, 'dans la plus grande partie de cette région c'est le type brachycéphalique qui a prévalu, et il est d'autant plus prononcé, que les populations celtiques ont reçu . . . moins d'éléments étrangers.'[5]

To illustrate and enforce his theory, Broca examined four groups of skulls, taken from Auvergne, from Brittany, from Paris, and from the department of the Marne respectively. The Auvergnat skulls, 125 in number, came from the village of St. Nectaire-le-Haut in the department of the Puy-de-Dôme; and from the isolated situation of this village Broca concluded that its population had received practically no foreign admixture since the Gallic epoch. The value of this conclusion will be presently examined. The average index of the whole number was 84·07, and of the male skulls 84·45. The Auvergnats, says Broca, are the purest, because they are the most brachycephalic, of the living representatives of the Celtae.[6] Whether they are the purest, the reader will soon be able to judge: but, according to the measurements of M. Collignon, which had not been made public when Broca wrote, they are certainly not the most brachycephalic; for the departments of the Lozère (87·87) and Jura (88·20) show higher indices than any of the departments of Auvergne.

The Breton skulls, numbering 136, were collected by Dr. Guibert from the department of the Côtes-du-Nord. A line, running from north to south about 20 kilometres west of St. Brieuc, divides the Celtic-speaking from the French-speaking inhabitants of the department. The average index of all the skulls taken from the former district, which is in Basse-Bretagne, was 81·34, of those of males 81·71; while in the French district, which is in Haute-Bretagne, the

[1] *Bull. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, 2e sér., viii., 1873, pp. 247–8.
[2] *Mém. d'anthr.*, i, 392. [3] *Rev. d'anthr.*, ii, 1873, pp. 559, 689.
[4] These statements are not strictly accurate. According to Broca's own standard, the Seine-et-Oise, Aisne, and Somme are mesaticephalic, and the Marne and Oise sub-brachycephalic.
[5] *Rev. d'anthr.*, ii, 1873, p. 590. [6] *Ib.*, pp. 598, 608.

figures were 82·9 and 82·54 respectively. In these results Broca sees a confirmation of his theory. Haute-Bretagne, he remarks, was indeed successively invaded by Alani, Visigoths, Frisians, Saxons, and Normans ; but it is probable that the influence of these successive infusions of foreign blood upon the original population was weaker than that of the British invasion of Basse-Bretagne, because ' l'intensité des effets du croisement dépend avant tout du nombre relatif des étrangers qui viennent, *à un certain moment*, contracter des alliances,' [1] &c. Therefore, Broca thinks, it is natural that the average index of the skulls taken from Basse-Bretagne, which was invaded, ' *à un certain moment*,' by dolichocephalic Britons, should be lower than that of the skulls taken from Haute-Bretagne, which was invaded, at five successive periods, by dolichocephalic Saxons and other ' Germanic peoples '.

The Parisian skulls, numbering 125, which were taken from the ' cimetière de l'Ouest ', showed an average index of 79 ; and, as the same number, taken from a Parisian cemetery of the twelfth century, yielded an almost identical average (79·18), Broca inferred that 79 was approximately the index which would have been yielded by any group of Parisian skulls in the time of Caesar. While, he concludes, the Auvergnat group represents the ' Celtic ' race almost at its purest, and that of the Côtes-du-Nord displays the characters of a mixed population, in which the ' Celtic ' element predominated, but the ' Kymric ' formed a considerable minority, the Parisian series shows the results of a fusion in which the two elements were almost equally represented.

The ' Kymric ' skulls were only 38 in number, 27 being male and 11 female. The mean index of the former is 78·49, of the latter 77·02 : but Broca assumes that the index of skulls of the purest ' Kymric ' type would have been considerably lower ; for, he argues, as the Gauls of the Marne lived very near the frontier of the Celtae, they must have been ' fortement croisés de Celtes brachycéphales '. His conclusions have recently been reinforced by Dr. E. T. Hamy, who in three papers on the earliest Gallic invaders of the Iron Age [2]

[1] The canton of Marans, near the mouth of the Sèvre, which was colonized by a group of Alani, will serve to illustrate the effect which may, in certain circumstances, be produced by the immigration of an alien people. Marans, though 25 per cent. of its population is blonde, is one of the most brachycephalic cantons of Saintonge. Yet the Alani were certainly a dolichocephalic people. M. Collignon concludes that, not having been accompanied by women, they would soon have been absorbed by the original population. In his opinion, what has modified the ' Auvergnat ' type in this canton is the tall, fair, ' Gallic ' type. See *Mém. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, 3e sér., i, 1895. pp. 115–6, 122.

[2] *Bull. du Muséum d'hist. nat.*, &c., 1902, p. 178 ; *L'Anthr.*, xvii, 1906, pp. 7, 10, 16–7, 25 ; xviii, 1907, pp. 127–39. See also *Bull. et mém. de la Soc. d'anthr.*, 5e sér., ii, 1901, pp. 721–3, and *Association franç. pour l'avancement des sc.*, 36e sessn., 1907, p. 876. Unfortunately, although the skeletons of the Iron Age which have been found in France were very numerous, those which were sufficiently well preserved to be susceptible of measurement were very few ; and I have not here taken account of four skulls, found in the Grotte de Courchapon in the department of the Doubs (*L'Anthr.*, xviii. 1907, p. 128), as they appear to have belonged to the end of the Bronze Age. *Rev. arch.*, 4e sér., xiii, 1909, pp. 228–9.

shows that in the Côte-d'Or dolichocephali predominated; that the cephalic indices of the available skulls from the Châtillonnais and the arrondissement of Beaune range between 73·1 and 76·59, while the average stature was 1 metre 757, or just over 5 feet 9⅙ inches; and that in Franche-Comté and Lorraine the same race, dolichocephalic or mesaticephalic[1] and tall, had asserted its superiority, although the old brachycephalous population survived.

Finally, Broca is careful to explain the sense in which he applies the term 'race' to the Celtae and the Belgae. These two peoples, he warns his readers, were not 'des races primitives et pures'.[2] What happened, he believes, was this. The tall, fair, 'Kymric' race took possession of the whole of Gaul, except Aquitania.[3] Between the Seine, the Marne, and the Scheldt, that is to say in the western part of the country of the Belgae, the 'Kymri' remained almost entirely pure until the Merovingian epoch, when they received an infusion of German blood:[4] the Celtae were a mixed race resulting from the crossing of the 'Kymri' with the small, dark, aboriginal peoples.

M. Hovelacque,[5] Dr. Lagneau,[6] and others have endeavoured to support Broca's theory by referring to ancient writers. Diodorus Siculus, they argue, distinguished the Gauls from the Celts: he described the former as tall and fair; the inference is obvious that the latter were short and dark. And, says Dr. Lagneau, if Caesar tells us that the people who dwelt between the Belgae and the Aquitani called themselves Celts, while the Romans called them Gauls, the explanation is easy:—'il semble que les Celtes, confondus sous la dénomination de leurs vainqueurs Gaëls, aient cherché à protester encore contre cette dénomination en persistant à se donner encore à eux-mêmes le nom de Celtes.'

Neither of these arguments has any force. I have already quoted the passage in which Diodorus distinguishes between the Celts and the Gauls.[7] Anybody who carefully reads the chapters in which he describes the inhabitants of Gaul will see that he habitually uses the word Γαλάται not in the restricted but in the general sense, including both Γαλάται and Κελτοί. Therefore when he describes the Gauls as tall and fair, he means that description to apply both to

[1] The indices varied from 71·5 to 78·8. Dr. Hamy (*L'Anthr.*, xviii, 1907, p. 135) regards the mesaticephali as the result of intermarriage between brachycephalic natives and Celtic invaders.

[2] *Mém. d'anthr.*, i, 394–6; *Bull. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, 2e sér., ix, 1874, p. 713.

[3] *Mém. d'anthr.*, i, 395. Broca believed that the fair invaders came in two hordes, the second of which entered Gaul more than 1,000 years before the first. But I need hardly say that no scholar would admit that the first invasion of the Celts—I use the word in its strict sense, not in the sense which Broca arbitrarily attached to it—took place in 1500 B.C.

[4] *Ib.*, pp. 394–6. Elsewhere Broca says that 'la race celtique . . . avait très probablement autrefois occupé au moins la partie méridionale de la Gaule belgique, où la race Kymrique . . . avait fini par la supplanter en l'absorbant dans un mélange inégal.'

[5] *Bull. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, 2e sér., ix, 1874, p. 705.

[6] *Rev. d'anthr.*, i, 1872, pp. 613–4; *Dict. encycl. des sc. médicales*, xiii, 1873, pp. 704–5.

[7] See p. 303.

the people whom he calls Celts and to the people whom he calls Gauls. If I am wrong in this conclusion, he does not describe the Celts at all; for in describing the people of Gaul he invariably speaks of them as Gauls. But it is certain that my conclusion is right; for, after describing[1] the manners and customs of the Gauls, as he calls them, he says 'I have now spoken enough about the Celts and will proceed to describe the Celtiberians' (ἡμεῖς δ' ἀρκούντως περὶ τῶν Κελτῶν εἰρηκότες μεταβιβάσομεν τὴν ἱστορίαν ἐπὶ τοὺς Κελτίβηρας). In fact, though he thinks it necessary to warn his readers that the Celtae were geographically distinct from the Galli, he draws no physical distinction between them;[2] and, in conformity with ancient usage, he as a rule uses the two terms indifferently. It is hardly necessary to add that he was an uncritical writer, and that the territory to which he restricts the Celtae is not coextensive with that which Caesar assigns to them. The argument that the Celtae called themselves by this name in order to mark their protest against the domination of their Gallic masters, is too fanciful to require an answer. When Caesar tells us that the people whom the Romans called *Galli* called themselves *Celtae*, he is not speaking of the conquered people only but of the entire population of the great central division of Gaul, including the conquerors, who, by the admission of Broca and his disciples, were Gauls properly so called.[3]

[1] v, 25–32.

[2] Since I wrote these words I have found that Prichard said much the same:— 'It is plain,' he remarked, 'that this distinction laid down by Diodorus is founded on no ethnographical limitation.' *Physical History of Mankind*, iii, 1841, p. 49, note.

[3] Sir John Rhys (*Celtae and Galli*, 1905, p. 57 [*Proc. Brit. Acad.*, vol. ii]) affirming that inscriptions prove that 'Celtae and Galli spoke different languages in the central district between the Seine and the Garonne', argues that 'as we are forced to admit the fact of a cleavage, one cannot help accepting the names Celtae and Galli as marking the lines of that cleavage'. But did not Caesar take pains to make it clear that Celtae and Galli were identical? The inscriptions show that a language which Sir John Rhys regards as Celtic, but which was certainly not Gallo-Brythonic (see pp. 319–21, *infra*), was probably once spoken in the department of the Ain and in the department of the Deux-Sèvres. These two languages point to the existence of two groups of invaders; but why assume, in defiance of Caesar's statement, that they were respectively Celtae and Galli? Sir John Rhys, as I have remarked elsewhere (*Anc. Britain*, p. 438, n. 3), argues from the comparative dearth of 'Celtican' linguistic remains that the Celtae were conquered by the Galli. Possibly Goidelic Celts, or 'Celticans', and the prehistoric peoples with whom they had coalesced, were conquered by Gallo-Brythonic Celts; but if so, it remains certain that both conquered and conquerors, after their amalgamation, were by themselves collectively called Celtae. How could the name of the conquered supersede that of the conquerors if, as Sir John Rhys of course maintains, the language of the conquerors prevailed? See also *Rev. de synthèse hist.*, iii, 1901, pp. 32–3; *Rev. de l'École d'anthr.*, xv, 1905, pp. 216–30; and *Rev. celt.*, xxvii, 1906, pp. 109–10.

Sir John Rhys formerly argued that a distinction between Celtae and Galli was established by the distribution of dolmens and *tumuli* in Gaul, the former of which he attributed to the Celtae and the latter to the Galli, and also by a familiar passage in Sulpicius Severus (*Dialogus*, i, 27), who puts into the mouth of Postumianus, one of the characters in his dialogues, the words *Tu vero vel Celtice aut, si mavis, Gallice loquere*, which Sir John translated by 'Speak

The radical errors in Broca's definition of 'the Celts of history' are these :—first, he calmly assumes that no classical writer's testimony, except Caesar's, is of any value ; and secondly, he fails to see that Caesar, by saying that the people who called themselves 'Celts' were called by the Romans 'Gauls', makes it as clear as noon-day that for him and for his countrymen, as for Polybius and Pausanias, the words 'Celt' and 'Gaul' were synonymous. Broca admits that the older population of Gallia Celtica was conquered by men of the same race as the Gauls or Celts who captured Rome. Therefore it is absolutely certain that the Celtae of Transalpine Gaul were called after their conquerors. The truth is that Broca, while he aimed at putting an end to confusion, only made confusion worse confounded. Moreover, throughout his discussion, he simply ignores the Helvetii, who, according to Caesar,[1] were included among the Celtae.

But these points are of minor importance ; and I have only touched upon them in order to clear away the misconceptions to which Broca's theory has given birth. The real question is whether his account of the ethnology of Gallia Celtica is accurate,—in other words, whether the bulk of the population in Caesar's time was short, dark, and

Celtic or Gallic, if you prefer it'. I do not suppose that Sir John would now insist upon these arguments. *Celtice aut, si mavis, Gallice* simply means 'in the Celtic or, if you prefer to call it so, the Gallic tongue' ; and it is matter of common knowledge that the dolmens were not built by Celts at all, and, moreover, that the map referred to by Sir John, which purported to represent the distribution of dolmens and *tumuli*, was based upon insufficient data.

M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, i, 319, n. 4), who says that he is substantially in agreement with Sir John Rhys, admits that the ancient writers finally extended to the Celtae the name *Galli*, but argues that the reason why the Celtae did not call themselves Galli was that the latter name properly belonged to the Belgae. If he means that it never properly belonged to the Gallo-Brythonic Celts who had amalgamated with and become predominant among the mixed population which Caesar called Celtae, he differs essentially from Sir John.

The theories of Sir John Rhys and M. Jullian are both traceable to the writings of the late Alexandre Bertrand (*Rev. d'anthr.*, ii, 1873, pp. 235–50, 422–35, 629–43 ; *Rev. arch.*, 3e sér., i, 1876, pp. 1–24, 73–98, 153–61 ; *Archéologie celt. et gaul.*, 2e éd., 1889 ; *Les Celtes . . . dans les vallées du Pô et du Danube*, 1894, especially pp. 1–63, 124–5, 132–3, 142, 149–51, 156–7, 177–8 ; *La religion des Gaulois*, 1897, pp. 8, 10–3, 313, &c.). He maintained that the Gauls, properly so called—'les Gaulois' or 'les Galates'—formed a group apart from the Celts : nevertheless he held that the two groups were, in physical characters, identical, and spoke dialects of the same language. The invaders who captured Rome were, he maintained, Gauls, properly so called ; but, long before they threaded the passes of the Alps, a peaceful 'Celtic' population had been settled in the Plain of Lombardy. Similarly, he argued that 'Celtic' immigrants had established themselves in Transalpine Gaul five or six centuries before the true Gauls arrived. He pointed, in support of his theory, to various archaeological discoveries, and he laboured at prodigious length to prove that it had the support of Polybius. But the archaeological evidence is now excluded as irrelevant ; and it has been demonstrated by M. d'Arbois de Jubainville (*Les premiers habitants de l'Europe*, ii, 1894, pp. 394–409) and by Professor Zupitza (*Zeitschr. f. celt. Philologie*, iv, 1903, pp. 3–6) that the terms *Celtae* and *Galli*, as used by the ancient writers, including Polybius, were, generally speaking, synonymous. Cf. A. Holder, *Alt-celtischer Sprachschatz*, i, 892.

[1] *B. G.*, i, 1, § 4.

brachycephalic, as it is at the present day. There is certainly a solid substratum of truth in Broca's theory, for sepulchral evidence proves that the number of roundheads was considerable; but I believe that, partly perhaps from the characteristically French love of logical precision, partly from the want of sufficient data, he pushed it too far. In his time the supplementary tables of MM. Collignon and Topinard had not been published.

There are several departments the returns for which appear to clash with or, at all events, are not to be accounted for by Broca's theory. Thus Finistère and the Morbihan are both in the lowest class as regards stature; and yet the former ranks as comparatively fair, the latter as very fair in Topinard's list. Again, the eastern group of departments presents features which neither Broca nor any other ethnologist has satisfactorily explained. The people of the Doubs, Jura, Haute-Marne, and Haute-Saône are respectively 1st, 3rd, 4th, and 9th in the table of stature: the first three appear in the group which Topinard styles 'les plus blonds', and the fourth is comparatively fair; yet all four are extraordinarily brachycephalic. Dr. Collignon[1] and others explain this combination as the result of a cross between the tall fair Burgundians and the short, dark, brachycephalic people whom they conquered; and Dr. Collignon remarks that the modern Lorrainers are much shorter than genuine blondes like the Scandinavians. But the Burgundians were extremely dolichocephalic; and it is difficult to see how a cross between a dolichocephalic and a brachycephalic race should result in a population even more brachycephalic than the most brachycephalic of their ancestors. I can only suggest that, if Dr. Collignon had measured a relatively large number of skulls in the Burgundian departments, their indices might have turned out lower.[2]

Dr. Guibert has made an elaborate investigation into the ethnology of the Côtes-du-Nord,[3] which was supplemented and corrected by Dr. Collignon.[4] They found that the conditions of the problem were far more complex than Broca had supposed. For example, the average stature is greatest in the maritime districts, not of the Breton-speaking but of the French-speaking portion; and it is in these very districts that the proportion of blue eyes and fair hair is lowest. Indeed, the researches of Collignon, although they do not disturb Broca's general theory, point to such a medley of races as must make it impossible to draw any valuable inference from the ethnology of the Côtes-du-Nord regarding that of Gallia Celtica as a whole.

But it was in his treatment of the ethnology of Auvergne that

[1] *L'Anthr.*, i, 1890, p. 213. See also *Rev. mensuelle de l'École d'anthr.*, 1896, p. 218, where it is pointed out that 'les croisements ethniques ont souvent pour résultat non pas la fusion, mais l'échange des caractères'.

[2] M. J. Deniker (*Association franç. pour l'avancement des sc.*, 36e sessn., 1907, 1re partie, p. 277) says that people of the tall, dark, brachycephalic type which he calls Adriatic (see p. 325, *infra*) are to be found in Alsace, Lorraine, and the region of the Vosges.

[3] *Bull. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, 2e sér., v, 1870, pp. 252–65.

[4] *Ib.*, 4e sér., i, 1890, pp. 750–83.

Broca was least fortunate. Dr. A. Bouchereau[1] has recently shown that the Auvergnats in general are extraordinarily mixed,[2] and his researches suggest that the villagers of St. Nectaire-le-Haut, whom Broca singled out on account of their supposed purity, may have been very different from their Gallic predecessors. It is true that the number of ancient skulls which Bouchereau has been able to collect is very small: but among those of the Neolithic Age and the Iron Age he could not find one specimen that was not dolichocephalic; and in the cemetery of St. Floret he found that while the mean index of the most recent skulls was 83·73, that of the lowest layer, some six centuries older, was less than 80.

At all events, it would seem that Broca did not sufficiently allow for the influence which the various Germanic conquerors of Gaul must have exercised in modifying the physical characters of the people among whom they settled.[3] It is probable that those conquerors were, generally speaking, tall, fair, and dolichocephalic; and it is precisely in those parts of France in which they settled—always excepting the inadequately explained brachycephaly of Burgundy, Franche-Comté, and Lorraine—that the closest approximation to those characteristics is found among modern Frenchmen. Who shall decide what proportion of the result is to be ascribed to these Germanic peoples, and what to the tall fair Gauls of Caesar's time? When Broca and his disciples maintain that the Celtae were, for the most part, markedly different in physical characters from the Belgae, they forget or disregard the evidence of Strabo,[4] who says that the Belgae and the Celtae 'participated in the same Gaulish exterior' —that is to say, that they were both alike tall and fair—and the evidence of Caesar, who says that *omnes Galli*, that is to say, Belgae and Celtae alike, were tall. On the other hand, if we attempt to use this evidence against Broca, we are confronted by the fact that a large proportion of the Celtae and some certainly of the Belgae were demonstrably short and dark, and by the fact that we cannot tell whether Strabo was only repeating what he had heard or read, and whether Caesar did not exaggerate, like many unscientific travellers, the prevalence of those characters by which he was most impressed. Furthermore, in the well-known passage[5] in which he tells us that the inhabitants of Vesontio (Besançon) frightened the legionaries by telling them of the huge stature of the Germans, he certainly seems to imply that tallness was much less common among the people of Gaul than among the people on the east of the Rhine.

[1] *L'Anthr.*, xi, 1900, pp. 691–706; *Association franç. pour l'avancement des sc.*, 37e sessn., 1908, p. 700.

[2] It is remarkable that the red-haired individuals whom he noticed were not, as might have been expected, dolichocephalic, but the most brachycephalic of all.

[3] In one of his articles, however (*Mém. d'anthr.*, i, 287), he lays great stress upon that influence: 'nous voyons . . . entre la Meuse et le Rhin . . . les Kymris presque entièrement germanisés par suite de la prédominance de la population franke . . . entre la Seine, la Meuse et l'Escaut, les mêmes Kymris, restés à peu près purs jusqu'à l'époque mérovingienne, et mêlés depuis lors, en proportion notable, aux conquérants germaniques,' &c.

[4] iv, 1, § 1.

[5] *B. G.*, i, 39, § 1.

I will now try to use the data which I have collected. First, it is undeniable, and is admitted by every one who has studied the question, that a large proportion of the people whom Caesar called Celtae were short, dark, and brachycephalic; that is to say, that they differed essentially in physical characters from the Gauls or Celts, whom the ancient writers with one voice describe as tall, and whom nearly all of them describe as fair. It is also probable that a considerable portion of them, in certain districts, were short, dark, and relatively dolichocephalic. Furthermore, M. Collignon has remarked that 'la brachycéphalie semble croître avec l'altitude du lieu, et que ses maxima répondent aux massifs montagneux les plus élevés,' [1] from which he concludes that the older inhabitants were, in some measure, driven out of the more fertile tracts by blonde dolichocephalic invaders. So much modern research has added to the knowledge which we derive from the ancients. But of that research the statistics that have been collected regarding the modern population are not perhaps the most valuable part. They confirm the evidence of history and of prehistoric graves; but they do not add to it much. The question that remains is why the existing traces of the tall fair Gauls in the country (exclusive of Helvetia) that was once occupied by the Celtae are so slight. M. d'Arbois de Jubainville offers a peculiar explanation.[2] The Gauls, he says, were very few; and even those few were almost annihilated in the Gallic war. The true Gauls, he insists, were merely the aristocratic caste whom Caesar describes[3] as *equites*; and a passage in *B. G.*, vii, 64, § 1, proves that they only numbered 15,000 fighting men, from which it may be inferred that the whole population, including women and children, was not more than 60,000! There is no force in this argument. First, it entirely ignores the statement of Caesar that the Gauls generally, including the Celtae (*omnes Galli*), were tall, as well as the statements of Strabo and Diodorus, to which I have already referred. Secondly, it assumes that Caesar always uses the word *equites* in the same sense,—that the Gallic *cavalry* were entirely composed of the 'knights' or nobles whom Caesar describes in his general account of the manners and customs of the Gauls; whereas he expressly says that Dumnorix maintained a large number of *equites*, who could not have been 'knights', at his own expense.[4] Thirdly, it leaves out of account the fact that, even in the last year of the Gallic war, there were, at the very least, 8,000 *equites* [5] besides those mentioned in *B. G.*, vii, 64, § 1. Fourthly, it assumes that these same 'knights' had for centuries preserved their organization as a close corporation, and that none of the *plebs* belonged to the tall fair race,—an assumption which is contrary to all reason. Moreover, there is no evidence that the *equites* were 'almost annihilated' in the Gallic war; and it

[1] A. Bertrand, *La Gaule avant les Gaulois*, pp. 323–4. Cf. *Annales de géogr.*, v, 1896, p. 192. Dr. Bouchereau's researches, however, would lead one to suspect that Collignon's generalization may not be universally applicable to Caesar's time.

[2] *Les premiers habitants de l'Europe*, ii, 1894, pp. 7, 10.

[3] *B. G.*, vi, 13, § 3; 15, § 1. [4] *Ib.*, i, 18, § 5. [5] *Ib.*, vii, 76, § 3.

is hard to understand why the cavalry should have been annihilated any more than the infantry.[1]

By way of explaining the existing rarity of blondes in Celtican Gaul, Dr. Beddoe remarks [2] that we do not know exactly what the ancient writers meant by certain shades of colour, nor can we estimate the personal equation of those of them who wrote from personal observation. 'What is darkish brown,' he remarks, 'to most Englishmen would be chestnut in the nomenclature of most Parisians ... an ancient Roman might ... have called it ... even *flavus*.' This argument is to my mind invalidated by three facts: the meaning of *flavus* and *rutilus* is fixed by numerous passages; [3] the ancients described the Germans, whom Dr. Beddoe admits to have been genuine blondes, by practically the same epithets as the Gauls; and Diodorus [4] describes the extreme fairness of Gallic children and the gradual darkening of their hair as they grow older in terms which would be applicable to Norwegian children in the present day:[5]—*τὰ δὲ παιδία παρ' αὐτοῖς ἐκ γενετῆς ὑπάρχει πολιὰ κατὰ τὸ πλεῖστον· προβαίνοντα δὲ ταῖς ἡλικίαις εἰς τὸ τῶν πατέρων χρῶμα ταῖς χρόαις μετασχηματίζεται.*

Without resorting to M. d'Arbois's explanation or to Dr. Beddoe's, it is not difficult to account satisfactorily for the general disappearance from Gallia Celtica of the type which Caesar, Strabo, and Diodorus describe. Men of this type were, there can be little doubt, less numerous, even in Caesar's time, than the dark races; and even then intermarriage had probably been going on for generations between them and the peoples whom their forefathers had conquered. The losses which they suffered during the Gallic war were no doubt disproportionately heavy: it is, as Broca has pointed out, the constant tendency of a mixed race to revert to the type which was, at the outset, numerically in the ascendant; [6] and, as Penka [7] has

[1] Mr. W. H. (Bullock) Hall (*The Romans on the Riviera*, &c., 1898, p. 4) found 'reason to hope', after an interview with M. d'Arbois, that he was 'prepared to modify his extreme views'.

[2] *The Races of Britain*, p. 3.

[3] See Forcellini, *Totius latinitatis lexicon*, iii, 1865, pp. 98–9; v, 1871, pp. 279–80.

[4] v, 32, § 2.

[5] In the public gardens of Clermont-Ferrand, which is in the typically (?) 'Celtic' department of the Puy-de-Dôme, almost every child whom I saw was fair, and many had flaxen hair. H. Martin remarks (*Rev. d'anthr.*, 2e sér., ii, 1879, pp. 194–5) that immense numbers of children are born blonde, and darken, which, he argues, proves that the 'Gallic' element among the Celtae was larger than is commonly supposed. The members of the *Association française pour l'avancement des sciences*, when they met at Clermont, made an excursion into the mountains and were astonished to find 'an almost pure race with fair hair, blue eyes, and white skin' (*L'Anthr.*, xi, 1900, p. 695). Dr. A. Bouchereau (*ib.*, p. 698) affirms that a blonde element also exists in the departments of the Creuse, Corrèze, Cantal, and Allier.

[6] Broca lays it down as an axiom that when two races, numerically very unequal, mix, the less numerous is rapidly absorbed, and that hybrids tend to revert to the type of the more numerous. See *Rev. d'anthr.*, ii, 1873, p. 619. Again, Dr. Beddoe remarks (*Scottish Review*, xix, 1892, p. 416) that tall fair children cannot stand the insanitary conditions of urban life as well as short dark ones. See also L. Vanderkindere, *Recherches sur l'ethnologie de la Belgique*, 1872, p. 62.

[7] See *The New Princeton Review*, v, 1888, pp. 12–3. Cf. p. 259, *supra*.

shown, the tall blonde races have, owing to climatic reasons, never been able to maintain their original proportion in Central or Southern Europe. When we consider all these things, and bear in mind further that, since Caesar wrote, racial amalgamation has been going on for nearly 2,000 years, it is not to be wondered at that so few specimens of the classical Gallic type are to be found now in the country which corresponds with Celtican Gaul.

But we must beware of exaggerating the rarity of the type. The three tables published by MM. Broca, Topinard, and Collignon are apt to suggest to an unwary reader that the people of this or that department are uniformly short, dark, and brachycephalic. Any traveller who kept his eyes open would soon find out that this was a mistake. The tables only profess to give general results; and the numbers of individuals on which those of MM. Topinard and Collignon were based were comparatively small. The well-known traveller, William Edwards,[1] saw numerous examples of what he called the 'Kymric' type between Geneva and Mâcon, in Burgundy, and between the mouths of the Somme and the Seine. The characteristics of this type he described as 'la tête longue, le front large et élevé, le nez recourbé, la pointe en bas, et les ailes du nez relevées, le menton fortement prononcé et saillant, la stature haute'. I saw it myself fourteen years ago, combined with fair hair and complexion, in two carters, near Royat, in the department of the Puy-de-Dôme.[2]

We must not overlook the Helvetii. Caesar, it will be remembered, includes them among the Celtae. Now, although, as we have seen,[3] the older inhabitants of Helvetia, like those of the rest of Gallia Celtica, were a medley of roundheads and long-heads, and doubtless, for the most part, dark, there is abundant evidence that the Helvetii, properly so called, were tall powerful Gauls. In the Hallstatt Period tall dolichocephalic invaders appear to have subdued the lake-dwellers; in the period of La Tène, corresponding with that which in our own island is called Late Celtic, the Helvetii, who belonged to the same stock, made themselves masters of Switzerland.[4]

It is universally admitted that a certain proportion, great or small, of the people whom Caesar called Celtae were tall and fair, and were ethnically identical with or akin to the Gauls who captured Rome. Were these men identical in race with the tall fair Belgae, and did they originally belong to one ethnical group or to two?

Perhaps the evidence of language may help us. Of the language or languages that were spoken in Gaul nothing remains except names of men and of peoples, geographical names, a few names of things

[1] *Les caractères physiol. des races humaines*. 1829, pp. 58, 61, 66–7.

[2] M. P. Gouÿ (*Rev. de l'École d'anthr.*, xvii, 1907, pp. 266–8) remarks that many persons of 'Kymrie' type are to be seen in the Ardèche. They are often fair and generally dolichocephalic; many of them exceed 1 m. 80 (nearly 5 ft. 11 in.) in height, and some reach 1 m. 90 (nearly 6 ft. 3 in.). Dr. Collignon (*Annales de géogr.*, v, 1896, p. 164) tells us that the same type is noticeable in the rich district round Limoges. See pp. 331–5, *infra*.

[3] See p. 275.

[4] *Bull. et mém. de la Soc. d'anthr.*, 5e sér., viii, 1907, pp. 226–7; ix, 1908, pp. 743–5.

which passed into Latin, and a few inscriptions.[1] Here it may be well to state certain elementary facts of Celtic phonology, although I dare say that to most of those who may read these pages they are already familiar.

The Gauls, for the most part, including the Belgae, and the Brythons, or Celts who invaded Britain, from whose dialect modern Welsh is descended, are commonly called the P Celts ;[2] while the Goidels, whose dialect was the ancestor of Gaelic, Irish, and Manx, are known as the Q Celts. The reason of this distinction is that the Gauls and Brythons changed the original sound of *qu* into *p*, while the Goidels retained it, and in the sixth century of our era modified it into *c*.[3] It has been affirmed, however, on the evidence of the 'formularies' of Marcellus of Bordeaux, who was physician to Theodosius the Great, that some of the Western Gauls in the fourth century spoke a dialect which was akin to Goidelic ;[4] and Sir John Rhys and Mr. E. W. B. Nicholson[5] regard the words *Sequani* and *Sequana* (the Gallic name of the Seine) as proving that this dialect was not confined to the west : but, as we have seen,[6] M. d'Arbois de Jubainville refuses to admit that these names are Celtic ; and he contemptuously denies that the formularies are to be taken seriously.[7] Sir John Rhys[8] and Mr. Nicholson[9] also infer from certain inscriptions found in the departments of the Ain and Deux-Sèvres, which probably belong respectively to the first and the fourth century of our era, that a dialect akin to Goidelic was spoken in those localities : but here again M. d'Arbois dissents ;[10] and he remarks that an inscription found at Géligneux in the department of the Ain contains a word, *petrudecametos*,[11] which belongs to the language of the P Celts. Sir John Rhys urges that 'the presence of monuments in the language occupying the subordinate position may be taken as evidence presumptive of its being the vernacular in the immediate neighbourhood':[12]

[1] See Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 580, and Sir J. Rhys's papers in *Proc. Brit. Acad.*, vol. ii.

[2] Mr. E. W. B. Nicholson (*Keltic Researches*, 1904) has attempted to prove that the Belgae were Goidels, a theory which is refuted in my *Anc. Britain*, pp. 449–52.

[3] See J. Rhys, *Celtic Britain*, 3rd ed., 1904, pp. 215–6.

[4] Zeuss, in the preface (dated 1853) to his *Grammatica Celtica* (pp. xxxii–xxxiii, ed. 1871), denied that there were any Celtic words in the formularies; but, according to Prof. W. K. Sullivan (E. O'Curry's *Manners and Customs of the Ancient Irish*, i, 1873, p. lx), he afterwards 'fully admitted the Celtic character of the Marcellian formulae in a letter to Jacob Grimm'. Cf. J. Rhys, *Celtae and Galli*, 1905, p. 50, note (*Proc. Brit. Acad.*, vol. ii).

[5] *Keltic Researches*, pp. 6, 128, 149, 167.

[6] See p. 281.

[7] *Rev. celt.*, xxv, 1904, pp. 351–3 ; xxvii, 1906, pp. 107–8.

[8] *Celtae and Galli*, pp. 1–2, 46, 55–64. See p. 282, n. 2, *supra*.

[9] *Keltic Researches*, pp. 116–53.

[10] *Rev. celt.*, xxv, 1904, pp. 351–3 ; xxvii, 1906, p. 107.

[11] *Corpus inscr. Lat.*, xiii, 2494. M. Loth regards the word *petrudecametos* as a proof that the other inscription found in the same department—the famous calendar of Coligny—cannot be Ligurian. But M. d'Arbois is never at a loss for an answer :—may not the calendar have been written in an archaic language, just as the 'ordinal' used by Catholic priests is in Latin ? See *Rev. celt.*, xxx, 1909, p. 214.

[12] *Celtae and Galli*, p. 62.

but a pillar, bearing a Goidelic inscription, has been found at Silchester, where the vernacular was undoubtedly Brythonic;[1] and the explanation may be that the inscription was the work of a stranger. M. d'Arbois,[2] moreover, unlike Sir John Rhys, maintains that when the Celts first invaded Britain, the Celtic language everywhere was one and the same: according to him, none of the Celts had then changed *q* into *p*, but that change was made at a later date by the Celts who conquered Gaul, and some of whose descendants afterwards conquered Britain.

But, as the reader will have gathered from an earlier paragraph,[3] the antagonism between M. d'Arbois and Sir John Rhys is less sharp than it might at first sight appear. The former regards *Sequani*, *Sequana*, and the language of the inscriptions as Ligurian; the latter is now inclined to believe that 'Ligurian was the Continental idiom akin to Goidelic as Gaulish was to Brythonic'.[4] On what does he base this assimilation of a language of which we know hardly anything to a language of which, as he himself says, we know little?[5] Simply, it would seem, on the fact that certain inscriptions which he is 'greatly inclined to regard as Celtican',[6] but which M. d'Arbois refuses to regard as Celtic at all, have been found on both banks of the Lower Rhône in territory which M. Jullian has shown to have been occupied by Ligurians. But M. Jullian, who by emphasizing this fact (which, by the way, was already public property) has in Sir John's opinion gone 'some way to solve the Celto-ligurian question',[7] insists that before the fourth century B.C. the Ligurian language had been supplanted by Celtic.[8]

The conclusion appears to be this. It is admitted that in Caesar's time the bulk of the Celtae spoke a language—Gaulish or Gallo-Brythonic—which was also that of the Belgae, and therefore that, as far as we can judge from linguistic evidence,[9] there was no ethnological distinction between the Belgae and the conquerors who, as I shall afterwards prove,[10] had imposed that language in 'Celtican' Gaul. It is admitted that at a later time inscriptions were erected in a language which, whether it was Ligurian or 'Celtican' or both, was different from Gaulish; for it retained *qu* and Indo-European *p*, both of which Gaulish had lost. If, as has been suggested,[11] the inscriptions were written in a dead language, still it had been spoken in Gaul at an earlier time. If it was Ligurian, it throws no light upon Celtic ethnology unless we are to adopt the desperate solution that Ligurians and Celts, or rather 'Celticans', were linguistically one. If it was Celtican and not Ligurian, it points to the existence of an earlier influx of Celtic conquerors who differed in speech from the

[1] See F. Haverfield, *The Romanization of Roman Britain*, 1905, p. 29 (*Proc. Brit. Acad.*, vol. ii).

[2] *Les premiers habitants de l'Europe*, ii, 1894, pp. 255–82; *Les Celtes*, pp. 17–9.

[3] See pp. 281–2.

[4] *Celtic Inscriptions in France and Italy*, 1906, pp. 99–100 (*Proc. Brit. Acad.*, vol. ii).

[5] *Ib.*, p. 79.

[6] *Ib.*, p. 81.

[7] *Ib.*, pp. 77–81, 99.

[8] *Mélanges H. d'Arbois de Jubainville*, 1906, p. 108.

[9] See J. Rhys, *Celtae and Galli*, p. 60.

[10] See pp. 328–31.

[11] See p. 319, n. 11.

later Gallo-Brythons. If it was Ligurian and not Celtican, and if accordingly the Celtic language, when the Celts first invaded Gaul, was everywhere the same, the Goidels and Brythons of later times sprang from the same stock. And even if the first invaders of Gaul were Goidels, there is no reason to suppose that they were physically different from the Brythons who conquered them.

It is certain that the conquering people among the Belgae and the conquering people among the Celtae were, ethnically, one and the same.[1] They spoke the same language or dialects of the same language: their physical features are described by the ancient writers in terms which are virtually identical: remains of a common civilization are found in the territories of both peoples. The chief reason for raising the question which I have been discussing is that, according to the Reman envoys who visited Caesar in 57 B. C., the Belgae were 'of German origin' (*ortos a Germanis*);[2] and we shall presently see that this statement does not shake the orthodox conclusion, that the Belgae, or rather the Belgic conquerors, were, for the most part at all events, a Gallic and Celtic-speaking people.

One word more, and I bid adieu to the Celtae. It has been asserted that 'the word "Kelt" has long ceased to have any ethnical significance'.[3] If so, the reason is that writers on ethnology have not kept their heads clear. Broca, as we have seen, laid it down that 'the Celts of history' were the mixed population of Gallia Celtica whom Caesar called *Celtae*; and if for 'the Celts of history' we substitute 'the Celts of history as written by Caesar', his definition is a truism. But one important point Broca overlooked. Just as the French are called after one conquering people, the Franks; just as the English are called after one conquering people, the Angles; so the heterogeneous Celtae of Transalpine Gaul were called after one conquering people; and that people were the Celts, or rather a branch of the Celts, in the true sense of the word. The Celts, in short, were the people who introduced the Celtic language into Gaul, into Asia Minor, and into Britain; the people who included the victors of the Allia, the conquerors of Gallia Celtica, and the conquerors of Gallia Belgica; the people whom Polybius called indifferently Gauls and Celts; the people who, as Pausanias said, were originally called Celts and afterwards called Gauls. If certain ancient writers confounded the tall fair Celts who spoke Celtic with the tall fair Germans who spoke German, the ancient writers who were better informed avoided such a mistake. The popular instinct in this matter has been right. Let us therefore restore to the word 'Celt' the ethnical significance which of right belongs to it.[4]

[1] Of course I do not mean to affirm that either the conquering Belgae or the conquering Celtae were homogeneous; or to deny that the prevailing types of the two groups, of whom the Belgae were the later comers, may, from various causes, have become more or less differentiated: I only mean that the purer Belgae and the purer Celtae sprang from the same stock.

[2] *B. G.*, ii, 4, § 1.

[3] A. H. Keane, *Ethnology*, 1896, p. 397.

[4] I find that my conclusions were sanctioned in advance by Dr. Collignon in an article (*Annales de géogr.*, v, 1896, pp. 156–66) which I had not seen when

VI

THE BELGAE

1. What Caesar, Strabo, and Diodorus Siculus tell us about the physical characters of the Belgae, I have virtually stated already. They were tall, and, according to the two later writers, fair ; and they did not differ noticeably from the Celtae. Caesar, as everybody knows, tells us that the Belgae, according to his Reman informants, were, for the most part, of German origin, and that the Condrusi, Eburones, Caerosi, and Paemani were designated, in his time, as Germans;[1] and, in one passage,[2] he himself describes the Segni and Condrusi as Germans by race. The significance of these statements I shall presently discuss.

2. The great majority of the people who have settled in Belgic Gaul since Caesar wrote have belonged to the German or kindred races. Franks settled in large numbers in Flanders and Brabant and also in the neighbourhood of Laon and Soissons : afterwards Saxons and Frisians completely Germanized Flanders and Brabant.[3]

3. Of the skulls, prehistoric and Celtic, which have been found in Belgic territory, I have already spoken.[4]

The evidence collected by MM. Broca, Collignon, and Topinard is available only for the western and southern portions of the Belgic territory, which comprise the departments of the Aisne, Ardennes, Marne, Nord, Oise, Pas-de-Calais, Seine-Inférieure, Seine-et-Marne, and Somme. In every one of these departments the mass of the people are fair or relatively fair : in all, except the Seine-Inférieure, where the average height is medium, they are relatively tall ; while in the Aisne, Nord, Pas-de-Calais, Seine-Inférieure, and Somme, they are mesaticephalic, and in the remainder sub-brachycephalic.

With regard to that part of the Belgic territory which is included in Belgium and Holland, we are mainly dependent upon the researches of L. Vanderkindere,[5] Dr. Beddoe,[6] and M. J. Deniker. The

the first edition of this book appeared. He speaks (p. 159) of the ' population pré-gauloise que Broca nommait à tort les Celtes ' and affirms that ' les Celtes de l'histoire sont en effet aussi des blonds de haute taille '. Since the first edition was published I have also lighted upon a passage (*Bull. de la Soc. d'anthr.*, ii, 1861, pp. 508–9) in which Broca himself justifies my argument and uses the word ' Celt ' in the same sense which I attach to it. The Celtae of Gaul, he remarks, ' were already mixed before the arrival of the Kimris [or Gallo-Brythonic invaders], since the name [Celtae] under which they appeared for the first time in history had been imposed upon them by the conquering race of the Celts properly so called, which, like the Kimris [who of course were also Celts] and the Germans, came from the east, and like them, was dolichocephalic.' ' Cette première opinion,' says Dr. L. Wilser (*L'Anthr.*, xiv, 1903, pp. 496–7), ' oubliée plus tard par son auteur et ses disciples, était juste.' Cf. *Anc. Britain*, pp. 436–40.

[1] *B. G.*, ii, 4, §§ 1, 10.
[2] *Ib.*, vi, 32, § 1.
[3] *Scottish Review*, xxi, 1893, pp. 177–8.
[4] See pp. 269, 272–4, 305.
[5] *Recherches sur l'ethnologie de la Belgique*, 1872, pp. 21–2, 59, 63, 65, 68 ; *Nouvelles recherches sur l'ethnologie de la Belgique*, 1879, pp. 41, 44–5.
[6] *The Races of Britain*, pp. 16, 21, 72–3, 94 ; *Scottish Review*, xxi, 1893, pp. 178–9.

line which marks the separation between the Flemish and Walloon languages also marks the separation between two physical types, the Flemings, whose territory was conquered, and has often been re-peopled by Germans, being taller and fairer than the Walloons. The Walloons, however, in the strip of territory which extends along the valley of the Lys in Western Flanders, are taller than the Flemings in the basin of the Yser. The inhabitants of the Flemish provinces are also more dolichocephalic than those of the Walloon, the cephalic index of the former ranging between 76·7 and 78·31, that of the latter between 78·51 and 81·17.[1] Although the Walloons, generally speaking, are dark, the purest, according to Vanderkindere—for example, those of Namur—are fair. The inhabitants of the Dutch provinces of Zeeland, North Brabant, and Limburg, belong for the most part to Broca's 'Celtic' type,[2] which is also found in the district of Mons;[3] while tall, dark, brachycephalic individuals, belonging to the type which M. Deniker calls Adriatic, may be seen in Luxembourg as well as in the department of the Marne.[4]

4. I have already, in speaking of the Celtae, mentioned the view which Broca took of the Belgae. He believed that the great mass of the people, in Caesar's time, were 'Kymric'—that is to say, tall fair Gauls of the classical type—intermixed with or living among a minority of the short, dark, brachycephalic type which he called Celtic. But it is certain that the comparatively high stature, the comparatively low cephalic index, and the fairness of the existing population are largely due to the German immigrants who have settled in the country since Caesar's time; and it is possible, as Dr. Beddoe[5] suggests, that the cephalic index may be due not only to 'Kymric' and German elements, but also to the presence, in ancient times, of the small, dark, dolichocephalic people of the Homme Mort type, whom ethnologists loosely call Iberian. That Broca's 'Celtic' element existed in considerable force, is proved not only by the continued existence, in certain parts of the country, of people of the Grenelle type, but also by the fact that so large a proportion of the population are now relatively brachycephalic. The round-headed element suggests a question which I cannot answer. Caesar's informants told him that the Belgae had expelled the Gauls whom they found in possession, and who certainly included numerous representatives of the old brachycephalic race. If the expulsion was even approximately complete, it would seem that the Belgae themselves included a large proportion of round-heads, which, indeed, is not unlikely: anyhow round-heads must have been numerous in the Belgic population of Caesar's time. Nevertheless I believe that Broca's view, if it was pushed too far, contained a considerable element of truth, and that in the northern, western, and relatively dolichocephalic districts, at all events, the tall, blonde, Gallic element

[1] According to M. E. Houzé (*Rev. d'anthr.*, 2e sér., v, 1882, pp. 527–30), the average cephalic index of 166 Flemings was 76·84, of 75 Walloons 81·10.

[2] *Bull. et mém. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, 5e sér., v, 1904, p. 579.

[3] *Association franç. pour l'avancement des sc.*, 36e sessn., 1907, 1re partie, p. 277.

[4] *Ib.*

[5] *The Races of Britain*, p. 94.

was proportionately stronger, in Caesar's time, among the Belgae than among the Celtae. For it is certain, and indeed obvious that the dark brachycephalic element is proportionately much smaller now in Belgic than in Celtic Gaul; and, moreover, a large number of the taller modern inhabitants, especially among the Walloons and in the neighbourhood of Reims, present a type which is markedly non-Germanic, and which, as I shall show in the proper place, there is strong reason to regard as a modified form of the true Gallic type. Before I come to this question, it will be well to examine the view which Dr. Beddoe has published regarding the composition of the Belgae.[1]

Besides the short, dark, brachycephalic people, the so-called Iberians, and other representatives of prehistoric races, Dr. Beddoe holds, as I understand, that the bulk of the Belgae proper consisted of a large proportion of tall dark people, and a small proportion of tall fair people, who formed the dominant caste. He arrives at this conclusion by the following reasoning. The purest representatives of the Belgae are, he believes, the Walloons, who, as Thurnam remarked,[2] 'pride themselves upon being of the most ancient Gaulish lineage.'[3] Doubtless, Dr. Beddoe admits, the Walloons are not, strictly speaking, a pure race. There is probably a Germanic and an 'Iberian' element in their composition. Still, their type is markedly different from that of the true Germans and the blonde Flemings. They and the inhabitants of Reims and Epernay, who closely resemble them, have the 'tall frames, square foreheads, and long sharply drawn features which constitute W. Edwards's Kymric type'. This type prevails throughout the country extending north-eastward from the neighbourhood of Reims through the Ardennes to Liège and Verviers. But the moment we cross the Walloon frontier, we find ourselves among a totally different people, whose features and complexions are German. People of the Walloon type are found in other districts, where Gauls or Celtic-speaking peoples have lived. They are found everywhere in Brittany, and especially in the district of Léonais, where the British immigrants of the fifth century are believed to have landed: they abound in Normandy, in Northern Italy, and in Cornwall; and the type 'seems to constitute an element of more or less importance in the population of most parts of the British isles'. 'This hatchet-faced Walloon type,' says Dr. Beddoe, 'is the same which . . . Broca . . . connects with tall stature and fair hair.' But the point upon which the doctor, speaking from personal observation and with the authority of an expert whose reputation among anthropologists is European, lays special stress, is that in the country of the Belgae the type is not connected with fair, but with dark hair. All the 14 Flemish arrondissements of Belgium, he insists, show more blondes and

[1] *The Races of Britain*, pp. 21–2; *Journ. Anthr. Inst.*, ii, 1873, pp. 18–20.

[2] *Crania Britannica*, pp. 164–5.

[3] According to Vanderkindere (*Recherches*, &c., p. 66) the Walloons of Namur and Luxembourg are ethnically identical with the people of North-Eastern France, and especially of Champagne.

fewer 'brunets' than any of the 12 Walloon; and his conclusion is that 'though the chiefs, the true Galatae, were fair, the mass of the old Belgae was of old something like what it is now'.

Vanderkindere[1] is of a different opinion. He admits that the Walloons in general are dark, but he holds that Dr. Beddoe is wrong in concluding from this fact that the mass of the Belgae resembled them in colouring. The darkness of the Walloons is due, he thinks, to the crossing of their ancestors with the prehistoric dark population; and the proof is that the purest Walloons, for example those of Namur, are fair.

It is impossible to decide the question. Dr. Beddoe himself infers from the skull-form of the Walloons that their ancestors were largely crossed by the dark 'Iberians'. Vanderkindere thinks that their comparatively high cephalic index is due to admixture with the dark brachycephalic people,[2] and Dr. Beddoe himself[3] ascribes it to partial descent from the same stock. Possibly both may be right. It is impossible to say whether the coalescence of races had already proceeded so far before Caesar's time that even then, as Dr. Beddoe thinks, the mass of the Belgae were dark, or whether it was mainly deferred till a later time. The tallest men in Dalmatia are the darkest;[4] and the tallest representatives of the tallest population in Great Britain—the men of Upper Galloway, whose average height is nearly 5 feet 10½ inches, or 1 metre 79—are also the darkest;[5] though the fact that their dark-brown hair often shows a substratum of red, and is generally accompanied by grey eyes, seems to show that they had fair as well as dark ancestors. But considering the implied statements of the ancient writers regarding the prevalent fairness of the Belgae, I find it difficult to believe that this attribute was virtually confined to a few chiefs.

VII

WHO WERE THE TRUE GAULS?

I have now to grapple with one of the most difficult problems of Gallic ethnology,—who were the tall fair conquerors of Gaul, the Gauls properly so called, the latest element in each of the two groups which were known as Celtae and Belgae? Are we to identify them with the ancient Germans, or did they constitute a distinct group?[6]

[1] *Recherches sur l'ethnologie de la Belgique*, p. 65.
[2] So also M. Houzé. See *Rev. d'anthr.*, 2e sér., v, 1882, p. 530.
[3] *The Races of Britain*, p. 42.
[4] *Scottish Review*, xx, 1892, p. 378.
[5] Beddoe, *The Races of Britain*, p. 249.
[6] The absurd but widely accepted theory that the Goidels, for whom some have actually substituted the Belgae, were identical with the tall Round Barrow 'race' of Britain is refuted in *Anc. Britain*, pp. 429–33, on which a well-informed writer in *Nature*, April 30, 1908, p. 602, remarks that 'perhaps the most valuable pages of the book are those in which he demonstrates that the short-headed race was not Celtic'.

It ought not now to be necessary to warn the reader that, when I speak of 'the tall fair conquerors of Gaul, the Gauls properly so called', I do not mean to imply that any group of Gauls, even the Gauls who captured Rome, all belonged to one type. On the contrary, if anything in ethnology is certain, we may be sure that even they were more or less mixed. So, Dr. Beddoe warns us not to believe that there was ever a period when, for example, all the Caledonians were red-haired.[1] I only mean to imply that, among the conquerors of Gaul, tallness and fairness were the prevailing, or at least the most noticeable characteristics.

The ancient writers, who are unanimous in describing the physical type of the Gauls, tell us nothing about the shape of their skulls. Broca, as I have already observed, thought that it was dolichocephalic, although he admitted that the authentic Gallic skulls which were then available were too few to generalize from. Since he wrote, however, further discoveries, which I have already noted,[2] have proved that he was right: the Celts who invaded Gaul in the Iron Age were for the most part a long-headed people; and the morphology of their skulls was identical with that of those which have been found in Merovingian graves. Or rather I should say that such were the invaders as we know them from sepulchral evidence; for the humbler classes may not have been represented in the graves from which that evidence is derived.

Some 50 years ago a Belgian general, M. J. B. Renard, published a treatise[3] to prove that the Gauls and the Germans were, anthropologically, the same people. Many of his arguments are now completely out of date; and M. Vanderkindere[4] speaks of his theory as one which it is no longer worth while to refute: but there are still eminent authorities who hold it, at all events in a modified form. Broca[5] maintained that the Gallic conquerors and the Germans were closely akin, if not identical: Dr. Lagneau[6] grouped them along with the Germans, the Franks, the Normans, the Goths, and the Burgundians, under the common designation of 'la race germanique septentrionale'; Huxley[7] affirmed that the typical Gauls were 'the close allies, by blood, customs and language, of the ancient Germans'; and M. Jullian, who is unable to draw a sharp distinction between German and Celt, regards the Celtic conquerors of Gaul as 'des Cimbres qui ont réussi'.[8]

The testimony of the ancient writers has been quoted so often that

[1] *The Races of Britain*, p. 245.

[2] See pp. 310–1, and Rice Holmes, *Anc. Britain*, pp. 434–6, 440.

[3] *De l'identité de race des Gaulois et des Germains*, 1856. Cf. A. Holtzmann, *Kelten und Germanen*, 1855, and M. Jullian's bibliographical notes (*Hist. de la Gaule*, i, 231, nn. 1, 2).

[4] *Recherches sur l'ethnologie de la Belgique*, p. 11.

[5] *Bull. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, iv, 1893, p. 51.

[6] *Dict. ency. des sc. médicales*, xiii, 1863, p. 767.

[7] *Critiques and Addresses*, 1873, p. 180. See also F. Delisle's article in *Dict. des sc. anthr.*, p. 503.

[8] *Rev. hist.*, lxxxv, 1904, p. 320. Cf. C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, i, 231–2, 243, n. 3.

it is unnecessary to repeat it. With absolute unanimity they describe the Germans in terms which are virtually identical with those which they use in describing the Gauls. The Germans, like the Gauls, were tall and fair: that is the sum and substance of their evidence.[1] Attempts have been made to show that they draw distinctions in detail between the two peoples, but without much success. Thus Suetonius [2] tells us that Caligula tried to palm off Gauls for Germans by picking out the tallest and dyeing their hair red, the inference being that the Gauls generally were shorter and darker than the Germans: [3] but this does not prove that the pure Germans were redder than the pure Gauls; for in Caligula's time the Gauls were very much mixed. Again, Tacitus, after saying that the Caledonians had the huge stature and the red hair of Germans, goes on to say that the people of Southern Britain were more like the Gauls.[4] Assuming the accuracy of Tacitus's statement, it should seem that the Gauls, or rather the inhabitants of Gaul generally in his time, were less fair than the Germans whom the Romans knew; but this does not prove that the purest Gauls were less fair. Strabo [5] also says that the Germans, though like the Gauls, were taller and fairer; but the only inference which can fairly be made from his statement, as from those of Tacitus and Suetonius, is that, in the first century of our era, tall stature and fair hair were less common among the Gauls than among the Germans. Moreover, there is no evidence, except the remark of Tacitus, for the theory that the Caledonians were Germans: they certainly spoke Celtic; and even if they or their ancestors had migrated from Germany, the fact would be quite consistent with the view that they were Celts.[6]

So much for the testimony of the ancients. We may also learn something from modern research. Although in Southern Germany, as in Gaul, the older population was brachycephalic, it is certain that the Germans whose physical features the Romans described were a dolichocephalic race. This statement is true of all the races who are generally known as Germanic. The Merovingian skulls have been already mentioned. Numerous skulls, which are known as the Row Grave (Reihen-Gräber) skulls, have been found in South-Western Germany, and are 'assigned to Frankish and Alemannic warriors of the fifth and following centuries'. Their average index is 71·3; and skulls of the same type have been found over the whole area which was conquered by the Goths, the Franks, the Burgundians, and the Saxons.[7] Modern Germans with skulls of this type are nearly always fair; and, as Dr. Beddoe observes, this fact is a further proof that the Row Grave type of skull was that of the Germans of

[1] See Prichard, *Physical History of Mankind*, iii, 391–2, who gives all the references.

[2] *Caligula*, 47.

[3] Huxley observes (*Critiques and Addresses*, p. 171) that the Germans were in the habit of artificially reddening their hair. But so were the Gauls (see Diodorus Siculus, v, 28, § 1).

[4] *Agricola*, 11.

[5] vii, 1, § 2.

[6] Rice Holmes, *Anc. Britain*, p. 418, n. 1.

[7] De Quatrefages, *Hist. gén. des races humaines*, 1887–9, pp. 492–4.

classical times. Again, Dr. Beddoe tells us that 70 Anglo-Saxon skulls discovered in Britain show a mean index of 74·59 ; and these skulls resemble the well-known Hohberg type, which has been proved to be that of the Burgundians.[1]

It may be taken as proved, then, that the typical Gaul and the typical German were alike tall, fair, and dolichocephalic. But was their fairness of the same kind ? For instance, were the Gauls like the fair red-bearded Highlanders of Perthshire, and the Germans like the yellow-haired and yellow-bearded Scandinavians ? Were there any other features which differentiated them ? ' Judging by the testimony of the ancient writers, who did not draw nice distinctions, we should say that there was practically no difference between the two peoples. Let us, then, turn to other sources of information.

It is important to decide what people introduced the Celtic language into Gaul. The prevailing view, which indeed is taken for granted by some writers, is that the Gauls imposed their language upon the peoples whom they conquered ; but M. A. Hovelacque, who assumes the ethnic identity of the Gauls and the Germans, has tried to prove that the language of the Gallic conquerors was German.[2] His argument is substantially this :—wherever the Gauls pushed their conquests, they found a Celtic population—using the word ' Celtic ' in the erroneous sense of the dark brachycephalic people—in possession ; but the Gauls did not penetrate into every country which was occupied by ' Celts '. It is clear that the Gauls did not impose their language upon peoples among whom they never settled ; while on the other hand it is easy to understand that in the countries in which they did settle they adopted the language of the inhabitants. ' En somme,' triumphantly concludes M. Hovelacque, ' 1° tous les blonds de haute taille . . . parlaient jadis des idiomes teutoniques ; 2° la partie de cette race (Galates) qui pénétra sur le territoire occupé par des Celtes perdit la propre langue et parla celtique.'

I must say that this argument is one of the most amazing instances of sheer confusion of thought that I have ever come across. Of two things one. By ' les Celtes ' M. Hovelacque either means the dark brachycephalic Grenelle race, or he means Celtic-speaking peoples. As far as I can see, he means the former. If so, there is no evidence that the Gauls, wherever they pushed their conquests, found a ' Celtic ' people in possession ; and there is evidence that in some countries they did not. It is certain that the people whom the Belgic immigrants found in possession when they settled in the British Isles were for the most part ethnologically distinct from the dark brachycephalic race whom the Gallic conquerors found in Gaul ; nor is there any evidence that the Gallic conquerors of Galatia found in possession a people of this race. If, on the other hand, M. Hovelacque means by ' les Celtes ' Celtic-speaking peoples, he begs the whole question !

That the Gauls imposed the Celtic language upon the peoples

[1] *Scottish Review*, xxi, 1893, pp. 167–8 ; *L'Anthr.*, v, 1894, p. 518.
[2] *Rev. de linguistique*, xviii, 1885, pp. 194–5.

whom they found in possession of Gaul, can be proved to demonstration. Assuming, what is not proved, that the Gallic conquerors were greatly inferior in numbers to the people whom they conquered, there is abundant evidence that a conquering minority may and frequently has imposed its language upon a subject population. It is quite true that there are plenty of instances on the other side ; the Normans who conquered England, the Goths, and the Burgundians learned the languages of their subjects. But in these cases the conquerors, besides being numerically inferior, were also either less civilized or not more civilized than the peoples whom they conquered. The inhabitants of Gaul were far superior in numbers to the Roman conquerors who settled among them ; but their language is a Romance language. But what I have said only shows that the Gauls might have imposed their language upon their subjects. There is abundant evidence that they did. Putting aside certain geographical names, such as *Sequana*, which may be Ligurian, the vast majority of the names of towns and people in Gaul are Celtic. Is it credible that the chiefs of the conquering race should have been called by names which were not their own but those of their subjects ? Wherever history tells us that the Gauls or the Celts (I use the word not in M. Hovelacque's sense but in the sense of Polybius) conquered or settled, there we find traces of the Celtic tongue. The Gauls made conquests in Germany and Switzerland, and there we find abundant linguistic traces of their occupation. The Celts settled in certain parts of Spain ; and names like *Celtici*, *Celtica*,[1] and *Celticoflavia*,[2] if not *Nemetobriga*, bear witness to their presence. They settled in Asia Minor ; and they spoke Celtic, and their chiefs bore Celtic names. Goidels, Brythons, and Belgae settled in Britain ; and Celtic is still spoken in the British Isles. Yet Broca insisted that there never were any Celts, in the sense in which he used the word, in Britain ;[3] and although recent discoveries have shown that he was too positive, the invaders of the Grenelle type who reached our country were few.[4] As M. Zaborowski remarks,[5] Celtic names exist in places where ' notre type celtique, celui des anthropologistes, n'a jamais existé '.

Professor Ridgeway, indeed, who believes that the Celtic conquerors of the British Isles learned the language of ' the Gaelic-speaking melanochrous Aborigines ',[6] argues that even when ' the conquerors bring with them some women of their own race . . . the invaders are liable to drop their own language and practically adopt that of the natives ', and that ' the adoption of the language of the conqueror by the conquered, except in the most favourable circumstances, is not common, and only takes place by a very gradual process, as is seen in the case of Ireland ' ; and he complains that

[1] Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, iii, 1 (3), §§ 13–4.
[2] *Corpus inscr. Lat.*, ii, 880.
[3] *Rev. d'anthr.*, ii, 1873, p. 625.
[4] Rice Holmes, *Anc. Britain*, pp. 425–30, 455.
[5] *Dict. des sc. anthr.*, pp. 246–7.
[6] *Who were the Romans ?* 1907, p. 22 (*Proc. Brit. Acad.*, vol. iii).

Sir John Rhys has 'assumed that it was possible for the aborigines [of Britain] to have been so completely Celticized as to have adopted the Aryan tense system, as well as the Aryan vocabulary, in its fullness in the interval between the sixth or fifth century and the second century B. C.' Yet, he says, although 'English has been the master speech in Britain for many centuries, and that, too, when reading and writing have been commonly practised . . . Gaelic still survives, while Welsh not only survives, but flourishes. It is therefore simply incredible that such a complete transformation as that postulated could have taken place in three or four centuries in an age when writing and literature can be hardly said to have existed in these islands'.[1]

Now, as the reader will have seen, the position against which Professor Ridgeway's battery is chiefly directed is that the language of the people whom the Celtic conquerors found in possession was non-Aryan. Admit that it may have been Aryan: all that I am concerned to show is that the conquerors did not learn Celtic, but spoke it already and imposed it. To begin with, it is certain that the Celtic conquerors of Gaul did bring with them not only 'some women' but all their women. This was the regular practice both of the Celts and of their kinsfolk, the Germans.[2] The time in which, according to Professor Ridgeway, it is 'simply incredible' that the Celtic language should have become dominant in Britain, and presumably also in Gaul, was considerably longer than that in which, on his own showing, the language of a small minority of English settlers became dominant in Ireland. Leaving out of account the rapidity with which the language of Rome took root in Britain,[3] Gaul,[4] and Spain,[5] I ask Professor Ridgeway to reflect upon what is involved in the theory that the Celtic conquerors learned Celtic from the peoples whom they conquered. First, this startling paradox requires us to assume either that the Ligurians had always been confined to the south-east of Gaul, or that the Ligurian language was Celtic: if the former alternative is true, the Celtic conquerors imposed the Celtic language, which *ex hypothesi* they had only just learned, upon the southern Ligurians, for the latter spoke Celtic in the fourth century B. C.;[6] if, as Sir John Rhys is now inclined to believe, the Ligurian language was Celtic—in other words, the twin-brother of Goidelic—it was itself supplanted by Gallo-Brythonic.[7] Secondly, Professor Ridgeway's theory would oblige us to assume that Celtic was the language which the Celtic conquerors found spoken not only in Gaul and in Britain, but also in Helvetia and in Spain: is

[1] *Nature*, Sept. 24, 1908, pp. 529–30.

[2] Strabo, iv, 4, § 2. Cf. Caesar, *B. G.*, i, 29, § 1; 51, § 3.

[3] F. Haverfield, *The Romanization of Roman Britain*, 1905, pp. 10–1, 27 (*Proc. Brit. Acad.*, vol. ii).

[4] E. Lavisse, *Hist. de France*, t. i (by G. Bloch), 1900, pp. 385–6. Cf. *Rev. celt.*, xxviii, 1907, p. 374.

[5] Professor Ridgeway himself remarks (*Who were the Romans?* p. 24) that 'the Latin language got a hold on all Eastern Spain with an astonishing rapidity after the Roman conquest'.

[6] *Mélanges H. d'A. de Jubainville*, p. 108.

[7] See pp. 281–2, 319–20.

such a remarkable diffusion of Celtic among peoples widely separated and anthropologically different credible? Thirdly, is Professor Ridgeway prepared to maintain that Celtic was spoken by the aborigines—I use the word not loosely, but in its strictest sense—in Gaul, in Britain, and in Helvetia? If not, he must admit that in those countries *some* invaders had imposed it. Fourthly, if the 'aborigines' of the British Isles and of Gaul spoke Gaelic, Gaelic must have branched off from the parent Indo-European language in the Palaeolithic Age:[1] is Professor Ridgeway prepared to maintain this? Fifthly, if the 'aborigines' of the British Isles spoke Gaelic, why did not the Brythons, who conquered them, learn Gaelic from them? Sixthly, if the Celts did not speak Celtic when they invaded Gaul, Britain, and Helvetia, how are the Celtic place-names in Germany[2] to be accounted for? Lastly, it is admitted that the language of the Belgae was Celtic: they certainly did not learn it from the Gauls whom they found in possession, for they incontinently expelled them;[3] therefore they must have spoken it when they invaded Gaul. Is not the inference inevitable that their kinsmen who had already conquered the rest of Gaul did the same? The Gallo-Brythonic language unquestionably prevailed, wholly or in great part, over that Q language which has provoked so much controversy: in Caesar's time it was the language not only of the Belgae but also of all, or almost all the Celtae; and not even the most perverse ingenuity can plausibly argue that conquerors learned it from conquered. It is likely enough that both in Britain and in Gaul aboriginal languages, Aryan or non-Aryan, survived here and there even in Caesar's time; but let Professor Ridgeway think again, let him remember how Etruscan vanished before Latin, and haply he will no longer find it incredible that the language of the conquerors, who were accompanied by their women, should have prevailed.

I regard it, then, as certain that when the Gallic conquerors entered Gaul, they brought the Celtic language with them; and, inasmuch as Celtic is more closely akin to Latin than to German, it is clear that the tall fair Gauls, if they had been originally one with the tall fair Germans, had long since branched off from them; and it is therefore not improbable that the physical types of the two peoples had become to some degree differentiated. N. Fréret[4] remarks that Celts and Germans must have become greatly intermixed during the long sojourn of the former in Germany; and the same thought had often presented itself to my own mind before I read Fréret's book. But is it absolutely certain that when the

[1] See O. Schrader, *Prehist. Ant. of the Aryan Peoples*, pp. 358–9, 362–3, 367–8; Rice Holmes, *Anc. Britain*, p. 433, n. 5; *Rev. de l'École d'anthr.*, xviii, 1908, p. 406; and J Déchelette, *Manuel d'archéologie*, ii, 9, n. 2.

[2] See p. 339.

[3] *B. G.*, ii, 4, § 1. No doubt Caesar's words are not to be taken literally; but admitting this, 'all analogy,' as Zupitza says (*Zeitschr. f. celt. Philologie*, iv, 1903, pp. 18–9), is opposed to the assumption that the Belgae did not speak Celtic before they crossed the Rhine.

[4] *Œuvres complètes*, v, 1896, pp. 7–8.

Celts began to migrate from Germany into Gaul, the tall fair Germans had long established themselves in Germany? Is it certain that the pressure of their invasion was not the motive of the Celtic emigration?[1] Still, we must not forget that Hamy could detect no essential difference between the skulls of the early La Tène period which he examined, and those of the Merovingian type; and perhaps it was not long before Caesar's time that the aspect of the descendants of the Gallic conquerors had become noticeably different from that of their German neighbours.

I have argued that the Belgae must have spoken Celtic before they arrived in Gaul; and I do not waver when I recall those famous words *plerosque Belgas esse ortos a Germanis* ('most of the Belgae were of German origin'). Caesar merely records the statement of the Reman envoys without endorsing it[2]; and the fact that he himself, rightly or wrongly, specifies four Belgic peoples—the Eburones, the Segni, the Condrusi, and the Paemani—as German,[3] would seem to imply that he had reason to believe that the rest of the Belgae were not.[4] Tacitus, who, as Dr. Beddoe observes,[5] 'evidently aimed at accuracy in the matter, allows only the Triboci, the Nemetes, and the Vangiones . . . to be "haud dubie Germanorum populi"';[6] and none of the three were Belgae at all. The Treveri and the Nervii, according to Tacitus,[7] wished to be thought Germans; but, if Tacitus was rightly informed, this very fact would appear to show that they were not what they professed to be. Strabo says that the Nervii were Germans:[8] but his unsupported statement does not count for much; and the names of Nervian and Treveran individuals, as well as the geographical names of both peoples,[9] were Celtic. So also were the names of the Eburones and their two kings,—Ambiorix and Catuvolcus. Hirtius, while noting the resemblance of the Treveri to the Germans in manners and customs, says that it was due simply to geographical propinquity;[10] and M. Vanderkindere points out[11] that Caesar draws a distinction between the Menapii and the Germans.[12] It may be that, as M. Jullian[13] suggests, there were Celticized Ger-

[1] M. d'A. de Jubainville gives linguistic reasons for believing that the Germans had lived for some centuries in subjection to the Celts, and hemmed in between them, the Slavs and the North Sea. He points to the word *Teutoni*—'mot germanique conservé intact par les Celtes, qui n'en ont celtisé que la désinence'—and to various military and other words 'qui sont communs aux Celtes et aux Germains', and which, he affirms, were borrowed by the latter from the former (*Les premiers habitants de l'Europe*, ii, 1894, pp. 325–73). Is the evidence sufficient to sustain the theory? M. d'Arbois argues further that 'une opposition religieuse chez les Germains empêche leur absorption par les Celtes' (*ib.*, pp. 373–83); whereas Sir John Rhys (*Celtic Heathendom*, p. 41) is impressed by 'the striking similarity between the ancient theologies of Celts and Teutons.'

[2] *B. G.*, ii, 4, §§ 1–2.

[3] *Ib.*, ii, 4, § 10; vi, 32, § 1.

[4] See pp. 338–40.

[5] *The Races of Britain*, pp. 20–1.

[6] *Germania*, 28.

[7] *Ib.*

[8] iv, 3, § 4.

[9] See p. 329.

[10] *B. G.*, viii, 25, § 2.

[11] *Recherches sur l'ethnologie de la Belgique*, p. 16, n. 3. Dr. Beddoe (*The Races of Britain*, p. 21) argues that, as the modern inhabitants of the country which was once occupied by the Nervii are generally Walloon in language and in physical type, although the country was invaded by Franks, the Nervii were not of German origin.

[12] *B. G.*, iv, 4.

[13] *Hist. de la Gaule*, ii, 464–5.

mans among the Nervii and the Treveri;[1] but, unless we know what the Reman envoys meant by the word *Germani*, their statement that the Belgae 'were of German origin' proves nothing.[2] The word *Germanus* may or may not have been Celtic;[3] but there is no proof that the Gauls meant by *Germani* a Teutonic people who spoke a Teutonic language. My own conviction is that when the Reman envoys told Caesar that the Belgae were 'of German origin', they spoke the truth; but that they only meant that the Belgae were the descendants of a people who had once dwelt on the east of the Rhine.[4]

Assuming for the present that, notwithstanding their general similarity, there was a physical distinction of some sort between the Gauls who conquered Gaul and the Germans, it may be that an observation of the Celtic-speaking peoples of the British Isles will help us to form an approximately just idea of the Gallic type. This inquiry will of course demand great care, for the purest specimens of the Scottish Highlanders and the Irish Celts are greatly mixed; but I do not think that the difficulties are insuperable. The Gaels in Ireland and Scotland, says Dr. Beddoe,[5] are probably 'Iberians', crossed with a 'long-faced, harsh-featured, red-haired race, who contributed the language and much of the character'. The 'dolichocephalous Celt' of the Scottish Highlands, says the same writer, comprehends both Galatic and Iberian elements, if not others. Some of the leading points of this type, he goes on to say, *are prevalent wherever Gaelic is known to have been spoken*. Now, what are the physical characteristics of the 'dolichocephalous Celt'? Taking colour first, Dr. Beddoe found that of 48 individuals 5 had red hair, 4 fair, 3 lightish brown, 11 brown, 17 dark brown, 3 brown-black, and 3 coal-black, but that the eyes were generally light. And, he adds, the figures for the Highlands generally are much the same.[6] According to Hector Maclean, 'the dolichocephalous Celt'—the truly Celtic type, as he regards it, 'to which belonged the Galli of the old Roman writers and the Celtae of Caesar'—'is often tall; he is of various complexion . . . ranging from a ruddy white to a swarthy hue. . . . The face is frequently long . . . the lips are usually full . . . cheek bones large and prominent; eyes most frequently grey or bluish grey . . . hair reddish yellow, yellowish red, but more frequently of various shades of brown, of which yellow ("I," notes

[1] If the Cimbri and Teutoni were Germans (see pp. 549–53), so were their descendants, the Atuatuci (*B. G.*, ii, 29, § 4), though they must have become Celticized in speech, and largely in blood.

[2] Professor G. Kossinna (*Korrespondenz-Blatt d. deutsch. Gesellschaft f. Anthr.*, &c., xxxviii, 1907, p. 58) attributes the fact that in the period known as La Tène III, which began about 100 B. C., cremation appears to have been general in North-Eastern Gaul, to German influence; but he admits (p. 59) that in Alsace—the territory of Ariovistus and his German host—German graves have not been found.

[3] See K. Müllenhoff, *Deutsche Altertumskunde*, ii, 200–5; A. Holder, *Alt-celtischer Sprachschatz*, i, 204; and *Rev. celt.*, xxviii, 1907, p. 414.

[4] Cf. *Bull. bibl. . . . du Musée belge*, 1908, p. 71.

[5] *The Races of Britain*, pp. 270–1.

[6] *Ib.*, pp. 244–5.

Dr. Beddoe, " should read here red or reddish yellow ") is the ground colour.'

Dr. Beddoe remarks further that the Strathclyde Brythons and many Cornishmen have a considerable resemblance to the Walloons ; that the features of the Belgae depicted on the monument of Jovinus at Reims were not unlike those of modern Gaels ; and that the people of the Aran Isles in Galway Bay have ' much the same long-headed long-featured type which is common in the Belgic districts of North-Eastern France '.[1]

Now, making every allowance for the admixture of other blood which must have considerably modified the type of the original Celtic or Gallic invaders of these islands, we are struck by the fact that among all our Celtic-speaking fellow-subjects there are to be found numerous specimens of a type which also exists in those parts of Brittany which were colonized by British invaders and in those parts of Gaul in which the Gallic invaders appear to have settled most thickly, as well as in Northern Italy, where the Celtic invaders were once dominant ; and also by the fact that this type, *even among the most blonde representatives of it, is strikingly different, to the casual as well as to the scientific observer, from that of the purest representatives of the ancient Germans*.[2] The well-known picture by Sir David Wilkie —*Reading of the Waterloo Gazette*—illustrates, as Daniel Wilson remarked, the difference between the two types. Put a Perthshire Highlander side by side with a Sussex farmer. Both will be fair : but the red hair and beard of the Scot will be in marked contrast with the fair hair of the Englishman ; and their features will differ still more markedly. I remember seeing two gamekeepers in a railway carriage running from Inverness to Lairg. They were tall, athletic, fair men, evidently belonging to the Scandinavian type, which, as Dr. Beddoe says, is so common in the extreme north of Scotland ; but both in colouring and in general aspect they were utterly different from the tall fair Highlanders whom I had seen in Perthshire. There was not a trace of red in their hair, their long beards being absolutely yellow. The prevalence of red among the Celtic-speaking peoples is, it seems to me, a most striking characteristic.[3] Not only do we find 11 men in every 100, whose hair is absolutely red, but underlying the blacks and the dark browns the same tint is to be discerned. In France again the proportion of red-haired individuals is greatest (5·32 per 100) not in Normandy or the north-eastern departments, where the proportion of Germanic immigrants was greatest, but in Finistère,[4] where many of the ' Kymric ' invaders from Britain landed. It is true that M. Topinard

[1] *The Races of Britain*, pp. 21, 25, 28, 245.

[2] It cannot, argues W. Edwards (*Les caractères physiol. des races humaines*, pp. 6–7), have been either Burgundian or Norman, because it is found in places where neither Burgundians nor Normans have ever existed.

[3] So Dr. Beddoe, I find, regards the high proportion of red hair in the Burgundian cantons of Switzerland as ' a legacy of the Helvetii rather than of the Burgundians ' (*The Races of Britain*, p. 78). He also remarks that the people of Central Wales resemble the Scottish Highlanders in the frequency of red hair.

[4] *L'Anthr.*, iv, 1893, pp. 584, 590–1.

regards red hair as a mere variety of blonde, without racial significance ; but if so, it is difficult to understand why it is so frequent—judging from my own observations—among Jews, and comparatively so rare among the modern Germans [1] and the English. My investigations lead me to believe that red-haired people, living in England, would, in nearly all cases, prove to be of Scotch, Irish, Welsh, or Jewish origin.[2] I know well that it is impossible to break up the Highland type and the Anglo-Saxon into their component parts, and then to isolate the Celtic element in the one and the German in the other, and compare or contrast them ; but, considering that, wherever the Celtic language is spoken, we find the same ' Kymric ' type, I think that what I have said is enough to establish at least a probability that the Celtic element and the German, notwithstanding their general resemblance, differed one from the other. The ' Kymric ' type of face may be due to crossing between Gaul and ' Iberian ' ; but is the striking difference in colouring between the red Highlanders of Perthshire and the blonde North German or Scandinavian to be explained by any intermixture in the blood of the former ? [3]

Perhaps it is. For the most that I have succeeded in proving is that the Celts had become differentiated from the Germans some centuries after they had parted from them ; and what we want to learn is whether any difference had arisen when they first entered Gaul. The tall Gaul and the tall German were undoubtedly descended from a common ' xanthochroid ' stock.[4]

[1] *Scottish Review*, xix, 1892, p. 418.

[2] Some years ago I found that 34 out of about 620 boys in one of the great public schools had red hair of various shades. I ascertained the nationality of 31. Of these 10 were either wholly or partly Scotch, 8 (including one of the previous group) wholly or partly Irish, 7 (including one of the last-named group) wholly or partly Welsh, 1 Lancastrian, 1 Salopian, and 3 Jewish. Of the 3 whose nationality I omitted to inquire, 2 had names which are common in Scotland and Ireland.

[3] In regard to the cause of red hair see Rice Holmes, *Anc. Britain*, p. 440, n. 6 ; *Globus*, xciii, 1908, pp. 309–12 ; *Rev. de l'École d'anthr.*, xviii, 1908, p. 281 ; and *Man*, viii, 1908, no. 27, pp. 54–8. ' It looks,' says Mr. J. Gray (*ib.*, p. 57), ' as if red hair were evolved from dark brown by converting a certain percentage of its black pigment into orange pigment. It would follow . . . that red hair should be of rare occurrence in a very blonde population. . . . This conclusion is confirmed by the observations of Virchow in North Germany, where only a very small percentage of red hair was found.

[4] In the first edition (pp. 316–7) I tried to show further that the temperament of the Celtic invaders of Gaul was different from that of the Germans. But I was groping in the dark. The many-faceted ' Celtic ' temperament is a fascinating object of study ; but it is not everywhere the same. Let me repeat what I have said elsewhere (*Anc. Britain*, p. 457),—' Study it in Wales, in Man, in the Scottish Highlands, in Ireland, in Cornwall, in France, and you will find that while it is Celtic everywhere, everywhere it is different ; that everywhere it has become what it is, because it is compounded, in different degrees, not only of Celtic, not only of pre-Celtic and pre-Aryan, but also of post-Celtic elements. And all these elements have been modified and moulded by different geographical and climatic influences and by adventitious circumstances too numerous to be particularized and too elusive to be estimated.' The ' Celtic ' character, as described by Caesar and other ancient writers, was the character of a mixed people, whose Celtic ancestors had parted from the Germans centuries before. We cannot compare the Celts who first crossed

I will now briefly recapitulate the results at which I have arrived. It is not improbable that man existed in Gaul even in the immeasurably remote Tertiary Period. The palaeolithic peoples, who lived there in the Quaternary Period, were all, as far as is known, dolichocephalic: some of them belonged to the Neanderthal type; others had certain negroid characteristics; others again belonged to the highly developed types which are represented by the skeleton of Cro-Magnon, by similar skeletons in the caves of Mentone, and by those of Laugerie-Basse and Chancelade. There is not enough evidence either to confirm or to disprove the hypothesis that the Neanderthal race became extinct; but at all events before the close of the Palaeolithic Age the zoological evolution of man was complete. Of the neolithic races the earlier, represented by the people of l'Homme Mort and Baumes-Chaudes, was of medium stature, slender, and dolichocephalic, and descended from the people of Cro-Magnon and Laugerie-Basse: the later was for the most part brachycephalic, and entered Gaul from the east. If new immigrants entered Gaul in the Bronze Age, they probably belonged for the most part to this same stock; but early in the Hallstatt Period a tall dolichocephalic race appeared in the Jura and the Doubs, who may have been the advanced guard of the Celts. The Ligurians, when they first came under the notice of the Greek geographers, occupied the region bounded by Italy, the Mediterranean, and the Rhône, and afterwards the country between the Rhône and the Pyrenees: but there is reason for believing that Ligurians had also once possessed the whole eastern region as far north as the Marne, if not Aquitania; and if so, their descendants must have survived in considerable numbers among the Celtae. The Iberians dwelt between the Rhône and the Pyrenees, where, in the fourth century B. C. and doubtless later, they were mingled with Ligurians, and also most probably in Aquitania. Their country had once been occupied by people who spoke a language akin to Basque; and it may be that descendants of this people survived among the Iberians who are noticed by the ancient writers. The Iberians were, for the most part, short, dark, and dolichocephalic. There is no evidence that, in Gaul, any Iberians, so called, dwelt outside the limits which the ancient writers assigned to that people; but it is certain that men who physically resembled them dwelt in various other parts of Gaul,—in considerable numbers in the Neolithic Age, here and there at a later time. The original type of the Ligurians, if it ever existed, cannot be certainly defined: but they were undoubtedly both short and dark; and there is some reason to believe that at least in North Italy, they were mainly dolichocephalic. When Caesar entered Gaul, Celtic-speaking immigrants, who first crossed the Rhine about the seventh century B. C., had long been settled both in the country of the Iberians and in that of the Ligurians. The people who called themselves 'Celtae' were very much mixed. They comprised descendants of palaeolithic

the Rhine with the Germans whom they had left behind: if we could, perhaps we should find that they had much in common.

and neolithic races; and the latest comers, the conquering Celtic-speaking Gauls, were those who had given their name to the entire group. These conquerors, who doubtless intermarried to some extent with the peoples whom they subdued, were, for the most part, tall and fair; but, although the proportion of men of this type must have been far greater among the Celtae than it is among the modern inhabitants of the same country, the majority of the Celtae were, even in Caesar's time, brachycephalic, short, and dark. The conquerors of Belgic Gaul belonged, in a large measure at all events, to the same race as the conquerors among the Celtae; and, like the Celtae, the entire group of peoples whom Caesar called Belgae included descendants of indigenous races. There is perhaps some reason to believe that the Celtic-speaking conquerors of Belgic Gaul included tall dark men; but this is uncertain. The Gauls, properly so called—the Celtic-speaking conquerors of Belgic and of Celtic Gaul—like their kinsmen, who conquered Lombardy and Piedmont, closely resembled the Germans both in stature and in colouring, and were, like them, generally dolichocephalic. But, as the Gauls differed from the Germans in custom, and as their language was more nearly related to Latin than to German, it is certain that, although the two peoples had sprung from the same stock, they had branched off into two groups, practically distinct. There is, I would suggest, some reason to believe that red hair was a common characteristic of the purer Gauls, yellow or flaxen hair of the Germans. When the Reman delegates told Caesar that the Belgae were 'of German origin', they probably meant only that the ancestors of the Belgic conquerors had formerly dwelt in Germany, and this is equally true of the ancestors of the Gauls who gave their name to the Celtae; but, on the other hand, it is quite possible that in the veins of some of the Belgae there flowed the blood of genuine German forefathers.

And now I have done. To me the writing of this essay and the long study upon which it is based have been deeply interesting; but I fear that it will be interesting to hardly any one else, except perhaps the few professed students of ethnology, who will be quick to detect its many faults. And I do not wonder. For the main interest of these studies is the *certaminis gaudium*,—the interest that belongs to every attempt to solve a difficult problem, the interest that Adams and Le Verrier felt when they were fighting their way through the long calculations, which tasked all their powers to the utmost, that led to the discovery of the planet Neptune. And to deal successfully with the problems of ethnology requires powers hardly less than theirs—such a combination of moral and mental qualities as is hardly to be found in any one man—enthusiasm, indefatigable zest for research, sagacity, judgement, common sense, perfect clearness of head, lucidity in exposition. Even if all these qualities could be brought to bear upon the investigation of the problems which I have set myself, some of those problems would, for want of evidence, remain, in a scientific sense, insoluble. And even if they could all be solved, if we could describe exactly the physical

type of the Iberians, the Ligurians, and the Gauls, if we could tell exactly the proportion which each bore in the population of ancient Gaul, the scoffer would still say, What then? Of what value are your conclusions ? What do I care whether the Iberians were or were not the ancestors of the Basques, whether the Ligurians were or were not the same as the brachycephalic ' Celtae ', whether this people had broad skulls and dark hair, and that people long skulls and fair hair ? What I ask is that anthropologists should discuss ethnical questions in their bearing upon national character ; for there is no subject upon which more clap-trap has been written by glib paragraphists ignorant of the rudiments of ethnology. Can anthropology analyse the elements of the ' Celtic ' temperament, refer them to the various groups that mingled to form the population of Gaul, and show how far they were due to heredity, how far to environment ? Can it help to explain why Roman culture so rapidly assimilated the culture of Gaul ? When it can do all this my interest will awake.[1]

Such are the posers that the scoffer might set ; and I am not prepared to say that he would have no reason on his side.

THE NATIONALITY OF THE EBURONES, CAEROSI, PAEMANI, SEGNI, AND CONDRUSI

The nationality of the Eburones, Caerosi, Paemani, Segni, and Condrusi is a separate question. Among the Belgic tribes that contributed their contingents to the confederate army which Caesar dispersed in 57 B. C., the Reman envoys, he says, enumerated *Condrusos, Eburones, Caerosos, Paemanos, qui uno nomine Germani appellantur.*[2] Caesar himself, in another passage,[3] calls the Segni and Condrusi Germans. Müllenhoff,[4] however, insists that all these tribes were Celts. Caesar himself, he remarks, includes them among the Belgae (*B. G.*, i, 1, § 2) ; and, according to *B. G.*, v, 27, §§ 4–6, they allowed themselves to be classed as Gauls. All their racial and individual names, all ancient names of rivers and places within their territory, are Celtic ; [5] and whoever classes them among the Germans proper must also class the Walloons, who dwell in the western part of their territory, among peoples of Germanic descent, whereas they are really Romanized Gauls. Again, pointing out that, according to the testimony of Caesar (*B. G.*, vi, 32–4), the customs of the Eburones were more primitive than those of the rest of the Gauls, Müllenhoff observes that this persistent conservatism may account for the fact that the more civilized Belgae of the south-west

[1] See the interesting remarks of M. J. Deniker in *L'Année psychologique*, xiii, 1907, pp. 292–4, and of Professor G. Retzius in *Journ. Anthr. Inst.*, xxxix, 1909, pp. 301–2.

[2] *B. G.*, ii, 4, § 10.

[3] *Ib.*, vi, 32, § 1.

[4] *Deutsche Altertumskunde*, ii, 196–204.

[5] See also *Rev. hist.*, xxx, 1886, p. 39.

distinguished their neighbours and kinsmen from themselves by the surname 'Germani'.

Müllenhoff's is a great name; but I do not think that his arguments establish his theory. The mere fact that the racial and one or two individual names of the peoples in question and the ancient names of rivers and places within their territory are Celtic, does not prove that they themselves were not partly Germanic. Granted that Ambiorix is a Celtic name: so is Boiorix, the name of a leader of the Cimbri; yet Müllenhoff, with nearly every modern scholar, believes that the Cimbri were Germans. The prevalence of Celtic local names might possibly be accounted for by the fact that the Eburones and their neighbours had intermingled with an older Celtic population. Celtic local names were current in Germany long after the time of Caesar, from which fact it has been inferred that in Germany the Celts were once predominant; but Müllenhoff knew as well as anybody else that their predominance (if it ever existed) had ceased before the conquest of Gaul. *Kent* is a Celtic name; but the fact does not prove that the present inhabitants of Kent are Celts.

Müllenhoff quotes *B. G.*, v, 27, § 6, to prove that the Eburones allowed themselves to be classed as Gauls. Admitting that Ambiorix really made the statement which Caesar puts into his mouth, that statement proves nothing. The Eburones, whether Gauls or not, had thrown in their lot with the Gauls; and Ambiorix might speak of them as Gauls in the same sense that a Dutch broker, living in Fifth Avenue, would call himself an American, or a Jewish alderman of the City of London an Englishman.

Now, let us see exactly what Caesar says. He certainly classes the Eburones, the Condrusi, the Caerosi, and the Paemani among the Belgae. But in *B. G.*, ii, 4, § 10, he calls them *Germani*: in vi, 2, § 3, he describes them by the same name; and in vi, 32, § 1, he says that the envoys of the Segni and Condrusi begged him not to conclude that all the Cisrhenane Germans—including themselves—were of the same way of thinking:—*Segni Condrusique, ex gente et numero Germanorum, qui sunt inter Eburones Treverosque, legatos ad Caesarem miserunt oratum ne se in hostium numero duceret neve omnium Germanorum, qui essent citra Rhenum, unam esse causam iudicaret.* It appears, then, that not only did the Reman envoys in 57 B. C. describe the Condrusi as Germans, but the envoys of the Condrusi called themselves by the same name. It is also clear that Caesar believed them. He emphasizes the distinction between the Germans and the Gauls both in regard to religion and manners (*B. G.*, vi, 21–4) and in regard to language (i, 47, § 4). His informants had probably, his interpreters had certainly both seen and conversed with Germans about whose nationality there could be no dispute.[1]

[1] I do not attach any importance to the argument of M. Piot, that the conversation which Caesar records (*B. G.*, vi, 35, §§ 8–9) between the German Sugambri and their Eburonian captives proves that the Eburones spoke German; for the leaders of the Sugambri might have learned, like Ariovistus (i, 47, § 4), to speak the Gallic tongue.

But I am not trying to prove that these tribes were German ; only to show that there are objections, which Müllenhoff has not fairly met, to the theory that they were Celtic. Indeed, I believe that he was, in the main, right. For the truth is, as I have remarked in the preceding article,[1] that we do not know what meaning Caesar's Belgic informants attached to the word *Germanus*. Probably they only meant that the 'Cisrhenane Germans' were descended from people who had dwelt on the east of the Rhine ; and a large tract of what we call Germany had, for a long period, been inhabited by Celts.[2] If the Eburones and their neighbours were called by Caesar *Germani* in a special sense, as distinct from the rest of the Belgae, who also claimed to be of German origin, the explanation may be that the former were the latest immigrants. It may be that a certain proportion of the Eburones and the other 'Cisrhenane Germans' were descendants of German-speaking ancestors of genuine Teutonic blood ;[3] but if so, they had certainly been absorbed, as the evidence of nomenclature shows, by a more numerous Celtic and pre-Celtic population.

THE POPULATION OF GAUL

Napoleon III, Mommsen,[4] and others have attempted to estimate approximately the population of Gaul in Caesar's time. The data are as follows. Caesar tells us that from certain tablets which fell into his hands after the Helvetian war he ascertained that the Helvetii, who apparently had emigrated *en masse*, numbered 263,000, and, along with their allies, 368,000 souls ; and that of the latter number 92,000, or exactly one-fourth, were fighting men.[5] He also tells us, on the authority of the Remi, that when he marched against the Belgae, the Belgic tribes, exclusive of the Remi, had undertaken

[1] See p. 333. [2] See p. 331.

[3] M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, ii, 466–7) appears to think that the 'Cisrhenane Germans' were really Germans who had become Celticized in culture and speech. But is it likely that they, alone among the Belgic tribes (see p. 331, *supra*), learned Celtic in Gaul ? Certainly they could not have learned it from mere contact with neighbouring tribes ; and if they were originally German-speaking conquerors who became Celticized, they must have been unaccompanied by women and far inferior in numbers to the Celtic peoples whom they subdued, and who, with them, formed the 'Cisrhenane Germans'. Such an assumption is most improbable. See p. 330. The detachment of the Cimbri and Teutoni, however, who formed the nucleus of the Atuatuci were, it should seem, left without women. See p. 333, n. 1.

[4] Former editions of the authorized English translation (iii, 228 [ed. 1881]) of Mommsen's *Römische Geschichte* contained serious mistakes, due to a confusion of the German with the English square mile, which were pointed out in my first edition (pp. 325–7), and corrected accordingly by the late Professor Dickson in his reprint of 1901.

[5] *B. G.*, i, 29, §§ 2–3. M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, ii, 6), referring to *B. G.*, i, 4, § 2, says that, besides the 263,000 Helvetii, numerous slaves must be reckoned. But can we be sure that they were ignored in the Helvetian census ? The number 368,000, which was probably an estimate, based upon the ascertained number 92,000, may be an exaggeration. See p. 241, *supra*.

to put 296,000 men into the field ; and he implies that this force was considerably less than their full fighting strength, for he remarks that the Bellovaci only contributed 60,000 out of an available 100,000.[1] Finally, he says that the army which was dispatched to the relief of Vercingetorix, and to which every Gallic tribe, except the Atuatuci, Ambarri (?), Ambiliati, Ambivariti, Caerosi, Condrusi, Eburones, Esuvii (?), Latobrigi, Leuci, Lingones, Mandubii, Meldi, Menapii, Paemani, Remi, Segni, Suessiones, Treveri, and Viromandui, the Aquitani generally, and possibly the Diablintes and Namnetes, contributed, amounted to about 258,000.[2] It is obvious that the statements regarding the Belgic army and the army of relief are useless for our purpose ; for in neither of the two cases have we any means of knowing what proportion the army bore to the male population who remained at home. If we might assume that the Helvetian territory was peopled with exactly or nearly the same density as the rest of Gaul, we might form an approximate estimate of the whole Gallic population. But of course we have no right to make any such assumption. Nor indeed can we be sure that Caesar's statement that the Helvetii emigrated *en masse* is literally correct. I agree, therefore, with Desjardins[3] that to calculate the population of Gaul even approximately is impossible.

J. Beloch, basing his calculations on the Reman estimate, as reported by Caesar, of the Belgic levies, and assuming that the territory of the Belgae was less thickly peopled than the rest of Gaul, originally estimated the whole population, exclusive of that of the Roman Province, at 3,390,000 ;[4] but, after revising his calculations, he substituted for this figure 4,500,000.[5]

J. Levasseur[6] remarks that, according to Diodorus Siculus,[7] the chief Gallic tribes numbered each about 200,000 and the smallest 50,000 souls. It is probable, he argues, that the average was 100,000 : accordingly he estimates the whole population at 6,000,000, —' pas comme un fait certain, ni même comme un fait probable, mais comme une simple hypothèse.' This caution is certainly justified ; but to make such hypotheses at all is futile.

It may, however, be admitted that M. Jullian,[8] who rarely handles a problem without illuminating it, has adduced reasons for suspecting that the highest of the foregoing estimates is too low. According to Frontinus,[9] the Lingones in Domitian's time had 70,000 fighting men,—say that they numbered 280,000 all told : the present population of their territory is 580,000. The 100,000 warriors of the Bellovaci would have represented 400,000 inhabitants,[10] which, M. Jullian remarks,[11] is the actual population of the Beauvaisis.

[1] *B. G.*, ii, 4, §§ 5–10.
[2] *Ib.*, vii, 76, § 3.
[3] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 552–3.
[4] *Die Bevölkerung der griech.-röm. Welt*, 1886, pp. 453–60.
[5] *Rhein. Mus.*, N.F., liv, 1899, pp. 429, 438.
[6] *La population française*, i, 1889, pp. 99–102. See also H. Mollière, *Recherches sur l'évaluation de la population des Gaules*, &c., 1892, pp. 22–3.
[7] v, 25, § 1.
[8] *Hist. de la Gaule*, ii, 3–8.
[9] iv, 3, § 14.
[10] See, however, p. 242.
[11] *Hist. de la Gaule*, ii, 7 and n. 4.

The contingent which they were required to furnish in 52 B.C.[1] was only one-tenth of what their effective strength had been five years before : if the other tribes were assessed proportionally, their effective strength in 58 B.C. must have been 275,000 × 10, which would imply a population of eleven millions.[2] Plutarch[3] reckoned that the Gauls whom Caesar encountered in the field numbered three millions, while Appian's[4] estimate was four millions,—numbers which presuppose a population of from twelve to sixteen millions. The area, comprising the departments of the Nord, Pas-de-Calais, Somme, Seine-Inférieure, and Oise,[5] and inhabited by the Bellovaci, Suessiones, Ambiani, Caleti, Veliocasses, Viromandui, Atrebates, and Morini, which in 57 B.C. contributed 180,000 men to the Belgic host,[6] was only one-twentieth of Gaul. The 180,000 men, if the several contingents bore the same ratio to the whole available strength as the contingent of the Bellovaci, were selected from 300,000, representing a population of 1,200,000 : multiply this by 20, and you will see that the Gallic population, not including slaves, amounted to 24,000,000.

Now what first strikes the sceptical reader is that these divers methods of calculation not only rest upon unverifiable and, in some cases, most improbable hypotheses, but also lead to very different results. M. Jullian insists that the numerical statements of the writers whom he quotes are trustworthy. But the estimates which he deduces from them range from eleven to thirty millions ; and is it not evident that to multiply 1,200,000 by 20—which implies that the whole of Gaul could sustain as dense a population as the ' very fertile ' territories of the Suessiones[7]—can only result in gross exaggeration ? Did not the mere fact that the 100,000 warriors of the Bellovaci would have represented a population as great, or nearly as great, as the actual population of the Beauvaisis suggest to M. Jullian a suspicion that the number 100,000 was wrong ?[8] ' There is nothing more difficult in war,' says Colonel G. F. R. Henderson,[9] ' than to get an accurate estimate of the enemy's numbers, especially when civilians are the chief sources of information.' Either Plutarch or Appian was certainly misinformed, for there is a discrepancy of a million between their estimates ; and when we see that, according to the former, Caesar took more than 800 Gallic towns by storm, whereas he himself only records the capture of eight, our faith receives a shock. Perhaps inevitable error will be minimized if, making a due reduction in view of the probable excess in the number ascribed to the Bellovaci at their full strength, we provisionally accept the figure based upon Caesar's enumeration of the contingents that were raised for the relief of Vercingetorix. Considering what

[1] *B. G.*, vii, 75, § 3.
[2] C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, ii, 8. n. 3.
[3] *Caesar*, 15.
[4] *Celtica*, 2.
[5] These appear to be the departments which M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, ii, 8, n. 3) means by the ' cinq départements du nord '. But the Morini also inhabited a part of Belgium, and the Suessiones a part of the department of the Aisne.
[6] *B. G.*, ii, 4, §§ 5, 7, 9.
[7] Suessiones . . . latissimos feracissimosque agros possidere (*ib.*, §§ 6–7).
[8] See p. 242.
[9] *Stonewall Jackson*, i, 1898, p. 401.

Strabo[1] tells us of the fecundity of the Gallic women, and that the population of Kent, the conditions of which closely resembled those of Gaul, appeared to Caesar, or to 'the pseudo-Caesar', 'immense;'[2] remembering, on the other hand, that great cities did not then exist in Gaul, and that much land which is now cultivated had not then been reclaimed,[3] we may be inclined to acquiesce in the belief that M. Jullian's lowest estimate is not very far above the truth. But I would ask him, before he pins his faith to the statements of the ancient writers, to consider an illustration drawn from modern history. In 1857 William Tayler, the Commissioner of Patna, observed that the population of that city—the capital of his Division—was 'estimated at 400,000'. An official holding such a position in Gaul would certainly have been regarded by M. Jullian as an unimpeachable authority. But, according to the census taken in 1872, the population of Patna was 158,900.[4]

[1] iv, 1, § 2. [2] *B. G.*, v, 12, § 3; 14, § 1. See p. 206, n. 4.

[3] M. Jullian himself (*Hist. de la Gaule*, i, 283) emphasizes the comparative smallness of the habitable area of Gaul.

[4] See Rice Holmes's *Hist. of the Indian Mutiny*, 5th ed., 1898 (or the reprint of 1904), p. 179, n. 1.

SECTION III.—PURELY GEOGRAPHICAL

CAESAR'S WANT OF PRECISION IN GEOGRAPHICAL STATEMENTS

The *Commission de la topographie des Gaules* remark that Caesar must have known that the Bituriges Vivisci occupied both banks of the Garonne.[1] It is clear, then, they argue, that when he spoke of the Garonne as the common frontier of Aquitania and Gallia Celtica,[2] he did not intend to speak with literal accuracy. Again, part of the territory of the Veliocasses, who were a Belgic people, was on the left bank of the Seine; and the Seine and the Marne, according to Caesar,[3] formed the boundary between the Celtae and the Belgae. These inaccuracies are worth noting, because some critics have gone astray by basing investigations on the assumption that every geographical statement in Caesar must necessarily be regarded as rigidly precise. But the *Commentaries* are quite accurate enough for every practical purpose, if we exercise a little common sense in interpreting them.

THE TERRITORIES OF CLIENT TRIBES

It is necessary, in order to define the territories of certain Gallic tribes, to ascertain whether Caesar included within their limits the territories occupied by tribes which he calls *clientes*. Deloche [4] takes Walckenaer and B. Guérard to task for reckoning client tribes as *pagi*, or mere subdivisions of the tribes whose overlordship they recognized. This view, he argues, finds no support in the *Commentaries*; for Caesar does not apply the word *pagus* to any of the tribes which he calls *clientes*; and the Carnutes and other client peoples are expressly designated by him as *civitates*. Now there can be no doubt that, as a general rule, Caesar distinguishes the territories of client tribes from the territories of their overlords. Thus he says that the Usipetes and Tencteri 'made their way into the territories of the Eburones and the Condrusi, who are clients of the Treveri' (*in fines Eburonum et Condrusorum, qui sunt Treverorum clientes, pervenerant*);[5] and he says that the Carnutes were clients of the Remi,[6] from whom they were separated by the Suessiones, the

[1] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 71. [2] *B. G.*, i, 1, § 2. [3] *Ib.*
[4] *Mém. présentés par divers savants à l'Acad. des Inscr.*, 2e sér., iv, 1860, pp. 365–70. [5] *B. G.*, iv, 6, § 4. [6] *Ib.*, vi, 4, § 5.

Meldi, and the Parisii. On the other hand, the passage[1] in which he remarks that the Cevennes separates the Helvii from the Arverni can only be explained on the assumption that he included in the territory of the Arverni that of their clients, the Vellavii.[2]

THE MAP OF GAUL

I. I warn those who may read the articles in my Geographical Index or those which deal with the geography of Caesar's campaigns that it is absolutely impossible to make this book self-sufficient in the matter of maps. For in the course of the articles I have often been obliged to mention streams, hills, and villages which are not marked in any maps except the sheets of the *Carte de l'État-Major*, the *Topographische Atlas der Schweiz*, or the *Carte topographique de la Belgique*. My own maps are intended merely to illustrate the narrative; not to illustrate the arguments by which I have arrived at the results which the narrative records. Those who may wish to control the statements in my articles must buy or borrow the various sheets to which I refer therein for themselves. The scale of the *Carte de l'État-Major* is $\frac{1}{80000}$, or about one mile and a quarter to an inch.[3] Based upon it, is a map drawn on the scale of $\frac{1}{320000}$; and the *Service géographique de l'armée* have also issued a third map on the scale of $\frac{1}{200000}$. The scale of the *Topographische Atlas der Schweiz* is $\frac{1}{50000}$: that of the *Carte topographique de la Belgique* $\frac{1}{20000}$. All these maps are beautifully executed. An admirable little book, called *La Carte de l'État-Major: Guide pour sa lecture*, has been written by Captain J. Molard. It only costs 4*d*., and enables any one who masters it to read the map perfectly.

II. The map of Gaul in this book will fail to satisfy minds which are intolerant of an avowal of ignorance. Readers of this kind will find what they want in the maps of Napoleon, von Göler, von Kampen, Kiepert, and others; and if they find discrepancies between the conclusions of those authorities, they will have no cause to complain that any of them is an agnostic. But any one who has the patience to read my geographical notes will find that even Kiepert has marked on his maps towns, camps, and battle-fields, the sites of which it is impossible, with our present materials, to determine; and that he has marked them without warning the reader that his identifications are purely conjectural. It is simply impossible to construct a complete map to illustrate the *Gallic War* which shall not be misleading. A map which, like Kiepert's and von Göler's, traces the whole network of Caesar's lines of march certainly looks much prettier than one which omits many of them: but it is not scientific; and whoever publishes such a map ought to put his readers on their guard.

III. Generally speaking, it is impossible to determine the frontiers

[1] *B. G.*, vii, 8, § 2.

[2] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, ii, 17. Cf. p. 518, n. 3.

[3] A new edition on the scale of $\frac{1}{50000}$ is now being published.

of the Gallic states with certainty. With one or two exceptions, one may indicate their position on the map : one may determine approximately the extent of country which they occupied ; and in a few cases some portion of the actual frontier can be traced with precision. But if the reader finds that maps which, like those of Napoleon III, have the boundaries of the states marked, help him to realize the story more vividly, he should distinctly understand that those maps are so far for the most part conjectural. I am aware that d'Anville believed that it was possible to reconstruct the map of Gaul even in this detail. 'En général,' he affirmed, 'le gouvernement Ecclésiastique en France a été réglé sur le gouvernement Civil, tel qu'il étoit lors de l'établissement du Christianisme dans les provinces de la Gaule ; en sorte que les anciens Diocèses répondent aux territoires des anciens peuples.'[1] By way of proving his thesis, he says that there is a town called Feins on the confines of the dioceses of Orléans and Blois, another town of the same name on the confines of the dioceses of Orléans and Chartres, and a third on the confines of the dioceses of Sens and Auxerre ; that each of these towns stands upon the site of one of the numerous Gallo-Roman frontier-stations called *Fines* ; and that consequently 'les limites de ces Diocèses sont les mêmes que les *Fines* des Cités de Chartres, d'Orléans, de Sens et d'Auxerre sous l'Empire Romain '. He also says that between Alise-Sainte-Reine and Montbard there is a town called Fins, situated on the confines of the dioceses of Autun and Langres,—'a sure proof that the Aedui and the Lingones had the same limits under the Roman Empire ; ' and that the Fines of the *Table*, near Aquis-Segeste, is on the confines of the dioceses of Orléans and Sens, which proves that 'the boundaries of those dioceses are identical with the boundaries of the Carnutes and Senones '.[2] D'Anville's conclusion is certainly very plausible ; but it would be rash to conclude that because the territories of certain Gallo-Roman peoples coincided with certain ancient French dioceses, therefore the territories of all the Gallo-Roman peoples might be similarly defined. It would be still more rash to assume that all the Gallo-Roman provinces exactly coincided with the territories of the Gallic states that preceded them. It is true that the stations called *Fines* were frontier-stations ;[3] but, says a French writer, 'Malheureusement l'emplacement de ces *Fines* n'est pas toujours facile à déterminer, et, quand on parvient à le faire, il ne concorde pas toujours avec les limites des anciens diocèses.'[4]

Desjardins admits that, in principle, the boundaries of the Gallic

[1] *Éclaircissemens sur l'ancienne Gaule*, 1741, pp. 234–5. See also A. Longnon, *Atlas hist. de la France*, 1884, p. iii. The *Éclaircissemens*, which I have just quoted, are commonly attributed by French scholars to the Abbé Belley ; but M. Jullian (*Rev. des études anc.*, x, 1908, p. 351), with whom I agree, is inclined to believe that they were really written by d'Anville, under whose name they were published. In his *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule* he frequently refers both to the *Éclaircissemens* and to Belley, but never attributes the former, with which he invariably agrees, to the latter.

[2] *Éclaircissemens*, pp. 191, 453.

[3] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 397.

[4] *Ib.*, and 399, no. viii.

peoples whom Caesar subdued served to define the territories of the sixty *civitates* of Augustus; and that subsequently the boundaries of those *civitates* served, in principle, to define the areas of episcopal jurisdiction. 'Mais,' he proceeds, 'dans le passage de l'état autonome de la Gaule à l'organisation romaine . . . il faut se garder de croire que les délimitations des Soixante cités de l'époque romaine correspondissent exactement à celles des peuples, dont les frontières politiques étaient souvent vagues et indéterminées : des peuplades entières avaient été exterminées comme celles des Éburons et des Aduatuques ; d'autres, sensiblement diminuées par la guerre, se trouvèrent fondues, sur différents points, dans les cités voisines ; on en voit surgir d'autres qui proviennent d'un dédoublement opéré, sinon par Auguste, du moins par ses successeurs, afin de proportionner à peu près les territoires entre eux ; le pays des Éduens et de leurs sujets étant jugé beaucoup trop vaste pour former une seule cité, on dut en détacher celui des *Segusiavi* . . . leurs anciens clients. C'est pour les mêmes causes sans doute que la cité des *Tricasses* . . . fut créée plus tard dans une portion détachée des *Senones* . . . ou des *Remi*.'[1] In another place Desjardins speaks of the difficulty occasioned by 'ces liens de patronage et de clientèles si répandus dans la Gaule, liens qui empêchent d'isoler ces peuples et parfois même de les distinguer entre eux.'[2] Thus the Aulerci Brannovices were 'clients' of the Aedui, and, as clients, possessed, in Caesar's time, a territory of their own. But this territory was afterwards merged in one of the dioceses which are generally assigned to the Aedui; and it is impossible to say how much of that diocese belonged to the Aedui, how much to the Aulerci. Again, Caesar makes no mention of certain peoples, for example the Silvanectes and the Tricasses, whose territories afterwards formed separate dioceses; and it is impossible to decide whether these were client peoples or *pagi*,[3] and to which, if to any of the better known states their territories belonged. Moreover, it is certain that several of the states mentioned in the *Notitia provinciarum* were not formed into dioceses, and that several dioceses even of the fifth century do not figure as states in the *Notitia*.[4] Finally, Deloche points out that bishops sometimes encroached upon the dioceses of their neighbours.[5]

Nevertheless, it would be a great mistake to jump to the conclusion that our knowledge of the boundaries of the ancient dioceses is of no use to the student of Gallic geography. Those dioceses do probably often correspond exactly or nearly with the territories of Gallic states; for there is no reason to suppose that, except in certain cases, which will be mentioned in the proper places, the areas of the Gallo-Roman differed materially from those of the Gallic territories. The cases in which the evidence of the dioceses fails us[6] will also be duly noted in

[1] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 428–9. [2] *Ib.*, ii, 217.
[3] See p. 344.
[4] See J. Loth, *L'Émigration bretonne en Armorique*, 1883, p. 49.
[5] *Mém. présentés par divers savants à l'Acad. des inscr.*, iv, 1860, pp. 326–7.
[6] See K. Thomann's *Der französische Atlas zu Cäsars gall. Kriege*, 1868, pp. 3–4, and *Rev. du Lyonnais*, 3e sér., i, 1866, p. 191.

the Geographical Index. To the student of Caesar the matter is of no practical importance, except in so far as it affects the search for the sites of places which are mentioned in Caesar's narrative. Only it is not always safe, in that search, to place absolute reliance upon arguments drawn from the areas of the ancient dioceses.[1] Moreover, although Caesar often speaks of the frontiers of Gallic tribes,[2] it seems probable that, as in India in the early days of the British occupation, these frontiers were more or less variable, portions of territory being periodically won or lost as the result of intertribal wars, and the possession of river-valleys, which involved the power of collecting tolls, being constantly in dispute.[3] Thus the territories of a tribe would be the area in which it was able for the time being to collect revenue.[4] Caesar, however, of course described the frontiers as they existed in his time.

IV. One more point demands consideration. If, in drawing a map of Gaul, one traces the coast-line as it appears in the map of contemporary France, the map will be so far misleading; for the coast has undergone considerable changes. Accordingly Desjardins, Kiepert, and A. Longnon have attempted to trace the coast-line as it existed in the time of Caesar. But even their maps cannot but be misleading to a certain extent; for although it has been proved that the sea has in some places gained upon the land, and that certain tracts of land have been won from the sea, it is, generally speaking, impossible to say exactly what was the dividing line between sea and land in the time of Caesar; and Desjardins himself admitted that his maps were largely conjectural. Nevertheless, even a conjectural map, based upon a study of the numerous monographs that have appeared upon the subject, should be more trustworthy than a mere reproduction of the modern map. Moreover, the tracing of the coast-line, for the most part, has no interest except for physical geographers: in three instances only, which will be duly mentioned in the notes, has it any bearing upon the study of Caesar's campaigns.[5]

[1] M. J. F. Bladé (*Annales de la Faculté des lettres de Bordeaux*, 1893, p. 115) argues that it is impossible to establish a correspondence between the area of any given diocese and the territory of any independent Aquitanian tribe. For independent Aquitania was represented under the late Empire by ten *civitates*, six of which are generally supposed to correspond with the territories of the following six independent tribes—Elusates, Ausci, Tarbelli, Vasates, Bigerriones, and Boi [or Boiates]. But independent Aquitania contained twenty-seven tribes in all. Therefore, concludes M. Bladé, the territories of twenty-one of them would be represented by four *civitates*. But may not some of the twenty-seven have been included in the other six (see my article on the Tarbelli [pp. 477–9])? Still, it is impossible to prove that any given diocese did not include the territory of some insignificant tribe besides that of the tribe with which it is commonly associated.

[2] *B. G.*, i, 6, §§ 2–3; 8, § 1; ii, 15, § 3; v, 24, § 2; 26, § 2; 54, § 2; vi, 44, § 3; vii, 5, § 4.

[3] See p. 353.

[4] These remarks have been suggested to me by conversation with Sir Alfred Lyall.

[5] Any one who may wish to study the question should refer to A. E. E. Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, i, 188–398; A. Longnon, *Atlas hist. de la France*, pp. i–ii; *Mém. couronnés par l'Acad. Roy. des sciences et belles-lettres de Bruxelles*, vi, 1827, pp. 23–4, 26, 74–7, 149–50, 171; A. Belpaire, *Étude sur la*

THE ITINERARY OF ANTONINE AND THE TABLE OF PEUTINGER

I shall often have occasion in the following notes to refer to the *Itinerary of Antonine* and the *Table of Peutinger*. The compilation of the former was probably begun in the reign of Antoninus (Caracalla); but, as it mentions Diocletianopolis and Constantinopolis, it can hardly have been completed before the middle of the fourth century. The figures contained in that part of it which relates to Gaul are usually followed by the letters M P M (*milia plus minus*), except in two routes—from Fines Helvetiorum to Argentorate (Strasbourg) and from Lugdunum (Lyons) to Gesoriacum (Boulogne), where the distances are indicated both in Roman miles and in Gallic leagues; and in three others—from Colonia Agrippina (Cologne) to Castra leg(ionis) XXX (Birten ?), from Durocortorum (Reims) to Treveri (Trèves), and from Trèves to Cologne—where they are indicated in Gallic leagues only. Nevertheless, it is universally admitted that, except in the case of the Province, the figures actually denote Gallic leagues.[1] The edition which I have habitually used is that of Wesseling; but the edition of Parthey and Pinder (1848) may also be consulted.

The so-called *Table of Peutinger*, in the form in which it has come down to us, was the work of an anonymous writer, 'the monk of Colmar,' who was living in 1265. It was discovered at Worms in 1494, and in 1508 passed into the hands of Conrad Peutinger. The original document upon which the monk worked belonged to the imperial epoch; but its date cannot be ascertained. The best edition is that of Desjardins. See *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, iv, 72–3, and Desjardins's *La Table de Peutinger*, p. 76 ff.

formation de la plaine maritime depuis Boulogne jusqu'au Danemark, 1855, pp. 197, 200–1; A. de Laveleye, *Affaissement du sol et envasement des fleuves*, 1859, p. 8; H. Debray, *Étude géol. . . . du littoral flamand*, 1873; *Bull. de la Soc. de géogr. d'Anvers*, i, 1877, pp. 155–88; *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, 2e pér., lxxix, 1869, pp. 429–53; *Mém. du Congrès scientifique de France*, ii, 1872, pp. 451–60; *Bull. de la Soc. de géogr.*, 6e sér., x, 1875, pp. 225–41; *Bull. de géogr. hist. et descr.*, 1901, pp. 313–41; *Bull. de la Soc. géol. de France*, 4e sér., vi, 1906, pp. 142–7; Rice Holmes, *Anc. Britain*, &c., pp. 517–8; C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, i, 6–12, 22, n. 6; and *Rev. des études anc.*, xi, 1909, p. 361. See also pp. 681–3, 691–6, *infra*. I am inclined to think that in constructing my map twelve years ago I in some cases accepted evidence for changes of coast-line which was inconclusive; but for the reason implied in the text I leave the errors uncorrected.

[1] Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, iv. 37–8; *Itin. Ant.*, ed. Wesseling, pp. 251–2, 254–6, 358–63, 365–7, 372–3. See also *Corpus inscr. Lat.*, xiii, pars ii, fasc. 2, p. 646.

THE GALLIC LEAGUE AND THE ROMAN MILE

I. It is generally admitted, on the strength of certain statements of Ammianus Marcellinus[1] and Jornandes[2] and of certain passages in the *Itinerary of Antonine*,[3] that the Gallic league was equivalent to 2,222 metres, or one Roman mile and a half; and the orthodox view is that, whenever in the *Itinerary* or the *Table* distances are computed in leagues, a league of this length is meant. In reality one Roman mile and a half is equivalent to 2,217¾ metres. But according to T. Pistollet de St. Ferjeux,[4] this league was only the Gallic league as officially recognized by the Romans: the true Gallic league, he maintained, was 2,415 metres.

If I were writing a treatise upon Gallic geography, it would be my duty to discuss his theory as carefully as I have studied it; but, as I am only concerned with Gallic geography in so far as it is related to the history of Caesar's conquest and of the events which led up thereto, I may leave it alone. For Pistollet does not dispute any of the identifications that have been proposed of the towns which are mentioned in Caesar's narrative.

II. The Roman mile was 1,617 yards, or 1,478½ metres. In W. Smith's *Dictionary of Antiquities*, ii, 159–60, will be found a full account of the various methods by which the length of the Roman foot has been computed: it was ·2957 metre.[5] From this result the length of the mile has been determined.

[1] xv, 11, § 17; xvi, 12, § 8.

[2] *Getica*, xxxvi, 192 (*Monumenta Germaniae hist., auctores antiquissimi*, v, 1882, p. 108).

[3] Ed. Wesseling, 1735, pp. 359–63.

[4] *Mém. sur l'ancienne lieue gauloise*, pp. 9–13, 18–20. See also *Rev. des Soc. savantes*, 3e sér., ii, 1863, pp. 186–91; iv, 1864, p. 449; *Mém. de l'Acad. du Gard*, 1863–4, pp. 110–20; 1866–7, pp. 109–19; *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., vii, 1863, pp. 344–9; xiv, 1866, pp. 194–7; xv, 1867, pp. 444–6; *La Table de Peutinger*, pp. 10, col. 2; 25, col. 3; 33, col. 2–3; Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, iv, 23–5; and C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, ii, 395, nn. 3–4. M. Jullian (*Rev. des études anc.*, ix, 1907, p. 189) suggests that there is an allusion to the Gallic league in Posidonius (*Fragm. hist. Graec.*, ed. Didot, iii, 1849, pp. 260–1, fr. 25), who says that the Arvernian king, Luernius, had enclosures, 12 stades square, made for festivals: 12 stades, M. Jullian points out, are equivalent to 2,220 metres.

[5] Cf. Daremberg and Saglio, *Dict. des ant. grecques et rom.*, iii, 1730. The leading authority is F. Hultsch, *Griech. und röm. Metrologie*, 1882, pp. 88–98. Cf. *Mém. de la Soc. nat. des ant. de France*, lxviii, 1908 (1909), pp. 444–6.

GEOGRAPHICAL INDEX[1]

Admagetobriga. See MAGETOBRIGA.

Aedui.—The territory of the Aedui, if we include in it, as most geographers do, the territories of their clients,[2] the Aulerci Brannovices and the Mandubii (q.v.), comprised, roughly speaking, at all events, the dioceses of Autun (Augustodunum), Chalon-sur-Saône (Cavillonum), Mâcon (Matisco), and Nevers (Noviodunum), the last three of which were severed from the primitive diocese of Autun.[3] This territory corresponded with the departments of the Saône-et-Loire and Nièvre and parts of the Côte-d'Or and the Allier. Desjardins has shown in his posthumous volume that in the third century of our era, if not in Caesar's time, the Aedui also possessed the territory which belonged to the *civitas Autessiodurum* (Auxerre).[4]

When Caesar said that the Loire separated the Aedui from the Bituriges, he evidently meant that it served as the common frontier of the two peoples in that part of its course to which the Aeduan force came in 52 B. C., when they had been sent to the assistance of the Bituriges.[5] This part of the river, it should seem, lay somewhere between its junction with the Allier and Sancerre. But the diocese of Nevers embraced a narrow strip of territory on the left bank of the Loire, south of a point about 3 miles north of La Charité, which is itself about 12 miles south-east of Sancerre.[6] If, then, as would seem probable, the Aeduan force approached the Loire between Nevers and La Charité, Caesar's delimitation of the frontier does not coincide with the western boundary of the diocese of Nevers. M. Jullian, however, pointing out that intertribal frontiers in Gaul were rarely formed by rivers, argues that Caesar's statement must not be taken literally.[7] I cannot agree with him. Consider what Caesar says :—'When they [the Aeduan force] reached the Loire—the boundary between the Bituriges and the Aedui—they lingered there a few days, and then turned back without venturing to cross the river' (*qui cum ad flumen Ligerim venissent, quod Bituriges*

[1] I generally pass over places like Avaricum and Lutecia, the sites of which have either never been disputed or have been finally identified with such certainty that they are no longer disputed even by charlatans, though, where it seemed necessary, I have briefly given the reasons for the identification; and, in speaking of the territories of Gallic peoples about the geographical position and the extent of which there is no dispute, I simply state the facts and give the necessary references.

[2] See pp. 344–5, and C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, ii, 538, n. 5.

[3] D'Anville, *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 35 ; Walckenaer, *Géogr. des Gaules*, i, 325 ; *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 14.

[4] See GORGOBINA and SENONES.

[5] *B. G.*, vii, 5, §§ 3–4.

[6] See M. Clairefond's map in *Bull. de la Soc. d'émulation du département de l'Allier*, vii, 1859, p. 284, and cf. the map facing p. 1 of the twelfth volume of *Gallia Christiana*.

[7] *Festschr. zu O. Hirschfelds sechzigstem Geburtstage*, 1903, p. 217.

ab Haeduis dividit, paucos dies ibi morati neque flumen transire ausi domum revertuntur). To my mind these words clearly imply that the Aedui, if they had crossed over, would have found themselves in the territory of the Bituriges.[1] Either they approached the Loire more than 3 miles north of La Charité—at Sancerre or even further down the valley—or the Aedui did not possess that strip of territory west of the Loire.

According to Strabo,[2] the Saône separated the Aedui from the Sequani; but the French Commission disregard his statement and follow the indications of the dioceses, remarking that Strabo's text 'n'a rien d'absolument affirmatif quant à la non-discontinuité de la limite le long du fleuve, comme il est facile de s'en convaincre en examinant l'ensemble de la phrase'.[3] Strabo may have made a mistake, but his language seems precise enough:—ῥεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ Ἄραρ ἐκ τῶν Ἀλπεων, ὁρίζων Σηκοανούς τε καὶ Λἰδούους. Ptolemy[4] also says that the Saône was the eastern boundary of the Aedui. Caesar says that the Saône 'flows through the territories of the Aedui and the Sequani, and discharges itself into the Rhône' (*per fines Haeduorum et Sequanorum in Rhodanum influit*).[5] From these words also von Göler[6] infers that the Saône formed the boundary between the Aedui and the Sequani: but, as R. Schneider[7] says, he mistranslates the passage; and Napoleon refers to three others in the *Gallic War*—*inter fines Helvetiorum et Allobrogum . . . Rhodanus fluit* (i. 6, § 2), *cum Sequanos a provincia nostra Rhodanus divideret* (i, 33, § 4), and *flumen Ligerim . . . quod Bituriges ab Haeduis dividit* (vii, 5, § 4)—to show that if Caesar had meant what von Göler says, he would have expressed himself differently. Caesar simply meant that the Saône flowed through the territories of the Aedui and the Sequani considered as one tract.[8] P. Guillemot,[9] differing from von Göler, holds that 'la Bresse chalonnaise' belonged to the Aedui, arguing that when they complained to Caesar that the Helvetii were ravaging their lands,[10] the Helvetii had not yet crossed the Saône. I do not think that this inference can legitimately be drawn from Caesar's narrative; for he appears to have attacked the Tigurini directly after the

[1] The Bituriges acknowledged the overlordship of the Aedui (*B. G.*, vii, 5, § 2), and therefore presumably did not dispute their right to collect tolls on the river. If so, the Aedui would not have been tempted to encroach upon the western bank. See p. 353.

[2] *Geogr.*, iv, 1, § 11; 3, § 2. [3] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 14.

[4] *Geogr.*, ii, 8, § 12. [5] *B. G.*, i, 12, § 1. [6] *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 15.

[7] *Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xii, 1886, pp. 240–1.

[8] Thomann (*Der französische Atlas zu Cäsars gall. Kriege*, 1868, p. 9), commenting on Napoleon's remarks, asks, 'Are we then to conclude that the tribes mentioned in *B. G.*, iv, 10, lived on the right as well as on the left bank of the Rhine?' The well-known passage to which Thomann refers, and which, as Meusel has shown (see p. 692), is probably spurious, runs as follows: *Rhenus . . . per fines Nantuatium, Helvetiorum, Sequanorum, Mediomatricorum, Tribocorum, Treverorum citatus fertur.* In my note on the Triboci I show that, unless the writer made a slip, some portion of the territory of that people must have been on the right bank, as otherwise *per* must mean the same as *praeter* ('past' or 'along'); and there is no evidence that *per* ever bears this meaning.

[9] *Excursions dans les montagnes de la Côte-d'Or*, 1861, p. xx.

[10] *B. G.*, i, 11, §§ 2–3.

Aedui made their complaint; and, at the moment when he attacked the Tigurini, three-fourths of the Helvetii had crossed the river.[1]

M. Jullian[2] argues that the reason why rivers were rarely frontiers is implied in Strabo's[3] further statement that the Aedui and the Sequani disputed about the collection of tolls on the Saône. The possession of both banks of a river was necessary, he maintains, in order to enforce payment. No doubt: but if the Aedui had permanently possessed both banks, would there have been a struggle? Strabo's statement surely implies that the riparian territory was debatable land.

My own belief is that no certain conclusion can be drawn from any of the ancient authorities as to the eastern boundary of the Aedui. Caesar's words, even though they do not prove that it was formed by the Saône, are not irreconcilable with the view that it was: on the other hand, Strabo and Ptolemy, if they did not misunderstand Caesar, may only have meant that the Saône was, roughly speaking, the boundary. On the whole, it seems to me safer to prefer the evidence of the dioceses to their uncertain statements. It seems probable that after Caesar had restored the hegemony of the Aedui they acquired permanent possession of the disputed territory.

Agedincum has always been generally identified with Sens; but a few commentators have decided for Provins, which is about 25 miles, as the crow flies, from Sens, and nearly due north of it. This theory, however, is no longer defended. Provins is on the right bank of the Seine; and Labienus, when he decided to abandon his campaign against the Parisii, in order to return to Agedincum,[4] crossed from the right to the left bank. For Caesar, describing the position in which Labienus found himself when he was about to return, says,[5] 'on one side he was menaced by the Bellovaci . . . on the other Camulogenus held the field with a well-found army, ready for action' (*altera ex parte Bellovaci . . . instabant; alteram Camulogenus parato atque instructo exercitu tenebat*). This passage proves that Labienus was, at that moment, on the right bank of the Seine. For he was on one bank, and Camulogenus on the other. Therefore, if he was on the left bank, Camulogenus was on the right; and Camulogenus and the Bellovaci were both on his right; whereas Caesar says that he was between them. Achaintre makes a desperate attempt to anticipate and turn this argument. Caesar, he urges, was only speaking 'generally': the Bellovaci were preparing for war; the Parisii, on the other hand, were already prepared. But that Caesar used the words, *altera ex parte*, &c., in a strictly geographical sense, is proved by his having, in the same breath, used the phrase *alteram* (partem) *Camulogenus parato atque instructo exercitu tenebat*.

It is clear, then, that Agedincum was not Provins. There is evidence to show that it was Sens; and as this evidence is similar

[1] *B. G.*, i, 12, 13, §§ 1–2.
[2] *Festschr. zu O. Hirschfelds sechzigstem Geburtstage*, 1903, p. 218, n. 1.
[3] iv, 3, § 2. [4] *B. G.*, vii, 59–62. [5] *Ib.*, 59, § 5.

to that by which the sites of Lutecia, Avaricum, and many other Gallic towns, were identified centuries ago, it may be well to state it. Caesar says that Agedincum was in the territory of the Senones.[1] Now the chief town of the Senones, in the early days of the Church, was Sens, or, as it was then called, *Senones*; and the chief town of the Senones was, according to Ptolemy,[2] Ἀγηδικόν. Again, in the *Itinerary of Antonine*,[3] *Agredicum* is marked as 13 Gallic leagues, or 19½ Roman miles, from *Condate* (Montereau-sur-Yonne), and as 30 Gallic leagues, or 46 Roman miles, from *Augustobona* (Troyes); and the actual distances, according to Cassini,[4] are 21 and 43½ Roman miles respectively.[5] Finally, an inscription of the year 250 A. D., in which the name AGIED (*incensium*) occurs, was discovered, in 1837, at Sens.[6]

A. de Barthélemy has, however, suggested[7] that, although a Gallo-Roman town called Agedincum undoubtedly stood upon the site of Sens, the Gallic town of the same name may have been situated elsewhere. Just as Gergovia was succeeded by the Gallo-Roman Augustonemetum, and Bibracte by the Gallo-Roman Augustodunum, so, he suggests, the Agedincum which stood upon the site of Sens may have been the Gallo-Roman successor of the Agedincum mentioned by Caesar. I cannot accept this suggestion; for if the Gallic Agedincum had yielded its position as the chief town of the Senones to a Gallo-Roman foundation, the latter would not have been called by a Celtic name, but by some name of which *Caesar*, as in *Caesarodunum*, or *Augustus*, as in *Augustonemetum*, would have formed an element.

Similar groundless suggestions have been made in regard to Durocortorum (Reims) and Lemonum (Poitiers).

Alesia.—The site of Alesia is absolutely certain. It covered the plateau of Mont Auxois, on the south-western slope of which now stands the village of Alise-Sainte-Reine. But, as it was the scene of the most famous event in the Gallic war, the question of its whereabouts has given rise to a controversy, the echoes of which have not yet died away. M. Ruelle, in his *Bibliographie générale des Gaules* (pp. 163–72), enumerated 158 works bearing upon the subject; and since 1870, the date which he fixed as his limit, new pens have been busy with the same theme. The controversy was not closed by the publication of the results of Napoleon's investigations. Jules Quicherat, who was, in his day, one of the best known of French antiquaries, remained unconvinced: C. Müller, in the Atlas which he published in 1880, to illustrate Strabo's *Geography*, marked Alesia on the site of Alaise;[8] and other writers of less note, while differing among themselves as to the true site, agree in rejecting Napoleon's conclusion. I was therefore bound, by the principles

[1] *B. G.*, vi, 44, § 3. [2] *Geogr.*, ii, 8, § 9. [3] Ed. Wesseling, p. 383.
[4] Walckenaer, *Géogr. des Gaules*, iii, 54.
[5] See also *La Table de Peutinger*, ed. Desjardins, p. 26, col. 2.
[6] *Rev. de philologie*, ii, 1847, p. 355; *Corpus inscr. Lat.*, xiii, 2949.
[7] *Rev. celt.*, viii, 1887, p. 398.
[8] *Strabonis Geographicorum Tabulae XV*, Praefatio, p. vi.

which guided me in writing this book, to discuss the question in the first edition; and as, notwithstanding the multitude of treatises which had appeared, the whole of the arguments had never been marshalled within any one work, I thought that it might save future inquirers trouble if I supplied the want. Within the last few years, and especially since the commencement of the excavations, still in progress, which have proved that a Gallic, and afterwards a Gallo-Roman town stood upon Mont Auxois, various writers have attempted to reopen the question. Like the enthusiasts who have formed a society to prove that the earth is flat, such writers will never be convinced; and perhaps a generation will pass before the truth is left unassailed. But although the question is now regarded by all scholars as closed, intelligent readers will naturally want to know the reasons upon which the truth is founded. I will therefore re-state them as briefly as I can.

Besides Mont Auxois, seven sites have been proposed, namely Alaise in the department of the Doubs, Alais in the department of the Gard, Novalaise and the plateau of La Crusille in Savoy, Izernore in the department of the Ain, a place, the name of which I cannot discover, in Auvergne,[1] and Aluze in the department of the Saône-et-Loire.[2] Izernore and La Crusille are dismissed by A. de Barthélemy, in an admirable article on Alesia,[3] as unworthy of discussion; but as Izernore was advocated by a laborious student, and still finds support,[4] I shall examine its claims here. The pretensions of Alais,[5] Novalaise, and the above-mentioned (or any) site in Auvergne, are so wildly absurd that it is difficult to believe that any one could have advocated any of the three, except from a love of singularity. Aluze is a new candidate, having only made its appearance in 1906; but its supporter is not deterred by the mere fact that during centuries of discussion it had been overlooked. The real controversy, however, has always been between the champions of Mont Auxois and those of Alaise.

Caesar gives a description of Alesia, of the camp which Vercingetorix formed upon its eastern slope, and of his own camps and lines of contravallation and circumvallation, the gist of which I have embodied in my narrative[6] and need not reproduce here. The additional data which he supplies for determining the geographical position of the stronghold may be stated in a few words. When he was passing 'through the furthest part of the territory of the Lingones' (*per extremos Lingonum fines*) towards the country of the Sequani, Vercingetorix encamped at a distance of 10 Roman miles from his camp. Next morning Vercingetorix attacked the

[1] *Comptes rendus de l'Acad. des inscr.*, 4e sér., xvii, 1889 (1890), p. 410.
[2] *Pro Alesia*, 1908, pp. 274, 276.
[3] *Rev. des questions hist.*, iii, 1867, pp. 43–4.
[4] *Comptes rendus de l'Acad. des inscr.*, 1906, pp. 724–5.
[5] Alais, which was advocated in 1696 by Des Ours de Mandajors (*Nouvelles découvertes sur l'état de l'ancienne Gaule du temps de César*) is at least 200 miles, as the crow flies, from the nearest frontier of the Lingones, in whose country Caesar was the day before he reached Alesia (*B. G.*, vii, 66–8).
[6] See pp. 169–73.

Roman column, when it had advanced to within a short distance from his own camp. Beaten in this engagement, he retreated to Alesia; and the Romans arrived there on the day after the battle.[1]

I. Alesia, according to J. Maissiat, stood upon the site of Izernore, near the Perte du Rhône and 9 kilometres, or between 5 and 6 miles, north-west of Nantua. The whole weight of his theory rests upon his interpretation of the famous passage in which Caesar describes his own position and that of Vercingetorix on the night before the action which immediately preceded the blockade of Alesia,—*cum Caesar in Sequanos per extremos Lingonum fines iter faceret, quo facilius subsidium provinciae ferre posset, circiter milia passuum X ab Romanis trinis castris Vercingetorix consedit.*[2] I discuss, on pages 791–4, the meaning of *per extremos Lingonum fines*, in so far as those words bear upon the question where the action was fought. The passage means that, at the time of which Caesar wrote, he was marching through the country of the Lingones towards the country of the Sequani. Nothing of the kind, says Maissiat: Caesar '*indique seulement la direction de sa marche actuelle*, à savoir, *du pays des Lingons, chez les Sequanes et vers la Province*'.[3] Again, Maissiat says that in this passage *in* does not mean 'vers' or 'dans la direction de'; for, in order that *in* should have either of these meanings, 'il nous paraît indispensable que le texte présente quelque raison accessoire et particulière, comme pourrait être la nature du verbe employé par l'auteur,'[4] as, for instance, *instituit*, in the passage *iter in Senones facere instituit.*[5] Now there is one passage in the *Commentaries* which proves conclusively that Maissiat is wrong. In *B. G.*, ii, 29, § 4, Caesar, speaking of the Atuatuci, writes:—*ipsi erant ex Cimbris Teutonisque prognati, qui, cum iter in provinciam nostram atque Italiam facerent, iis impedimentis quae secum agere ac portare non poterant citra flumen Rhenum depositis custodiae ac praesidio VI milia hominum una reliquerunt.* At the time of which Caesar wrote, the Cimbri and Teutoni were marching *in provinciam nostram atque Italiam;* and they had not yet come anywhere near either of those places. Therefore *in*, without any 'raison accessoire et particulière', does mean 'towards'; and *cum Caesar in Sequanos per extremos Lingonum fines iter faceret* means that Caesar was marching *through* the country of the Lingones *towards* the country of the Sequani.[6]

Thus the foundation of Maissiat's theory is undermined; and it is needless to examine the buttresses by which he strives to sustain the shattered structure: but perhaps I should mention that the Gallic name of Izernore was not Alesia but Isarnoduros.[7]

[1] *B. G.*, vii, 66, § 2; 67–8.
[2] *Ib.*, vii, 66, § 2.
[3] *Jules César en Gaule*, ii, 269.
[4] *Ib.*, 271–2.
[5] *B. G.*, vii, 56, § 5.
[6] M. A. de Barthélemy justly argues that, if Caesar had already penetrated into Sequania, he would have written, not *iter faceret* but *iter fecisset*. *Rev. des quest. hist.*, iii, 1867, p. 50. Further proof, if it be required, will be supplied by a comparison of *B. C.*, i, 39, § 3 with i, 60, § 5.
[7] A. Holder, *Alt-celtischer Sprachschatz*, ii, 76. It is incredible that this name should have been given to the stronghold after the conquest if it had ever borne the famous name of Alesia.

II. I now come to the knot of the question. I have sufficiently established the meaning of *per extremos Lingonum fines*. There may be room for doubt as to the exact spot in the country of the Lingones to which Caesar referred ; but it is absolutely certain that on the night before the battle he was somewhere within that country. As the battle-field was not more than 10 Roman miles from this point, and as, before the battle began, Caesar was marching towards the country of the Sequani, it is clear that the battle-field was either within the country of the Lingones or only just south of the Saône, which separated their country from that of the Sequani. I show on page 800, and it is universally admitted, that Alesia could hardly have been more than 35, or perhaps at the very outside 40 miles from the battle-field. Now, on the south of the Saône the only conceivable site—the only site that has ever been suggested, answering to these conditions—is Alaise. On the north of the Saône, the only conceivable site—the only site that has ever been suggested at all—is Mont Auxois. Between these two the choice must lie.

Quicherat tries to show that the names of various localities in the neighbourhood of Alaise recall various scenes in the drama of Alesia, and that the topography of Alaise corresponds with Caesar's description of the topography of Alesia. Now even when the meaning of names of places is certain, their evidence should be used with great caution. But when a writer, determined to make out his case by hook or by crook, arbitrarily attaches this or that meaning to the name of a place, his arguments may be safely ignored. 'En règle générale,' says M. A. de Barthélemy,[1] 'je ne me fie pas plus aux lieux-dits qu'aux traditions. Ces sources altérées à chaque siècle par l'influence de l'imagination populaire, aidée de ce que les érudits peuvent y ajouter en passant, ne peuvent que faire composer une histoire fantastique.'[2] As for topography, the following reasons are sufficient to convince any one who has a good map and can read it that Alesia was not Alaise. First, Alaise is not a hill at all, but a mountain mass, rising into numerous hills, various in form and elevation, nearly all wooded, and separated from one another by ravines. Secondly, the plain, about 3 miles long, which extended on the west of Alesia, does not exist at Alaise. The only 'plain' which the advocates of Alaise can point to is situated in the valley of the Todeure,[3] and forms an inclined plane, not a plain, about 1,000 yards long and 165 yards wide : the cavalry battle which Caesar describes could not possibly have taken place here. Thirdly, Alaise is not surrounded, as Caesar's description requires, by hills about as high as itself, but on the north, the west, and the south by hills of very unequal altitudes, diverse forms, and chaotic arrange-

[1] *Rev. des quest. hist.*, iii, 1867, p. 43.

[2] Here are a few instances of the way in which Quicherat manipulates 'lieux-dits'. Mouniot, he says, is derived from *munitorium*, Châteley from *castellare*, Châtaillon from *castellio*, &c. &c. (*Mélanges d'arch. et d'hist.*, i, 518–20). Therefore Alaise=Alesia !

[3] In the *Carte de l'État-Major* (Feuille 126) the Todeure is called 'Ruisseau de Conche'.

ment, and on the east by the vast plateau of Amancey, which rises to a height of 707 metres. Fourthly, if the Gallic army had been encamped on the eastern slopes of Alaise, the fortifications which Caesar describes would have been superfluous; for nature had fortified the site with huge precipices.[1] Fifthly, the smallest line of contravallation which could have been drawn round Alaise would have been more than 22 kilometres in extent; whereas the line of contravallation which Caesar drew round Alesia was not more than 10[2] Roman miles, or less than 15 kilometres.[3] Sixthly, the labour of constructing and of defending such elaborate lines of contravallation and circumvallation as Caesar describes, on this vast scale, would have been beyond the power even of Caesar's army. Seventhly, this stupendous labour would have been labour thrown away; for the mountain mass of Alaise was easily accessible, on the west and south, by the pass of 'la maison Pourtalis' and Montfordes; and Caesar could thus have gained possession of the western and southern parts of the mountain, which dominated the site of the alleged *oppidum*.[4] Lastly, Quicherat, finding it impossible to discover on the north of Alaise a hill corresponding with the description which

[1] Chataillon, where the camp has been placed, is far too small; and, as it is protected by the precipitous banks of the Lison, the Gallic fortifications would have been unnecessary; or, if they had been made, they would have looked not towards the east but towards the west, facing the town. Quicherat, recognizing the objections to this site, placed the camp in the neighbourhood of Saraz; but, as the Duc d'Aumale points out, Saraz is not on the east but on the south of Alaise. See *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, 2e pér., xv, 1858, p. 133, note.

[2] Or, according to the *a* MSS., 11. Caesar does not expressly say that the contravallation was 10 miles in extent: he only says that his original line of investment was; and it is not certain that the two were identical. This suggestion, which I made in the first edition (p. 373), is supported by M. Pernet's description of the excavations (*Pro Alesia*, 1907, p. 280).

[3] Perverse and wrong-headed as he was, Quicherat was no fool, and he saw clearly enough that the mountain mass of Alaise was too large to have been surrounded by the lines of contravallation and circumvallation which Caesar described. Accordingly he set to work to distort and force, if by any means it were possible, the narrative of Caesar into some sort of agreement with the topography of Alaise. He insists (*Mélanges d'arch. et d'hist.*, i, 530–9) that, after Vercingetorix withdrew his army into the town, Caesar entirely changed his plan of blockade. From Caesar's description, he says, 'on se croirait revenu au moment où le blocus vient d'être décidé.' The works which Caesar describes in *B. G.*, vii, 72 did not surround Alesia, but, as we may gather from the topography of Alaise—observe how naïvely Quicherat begs the question—only one side of it, namely that on which is situated Charfoinge; for on the other sides nature had done his work for him. Why, then, I may ask, did Caesar change his plan of attack? Had he neglected to examine the ground before he originally invested Alesia? Caesar, continues Quicherat, speaks of the lines of contravallation and circumvallation as his own work; whereas he speaks of the entrenchments that defended the camp of Rebilus and Reginus as the work of his men (*nostri*),—'premier indice que ce camp n'adhérait pas aux lignes qui enveloppaient la ville.' This, as Dr. Johnson would have said, is sad stuff; and no unbiased person who has read the *Commentaries* would thank me for refuting it. If anything about Alesia is certain, it is that Caesar's lines surrounded the place entirely, and that every stroke of work was done by his men (*nostri*) under his supervision.

[4] See Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 696, n. 3, 697, nn. 1–3, 699, n. 1, 700, n. 1, and *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, 2e pér., xv, 1858, pp. 122–34.

Caesar gives of that on the southern slope of which was situated the camp that Vercassivellaunus attacked, coolly identifies it with the plateau of Amancey. 'La colline au nord,' comments the Duc d'Aumale, 'serait le plateau d'Amancey, qui est situé à l'est, et qui a soixante-quatre kilomètres de tour!'

These facts prove that Alaise does not correspond with Caesar's description of Alesia; but if any one is not convinced, let him read pages 125–34 of the Duc d'Aumale's article in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, and I warrant that he will make up his mind.

But there are other arguments equally conclusive. The geographical position of Alaise suits Caesar's description no better than its physical features. Alesia had been provisioned in advance. If, then, Alesia was Alaise, it must be admitted that Vercingetorix had known Caesar's intentions for weeks before Caesar started on his march for the Province; and, what is more, that he knew exactly what route Caesar would take. That he possessed such foreknowledge is, as the Duc d'Aumale argues, incredible. It may be replied that the assumed identity of Alesia with Mont Auxois is open to the same objection. But the two cases are widely different. For at Mont Auxois Vercingetorix was in a central position from which he could strike at Caesar, whatever route Caesar might take in marching to the relief of the Province; whereas if Vercingetorix established himself at Alaise, he must have expected that Caesar would take that route through the country of the Sequani which would lead him to the Jura; and this was just the route which Caesar would have avoided. Again, it is obvious that, in taking up his position at Alaise, Vercingetorix would have left the all-important city of Bibracte—the political centre of Gaul—exposed to Caesar's attacks. As the Duc d'Aumale says, 'Le proconsul pouvait par une marche rapide fondre sur cette ville, peut-être l'enlever par un coup de main, peut-être détacher du parti national les Éduens mécontents. En tout cas, la position excentrique prise par l'armée gauloise aurait laissé le champ libre au génie de César.'[1]

On the theory that Alesia was Alaise, it is impossible to discover any site for the cavalry action which immediately preceded the blockade of Alesia. I show, on pages 791–4, that, on the night before the action, Caesar encamped somewhere on the north of the Saône.[2] Nobody will believe that Vercingetorix would not have attacked him while he was endeavouring to cross that river; and to cross a river in the face of an enemy is one of the most difficult

[1] *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, 2e pér., xv, 1858, pp. 84–5, 90, 94–5. Heller (*Philologus*, xiii, 1858, p. 595) argues, further, that if Vercingetorix had intended to take up a position in Sequania at all, he would probably have occupied its strong capital, Vesontio (Besançon), not Alaise. But is it not possible that, as G. Veith suggests (*Gesch. der Feldzüge C. J. Caesars*, p. 498, n. 1), Caesar may have continued to hold this important position since 58 B.C.?

[2] Quicherat simply drives a coach and four through this difficulty. He mistranslates *per extremos Lingonum fines*, and he mistranslates *circiter milia passuum X ab Romanis trinis castris Vercingetorix consedit*: 'au moment où César passait de la frontière des Lingons en Séquanie . . . Vercingétorix se tint, pendant trois étapes, à environ dix milles des Romains.'

of military operations. A. Delacroix, however, one of the most notorious champions of Alaise, places the battle-field in the neighbourhood of Cugney, near the northern bank of the Ognon. But, objects the Duc d'Aumale, if we accept this site, we still have to admit that Vercingetorix, the greatest general of Gaul, was so imbecile that he sat idle in his camp and allowed the Romans to cross the Saône without molestation. As this assumption is incredible, we must look for the battle-field south of the Ognon. Between Pontailler and the forest of Serre there is a site which might perhaps, by a prejudiced inquirer, be regarded as agreeing with Caesar's description of the battle-field. But even on this theory, the Romans would have virtually crossed the Saône in presence of the enemy; for Vercingetorix would have been quite near enough to dispute the passage. In any case, then, to quote the Duc d'Aumale, we must admit that, within the space of two days, Caesar crossed three, or even four rivers—the Saône, the Ognon, the Doubs, and the Loue; that he crossed the Saône on the morning of the battle and in the presence of an apathetic enemy; that of all these rivers he only mentioned one; and that within those two days he also fought a battle, and marched at least 60 kilometres, or 36 miles, over a broken and wooded country. Such an admission would be absurd. Therefore Alesia was not Alaise.[1]

One word more. After the fall of Alesia, Caesar went to the country of the Aedui. Either he took his army or a part thereof with him or he went alone. In any case, after the surrender of Vercingetorix, he sent Labienus, with two legions and the cavalry, into the country of the Sequani.[2] Alaise is in the country which belonged to the Sequani. If, then, Alesia was Alaise, and if Caesar took his army with him, he needlessly marched Labienus's large force, as well as his other eight legions, across the Saône, and then sent it back again. If he left Labienus at Alesia, it was at Alesia that Labienus received orders to go to Sequania. But in that case, if Alesia was Alaise, Labienus received orders to go from Sequania into Sequania, which is absurd.

III. If the foregoing arguments are sound, Alesia can only have stood upon the plateau of Mont Auxois. Intrinsically, the reasons for accepting this view, which was adopted at least as early as the ninth century, are (1) that the geographical position of Mont Auxois alone agrees with the indication which Caesar gives of his own whereabouts on the day before he reached Alesia; (2) that its physical features alone agree with Caesar's description of Alesia; (3) that excavation has revealed (*a*) remains of the Gallic town on the site of which the recently discovered Gallo-Roman one was built, (*b*) unmistakable traces of Caesar's lines both of contravallation and of circumvallation, (*c*) numbers of weapons both Roman and Gallic, as well as numerous bones of men and of horses, (*d*) five barbed spikes such as Caesar describes, in his inventory of the siege-works, under the name of

[1] *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, 2e pér., xv, 1858, pp. 90–3.
[2] *B. G.*, vii, 90, §§ 1–4.

stimuli, (*e*) Gallic pottery, and (*f*) 619 coins,—none of which are of a later date than 52 B. C., the year of the siege, and one of which bears the image and superscription of Vercingetorix;[1] (4) that a Gallic inscription, in which occurs the word ALI/SIA has been discovered at Alise-Sainte-Reine;[2] (5) that in the territory which the advocates of Mont Auxois, but not those of any other site, assign to the Mandubii, there has been found an inscription, now preserved at Dijon, containing the name Mandu-bilos,[3] a spelling which is supported by the Μανδιβούλων of Strabo,[4] and (6) that the geographical position of Mont Auxois alone agrees with the description which Caesar gives of his distribution of the legions, after the capture of Alesia, into winter-quarters. To quote M. A. de Barthélemy,[5] 'de toutes les localités où l'on a proposé de placer *Alesia*, Alise-Sainte-Reine est la seule qui présente les caractères les plus certains : le texte de César, la description des travaux de siège, et les découvertes archéologiques et numismatiques s'accordent à faire accepter cette identification.'[6]

The coins are fully described on pages 555–61 of the second volume of Napoleon's *Histoire de Jules César*. One hundred and thirty-two were Roman; four hundred and eighty-seven Gallic. It is significant that the latter include specimens belonging to twenty-four different states,—more than half of those which sent contingents to the relieving army; that no less than one hundred and three of the whole number belonged to the Arverni,—the countrymen of Vercingetorix; and that, like most of the bones, they were discovered in the trenches of the very camp—the camp on Mont Réa—which, assuming the identity of Alesia with Mont Auxois, must have been the scene of the final struggle.[7]

I proceed to deal with objections.[8]

1. The most rational comes from the pen of Captain Gallotti;[9] but

[1] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., i, 1860, p. 271; Napoleon III, *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 555–61; A. Blanchet, *Traité des monn. gaul.*, p. 495, n. 4; *Pro Alesia*, 1906, p. 31; 1907, pp. 122–5, 157–9, 173–5, 207–8, 248–50, 277–81; 1908, pp. 300–3, 379–80; 1909, pp. 505–7, 534–7, 596; Juin, 1910, p. 2 of cover.

[2] *Corpus inscr. Lat.*, xiii, pars i, no. 2880. M. A. T. Vercoutre (*Pro Alesia*, 1907, p. 193) points out that, according to Consentius (*Ars . . . de barbarismis*, &c., ed. H. Keil, 1868, p. 394), the Gauls gave to *i* a sound intermediate between the Latin *e* and *i*. Thus they would have pronounced ALISIIA (=ALISEA) in a way which Caesar would have reproduced as ALESIA.

[3] R. Mowat, *Inscr. de la cité des Lingons*, 1re partie, p. 35, no. 37, quoted by H. d'A. de Jubainville, *Les noms gaulois chez César et Hirtius de Bello Gallico*, 1891, p. 128.

[4] Ed. Müller and Dübner, iv, 2, § 3 and p. 962.

[5] *Rev. des quest. hist.*, iii, 1867, p. 66.

[6] The various antiquities discovered at Mont Auxois by the French Commission are to be seen in the 'salle d'Alesia' of the Musée de St. Germain. See also *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 36–9, and *Journal des Savants*, 1880, pp. 561, 563–4.

[7] See *Rev. des quest. hist.*, iii, 1867, p. 65.

[8] I ignore various perverse and frivolous objections, made by Quicherat, which I refuted in the first edition (pp. 370–2).

[9] *Mém. de la Soc. d'émulation du Doubs*, 4e sér., i, 1866, pp. 361–75, and especially 364–5, 368, 370, and 374.

it is safe to say that he would have withdrawn it if he had known that the choice lay between Mont Auxois and Alaise, and that the objections to Alaise were unanswerable. If Alesia was on Mont Auxois, it is certain that the hill which, Caesar says, extended so far to the north that he had not been able to include it within his circumvallation, was Mont Réa. Now, observes Gallotti, Réa is connected with the plateau of Ménétreux by a col : the circumvallation would naturally have crossed the col ; and in order to give it this extension, Caesar would only have had to increase its length by two kilometres. Let any one look at the map, and he will see that Gallotti's statement is correct. But surely the natural conclusion to be drawn from Caesar's words is that he had not had time, before the arrival of the relieving army, to increase the length of his circumvallation by a fraction which would have been about one-eighth of the whole. Again, Gallotti argues that Vercassivellaunus would not have required 10 hours to march the 4 kilometres which separated his camp from Mont Réa : but he forgets that it was necessary for Vercassivellaunus to make a long *détour*, in order to avoid observation ;[1] for his chance of storming the camp of Caninius would be greatly increased if he could attack it unawares.[2] Nor can I see any force in Gallotti's objection that Caesar would not have called the defences of the camp on Mont Réa *superiores munitiones*.[3] They were higher than the contravallation ; and, as Caesar himself says that the camp was on 'gently sloping ground' (*leniter declivi loco*[4]), we may reasonably infer that it was not high up the hill. If the lines of contravallation and circumvallation which the excavations revealed were not Caesar's, one must admit that a position which corresponds exactly with Caesar's description of Alesia was blockaded in a manner which corresponded exactly with his description of the blockade ; that the blockader defended himself, like Caesar, against a relieving army ; and that of these vast operations no record remains. The chances against such a coincidence are almost infinite.

2. Maissiat denies that Vercingetorix could have got water on Mont Auxois.[5] But, to quote Napoleon,[6] 'Near the western summit of the mountain two abundant springs arise ; and there is another on the eastern side. . . . Besides, manifest traces of a great number of wells are visible on the plateau, so that it is evident the besieged can never have wanted water, besides which they could always descend to the two rivers.' See also *Pro Alesia*, 1907, pp. 124–5 ; 1910, p. 627.

I have now proved the assertion with which I began this note. No sane man who has studied the subject will ever again deny that Alesia stood upon the plateau of Mont Auxois. The question should

[1] See Napoleon, *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 309–10, and *Pro Alesia*, 1909, p. 581.

[2] The distance from the nearest point of the Gallic camp to the rear of Mont Réa, where Vercassivellaunus halted (*B. G.*, vii, 83, § 7) is 5½, not 4 kilometres ; and the time which he spent on his circuitous march—from some period in the first watch to daybreak—may not have been more than 7 hours.

[3] *B. G.*, vii, 85, § 4.

[4] *Ib.*, 83, § 2.

[5] *Jules César en Gaule*, iii, 52–3.

[6] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 300, n. 1.

now be closed. And if any man with an eye for a country, who knows his Caesar and happens to be travelling to or from Dijon, will get out at the station of Les Laumes, walk up to the top of Mont Auxois, and look about him, he will marvel that the question should ever have arisen.[1]

Allobroges.—We learn from Caesar that the Allobroges were separated from the Helvetii by the Rhône; that they possessed certain lands on its right bank; that their territory was conterminous with the territories of the Vocontii, the Segusiavi, and the Nantuates; and that the most northerly town in their country was Geneva.[2] Their other important towns were Vienna (Vienne) and Cularo (Grenoble).[3] It is clear, then, that the greater part of their territory lay between the Rhône, the Isère, and the Lake of Geneva. Roughly speaking, it comprised, as the French Commission remark,[4] the territories of the *civitas Viennensium*, the *civitas Gratianopolitana*, and the *civitas Genavensium*. But in the opinion of the Commission, in order to determine their frontiers, it is not enough to unite the dioceses of Vienne, Grenoble, and Geneva, because 'nous nous trouvons . . . en présence de diverses petites populations réunies à de plus grandes sans que nous puissions bien saisir la loi qui a présidé à ces réunions.' For example, the dioceses of Geneva and Grenoble included the territories of the Nantuates, Veragri, Ceutrones, Medulli, and Tricorii; while it is probable that of the diocese of Lyons certain portions on the left bank of the Rhône belonged to the Allobroges. These statements, however, are not altogether accurate: at all events, I can see no reason for including either the Nantuates (as a whole) or the Veragri in the diocese of Geneva. That diocese extended eastward along the southern bank of the lake to a point about midway between Évian and its eastern extremity, and did not include St. Maurice, which belonged to the Nantuates; while we learn from Caesar that the Veragri possessed territory on the southern bank of the upper Rhône. At all events, the reasons given by the Commission need not prevent us from tracing approximately the frontiers of the Allobroges.

Eastward their territory extended as far as Évian, or a little beyond it.[5] The Nantuates and Veragri, who were their eastern neighbours, certainly possessed the towns of Tauretunum, which was close to the point where the Rhône enters the lake,[6] St. Maurice, and Martigny; and the eastern boundary of the diocese of Geneva may serve to mark, at least approximately, the eastern boundary

[1] M. R. Bouton has just published a history of the controversy in *Mém. de la Soc. d'émulation du Doubs*, 8e sér., iii, 1908 (1909), pp. 43–83.

[2] *B. G.*, i, 6, § 2; 11, § 5; 10, § 5; 6, § 3; iii, 1, § 1; 6, § 5.

[3] Ptolemy, *Geogr.*, ii, 10, § 7; Cicero, *Fam.*, x, 23, § 10.

[4] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 41–2.

[5] Desjardins (*Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 242) thinks that the Dranse or the spurs of the Alps, which abut on Évian and Thonon, would have formed a natural boundary.

[6] See Gregory of Tours, *Hist. Franc.*, iv, 31 (*Patrologiae cursus completus*, ed. Migne, lxxi, 294), Marius of Avenches (*ib.*, lxxii, 799), and Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 234, 242.

of the Allobroges. The Ceutrones, who occupied the Tarentaise, were their neighbours on the south; and the famous inscription of Forclaz, which was discovered in the valley of the Arve, between Chamonix and Sallanches, enables us to trace the frontier of the Ceutrones, as it was in the time of Vespasian. The tracing of the frontier which took place then was probably, as Desjardins says, an official delimitation of that which had existed before. It ran along the valley of the Arly to its confluence with the Isère, and thence along the ridge which separates the Tarentaise from the Maurienne. The last-named valley belonged to the Medulli, who, like the Ceutrones, were conterminous with the Allobroges. So too were the Uceni and the Tricorii, who occupied respectively the valleys of the Romanche and the Drac.[1] Desjardins, who does not believe that rivers generally served as frontiers, makes the southern frontier of the Allobroges leave the Isère on the south, and extend across the two last-named valleys along the foot of the hills; but he believes that it may have followed the line of the Isère from the mountains of St. Nizier to the Rhône.[2] Who can tell? Rivers sometimes did serve as frontiers, for instance between the territories of the Aedui and the Bituriges.[3]

De Valois, remarking that part of the diocese of Vienne was in the Vivarais, argued that the Transrhodane possessions of the Allobroges, which Caesar mentioned, were on the frontier of the Helvii (q.v.), below the confluence of the Saône and the Rhône.[4] But these Transrhodane possessions were ravaged by the Helvetii;[5] and, as d'Anville points out,[6] the Helvetii would not have marched in that direction, as they were bound for the country of the Aedui. Still, it is possible, that, besides the Transrhodane possessions which Caesar mentioned, the Allobroges had others in the tract indicated by de Valois.[7] Debombourg, who finds fault with Napoleon for tracing

[1] I can see no reason for including the territories of the Uceni and Tricorii, as M. Longnon does (*Atlas hist. de la France*, pl. 1), apparently because they were in the diocese of Grenoble, in the territory of the Allobroges. 'Clients' they may have been; but the Tricorii, at all events, were plainly regarded by Livy (xxi, 31, § 9) as an independent people. See my article on the VOCONTII.

[2] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 236.

[3] *B. G.*, vii, 5, § 4. See, however, pp. 351–3, *supra*. Debombourg (*Rev. du Lyonnais*, 3e sér., i, 1866, p. 456) argues that a letter from Plancus to Cicero (*Fam.*, x, 23, § 7) proves that Cularo was on the frontier of the Allobroges, and therefore that the Isère, in a part of its course, was their southern frontier, —namely from Vinay and St. Marcellin on its right bank and St. Gervais and Iseron on its left as far as its confluence with the Rhône. Between these limits the Isère is a natural barrier, difficult to cross. Not so in the upper part of its course: there the Allobroges possessed both banks as far as the foot of the mountains of Belladonne. Debombourg may be right; but Plancus only said that Cularo was *ex finibus Allobrogum*,—in the territory (not on the frontier) of the Allobroges.

[4] *Notitia Galliarum*, p. 608.

[5] *B. G.*, i, 11, § 5.

[6] *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 54.

[7] Debombourg (*Rev. du Lyonnais*, 3e sér., i, 1866, pp. 455–6) infers from Strabo (iv, 3, § 4) that the territory of the Allobroges extended on the west of the Rhône as far as the chain of the Vivarais; and, he adds, Strabo's statement is confirmed by the fact that the diocese of Vienne extended on the right bank of the Rhône as far as Doux, near Tournon. But Strabo only says that the

the common frontier of the Sequani and Allobroges without regard to natural boundaries, gives the Allobroges *trans Rhodanum* the 'archiprêtrés' of Belley, Virieu-le-Grand, and Arbignieu, that is to say, a triangular tract of land of which the apex is near Tenay, and which is bounded by the 'chaînon d'Inimont' and the 'chaînon de Parve'.[1] The French Commission agree with d'Anville in assigning them those parts of the dioceses of Geneva and Belley which are on the right bank of the Rhône, that is to say, a strip of land extending from Bellegarde to Mar, comprising the val Romei, the districts of Châtillon and Michaille, and the Bugey.[2] On this theory, however, the Helvetii, who traversed the country of the Sequani on their march from Geneva to the Saône,[3] would have passed out of their territory into that of the Allobroges almost immediately after they emerged from the Pas de l'Écluse. Desjardins, having regard to Caesar's statement[4] about the complaints which the Transrhodane Allobroges made to him of the devastation of their lands by the Helvetii, and to the fact that Caesar was then in the angle between the Rhône and the Saône, infers that their territory lay further westward, and gives them the cantons of Ambérieux, Ménémieux, and Montluel.[5] See NANTUATES and SEQUANI.

Ambarri.—The name of the Ambarri appears to be preserved in Ambérieu and Ambronay. Their territory formed that part of the *civitas Lugdunensium* which lies between the Rhône and the Saône, excepting the small tract which belonged to the Segusiavi (q.v.). The French Commission[6] remarks that, after defining the territories of the surrounding peoples—the Aedui, the Sequani, the Helvetii, the Allobroges, and the Segusiavi—we find remaining for the Ambarri a district which corresponds roughly with the department of the Ain. The Commission, however, do not admit that the Segusiavi possessed any territory between the Rhône and the Saône. According to d'Anville,[7] the northern boundary of the Ambarri reached its northernmost point near Mâcon. But the Commission, following the traces of the ancient dioceses, extend it to the river Seille, and trace its other boundaries along the Saône, the Rhône, and the mountains of Bugey. They admit, however, that the northern frontier, as traced in their map, is quite conjectural, and that d'Anville may be right. For my part, I cannot see why they do not firmly adhere to the principle by which they are usually guided. I believe therefore that, besides the central and western parts of the Ain, the Ambarri possessed the south-eastern part of the Saône-et-Loire. Desjardins,[8]

peoples beyond the Rhône and the Saône and between the Loire and the Seine are adjacent to (παρακεῖται) the Allobroges; and, as he includes the Carnutes among these peoples, it is plain that he used the word παρακεῖται loosely. The argument based on the western extension of the diocese is, however, reasonable enough.

[1] *Rev. du Lyonnais*, 3e sér., iv, 1867, pp. 10–2.
[2] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 43.
[3] *B. G.*, i, 9; 10, § 1; 11, § 1.
[4] *Ib.*, 10, § 5.
[5] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 605.
[6] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 48.
[7] *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, map facing p. 1.
[8] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 605.

who restricts their territory by extending that of the Segusiavi on the eastern bank of the Saône as far north as Mâcon, is, I believe, so far wrong. M. d'Arbois de Jubainville [1] appears to think that the Ambarri, originally at all events, possessed territory on both banks of the Saône; for he derives their name from *Ambi-arari*,—'ceux qui habitent sur les deux rives de l'Arar' (Saône). Debombourg [2] assigns to the Ambarri the 'archiprêtré' of Anse on the western bank of the Saône, which is usually assigned to the Segusiavi, and the 'archiprêtré' of Morestel on the southern bank of the Rhône, which is usually assigned to the Allobroges (q.v.). 'To sceptics,' he says, 'I should reply by pointing to Ambérieux in Anse and Amblagnieu on the southern bank of the Rhône.' But whatever may be the etymology of Ambérieux, it is evident from Caesar's narrative,[3] read in conjunction with Ptolemy,[4] that Anse, which is nearly opposite Trévoux, belonged, at least in his time, to the Segusiavi; and the very faint resemblance between the names 'Amblagnieu' and 'Ambarri' will hardly prevail against the evidence which goes to prove that the country between the Rhône and the Isère belonged to the Allobroges.

The parts of the frontier of the Ambarri which can be defined with least certainty are those which separated them from the Segusiavi and from the Transrhodane Allobroges.

Ambiani.—The Ambiani occupied the diocese of Amiens, which nearly corresponds with the department of the Somme.[5] See Bellovaci.

Ambibarii.—The Ambibarii, who are mentioned only by Caesar,[6] appear in his list of the Aremorican or maritime states. The French Commission [7] place them in the diocese of Avranches, which subsequently belonged, wholly or in part, to the Abrincatui,[8] because, they argue, after the territories of the other Aremorican states have been fixed, this diocese alone remains unoccupied. Desjardins, who agrees with the Commission, adds that the Abrincatui are not mentioned by Caesar, while the Ambibarii are not mentioned by Ptolemy or Pliny. But this is hardly a sufficient reason for assuming that the Ambibarii were identical with the Abrincatui; and the Commission regard them as distinct though conterminous peoples. Moreover, it is impossible, as I show elsewhere (see Diablintes), to determine the frontiers of all the Aremorican states. The Ambibarii, in the opinion of the Commission,[9] may have also possessed a part of the diocese of Coutances, as the southern frontier of the Venelli (q.v.) is very uncertain.

Desjardins,[10] comparing Caesar's two lists of maritime states, notes

[1] *Les noms gaulois chez César et Hirtius de Bello Gallico*, 1891, p. 38.
[2] *Rev. du Lyonnais*, 3e sér, i, 1866, pp. 183–97 (esp. 189–90).
[3] *B. G.*, i, 10–2. [4] *Geogr.*, ii, 8, § 11. [5] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 49.
[6] *B. G.*, vii, 75, § 4. There are various readings: but *Ambibarii* has the most support. [7] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 49.
[8] Ptolemy, *Geogr.*, ed. C. Müller, ii, 8, § 8, pp. 214–5.
[9] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., ix, 1864, pp. 406–7.
[10] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 487–91.

that the Ambibarii, whom he wrongly calls Ambivariti,[1] are mentioned only in the latter, the Aulerci only in the former.[2] As none of the known Aulercan tribes were maritime, he infers that the Ambibarii belonged to the Aulercan group.

Ambiliati.—The Ambiliati are named once only in the *Commentaries*,[3] among the tribes whom the Veneti engaged to join them in their war against Caesar. The β MSS. read *Ambianos*. Orosius, mentioning in one and the same place[4] all the other tribes that are enumerated in this passage by Caesar, wrote *Ambivaritos*. The French Commission, considering the unsupported testimony of Orosius insufficient, and having regard to the fact that, except in certain MSS. of one solitary passage of Caesar, the name *Ambiliati* does not occur, prefer the reading *Ambianos*.[5] They consider it probable that the Ambiani joined the Venetian alliance, as their near neighbours, the Morini, did so; and they call attention to the fact that those very neighbours are mentioned by Caesar, in *B. G.*, ii, 4, § 9, immediately after the Ambiani. Thomann[6] reads *Ambivaritos*, but in addition to, not instead of *Ambiliatos*. He says that the Ambiliati were evidently the same as the Ambilatri of Pliny;[7] and, he continues, as Pliny observes geographical order in his enumeration of the Gallic peoples, the Ambiliati were on the left bank of the lower Loire. But Pliny often departs from geographical order; for instance, he mentions the Veneti immediately after the Caleti, the Abrincatui immediately after the Veneti, and the Osismi immediately after the Abrincatui.[8] Walckenaer,[9] who accepts the reading *Ambiliatos*, places them in the environs of Lamballe, in the diocese of St. Brieuc, because, he says, there is no other place for them. But, say the French Commission, 'ils seraient là en plein pays curiosolite.' Nor is it certain that 'there is no other place for them'; for we cannot determine the frontiers of all the Aremorican peoples. M. Jullian[10] thinks that *Ambiliati* may mean 'those who dwelt on both banks of the Ille', in the department of the Ille-et-Vilaine. Dittenberger[11] suggests that Caesar may have written *Ambibarios* (q.v.).

I follow the α MSS. in accepting the reading *Ambiliatos*; but the problem of their whereabouts is insoluble.

Ambivareti.—*Ambibareti* is the form found in the MSS. of the name of a people mentioned in *B. G.*, vii, 90, § 6, in whose country Caesar quartered a legion after the fall of Alesia. Schneider[12] identifies this people with the *Ambluareti*—to adopt the reading of the α MSS.—who are mentioned in *B. G.*, vii, 75, § 2, among the clients of the Aedui. All the well-known editors, except Meusel, likewise hold that in both passages Caesar is speaking of the

[1] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, p. 490.
[2] *B. G.*, ii, 34; vii, 75.
[3] *Ib.*, iii, 9, § 10.
[4] vi, 8, § 8.
[5] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 50.
[6] *Der franz. Atlas zu Cäsars gall. Kriege*, 1871, p. 17. Desjardins (*Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 487–8) also gives the Ambiliati, whom he wrongly identifies with the Ambibarii of *B. G.*, vii, 75, § 4, the misnomer, *Ambivariti*.
[7] *Nat. Hist.*, iv, 19 (33), § 108.
[8] *Ib.*, iv, 18 (32), § 107.
[9] *Géogr. des Gaules*, i, 382.
[10] *Hist. de la Gaule*, ii, 490, n. 1.
[11] *Caesar*, 15th ed., p. 315.
[12] *Caesar*, ii, 641.

same people; but most of them adopt, with Glück,[1] *Ambivareti*, —the reading of *β*. Nipperdey,[2] however, thinks it probable that *Ambluareti* and *Ambibareti* (or, according to the reading which he follows, *Ambilareti*) are corrupt forms of *Ambarri*, as the Ambarri were intimately connected with the Aedui, and are not mentioned in *B. G.*, vii, 75. If, however, the Ambluareti (so-called) were identical with the Ambarri, the Ambarri must have been clients of the Aedui; and we are not told that they were. The French Commission[3] 'also identify the Ambluareti with the Ambarri, but think it doubtful whether the Ambivareti were the Ambarri or the Ambibarii (q.v.). Long, who also includes the Ambivareti among the clients of the Aedui, places them east of the Loire and west of Bibracte. He remarks that in the winter of 52–51 B. C. Caesar left Bibracte, joined the legion which was quartered among the Bituriges, and joined to it the 11th legion, which was nearest. This legion, says Long, could not have been either of those which were quartered in the valley of the Saône, for they were the 8th and 14th: it could not have been the legion at Bibracte, for Caesar left Bibracte with only a cavalry escort: it must, therefore, have been the legion which was quartered in the country of the Ambivareti. That legion must have been on the west of Bibracte: it must, being quartered among clients of the Aedui, have been near their country; and therefore it was probably on the east of the Loire.[4]

Napoleon, perhaps following Dr. Noelas,[5] places the Ambivareti, or, as he calls them, the Ambluareti, on the west of the Loire, in the neighbourhood of Ambierle, where a Roman camp has been discovered, in the arrondissement of Roanne. Maissiat[6] suggests that they may have possessed a subdivision of the territory of the Ambarri, and that their name may survive in Vavre, Vavrette, and Varambon, —places in the neighbourhood of the confluence of the Ain and the Suran. But the truth is that, unless we identify them with the Ambarri, which we have no right to do, it is useless to look for their territory.

Ambivariti.—The geographical position of the Ambivariti cannot be determined. No ancient writer mentions them except Caesar.[7] He says that, when the envoys of the Usipetes and Tencteri first met him, their cavalry were in the country of the Ambivariti, on the further bank of the Meuse; and the common opinion is that the further

[1] See p. 840.

[2] *Caesar*, p. 106. Mommsen (*Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xx, 1894, p. 211) also changes *Ambivaretis*—the *Ambluaretis* of the MSS.—into *Ambarris*, partly for the reason given by Nipperdey, partly because the Ambivareti, who, he says, dwelt near the Menapii [!], could not have been clients of the Aedui, This curious argument is evidently due to a lapse of memory: not the Ambivareti but the Ambivariti dwelt near the Menapii.

[3] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 50.

[4] Long's *Caesar*, pp. 407–8.

[5] *Rev. du Lyonnais*, 3e sér., iii, 1867, pp. 261–79. Noelas's paper was not published till after the appearance of the *Hist. de Jules César*; but he may have communicated his views to the Emperor before.

[6] *Jules César en Gaule*, i, 81.

[7] *B. G.*, iv, 9, § 3.

bank means the left or western bank. This opinion is based upon the facts that the Usipetes and Tencteri had, before Caesar marched against them, reached the territories of the Eburones and Condrusi,[1] and that the greater part of the territory of the Eburones [2] and the whole of the territory of the Condrusi (q.v.) were on the right bank of the Meuse. Various writers place the Ambivariti in the environs of Antwerp (Anvers); others more to the south, near Givet, in a district where there is a place called Amberive.[3] Napoleon asserts, without giving any reasons, that they were 'established on the left bank of the Meuse, west of Roermond, and south of the marshes of Peel'.[4] General von Veith [5] finds them in the country round Weert, about 12 miles west-north-west of Roermond. Desjardins, who supposes that the name *Ambivariti* had a purely local significance, suggests that it denoted the Eburones (!) 'situés des deux côtés de la Meuse, comme *Ambitrebius* signifie le pays situé des deux côtés de la Trébie.' [6] But if so, why *Ambivariti?* M. Jullian [7] conjectures that they dwelt on both banks of a river called **Ivara* either in Dutch Brabant or in the low lands of the Dutch province of Limburg.[8]

The French Commission endeavour to prove that the common view is erroneous, and that the Ambivariti were between the Meuse and the Rhine.[9] They argue that if the Roman army had been on the right bank of the Meuse, Caesar would have been able to prevent the cavalry of the Usipetes and Tencteri from taking refuge in the country of the Sugambri.[10] This argument will not bear examination. The rout of the Usipetes and Tencteri took place either near the confluence of the Meuse and the Waal, which was at Gorkum or Fort St. Andries, or near the confluence of the Rhine and the Moselle.[11] In either case there is nothing to show that the Ambivariti, if their territory was anywhere near the left bank of the Meuse, were not as near as Caesar to the Sugambri. If so, how was he to prevent the German cavalry from reaching Sugambrian territory? Even if he had had the shorter distance to march, he might have failed to intercept them; for, as his cavalry were no match for the Germans,[12] he would have been obliged to march against them with his infantry; and the light German horse would probably have been too quick for him. It is even probable that, when the rout of the Usipetes and Tencteri took place, the German cavalry had quitted the country of the Ambivariti, and were actually on their way to rejoin their countrymen. Besides, as I have already remarked, Caesar says that when he began to march against the Usipetes and Tencteri, they had reached the territory of the Condrusi, which was on the right bank

[1] *B. G.*, iv, 6, § 4.
[2] *Ib.*, v, 24, § 4.
[3] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 51.
[4] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 140, n. 1.
[5] *Jahresb. d. Geschichtswissenschaft*, iii, 1880, ii, 2.
[6] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 651, n. 2.
[7] *Hist. de la Gaule*, ii, 475, note.
[8] The latter alternative corresponds with Napoleon's view.
[9] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 51–2. So also Walckenaer (*Géogr. des Gaules*, i, 508), who places them on the south of Liège, in the plain watered by the Amblève.
[10] *B. G.*, iv, 16, § 2.
[11] See pp. 691–706.
[12] *B. G.*, iv, 12.

of the Meuse. Therefore the territory of theAmbivariti, which, from the standpoint of the Usipetes and Tencteri was *trans Mosam*, must have been on the left bank. General Creuly[1] assumes that when Caesar said that the Usipetes and Tencteri had advanced as far as the country of the Condrusi, he was speaking of a reconnoitring party only ; but, in order to support the theory that the Ambivariti dwelt between the Meuse and the Rhine, he is obliged to make the further assumption that the main body remained throughout the campaign on the western side of the Meuse. He believes that they had originally crossed the western arm of the Rhine below the (alleged) confluence of the Waal and the Meuse at Gorkum ; for otherwise, he argues, when the Germans marched towards the country of the Treveri, their course would have been parallel with the Rhine, and the words *uti ab Rheno discederent*[2] in Caesar's account would be meaningless. But Caesar says that they marched towards the country of the Condrusi, not that of the Treveri ; and the map shows that, marching between the Meuse and the Rhine towards the country of the Condrusi, they would have moved away from the Rhine.[3]

The conclusion of the matter is this. The Ambivariti dwelt somewhere on the left bank of the Meuse ; and, as they are not mentioned by any ancient writer, except Caesar, and do not appear in the *Notitia provinciarum*, it is probable that they were dependants of some more powerful people. But there is not the faintest evidence for fixing their geographical position ; and to mark them on the map would be simply to mislead.

Andes.—The Andes occupied the whole of the diocese of Angers, excepting the canton of Mauges, that is to say, the department of the Maine-et-Loire and part of the Sarthe.[4]

Aremoricae (civitates).—Walckenaer[5] and Desjardins[6] understand by 'Aremorican' simply 'maritime'; while D'Anville[7] observes that Caesar appears to apply the term specially to the peoples between the Seine and the Loire. The only passage in which Caesar mentions by name any of the Aremorican peoples, as such, occurs in *B. G.*, vii, 75, § 4, in the enumeration of the states which sent contingents for the relief of Alesia. In this passage he says that 30,000[8] men were levied *universis civitatibus quae Oceanum attingunt quaeque eorum consuetudine Aremoricae appellantur, quo sunt in numero Coriosolites, Redones, Ambibarii, Caletes, Osismi, Veneti, Lexovii, Venelli.*[9] All these peoples dwelt between the Seine and the Loire, except the

[1] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., viii, 1863, pp. 26–8. [2] *B. G.*, iv, 6, § 3.

[3] The theory of General Creuly and of the French Commission, on which their location of the Ambivariti depends, that the Usipetes and Tencteri crossed the Meuse (regarded as the western arm of the Rhine) below Gorkum, is refuted on pp. 689–90. See also Heller in *Philologus*, xxii, 1865, p. 132.

[4] D'Anville, *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, pp. 67–8 ; Walckenaer, i, 376.

[5] *Géogr. des Gaules*, i, 437.

[6] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 437, 461, 489.

[7] *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 103.

[8] Schneider (*Caesar*, ii, 587) argues that the MS. reading is wrong, and that Caesar probably wrote *X* (milia). See, however, *Rhein. Mus.*, N. F., liv, 1899, p. 421. [9] Cf. *B. G.*, ii, 34.

Caletes, who were on the right bank of the estuary of the Seine; and as the Morini, the Atrebates, and the Ambiani, maritime peoples who dwelt on the east of the Seine, and the Pictones and the Santoni, maritime peoples who dwelt on the south of the Loire, are mentioned in the enumeration, it is clear that Caesar did not reckon them as Aremorican.

According to Pliny,[1] the country between the Garonne and the Pyrenees was called by the name 'Aremorica', before it was called 'Aquitania'. But Pliny could hardly have had any authority for this statement; and, as he does not apply the term 'Aremorican' to the tribes which Caesar called by that name, Long concludes that he simply made a mistake.[2]

Arverni.—The territory of the Arverni, exclusive of the territories of their clients, is represented by the diocese of Clermont and part of that of St. Flour, which was severed from the parent diocese in the fourteenth century. This territory comprises the departments of the Cantal and Puy-de-Dôme and parts of those of the Allier and Loire-Supérieure. The Gabali, one of the client peoples of the Arverni, occupied the remaining part of the diocese of St. Flour.[3]

Atrebates.—The Atrebates occupied the diocese of Arras, that is to say the south-eastern part of the department of the Pas-de-Calais and the adjacent part of the department of the Nord.[4]

Atuatuca (and the winter camps of 54–53 B.C.).—'The researches,' says Napoleon, 'which Major Cohausen kindly made for me, and those of MM. Stoffel and Locqueyssie have enabled me to determine approximately the winter-quarters.'[5] But Napoleon vouchsafes not a word to tell us what these researches were, or where or how they were carried on; and, as neither Caesar nor any other ancient writer gives us the least help towards determining any of the sites, except those of Atuatuca and the camps of Cicero, Labienus, and Trebonius, and only the least possible help towards determining the first two, no researches could, except in regard to these four places, be of any use.

I. The first question is how to interpret the famous passage,—*harum tamen omnium legionum hiberna, praeter eam quam L. Roscio in pacatissimam et quietissimam partem ducendam dederat, milibus passuum C continebantur.*[6] This apparently means that no two camps were more than 100 Roman miles apart; and, as the camp at Atuatuca, wherever Atuatuca may have been, was confessedly much more than 100 miles from Samarobriva (Amiens), where the camp of Trebonius was placed,[7] it follows that either there is an error in the

[1] *Nat. Hist.*, iv, 17 (31), § 105.

[2] W. Smith's *Dict. of Greek and Roman Geogr.*, i, 218. Cf. C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, ii, 455, n. 3, and *Annales de la Faculté des lettres de Bordeaux*, 1893, p. 99.

[3] See d'Anville, pp. 104–5; Walckenaer, i, 340; and *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 83.

[4] Walckenaer, i, 433; *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 89.

[5] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 200, n. 1.

[6] *B. G.*, v, 24, § 7.

[7] Schneider (*Caesar*, ii, 156–8) holds that Caesar, after he had dispatched messengers to order Crassus, Fabius, and Labienus to join him in marching to

text or Caesar made a mistake. Schneider,[1] Long,[2] and Desjardins[3] interpret the Latin as I have done; and Long observes that 'Caesar could not know the distance accurately, and we can never trust the numerals in the manuscripts'.[4] But it is hard to believe that Caesar could have made so gross a mistake; and therefore it seems just possible that he wrote *CC*, and that a *C* has dropped out. Still, it is unlikely that he would have told us that the greatest distance between any two camps was 200 miles, since he evidently means that the camps were not so very far apart, after all. Napoleon,[5] apparently determined to make the MS. reading square with the facts, says 'these different winter-quarters were all included within a circle of 100 miles' radius'. But this meaning cannot be got out of the Latin. Von Göler[6] remarks that the camps formed two groups, an eastern group and a western group, which is, in a sense, true; and he holds that between the most easterly camp of the western group and the most westerly camp of the eastern group there was an interval of 100 miles. But of all this Caesar says nothing. M. Jullian[7] thinks that the passage means that no camp was more than 100 miles from the one nearest to it,—an interpretation which seems to me unwarrantable. Moreover, it is evident that according to Caesar's informants, no camp was much more than 50 miles from the one

relieve Cicero, moved himself from Samarobriva to the camp of Trebonius; returned thence to Samarobriva with Trebonius's legion; and, leaving it there under the command of Crassus, marched with Crassus's legion to the rescue of Cicero. Schneider completely misunderstands Caesar's narrative (*B. G.*, v, 46–7), the meaning of which a clear-headed child could hardly fail to grasp. Caesar says that when he received Cicero's request for help, in the afternoon, he sent a messenger to order Crassus to come to join him; that he sent a messenger to order Fabius to lead his legion into the country of the Atrebates, through which he would himself have to march to Cicero's camp; and that he wrote to order Labienus to march, if he could safely do so, into the country of the Nervii. The rest of the army, that is to say, the legions of Plancus and Roscius, were, he says, too far off to be able to help him. Next morning he was informed that Crassus was approaching. Thereupon he placed Crassus in command of Samarobriva; assigned him a legion for its defence, because he was leaving there the heavy baggage of the army, his hostages and state-papers, and the winter's supply of corn; marched himself with one legion to join Fabius; and advanced 20 Roman miles on the same day. The only reasonable conclusion is that the camp of Trebonius was at or in the immediate neighbourhood of Samarobriva, and that, as soon as Caesar knew that Crassus had approached sufficiently near Samarobriva to secure it, he left the place with Trebonius's legion. For (1) if Schneider was right, Samarobriva, the importance of which was so great that Caesar was obliged to detail an entire legion for its protection even when he required all the troops that he could get for the relief of Cicero, was absolutely defenceless before Caesar received Cicero's dispatch; and (2) if Trebonius had been, as Schneider maintains, 20 miles from Samarobriva, Caesar would not have made a useless journey from Samarobriva to Trebonius's camp and back, but would have summoned Trebonius to join him; nor (3) would he have said that all the legions, except those of Crassus, Fabius, and Labienus, were too far off to be able to help him. He only said this because Trebonius's legion was with him at Samarobriva.

[1] *Caesar*, ii, 97.
[2] *Caesar*, p. 243.
[3] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 658, n. 1.
[4] *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv, 216.
[5] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 202.
[6] *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, pp. 168–71.
[7] *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 371, n. 8.

nearest to it.[1] However, the difficulty presented by the MSS. is unimportant; for, whatever Caesar wrote, it is beyond question that Atuatuca was much more than 100 Roman miles from Amiens.

II. Let us see first of all what Caesar has to say about Atuatuca. (1) He says that the camp of Sabinus and Cotta, which, as we learn from *B. G.*, vi, 32, §§ 3–4, was at Atuatuca, was situated in the country of the Eburones, 'the greater part of whose territory is between the Meuse and the Rhine' (*quorum pars maxima est inter Mosam ac Rhenum*);[2] (2) he says (according to the usual interpretation of the Latin) that Atuatuca was 'nearly in the centre of the country of the Eburones' (*fere in mediis Eburonum finibus*);[3] (3) he remarks that its position was naturally strong, and gives particulars, for which I may refer to pages 107, 110, and 126–7, of my own narrative, regarding the country in its immediate vicinity; (4) he apparently implies that, when Sabinus quitted it, he marched in the direction of Cicero's camp, which was in the country of the Nervii; for he makes Ambiorix say that the camp of Cicero was nearer to Atuatuca than the camp of Labienus;[4] and he makes Sabinus say that the best plan would be to march to the nearer camp.[5] Furthermore, as it is not likely that Ambiorix knew which of the two camps Sabinus intended to join, we may perhaps infer with General Creuly that in either case the first part of his route would have led through the valley which Ambiorix occupied.[6]

1. D'Anville, Walckenaer, Mommsen, Long, Napoleon, the French Commission, Desjardins, Kiepert, and most of the modern editors identify Atuatuca with Tongres, in the valley of the Geer, which flows into the Meuse on its left or western bank. Desjardins affirms that the identification is proved by the itineraries. The Atuaca of the *Table*[7]—the Ἀτουάτουκον of Ptolemy[8]—was indisputably upon the site of Tongres, and was the chief town of the Tungri. The Tungri are mentioned for the first time by Pliny,[9] and afterwards by Tacitus;[10] and it is inferred that they succeeded to the territory of the Eburones, who appear to have been virtually exterminated, as a people, by Caesar. General Creuly remarks that it is unlikely that in the country of the Eburones there were two places of the same name;

[1] *B. G.*, v, 27, § 9.
[2] *Ib.*, v, 24, § 4. See Schneider's *Caesar*, ii, 96, note.
[3] *B. G.*, vi, 32, § 4.
[4] *Ib.*, v, 27, § 9.
[5] *Ib.*, 29, § 6; 30, § 3. M. A. de Vlaminck, on the contrary (*Messager des sciences hist. de Belgique*, 1887, p. 396), argues that Sabinus must have marched in the direction of Labienus's camp, because 'pas un seul des légionnaires échappés au massacre n'arriva jusqu'à Cicéron'. I do not think that this argument will prevail against the one which I have drawn from Caesar's narrative; nor do I think that it is intrinsically strong. The few legionaries who escaped the massacre may have found that retreat in the direction of Cicero's camp would be cut off by the army of Ambiorix; and, as they were not an organized body, if Atuatuca was between the Meuse and the Rhine, they may have shrunk from the prospect of having to cross the Meuse.
[6] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., viii, 1863, pp. 143–4.
[7] *La Table de Peutinger*, ed. Desjardins, p. 12, col. 1.
[8] *Geogr.*, ii, 9, § 5.
[9] *Nat. Hist.*, iv, 17 (31), § 106.
[10] *Hist.*, iv, 55, 79, &c.

and accordingly he concludes that the Atuaca of the *Table* was identical with the Atuatuca of Caesar.[1] But the general forgets that he has himself argued in another place that there were probably several towns called Uxellodunum in the country of the Cadurci.[2]

T. Fuss[3] remarks that Atuatuca must have been, like Tongres, in a plain and on a low-lying site, since the cavalry of the Sugambri rode up at a rapid pace from the neighbouring woods to attack the decuman gate of the camp.[4] This fact may prove that the decuman gate was very little, if at all higher than the level of the woods: but it does not prove that the camp did not stand on ground which shelved down in other directions; and, if it did, it would not prove that Atuatuca stood upon the site of Tongres:—it would merely remove one of the many objections which have been urged against that site.

First, when Caesar, after mentioning that the camp of Sabinus and Cotta was in the country of the Eburones, says, in the same breath, that the greater part of that country lay between the Meuse and the Rhine, one is naturally inclined to infer that the camp was somewhere between those two rivers. Otherwise, Caesar's remark would be pointless and out of place. But Tongres is on the left bank of the Meuse. And the inference from Caesar's statement is no less obvious even if he meant, as has been argued, not that the greater part of the territory was situated, but only that the greater part of the population dwelt between the two rivers. Fuss struggles to get over this difficulty by suggesting that Caesar, not having previously mentioned the whereabouts of the Eburones, took this opportunity of doing so. If, he pleads, Caesar had intended to indicate the site of the camp of Sabinus and Cotta, he would have done so with more precision.[5] But what if Caesar did 'take this opportunity' of mentioning the whereabouts of the Eburones? The point is that, in the same breath in which he mentioned that the greater part of the territory of the Eburones was between the Meuse and the Rhine, he said that the camp of Sabinus was in their territory. And, as Fuss ought to have known, Caesar does not, except very rarely, describe sites with precision. In a later passage he does 'intend to indicate the site of the camp of Sabinus', and says vaguely that it was *fere in mediis Eburonum finibus*.

Secondly, it has been objected that it is useless to try to reconcile the actual position of Tongres with Caesar's statement that Atuatuca was *fere in mediis Eburonum finibus*, if that statement means 'nearly in the centre of the country of the Eburones.' Attempts have, however, been made to explain away the difficulty. 'Tongres est situé,' says Napoleon,[6] '*in mediis finibus Eburonum*, ce qui signifie en plein

[1] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., viii, 1863, p. 138.
[2] *Examen hist. et topogr. des lieux proposés pour représenter Uxellodunum*, 1860, pp. 15–6, 27.
[3] *Bull. de la Soc. sc. et litt. du Limbourg*, ii, 1854, p. 175.
[4] *B. G.*, vi, 37, § 1.
[5] *Bull. de la Soc. sc. et litt. du Limbourg*, ii, 1854, p. 169.
[6] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 201.

pays des Éburons et non au centre du pays.' I cannot see how this meaning is to be got out of the Latin : if Caesar had meant what Napoleon says, he would simply have written *in finibus Eburonum* ; for the word *fere* would have had no point. Mr. C. E. Moberly [1] offers a curious explanation. 'A military man,' he says, 'would take his idea of a central position more from the roads than from the general country which he occupies. Thus Tongres would be a *medius locus*, as lying on the great arterial road of the Meuse, by which alone the baggage of the army could be transported.' It is not proved that there was no other road through the territory of the Eburones by which baggage could be transported ; but let us assume the truth of Mr. Moberly's assertion. On his theory, if an invading army, having effected a landing at Brighton, were to march direct on London, Redhill would be *in mediis Anglorum finibus*. On his theory, too, the word *fere* in Caesar's statement would be superfluous. Lastly it has been argued that the country of the Eburones extended westward as far as the Scheldt, and therefore that Tongres *is* in the centre of that country. 'D'après le récit même des Commentaires,' says a member of the French Commission,[2] 'les Éburons s'étendaient à gauche jusqu'à l'Escaut.' The passage on which the argument is based is in *B. G.*, vi, 33, § 3. Describing the measures which he took in 53 B. C., after returning from Germany, to apprehend Ambiorix, Caesar says that he determined to march in the direction of the Scheldt and the most distant parts of the Ardennes, whither he heard that Ambiorix had gone (*ipse cum reliquis III* [legionibus] *ad flumen Scaldim, quod influit in Mosam, extremasque Arduennae partes ire constituit, quo . . . profectum Ambiorigem audiebat*). This passage proves nothing as to the extent of the Eburonian country, for Caesar does not say that Ambiorix was in that country : he may, for aught we know, have escaped beyond his own frontier, as Caesar expressly says that many of his subjects did.[3] General Creuly [4] says that 210 kilometres, or 130 miles, the distance from Tongres to the nearest point of the Scheldt and back, is just what Caesar would have accomplished in seven ordinary marches. But, to say nothing of the fact that 30 kilometres is considered by most authorities too much for an ordinary march,[5] Caesar does not say that he went all the way to the Scheldt ; and when he told Cicero that he would return from his expedition in seven days, he may not have known how far off the Scheldt was. Moreover, even if he did march as far as the Scheldt, even if the Scheldt bounded the territory of the Eburones, Tongres was not in the centre of that territory ; for it was certainly close to their southern boundary.

One can conceive, however, that Caesar may have meant to convey a meaning different from that which has commonly been ascribed to his words. It has been suggested that *finibus* should be

[1] In his edition of the *B. G.*, 1880, p. 301.

[2] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 11.

[3] Multi ex suis finibus egressi, se suaque omnia alienissimis crediderunt. *B. G.*, vi, 31, § 4.

[4] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., vii, 1863, p. 386.

[5] See p. 635.

translated by 'frontier'. There are at least three passages[1] in the *Gallic War* where *fines* obviously means 'frontier'; and one of them certainly suggests that Atuatuca was on or very near the southern frontier of the Eburones. In the passage to which I refer[2] Caesar says that Ambiorix and Catuvolcus met Sabinus and Cotta near the frontier of their kingdom, and brought their quota of corn to the Roman camp:—*initium repentini tumultus ac defectionis ortum est ab Ambiorige et Catuvolco; qui, cum ad fines regni sui Sabino Cottaeque praesto fuissent frumentumque in hiberna comportavissent*, &c. But I do not believe that *fines*, in Caesar, ever means frontier, except where that meaning is unmistakably indicated by the context; and if 'frontier' is the meaning here, it would seem that the words *hoc fere est in mediis Eburonum finibus* are meaningless; for a frontier, considered as a whole, has no centre. Pondering over this, it occurred to me some time ago that Caesar may have written *meridianis*, not *mediis*; and von Göler[3] makes the same suggestion. But Meusel in a MS. note urges that Caesar would have written *meridiano* (fine), not *meridianis* (finibus); and the longer I study the *Commentaries* the more convinced I become that in nine cases out of ten the passages which it is sought to amend require no emendation. Caesar tells us that Ambiorix was king of one half of the country of the Eburones, and Catuvolcus of the other.[4] I am inclined to believe that what he meant (though he expressed his meaning rather loosely) was, not that Atuatuca was nearly in the centre of the whole Eburonian territory, but that it was nearly in the middle of that territory, in the sense that it was near the common frontier of the two kingdoms of which the whole territory was composed. Still, I find it difficult to suppose that he would have used the words *in mediis Eburonum finibus* to indicate a site which lay 15 kilometres west of the Meuse and yet belonged to a people 'the greater part of whose territory is between the Meuse and the Rhine'.

There are several other passages in Caesar which point to the conclusion that Atuatuca was between the Meuse and the Rhine. He tells us that Ambiorix, in his colloquy with Gaius Arpineius and Quintus Junius, stated that a body of Germans, who were coming to the assistance of the Gallic insurgents, had crossed the Rhine, and would be at Atuatuca in a couple of days.[5] Sabinus, in the council of war which was called to discuss the statements of Ambiorix, remarked that the Rhine was close by (*subesse Rhenum*),[6] a phrase which he would hardly have used if the Meuse had intervened between the Rhine and Atuatuca. When the Sugambri invaded the country of the Eburones, we are told that they crossed the Rhine;[7] but we are not told that, in order to reach Atuatuca, they crossed the Meuse. When they left Atuatuca, we are told that they retreated across the Rhine (*trans Rhenum se receperunt*);[8] and this phrase would certainly

[1] *B. G.*, v, 26, § 2; 54, § 2; vi, 44, § 3.
[2] *Ib.*, v, 26, § 2.
[3] *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 175.
[4] *B. G.*, v, 24, § 4; vi, 31, § 5.
[5] *Ib.*, v, 27, § 8.
[6] *Ib.*, 29, § 3.
[7] *Ib.*, vi, 35, § 6.
[8] *Ib.*, 41, § 1.

be misleading if they had first had to cross so important a river as the Meuse.

Heller, who believes, as I do, that Sabinus took the road leading to Cicero's camp, says that he would not have attempted to cross the Meuse, as he must have intended to do, if Atuatuca was on the right bank, in order to reach his destination.[1] It is amusing to find that Heller himself points out that the Sugambri, in order to reach Tongres, which he identifies with Atuatuca, could easily have crossed the Meuse at Lixhe or Maestricht.[2] If the Sugambri, why not Sabinus and his cohorts ? And why should Sabinus have hesitated to cross the Meuse when he did not fear opposition ? Besides, on Heller's theory, the handful of fugitives who escaped to Labienus's camp must have crossed the Meuse.

I do not forget that M. Jullian[3] has affirmed the identity of Atuatuca with Tongres ; and I rarely differ from him without searchings of heart. But M. Jullian is also convinced that Labienus's camp was at Mouzon, some 10 miles south-east of Sedan. Now Mouzon is about 85 English, or 93 Roman, miles *in a straight line* from Tongres ; and Caesar says that Labienus's camp was rather more than 50 miles from Atuatuca.[4] It can hardly be supposed that the number *L* is due to a copyist's mistake ; for Caesar also puts into Sabinus's mouth the statement that the brigade quartered at Atuatuca would be able to reach the camp of Cicero or of Labienus in a couple of days.[5] He could not have reached Mouzon in less than four.

So much for the geographical position of Tongres : let us consider its topography. Napoleon, after the publication of his *History*, sent Major de Locqueyssie to study the environs of Tongres ; and this officer decided against identifying it with Atuatuca.[6] Having explored the position myself, I fail to see how it can be satisfactorily reconciled with Caesar's description. Several years ago I showed that the only part of the adjoining valley which could be identified with the *magna convallis* was close to Koninxheim ; and M. Jullian[7] has adopted this view. He holds that the combat took place between Koninxheim and Russon ; and he adds that excavations carried out in Tongres and its environs by M. F. Huybrigts add fresh proofs to those furnished by the texts and by study of the ground, for hundreds of Roman coins earlier than 54 B.C. have been found during the last twenty years between Koninxheim and Lowaige.[8] But I should like to know how many later Roman coins have been found in the same valley ; and I would suggest that since coins

[1] *Philologus*, xxii, 1865, pp. 139–40.
[2] *Ib.*, p. 140.
[3] *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 376, n. 6.
[4] *B. G.*, v, 27, § 9.
[5] *Ib.*, 30, § 3. See p. 383.
[6] *Bull. de l'Acad. Roy. de Belgique*, xxxvii, 1874, p. 118.
[7] *Rev. des études anc.*, x, 1908, p. 362. Cf. M. Jullian's *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 379, n. 4.
[8] F. Huybrigts, *La Tongrie et ses antiquités*, 1907, pp. 9–10. M. Huybrigts himself says (p. 9) that the coins have been found 'entre Tongres et Koninxheim, et tout près de Tongres', and again (p. 10) 'aux abords de Tongres vers l'ouest et toujours dans la même vallée'.

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minted in 54 B.C. or earlier remained in circulation for many years, these coins (assuming that they are described correctly) may have been lost by Roman troops quartered at Atuaca after Sabinus's death. Moreover, we are merely assured that 'hundreds' of coins have been found: they are not catalogued in M. Huybrigts's tract; and no details of their discovery are given. Indeed M. Huybrigts's account seemed to me so unsatisfactory that I asked a well-known numismatist, attached to the Cabinet des Médailles in the Bibliothèque royale of Brussels, to enlighten me. It would, I fear, be indiscreet to quote his reply in full; but while he emphasizes the 'perfect good faith' of M. Huybrigts, he assures me that no conclusion regarding the site of Atuatuca can be based upon his statements. For, he says, 'on n'a pas fait de trouvaille importante de monnaies consulaires entre Tongres et Koninxheim . . . vous trouverez dans le *Bulletin de la Société scientifique et littéraire du Limbourg*, t. xvii, 1897, p. 36, une liste de huit deniers consulaires dans la collection de M. Huybrigts. Il y accuse également "60 monnaies de bronze antérieures à l'année 700 de Rome"; mais ce sont pour la plupart des pièces frustes de l'époque impériale.' Again, I would ask any man who has seen Tongres whether it could have been described by Caesar as a naturally strong position. It is approached by an ascent, which is very gentle, on the south and south-east only; and it was of course on this side that the first attack of the Sugambri would have been directed. How, then, could Caesar have said that '*the strength of the position* as well as the entrenchments forbade any attempt to enter elsewhere' (*reliquos aditus locus ipse per se munitioque defendit*?)[1] M. Jullian, indeed, argues that Tongres was partly protected by marshes; but where could they have been, except between the south-east and the south-west, where they may have been formed by the Geer? And even they would not have extended up to the hypothetical site of the camp. Besides, Tongres is at least 15 kilometres, or more than 9 miles, in a straight line from the nearest point of the Meuse; and no one will deny that the Sugambri must have been on the eastern bank when they were advised to attack Atuatuca. The Meuse is a very broad and deep river; and it is hardly credible that the 'obscure and insignificant'[2] Eburones should have bridged it anywhere near Liège. If not, the Sugambri could only have crossed it, as they crossed the Rhine, in boats or on rafts: are we to believe that they collected boats, crossed, and marched to Tongres in three hours?[3] And if so, what did they do with the numerous cattle which they had looted? Is it not equally difficult to believe that they ferried them across the Meuse, and that if they had left them on the right bank, they would have found them on their return?

General Creuly observes that the 'Atuaca' which stood upon the site of Tongres is described on the famous mile-stone of that town as a *castellum*, and adds that 'it is worthy of remark that Caesar designates Aduatuca as a *castellum*, while everywhere else he calls

[1] *B. G.*, vi, 37, § 5. [2] *Ib.*, v, 28, § 1. [3] *Ib.*, vi, 35, § 8.

the strongholds of the Gauls *oppida*'.[1] But Caesar says that the Atuatuci and the Nantuates had *castella*.[2]

The conclusion of the matter is this. For the assumed identity of Atuatuca with Tongres there are only two strong arguments,—the fact that a Gallo-Roman town, which stood upon the site of Tongres, was called Atuaca, and the fact that this town was situated at the junction of great roads.[3] A. Wauters[4] warns us that, unless we accept Tongres, we must remain in complete uncertainty as to the site. No doubt! But what then? It is unpleasant to be forced to confess that, after prolonged research, one has failed to identify the scene of one of the most famous episodes in the Gallic war; but even Wauters would probably admit that it is better to be uncertain than to deceive oneself and one's readers.[5]

Nevertheless, of the numerous other sites that have been proposed, there are two or three which have found advocates of sufficient repute to make it worth while to examine their claims. Supposing that Atuatuca was east of the Meuse, it could not have been far from the right bank if it was not more than 50 Roman miles from Cicero's camp in the country of the Nervii.[6] 2. The plateau of Embourg or Embour, near Liège and between the Ourthe and the Vesdre, answers, it is said, to all the requirements of Caesar's narrative; and von Cohausen, Thomann, Grandgagnage, and von Kampen agree in adopting it. A place called La Hasette on the plateau is, in their opinion, the site of the *castellum*.[7] On three points it is protected by rocks, thus answering to Caesar's description[8] of the natural strength of the position. On the north it touches a plain; and it was here, Grandgagnage believes, that the Sugambri attacked it. Woods still exist in the neighbourhood: a Roman road leads to La Hasette: on the north and south there are two hills, either of which might have been the *collis* to which Caesar alludes in his description of the attack on Cicero's camp;[9] and there is more than one *magna convallis* in the neighbourhood.

[1] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., iii, 1861, pp. 412–3. I am rather inclined to suspect that the words *id castelli nomen est* (*B. G.*, vi, 32, § 4) were interpolated by some one who knew that the Atuaca of the *Table* was a *castellum*, and that the following *hoc* was originally *haec*. I doubt whether Caesar would have made such an irrelevant remark.

[2] *B. G.*, ii, 29, § 2; iii, 1, § 4. Von Göler (*Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 3) says that a *castellum* was a stronghold intended for military purposes only, whereas an *oppidum* was permanently inhabited; and I believe that he is right.

[3] See C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 376, n. 6. But M. Jullian himself (*ib.*, p. 406) says that the camp was 'sottement exposé'.

[4] *Bull. de l'Acad. Roy. de Bruxelles*, xv, 1863, p. 286.

[5] Professor L. Halkin (*Bull. bibl. du Musée belge*, ix, 1905, p. 446) and Dr. V. Tourneur (*ib.*, xii, 1908, p. 72, n. 1) hold that I have disproved the identity of Atuatuca with Tongres: but I do not claim to have done so much; for I cannot offer an alternative which is wholly satisfactory.

[6] *B. G.*, v, 27, § 9.

[7] See *Jahrb. d. Vereins von Alterthumsfreunden im Rheinlande*, xliii, 1867, pp. 26–41, and A. von Kampen's *Quindecim ad Caesaris de b. G. comm. tabulae*, viii.

[8] *B. G.*, vi, 37, § 5.

[9] *Ib.*, 36, § 2.

These arguments are not conclusive. The suggestion that the name 'Embourg' is derived from *Eburones* is hardly convincing. Moreover, there is one objection to Embourg which is absolutely fatal. The *magna convallis* is assumed to have been a part of the valley of the Mosbeux, a rivulet which flows into the Vesdre. This valley is not two but five miles from Embourg. Von Kampen naïvely admits that 'the words *in silvis oportuno atque occulto loco a milibus passuum circiter duobus* can only apply if . . . the forests extended to within that distance of the camp, which is not unlikely in itself, if only we assume further, that the hostile army lying in ambush there, first allowed the Romans to pass them, in order to pursue and fall upon them with more chance of success in the *magna convallis* some four miles farther'.[1] In other words, 'if only we assume' what flatly contradicts Caesar's narrative!

3. Von Göler[2] finds the camp of Labienus in the neighbourhood of Chiny, on the river Semoy. This place, he says, is 100 miles from the most easterly of the western group of camps, which he places at Soissons, and was connected with Reims by a Roman road. The camp of Cicero he places at Namur, which he regards as the best place that Caesar could have selected, both because of its strength and because it would have afforded easy communication, on the one side by the valley of the Meuse with the (assumed) camp of Labienus and on the other by the valley of the Sambre with Caesar's camp at Samarobriva, which he identifies not with Amiens, but with Bray![3] Fifty miles eastward of Namur, he finds in Limbourg a site which he regards as conforming to Caesar's description of Atuatuca.[4]

This is a fair specimen of von Göler's laborious and ingenious, but futile method. Labienus's camp *may* have been near Chiny; but if von Göler was really convinced that he had found the site, he must have been sadly deficient in the sense of humour. Caesar's camp was not at Bray, but at Amiens.[5] There is no evidence that the camp of Plancus was at Soissons; and if it was, there is no evidence that it was 100 miles from the camp of Labienus. There is no evidence, and it is most unlikely that the camp of Cicero was at Namur.

Since von Göler wrote, Limbourg has found new advocates, General von Veith[6] and M. E. Harroy,[7] the latter of whom has said everything that can be said in its favour. Limbourg, which stands upon a high rock, about 270 feet above the river Vesdre, is some 15 miles, as the crow flies, east of Liège. The *magna convallis*, in which the disaster occurred, is identified by M. Harroy with the valley of Dolhain, the nearest entrance to which is about one mile, measured along the winding road which leads to it, from Limbourg itself. This valley is about 1,640 yards[8] long, and its average breadth is from a quarter of a mile to 550 yards.[9] It forms a plain, hemmed in on the north

[1] *Quindecim ad Caesaris de b. G. comm. tabulae*, viii.
[2] *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 173. [3] *Ib.* [4] *Ib.*, pp. 172–5.
[5] See my note on SAMAROBRIVA.
[6] Pick's *Monatsschrift f. d. Gesch. Westdeutschlands*, 1878, pp. 419–27.
[7] *Les Éburons à Limbourg*, 1889.
[8] 1,500 metres. [9] 400 to 500 metres.

by an escarpment, which rises fully 300 feet above it, and on the south by wooded heights of lower elevation and more gentle slope. At its western, as at its eastern entrance, the valley narrows into a gorge. The point at which the Roman advanced guard was checked would have been opposite the gorge of Bilstain, which opens into the valley from the north ; and the doomed cohorts would have made their last stand on the Pavé du Diable,—the widest part of the valley. The field to which Cicero's foragers were sent would be on the north-east of Limbourg, between Baelen and Honthem, and separated from it, as Caesar's narrative requires,[1] by a hill ; and the Sugambri would have approached the rocky height of Limbourg from the south-east by the slope which leads past Eupen, Membach, and Goé.[2] To the possible objection that the Vesdre flows through the valley of Dolhain, and that Caesar, in his description of the disaster, says nothing about a river, M. Harroy replies that within his own recollection the Vesdre, in that part of its course, was a rivulet—a mere thread of water—which one could cross without wetting one's feet ;[3] and that, as Caesar tells us, the summer had been characterized by extraordinary drought.[4] M. Harroy also insists that Limbourg and its environs correspond, in every detail, with Caesar's narrative. I can find no fault with the field to which he sends Cicero's foragers nor with the valley of Dolhain, except that it seems to me rather too short to have held a column which could hardly have numbered less than 5,000 fighting men, besides cavalry and servants and a long baggage train,—a column the formation of which Caesar condemns because of its excessive length.[5] But be this as it may, I have two objections to make to M. Harroy's theory. Caesar says that the Eburones lay in wait for the Romans, in two divisions, at a distance of about two Roman miles from the Roman camp (*conlocatis insidiis in silvis oportuno atque occulto loco a milibus passuum circiter duobus*).[6] This is not perfectly clear ; but, as Long justly remarks, ' the simplest explanation is this, that *a* points out the termination of 2,000 paces from the camp as the place where the ambuscade began. Thus it was from or after the space of 2,000 paces that the ambuscade was seen and felt.' [7] Now M. Harroy is only able to bring his theory into a show of harmony with Caesar's statement by reckoning the distance of two miles from the farthest extremity of the valley of Dolhain.[8] I press this objection because Caesar saw Atuatuca himself,[9] and we cannot doubt that he visited the scene of a disaster which he never allowed himself to forget. Secondly, although Atuatuca was undoubtedly a place of natural strength, I find it difficult to believe that it stood upon a high and almost impregnable rock like Limbourg.[10] Caesar would hardly have failed to inform us of so remarkable

[1] *B. G.*, vi, 36, § 2.
[2] *Les Éburons à Limbourg*, pp. 17, 64, 71, 74.
[3] *Ib.*, p. 80.
[4] *B. G.*, v, 24, § 1.
[5] *Ib.*, 31, § 6.
[6] *Ib.*, 32, § 1.
[7] *Caesar*, p. 250.
[8] *Les Éburons à Limbourg*, p. 65.
[9] *B. G.*, vi, 32, §§ 2–5 ; 41, § 4.
[10] See *Carte topogr. de la Belgique*, Feuille 43, pl. 5.

a circumstance ; and it is difficult to understand how the Sugambri, with their inadequate force, could have had the temerity to attack so formidable a position. I fear, therefore, that M. Harroy's interesting *brochure* must be pronounced inconclusive.[1]

4. It is hardly necessary to mention any of the other conjectures. Colonel P. Henrard [2] identifies Atuatuca with Vieux-Virton, which is about 80 miles due south of Liège! M. de Vlaminck with Aix-la-Chapelle : [3] M. Caumartin [4] with Hontem, near the eastern bank of the Meuse and the ford of Navague, and about 15 miles north-east of Liège : B. Schöttler [5] with Rheinbach, about 11 miles south-west of Bonn, which is very much too far from the country of the Nervii to correspond with Caesar's narrative. Besides *Atuatuca* and *Aduatuca*, in *B. G.*, vi, 35, § 8, there are, in inferior MSS., various readings, *ad Vatucam*—or, according to Frigell, *at Vatucam*, which is absolutely meaningless—and *ad Varucam* ; [6] and accordingly, from the resemblance of the names, the camp has also been placed by some at Wittem,[7] about 8 miles west-north-west of Aix-la-Chapelle, and by others at Waroux,[8] on the west of the Meuse, about 3 miles from Liège. But it is needless to say that Caesar, being an educated man, would not have written *ad Vatucam* or *ad Varucam* [9] (*venire*) ; and besides it needs no critical acumen to see that *ad Vatucam* and *at Vatucam* are simply *Aduatucam* and *Atuatucam*, miswritten by a dunce. Finally, Alfred Holder [10] places Atuatuca at Vetschau,[11] about 3 miles north-west of Aix-la-Chapelle ; but I have not been able to discover on what grounds he bases his opinion.[12]

The truth is that the data are insufficient. But, although the arguments against identifying Atuatuca with Tongres are many and strong, it must be admitted that, after the most searching exploration,

[1] If M. Jullian is right in placing Labienus's camp at Mouzon (see p. 384, *infra*), Limbourg can hardly be identified with Atuatuca ; for it is about 80 miles from Mouzon. But this objection applies equally to Tongres. M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 376, n. 6) objects, further, that the few Roman soldiers who escaped would not have been able to make their way to the camp of Labienus ' à travers les montagnes et les bois '. But does not Caesar say that they went by the *woodland* tracks ' (*incertis itineribus per silvas* [*B. G.*, v, 37, § 7]) ?

[2] *Mém. couronnés . . . publiés par l'Acad. Roy. de Belgique*, xxxiii, 1882, pp. 10, 21, 37–40, &c. Cf. pp. 54, 57.

[3] *Messager des sciences hist. de Belgique*, 1882, pp. 413–4.

[4] *Ib.*, 1883, pp. 238–9.

[5] *Über d. Lage d. geschichtl. Orte Aduatuca*, 1889.

[6] Schneider's *Caesar*, ii, 299.

[7] J. B. Renard's *Hist. pol. et mil. de la Belgique*, p. 442 ; *Mém. de l'Acad. Roy. . . . de Bruxelles*, ii, 1822, pp. 261–2.

[8] *Ib.*, pp. 258–61.

[9] A reviewer in the *Athenaeum* (Jan. 13, 1900) takes exception to this remark ; but I would remind him that *ad Vatucam* (venire) would only be admissible if it meant (to come) ' to the neighbourhood of Vatuca '.

[10] *Alt-celtischer Sprachschatz*, i, 47–8.

[11] See Sheets 2965–6 of the German Government Map (1 : 25,000).

[12] Essneux, Fauquemont, Fouron le Comte, Gressenich, Herve, Huy, Julemont, Juliers, Liège, Maestricht, Mortroux, Rolduc, Valkenberg, Verviers, Wandre, and the ' plateau de Falise ', at the confluence of the Ourthe and the rivulet of Laval, have also been proposed. See *Jahrb. d. Vereins von Alterthumsfreunden im Rheinlande*, xliii, 1867, p. 18.

nobody has succeeded in finding another site which is not open to grave objection. Moreover, Atuatuca was in the kingdom of Ambiorix, which formed the western part of the territory of the Eburones; and it cannot be denied that the Meuse might have formed a natural boundary between his dominions and those of Catuvolcus.

III. Napoleon[1] places Cicero's camp at Charleroi, which, he says, 'is situated near the Roman road from Amiens to Tongres, and, as the Latin text requires, at 50 miles from the latter town. On the high part of Charleroi, where the camp was no doubt established, we command the valley of the Sambre, and we can see, in the distance towards the west, the country through which Caesar arrived.[2] Moreover, the valley of the Haine and Mont Sainte-Aldegonde, above the village of Carnières, agree perfectly with the details of the combat in which the Gauls were defeated.'[3]

M. Jullian[4] points to Binche, about a dozen miles west of Charleroi, which, assuming that Atuatuca was at Tongres, is open to no objection,—save what M. Jullian himself calls the 'grosse objection' that it is about 66 Roman miles from Tongres, and almost 80 from Mouzon, where he places the camp of Labienus. My friend strives to set our minds at rest by arguing that the distances which Caesar gives were given on the authority of Gauls, and therefore that not Roman miles were meant, but Gallic leagues. Possibly. But Caesar was not credulous; and he states the distance from the camp of Cicero to that of Labienus on his own authority.[5]

Desroches[6] places Cicero's camp at Assche; Dewez and others at Mons;[7] von Göler[8] and von Kampen at Namur. But it would be as tedious as it is needless to prolong the list of guesses. Until the position of Atuatuca has been fixed it will be absolutely hopeless to search for Cicero's camp. For we know nothing about its position, except that, if Caesar's, or rather Ambiorix's, figures are accurate, it was about 50 Roman miles from Atuatuca, was within a short march and on the east of a rivulet which flowed through a broad valley, and was probably close to the road that led from Amiens to Atuatuca. Regarding the camp of Labienus, which the omniscient Napoleon places at Lavacherie on the Ourthe, we are somewhat better informed. It was rather more than 50 Roman miles from Atuatuca;[9] it was near the common frontier of the Treveri and the

[1] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 214, n. 2. [2] *B. G.*, v, 48, § 10.
[3] *Ib.*, 48–52. [4] *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 383, n. 2.
[5] See p. 377. 'De plus,' says M. Jullian, 'comparez v, 53, 1 à vii, 3, 3, et vous verrez que le chiffre de 60 milles, entre les camps de Cicéron et de Labiénus, est évidemment trop faible.' M. Jullian means that if news was transmitted over a distance of 160 Roman miles from Cenabum in about 12 hours, it ought to have travelled 60 Roman miles in less than 9. But how can he tell that the circumstances were the same? See pp. 736–7.
[6] *Nouveaux mém. de l'Acad. Roy. . . . de Bruxelles*, ii, 1822, pp. 241, 243.
[7] *Ib.*, pp. 241–4. [8] *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, pp. 170, 173–4.
[9] Caesar (*B. G.*, v, 27, § 9) makes Ambiorix say, in his interview with Arpineius and Junius, that the camp of Cicero was about 50 Roman miles from Atuatuca, and that of Labienus a little more (*ipsorum esse consilium velintne prius quam*

Remi; it was close to a river, which was fordable; and if it was identical with the camp which Labienus occupied in 53 B.C., that river, or at all events a river in the neighbourhood, had steep banks. In 53 B.C. Labienus quitted his camp, and marched 14 miles against the Treveri, who were separated from him by the river with steep banks. On his side of the river and between him and his old camp, there was a knoll (*tumulus*), on which he parked his baggage.[1] M. Jullian has not the slightest doubt that the old camp was at Mouzon, on the 'mont de Brune', where, he says, the Meuse was fordable; and he identifies the knoll with a hill between Mouzon and Izel and the river with steep banks with the Semoy.[2] I do not gainsay my friend's discovery; but is the district between Mouzon and Izel the only one in Luxemburg which corresponds with Caesar's narrative? And is it not difficult to explain away the fact that Mouzon is about 85 miles, in a straight line, from Tongres, which he identifies with Atuatuca?

Atuatuci.—The Atuatuci and the Eburones were, in the opinion of Desjardins[3] and others, practically one people; but it is difficult to understand how any one who knows the *Commentaries* can maintain such a paradox. Caesar clearly implies, again and again, that the two peoples and their territories were distinct. Ambiorix, one of the two kings of the Eburones, says that he has been relieved by Caesar from the obligation of paying tribute to the Atuatuci, his neighbours.[4] Again, after his victory over Sabinus, Ambiorix marched into the country of the Atuatuci, 'who were conterminous with his kingdom' (*qui erant eius regno finitimi*),[5] and persuaded them to join him in attacking Cicero. In the following year (53 B.C.) Trebonius was sent to ravage that part of the country of the Eburones which bordered on the country of the Atuatuci.[6] Lastly, Caesar says that

finitimi sentiant eductos ex hibernis milites aut ad Ciceronem aut ad Labienum deducere, quorum alter milia passuum circiter L, alter paulo amplius ab iis absit). General Creuly, referring to *B. G.*, vii, 17, § 2 (*de re frumentaria Boios atque Haeduos adhortari non destitit; quorum alteri, quod nullo studio agebant, non multum adiuvabant; alteri non magnis facultatibus quod civitas erat exigua et infirma, celeriter quod habuerunt consumpserunt*) argues that the first *alter* refers to Labienus and the second to Cicero. But the two passages are not parallel. In the second it is made clear by the context that the first *alteri* refers to the Aedui and the second to the Boi; whereas in the other passage the context does not help us, and to prove his point Creuly ought to be able to show that Caesar habitually uses *alter . . . alter* in an inverted order. But Heller (*Philologus*, xxii, 1865, p. 154) caps his quotation by another from *B. G.*, v, 54, § 4 (*ut praeter Haeduos et Remos, quos praecipuo semper honore Caesar habuit, alteros pro vetere ac perpetua erga populum Romanum fide, alteros pro recentibus Gallici belli officiis, nulla fere civitas fuerit non suspecta nobis*). In this passage it is unquestionable that the first *alteros* refers to the Aedui and the second to the Remi. On Creuly's theory, in v, 27 Caesar's meaning would have been doubtful even to Roman readers; but it is clear that as, in that passage, the context does not fix his meaning, he used *alter . . . alter* in their natural order.

[1] *B. G.*, v, 24, § 2; 58, § 6; vi, 7, § 5; 8, § 3.

[2] *Rev. des études anc.*, x, 1908, p. 266. Cf. M. Jullian's *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 394, n. 6, where he adds that Mouzon (Mosomagus) is on the great road from Reims to Trèves.

[3] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 437–8, 457.

[4] *B. G.*, v, 27, § 2.

[5] *Ib.*, 38, § 1.

[6] *Ib.*, vi, 33, § 2.

the Atuatuci had numerous strongholds (*oppida*) and that the Eburones had none.[1]

I. According to Dion Cassius,[2] who is no authority, the territory of the Atuatuci bordered on that of the Nervii; but I have no doubt that he is right here, for, according to Caesar,[3] a part at least of their territory was between that of the Nervii and that of the Eburones. The Eburones had some territory on the west of the Meuse, east of the Nervii and south of the Menapii; but the greater part was between the Meuse and the Rhine.[4] South of the Meuse, in the neighbourhood of Condroz, were the Condrusi. Accordingly the Atuatuci are generally placed in the valley of the Meuse, principally along its left or northern bank, between the Nervii and the Condrusi.

The French Commission, who identify Atuatuca with *Tongres*, consider that the name *Atuatuca* proves that the Atuatuci possessed the vast plain which is dominated by Tongres.[5] But Caesar expressly says that Atuatuca was in the country not of the Atuatuci but of the Eburones;[6] and, moreover, as I have shown in the preceding note, it is at least doubtful whether Atuatuca was on the site of Tongres. The Commission also argue that the Atuatuci must have possessed Namur, because numerous coins bearing the legend AVAVCIA, which Caignart de Saulcy attributed to them, have been found there.[7] The attribution is imaginary;[8] but, assuming its correctness, what would the discovery of the coins prove? Coins belonging to the Helvetii, the Santoni, the Sequani, the Carnutes, the Senones, the Lingones, the Bituriges, and the Atrebates have been found on Mount Beuvray[9] (Bibracte); but these peoples did not live in Aeduan territory. Still, the orthodox faith is that the Atuatuci occupied Namur and its neighbourhood,[10] that is to say, the district of Hesbaye, on the northern bank of the Meuse, and perhaps also some little territory in the western part of Condroz, on the southern bank of the same river.[11]

A novel view regarding the geographical position of the Atuatuci has been propounded by A. de Vlaminck, and accepted by M. A. Longnon.[12] According to this view, as originally stated, they occupied that part of the country between the Meuse and the Rhine which subsequently belonged to the Ubii. De Vlaminck took his stand upon the well-known passage in which Caesar says that the Atuatuci were descended from the Cimbri and Teutoni, who, when they were about to invade the Province and Italy, had left a detachment on

[1] *B. G.*, ii, 29, §§ 1–2; vi, 34, § 1.
[2] xxxix, 4, § 1.
[3] *B. G.*, v, 38, §§ 1–2.
[4] *Ib.*, 24, § 4.
[5] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 11.
[6] *B. G.*, vi, 32, §§ 3–4.
[7] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 11.
[8] See *Rev. celt.*, xxx, 1909, p. 194. M. Blanchet (*ib.*, xxxi, 1910, p. 57) has no doubt that *Avaucia* was the name of a monetary agent.
[9] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, t. i.
[10] D'Anville, *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 33.
[11] M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, ii, 465, n. 4) assigns Hesbaye to the Eburones and the country round Namur to the Atuatuci. But how much of the country round Namur? If the Atuatuci did not possess Hesbaye, they must have been very badly off.
[12] *Atlas hist. de la Gaule*, p. 4.

the left bank of the Rhine to protect all the *impedimenta* that they were unable to take with them.[1] As, argued de Vlaminck, the detachment evidently had to keep open the communications of the Cimbri and Teutoni, and to cover their retreat in case of a disaster, it would be absurd to suppose that their territory was so far removed from the Rhine as is generally supposed. He also insisted that so powerful a tribe would never have been confined in the narrow space between the Eburones and the Nervii.[2]

The first of these arguments is childish : the Atuatuci were not required to keep open the communications of their kinsmen for half a century. In reply to the second, it may be said that, judging from the size of the contingent which they furnished to the Belgic army in 57 B.C., they were far inferior in strength even then to the Bellovaci, the Suessiones, and the Nervii ;[3] and also that it is quite possible that, after the crushing blow which Caesar inflicted upon them in that year, when he slew 4,000 of them, sold 53,000 into slavery, and released the Eburones from the obligation of paying them tribute,[4] he may have transferred to the Eburones a portion of their territory, including the fastness of Atuatuca.

De Vlaminck's arguments naturally provoked hostile criticism ; and he subsequently modified his theory.[5] It would, however, be waste of time to examine the fresh arguments by which he endeavoured to prove that they never crossed the Meuse ;[6] for a single passage in the *Commentaries* stultifies them. In *B. G.*, v, 38, §§ 1–2, describing how Ambiorix followed up his victory over Sabinus and Cotta, Caesar writes :—*Hac victoria sublatus Ambiorix statim cum equitatu in Atuatucos, qui erant eius regno finitimi, proficiscitur : neque noctem neque diem intermittit peditatumque se subsequi iubet. Re demonstrata Atuatucisque concitatis, postero die in Nervios pervenit*, &c. After reading the first of de Vlaminck's later papers, I wrote, ' this passage proves that the Atuatuci were between the Eburones, from whose territory Ambiorix started, and the Nervii.' But by extending the territory of the Atuatuci westward a little beyond Embourg and placing Atuatuca at Aix-la-Chapelle, de Vlaminck labours to force his theory into conformity with Caesar's narrative. Yet even so, Ambiorix would only have passed across the extreme western corner of the country of the Atuatuci, and would then have had to recross the territory of the Eburones or to cross the territory of the Condrusi before reaching that of the Nervii. But no unbiassed reader can fail to see that, taken in their natural sense, Caesar's words imply that the territory of the Atuatuci intervened between that of Ambiorix and that of the Nervii.

Nevertheless, I believe that in de Vlaminck's pages there is a grain of truth. He wholly fails to prove that the Atuatuci did not possess the territory on the western bank of the Meuse which, until he wrote,

[1] *B. G.*, ii, 29, § 4.
[2] *La Ménapie*, &c., 1879, pp. 42–4.
[3] *B. G.*, ii, 4, §§ 5–9.
[4] *Ib.*, 33, § 7 ; v, 27, § 2.
[5] *Messager des sciences hist. de Belgique*, 1882, pp. 391–2 ; 1884, p. 282 ; 1887, pp. 39, 55–6, 351–2.
[6] I did this work of supererogation in the first edition (pp. 350–2).

geographers had generally assigned to them. But it is probable, or at least possible, that, before their treachery provoked the vengeance of Caesar, they also possessed a tract between the Meuse and the Rhine.

II. The Eburones are not mentioned by any ancient writer except Caesar. The greater part of their country was between the Rhine and the Meuse, from which it may be inferred that the remaining part was west of the Meuse. Their neighbours on the south were the Treveri, the Segni, and the Condrusi ; on the north the Menapii ; and on the south-west, I believe, the Atuatuci. Their territory may also have been conterminous on the west with that of the Nervii.[1] But it is impossible to define the frontiers of any of these peoples, except perhaps the Nervii ; and therefore it is impossible to define the frontiers of the Eburones. General Creuly endeavours to prove that their territory extended northward as far as the sea, and separated the Menapii from the Morini.[2] This theory contradicts the evidence of Strabo, who says that the territories of the Menapii and the Morini were conterminous.[3] But Creuly relies on Caesar. Caesar says that in the sixth year of the war those of the Eburones who dwelt nearest the sea took refuge in the islands which were formed at high tide.[4] These, says Creuly, must have been the islands at the mouths of the Scheldt. They must have belonged to the Eburones because Caesar, after describing his campaign, says, *haec in omnibus Eburonum finibus gerebantur*.[5] But Creuly unduly strains Caesar's text. I have no doubt that his statement refers only to the events described in *B. G.*, vi, 33–4. If it refers to chapters 31 and 32 as well, it obviously includes events which did not take place in the country of the Eburones ; for in chapter 32 he describes what the Segni and Condrusi were doing ; and in chapter 31, on which Creuly lays great stress, he says that many of the Eburones fled beyond their own borders. I believe, then, that those Eburones who took refuge in the islands were not at the time in their own country ; and I conclude that Strabo was right. See also page 375.

Atuatucorum Oppidum.—According to Caesar, the stronghold of the Atuatuci was steep and rocky on every side, except at one place, where it was approached by a gentle slope not more than 200 feet wide :—*cunctis oppidis castellisque desertis*, he writes, *sua omnia in unum oppidum egregie natura munitum contulerunt. Quod cum ex omnibus in circuitu partibus altissimas rupes despectusque haberet, una ex parte leniter acclivis aditus in latitudinem non amplius pedum CC relinquebatur*.[6] It was large enough to shelter at least 57,000 people ;[7] and the line of contravallation with which Caesar surrounded it was traced along ground comparatively high but of varying elevation, and measured 15 or, according to another interpretation of the text, only 3 Roman miles.[8]

[1] *B. G.*, v, 24, § 4 ; vi, 32, § 1 ; 33, §§ 1–2.
[2] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., vii, 1863, pp. 385–6.
[3] See p. 450.
[4] *B. G.*, vi, 31, § 3.
[5] *Ib.*, 35, § 1.
[6] *Ib.*, ii, 29, § 3.
[7] *Ib.*, 33, §§ 5–7.
[8] *Ib.*, 30, § 2. See pp. 390–1.

A score of sites or more have been suggested; but the majority are not worth examining. Either they do not correspond with Caesar's description, or they are in territory which could not have belonged to the Atuatuci.[1]

The great Napoleon, probably following d'Anville, decided for Falais, near Huy, a height which is nearly surrounded by the river Méhaigne.[2] Des Roches and others[3] have suggested Hastedon, which is quite close to Namur: Napoleon III pronounced for the citadel of Namur: von Göler, the French Commission, K. Thomann, von Kampen, and Kiepert for Mont Falhize.

1. 'According to the researches,' says Napoleon, 'which have been carried on in the country supposed to have been formerly occupied by the Atuatuci, two localities only, Mont Falhize and the part of the mountain of Namur on which the citadel is built, appear to agree with the site of the *oppidum* of the Atuatuci. But Mont Falhize is not surrounded with rocks on all sides, as the Latin text requires. The contravallation would have had a development of more than 15,000 feet, and it would have twice crossed the Meuse, which is difficult to admit. We therefore adopt . . . the citadel of Namur.'[4]

Long, in his edition of Caesar,[5] rejected Namur, on the ground that it 'is on the Maas, a circumstance incompatible with Caesar's description, for he mentions no river'. But, in his *History*,[6] he accepted Mont Falhize, which is also on the Meuse, and therefore virtually withdrew his objection. Long also argued, as d'Anville[7] had done before him, that Namur is too small; for its area is only 12 hectares,[8] or about 27 acres. M. Jullian contends that additional room might have been gained if some of the garrison had encamped on the flanks of the hill; but even so it would hardly have been possible to find a greater space than 52 acres, or 40 square feet for each man.[9] If the plateau had been covered by houses several storeys high, the garrison might have found accommodation; but can we conceive that they were packed for days, like the crowd at the boat-race, along with numerous cattle,[10] nearly four times as tightly as the garrison of Alesia?[11] Dewez, indeed, urges[12] that,

[1] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, p. 11.

[2] See A. E. E. Desjardins, *Alésia,—suivie d'un appendice renfermant des notes inédites écrites de la main de Nap. I.*, &c., and d'Anville, *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 34.

[3] *Nouveaux mém. de l'Acad. Roy. des sciences . . . de Bruxelles*, ii, 1822, pp. 251–2.

[4] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 116, n. 1.

[5] Page 135.

[6] *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv, 63–4.

[7] *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, pp. 33–4.

[8] C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 270, n. 2.

[9] See Napoleon's Planche 11 and A. von Göler, *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 91, n. 4. M. Jullian himself (*op. cit.*, iii, 556, note) rejects the proposed identification of Uxellodunum with Luzech partly because the area of the latter is only 8 hectares; but the garrison of Uxellodunum, exclusive of the townsfolk, was, on the highest estimate, less than one-tenth of that of the stronghold of the Atuatuci.

[10] *B. G.*, ii, 33, § 2.

[11] See p. 243.

[12] *Nouv. mém. de l'Acad. Roy. de Bruxelles*, ii, 1822, p. 247.

although the citadel of Namur is too small in itself, it communicates with other rocky heights, and that all of them taken together would have been sufficiently large. Caesar, however, does not describe a group of hills, but a single hill; and even if the chain of heights the easternmost of which is occupied by the citadel could be regarded as a single hill, their length and extent are such that they could not have formed one stronghold, and they are nowhere approached by a gentle slope, 200 feet wide. The writer of the article *Aduatuci* in the *Dictionnaire archéologique de la Gaule* rejects Namur, not only because it is too small, but also because (1) the gentle slope is not to be found;[1] and (2) if the contravallation had been made to follow the windings of the Sambre, which, in his opinion, would not have been a sufficient obstacle, it would have required a development of 9 kilometres, or 6 Roman miles;[2] whereas, if Caesar had merely drawn the line over the heights from the bank of the Meuse to the bank of the Sambre, two kilometres, or barely a mile and a quarter,[3] would have sufficed. As a matter of fact, Napoleon, in his plan (Planche 11), adopts the latter alternative, thereby contradicting his own interpretation of '*XV milium*'. But if any one will ascend the hill on which the citadel is built, or even inspect the model, executed by M. Locqueyssie for Napoleon, which is in the museum of Namur, he will see that other reasons militate against Napoleon's choice. Caesar's contravallation would necessarily have been carried up the steep and rocky flanks of the hill and over ground considerably higher than that on which the *oppidum* is supposed to have stood. Why should the Atuatuci have restricted the *oppidum* within absurdly narrow limits? Why should they have left the higher ground unoccupied? According to M. Locqueyssie, remains of an old earthwork, which he describes with a note of interrogation as 'gallo-belge', were discovered about 500 metres south of the slope which, according to Napoleon, led up to the double wall of the *oppidum*. Suppose that this earthwork was really erected by the Atuatuci. In that case, if Namur represents the *oppidum*, the slope did not exist: the wall, which would have to be identified with the earthwork, was about ten times as wide as that which Caesar describes; and he would still have been obliged to carry his contravallation right up and over the rocky heights. Again, if we accept Napoleon's theory, in what direction could the Atuatuci have made their desperate sortie?[4] Not down the gentle slope, which *ex hypothesi* was already occupied by the Roman *agger*. As far as I can see, they would either have headed north-westward along the low ground parallel with the Sambre, or southward along the eastern flank of the hill or the narrow strip of ground below, parallel with the Meuse. But in either case, if they had succeeded in storming the contravallation, would they not have been trapped between river and hill?

2. The writer of the article, already referred to, in the *Dictionnaire*

[1] Napoleon marks the slope in his plan (pl. 11); but is it *minime arduus*?
[2] This is an exaggeration: 4½ kilometres would be nearer the mark.
[3] The contravallation which Napoleon traces in his plan (pl. 11) is even less.
[4] *B. G.*, ii, 33, § 2.

archéologique de la Gaule says that of all the localities which have been proposed Beaumont, Namur, and Mont Falhize alone deserve serious consideration. As we have seen, he rejects Namur. Beaumont he also rejects because it is only 25 kilometres, or about 15 miles, from Neuf-Mesnil, the site of the battle with the Nervii,[1] and, as the Atrebates and the Viromandui, who also took part in the battle, had to travel respectively 80 and 100 kilometres, the Atuatuci, if they had only had so short a distance to go, could have easily arrived in time. But there is no reason to assume that, because the Atuatuci took refuge against Caesar in a certain stronghold, therefore that stronghold must have been the point from which they marched to join the Nervii. There are, however, other reasons for rejecting Beaumont. First, the plateau of the alleged *oppidum* is smaller even than the plateau of Namur ;[2] and secondly, Beaumont is not in the territory which belonged to the Atuatuci.

3. General von Göler,[3] who carefully explored Mont Falhize, considered that it corresponded exactly with Caesar's description of the stronghold ; and General Creuly, after examining the *Carte topographique de la Belgique*, came to the same conclusion, and also recorded his belief that no other site in the whole of Belgium fulfilled the conditions of the problem.[4] Napoleon's objections to this site have been already stated. In answer to them it may be said (1) that *quod cum omnibus in circuitu partibus altissimas rupes despectusque haberet* describes, as the writer of the article in the *Dictionnaire* says, a hill with scarped flanks, ' d'où la vue dominait sur la campagne environnante,'[5] which description applies to Mont Falhize ; and (2) that the contravallation need not have had ' a development of more than 15,000 feet ', because it need not have crossed the Meuse at all. As the writer of the article in the *Dictionnaire* observes, the Meuse, which encloses the southern slopes, is, on that side, a sufficient obstacle ; and Caesar need only have left a corps of observation on the right bank at Huy, to watch it. Moreover, the word *circummuniti* does not necessarily mean that the contravallation entirely surrounded the town ;[6] and in fact Napoleon's Plan does not make it surround Namur or cross the Meuse.

The extent of the contravallation is, however, uncertain. The reading of β, which Meusel adopts, is *vallo p̄. XII in circuitu XV milium crebrisque castellis circummuniti*. Schneider supplies *passuum* with *XV milium* ; and, if he is right, the extent of the rampart was 15 Roman miles. As *XII* is omitted in a, Frigell[7] believes that the true reading is *vallo passuum in circuitu XV milium*. A. Holder[8]

[1] See pp. 671–7.

[2] See *Carte topogr. de la Belgique* (1 : 20,000), Feuille 52, pl. 6.

[3] *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, pp. 91–5.

[4] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., viii, 1863, p. 392. See also O. Bocquet in *Bull. de l'inst. arch. liégeois*, v, 1862, pp. 167–76, and A. Hock, *Études sur quelques campagnes de Jules César dans la Gaule belgique*, 1897.

[5] Cf Schneider's *Caesar*, i, 191.

[6] Cf. *B. G.*, i, 38, § 4,—flumen Dubis ut circino circumductum paene totum oppidum cingit.

[7] *Caesar*, i, 38 ; ii, 23.

[8] *Caesar*, p. 50.

prefers the reading of *a*,—*vallo pedum in circuitu XV milium*, that is to say, 'with a rampart 15,000 feet in extent'; but whoever collates the relevant passages in the *Commentaries* will conclude that Caesar would not have reckoned miles in terms of feet.[1] Creuly and Bertrand, who are followed by Napoleon,[2] adopt the reading of *β*, but supply *pedum* after *XV milium*, remarking that Caesar nowhere else uses *milia* or its cases, without *passuum*, to express 'miles'.[3] But this is an astounding blunder; as, in a very incomplete search, I have found no less than three passages where he does so.[4] Schneider says that to supply *pedum* after *XV milium* would be contrary to the usage of Latin; but Heller believes that the word *pedum* is employed, as 'a joint factor', to be coupled both with *XII* and with *XV milium*.[5] I am sure that he is wrong; but at all events it is certain that to construct a line of contravallation 15 Roman miles in extent round either Namur or Mont Falhize would have been contrary to the usage of a sane, not to say a great, general.

Other objections have been urged against Mont Falhize. The Atuatuci, we are told, would not have built their principal stronghold near their north-eastern frontier, which separated them from the Condrusi. To this General Creuly replies that we do not know what that frontier was, and that if the Condrusi occupied the right bank of the Meuse, that was the very reason why the Atuatuci should have established a stronghold on the opposite bank. Moreover, the general considers that of all the places which they could have chosen for a city of refuge Mont Falhize was naturally the best.[6]

4. The same objection applies to Falais as to Mont Falhize,—it is nearly surrounded by a river; and in other respects it does not conform so closely to Caesar's description.

5. MM. G. Arnould and de Radigués[7] consider that the plateau of Hastedon, about a mile and a half north-west of Namur, corresponds with Caesar's description more nearly than any other place which has been suggested; and they claim that its area, 13 hectares or about 32 acres, is not too small. In France, they remark, 'on admet comme surface minima, pour le campement de l'infanterie sous la tente, un rectangle de 48 m. carrés, pour 15 hommes . . . soit 3 m². 20 par homme. Admettons 13 hectares 25 ares pour la superficie d'Hastedon; on trouve 2 m². 45 par individu.' They omit to say that, as even soldiers must have room to move about, the tents in a camp do not cover anything like the whole area; and even so they allot much less space to the unhappy Atuatuci than the 'surface minima' which they mention. But without elaborate

[1] See p. 729.

[2] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 117, n. 1.

[3] *Rev. arch.*, 2ᵉ sér., iv, 1861, p. 459.

[4] *B. G.*, i, 41, § 4; iii, 17, § 5; iv, 14, § 1. See also Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, ii, 609–10.

[5] *Philologus*, xxvi, 1867, pp. 665–7. Meusel does not agree with Heller, and in a MS. note suggests that *XV* is corrupt.

[6] *Rev. arch.*, 2ᵉ sér., vii, 1863, p. 392.

[7] *Congrès internat. d'anthr. et d'arch. préhist.* (Bruxelles, 1872), 1873, pp. 318–26; *Annales de la Soc. arch. de Namur*, xii, 1872–3, pp. 229–39.

calculation any one can see that to pack 57,000 men into a space of 32 acres and keep them there for several days would be impossible.

In conclusion, I ought to say that M. de Vlaminck, followed by M. A. Longnon,[1] considers that nearly all the attempts that have been made to identify the stronghold were foredoomed to failure, because they were based upon the assumption that the territory of the Atuatuci was confined to the region of Namur, whereas it really extended nearly as far eastward as the Rhine. I have examined elsewhere[2] M. de Vlaminck's theory of the habitat of the Atuatuci. He himself identifies the *oppidum* with Embourg, on the east of the Meuse, near the junction of the Vesdre and the Ourthe ;[3] but this place does not correspond with Caesar's description. Cohausen and others have assumed that the stronghold is identical with Atuatuca,[4] the site of the camp in which Sabinus and Cotta were quartered in the autumn of 54 B.C. It is hardly necessary to refute this assumption, for which there is not a particle of evidence ; but one fact is sufficient to demonstrate its absurdity. The stronghold of the Atuatuci was situated upon a steep and rocky hill, which even Caesar's powerful army could only approach, with the aid of a terrace, by one narrow slope : Atuatuca, although a strong place, was so situated that in 53 B. C. 2,000 German cavalry nearly carried it by a *coup de main*.[5]

To sum up, Mont Falhize conforms perfectly, in the judgement of trained professional observers, to Caesar's description. On the other hand, he does not mention the Meuse or any other river :[6] no antiquities had been found on Mont Falhize up to the date (1868) when the first part of the *Dictionnaire archéologique de la Gaule* was published, and I have not been able to discover that any have been found since ; the place was not, so far as we know, occupied in the Middle Ages, nor has it been occupied in modern times. A more serious objection presented itself to me when I visited Mont Falhize : I was unable to detect the narrow gentle slope on the eastern side, the existence of which von Göler affirms. Possibly it may have been obliterated by the earth and rubble of which the *agger* would have been largely composed ; but if it exists at all, it is insignificant.[7]

[1] *Atlas hist. de la France*, p. 4. [2] See pp. 385–7.

[3] *Messager des sciences hist. de Belgique*, 1887, pp. 46, 49. Cf. *Jahrb. d. Vereins von Alterthumsfreunden im Rheinlande*, xliii, 1867, pp. 26–36.

[4] See A. von Kampen, *Quindecim ad Caesaris de b. G. comm. tabulae*, ii.

[5] *B. G.*, ii, 29, § 3 ; vi, 37–8.

[6] It has been argued that he did not mention the Meuse because it played no part in the siege (A. Hock, *Études sur quelques campagnes de Jules César*, &c., 1897, p. 22) ; but surely it would have played the part of a natural line of contravallation.

[7] Von Göler (*Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 94) says that the ground falls eastward about 20 feet (*Oestlich gegen das Gehölze von Huy hin senkt sich das Terrain um ungefähr* 20 *Fuss*). M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 270, n. 2) says, 'Je trouve bien à Falhize le col de 200 pieds dont parle César . . . mais il ne présente pas une inclinaison ou une dépression assez sensible pour justifier ce qu'il en dit.'

As at Namur, the contravallation would necessarily have been carried up and down, but only in a small fraction of its extent. The *minime arduus ascensus* would have been on the north.

Moreover, I agree with M. de Vlaminck that the territory of the Atuatuci, before they came into collision with Caesar, extended further eastward than is commonly supposed.[1] Therefore, although I mark the *oppidum* upon the map, I only do so tentatively.

Aulerci Brannovices.—The Aulerci Brannovices and Blannovii are only mentioned by Caesar, and only once by him ; and he tells us nothing about them, except that they were clients of the Aedui.[2] To add to the difficulty of identifying their territories, the MSS. offer a variety of readings. *A* has *Blannovicibus* instead of *Brannovicibus*. Nipperdey follows one of the old editions in reading *Brannoviis*, instead of *Blannoviis*. Ciacconius deleted *Blannoviis* on the ground that its insertion was probably due to dittography ; and Meusel[3] now follows his example.

The French Commission[4] agree with d'Anville[5] that the territory of the Brannovices may be represented by the canton of Brionnais, on the eastern bank of the upper Loire. Walckenaer, who accepts the reading (Aulercis) *Blannovicibus*, *Blannoviis*, places the Blannovices in the neighbourhood of Blannot in the arrondissement of Mâcon, and the Blannovii in the neighbourhood of another Blannot in the arrondissement of Beaune.[6] M. Longnon proposes to identify the territory of the Brannovices with the diocese of Auxerre, which he assigns to the Aedui (q.v.). He bases his conjecture on 'la mention d'un "quidam Aeolercus", que la légende du premier évêque d'Auxerre montre élevant un temple païen à Entrains (Nièvre)'.[7]

The whole matter is quite uncertain, as we have no evidence except that of nomenclature. I follow d'Anville, but doubtfully, in assigning to the Brannovices the canton of Brionnais. As to the Blannovii, supposing that they existed, nobody can tell where they lived ; for there are two Blannots, and one might as well toss up as attempt to decide between them.

Aulerci Cenomani.—The Cenomani occupied that part of the diocese of Le Mans which did not belong to the Diablintes (q.v.) and the Arvii ; but the frontier can only be conjecturally traced. Their territory corresponded, roughly, with the department of the Sarthe.[8]

Aulerci Eburovices.—The Aulerci Eburones appear in the MSS. among the tribes who sent troops to the relief of Vercingetorix.[9] De Valois,[10] however, conjectured that for *Eburonibus* should be read *Eburovicibus*, (1) because the Aulerci Eburovices appear in *B. G.*, iii, 17, § 3, side by side with the Lexovii, immediately after whom the Aulerci Eburones are mentioned in the passage which I am discussing ; and (2) because the Aulerci Eburones are mentioned

[1] See the preceding article.
[2] *B. G.*, vii, 75, § 2.
[3] *Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xxxvi, 1910, p. 60.
[4] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 93.
[5] *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 129.
[6] *Géogr. des Gaules*, i, 331.
[7] *Atlas hist. de la France*, p. 4.
[8] D'Anville, *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 130 ; *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 93. Cf. F. Liger, *La Cénomanie rom.*, 1904, pp. 3–4.
[9] *B. G.*, vii, 75, § 3.
[10] *Notitia Galliarum*, p. 66.

nowhere else by Caesar and by no other writer, whereas the Eburovices are mentioned not only by Caesar, but also by Pliny,[1] Orosius,[2] and later writers. De Valois's emendation is accepted by most editors; but Schneider retains the reading of the MSS., believing that if there was a mistake, it was made by Caesar in consequence of his having been misinformed. I think that de Valois's arguments are sufficient; and it is significant that in *B. G.*, iii, 17, § 3, where Caesar mentions the Eburovices, one inferior MS. has Eburones.[3] The Eburovices occupied the diocese of Évreux, or the central and the southern part of the department of the Eure.[4]

Ausci.—The Ausci occupied the southern part of the diocese of Auch, that is to say, the central and the southern part of the department of the Gers.[5]

Belgae.—Are the Treveri to be included among the Belgae? Caesar's introductory chapter, taken by itself (unless, as Meusel[6] contends, the last three sentences were interpolated), certainly implies that this question is to be answered in the affirmative. After telling us that the Gauls, or Celtae, 'are separated from the Belgae by the Marne and the Seine,' he says, 'that part of the whole country which, as we have said, is occupied by the Gauls, begins at the river Rhône, and is bounded by the Garonne, the Ocean, and the country of the Belgae: *it extends, moreover, in the region occupied by the Sequani and the Helvetii, to the Rhine*' (*eorum una pars, quam Gallos obtinere dictum est, initium capit a flumine Rhodano: continetur Garumna flumine, Oceano, finibus Belgarum; attingit etiam ab Sequanis et Helvetiis flumen Rhenum*).[7] Now he says elsewhere that the territory of the Treveri extended to the Rhine.[8] But if they had been Celtae, not Belgae, he ought to have written, in the passage which I have

[1] *Nat. Hist.*, iv, 18 (32), § 107. [2] vi, 8, § 18.
[3] Schneider's *Caesar*, i, 263. [4] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 94.
[5] Walckenaer, i, 288; *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 97–8.
[6] *Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xxxvi, 1910, pp. 20–3. With one exception, Meusel's arguments appear to me inconclusive, for they imply that Caesar was incapable of writing carelessly, and certain objections which he makes on the score of orientation would hold good against the authorship of an interpolator as well as against that of Caesar; but if he is right in maintaining that the words (Belgae) *a b extremis Galliae finibus oriuntur* and the singular *septentrio* (which is used by Livy, xxxii, 13, § 3) could not have been written by Caesar, the passage must be condemned. Still, if it is an interpolation, it must have been derived from a writer earlier than Augustus; for the boundaries which it assigns to Aquitania are those of Caesar's time. Is it likely that the interpolator, who, according to Meusel (*op. cit.*, pp. 73–4), lived in the third or the fourth century, would have been ignorant of the boundary as it existed in his own day? [A. Klotz (*Caesarstudien*, pp. 27–30) also condemns the passage for reasons which are much the same as those of Meusel. He argues that *initium capit* (in the sense in which it is used in § 5), *ab* (Sequanis), *spectant in* and *spectant inter*, and (Pyrenaeos) *montes* instead of *saltus* are not expressions which Caesar would have used. Apparently he believes that the statement about the northern boundary of Aquitania—*continetur Garumna flumine*—was derived from Timagenes.]
[7] *B. G.*, i, 1, §§ 2, 5.
[8] *Ib.*, vi, 9, § 5. The authenticity of iv, 10 is more than doubtful. See p. 692.

just quoted, *attingit etiam ab Treveris, Sequanis, Helvetiis flumen Rhenum.* Moreover, as the Condrusi, clients and neighbours of the Treveri, were undoubtedly Belgae,[1] it might be inferred that the Treveri themselves belonged to the same group. On the other hand, the Remi told Caesar in 57 B.C. that all the Belgae, except themselves, were in arms; and the Treveri are not mentioned in the list which they furnished of the various contingents.[2] Again, there is a passage in *B. G.*, vi, 3, § 4, which might suggest that Caesar reckoned the Treveri as Celtae. He says that when he held his annual council of Gallic chiefs in the spring of 53 B.C., all the states, except the Senones, the Carnutes, and the Treveri, sent their representatives (*concilio Galliae primo vere, ut instituerat, indicto, cum reliqui praeter Senones, Carnutes Treverosque venissent*, &c.); and, as the preceding chapter proves that the Nervii, the Atuatuci, and the Menapii—all Belgic peoples—were not represented, Long[3] infers that Caesar was only speaking of the states of Gallia Celtica. After looking at both sides of the question, it seems reasonable to conclude, from the fact that the Treveri do not appear in the list of the Belgic tribes and from the fact that they actually assisted Caesar in his first campaign against the Belgae,[4] that, according to his informants, they were reckoned among the Celtae. Still, there were striking differences, which Hirtius noticed, between the Celtae and the Treveri.[5]

Belgium.—Did Caesar use this word in *B. G.* v, 24, § 2, and if so, in what sense? He mentions Belgium three times (v, 12, § 2; 24, § 2; 25, § 4), or, according to the α MSS., twice (12, 25). In the former of these two chapters—I may here assume that it is genuine, although Meusel and A. Klotz regard it as an interpolation[6]—he says that the maritime part of Britain had been colonized by immigrants from Belgium, 'almost all of them being called after the tribes from whom the first comers were an offshoot':—*maritima pars* (incolitur) *ab iis qui praedae ac belli inferendi causa ex Belgio transierunt qui omnes fere iis nominibus civitatum appellantur, quibus orti ex civitatibus eo pervenerunt.* The natural conclusion is that *Belgium* meant the country of the Belgae;[7] for, if it had meant only a particular part of that country, how could Caesar's readers have known what part he meant? In the second of the two chapters (25) he says that he ordered Plancus to march with his legion from Belgium to the country of the Carnutes; and this statement, taken by itself, would lead to the same conclusion. But in the preceding chapter (24) there occurs a passage which has led most commentators to adopt a different opinion. Describing the distribution of the legions which he made in the autumn of 54 B.C., Caesar says that he placed three, under Crassus, Plancus, and Trebonius respectively, in the country of the Belgae, or, according to the β MSS., in Belgium:—*tres* (legiones) *in Belgis* (or *Belgio*) *conlocavit: his M. Crassum*

[1] *B. G.*, ii, 4; iv, 6; vi, 32, § 1.
[2] *Ib.*, ii, 3, § 4; 4.
[3] *Caesar*, p. 288.
[4] *B. G.*, ii, 24, § 4.
[5] *Ib.*, viii, 25, § 2.
[6] See p. 206, n. 4.
[7] Cf. Schneider's *Caesar*, ii, 56.

quaestorem et L. Munatium Plancum et C. Trebonium legatos praefecit. Now all the other legions, except one, were also quartered in the country of the Belgae; and accordingly the reading *Belgis* would seem to have no point. For this reason A. Holder, following Cluver,[1] reads *Bellovacis*; while d'Anville,[2] Walckenaer,[3] the French Commission,[4] and Meusel (in the re-issue of his school edition) read *Belgio.* Assuming that this is the true reading, it is obvious that, in this passage at all events, unless Caesar was very careless, *Belgium* can only mean a part of the whole territory of the *Belgae.* If so, what was that part? Now Hirtius[5] mentions Belgium four times; but we only learn from him that within the limits of Belgium was Nemetocenna, the chief town of the Atrebates. A passage in v, 46, § 1 —*Caesar . . . in Bellovacos ad M. Crassum quaestorem mittit, cuius hiberna aberant ab eo milia passuum XXV*—proves that the camp of Crassus, one of the three camps which, according to the passage in v, 24, were in Belgium, was in the territory of the Bellovaci. As it is clear, then, says d'Anville, that Belgium comprised the territories of the Bellovaci and the Atrebates, it must have also comprised the territory of the Ambiani, which was between the other two. This is the orthodox view; and if, in the doubtful passage (v, 24), the true reading is *Belgio*, it is right.

But is *Belgio* the true reading? It would be quite natural that Caesar should have called the country of the Belgae *Belgium*; but, although he used the word *Gallia* both in a general and in a restricted sense, it seems unlikely that he should have also used the word *Belgium* to denote a portion only of the country of the Belgae. On the other hand, the emendation *Bellovacis* does not mend matters; for it is certain that Trebonius's legion was at Samarobriva (Amiens) in the country of the Ambiani.[6] Caesar must have forgotten this, if he wrote *Bellovacis.* If he wrote *Belgis* or *Belgio*, he must have made a slip, unless the term *Belgium* was really used in a restricted sense, to describe the territory of the Bellovaci, the Ambiani, and the Atrebates, as well as in a general sense, to describe the whole territory of the Belgae.

To sum up, if we adopt the reading *Bellovacis*, we adopt a purely conjectural reading, and we have to admit that Caesar made a slip. If we adopt either of the readings, *Belgis* and *Belgio*, we have the support of good MSS.; and although it seems probable that, in either of these cases, Caesar made a slip, it is at least possible that in the latter he did not. Taking probability as our guide, we must, I think, decide in favour of *Belgio.* It may, indeed, be argued that it is unlikely that Caesar, departing from his habitual practice, would have said that certain legions encamped in Belgium, instead of mentioning the peoples among whom they encamped; and Nipperdey, who reads *Belgis*, remarks that, in v, 24, 'when we see that the Belgae are mentioned after certain Belgic tribes, we must conclude

[1] *Germania antiqua*, 1631, p. 341.
[2] *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, pp. 147–8.
[3] *Géogr. des Gaules*, i, 420–2.
[4] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 138.
[5] *B. G.*, viii, 46, §§ 3, 6; 49, § 1; 54, § 4.
[6] See p. 371, n. 7.

either that Caesar thought it superfluous to state what Belgic tribes he meant by Belgae or that he simply forgot to do so.'[1] But the retort is obvious. If we read *Belgio*, we must conclude either that Caesar thought it superfluous to state what part of the territory of the Belgae he meant by Belgium or that he simply forgot to do so. Again, it seems more likely that the word *Belgium* should have been used in a restricted as well as in a general sense than that Caesar should have used the word *Belgae*, the meaning of which he had himself defined at the outset of his work, in a way which would have been certain to mislead. Moreover, it is possible that the word *Belgium* was only used in a restricted sense; for in the chapter (v, 12) in which we read that immigrants from Belgium settled in Britain, there is a various reading—found, it is true, only in inferior MSS.—*Belgis*. See Nipperdey's *Caesar*, page 355.

Bellovaci.—The Bellovaci certainly possessed the diocese of Beauvais. D'Anville,[2] Walckenaer,[3] and the French Commission[4] also assign them the diocese of Senlis, corresponding with the territory of the *Silvanectes*,[5] a people who are not mentioned by Caesar, and who may have been one of their *pagi*. The Commission observe that the diocese of Beauvais alone would not have been sufficient for so important a state. But by the same reasoning the diocese of Senlis might be, as it has been, assigned to the Suessiones, who, according to Caesar,[6] had a very extensive territory. To one or the other of the two tribes, it has been argued, this intermediate tract must have belonged; for Caesar[7] implies that their territories were conterminous. His statement is, indeed, not absolutely inconsistent with the theory that the Silvanectes were an independent people; for in any case the Bellovaci and the Suessiones would have been conterminous in the country north of the Silvanectes. Still, as he does not mention the Silvanectes in his list of the Belgic tribes, I am inclined to believe that they were dependants of or included among the Suessiones.

The Commission further propose to extend the territory of the Bellovaci to the sea, giving them the tongue of land which separates the river Bresle from Arques, as this tract cannot be assigned with certainty either to the Ambiani or to the Caletes[8] (q.v.). But neither can it be assigned with certainty to the Bellovaci; and it seems to me safer to follow the indications of the dioceses.[9]

L. Mazière[10] believes that the Bellovaci also possessed the Noyonnais. The district in question is generally assigned to the Viromandui;

[1] See Nipperdey's *Caesar*, p. 79. It must be remembered that Nipperdey was prejudiced against the β MSS.

[2] *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 148.

[3] *Géogr. des Gaules*, i, 429.

[4] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 140.

[5] Ptolemy, *Geogr.*, ii, 9, § 6; Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, iv, 17 (31), § 106.

[6] *B. G.*, ii, 4, § 6.

[7] *Ib.*, 13, § 1.

[8] The district in question forms part of the diocese of Rouen. See the map in *Gallia Christiana*, t. xi.

[9] Cf. C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, ii, 482, and V. Leblond's paper in *Congrès archéol. de France*, 1905 (1906), pp. 318–26.

[10] *Comptes rendus et mém. du comité arch. de Noyon*, iii, 1868, pp. 34–9.

and, in support of this opinion, it is pointed out that in 531 the see of the bishopric of Vermand was transferred to Noyon. Mazière, however, infers from Caesar's statement that the Bellovaci numbered 100,000 fighting men,[1] that their entire population must have amounted to at least 400,000; and he argues that, without the Noyonnais, their territory would have been much too small to support such a multitude. I admit that, if it was confined to the diocese of Beauvais, it would have been disproportionately small: but, if we are to disregard the law of the dioceses, we must have stronger evidence; and, as I have shown on page 242, the number, 100,000, is probably exaggerated. See VELIOCASSES.

Bibracte.—In the first edition of this book,[2] it was demonstrated that Bibracte was identical, not, as was formerly supposed, with Augustodunum—the Gallo-Roman town which stood upon the site of Autun—but with the great manufacturing town on Mont Beuvray, 12 miles west of Autun, which preserves the ancient name, and whose defences, houses, and workshops have been revealed by excavation. Although the old error was repeated by well-known writers up to the close of the last century and was not corrected even by Mommsen in his latest edition, I need not reprint my original article; for the claims of Mont Beuvray, unlike those of Alise-Sainte-Reine (Alesia), are no longer disputed. Bibracte was abandoned early in the imperial era and succeeded by Augustodunum, which was built upon virgin soil, and, as Freeman said, 'was a new city on a new site, deliberately laid out from the beginning on a great scale.'[3]

Bibrax.—Bibrax was 8 Roman miles from the camp which Caesar made in 57 B. C., immediately after crossing the Aisne, and was situated on or near the road by which the Belgae advanced against him.[4] Many places have been proposed for the site;[5] but, as Caesar crossed the Aisne either at Berry-au-Bac or at Pontavert,[6] there are only two which answer sufficiently to his description to call for discussion. They are Beaurieux and Vieux-Laon.[7]

1. Von Göler[8] pronounced for Beaurieux, which is about 8 Roman miles west of the hill of Mauchamp, where, if Caesar crossed at Berry-au-Bac, he encamped, and about 2 miles north of the Aisne. General Creuly[9] objects that Beaurieux was so situated that it could

[1] *B. G.*, ii, 4, § 5.
[2] Pp. 387–94.
[3] *Hist. Essays*, 4th ser., pp. 103–5. Cf. *Mém. de la Soc. éduenne*, i, 1872, pp. 311–7, 356, 367, and *Sitzungsberichte d. Königl. preuss. Akad. d. Wissenschaften*, 1897, pp. 1104, n. 1, 1113, n. 5.
[4] *B. G.*, ii, 6, § 1.
[5] See *Bull. de la Soc. acad. de Laon*, xix, 1869–70, pp. 265–76.
[6] See pp. 659–66.
[7] See Caignart de Saulcy, *Les campagnes de Jules César dans les Gaules*, 1862, p. 110. D'Anville indeed, who believed that Caesar crossed the Aisne at Pontavert, decided for Bièvre, 'qui conserve évidemment le nom de Bibrax' (*Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, pp. 159–60). But the hill of Bièvre is scarped on every side, except the north, which would have prevented the Belgae from attacking it; and it is almost 16 kilometres, or about 11 Roman miles, from the Aisne. Therefore, if it was the site of Bibrax, Caesar's camp must have been on the heights of Craonne; and this, as I show on p. 666, is impossible. See de Saulcy, p. 120, and von Göler, *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 67, n. 1 and p. 272.
[8] *Gall. Krieg*, p. 67.
[9] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., vii, 1863, pp. 299–300.

have been entirely surrounded by the Belgae ; and that the relieving force sent by Caesar would therefore have been useless. Von Göler assumes, however, that the heights on which the town stands were then washed by the Aisne, and he argues that this assumption explains the fact that Caesar's light-armed troops were able to relieve Bibrax (by crossing the river) although it was blockaded by the Belgae. M. Jullian,[1] who accepts von Göler's choice, but of course rejects his hypothesis about the Aisne, maintains that in the night Caesar's troops could have made their way into the town ; but does not this argument ascribe to the Belgae a degree of carelessness which is hardly credible ? Moreover, Beaurieux was not on the road by which the Belgae marched against Caesar, unless they came from Soissons ; and, as I show on pages 658–9, this is most improbable. It need hardly be added that the identification of Bibrax with Beaurieux depends on the assumption that Caesar crossed the Aisne at Berry-au-Bac.[2]

2. Napoleon[3] adopted the plateau of Vieux-Laon, which Thillois[4] and de Saulcy[5] had selected before him. A little to the south of this plateau and dominated by it, is the village of Berrieux, or, as it was once called, Bébrieux.[6] It has been conjectured that in the fifth century a town which stood upon the plateau was abandoned by its inhabitants, who took up their abode upon the hill of Laon ; that they in turn built a settlement upon the site of Berrieux ; and that they gave to this settlement the name of Bibrax, their abandoned home.[7] Anyhow, it is certain that the hill of Laon was once called Bibrax :[8] Laon is much too far from the Aisne to have been the Bibrax of the *Commentaries* : it is therefore probable that the name *Bibrax* was given to it because the inhabitants of the Bibrax of the *Commentaries* had migrated to it : this probability is increased by the fact that the entrenchments of St. Thomas, which stood on the hill of Vieux Laon, were called in the charter of the abbey of St. Vincent, in 1213, Vetus Landunum ;[9] and it is a reasonable conjecture that the Bibrax of the *Commentaries* stood on or close to the hill which is now called Vieux Laon. Napoleon[10] observes that, on its southern side, it was unassailable by the Gallic method of assault ;[11]

[1] *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 253, n. 2, 254, n. 2. [2] See pp. 659–66.
[3] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 101.
[4] *Bull. de la Soc. acad. de Laon*, xix, 1869–70, pp. 263–76
[5] *Les campagnes de Jules César dans les Gaules*, p. 110.
[6] *Bull. de la Soc. acad. de Laon*, xix, 1869–70, pp. 273–4. [7] *Ib.*
[8] See *Acta Sanctorum*, June 20,—*Landunum montem qui antiquo nomine Bibrax nuncupabatur.* M. Wauters (*Bull. de l'Acad. Roy. de Bruxelles*, 3e sér., i, 1881, p. 367, with which cf. C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 253, n. 2) does not believe that Laon was ever called Bibrax, because he considers it unlikely that one place should have had two Gallic names—*Bibrax* and *Landunum*—at the same time. But it is not certain that the names *Bibrax* and *Landunum* were applied to Laon at the same time ; and M. Wauters might have remembered that the Saône was called by two Gallic names, *Sauconna* and *Arar* (Ammianus Marcellinus, xv, ii, § 17).
[9] A. Piette, *Itin. gallo-rom. dans le départemen de l'Aisne*, 1856–62, pp. 263–4.
[10] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 101, n. 1. [11] *B. G.*, i , 6, §§ 2–3.

and he argues that the Belgae, with the carelessness of a half barbarous people, would have neglected to invest it on that side. But, objects Long,[1] Napoleon assumes 'that Caesar's light troops entered Bibrax, which is not distinctly stated by Caesar'. This is true; but, if the troops did not actually enter Bibrax, it is probable that they were prepared to do so.[2]

Bigerriones.—The Bigerriones, whose name is preserved in Bigorre, inhabited the diocese of Tarbes, or, roughly speaking, the department of the Hautes-Pyrénées.[3]

Bituriges.—The Bituriges Cubi occupied the diocese of Bourges, which included the departments of the Cher and Indre and the north-western part of the department of the Allier.[4]

The Bituriges Vivisci, who are not mentioned by Caesar, occupied the diocese of Bordeaux, that is to say, the greater part of the department of the Gironde.[5] See SANTONI.

Boi.—See GORGOBINA.

Brannovices.—See AULERCI.

Bratuspantium.—Bratuspantium cannot be identified with certainty. Caesar mentions the town once only;[6] and no other ancient writer mentions it at all. Caesar merely says that it was a stronghold of the Bellovaci, who surrendered it to him in 57 B.C., when he was marching from Noviodunum (Suessionum) into the country of the Ambiani, whose capital was Samarobriva, or Amiens. Noviodunum (q.v.) was certainly close to Soissons, and was most probably on the hill of Pommiers, 4 kilometres, or about $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles, north-west of that town.

Napoleon,[7] following the Abbé Devic,[8] adopts a site, close to Breteuil, which, he remarks, is just 25 miles—the distance, he says, mentioned by the *Commentaries*—from Amiens. What there is to be said for this site is that it is on the Roman road from Soissons to Amiens; that the ground is suitable for a stronghold; and that in the neighbouring valley of Vandeuil a few Gallic and numerous Gallo-Roman antiquities have been found.[9] But when Napoleon said that 25 miles was the distance from Bratuspantium to Samarobriva, 'mentioned by the *Commentaries*,' he must have been dreaming; for the *Commentaries* do not mention the distance at all. Walckenaer[10] considers it unlikely that the chief *oppidum* of the Bellovaci should have been situated, like Breteuil, close to their frontier, instead of in the heart of their territory; but this objection is not conclusive. It used to be asserted that Breteuil itself, or the neighbourhood of Breteuil, had, from time immemorial, been called Bratuspance:[11]

[1] *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv, 48, n. 2.
[2] See p. 241, n. 6.
[3] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 160.
[4] D'Anville, *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 162.
[5] *Ib.*, p. 163, and *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 165.
[6] *B. G.*, ii, 13, § 2.
[7] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 106, n. 1.
[8] *Dissertation sur Bratuspantium*, 1843; *Étude sur les . . . Comm. de César*, 1865, pp. 20—57.
[9] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 193.
[10] *Géogr. des Gaules*, i, 42, 7–8.
[11] L. d'Allonville, *Dissertation sur les camps romains du dépt de la Somme*, 1828, p. 155.

ut that argument has long been abandoned, even by the advocates f Breteuil. 'From time immemorial,' in questions of this kind, enerally means from the time when some forgotten antiquary tarted a theory which grew into a pseudo-tradition ; and, as Walcke-aer observes, if Breteuil was ever called Bratuspance, it probably egan to be so called in 1574, when a certain curé of Breteuil reported o the prince of Condé in favour of the probable identity of Breteuil ith Bratuspantium.

2. Another conjecture is that of Perrot d'Ablancourt, who placed ratuspantium at Gratepanse, a hamlet about 5 miles east of Mont-idier.[1] Gratepanse must not be confounded with Gratepanche in he diocese of Amiens, with which Bratuspantium has also been bsurdly identified.[2] The hamlet has disappeared, but was still tanding at the beginning of the last century. It has been said that etween the words *Bratuspantium* and 'Gratepanse' there is a esemblance ; that the hill upon which Gratepanse stood was suitable or a Gallic stronghold ; that various roads met at the hamlet, from hich it might be inferred that the place had once been an important entre ; that in 1687 the remains of massive walls were discovered here ; and that since then Roman coins have been found.[3] But it s needless to say that all these facts taken together do not amount o anything like proof. Besides, the hill on which the hamlet stood s only about 600 metres long and between 400 and 500 broad ; and his is too small to have been the site of an important *oppidum* like ratuspantium.

3. De Valois[4] identified Bratuspantium with Beauvais, on the ite of which stood Caesaromagus, the Gallo-Roman capital of the ellovaci ; but it has been proved that no Gallic town existed there efore.[5]

4. M. de Lepinois conjectures that Bratuspantium was on the ite of Clermont ; but, as Dr. Leblond[6] observes, the area of this ill is only 20 hectares, or about 49 acres, and hardly any antiquities ave been found upon it.

5. Von Göler decides for Montdidier, which is about 12 miles, in direct line, east of Breteuil ; and his son, endorsing his decision, ays that Montdidier was the place selected for the camp of Crassus n the winter of 54–53 B.C.[7] But there is not a tittle of evidence that rassus was ever at Montdidier ; and even if he was, that is no reason or inferring that Montdidier was the site of Bratuspantium. In act there is nothing to be said for Montdidier, except that it was ituated on or near the route which it may be conjectured that aesar took.[8]

[1] V. de Beauvillé, *Hist. de la ville de Montdidier*, 1857 (2nd ed., 1875), i, 23–5.
[2] *Comptes rendus et mém. du Comité arch. de Noyon*, 1862, pp. 198–9.
[3] *Ib.*, p. 200 ; De Beauvillé, *op. cit.*, i. 23–5. Dr. V. Leblond, however, ays, 'je ne sache pas que d'importantes trouvailles gauloises ou gallo-omaines y aient jamais été faites' (*L'oppidum Bratuspantium*, &c., 1909, p. 16).
[4] *Notitia Galliarum*, p. 113.
[5] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 193.
[6] *Op. cit.*, p. 24.
[7] *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 73, n. 2.
[8] *Comptes rendus et mém. du Comité arch. de Senlis*, 2e sér., iv, 1878, p. 19.

6. Perhaps the most plausible conjecture is that of M. Seymour de Ricci,[1] who, accepting the identification of Noviodunum (Suessionum) with Pommiers,[2] argues that just as Pommiers is close to Soissons, (the Gallo-Roman capital of the Suessiones), so Bratuspantium was close to Beauvais. The only admissible site, in his opinion, is Mont-César in the commune of Bailleul-sur-Thérain, 11 kilometres, or between 6 and 7 miles, ESE. of Beauvais. It may be added that Augustonemetum (Clermont-Ferrand) and Augustodunum (Autun) —the Gallo-Roman capitals of the Arverni and the Aedui respectively—were built near the old strongholds, Gergovia and Bibracte. But does not Caesar's statement[3], that when he was encamping on the outskirts of Bratuspantium 'the women and children stretched out their hands from the wall . . . and begged the Romans for peace', suggest that it was not situated on a hill 78 metres above the plain ?[4] M. Jullian[5] in despair proposes 'sous toutes réserves, quelque croupe dans les environs immédiats de Beauvais'.

The reader now knows all that can be known about the site of Bratuspantium,—that is nothing : but he also knows why nothing can be known ; and that is something gained. There is perhaps more to be said for the site near Breteuil than for any other site which has been suggested ; but if Bratuspantium is to be marked upon the map at that point, it should be with a note of interrogation.

Cadurci.—The Cadurci were dependants of the Arverni ;[6] and their territory corresponded with a part at least of the diocese of Cahors, in other words of the department of the Lot.[7] Caesar mentions them three times ;[8] and in the last passage he writes *Eleutetis Cadurcis*, or, according to π, *Heleutetis et Cadurcis*. Napoleon,[9] apparently assuming that *Eleuteti* [or, according to an inferior MS., *Eleutheri*] was the Celtic equivalent of ἐλεύθεροι, conjectures that *Eleutheri Cadurci* means 'the independent Cadurci' ; that the Eleutheri Cadurci occupied the northern part of the whole territory of the Cadurci ; and that the southern part was, even in Caesar's time, under the dominion of Rome. This conjecture is simply a bad guess. If the southern part had been under Roman rule, it would have formed a part of the Province ; and when Caesar was writing of the danger that was likely to threaten the Province if the Helvetii were allowed to settle in the country of the Santoni,[10] he would have given additional point to his statement by saying that the country of the Santoni was not far from the country of the Cadurci, instead of saying that it was not far from the country of the Tolosates. Long[11] suggests that *Eleutheri*, like *Aulerci*, was a generic name ; but

[1] *Rev. arch.*, 4e sér., ix, 1907, p. 403. Dr. Leblond (*op. cit.*, pp. 25–32) agrees with M. de Ricci, principally because 'le Mont-César apparaît un emplacement parfait comme camp d'observation et comme lieu de refuge.'

[2] See pp. 465–6.

[3] *B. G.*, ii, 13, § 3.

[4] See *Carte de l'État-Major* (1 : 80,000), Sheet 32.

[5] *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 259, note.

[6] *B. G.*, vii, 75, § 3.

[7] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 215.

[8] *B. G.*, vii, 4, § 6 ; 64, § 6 ; 75, § 2.

[9] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 24, n. 2.

[10] *B. G.*, i, 10, §§ 1–2.

[11] *Caesar*, p. 393.

if so, why was it not applied by any ancient writer to any other people besides the Cadurci ? I believe that if Caesar wrote *Eleuteti* or any such name, the Eleuteti were distinct from the Cadurci. M. Jullian [1] thinks that *Eleuteti* perhaps denotes those of the Ruteni, or of a part thereof, who were not subject to Rome ; but are not the independent Ruteni mentioned by Caesar in the next sentence of the same chapter ? Glück,[2] following F. A. Ukert,[3] proposes to read *Helviis* instead of *Eleutetis* [4] ; but Heller [5] rightly objects that the Helvii, as far as we can judge, rendered no assistance to Vercingetorix, whereas the Eleuteti appear among the peoples who sent contingents to his relief. The Helvii, indeed, just before the blockade of Alesia, had taken an active part against him.[6]

Caerosi.—The Caerosi, the Condrusi, the Paemani, and the Segni are mentioned by no ancient writer except Caesar. He groups the Condrusi with the Eburones, the Caerosi and the Paemani : he implies that the Eburones and the Condrusi were conterminous ; and he says that the Segni and Condrusi were between the Eburones and the Treveri.[7] From these statements, supplemented by a comparison of the names of the several tribes with modern local names, attempts have been made to determine their respective territories.

1. Sanson [8] is inclined to place the Caerosi either in the neighbourhood of a village called Siré, not far from Liège, or in the neighbourhood of Bouillon, near the river Chiers, which enters the Meuse between Mouzon and Sedan. A. Wauters,[9] arguing that their powerful neighbours, the Treveri, would have kept the best parts of the country for themselves, and driven them into the mountainous regions of the Ardennes, assigns them a tract which was called in the eighth century *pagus Caros* or *Carascus*, north of Trèves, on the banks of the Prum ; and this view is adopted by the French Commission.[10]

2. The Condrusi were placed by d'Anville [11] in a district which, in the ninth century, was called Condrustum ; and this identification is generally accepted. Their name is still preserved in Condroz, a tract which extends along the right bank of the Meuse, between Liège and Dinant, Namur, and Huy.

Cluver [12] insists that the rout of the Usipetes and Tencteri must have taken place in the country of the Condrusi, because Caesar says that the Usipetes and Tencteri had reached their territory and that of the Eburones when he began his march against them : he places the scene of the rout near Coblenz ; and accordingly he assigns

[1] *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 516, n. 2.
[2] *Die bei C. J. Caesar vorkommenden keltischen Namen*, 1857, pp. 111–2.
[3] *Geogr. der Griechen und Römer*, 1816–46, ii, 2, 265.
[4] Meusel, in the re-issue of his school edition, also reads *Helviis*. Has he not overlooked *B. G.*, vii, 65, § 2 ?
[5] *Philologus*, xvii, 1861, p. 282.
[6] *B. G.*, vii, 64, § 6 ; 65, § 2.
[7] *Ib.*, ii, 4, § 10 ; iv, 6, § 4 ; vi, 32, § 1.
[8] *Les Comm. de César*, 3rd ed., 1658, p. 25.
[9] *Bull. de l'Acad. Roy. de Bruxelles*, xiii, 1862, p. 393.
[10] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 217.
[11] *Notice*, &c., p. 240.
[12] *Germania antiqua*, 1631, p. 397.

the Condrusi the country on the left bank of the Rhine from its confluence with the Moselle northward as far as the mouth of the Sieg. This argument is worthless ; for Caesar does not imply that the rout of the Usipetes and Tencteri took place in the country of the Condrusi. Besides, on Cluver's theory, their rout took place both in the territory of the Eburones and in that of the Condrusi !

3. The Paemani are placed, unanimously I believe, in the Pays de Famenne, a district which appears to retain their name, and also adjoins Condroz, the assumed territory of the Condrusi.[1]

4. The name of the Segni is believed to be preserved in that of Sinei or Signi, a town in the county of Namur, near Condroz.[2]

Caleti.—The Caleti occupied that part of the diocese of Rouen which did not belong to the Veliocasses ; and their territory included the Pays de Caux (*pagus Caletus*), or the western and central portion of the department of the Seine-Inférieure. Their precise limits, however, cannot be traced. D'Anville gives them, besides the archdeaconries of Grand Caux and Petit Caux, a part of the archdeaconry of Rouen, because, he says, their chief town, Juliobona (Lillebonne), was situated in the archdeaconry. But, according to the French Commission, Lillebonne is in the archdeaconry of Grand Caux. Longnon adds to the archdeaconries of Grand Caux and Petit Caux the archdeaconry of Eu.[3]

Carnutes.—The Carnutes possessed the dioceses of Chartres, Orléans, and Blois, or the greater part of the departments of the Eure-et-Loire, Loiret, and Loire-et-Cher. The diocese of Blois was formerly incorporated in that of Orléans.[4]

Caturiges.—Caesar mentions the Caturiges once only. He says that they, as well as the Ceutrones and the Graioceli, occupied the heights when he was crossing the Alps in 58 B.C., on his way from Cisalpine to Transalpine Gaul, and that they attacked him. The route which he followed led over Mont Genèvre.[5]

Ptolemy[6] mentions only one of the towns of the Caturiges, Ebrodunum, or Embrun, which, according to Strabo,[7] was on their western frontier. Another, Caturigae or Caturigomagus, which is mentioned in the itineraries, has been identified with Chorges. If it belonged to the Caturiges in Caesar's time, their western frontier, as a glance at the map will show, was almost certainly west of Ebrodunum. Walckenaer,[8] indeed, believes that their territory extended westward of Vapincum, or Gap, to a place called Fines, a name which, in Gallo-Roman geography, always marked a boundary. This place is identified by the measurements in the *Itinerary of Jerusalem* with Blaynie-Sept-Fons. The French

[1] D'Anville, pp. 511–2 ; Walckenaer, i, 508.

[2] See D'Anville, p. 591, and generally, on the position of all four tribes, K. Müllenhoff's *Deutsche Altertumskunde*, ii, 196–7.

[3] D'Anville, pp. 192–3 ; Walckenaer, i, 434–5 ; *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 219 ; A. Longnon, *Atlas hist. de la France*, p. 5. Eu is just in the territory which d'Anville's map assigns to the Caleti.

[4] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 232.

[5] *B. G.*, i, 10, §§ 3–4. See pp. 615–6.

[6] *Geogr.*, iii, 1, § 35.

[7] *Ib.*, iv, 1, § 3.

[8] *Géogr. des Gaules*, i, 541.

Commission, however, do not believe that Vapincum belonged to the Caturiges. Remarking that it has never belonged to the same ecclesiastical province as Embrun, they prefer to assign it to the Vocontii (q.v.) or one of the small neighbouring tribes which they regard as their dependants. Fines, on their theory, marked the frontier, not of the Caturiges, but of the small tribe to which, they assume, Vapincum originally belonged. Besides, they argue, there is no ground for supposing that the diocese of Gap was split into two parts, one of which, on the west of Fines, belonged to the Vocontii, and the other, on the east, to the Caturiges; yet, if Fines marked the western boundary of the Caturiges, this assumption is necessary. Vapincum is not mentioned by any authority earlier than the itineraries of Antonine and Jerusalem: but Desjardins[1] holds with good reason that it belonged to a small tribe called the Avantici; for, as he observes, the name of this people is preserved in Avançon and St. Étienne d'Avançon,—the names of two communes in the neighbourhood; and accordingly he believes that Fines marked the western boundary of the Avantici. But the question remains whether the Avantici were a *pagus* or a dependent tribe of the Caturiges or of the Vocontii.

D'Anville[2] believes that Brigantio, or Briançon, which Ptolemy[3] assigns to the Segusiani, really belonged to the Caturiges, as it lay outside the natural limits of the Segusiani, whose other town was Segusio (Susa); but Walckenaer maintains that Ptolemy was right, because, in his opinion, Ptolemy used, in preparing his book, a description of Italy written before the new divisions were made by Augustus. This is not a convincing argument; and whoever reads Caesar's notice of the Caturiges side by side with a good map[4] will agree with me that Brigantio must have belonged to that tribe.[5]

See Ceutrones, Graioceli, and Vocontii.

Cenabum.—Where was Cenabum? This is one of the most vexed questions of Gallic geography; and it has been a vexed question for centuries. Napoleon identifies Cenabum, or, as he calls it, Genabum,[6] with Gien. Mr. Froude, it is needless to say, follows Napoleon: so do Colonel Dodge, Captain G. Veith,[7] and Dr. Sieglerschmidt;[8] and so do some of the modern English editors. But I suspect that they all follow blindly; and they certainly follow a blind guide. Most of them seem to fancy that Napoleon has made a new

[1] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 228.

[2] *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 174.

[3] *Geogr.*, iii, 1, § 36.

[4] I recommend Sheet 60 of the *Carte de France* (1 : 200,000).

[5] Perhaps Desjardins is right in affirming that, in Caesar's time, 'ils s'étendaient aussi sur le versant oriental des Alpes, dans la vallée supérieure de la Duria' (*Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, i, 84–5).

[6] The right form is *Cenabum*. See p. 841.

[7] The young Austrian officer, whose knowledge of the literature of his subject is inadequate, makes the remarkable statement (*Gesch. d. Feldzüge C. J. Caesars*, p. 509) that the Gallo-Roman town which stood upon the site of Orléans was called, not Genabum (*sic*) simply, but Genabum Aurelianum.

[8] *Rev. arch.*, 4e sér., vi, 1905, p. 258, n. 1. Dr. Sieglerschmidt is a professor in the military school of Gross-Lichterfelde.

discovery ; whereas the truth is that many antiquaries had argued for Gien, or rather Gien-le-Vieux, which is about two kilometres, or a mile and a quarter, north-west of Gien, before Napoleon, and had argued much more forcibly than he. The tradition which identified Cenabum with Orléans appears to have been unbroken until, in the sixteenth century, some citizen of Gien endeavoured to make out a claim on behalf of his own town. Early in the eighteenth century, the famous Abbé Lebeuf attempted to sustain this claim ; but, after Lancelot and d'Anville had refuted his arguments, he virtually recanted his error. The authority of d'Anville was practically unquestioned for more than a century. But while Napoleon was collecting the materials for his work, MM. Bréan and Petit renewed the battle on behalf of Gien, or rather Gien-le-Vieux. Their arguments were criticized with relentless acumen by a commission, appointed by the *Société archéologique de l'Orléanais* to consider the question : but meanwhile the Emperor's book appeared ; and his verdict was given for Gien. Besides Mr. Froude and the other writers to whom I have alluded, Desjardins, Stoffel, Alfred Holder[1], and Meusel[2]—scholars whose opinion has weight—agree with Napoleon. The literature of the subject is very bulky. I have worked through it all, totally indifferent to the result to which my researches might lead me ; and I undertake to prove to demonstration that Cenabum stood, not upon the site of Gien, nor upon the site of Gien-le-Vieux, but upon the site of Orléans.

I. First of all, let us hear Caesar. He says that Cenabum belonged to the Carnutes, and that a number of Roman traders had settled there. The town was on the right bank of the Loire, and about 160 Roman miles from some point in the territory of the Arverni. It was seized by Carnutian rebels in the early part of 52 B. C. ; and they massacred the traders. A few weeks later Caesar marched with eight legions from Agedincum (Sens) for the country of the Boi, intending to relieve their town, Gorgobina, which was besieged by Vercingetorix. He left his heavy baggage at Sens, and directed the Aedui and the Boi to keep him supplied with corn. On the day after his departure from Sens he reached Vellaunodunum, a town belonging to the Senones, and captured it on the third day following. Thence he marched to Cenabum, and arrived there on the evening of the following day ; but, as it was late, he was obliged to postpone the siege. He implies that he marched from Vellaunodunum to Cenabum as quickly as possible.[3] Expecting that the inhabitants would try to escape in the night by a bridge over the Loire, he kept two legions under arms. He says distinctly that the bridge was in actual contact with the town.[4] About midnight he learned from his

[1] *Alt-celtischer Sprachschatz*, i, 979, 1997.

[2] In his school edition, 1908, p. 252.

[3] See p. 497.

[4] I assume, with all the best modern editors, except Nipperdey, that in the passage *oppidum Cenabum pons fluminis Ligeris contingebat*, Caesar wrote *contingebat*—the reading of the β MSS.—not *continebat*, which is found in the α MSS. Schneider (ii, 359) demonstrates that *continebat* is wrong. It has been defended on the assumption that *Cenabum* consisted of two parts, one on

patrols that the inhabitants were trying to escape. He accordingly fired the gates, and sent the two legions into the town ; and, as the fugitives were checked by the narrowness of the streets and bridge, they were nearly all captured. After this Caesar crossed the bridge, and made his way into the country of the Bituriges.

Hirtius says that when Caesar marched in the winter of 52–51 B.C. to punish the Carnutes for having attacked the Bituriges, he quartered some of his troops at Cenabum in the houses of the Gauls ; from which statement it is clear that some, at all events, of the houses were still standing. Hirtius adds that, after this expedition, Caesar left two legions at Cenabum, evidently to keep the Carnutes in awe.[1]

II. I will make one observation to clear the ground. It has been proved, so conclusively as to win the assent of Napoleon himself, that on the site of Orléans there was a Gallo-Roman, if not a Gallic town, called Cenabum. The proof is furnished by the testimony of ancient and mediaeval writers,[2] by the itineraries,[3] by an inscription which was discovered in 1846 in the Faubourg St. Vincent at Orléans,[4]

the right, the other on the left bank of the river, which the bridge joined (*continebat*). But Caesar's narrative shows that *Cenabum* was situated entirely on the right bank. Vossius, who accepts the reading *contirebat*, explains that the bridge 'linked the town to the opposite bank of the river' (*urbem adversae fluminis ripae adiungit, aut quasi unum cum illa continentem facit*), an explanation which, as Schneider shows, introduces ambiguity and obscurity into Caesar's text. Anyhow, if the town had been only near the bridge and not in actual contact with it, Caesar could have barred the inhabitants from all access to the bridge. See von Göler's *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 239, n. 5.

[1] *B. G.*, vii, 3 ; 10, §§ 3–4 ; 11 ; viii, 5, § 2 ; 6, § 1.

[2] Ptolemy, *Geogr.*, ii, 8, § 10, with which cf. *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., viii, 1863, p. 392 ; *Hist. Franc. scriptores*, ed. F. Duchesne, iii, p. 5 A ; Hugo, *Hist. eccl.*, lib. v (*Patrologiae cursus completus*, ed. J. P. Migne, clxiii, col. 836 B) ; A. de Valois, *Notitia Galliarum*, p. 226.—Ptolemy's estimate of the latitude and longitude of Cenabum is very nearly right for Orléans, while for Gien it is very far from the truth.

[3] *Itin. Ant.*, ed. Wesseling, pp. 367–8 ; *La Table de Peutinger*, ed. Desjardins, pp. 26, cols. 2–3 ; 33, col. 3 ; 34, col. 1. Cf. d'Anville, *Éclaircissemens sur l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 180 ; J. B. P. Jollois, *Mém. sur les ant. du dépt du Loiret*, 1836, p. 14 ; and *Mém. de la Soc. arch. de l'Orléanais*, xi, 1868, pp. 234–73, especially 260–5. The distances of Cenabum from Brivodurum (Briare), Agedincum (Sens), Masava (Mesves), Lutecia (Paris), and Caesarodunum (Tours) respectively are either absolutely or approximately right if Cenabum was at Orléans, utterly wrong if it was at Gien.

J. Lebeuf (*Recueil de divers écrits pour servir d'éclaircissemens à l'hist. de France*, ii, 1738, pp. 225–8) argues that as the *Itinerary of Antonine*, in the state in which it has come down to us, dates from a period later than that of Constantine, Cenabum ought, if it had been Orléans, to have been called in the *Itinerary* 'Aureliani',—the name by which Orléans was called after the Emperor Aurelian. But, at the time when the *Itinerary* was compiled, most of the towns of Gaul had two names,—the old Gallic name and the name of the people in whose territory the town was situated ; and in the *Itinerary* the old Gallic names were generally used. Thus we find *Samarobriva*, not *Ambiani*, *Agedincum*, not *Senones*, *Cularo*, not *Gratianopolis*, &c. Various other arguments of Lebeuf, which are not worth mention, are demolished by d'Anville in his *Éclaircissemens*.

[4] Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 477, n. 1. Cf. *Mém. de l'Acad. des inscr.*, xxvi, 1867, pp. 119–36. The inscription is referred to the period of Augustus.

and by the discovery of Gallic and Gallo-Roman coins.[1] But while admitting this, Napoleon, Stoffel, Desjardins, and others deny that the Cenabum which stood on the site of Orléans was the Cenabum captured by Caesar.

III. 1. Napoleon bases his first argument on the hypothesis, which he believes himself to have proved, that the site of Gorgobina is St. Parize-le-Châtel, near the confluence of the Allier and the Loire. He cannot believe that Caesar, marching from Sens to relieve Gorgobina, would have gone so far out of his way, even in order to attack a rebellious town, as the site of the modern Orléans, the route by which is nearly 60 miles longer than the route by Gien.[2]

Now it is not proved that Gorgobina was at St. Parize-le-Châtel; but wherever it was, if Caesar marched by way of Orléans, he certainly went out of his way in order to reach it.[3] But there is no reason why Caesar, even though his ultimate object was to relieve Gorgobina, should not have gone some distance out of his way in order to capture a town so important as Cenabum. Since I wrote the foregoing sentence, I have found that d'Anville enforces the same argument. 'S'il avoit une ville alliée,' he writes, 'à secourir, il devoit avant tout venger la majesté du nom Romain violé par le massacre de Genabum: c'étoit l'unique moyen de conserver les peuples qui restoient encore fidèles.'[4] Besides, how can we tell that, to the east of Orléans, any bridge spanned the Loire in that part of its course which crossed Caesar's line of march? Or, if there were bridges, how can we tell that Vercingetorix had not destroyed them?[5]

2. Secondly, says Napoleon, the distance from Cenabum to the country of the Arverni was, according to Caesar, 160 Roman miles. Assuming that Caesar is alluding to Gergovia, the capital of the Arverni, Napoleon points out that this distance corresponds exactly with the distance from Gergovia to Gien; whereas the distance from Gergovia to Orléans is nearly 40 miles more.

This argument has no weight; for how can we be sure that Caesar's estimate of the distance was strictly correct, or that when he spoke of the distance from Cenabum to the territory of the Arverni, he meant the distance from Cenabum to Gergovia? Moreover, 'nearly 40' is an exaggeration: the difference is about 25.

3. Thirdly, Napoleon says that, after crossing the Loire at Cenabum, Caesar found himself in the country of the Bituriges. This, he remarks, is true if he crossed at Gien, but false if he crossed at Orléans.

This argument is worthless. Caesar does not say that, after crossing the Loire, he found himself in the country of the Bituriges. On

[1] *Mém. de la Soc. arch. de l'Orléanais*, xv, 1876, pp. 115, 123–5, 133–47; xviii, 1884, pp. 172–5; A. Blanchet, *Traité des monn. gaul.*, p. 492. In the former edition I stated the proofs in detail; but it is no longer necessary to do this, as the identity of the Gallo-Roman Cenabum with Orléans is admitted by those scholars who still deny its identity with the Cenabum of Caesar.

[2] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 247. n. 1 (and following pages).

[3] See pp. 425–6.

[4] *Éclaircissemens sur l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 212.

[5] See *B. G.*, vii, 34, § 3.

the contrary, he implies that he did not. He simply says that 'he threw his army across the Loire, and made his way into the country of the Bituriges' (*exercitum Ligerim traducit atque in Biturigum fines pervenit*[1]). Napoleon does not know the meaning of the word *pervenit*.[2]

4. Fourthly, argues Napoleon, the site of Orléans, not being a hill, fails to answer the requirements of a Gallic *oppidum*.

The answer is that even of the Gallic *oppida* which were fortresses, some, such as Avaricum, were not built upon hills; and that we may gather from Caesar's narrative and from Strabo[3] that Cenabum was rather a trading town than a stronghold, and was not strongly placed. If it had been, would the Carnutes have run away from it without making the slightest attempt to stand a siege?

5. Finally, Napoleon gets over the difficulty presented by the discovery of the inscription at Orléans, by assuming that, after the destruction of Cenabum, its surviving inhabitants built a new town on the site of Orléans, and called it by the name of the old one.

In reply to this conjecture, I have only to say that there is not a particle of evidence for it.

6. If, says Bréan,[4] Cenabum was at Orléans, Caesar, after leaving Cenabum, must have had the infuriated Carnutes on his rear, the Bituriges on his right, and Vercingetorix in his front. He could not have recrossed the Loire, and he was too far from the Aedui to get supplies. The least check, therefore, must have been disastrous to him.

It is amazing that Bréan does not see that every one of his arguments recoils against himself. Let the reader look at his map. He will then see that, if Cenabum was at Gien or at Gien-le-Vieux, Caesar, after leaving Cenabum, would also have had the infuriated Carnutes on his rear, the Bituriges on his right, and Vercingetorix in his front. If he could not have recrossed the Loire in the one case, neither could he have recrossed it in the other; and as for supplies, when he marched to Avaricum, he was necessarily at a considerable distance from the Aedui. But of course the dangers which Bréan

[1] *B. G.*, vii, 11, § 9. Cf. *Festschr. zu Otto Hirschfelds sechzigstem Geburtstage*, 1903, p. 217.

[2] I have not the slightest doubt that every competent scholar will agree with me that Caesar meant that, after he had crossed the Loire, he had some distance, great or small, to travel before he could reach the frontier of the Bituriges. There is a passage in *B. G.*, i, 11, § 1, which is almost exactly parallel with the one which I am discussing. I print the two side by side:—

Helvetii iam per angustias et fines Sequanorum suas copias traduxerant et in Haeduorum fines pervenerant.	*exercitum Ligerim traducit atque in Biturigum fines pervenit.*

Now Napoleon ought, if he were consistent, to hold that the moment after the Helvetii stepped across the Sequanian frontier they were in Aeduan territory. But, as a matter of fact, he holds rightly that, before they reached Aeduan territory, they crossed the territory of the Transrhodane Allobroges and that of the Ambarri.

[3] Strabo (iv, 2, § 3) calls Cenabum the emporium of the Carnutes.

[4] *Itin. de l'expédition de César d'Agendicum à Gergovia-Boiorum*, &c., 1865, pp. 3–4.

conjures up were no more than the risks which every invader must face. 'The infuriated Carnutes' had been soundly thrashed, and were wise enough to keep their fury bottled up : the Bituriges, who, wherever Cenabum may have been, were on Caesar's right, aye and on every side of him, took good care to keep out of his way ; and Vercingetorix, as soon as he ventured a battle, was beaten. Caesar was actually, as he tells us,[1] obliged to do without the supplies which he expected from the Aedui : yet he survived the deprivation.

7. One question remains. Would Caesar have been able to march from Sens to Orléans in the time which he says that it took him to march from Agedincum to Cenabum ?[2] The distance from Sens to Orléans was, by the road mentioned in the *Table*,[3] 88½ Roman miles, or 131 kilometres : by the other Roman road, which, according to Napoleon,[4] can never have been a Gallic road, 108 kilometres. The time which he occupied on the march was four days. Admit, with Napoleon, that he must have gone by the longer road. We are then obliged to assume that he marched at the rate of 22 Roman miles a day. This is a high rate of marching.[5] But Caesar gives us to understand that he was doing his best ; and it must be remembered that the army was encumbered by very little baggage. There is, however, no proof that the other Roman road was not made upon the line of a Gallic road. It is incredible, says A. Challe,[6] that there should not have been a Gallic road running in a direct line from the important town of Agedincum into the heart of the rich country of the Carnutes, and following almost the same direction as the Roman road which is still traceable between Sens and Beaune. Boutet de Monvel, indeed, and other opponents of Orléans deny that Caesar could have performed the journey, even by the shortest road, in four days : but it is beyond dispute that Caesar marched 25 Roman miles down and 25 Roman miles up the valley of the Allier in about 28 hours ;[7] and practical soldiers like General Creuly, Colonel Stoffel, and the Duc d'Aumale consider that he could easily have marched 27 kilometres, or 18 Roman miles a day for several days at a stretch. As a matter of fact, he marched from Corfinium to Brundisium, a distance of 465 kilometres, in 17 days, or at the rate of more than 27 kilometres a day.[8]

Thus every objection that has been brought against the view which identifies the Cenabum of the Gallo-Roman period with the Cenabum of Caesar, falls to the ground. I proceed to examine the arguments that have been devised to prove that the Cenabum of Caesar stood on the site of Gien or of Gien-le-Vieux.

IV. 1. Five roads, we are told, meet at Gien-le-Vieux, namely from Sens (*Agedincum*), Autun (*Augustodunum*), Chartres (*Autricum*),

[1] *B. G.*, vii, 17, §§ 2–3.
[2] *Ib.*, vii, 10–11.
[3] *La Table de Peutinger*, ed. Desjardins, p. 26, cols. 2–3.
[4] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 249, note.
[5] See p. 635.
[6] *Bull. de la Soc. des sciences hist. . . . de l' Yonne*. xx. 1866, p. 142.
[7] *B. G.*, vii, 40–1.
[8] See p. 635. According to O. E. Schmidt's itinerary (*Briefwechsel d. M. T. Cicero*, 1893, pp. 149–50, 379), the distance was 485 kilometres

Bourges (*Avaricum*), and Sancerre ; and the supporters of Gien-le-Vieux labour to prove that these roads were Gallic.[1] But even if the so-called proof could be accepted, it would only show that there was an important Gallic town at Gien-le-Vieux : it would not show that that town belonged to the Carnutes, still less that it was Cenabum.

2. According to Bréan,[2] an old bridge spanned the Loire opposite Gien-le-Vieux ; and he infers that this was the very bridge by which Caesar crossed the Loire after capturing Cenabum. The 'proofs' which he offers of the former existence of this bridge are, that various inhabitants of Gien and the neighbourhood told him that they had seen the ruined piles of the bridge in the bed of the river when the water was low, and that he had himself discovered a 'massif' of stone close to Port Gallier (a quay on the southern bank), which had evidently formed a part of the bridge. Moreover, a number of antiquities, of which Bréan gives a list, were discovered at Gien-le-Vieux ; and he asserts that among them were Gallic coins of a period anterior to the Roman conquest. Finally, on the spot to which Bréan points as the site of Cenabum charred remains were discovered ; and he maintains that they are a relic of the fire which Caesar kindled in 52 B. C. !

Now a commission was appointed by the *Société archéologique de l'Orléanais* to investigate the value of Bréan's discoveries ; and the report of the commission is embodied in two papers published in volume ix (1866) of the Society's Memoirs,—*Rapport sur les communications de M. Bréan* (pp. 234–52) by M. Marchand, and *Question de Genabum* (pp. 253–90) by M. Collin.[3] The certificates, written by inhabitants of Gien, which Bréan printed in support of his theory regarding the alleged bridge, are demolished by the evidence of their authors ! No less than 2,090 soundings, in which Bréan himself took part, were made in the bed of the Loire, with the object of discovering the alleged remains of the bridge ; but all in vain.

Some years ago a coin of Pope Clement VIII was discovered adhering to the masonry of the so-called bridge,—the 'massif' to which Bréan pins his faith. It is almost certain that the coin could only have been left where it was found by the workmen who built the structure. If so, the structure itself cannot be assigned to any date earlier than the pontificate of Clement VIII.[4]

It has also been affirmed by Marchand, representing the Commission, that all the objects in Bréan's cabinet that were discovered at Gien-le-Vieux were Gallo-Roman, not Gallic ;[5] and, according to the French Commission, no Gallic antiquities have been found either at Gien or at Gien-le-Vieux.[6] Nevertheless, I will assume that a Celtic *oppidum* did really exist upon the site in question. Still, it cannot be proved that that *oppidum* was Cenabum ; and it can be

[1] A. Bréan, *Itinéraire*, &c., pp. 47–8 ; A. Petit, *Dissertation sur Genabum-Gien*, &c., 1863, pp. 74–5.
[2] *Itinéraire*, pp. 33–44.
[3] See also L. A. Marchand, *Hist. de la ville . . . de Gien*, pp. 6–7.
[4] *Mém. de la Soc. arch. de l'Orléanais*, ix, 1866, p. 290.
[5] *Ib.*, p. 247. [6] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 446.

proved that it was not. First of all, as to the charred remains :— the fact that coins of Tetricus (about A. D. 273) were found among them proves that the fire which we are asked to believe was kindled by Caesar took place not less than three centuries after Caesar's death.[1] Secondly, the dimensions of the Gallo-Roman town, as far as they can be ascertained by the results of the excavations, were far too small for an *oppidum* of the importance of Cenabum.[2] Now it is proved by Caesar's words—*oppidum Cenabum pons fluminis Ligeris contingebat*—that the town of Cenabum was in actual contact with the bridge over the Loire. Accordingly the advocates of Gien-le-Vieux are compelled to assume that the small settlement which the excavations have revealed was only a minute fraction of the entire Cenabum, which must have extended right down to the bank of the Loire. But this imaginary Cenabum is as much too large as the other is too small. 'La ville actuelle d'Orléans,' says Marchand,[3] 'tournerait à l'aise dans l'enceinte assignée à Gien-le-Vieux.'

3. There are traces of a Roman camp in the wood 'des Marceaux', near Gien-le-Vieux.

So says Bréan.[4] But, under the cold scrutiny of the commission, the 'camp' turns out to be of quite modern construction, and to have been made for a very peaceful and even prosaic purpose. 'Ces dossées,' says Marchand, 'ont été faites pour arrêter les moutons des Merceaux, et non les Carnutes de Gien-le-Vieux.'[5] Readers of *The Antiquary* will remember the shrewd aside of Edie Ochiltree, as he listened to the old pedant dilating on the construction of the 'camp' on the Kaim of Kinprunes :—'*Praetorian* here, Praetorian there! I mind the bigging o't.'[6]

4. Gien contains a street called 'à la Genabye', which leads, not towards Orléans, but towards the higher part of the town itself.[7]

Now there is no evidence that the street in question was called by this name before the seventeenth century; and it is probable that, as A. de Valois says,[8] the name was given to it, from motives of local patriotism, in consequence of the theory that Gien was identical with Cenabum. Moreover, there is, or was in the time of Walckenaer[9] a faubourg in Orléans which was also called by the name of 'Génabie'.

5. Stoffel[10] sees that Cenabum was not Gien-le-Vieux, because Cenabum must have touched the right bank of the Loire; but he maintains with Napoleon that Cenabum was 'le Gien actuel'; and these are his reasons. Vellaunodunum, he says, was at Toucy. Caesar marched from Vellaunodunum to Cenabum in two days.

[1] *Mém. de la Soc. arch. de l'Orléanais*, ix, 1866, p. 247.
[2] *Ib.*, pp. 237–8. [3] *Ib.*, p. 245. [4] *Itinéraire*, &c., pp. 45–6.
[5] *Mém. de la Soc. arch. de l'Orléanais*, ix, 1866, p. 241.
[6] Abbotsford edition, p. 28.
[7] Napoleon, *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 250, note. De Monvel (*Mém. de la Soc. d'agriculture . . . d'Orléans*, vii, 1863, p. 47) calls the street 'rue *de la* Genabie'.
[8] *Notitia Galliarum*, p. 226. Cf. *Mém. de la Soc. arch. de l'Orléanais*, ix, 1866, p. 168.
[9] *Géogr. des Gaules*, i, 401. [10] *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, pp. 149, 156.

'D'après cela, et en évaluant toujours les étapes à trente kilomètres . . . on est conduit à placer Genabum sur la Loire, à l'ouest et à soixante kilomètres de Toucy. Cette distance est exactement celle de Toucy à Gien. . . . Il en résulte que Genabum correspond à la ville actuelle de Gien.'

But, as I show elsewhere,[1] there is no proof, there is no evidence that Vellaunodunum was at Toucy.

That, reader, is the case for Gien and Gien-le-Vieux; and thus, at every point, it breaks down. I have proved that a Gallo-Roman town called Cenabum, in the country of the Carnutes, was at Orléans. I have refuted the theory that this Cenabum was different from the Cenabum of Caesar. I have shown that there is no evidence for the theory that the Cenabum of Caesar was at Gien or at Gien-le-Vieux. I shall now prove, by independent arguments, that it was not at either of those places.

V. 1. It is certain that, after the conquest, both Gien and Gien-le-Vieux were situated not in the territory of the Carnutes, but in that of the Senones, or possibly in that of the Aedui;[2] and, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it may be confidently affirmed that this statement is equally applicable to the time of Caesar. As this fact, if it is a fact, alone decides the whole question, a desperate effort has been made to disprove it. We may assume, say the advocates of Gien, that Caesar deprived the Carnutes of part of their territory as a punishment, and transferred it to the Senones; and this assumption would explain the fact that Gien belonged to the diocese of Auxerre.[3]

Yes, we may assume whatever we like; but assumption is not proof.

2. The argument from tradition against Gien is very strong. Although we have Latin documents, which relate to Gien, ranging from the sixth to the seventeenth century, Gien was never called either *Genabum* or *Cenabum* in any of them, except once by Séguier, bishop of Auxerre, who, in 1634, headed a document with the words *Datum Genabi*. This solitary exception proves no more than the bishop's private opinion. To quote a modern antiquary, 'une tradition qui sommeille durant onze siècles n'a plus le droit de se réveiller.'[4] And, asks Marchand,[5] if Gien was Cenabum, why did not St. Aunaire and St. Tétrice, bishops of Auxerre, call it so instead of *Giemus*?

3. Hirtius says that in the winter of 52–51 B.C. Caesar, after punishing the Carnutes for having attacked their neighbours the Bituriges, left Trebonius at Cenabum with two legions to overawe them.[6] Now, if Cenabum was at Gien-le-Vieux, even assuming that Gien-le-Vieux was in the country of the Carnutes, Trebonius was left on the extreme eastern limit of the Carnutian territory. But from such a position how would he have been able to keep the Carnutes

[1] See pp. 497–8.
[2] See p. 472.
[3] See Achaintre, *Caesar*, iv, 264.
[4] *Mém. de la Soc. arch. de l'Orléanais*, ix, 1866, pp. 161, 166.
[5] *Ib.*, p. 250.
[6] *B. G.*, viii, 6, § 1.

in check, or to prevent them from making another raid across the frontier of the Bituriges? Surely Caesar would have had the common sense to assign him a more central position.

Every argument which tells against the identification of Cenabum with Gien-le-Vieux tells equally against its identification with Gien. Even if the narrative of Caesar did not make it clear that Cenabum was not a hill-fort, it would be impossible to identify the hill of Gien with the site of Cenabum; for the hill is too small, and the very name of Gien-le-Vieux tends to show that it is older than Gien.[1]

VI. Desjardins[2] proposes a compromise. *Genabum*, he says (not quite correctly), is the reading of all the MSS. for the town which Caesar captured; whereas the town which stood upon the site of Orléans was Cenabum. Desjardins agrees with Napoleon that Orléans was too far from Agedincum to have been the place captured by Caesar. He therefore suggests that the town plundered by the Carnutes was Orléans, and that Genabum was Gien.

If this theory had been propounded by any one of less eminence than the late French geographer, I should not notice it. I do not believe that any one of Caesar's readers during the last 2,000 years, except Desjardins, ever dreamed of doubting that the Genabum of *B. G.*, vii, 3 was identical with the Genabum of chapter 11.[3] Every scholar knows that *c* and *g* were often interchanged. The town of the Carnutes which Caesar captured was confessedly identical with the town of the Carnutes in which he encamped in the following year; and Hirtius calls that town Cenabum, which, as I show on page 841, is the right form. Desjardins would of course have maintained that Gien must have been in the country of the Carnutes. Granted that it may have been, though the evidence is all the other way. Still, as Desjardins maintains that, besides Cenabum, there was a town called Genabum, on him lies the burden of proving that this assumed place was at Gien. But he has not attempted to do this. As I have shown, there is not a particle of evidence for the theory that either Gien or Gien-le-Vieux was ever called *Genabum*; and the argument which Desjardins bases upon the distance of Orléans from Sens I have already refuted.

To conclude. There is no evidence at all that Cenabum or Genabum—call it which you will—stood upon the site either of Gien or of Gien-le-Vieux; and there is conclusive evidence that it did not. That Cenabum stood where Orléans stands now is proved by evidence strong enough to convince Lord Collins or Professor Huxley. It is proved by the evidence of Caesar and Hirtius, by the evidence of Ptolemy, by the evidence of the itineraries, by the evidence of a tradition which is at least as old as the ninth century, by the evidence of coins and other antiquities, by the evidence of the inscription of the Faubourg St.Vincent. The conclusion is not merely probable, but certain,—as certain as that Lutecia stood upon the

[1] See Bréan, *Itinéraire*, &c., pp. 19–25.

[2] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 477, n. 1, 478, 480.

[3] In both passages the reading of the MSS. is not *Cenabum*, but *Genabum*, and (in vii, 3, § 1) *Genabim* or *Genabin*.

island of Notre-Dame, and Alesia upon Mont Auxois. It is the conclusion to which the most sagacious students of the *Commentaries* and the most eminent geographers and antiquaries in France, in Germany, and in Great Britain have come. It is the conclusion to which diligent study has led the *Commission de la topographie des Gaules*, the *Académie des Inscriptions*, the *Comité des travaux historiques*.[1] If Napoleon came to a different conclusion, it was because he allowed himself to be misled by writers whose local patriotism was stronger than their judgement. It is a pity that Colonel Stoffel, Mr. Froude, Desjardins, and other writers of less distinction, should have helped to propagate the error which he revived.

Cenomani. See Aulerci Cenomani.

Ceutrones (*a*).—The Alpine Ceutrones occupied the valley of Tarentaise and the adjoining mountains.[2]

Ceutrones (*b*). See Nervii.

Cocosates.—The Cocosates are mentioned by no ancient writer except Caesar[3] and Pliny,[4] neither of whom gives the slightest indication as to their geographical position. D'Anville[5] conjectures that *Coequosa*, for which he proposes to read *Cocosa*, a place mentioned in the *Itinerary of Antonine*, 16 Gallic leagues north of Dax, on the road to Bordeaux, was their capital; and the French Commission,[6] by the process of exclusion, arrive at a result substantially the same. After marking on the map all the peoples whose territories are approximately known, they find remaining for the Cocosates a strip of land in the department of Les Landes, between Castetz and Mimizan.

Condrusi. See Caerosi.

Coriosolites.—The neighbours of the Coriosolites were the Osismi on the west, the Veneti on the south, and the Redones on the east. They dwelt in the country round Corseul, which preserves their name. D'Anville,[7] with whom Walckenaer[8] agrees, believes that their territory extended westward as far as the neighbourhood of St. Brieuc, where, he maintains, a place called Finiac marks an ancient frontier as evidently as Fins (*Fines*) in other parts of France. But the so-called 'Finiac' is really Iffiniac; and the name has no etymological connexion with *Fines*. The French Commission[9] are inclined to believe that the diocese of Tréguier, or a part of it, as well as the dioceses of Aleth and Dol, belonged to the Coriosolites. With regard to the diocese of Aleth (which is identical with that of St. Malo) they have no doubt. The position of Aletum, or St. Servan, which commands the mouth of the Rance on its right bank, was, they argue, so important that the Coriosolites would not have allowed it to pass out of their hands. M. Kerviler, on the other hand, insists that the Rance, being a natural frontier, must have separated them

[1] See *Bull. de la Soc. arch. et hist. de l'Orléanais*, ix, 1887, p. 81.
[2] D'Anville, p. 221; Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, i, 78.
[3] *B. G.*, iii, 27, § 2.
[4] *Nat. Hist.*, iv, 19 (33), § 108.
[5] *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 229.
[6] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 295.
[7] *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 259.
[8] *Géogr. des Gaules*, i, 381–2.
[9] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 332.

from the Redones.[1] Certainly, the possession of Aletum would have been just as essential to the Redones as to the Coriosolites; and as the Redones were a maritime people,[2] and in any case only possessed a small seaboard, it seems likely that their territory extended westward as far as the Rance. If so, the Coriosolites did not occupy the diocese of Dol, or even the whole of that of Aleth. But it is impossible to define their frontiers with any approach to certainty. The geography of this part of Gaul, as d'Anville[3] observes, is most obscure. The number of dioceses greatly exceeds the number of states:[4] those who, like the French Commission, are guided by the indications of the dioceses, are obliged to admit that it is impossible to say with certainty whether the whole or only a part of the diocese of Tréguier belonged to the Coriosolites: the diocese of Rennes does not touch the sea, and yet Caesar says that the Redones were a maritime people; and finally M. J. Loth[5] has proved that of the dioceses in the Aremorican peninsula only those of Vannes, Nantes, and Rennes were Gallo-Roman; that all the rest were created by the invaders from Britain; and that when those invaders formed their dioceses, they took no account of the existing political divisions. On the south, it seems probable that the territory of the Coriosolites was limited by the natural barrier of the Montagnes Noires, and the French Commission[6] hold that it extended eastward as far as Feins, which they identify with the *Fines*[7] of the Redones; but all that we can say with certainty is that it corresponded more or less closely with the department of the Côtes-du-Nord.

II. Ptolemy[8] mentions a people called the Arvii (Ἀρούιοι). Desjardins[9] believes that they were identical with the Coriosolites, whom Ptolemy does not name. In the environs of Corseul there were discovered in 1707 the remains of a temple, which is locally known, or was known as recently as 1849, as the Temple de Mars.[10] In the *Table*[11] is mentioned a place called *Fanum Martis*, the distance of which from Condate (Rennes) appears to identify its site with that of Corseul. Desjardins infers that the temple is that from which Fanum Martis took its name. He argues that Ἀρούιοι is only another form of Ἄρειοι (of or belonging to Ἄρης [Mars]); and that Ἀρούιοι ought to be translated, not by *Arvii*, but, as it was translated in the fourth century, by *Martenses*.[12] This reasoning is

[1] *Bull. arch. de l'Ass^n bretonne*, 3^e sér., iv, 1885, pp. 225–8. See, however, pp. 351, 353. [2] *B. G.*, ii, 34. [3] *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 508.
[4] See *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., ix, 1864, p. 325.
[5] *L'Émigration bretonne en Armorique*, 1883, pp. xxi, 50–1, 75–82.
[6] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 399.
[7] *Itin. Ant.*, p. 387. [8] *Geogr.*, ii, 8, § 7.
[9] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, i, 322–4; *Rev. arch.*, 1849, p. 228.
[10] A. de la Borderie, *Hist. de Bretagne*, i, 1896, p. 114. M. Burgault (*Bull. de la Soc. polymath. du Morbihan*, 1875, p. 72) denies that there is any proof that the débris exhumed in the neighbourhood of Corseul were those of a temple; and he adds triumphantly that, according to the *Itinerary of Antonine* (p. 387), Fanum Martis was in Gallia Belgica. *A* Fanum Martis certainly! But not the Fanum Martis of the *Table*. Were there not many Noviodunums in Gaul?
[11] *La Table de Peutinger*, ed. Desjardins, p. 28, col. 2.
[12] *Notitia dignitatum*, ed. O. Seeck, p. 205 (xxxvii, 19).

accepted by M. Longnon.[1] To my mind it is unsatisfactory. Ptolemy places the Arvii between the Diablintes (q.v.) and the Veliocasses (q.v.). If he was right, it is evident that they dwelt far east of Corseul; and d'Anville[2] conjectures that they inhabited the valley of the Arve or Erve, a tributary of the Sarthe.

On the other hand, the Commission[3] disbelieve in the existence of the Ἀρούιοι, (1) because no ancient writer, except Ptolemy, mentions them; (2) because the name Arve, which has been supposed to be derived from their name, is common to numerous rivers; and (3) because the word Ἀρούιοι is probably only another form of Ἐσσούιοι (the Esuvii of Caesar). None of these reasons, except the second, which I am unable to verify,[4] appears to me to have any weight. Several Gallic tribes, whose existence has never been disputed, are mentioned by only one ancient writer; and it is incredible that Ptolemy should have invented the name. The third reason is simply a bad guess.

III. According to M. Longnon,[5] the Coriosolites disappeared as an independent people, before the publication of the *Notitia provinciarum*, that is to say before the fifth century, and were absorbed by the Diablintes. Although I am not concerned directly with the state of Gaul after the time of Caesar, it is my business to examine the theory of M. Longnon, because he makes use of his conclusion to argue that the Diablintes, and not the Coriosolites, occupied the diocese of Aleth.

Certain MSS. of the *Notitia* have the form *Coriosolitum*, others *Corisopitum*;[6] and M. Longnon[7] maintains that the latter is the true reading, because it is found in a MS. of the sixth century, which is probably to be assigned to the year 570. Therefore, he concludes, the *Notitia* does not mention the Coriosolites at all.

Can the reading *Corisopitum* be accounted for? A. de Courson[8] conjectures that emigrants from Corstopitum[9] (for which some MSS. have *Corisopito*), or Corchester, on the Tyne, founded Corisopitum, or Quimper, in Brittany. 'It is unlikely, says A. de la Borderie,[10] who agrees with this conclusion, that the Coriosolites existed, as an independent people, after the immigration from Britain in 514. Accordingly he pictures the copyist who transcribed the MS. of the *Notitia* mentioned by M. Longnon, saying to himself, as he read his original, '"*Civitas Co-ri-o-so-li-tum*, qu'est-ce que cela peut être? Je n'ai jamais ouï ce nom-là."—Puis tout-à-coup il se frappe le front: "Ah! j'y suis, c'est en Bretagne, c'est un évêché breton, seulement ici ils se sont trompés d'une lettre."'

[1] *Atlas hist. de la France*, p. 5. [2] *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 105.
[3] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 85.
[4] Only one 'Arve' is mentioned in Joanne's *Dict. géogr. . . . de la France*, i, 1890, p. 177.
[5] *Géogr. de la Gaule au VI^e siècle*, 1878, p. 316.
[6] *Coriosopotum*, according to M. Loth (*L'Émigration bretonne*, p. 57).
[7] *Mém. du Congrès scientifique de France*, 38^e sess^n., 1872, p. 397.
[8] *Bull. de la Soc. de géogr.*, 4^e sér., xx, 1860, pp. 264–5.
[9] See *Itin. Ant.*, pp. 464–5, and cf. A. Holder, *Alt-celtischer Sprachschatz*, i, 1136. [10] *Géogr. gallo-rom. de l'Armorique*, pp. 27–8.

De la Borderie's explanation may conceivably be right: but of course it is a mere guess;[1] and there is no proof that Corisopitum was founded in the fifth century by British immigrants. The bishop of Quimper was, it is true, called *episcopus Corisopitensis* in the eleventh century; but the earliest previous mention of the name *Corisopitum*, as applied to Quimper, was in the ninth century. The Breton name of this place in the fifth and the four following centuries was Kemper.[2] But it is unnecessary to have recourse to conjecture in order to refute M. Longnon; for, save the very doubtful evidence of the *Notitia*, there is absolutely no evidence that there were any Corisopites in Gaul either in Caesar's time or at the time when the *Notitia* first appeared. The natural conclusion is that the reading *Corisopitum* (or rather, according to M. Loth, *Coriosopotum*) in one of the MSS. of the *Notitia* is a copyist's blunder.[3] 'Ne lit-on pas aussi,' asks M. Loth,[4] 'immédiatement au-dessus *Nammitum* pour *Namnetum*, dans ce manuscrit 12,097, qui semble un livre sacré pour certains érudits?'

Diablintes.—Caesar[5] mentions the Diablintes once only, among the allies whose services the Veneti enlisted in 56 B.C. Ptolemy[6] describes them thus:—*ἐν δὲ τῇ μεσογείᾳ τῶν μὲν Οὐενετῶν εἰσιν ἀνατολικώτεροι Αὐλίρκιοι οἱ Διαβλίται, ὧν πόλις Νοιόδουνον. Νοιόδουνον* is generally identified with the *Nu-Dionnum* of the *Table*,[7] which was situated on the road from Le Mans to Bayeux.

The foregoing evidence supports d'Anville's[8] theory that the Diablintes occupied the neighbourhood of Jublains,[9] near Mayenne, where the remains of a Gallo-Roman town have been discovered. Nor is this all. Long remarks that a document of the seventh century speaks of 'condita Diablintica' as situated 'in pago Cenomannico'; thus, says Long, 'we obtain . . . an explanation of the fact of the name Aulerci being given in Ptolemy both to the Diablintes and Cenomani.' 'Another document,' he observes, 'of the seventh century speaks of "oppidum Diablintes juxta ripam Araenae fluvioli"; and the Arena is recognized as the Aron, a branch of the Mayenne.'[10]

The principal opponent of the received view is M. A. Longnon.[11] He admits that the ancient name of Jublains was Diablintes; but he will not allow that Diablintes was the chief town of the *civitas Diablintum*. It was simply, in his opinion, a colony founded by the Diablintes. He cites a case which he regards as parallel. Exmes,

[1] See Professor Haverfield's remarks in *Proc. Brit. Acad.*, ii, 215, n. 1.

[2] See E. Halléguen, *La Cornouaille et Corisopitum*, 1861, pp. 20, 26, 30, and J. Loth, *L'Émigration bretonne*, p. 59.

[3] The MSS. of the *Notitia* offer many variants, e.g. *Consulitum*, *Conisolitum*, *Corosopitum*, *Consolitum*, *Corisolitum*, *Coriosolitum*, and *Corisuletum*.

[4] *L'Émigration bretonne*, p. 57.

[5] *B. G.*, iii, 9, § 10. [6] *Geogr.*, ii, 8, § 7.

[7] *La Table de Peutinger*, ed. Desjardins, p. 23, col. 1.

[8] *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, pp. 266–7.

[9] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 339–40.

[10] W. Smith, *Dict. of Greek and Roman Geogr.*, i, 772.

[11] *Géogr. de la Gaule au VI^e siècle*, 1878, p. 318.

he says, the *pagus Oximensis*, in the diocese of Séez, doubtless owes its name to the Osismi. But nobody would contend that it was their capital; for it was not in their proper territory. It was probably only an Osismian colony. The territory of the Diablintes proper was in the neighbourhood of Aleth (St. Servan) between the territories of the Redones, the Veneti, and the Coriosolites: Aleth is a contraction of Dialeth (*Dialetum*); and Dialetum was the capital of the Diablintes.

M. Longnon's arguments have been answered by the distinguished Breton antiquary, A. de la Borderie.[1] As he remarks, M. Longnon's theory rests upon the hypothesis that the Coriosolites disappeared as a *civitas*, before the publication of the *Notitia provinciarum*, that is to say before the fifth century, and that they were absorbed by the Diablintes; and, as I have shown, this is a mistake. Nevertheless, I will examine M. Longnon's arguments.

1. The only passage in which Caesar mentions the Diablintes—*socios sibi ad id bellum* (Veneti) *Osismos, Lexovios, Namnetes, Ambiliatos, Morinos, Diablintes, Menapios, adsciscunt; auxilia ex Britannia, quae contra eas regiones posita est, arcessunt*[2]—proves, in M. Longnon's opinion,[3] that the Diablintes were a maritime people. M. de la Borderie[4] replies that the statement of Ptolemy, which I have quoted above, proves that the territory of the Diablintes was not maritime. It is true that Ptolemy is sometimes mistaken; and I do not think that his statement, taken by itself, amounts to proof. But it is supported by the fact, admitted by M. Longnon, that *some* Diablintes lived in Jublains and the neighbourhood. Moreover, Caesar's statement that Britain was opposite a number of states, of which the Diablintes were one, does not prove that the Diablintes actually possessed a seaboard. It has, indeed, been argued that they must have dwelt on the coast, because Caesar includes the Aulerci in his list of maritime tribes,[5] and none of the other known Aulercan peoples possessed a seaboard. But, assuming that Caesar did not carelessly include the Diablintes, who were certainly *near* the sea, among the maritime tribes strictly so called, the Aulerci may have included other peoples besides the Cenomani, the Brannovices, the Eburovices, and the Diablintes: moreover, it was not Caesar but Ptolemy who included the Diablintes among the Aulerci. Again, in support of Ptolemy's statement, the French Commission[6] point out that, while Caesar twice enumerates the maritime (Aremorican) states,[7] he does not include the Diablintes among them. Finally, it is possible that the Diablintes, even if we place them next the Cenomani, may have possessed a strip of coast.

2. M. Longnon[8] maintains that if Jublains had been the chief town of the Diablintes, it would have been the see of a bishop. But M. de la Borderie replies that it is unreasonable to assume that

[1] *Géogr. gallo-rom. de l'Armorique.*
[2] *B. G.*, iii, 9, § 10.
[3] *Mém. du Congrès scientifique de France*, 38e sessn., 1872, p. 430.
[4] *Géogr. gallo-rom. de l'Armorique*, pp. 4–5.
[5] *B. G.*, ii, 34.
[6] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 340.
[7] *B. G.*, ii, 34; vii, 75, § 4.
[8] *Mém. du Congrès sc. de France*, 1872, p. 429.

because, as a general rule, Gallo-Roman states became dioceses, they did so without exception.[1]

3. M. Longnon quotes a passage from the *Acta Sanctorum* (October, t. vii, pars 2, p. 1098), from which it appears that in the ninth and tenth centuries the metropolitan see of Dol and its seven subordinate sees, St. Pol de Léon, Vannes, Carhaix, Quimperlé, Quimper, Portus Saliocan, and Diallentic, were pillaged by the Northmen. This appears to him a proof that the territory of the Diablintes was situated in the Aremorican peninsula. De la Borderie [2] replies first, that the date of the document quoted by M. Longnon deprives it of all value; and secondly, that there is no proof that by Diallentic the writer meant Aleth.

4. A MS. of the *Notitia provinciarum*, belonging to the tenth century, has the gloss (civitas Diablintum) *quae alio nomine Aliud vel Adala vocatur;* and another MS. of the same century has the gloss (civitas Diablintum) *id est Carifes*. This, says M. Longnon,[3] proves that, in the Middle Ages, the *civitas Diablintum* was not regarded as having formed part of the diocese of Le Mans; for the gloss *id est Carifes* evidently points to one of the numerous Breton local names of which the radical prefix is the Breton *ker* (a house), Replying to this argument, M. de la Borderie [4] says, 'We are told that the least practised eye must recognize Aleth in *Aliud* and that *Adala* means Dol. . . . Admitting this provisionally, it should seem that the Diablintes must have had *three* capitals—Aleth, Dol, and "Carifes"—and as this is two too many, the only conclusion to which we can come is that the copyists of the *Notitia* did not know which was the real capital, and wrote these names at haphazard. . . . The gloss *Carifes* is to be regarded simply as a blunder on the part of the copyists, analogous to that which, in the same chapter of the *Notitia*, ascribes to Vannes the name of *Ciancti, civitas Cianctium* . . . a name which Vannes has never borne.'

5. Comparing the province of (Gallia) Lugdunensis Tertia, as described in the *Notitia provinciarum*, with the ecclesiastical province of Tours, we find, says M. Longnon,[5] that the first seven states of the former correspond with seven dioceses of the latter:—

Landranen,	bishop of	Tours	Metropolis civitas	Torinorum
Aldric,	,,	Mans	Civitas	Cenomannorum
Gernobrius,	,,	Rennes	,,	Redonum
Dodon,	,,	Angers	,,	Andicavorum
Actard,	,,	Nantes	,,	Namnetum

[1] 'Il n'est pas vrai,' says M. de la Borderie (pp. 31–2), 'que toutes les cités de la *Notice* soient devenues des diocèses. Outre les Diablintes, il en est quatre tout au moins d'où l'on ne voit sortir nul évêché, savoir: la *civitas Boatium* . . . *civitas Rigomagensium* (Chorges), *civitas Sollinientium* (Seillans), *civitas Equestrium* . . . D'autre part, en dehors de la troisième Lyonnaise, on trouve dans les Gaules au moins une dizaine d'évêchés . . . qui ne figurent point comme cités dans la Notice,' e. g. Nevers, Laon, Maurienne, Toulon, and Carpentras. See also J. Loth, *L'Émigration bretonne*, p. 49.

[2] *Géogr. gallo-rom. de l'Armorique*, pp. 13–4.

[3] *Mém. du Congrès sc. de France*, 1872, p. 434.

[4] *Géogr. gallo-rom. de l'Armorique*, pp. 29–30.

[5] *Mém. du Congrès sc. de France*, 1872, pp. 400, 426.

Felix, episcopus Corisopitensis	Civitas Corisopitum
Susannus, bishop of Vannes	,, Venetum
Liberalis, episcopus Oximensis	,, Ossismorum
Salacon, episcopus Aletensis or Dialetensis	,, Diablintum

Besides those seven states Lugdunensis Tertia included the *civitas Ossismorum* and the *civitas Diablintum* : besides those seven dioceses the province of Tours included in 848 the *episcopatus Oximensis* and the *episcopatus Aletensis*. In the face of these facts, says M. Longnon, no man who is not blinded by prejudice can fail to see that the *episcopatus Aletensis* (or *Dialetensis*), out of which were formed the dioceses of St. Brieuc, St. Malo, and Dol, was identical with the *civitas Diablintum*.

This argument perhaps looks plausible ; but it rests upon the assumption, which in my article on the Coriosolites I have refuted, that the compiler of the *Notitia* wrote *Corisopitum* and not *Coriosolitum*, and upon the assumptions that the territory of the Cenomani comprised the whole of the diocese of Le Mans, that the territory of the Redones was identical with the diocese of Rennes, and that the territory of the Osismi did not include, besides the *episcopatus Oximensis*, some part of the *episcopatus Corisopitensis* or diocese of Quimper. Moreover, it must be remembered that in the fifth century, when the *Notitia* was published, only three of the dioceses in the Aremorican peninsula—namely Vannes, Nantes, and Rennes—existed : there was no *episcopatus Corisopitensis*, no *episcopatus Oximensis*, and no *episcopatus Aletensis*.[1] The two lists which M. Longnon prints side by side are easily explicable on the orthodox theory. The *civitas Diablintum* occupied a part of the diocese of Le Mans : the territory, or a part of the territory,[2] which subsequently corresponded with the *episcopatus Aletensis* belonged to the *civitas Coriosolitum*. There is no evidence that the diocese of Le Mans corresponded exactly with the territory of the Cenomani, or that the Redones possessed only the diocese of Rennes. What shadow of proof is there, then, that the territory of the Diablintes corresponded with the *episcopatus Aletensis* ? Absolutely none, save the imaginary resemblance between the names *Diablintes* and *Aletensis*.

Writing in 1885,[3] M. Kerviler, who had formerly supported M. Longnon, frankly admitted his mistake ; but he insists that his conversion is due solely to M. Loth. This eminent Celtic scholar shows in his work, *L'Émigration bretonne*, that the dioceses of Breton, as distinguished from those of Gallo-Roman origin in Brittany were not formed out of Gallo-Roman states. The Aremorican peninsula, completely Romanized in the fifth century, was completely Bretonized by the British invasion which followed. The invaders, in forming their dioceses, took no account of the Gallo-Roman states. It is therefore idle to look for a complete correspondence between the political divisions mentioned in the *Notitia* and the ecclesiastical divisions mentioned in 848 by the council of Tours.

[1] See J. Loth, *L'Émigration bretonne*, pp. 75–82.
[2] See pp. 415–6.
[3] *Bull. arch. de l'Ass^n bretonne*, 3^e sér., iv, 1885, pp. 225–8.

In his *Atlas historique de la France* (p. 4) M. Longnon says 'les arguments de nos adversaires ne nous ont pas convaincu. Cependant nous n'avons pas voulu, pour une question ainsi controversée, abuser de l'occasion qui nous est offerte aujourd'hui pour faire pénétrer en quelque sorte notre opinion dans le domaine public, et nous avons marqué le nom des Diablintes auprès de la ville romaine de Jublains (*Diablintes*)', &c. If I may say so without offence, M. Longnon's modesty is out of place. He has not hesitated on other controverted points, for example, the position of the Atuatuci (q.v.), to 'faire pénétrer son opinion dans le domaine public'. If he believes that the Diablintes did not occupy the neighbourhood of Jublains, he is doing his best to mislead his readers by marking on his map the name *Diablintes* near Jublains. If his map represents his real opinion, he ought to recant his error.

Eburones. See ATUATUCI.

Eburovices. See AULERCI EBUROVICES.

Eleuteti. See CADURCI.

Elusates.—The Elusates occupied the country round Eauze. Their frontiers cannot be traced; but they apparently possessed the north-western part of the department of the Gers and a fraction of the southern part of that of the Lot-et-Garonne.[1]

Esuvii.—Caesar is the only ancient writer who mentions the Esuvii; and, if I am not mistaken, their name, under one form or another, occurs three times in the *Commentaries*.[2] In the first passage,[3] they are mentioned together with the Veneti, the Venelli, the Osismi, the Coriosolites, the Aulerci, and the Redones, 'which,' says Caesar, 'are maritime tribes, whose country reaches the ocean:' in the second[4] they are mentioned together with the Coriosolites and the Veneti: in the third[5] they appear as the people into whose territory the legion of Roscius was sent to winter in 54 B. C.; and from a subsequent chapter[6] we learn that Roscius was threatened by the maritime states. It is therefore certain that, although the MSS. offer a large choice of readings, Caesar is speaking, in all three passages, of the same people.

In the first passage all the good MSS. have *Sesuvios*, and in the third *Essuos*: in the second the α MSS. have *Esubios*. Schneider reads *Sesuvios* in the first two passages and *Essuos* in the third, remarking that *Sesuvios* might easily have been corrupted into *Esubios*, but that *Sesuvios* could hardly have been evolved by any copyist out of *Essuos*. Nipperdey and Meusel read *Esuvios* in all three passages; and it is probable that either *Esuvios* or *Esuios* is the

[1] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 368; Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 367; Longnon, *Atlas hist. de la France*, p. iv.

[2] Four times, according to Mommsen (*Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xx, 1894, p. 211), who holds that in vii, 75, § 3 *Esuviis* should replace *Lexoviis*; and if *Lemovices* [Aremoricani] (q.v.) is wrong in § 4, I have no doubt that he is right. One would expect, he says, to find the Lexovii mentioned in § 4 among the Aremorican tribes; and the omission of the Esuvii [unless, indeed, they were included, though not named, among those tribes] would be startling.

[3] *B. G.*, ii, 34.

[4] *Ib.*, iii, 7, § 4.

[5] *Ib.*, v, 24, § 2.

[6] *Ib.*, 53, § 6.

right form, because these forms are found on coins,[1] while the first letter of *Sesuvios* is obviously due to dittography,—the careless repetition of the last *s* of the preceding word, *Coriosolitas*. M. Longnon,[2] however, believes that in all three passages Caesar wrote *Lexovios*. Others again distinguish the Essui from the Sesuvii, but, like M. Longnon, identify the Sesuvii with the Lexovii. They urge that of all the Aremorican peoples the Lexovii were one of the most important and the most frequently mentioned. Therefore, they say, it would have been extraordinary if they had been omitted from the list of the peoples whose submission Crassus was sent to receive. Finally, they point out that in the list of the tribes which were called upon to furnish contingents for the relief of Vercingetorix[3] the name *Sesuvii* is omitted ; and this, they argue, is another reason for identifying them with the Lexovii.[4] De Valois[5] gives an independent reason for doing the same. He observes that in *B. G.*, ii, 34 Caesar writes *Sesuvios* immediately after *Coriosolitas*, and that in *B. G.*, iii, 11, § 4 he writes *Coriosolitas Lexoviosque*.

The French Commission[6] reply first, that *Lexovii* is found, *without any various reading*, in five other passages of the *Commentaries*,[7] besides the two under discussion, and that it is therefore unlikely that if in those two passages Caesar had written *Lexovios*, the various readings should have been so many; secondly, that, if *Lexovios* were read in *B. G.*, iii, 7, § 4, its presence in iii, 9, § 10 would be inexplicable, for it would be absurd to say that the Veneti allied themselves with the Lexovii, when the Lexovii were their allies already ; thirdly, that it would be inaccurate to describe the Lexovii as 'neighbours' (*finitimi*[8]) of the Veneti. This last argument is worthless: the diocese of Séez, where the Commission place the Esuvii, is very nearly as far from Venetia as the country of the Lexovii. In support of the other two arguments, it may be said that the theory which identifies the Sesuvii with the Lexovii is shattered (1) by the coins to which I have referred, and (2) by the fact that in none of the three passages does any single MS. give the reading *Lexovios* ; and I therefore regard it as certain that there was, in the time of Caesar, a tribe called *Esuvii*, and that that tribe was the one which the MSS. call *Sesuvii*. It remains to inquire where their territory was situated.

Now, if Caesar was the only ancient writer who mentioned the

[1] Desjardins (*Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 491, n. 1) says that M. C. Robert sent him a Gallic coin found in Jersey, bearing the inscription Esvvios. But Desjardins mis-spells the name. The name on the coin in question is spelt Esvios. This form, however, in the opinion of Eugène Hucher, is the prototype of Esvvivs, which is found on two coins of Tetricus. *Mélanges de numismatique*, i, 1875, pp. 321–2. Cf. *Corpus inscr. Lat.*, xiii, pars ii, fasc. 2, p. 669, and A. Blanchet, *Traité des monn. gaul.*, pp. 81, 319, 400.

[2] *Atlas hist. de la France*, p. 5.

[3] *B. G.*, vii, 75.

[4] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., ix, 1864, pp. 411–2.

[5] *Notitia Galliarum*, p. 494.

[6] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., ix, 1864, p. 412.

[7] *B. G.*, iii, 9, § 10 ; 11, § 4 ; 17, § 3 ; 29, § 3 vii, 75, § 3.

[8] *B. G.*, iii, 8, § 3.

Esuvii, there were two maritime peoples, the Baiocasses and the Viducasses, whom he did not mention at all. Augustodurus, the chief town of the Baiocasses, was indisputably Bayeux. Arigenus or Aregenua, the chief town of the Viducasses, appears in the *Table* as Araegenue, which was indisputably Vieux, near Caen.[1] The Baiocasses appear for the first time, as a *civitas*, in the *Notitia provinciarum*,[2] which does not mention the Viducasses at all. Both tribes, it is true, figure in Pliny : [3] but Pliny mentions several tribes which did not rank as *civitates* ; and Desjardins [4] considers that, at the time when Pliny wrote, the Baiocasses, or, as Pliny calls them, Bodiocasses, were merely clients of the Viducasses. The *Notitia provinciarum* [5] mentions a people called the Saii, who do not figure in the *Commentaries*, and whose territory is identified with the diocese of Séez. As Caesar mentions the Esuvii side by side with the Aulerci, who occupied the dioceses of Le Mans and Évreux, Walckenaer [6] infers that they occupied the diocese of Séez, which is conterminous with those two dioceses. The French Commission [7] arrive at the same conclusion. After assigning to the various peoples of Normandy on the west of the Seine, namely the Lexovii, the Aulerci Eburovices, the Ambibarii, and the Venelli, the dioceses which belonged to them, they find the diocese of Séez unoccupied, and accordingly assign it to the Esuvii.

Desjardins goes further. Having regard to the fact that the Esuvii are mentioned only by Caesar, and that Caesar does not mention either the Baiocasses or the Viducasses, he identifies the joint territories of the two latter tribes, which, he supposes, included the diocese of Séez, with the territory of the Esuvii. If he is right, the Esuvii possessed the central and the western parts of the departments of the Calvados and Orne.

It is clear that we cannot get beyond conjecture ; but the conjecture of Desjardins appears to me the most reasonable that we have. Just as the Helvetii were divided into four *pagi*, so it is probable that the Baiocasses, the Viducasses, and the Saii were *pagi*, if they were not clients, of the Esuvii. The French Commission,[8] indeed, include the territories of the Baiocasses and Viducasses in the territory of the Lexovii (q.v.) ; but, unless we accept Desjardins's suggestion, it must be admitted that Caesar was mistaken in describing the Esuvii as a maritime people.

A. Bertrand, having regard to the position in which Ptolemy places the Arvii, suggests that Ἀρούιοι is probably only a corrupt form of Ἐσσούιοι (*Essui*).[9] Yes, corrupt indeed ! Suggestions of this kind lead to nothing. See CORIOSOLITES.

Gabali. See ARVERNI.

[1] *Hist. de l'Acad. des inscr.*, xxxi, 1768, p. 235.
[2] Ed. O. Seeck, p. 263 (ii, 3).
[3] *Nat. Hist.*, iv, 18 (32), § 107.
[4] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, i, 338 ; ii, 492–3.
[5] Ed. O. Seeck, p. 263 (ii, 6).
[6] *Géogr. des Gaules*, i, 391.
[7] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., ix, 1864, p. 409.
[8] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, ii, 90–1.
[9] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., ix, 1864, p. 413.

Garumni.—The Garumni are mentioned by no ancient writer, except Caesar.[1] D'Anville[2] agrees with de Valois in placing them in the valley of the Garonne, below St. Bertrand-de-Comminges; and Walckenaer, the French Commission, and Desjardins accept this conjecture.

Gates.—The Gates are placed by d'Anville,[3] who follows Sanson and de Valois, between the Elusates and the Ausci, in the 'comté de Gaure'. But, as the French Commission observe,[4] this conjecture was based merely upon the resemblance of the name 'Gaure' to *Garites*, the name by which the tribe in question was designated in the old editions of the *Commentaries*. Now the reading *Garites* is only found in a few bad MSS.[5]: the best have *Gates*. Walckenaer makes a similar guess, which is not worth transcribing.

Geidumni. See Nervii.

Gorgobina.—Gorgobina was the stronghold, or the chief stronghold, of the Boi.[6] In order to find its site, it is first necessary to find the district which the Boi occupied.

Caesar says that the Boi, after the conclusion of the Helvetian campaign, were allowed by him, at the request of the Aedui, to settle in Aeduan territory; and he remarks that the Aedui made this request because they knew that the Boi were a brave people.[7] We may reasonably conclude that the Boi were established in the western part of the Aeduan territory, where they might perhaps serve as an outpost against those old rivals of the Aedui,—the Arverni.[8] Indeed, on any other hypothesis, Caesar's narrative of his march from Cenabum (Orléans) to Noviodunum and thence to Avaricum (Bourges), taken in conjunction with his statement that Vercingetorix, marching from the country of the Arverni to Gorgobina, passed through the country of the Bituriges, is inexplicable. I may add that, during the siege of Avaricum, Caesar expected a supply of corn from the Boi; and he would hardly have done so if they had not been near enough to forward the supply, that is, somewhere in the western part of the Aeduan territory.[9]

According to one of the earliest editors of Caesar, Raimondus Marlianus,[10] the Boi settled in the Bourbonnais. This was also the view of d'Anville.[11] He premised that the Boi must have dwelt somewhere in the Bourbonnais, because the route which Caesar followed from Agedincum (Sens) by way of Orléans across the Berri must have led into that country. He went on to quote passages from early mediaeval writers, showing, in his opinion, that that part of the Bourbonnais which lay on the west of the Allier had belonged to the Bituriges and the Arverni. Therefore, he concluded, the Boi must have occupied the part between the Allier and the Loire. If this

[1] *B. G.*, iii, 27, § 2.
[2] *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 342.
[3] *Ib.*, p. 340.
[4] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 436.
[5] Schneider's *Caesar*, i, 290.
[6] *B. G.*, vii, 9, § 6.
[7] *Ib.* and i, 28, § 5.
[8] See *Bull. de la Soc. d'émulation du dép^t de l'Allier*, viii, 1859, pp. 288–9.
[9] *B. G.*, vii, 9, § 6; 12–13; 17, § 2.
[10] *Veterum Galliae locorum . . . descriptio*, ed. 1544.
[11] *Éclaircissemens sur l'ancienne Gaule*, pp. 203–6.

conclusion is wrong, then, unless d'Anville is mistaken in holding that the Aedui possessed no territory on the west of the Allier, the Boi must have been somewhere east of the Loire, which, below its confluence with the Allier, formed the boundary between the Bituriges and the Aedui.[1] But such a position is open to the objection that the Aedui had no reason for establishing an outpost against the Bituriges, who were in a state of friendly dependence upon them; and, as far as I know, there is nothing to be said in its favour. Nevertheless, this opinion has found adherents. Walckenaer[2] supposes that Caesar would have restored to the Boi their original territory, which he assumes to have been occupied by the Aedui; and accordingly he places them in the district which afterwards became the diocese of Auxerre. He observes that near Entrains, in the centre of that diocese, there is a place called Boui, which, in the Middle Ages, was known as Boiacum. But the name 'Buy', between which and *Boi* the curious may also discover an affinity, is found more than once in the district between the Allier and the Loire. Moreover, there is no reason for assuming that the diocese of Auxerre was the original home of the Boi, except the fact, if it is a fact, that the diocese of Auxerre was adjacent to the territory of the Senones,[3] and that the Boian settlers in Italy were neighbours of the Senones. And this reason is purely fanciful.

In support of Walckenaer's view, a statement of Pliny[4] has been quoted:—*intus autem Aedui foederati, Carnutini foederati, Boi, Senones*, &c. But there is not the slightest proof that Pliny meant to enumerate the states in question according to their geographical order;[5] and if he did, his words would seem to mean that the Boi were wedged in between the Carnutes and the Senones, which is absurd.

On the other hand, it is impossible to prove that the Boi did not dwell in the diocese of Auxerre. For it has been proved that that diocese, or a part of it, belonged to the Aedui in A.D. 245;[6] and it is probable that it did so in Caesar's time as well. The route which Caesar followed from Sens by way of Orléans across the Berri would have served his purpose even if the Boi had been east of the Loire; for he would have diverted Vercingetorix from attacking them by merely threatening Avaricum. The one strong argument against placing the Boi in the diocese of Auxerre is the argument which I have already stated, namely that it is more reasonable to suppose that the Aedui should have established them as an outpost against the Arverni than against the Bituriges.

I conclude, then, that, while it is not certain that the country of the Boi was between the Allier and the Loire, it is more probable that it was there than that it was anywhere else.[7]

[1] See *B. G.*, vii, 5, §§ 3–4, and pp. 351–2. [2] *Géogr. des Gaules*, i, 82–4.
[3] See pp. 471–3. [4] *Nat. Hist.*, iv, 18 (32), § 107.
[5] In the same chapter Pliny mentions the Andegavi (Andes), who lived in the neighbourhood of Angers, immediately after the Tricasses, who lived in the neighbourhood of Troyes! [6] Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, iv, 184–5.
[7] Brugière de Lamotte argues that, if the territory of the Boi had been on

II. But if we cannot positively determine the territory of the Boi, how can we fix the site of their chief town ? Needless to say that there has been no lack of guesses. M. Clairefond [1] easily disposes of most of them, showing that the proposed sites are either outside the Aeduan frontier or otherwise irreconcilable with Caesar's narrative. There is really nothing, except doubtful military considerations, to guide the inquirer ; but it may be useful to examine the conjectures which the best known commentators have made.

1. Gorgobina has been identified with Moulins. But Moulins is not an old town ; [2] and besides, it is so far south that we may doubt whether Vercingetorix, after hearing the news of Caesar's departure from Cenabum (Orléans), would have been able to reach Noviodunum in time to fight a battle for its relief. For it must be remembered that, while the news was travelling from Cenabum to Gorgobina, Caesar was marching southward from Cenabum towards Noviodunum.[3]

2. Napoleon,[4] following M. Crosnier,[5] believes that he has found the site at St. Parize-le-Châtel. Crosnier says that this place was once known as ' le village de *Gentili* ', or, as it was called in the legends of St. Patrice, ' Pagus Gentilicus ' ; and that the people of this *pagus* remained idolaters until the middle of the sixth century, that is to say, for two centuries after the neighbouring peoples had accepted Christianity. This, argues Napoleon, is what we might expect from ' a tribe settled in a foreign country as the Boi were, who would retain their customs and religion for a longer time unchanged '. Perhaps. But precisely the same argument has been advanced in favour of placing the Boi in the neighbourhood of Sancerre.[6] At Buy in the neighbourhood of St. Parize-le-Châtel, says Crosnier, there is a decided bend in the Roman road from Augustodunum (Autun) to Avaricum (Bourges) ; and from this circumstance he concludes that on or near the bend in the road, that is, at or near Buy, was situated the *oppidum* of the Boi. The only argument of any weight which Napoleon adds is that the site of St. Parize-le-Châtel is better adapted for a Gallic stronghold than any other which has been proposed. The choice has the qualified support of Desjardins, who speaks [7] of ' Gorgobina . . . que l'auteur de la *Vie de César* place, avec vraisemblance, à Saint-Parize-le-Châtel '.

the right bank of the Allier, they could not have brought corn to Caesar at Avaricum (Bourges), or Vercingetorix would have intercepted them. But Vercingetorix could have intercepted them just as well if they had been on the left bank.

Again, Brugière insists that, if Gorgobina was between the Allier and the Loire, Vercingetorix, in order to get from Gorgobina to Noviodunum, would have had to cross the Allier, which was not fordable. But he forgets that the Allier was spanned by several bridges (*B. G.*, vii, 34, § 3). His arguments may be found in *Bull. de la Soc. d'émulation du dépt de l'Allier*, ix, 1864, pp. 434–5, 437–9, 444, 454, 473–5.

[1] *Ib.*, vii, 1859, pp. 294–303.

[2] D'Anville, *Éclaircissemens sur l'ancienne Gaule*, pp. 209, 236–7.

[3] *B. G.*, vii, 12–3.

[4] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 247–8, note.

[5] *Bull. de la Soc. nivernaise*, viii, 1880, pp. 104–6, 108–9.

[6] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 171.

[7] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 478.

3. Bonniard[1] places Gorgobina quite close to Boui, on the site of the ruins of a Gallic or Gallo-Roman town near St. Révérien in the department of the Nièvre. But this conjecture rests simply upon the resemblance between the names ' Boui ' and ' Boi '.

4. General Creuly refuses to look for the site anywhere in the angle formed by the Allier and the Loire. He objects that Vercingetorix would not, in order to enter this district, have crossed the territory of the Bituriges on his march from that of the Arverni ;[2] and that Caesar would not, in order to succour a town situated between the Allier and the Loire, have crossed the Loire so far to the west as Cenabum (Orléans), when he might easily have gone direct by Nevers. Accordingly Creuly thinks that the site must be looked for somewhere on the west of the Allier and of the Loire. Starting from this hypothesis, he affirms that no place in the neighbourhood in question is so well adapted for defence as Sancerre.[3] If, he says, his suggestion is accepted, one can easily understand why Vercingetorix established himself at Gorgobina. His object was to prevent Caesar from crossing the Loire, all the bridges over which that lay on or near the probable direction of his march had doubtless been demolished by the Carnutes and the Bituriges ; but Caesar upset his calculations by making a *détour* by way of Cenabum.[4] Creuly suggests that when Caesar said that the Loire separated the Bituriges from the Aedui, he only meant that part of the Loire which was in the neighbourhood of Nevers ; for in Creuly's opinion it was probably at Nevers that the Aedui crossed the Loire when, as Caesar relates in *B. G.*, vii, 5, they entered the country of the Bituriges. It seems to me much more probable that Caesar meant that all that part of the Aeduan territory which extended northward of the confluence of the Allier with the Loire, was separated from the territory of the Bituriges by the Loire.[5] Nor have Creuly's other arguments any real weight. It is true that if Vercingetorix had started from the neighbourhood of Gergovia with the intention of marching direct to the district round St. Parize-le-Châtel, he would naturally have gone down the valley of the Allier, and therefore need not have entered the territory of the Bituriges. But it is not necessary to assume that he did march direct to Gorgobina : he may have had reasons, of which we know nothing, for going back first into the country of the Bituriges ; and, indeed, Caesar's words—*Vercingetorix rursus in Bituriges exercitum reducit atque inde profectus Gorgobinam ... oppugnare instituit*[6]—would seem to suggest that from the country of the Bituriges he started off in a new direction. The objection that Caesar, marching from Agedincum, would not have gone so far to the west as Cenabum in order to relieve a town situated within the angle formed by the confluence of the Allier and the Loire, has been answered by anticipation in the note on CENABUM. Besides, if Cenabum lay far out of the way from Sens to St. Parize-le-Châtel,

[1] *Bull. de la Soc. d'émulation du dép^t de l'Allier*, viii, 1859, p. 298.
[2] *B. G.*, vii, 9, § 6. [3] See *Carte de l'État-Major* (1 : 80,000), Sheet 123.
[4] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., viii, 1863, pp. 398–9.
[5] See pp. 351–2. [6] *B. G.*, vii, 9, § 6.

it lay just as far out of the way from Sens to Sancerre. And Creuly himself maintains that Caesar made a *détour*.

M. Jacques Soyer,[1] has, however, recently supported General Creuly's choice. He argues that the form *Gorgobina* is bizarre, whereas *Gortona*—the reading of the β MSS.—is familiar in ancient toponymy; and he affirms that *Gortona* is the primitive name of Sancerre. As a matter of fact Sancerre has had, at successive epochs, various names, the earliest known of which was *Castrum Gordonicum*.[2] The name *Gortona*, of which M. Soyer does not produce a single instance (though it may be equivalent to *Cortona*), is not more familiar than *Gorgobina*; and *Gorgobina* has been accepted without question by Celtic scholars. However, if Caesar wrote *Gortona*, it is more than probable that the fort which Vercingetorix besieged was Sancerre. M. Jullian[3] objects, first, that Sancerre is in the ancient diocese of Bourges, and, secondly, that the Aedui would never have entrusted so strong a fort to the keeping of the Boi. The former objection is valid. As to the latter, it seems to me hardly probable that if the Aedui, as M. Jullian himself maintains,[4] had entrusted the Boi with the defence of Gorgobina as an advanced post against the Bituriges, they would have deliberately assigned to them a weak rather than a strong position. What had they to fear from their feeble dependants? Still, I agree with M. Jullian in rejecting Sancerre; for leaving out of account the fact that it is in the diocese of Bourges, I cannot accept the reading *Gortona*; and I doubt whether the mission of the Boi was to check the Bituriges.[5]

5. The French Commission originally decided for St. Pierre-le-Moutier: but this place is ill situated for defence;[6] and the Commission afterwards recanted, and professed themselves convinced by the arguments of Creuly.[7]

6. Von Göler[8] identifies Gorgobina with La Guerche-sur-l'Aubois, which is 17 kilometres, in a straight line, west by south of Nevers; but General Creuly[9] remarks that the name has only a deceptive resemblance to Gorgobina (or, as he calls it, Gergovina). M. Jullian, however, defends von Göler's hypothesis on different grounds. Arguing that Gorgobina must have been between the Aedui and the Bituriges, but south of that part of the Loire which separated those two peoples,[10] he remarks that it must also have been in fertile territory,[11] and concludes that these conditions are satisfied by

[1] *Bull. de géogr. hist. et descr.*, 1904, pp. 157–9.

[2] *Mém. de la Soc. hist. du Cher*, 3e sér., ii, 1882, p. 318. A. Chazaud (*Bull. de la Soc. du dépt de l'Allier*, viii, 1859, pp. 90–1), who also adopts the reading *Gortona*, identifies the stronghold with St. Satur, between Sancerre and St. Thibaut, which, he says, was formerly called *Gortonis castrum*; but M. Hippolyte Boyer (*Mém. de la Soc. hist. du Cher*, ii, 1882, pp. 301 ff.) has proved that the attribution of this name to St. Satur is unfounded.

[3] *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 434, note.

[4] *Rev. des études anc.*, v, 1903, p. 30, n. 1.

[5] See p. 426.

[6] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 248, note.

[7] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 453–4.

[8] *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 237 and n. 3.

[9] *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 434, note.

[10] See pp. 351–2. It must be remembered that M. Jullian does not believe that the Loire, strictly speaking, separated the Aedui from the Bituriges.

[11] *B. G.*, vii, 17, § 3.

La Guerche. The site of the stronghold would then have been the rising ground on which the church stands. But, as M. Jullian truly says, the country between the Allier and the Loire, which, in agreement with me, he attributes to the Boi, is likewise fertile; and that Gorgobina must have been intended as an outpost against the Bituriges I cannot admit. Besides, as I have already shown,[1] it is unlikely that the Aedui possessed any territory west of the Allier and of the Loire; and that they should have assigned to the Boi both this territory and that between the two rivers seems to me more unlikely still.

The reader has now before him the pith of what has been written upon the subject. The conclusion of the whole matter, in my judgement, is that there is not sufficient evidence for fixing the site of Gorgobina; but that there is more to be said for St. Parize-le-Châtel than for any other site which has been proposed. In short, I claim only a negative value for this note: it shows that cartographers who mark on their maps the territory of the Boi and the site of Gorgobina as if their geographical positions were certain, are not to be trusted.

Graioceli.—The Graioceli are mentioned only by Caesar,[2] immediately after the Ceutrones (q.v.) and immediately before the Caturiges (q.v.). These three Alpine tribes attacked him in 58 B.C., when he was returning from Italy to Transalpine Gaul, to deal with the Helvetii. Describing his march, he says that the last, that is to say, the westernmost town in the Citerior Provincia is Ocelum, and that he marched thence into the country of the Vocontii (q.v.) in seven days. Ocelum has been identified with Exilles, Uxeau or Usseau, Usseglio, and Aosta.[3] But there are only two sites for which any real evidence can be adduced; and for one or the other of these two the evidence is conclusive.

Desjardins[4] maintains that the name *Graioceli* proves that the territory of the tribe was on the eastern slopes of the Graian Alps. Strabo,[5] he points out, says that Ocelum was 99 Roman miles from Epeprodunum (Embrun); and, within a mile or two, this is the distance from Embrun, along the Roman road which ran past Brigantio, or Briançon, and over Mont Genèvre, to Avigliana. Four vases, on each of which an itinerary is inscribed, have been discovered at Bagni di Vicarello, the ancient Aquae Apollinares. Three of them place Ocelum at 20 Roman miles, or 29½ kilometres, from Turin, and two of them at the same distance from Susa.[6] These figures corre-

[1] See pp. 351–2.

[2] *B. G.*, i, 10, § 4. Mommsen (*Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xx, 1894, p. 200) conjectures that Caesar wrote *Grai Oceli*. The Graioceli, he observes, are not mentioned anywhere else, while the Grai are mentioned by Pliny (*Nat. Hist.*, iii, 20 [24], § 134) as inhabitants of the Graian Alps; and he argues that by breaking up *Graioceli* the sense is made clear. I confess that it seems to me clear as the text stands, but with Mommsen's alteration obscure. Moreover, the Esuvii are not mentioned by any ancient writer except Caesar.

[3] N. Sanson, *Les Comm. de César*, 3rd ed., 1658, p. 64; A. von Göler, *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 13; d'Anville, *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, pp. 500–1; Napoléon III, *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 56, n. 5; Walckenaer, *Géogr. des Gaules*, 538–9, 542–4.

[4] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, i, 84–5.

[5] iv, 1, § 3.

[6] The third, by an obvious mistake, places Ocelum at 27 Roman miles from Susa.

spond approximately with the actual distances of Drubiaglio and of Avigliana from Turin and from Susa respectively, Drubiaglio being on the northern, and Avigliana opposite it on the southern bank of the Dora Riparia. According to the fourth itinerary, there was a station called *Ad Fines*, 23 Roman miles from Turin. The same station, according to one passage in the *Itinerary of Antonine* (p. 341), was 18 Roman miles from Turin and 33, which is evidently a mistake for 23, from Susa ; according to another (pp. 356–7) 16 Roman miles from Turin and 23 from Susa ; according to the *Jerusalem Itinerary* (p. 556) 16 Roman miles from Turin and 24 from Susa. At Avigliana an inscription has been discovered, containing the words FINIB(*us*) COTTI ; and Strabo speaks of Ocelum as the boundary of Cottius's kingdom.[1] The inscription [2] in question and another found at the same place prove that at the town which stood upon the site of Avigliana was collected the duty of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent (*quadragesima* or one-fortieth) which was levied upon merchandise ; and on the fourth vase Ad Fines is called *Ad Fines* $\overline{XXXX}$, which, as Desjardins explains, means *Ad Fines quadragesimae*. From this evidence and from the evidence of the itineraries Desjardins [3] identifies Ad Fines with Avigliana ; and from the fact that important antiquities have been discovered at Drubiaglio,[4] as well as from the evidence of the itineraries and of Strabo, he identifies Ocelum with Drubiaglio. 'It is indubitable,' he says, 'from the vestiges of the ancient roads and the mile-stones found *in situ* that between Turin and Susa there were two roads, one on the left bank of the Dora Riparia and the other on the right.' [5] I can find no evidence for this assertion, except the discovery of antiquities at Drubiaglio ; and Mommsen [6] denies it. Desjardins's opinion, he maintains, is refuted not only by the topography but also by the fact that the anonymous geographer of Ravenna [7] places Ad Fines and Ocelum on the same road. These two towns, therefore, he concludes, were very close to one another, the former being nearer to Turin.[8]

[1] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., v, 1862, pp. 254–8 ; xxii, 1871, pp. 124–9.

[2] The inscription (*Corpus inscr. Lat.*, v, 7213) runs as follows :—

PVDENS · SOC
PVBL · $\overline{XL}$ · SER
ZSCR · FINIB
COTTI · VOVIT
ARCAR · LVGVD
S · L · M · ,

that is to say, *Pudens, soc*(iorum) *publ*(ici) *quadragesimae ser*(vus) *contrascr*(iptor) *Finib*(us) *Cotti vovit arcar*(ius) *Lugud*(uni) *s*(olvit) *l*(ibens) *m*(erito), or to quote Desjardins's translation, 'Pudens, esclave des fermiers associés de l'impôt indirect du quarantième des Gaules, contrôleur à la station de *Fines de l'ancien royaume de Cottius*, a voué ce monument. Devenu trésorier de la douane à Lyon, il a acquitté son vœu de grand cœur.'

[3] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, iv, 19–20.

[4] See Carlo Promis, *Storia dell' antico Torino*, 1869, pp. 56, 129, 238.

[5] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., xxii, 1871, p. 125.

[6] *Corpus inscr. Lat.*, v, pars ii, pp. 811–2.

[7] iv, 30 (ed. M. Pinder and G. Parthey, 1860, p. 250, 1–3).

[8] Mommsen's criticism notwithstanding, Desjardins (*Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 604, iii, 319–20) adhered to his opinion. My own has been modified.

M. E. Celesia, in a note which he communicated to Napoleon,[1] argued that besides the Ocelum of the itineraries, there were others at Usseglio and at Usseau.[2] Usseglio is in the valley of Viu, 40 kilometres north-west of Turin : Usseau is in the valley of the Clusone, between Pignerol and the ' col de Fenestrelle '. Now, it is certain that Caesar's Ocelum was neither at Usseglio nor at Usseau. For—to say nothing of the evidence which I have already adduced—Caesar must have taken the route by Mont Genèvre ; and, to reach Mont Genèvre, he would surely have followed the well-defined route along the Dora Riparia,[3] instead of going out of his way through the valley of the Stura or the valley of the Clusone.

Grudii. See Nervii.

Helvii.—The Helvii occupied the Vivarais, which forms the southern part of the department of the Ardèche.[4] See Allobroges.

Itius Portus.—In the first edition of this book[5] I argued, inconclusively, that Portus Itius was the former harbour of Wissant, between Cape Gris-Nez and Cape Blanc-Nez. In *Ancient Britain*[6] I again approached the question, with knowledge which was all but complete, and endeavoured to demonstrate the identity of the port with the harbour of Boulogne. My arguments were accepted by Mr. A. G. Peskett,[7] M. Salomon Reinach,[8] Professor Walter Dennison,[9] and other critics as conclusive : but two scholars who were convinced, and one of whom was converted, by the article in the same volume which deals with the question of Caesar's landing-place in Britain, told me that the article on Portus Itius did not seem to them to achieve demonstration ; and a few days before the publication of *Ancient Britain*, when all the sheets had been printed, I myself saw that there were defects in the reasoning. While I was preparing the article I felt the need of trustworthy and detailed information regarding the experiments that were made in order to ascertain the time in which the main division of the first Napoleon's flotilla could clear the port of Boulogne ; but I failed until too late to put my hands upon the authoritative work—Captain E. Desbrière's *Projets et tentatives de débarquement aux îles britanniques*—in which it is contained.

It will not, however, be denied by any critic who has even an elementary knowledge of seamanship or is willing to accept the unanimous testimony of nautical experts that the article made one contribution to knowledge : it proved that the port from which Caesar sailed in his first expedition was Boulogne.[10] It is now generally admitted that Portus Itius was either Boulogne or Wissant. If, then, Caesar sailed from the same port on both his expeditions,

[1] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 56, n. 5.
[2] Cf. C. Promis, *Storia dell' antico Torino*, p. 129.
[3] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., vii, 1863, p. 255.
[4] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, ii, 17.
[5] Pp. 433–43.
[6] Pp. 552–95.
[7] *Class. Rev.*, xxii, 1908, p. 94.
[8] *Rev. arch.*, 4e sér., xi, 1908, p. 307.
[9] *Class. Philology*, iii, 1908, p. 457.
[10] *Ancient Britain and the Invasions of Julius Caesar*, pp. 581–3. I am glad to find that Mr. Stuart Jones (*Eng. Hist. Rev.*, xxiv, 1909, p. 115), with many other competent critics, accepts this conclusion.

Portus Itius was Boulogne. The difficulty is that he did not say that on his first expedition he started from Portus Itius; and while I was at work upon the article I felt 'obstinate questionings' in regard to his having only mentioned the harbour in connexion with the second expedition. The drift of my argument was that Boulogne was in all respects more convenient as a starting-point than Wissant, and that Caesar, having had experience of the superior advantages of Boulogne in 55 B.C., would not have abandoned it in the following year. But, for want of the information which I afterwards found, I failed to see that Boulogne, with all its superior advantages, may have had, for the second expedition, one serious drawback. I have explained this matter in a paper which appeared in the *Classical Review* of May, 1909.

As the question of Portus Itius is more closely related to the story of Caesar's British expeditions than to the conquest of Gaul, it would be out of place in this volume to discuss it in all its bearings. The article in *Ancient Britain* contains, with one exception, all the information that is required for forming a decision; and it is admitted by those who detected its shortcomings that the general superiority of Boulogne as a port of departure for Caesar and its general correspondence with the requirements of his narrative are therein established. I will therefore only reprint, with certain alterations, so much of the paper in the *Classical Review* as may be necessary, pointing out the flaws in the article in *Ancient Britain* that escaped the notice of reviewers, and asking scholars to consider that one aspect of the question—the most important of all—which has hitherto been neglected.

'On page 569[1] of *Ancient Britain* I asked "if eight hundred ships had been beached at Wissant [during the twenty-five days for which Caesar was windbound at Portus Itius in 54 B.C.], would it not have been necessary, in order to protect them from storm-driven spring tides, to construct an enormous naval camp, the earth necessary for which did not exist?" I asked the question because, as I have shown on pages 566–7, there was no harbour, properly so called, at Wissant except a creek formed by the mouth of the rivulet called the Rieu d'Herlan, and possibly a small anchorage partially sheltered by a shoal. The answer is that to construct a naval camp would not have been necessary if the ships could be hauled up beyond the highest high-water mark of spring tides. Supposing that the dune which extends from the "ruisseau de Guiptun", near Tardinghem, to the "ruisseau d'Herlan", at Wissant, and which did not exist in the time of Caesar,[2] were bodily removed, I am not sure that it would be possible now to haul up ships beyond this mark;[3] but if we may suppose that the subsidence which, in the opinion of French geologists, has taken place since Roman times between Sangatte and Dunkirk extended to Wissant, there must in 54 B.C. have been a fringe of beach immediately below the high ground wide enough

[1] See also p. 574.
[2] *Anc. Britain*, &c., p. 566.
[3] This question could only be settled by taking levels.

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to allow eight hundred ships to remain high and dry at all states of the tide.[1] Hypothesis indeed is unnecessary; for the foundations of the mediaeval Wissant have been discovered in the dune.[2]

'On page 571, note 2, I hardly allowed sufficient weight to the fact that the author of *Bellum Africanum* (10, § 1) applies the name of *portus* to a mere anchorage,—that of Monastir (the ancient Ruspina), which is protected from northerly and westerly winds, but otherwise exposed.[3]

'On page 584 I argued, as Desjardins had done before, that the sixty ships which Labienus built during Caesar's absence in Britain could not have been built at Wissant, where there were certainly no dockyards and whither it would have been very difficult to convey the necessary timber; whereas the material could have been carried both by road and river to Boulogne. But I overlooked a passage in Caesar (v, 8, § 1) to which I had on an earlier page called attention. He tells us that he directed Labienus "to protect the ports" (*ut portus tueretur*), which implies that he thought it necessary to keep more than one port under control. If, then, Portus Itius was Wissant, the ships were doubtless built at Boulogne.

'On page 585 I showed that, according to "seafaring men, both English and French, who have practical experience of the winds and the currents in the Channel", "the passage for sailing-vessels from Boulogne to the south-eastern part of Britain is, and always has been, in circumstances such as Caesar described, not only very convenient but by far the most convenient". But Caesar had to think of the start and of the arrival as well as of the passage; and this consideration brings me to the question on which the whole controversy really turns,—could Caesar's fleet have started from Boulogne without becoming unduly scattered?

'It must of course be remembered that the port of Boulogne in the time of Napoleon was less spacious and less deep than it was 2000 years ago, because it had been largely silted up.[4] Still, the map in which Desjardins[5] attempts to depict the state of the Liane in Caesar's time and represents it as navigable for sea-going ships as

[1] The eminent geologist, M. Charles Barrois, of the University of Lille, has very kindly written to me on this question. 'Je ne crois pas,' he says, 'que nous ayons encore des documents assez précis pour arriver à une connaissance décisive et absolue de la question topographique qui vous intéresse. Il faudrait pour cela faire une série de levées topographiques et de nivellements précis qui n'ont pu être faits encore.

'Je ne puis donc vous donner que mon impression que les conclusions de M. Gosselet [that the coast between Sangatte and Dunkirk extended considerably further seaward in Roman times than now (*Anc. Britain*, p. 566)] me paraissent appuyées sur des bases solides, qui n'ont pas été réfutées, et doivent entraîner l'assentiment, la côte s'étendant plus loin à l'époque romaine. . . . Je n'ai rien à ajouter à vos connaissances bibliographiques, qui me paraissent fort complètes.'

[2] *Annales de la Soc. géol. du Nord*, xxviii, 1899, pp. 84–92. Cf. *Anc. Britain*, &c., p. 566.

[3] Cf. Stoffel, *Hist. de Jules César,—Guerre civile*, ii, 110–1, and pl. 20.

[4] *Anc. Britain*, &c., pp. 586–7. Cf. *Boulogne-sur-mer et la région boulonnaise*, i, 1899, p. 31.

[5] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, i, 1876, pl. xv.

far as Isques—7 kilometres from the mouth—is of course in part conjectural; and presumably he only intended to represent the harbour as it was at high water.[1] Moreover, although we know that Boulogne was from the time of Augustus the regular starting-point for ships sailing from North-Eastern Gaul to Britain and the naval station of the Roman Channel Fleet, we have no information as to the largest number of ships which ever started from it at one time. There is not even direct evidence that Aulus Plautius sailed from Boulogne:[2] if he did, some of his ships may have sailed from Ambleteuse; and we do not know how many he had. All we know is that Caesar sailed from Boulogne in 55 B. C. with about 80 transports and a few galleys; and it is probable that even this comparatively small fleet was inconveniently strung out.[3] Philip Augustus is said to have assembled 1500 ships at Boulogne in 1213 for his contemplated invasion of England;[4] but the attempt was abandoned.

'Captain Desbrière's researches have shown that one of the insuperable difficulties with which Napoleon had to contend was this:—it was impossible, in the most favourable circumstances, to float more than 100 vessels out of Boulogne harbour in one tide;[5] and therefore it would have been necessary for each successive relay of ships to anchor in the roadstead until the whole flotilla had cleared the harbour. But experience proved that it was dangerous to keep more ships in the roadstead than would be able, in case an unfavourable wind sprang up, to return for shelter into the estuary; and that westerly and south-westerly winds, which were favourable for the voyage, generally made the roadstead unsafe.[6] Owing to the rapidity of the current, vessels could not safely begin to move out of the port until half an hour before high tide; and even those which were rowed could not continue the operation later than two hours after the tide began to fall, and then only if the wind was not against them.[7]

'My point then is this. Although we know that the estuary of

[1] I can hardly believe that, even at high water, the Liane, which, less than two miles above Boulogne, is now only 8 or 10 metres wide, was then many times wider.

[2] Mr. H. G. Evelyn-White (*Class. Rev.*, xxii, 1908, p. 205, n. 9) thinks that it 'can probably be inferred [that Plautius started from Boulogne] from Suetonius, v, 17',—*Quare a Massilia Gesoriacum usque pedestri itinere confecto inde* [Claudius] *transmisit*, &c. But Claudius was not accompanied by an army; and it is questionable whether he would have started from Boulogne if he had had to get 800 ships out of the harbour. Moreover, Plautius's fleet sailed in three divisions (Dion Cassius, lx, 19, § 4).

[3] Cf. *B. G.*, iv, 23, § 2 with § 4.

[4] M. Luchaire (E. Lavisse, *Hist. de France*, t. iii, 1re partie, 1901, p. 162) appears sceptical as to the number.

[5] *Projets et tentatives*, &c., iii, 1902, pp. 451, 566.

[6] *Ib.*, iv, 91, 94–5; iii, 141. Between the 1st of May and the 1st of November, 1804, more than 150 vessels were on three several occasions anchored in the roadstead for six or seven successive days; but on each occasion, when they were returning into the harbour, some of them were dispersed or injured (*ib.*, iv, 145). Except in the very narrow space formed by the channel of the Liane, which at low water nowhere exceeded 40 metres in breadth and was in many places not more than 20, the ships were generally aground (*ib.*, iii, pp. 147–8). The vessels of least draught could only cross the bar even at spring tides during four hours.

[7] *Ib.*, p. 144.

the Liane was larger and deeper in Caesar's time than in Napoleon's, we can hardly be sure that Caesar would have been able to get eight times as many ships out of it in one tide as Napoleon; and even if he could have done so, they would probably have been obliged to anchor in the roadstead as they emerged until the whole flotilla had cleared the harbour. For, unless the harbour was as extensive and as deep as Desjardins maintained, this operation might have required several hours:[1] in that case, if the ships had sailed on as they emerged from the estuary, the leading division would have been off the British coast at daybreak[2] before the rearmost had begun their voyage; and it is clear from Caesar's words that the start was virtually simultaneous.[3] But there is another point to mark. I have said that the ships, as they came out of the harbour, might have been obliged to anchor in the roadstead. But it is doubtful whether they would have anchored in the open roadstead. Possibly they would have been attached by hawsers to the shore, and anchored as well. For Caesar describes his start by the words *naves solvit*.[4] Now, as Professor J. S. Reid has written to me, "the natural meaning of the expression [*navem solvere*] is . . . to free the ship from all her fastenings"; and it commonly connotes the operation of unmooring,—letting go a hawser and putting off from shore or quay. Perhaps, if the ships were merely riding at anchor, the expression might, as Professor Reid admits, "be loosely extended to lifting the anchor"; but it seems unlikely that Caesar uses it in this sense, for he repeatedly describes the operation of weighing anchor by the words *sublatis ancoris*.[5] If, then, Portus Itius was Boulogne, his narrative would suggest that the ships, as they passed out of the harbour, were moored alongshore outside until the signal was given for the whole fleet to set sail. Now, however closely they may have been moored, we can hardly allow a less breadth of front for each than 7 yards.[6] The ships then would have extended in a row more than 5,600 yards long,—about 5 kilometres, or more than 3 miles; in other words, they would have reached from the mouth of the Liane two-thirds of the way to Ambleteuse! . . .

'Although it would not have been possible to make as good a run

[1] In the *Classical Review* (p. 79) I stated positively that to clear the harbour 'would have required not much less than ten hours'. It would not have done so if the harbour was free from obstructions and as capacious as Desjardins supposed. My statement was a mistaken inference from an answer which Captain Iron, the harbour-master of Dover, had given to a question (*ib.*, n. 6).

[2] *B. G.*, v, 8, § 2. [3] *Ib.*, §§ 2, 5–6. [4] *Ib.*, § 2.

[5] *Ib.*, iv, 23, § 6; *B. C.*, i, 31, § 3; ii, 22, § 3; 25, § 7.

[6] The ships were small, but comparatively broad; 540 of them carried 5 legions with their auxiliaries, camp equipage and stores, 2,000 troopers, 2,000 cavalry horses, remounts, and baggage cattle (*B. G.*, v, 1, § 2; 2, § 2; 5, § 2; 8, §§ 1–2). Their breadth of beam cannot have been less than 15 feet and was probably rather more. The breadth of one of the great merchant-ships of the Mediterranean, the dimensions of which have been recorded by Lucian, was, as Mr. Torr points out (*Ancient Ships*, 1894, p. 24), 'slightly more than a fourth of the length;' and Caesar says that the breadth of the ships which he designed was proportionally greater than that of the Mediterranean craft. The breadth of Napoleon's 'bateaux canonniers', which were 60 feet long and drew only 4½ feet of water, was 14 feet (E. Desbrière, *Projets et tentatives*, &c., iii, 1902, p. 90).

to Britain before a south-west wind from Wissant as from Boulogne, although the labour of hauling up and hauling down the ships at Wissant would have been great, these disadvantages may not have been considered too high a price to pay for the advantages of security, certainty, and a simultaneous start.

'Professor Camille Jullian, who has seen the rough draft of this paper, writes to me, "Je ne vois pas en faveur de Wissant que *le nombre* donné par César [nor do I, with one exception, on which, as the reader will see, I do not lay undue stress], et je me demande si le pays est assez peuplé, assez fertile, assez près des bonnes routes pour nourrir une armée de 10 [read 8] légions." The considerations which my friend adduces were emphasized in *Ancient Britain*. But the comparative infertility of the country, its sparse population, and its want of good roads would not have been fatal if it was possible, as it surely was, to provision the army for a few weeks by sea or by pack-horses, which could have moved on tracks that would have been impracticable for wagons.'

. . . . . .

Again, the fact that Caesar only mentions Portus Itius in connexion with his second expedition does suggest that he did not sail from it on his first; and the impression is not removed by the words 'he ordered all the ships to converge on the Itian harbour, *from which he had ascertained that the passage to Britain was most convenient*' (*omnes ad portum Itium convenire iubet, quo ex portu commodissimum in Britanniam traiectum esse cognoverat*[1]). A. Klotz,[2] indeed, who actually identifies Portus Itius with the 'further harbour' (*portus ulterior*[3]), in which Caesar's cavalry transports assembled in 55 B.C., remarks that 'when Caesar mentions the two harbours in the Fourth Book he gives no name, because the name had no significance for his readers', whereas in the Fifth Book, if he had not given the name, he would have been forced to indicate by a clumsy circumlocution which of the two he meant. But he did not indicate this by giving the name; nor, indeed, did he make it clear that he meant either of the two.[4] Still, his words may suggest more than he intended; and it would not be judicial to rely upon the mere fact that in the *Fourth Commentary* Portus Itius is not named.

My only aim has been to show that the case for Boulogne cannot be regarded as absolutely proved, because, if there is only one real objection, that objection may not safely be ignored. But if there were not one gap in our knowledge, it would perhaps disappear. If we but knew precisely the ancient conditions of the estuary of the Liane, we might be able to identify Portus Itius as certainly as the port from which Caesar sailed in 55. He got under weigh (*naves*

[1] *B. G.*, v. 2, § 3. Caesar uses an analogous expression in v, 8, § 3,—*remis contendit ut eam partem insulae caperet qua optimum esse egressum superiore aestate cognoverat*; and the place where he landed in 54 B.C. was a little north of the coast between Walmer and Deal, on which he had landed in 55. See *Anc. Britain*, pp. 662, 664–5. [2] *Caesarstudien*, p. 22. [3] *B. G.*, iv, 23, § 1.

[4] The *portus ulterior* was Ambleteuse; and the notion that Caesar assembled 800 vessels in that tiny port is too absurd for discussion. See *Anc. Britain*, pp. 563–4.

solvit) about sunset.[1] If these words could have been used, as Professor Reid suggests, in an extended sense, referring to ships which were anchored in the roadstead—though of course this assumption would imply that the operation of clearing the harbour had begun several hours before sunset—I should still regard it as not merely probable, but almost certain that Portus Itius was Boulogne. Indeed, as the whole fleet could most probably have cleared the harbour in one tide, and as the ships would then have remained at anchor not more than a few hours, I only scruple because Caesar, like Napoleon, may have feared that freshening winds would make the anchorage unsafe. But his words appear to mean that the fleet *began* to move out of the harbour about sunset: if so, assuming that Portus Itius was Boulogne, the ships must all have sailed on, without anchoring, as they cleared the estuary; and the whole business of clearing the harbour must have been completed within an hour and a half, or the fleet would have been strung out over a space of more than 7 nautical miles.[2] Perhaps, if the estuary was as large and as deep as Desjardins maintained, such a feat would have been just possible.[3] But unless the question is settled by excavating for traces of the Roman camps, an element of doubt, however slight, will remain.[4]

Latobrigi.—It will be convenient to treat of the Latobrigi in conjunction with the Rauraci and the Tulingi. All three peoples were near neighbours of the Helvetii;[5] and, according to Ptolemy,[6] the chief towns of the Rauraci were Augusta (Augst), about 7 miles east by south of Basle, and Argentovaria, which was probably near Heidolsheim, close to the common frontier of Upper and Lower Alsace.

[1] *B. G.*, v, 8, § 2. [2] See *Anc. Britain*, p. 576, n. 1.

[3] My friend, Mr. W. H. Stuart Garnett, who is a thorough seaman, thinks that, given sufficient depth and extent of water, the feat might have been accomplished within two hours. He suggests that the vessels may have been ranged along both banks of the estuary at intervals of about 25 feet, so as to allow room for the oars. They would not have drawn more than 5 feet of water (*Class. Rev.*, May, 1909, p. 81, note). As, however, they would have been obliged to keep some distance apart in order to avoid collisions, they would not have had room to move simultaneously unless they had been formed in four or five parallel lines. This of course would only have been possible if there was water enough outside the narrow channel of the Liane (see p. 435, n. 6): otherwise they could only have moved in single file; and when Caesar *naves solvit* it was three or four hours before high tide (see *Anc. Britain*, pp. 729–30). Moreover, the current would have been against them; Captain Iron thinks that they could not have been rowed much more than two miles an hour; and it must not be forgotten that they were accompanied by some of the clumsy old transports (*B. G.*, v, 1, § 1). I believe that for convenience of embarkation they would have been moored as closely as possible, like the trawlers and 'hookers' in Plymouth Sound, near the mouth of the harbour, in which case considerably more time would have been required.

[4] Meusel (*Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xxxvii, 1911, p. 99) is among the critics who believe that in *Anc. Britain* the identity of Portus Itius was finally established. I can only claim to have brought the question as near solution as, in the present state of knowledge, is possible. [5] *B. G.*, i, 5, § 4.

[6] *Geogr.*, ed. C. Müller, ii, 9, § 9. Cf. Müller's note (p. 231) with *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 77, d'Anville's *Notice sur l'ancienne Gaule*, pp. 97–9, and Walckenaer's *Géogr. des Gaules*, i, 521. Artzenheim, near Markolsheim, which d'Anville and Walckenaer identify with Argentovaria, is about 5 miles south of Heidolsheim.

J. D. Schoepflin [1] remarks that Pliny [2] places the Rauraci between the Sequani and the Helvetii; and he infers that they occupied the slopes of the Jura, their territory being bounded on the east by the Aar and the Rhine, on the south by the ridge of the Jura between the sources of the Birse and the Pierre-Pertuis, and on the west by the branch of the Jura known as Lomont. As a matter of fact, Pliny only *mentions* the Rauraci between the Sequani and the Helvetii, which, as any careful reader of the *Natural History* will admit, is no proof that they separated the two peoples; and Caesar distinctly says that the Jura separated the Helvetii from the Sequani.[3] Ptolemy, Schoepflin argues, is mistaken in assigning Argentovaria to the Rauraci: their territory did not extend so far northward; otherwise the territory of the Sequani would not have touched the Rhine; and Caesar says that it did. The passage which Schoepflin has in mind [4] is perhaps an interpolation; [5] but let us assume that it is true. Even so, if the territory on the north of Argentovaria is rightly assigned to the Triboci (q.v.), and if they crossed the Rhine with Ariovistus, Schoepflin's argument collapses; for Ariovistus's followers settled in the territory of the Sequani.[6]

C. Martin [7] argues that the Rauraci could not have been clients of the Sequani, because Caesar, in his enumeration of the tribal levies which were raised for the relief of Alesia, couples the Rauraci with the Boi and mentions them quite apart from the Sequani; whereas he mentions the clients of the Aedui and of the Arverni respectively in the same breath, as it were, with those two tribes.[8] This reasoning appears to me to be sound, and also to prove that the Rauraci were not, as W. Gisi [9] supposes, a *pagus* of the Sequani. On the other hand, L. W. Ravenez [10] argues that they must have been clients of the Sequani, because Caesar does not mention them in *B. G.*, iv, 10 among the tribes who dwelt on the banks of the Rhine. This famous chapter is probably spurious; [11] nor does the writer mention among those tribes the Nemetes or the Eburones or the Menapii. In *B. G.*, vi, 25, §§ 1–2, which also appears to be an interpolation,[12] we read that the Hercynian forest, which was wholly in Germany, was conterminous with the territory of the Rauraci; and Schneider [13] infers that when they left their country to join the Helvetian emigration, some of them remained at home. But the writer who described the Hercynian forest also says that it was conterminous with the territory of the Helvetii, which, if we may accept Caesar's express statement,[14] was wholly on the left bank of the Rhine; and therefore,

[1] *Alsatia illustrata*, i, 1751, p. 37, § vi.
[2] *Nat. Hist.*, iv, 17 (31), § 106.
[3] *B. G.*, i, 2, § 3.
[4] *Ib.*, 1, § 5.
[5] See p. 394, n. 6.
[6] *B. G.*, i, 31, § 10.
[7] *Questions alsaciennes*, 1867, p. 18.
[8] *B. G.*, vii, 75, §§ 2–3.
[9] *Anzeiger für schweizerische Alterthumskunde*, 1884, p. 82.
[10] *L'Alsace illustrée*, i, 1849, pp. 380–1.
[11] See p. 692.
[12] *Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xxxvi, 1910, pp. 27–9. Cf. A. Klotz, *Caesarstudien*, pp. 50–4, 145.
[13] *Caesar*, i, 57.
[14] *B. G.*, i, 2, § 3.

if any conclusion can be drawn from the doubtful passage, it is possible that the territory of the Rauraci was wholly on the same bank.

Martin argues further that the Latobrigi, Rauraci, and Tulingi must all have been conterminous with the Helvetii,[1] because Caesar calls them neighbours (*finitimi*) of that people; that they were Gauls, not Germans; and therefore that their territories must have been entirely on the left bank of the Rhine. The fact, he goes on to say, that Caesar expressly says that the Boi, who were associated with the Latobrigi, the Rauraci, and the Tulingi in their emigration, dwelt on the eastern bank of the Rhine, proves by implication that the other three tribes did not. Following the indications of Ptolemy, he says that the territory of the Rauraci extended along the western bank of the Rhine, from the Helvetian frontier as far as the northern frontier of Upper Alsace, and was bounded on the west by the Ill. He admits that there are no texts which show directly the whereabouts of the Latobrigi and Tulingi: but he thinks that local names, such as Larg, Oberlarg, Largitzen, Thur, Thuringheim, and Thurbourg, indicate their position; and he maintains that in the tenth century the Tulingi were called Thuringi. Accordingly he places the Tulingi in the valley of the Thur, between the Ill, the Doller, the Vosges, and the Eckenbach; and the Latobrigi between the Vosges, the Doller, and the Ill.[2]

These arguments are worth nothing. Caesar often uses the word *finitimus* loosely.[3] If one of the three tribes had been conterminous with the Helvetii, and the other two had been at all near that one, he would not have hesitated to call them all three *finitimi* of the Helvetii. Indeed, if none of the three had been, strictly speaking, conterminous with the Helvetii, he might have called them *finitimi* of that people; for he calls the Santoni, who dwelt in the Charente-Inférieure, *finitimi* of the Provincia.[4] In the argument based upon his statement about the Boi there is a contradiction, which Martin overlooks: if the Boi, who, on his own showing, were undoubtedly Gauls, dwelt on the eastern bank of the Rhine, why should not the other tribes have done so too? Besides, Martin forgets that the Menapii, who were also Gauls, had territory on both banks of the Rhine.[5] Doubtful similarity in names proves nothing. There is not much resemblance between *Larg* and *Latobrigi*, and there is no proof that the Thuringi were the same people as the Tulingi, or that, if they were, the Thuringi of the tenth century occupied the same territory as the Tulingi of Caesar's time. Walckenaer,[6] who is followed by Napoleon,[7] places the Tulingi in the south of the Grand Duchy of Baden, and believes that Stühlingen, a town near Schaffhausen,

[1] Martin does not mean exactly what he says; for on his own showing, the Latobrigi and the Tulingi were not conterminous with the Helvetii.

[2] *Questions alsaciennes*, pp. 4–5, 8–12, 16.

[3] See *B. G.*, i, 10, § 2; iii, 7, § 3; 20, § 2; vii, 7, § 5.

[4] *Ib.*, i, 10, § 2. [5] *Ib.*, iv, 4, § 3. [6] *Géogr. des Gaules*, i, 559.

[7] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 46, n. 3. Cf. *Centralblatt für Anthropologie, Ethnologie und Urgeschichte*, 1897, p. 69.

derives its name from theirs. Walckenaer and Martin cannot both be right, and may both be wrong.

Walckenaer,[1] arguing from similarity of names, places the Latobrigi in the neighbourhood of Brugge, on the rivers Brege and Briggach, tributaries of the Danube; but the French Commission,[2] perhaps more wisely, confess ignorance. The form *Latobrigi*, on which Walckenaer's conjecture is based, is not certain: Glück[3] prefers *Latovici*;[4] A. Holder, who adopted that form in his edition of Caesar, now reads *Latobrigi*. Cluver[5] rejects Walckenaer's view (which had been advocated long before Walckenaer's time); for, he says, it is difficult to see who the Germans that were conterminous with the Helvetii[6] could have been unless they dwelt in the valley of the upper Rhine, between Lake Constance and the Aar, that is to say in the district which Walckenaer assigns to the Latobrigi. He goes on to argue that there was no room for either the Tulingi or the Latobrigi beyond the Jura, and therefore that they must have dwelt either on the east or on the south of the Helvetii. He concludes that the Latobrigi dwelt in that part of the Valais which was not occupied by the Nantuates, Veragri, and Seduni, namely on the east of the last-named people, in the district round Brige; and the only place which he can find left for the Tulingi is in the valley of the Rhine, above Lake Constance.

I am not concerned to defend Walckenaer, who simply made a guess; but Cluver's argument does not refute him. If the Latobrigi were a small tribe, there was room for them as well as the Germans between Lake Constance and the Aar; and when Caesar said that the Rhine separated the Helvetii from the Germans, he may have been thinking of the Germans who dwelt on the north of Lake Constance, through which the Rhine flows. Besides, Caesar's geographical statements are often loose.[7] As for the Tulingi, they may have been where Cluver places them or they may not. And if *Latovici*, not *Latobrigi*, is the true form, Cluver's 'Brige' helps us no more than Walckenaer's 'Brege'.

To conclude. It is impossible to do more than guess at the positions of the Latobrigi and Tulingi; but the conjecture which assigns to the latter the country round Stühlingen appears to me probable. As for the Rauraci, the evidence of Ptolemy is not decisive; for, like the Ubii and other Rhenish peoples, they may have changed their abode before Ptolemy wrote; or their territory may have been smaller in Caesar's time than in Ptolemy's. The solution of the puzzle may be that, as Napoleon holds, they dwelt, in Caesar's time, on both banks of the Rhine. I find it difficult to believe that any of the three peoples could have been clients or *pagi* of the Sequani;

[1] *Géogr. des Gaules*, i, 559–60.
[2] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, ii, 13.
[3] *Die bei Cäsar vorkommenden keltischen Namen*, 1857, p. 112. See p. 844, *infra*, and P. Geyer in *Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, v, 1879, p. 333.
[4] *Alt-celtischer Sprachschatz*, ii, 155.
[5] *Germania antiqua*, 1631, pp. 358–9.
[6] *B. G.*, i, 2, § 3.
[7] See p. 344.

for if they had been, it is unlikely that the Sequani would have acquiesced in their emigration.

Lemovices.—The Lemovices possessed the dioceses of Limoges and of Tulle, which was severed in 1318 from the ancient diocese of Limoges.[1] This territory corresponded roughly with the departments of the Haute-Vienne, Corrèze, and Creuse.

Lemovices Aremorici (?).—In the enumeration of the states that were called upon to furnish contingents for the relief of Vercingetorix are mentioned two tribes which bear the name *Lemovices*. The position of one has just been defined. The name of the other occurs in the enumeration of the Aremorican tribes.[2] This second tribe is mentioned nowhere else by Caesar, and not at all by any other writer; and the appearance of the name in this passage has given rise to much discussion. Davies, Oudendorp, and Schneider retain the word because it is found in all the MSS. Nipperdey[3] considers that *Lemovices* was written by some copyist in mistake for *Lexovii*. Desjardins,[4] following Frigell, proposes to substitute *Namnetes* for *Lemovices* and *Veneti*, which appear side by side in Caesar's list,—an idle conjecture, which leaves the question exactly where it was. De Valois[5] is inclined to read *Leonnenses*, the assumed name of the Gallic inhabitants of the district of Léon in southern Brittany; and d'Anville[6] approves of the conjecture, though for *Leonnenses* he would substitute *Leonnices*, 'pour s'écarter d'autant moins de ce qui est écrit *Lemovices*.' Walckenaer[7] remarks that some of the MSS. of Ptolemy assign the town of Ratiatum to the Λιμονίκοι (Lemovices), while others give the Pictones two chief towns—Limonum (Poitiers) and Ratiatum—and mention *Augustoritum* (Limoges) as the capital of the Lemovices.[8] 'Ne doit-on pas croire,' he asks 'd'après cela, que les *Limovici* étaient probablement mentionnés deux fois dans Ptolémée comme dans César, et que les copistes, ayant considéré cette double mention comme une faute, auront fait disparaître un des deux *Limovici*?'

Maximin Deloche[9] develops Walckenaer's suggestion. He rejects the emendations of de Valois and d'Anville, because there is no evidence of the existence of any ancient Gallic tribe called *Leonnenses* or *Leonnices*. He goes on to say, in pursuance of Walckenaer's argument, that the MS. of Ptolemy known as A (No. 1401 of the Bibliothèque nationale) wrongly assigns Ratiatum to the Lemovices and both Limonum and Augustoritum to the Pictones. 'Ces transpositions,' he observes, 'sont d'autant plus étranges, que le paragraphe relatif aux Pictones (§ 5) est séparé du paragraphe des Limovices (§ 9) par les paragraphes 6, 7 et 8, et qu'il a fallu un motif

[1] See d'Anville, *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 407, and *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, ii, 82.

[2] *B. G.*, vii, 75, §§ 3–4.

[3] *Caesar*, pp. 107–8.

[4] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 705–6.

[5] *Notitia Galliarum*, p. 269.

[6] *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 408.

[7] *Géogr. des Gaules*, i, 369.

[8] *Geogr.*, ii, 7, §§ 5, 9. See C. Müller's ed., pp. 202–4.

[9] *Mém. de la Soc. impériale des ant. de France*, xxiii, 1857, pp. 51, 56–63, 67–78.

particulier pour que le copiste du manuscrit A plaçât Ratiatum chez les Limovices ; et on ne peut s'expliquer cette circonstance qu'en admettant, suivant la conjecture de M. Walckenaer, que les Limovices se trouvaient nommés dans le paragraphe des Pictones.' This explanation seems to me unconvincing. If, as Walckenaer and Deloche maintain, Ptolemy mentioned a people called Lemovices in § 5 and another people of the same name in § 9, how are we to account for the fact that none of the MSS. exhibit, in these two sections, the names of any towns except Ratiatum and Limonum, which unquestionably belonged to the Pictones, and Augustoritum, which unquestionably belonged to the Lemovices of Limoges ? To quote C. Müller, the best editor of Ptolemy (p. 202), ' Confusio ista forte e tabula fluxit in qua Ratiati et Augustoriti nomina permutata erant. Similes errores Aquitaniae tabula habet in codice A, ubi positioni in Cadurcorum finibus notatae *Mediolanum* (quod est Santonum opp.) adscribitur, dum vera Mediolani positio indicatur quidem, sed nomine caret,' &c.

Deloche then proceeds to search for the Aremorican Lemovices. From the fact that Caesar has not distinguished them by any surname analogous to that of the Aulerci Cenomani, he concludes that they were merely a branch of the inland Lemovices. We learn, he says, from the anonymous author of *La Vie de St. Waast*, who flourished about A.D. 667, that there was once in western Gaul a people called *Leuci*. Scattered over a strip of territory which extends from a little to the east of Limoges along a chain of heights in a westerly, and then a north-westerly direction to the Bay of Biscay, near St. Jean-des-Monts, are to be found vestiges of this people and proofs of their Lemovician origin. Such are the names *La Mothe-Limousin*, *Le Puy Limousin*, *La Limouzinière*, &c. Appealing to the anthropological observations of J. M. Dufour,[1] Deloche maintains that the aforesaid chain of heights was inhabited by a race different from the neighbouring Pictones ; and from the evidence of nomenclature, specimens of which I have just given, he concludes that this race was the Lemovices Aremorici. Finally, to the anticipated objection that this theory requires a curtailment of the territory of the Pictones, he replies that it ought to be curtailed ; for the Pictones only contributed 8,000 men to the army destined for the relief of Vercingetorix, whereas the Aremorican Lemovices contributed 10,000.

Deloche's anthropological argument is absolutely worthless ; and it is certain that, if he had studied the ethnology of Gaul as a whole, he would never have adduced it. Still, if there were two tribes of Bituriges and three tribes of Aulerci, there may also have been two tribes of Lemovices. Limousin, the name of the province which roughly corresponded with the territory of the inland Lemovices, is unquestionably derived from their name ; and it is certainly remarkable that in the territory which Deloche assigns to their alleged Aremorican kinsmen there are two places bearing a name of which the same word forms a part, as well as a third of which the

[1] *De l'ancien Poitou*, 1826, pp. 111–2.

name is the obviously analogous *Limouzinière*. But Deloche has not proved his case; and it is not capable of proof.[1] I have therefore not marked the territory of the alleged Aremorican Lemovices on my map.

Leuci.—The Leuci, in the opinion of the French Commission, possessed the ancient dioceses of Verdun and Toul, as they were before the dioceses of St. Dié and Nancy were severed from them, or the department of the Vosges and the southern parts of the departments of the Meuse and Meurthe-et-Moselle.[2] The diocese of Verdun corresponded with the territory of the Veroduneńses, who are not mentioned by Caesar; and I am inclined to agree with Walckenaer and M. Longnon that they were a *pagus* or clients of the Mediomatrici (q.v.), not of the Leuci: but it is impossible to decide the question.

Levaci.—See Nervii.

Lexovii.—The Lexovii certainly possessed the diocese of Lisieux:[3] the only question is whether they did not possess something more. The members of the French Commission were not unanimous;[4] the majority decided that to the diocese of Lisieux must be added the dioceses of Bayeux and Séez, because Caesar does not mention either the Viducasses or the Baiocasses,[5] both of whom must therefore, in their opinion, have been clients of the Lexovii; and because he couples the Lexovii, without mentioning any intermediate people, with the Venelli, while between the known territory of the Venelli and the diocese of Lisieux intervene the territories of the Viducasses and Baiocasses. M. Longnon is inclined to agree.[6] He also considers that the Lexovii are identical with the Esuvii; but in my notice of the Esuvii (q.v.) I have combated this opinion. Desjardins identifies the joint territories of the Viducasses and Baiocasses with the territory of the Esuvii. He argues further that, as Caesar does not mention the Lexovii in *B. G.*, vii, 75 among the maritime peoples, their territory probably did not touch the sea.[7] But this view is refuted (1) by the fact that no known people intervened between the Lexovii and the sea, and (2) by the fact that the Lexovii are placed by Strabo [8] and Ptolemy [9] at the mouth of the Seine, and by Strabo, in another passage, on the sea-coast. Moreover, it is doubtful whether Caesar did not mention the Lexovii in the passage to which Desjardins refers.[10]

Lingones.—The Lingones possessed the diocese of Langres, as it was before the diocese of Dijon was severed from it.[11] To this territory

[1] The French Commission (*Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, ii, 82) agree with Deloche.
[2] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, ii, 87.
[3] D'Anville, *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 413; Walckenaer, *Géogr. des Gaules*, i, 394–5.
[4] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 114, ii, 90–1; *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., ix, 1864, p. 408.
[5] The Baiocasses are not mentioned under that name by any author before the compiler of the *Notitia provinciarum*; but Pliny (*Nat. Hist.*, iv, 18 [32], § 107) doubtless referred to them when he wrote *Bodiocasses*.
[6] *Atlas hist. de la France*, p. 5. [7] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 489.
[8] iv, 1, § 14; 3, § 5. [9] *Geogr.*, ii, 8, § 5.
[10] See Nipperdey's *Caesar*, pp. 107–8, and my article on the Lemovices Aremorici. [11] D'Anville, *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 417.

M. Longnon[1] adds the dioceses of Troyes and Châlons-sur-Marne, representing the territories of the Tricasses and the Catuvellauni, two tribes not mentioned by Caesar, whom, contrary to the prevailing opinion, he regards as clients of the Lingones. He argues that his view is the only one that can be reconciled with the passage in which Strabo[2] says that the Lingones were conterminous on the north with the Mediomatrici (q.v.). I am not sure that Strabo's words necessarily mean this; but if they do, he may have made a mistake, as Long believes.[3] For the territory of the Catuvellauni is generally assigned to the Remi (q.v.); the Tricasses were probably either clients of the Remi or a *pagus* of the Senones (q.v.); and, on M. Longnon's theory, the territory of the Remi appears to be unduly small[4] and that of the Lingones unduly large.

Von Göler[5] maintains that the diocese of Dijon must have belonged, in Caesar's time, not to the Lingones but to the Mandubii; for otherwise, he argues, the Helvetii would not have taken four days to march from the neighbourhood of Bibracte to the frontier of the Lingones. But von Göler made the mistake of placing the scene of the Helvetian defeat at Château Chinon, on the north, instead of on the south of Bibracte. From the site which Colonel Stoffel rightly identifies with the battle-field[6] to the nearest point of the frontier of the Lingones as ordinarily traced, the distance, *in a direct line*, is over 50 miles. The distance actually traversed would have been, say, a fifth longer than the distance in a direct line; and there is no evidence that the Helvetii marched towards the nearest point of the frontier.[7] Von Göler's argument therefore collapses.

Magetobriga.—Regarding the site of Magetobriga, the scene of the decisive victory which Ariovistus gained over the Aedui and their allies,[8] enough has been written to stock a small library. But it all amounts to guess-work, more or less ingenious; for Caesar gives us no indication whatever of the site, and thus there is nothing to go upon, except the name.[9]

D'Anville,[10] following F. Dunod,[11] identifies Amagetobriga (*sic*) with Broie, close to a marsh called Moigte-de-Broie, near the confluence of the Oignon and the Saône. At Moigte-de-Broie, says d'Anville, a piece of pottery was found, bearing the inscription MAG. ETOB: but this piece of evidence, such as it was, has long been generally discredited; for, if Walckenaer[12] is to be believed, 'on a eu soin de [le] perdre presque aussitôt après l'avoir trouvé.' Not content, however, with exposing the futility of d'Anville's conjecture, Walckenaer must needs make one of his own; and his choice falls upon Amage, near Luxeuil. M. A. Berget[13] has recently attempted to revive the theory,

[1] *Atlas hist. de la France*, pp. 5, 6.
[2] ὑπὲρ τῶν Μεδιοματρικῶν Λεῦκοι καὶ τῶν Λιγγόνων τι μέρος. iv, 3, § 4.
[3] W. Smith's *Dict. of Greek and Rom. Geogr.*, ii, 194.
[4] See *B. G.*, vi, 12, §§ 7–9. [5] *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, pp. 331–2.
[6] See pp. 625–7. [7] See pp. 631–4. [8] *B. G.*, i, 31, § 12.
[9] See pp. 844–5. [10] *Éclaircissemens sur l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 165.
[11] *Hist. des Séquanais*, i, 1735, pp. 92–5.
[12] *Géogr. des Gaules*, i, 319–20.
[13] *Bull. archéol. du Comité des travaux hist.*, &c., 1908, pp. 108–16.

propounded more than a century ago, that Admagetobriga (*sic*) was a fort on Mont Ardov, on the left bank of the Saône, close to Pontailler. He urges that Gallic antiquities have been discovered on the site, and that the speech which Caesar delivered at Vesontio[1] justifies the inference that Admagetobriga was a stronghold, probably near the common frontier of the Aedui and the Lingones, and on the banks of the Saône. Does it ? *Admagetobrigae*, if that were the right reading, would mean 'in Magetobriga'[2]; and, as M. d'Arbois de Jubainville dryly remarks, 'il paraît peu vraisemblable que la grande bataille . . . ait été livrée dans l'intérieur d'une ville gauloise.'[3] Most absurd of all, Desjardins, who is never tired of ridiculing the antiquaries who waste their time and ingenuity in the conjectural restoration of Gallic geography, dogmatically asserts that Admagetobriga was close to Broie, without troubling himself to produce any evidence or to offer any argument in support of his assertion.[4]

And now, absurd as it may seem, I am going to have my say. Of all the guesses d'Anville's is the least likely to be wrong. I give reasons, on page 845, for believing that the true form of the name is not *Admagetobriga* but *Magetobriga* or *Magetobria*. That questionable piece of pottery may after all have been really lost; and if it ever existed, it was evidence of a sort.[5] Anyhow there is no other, good, bad or indifferent.[6] But to my mind the mere fact that Ariovistus defeated the Gauls is enough; for Caesar does not describe the battle, he merely registers it.

Mandubii.—The Mandubii possessed the stronghold of Alesia (q.v.), or Mont Auxois. Their territory, therefore, comprised part of the department of the Côte-d'Or, but how much it is impossible to tell. Strabo[7] says that they were neighbours of the Arverni,—an obvious blunder.[8] A. de Barthélemy[9] thinks that the manner in which Vercingetorix was received by the Mandubii in Alesia proves that they were an independent people. I am quite unable to understand this argument. The Mandubii admitted Vercingetorix into Alesia either because they had voluntarily joined in the rebellion, or because they were a *pagus* or clients of the Aedui or under their influence, or because Vercingetorix compelled them to admit him. The French

[1] *B. G.*, i, 40, § 8.
[2] See *Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xx, 1894, p. 287.
[3] *Rev. celt.*, xxx, 1909, pp. 112–3.
[4] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 355.
[5] F. Fiedler indeed says (*Geogr. d. transalpin. Galliens*, 1828, pp. 45–6), apparently on the authority of some members of the Academy of Dijon, that the piece of pottery was still preserved at that town at the time when he wrote (1828 ?); but I cannot find any confirmation of his statement.
[6] Cf. C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 157, n. 4. [7] iv, 2, § 3.
[8] Desjardins (*Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 468) suggests that the Mandubii may have been neighbours of the Arverni at the time when Vercingetorix was at the height of his power, and when he may have extended the hegemony of the Arverni over the territory of the Aedui. But it is much more likely that Strabo made a mistake. On Desjardins's theory, if Vercingetorix had extended his hegemony over North-Western Gaul, the Osismi, who lived near Brest, might have been called neighbours of the Arverni.
[9] *Rev. des questions hist.*, iii, 1867, p. 46.

Commission,[1] following the principle of the dioceses, includes their territory in that of the Aedui. D'Anville,[2] in support of the same view, cites Hericus, who says, referring to Alesia,

Te fines Aeduos et limina sacra tuentem.[3]

The geographical accuracy of a mediaeval monk, who wrote in verse, may be questioned ; but, assuming that Hericus was well informed, his words may only mean that Alesia was near the Aeduan frontier, not necessarily that it was in their territory. It seems morally certain, however, that the Mandubii were clients of the Aedui.[4]

Mediomatrici.—The Mediomatrici are mentioned by the writer of *B. G.*, iv, 10,[5] between the Sequani and the Triboci, among the peoples whose territories bordered on the Rhine ; but if that statement holds good for the time of Caesar, they must have possessed the country round Worms and Spires, which, in Ptolemy's time, was occupied by the Vangiones and the Nemetes. Their chief town was Divodurum[6] (Metz). Their neighbours on the north were the Treveri (q.v.), on the west the Remi, on the south the Leuci and the Sequani. D'Anville[7] believes that they were separated from the Remi by a people called the Verodunenses, whose name survives in ' Verdun ', and who are not mentioned in any document earlier than the *Notitia provinciarum* ; for, he remarks, a place called ' Fines ', between Virodunum (Verdun) and Divodurum, is noticed in the *Itinerary of Antonine* :[8] but, as the Verodunenses were not mentioned by Caesar, their territory is generally included in that of the Mediomatrici. According to Strabo,[9] the Triboci (q.v.) had settled in the country of the Mediomatrici : but the Triboci were one of the tribes who fought under Ariovistus ; and Caesar says that the followers of Ariovistus had settled in the country of the Sequani.[10]

Meldi.—A tribe called Meldi is mentioned by Strabo,[11] Pliny,[12] Ptolemy,[13] and in the *Notitia provinciarum* ;[14] and it is universally admitted that this people occupied the diocese of Meaux, that is to say, the northern part of the department of the Seine-et-Marne and a fraction of the south-eastern part of the department of the Oise. It has, however, been denied that Caesar's Meldi were the same people. Strabo puts the Meldi next the Lexovii and says that they were a maritime tribe, a blunder into which he may have been led by misunderstanding the passage in Caesar which I am about to discuss. Caesar mentions the Meldi once only, when describing the preparations which he made for his second expedition against

[1] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 14.
[2] *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 431.
[3] *Patrologiae cursus completus*, ed. J. P. Migne, t. cxxiv, p. 1178, l. 106.
[4] Cf. C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, ii, 538, n. 5. O. Hirschfeld (*Corpus inscr. Lat.*, xiii, pars i, p. 439), referring to *B. G.*, vii, 90, § 1—*his rebus confectis* (i. e. after the capture of Alesia) [Caesar] *in Haeduos proficiscitur*—argues that the Mandubii were not in Aeduan territory.
[5] See p. 692.
[6] Ptolemy, *Geogr.*, ii, 9, § 7.
[7] *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 692.
[8] Ed. Wesseling, p. 364.
[9] iv, 3, § 4.
[10] *B. G.*, i, 31, § 10 ; 51, § 2.
[11] iv, 3, § 5.
[12] *Nat. Hist.*, iv, 18 (32), § 107.
[13] *Geogr.*, ii, 8, § 11.
[14] Ed. O. Seeck, p. 265 (iv, 9).

Britain.[1] On arriving at the Portus Itius (q.v.), where he had ordered the whole of his fleet to assemble, he found that 60 ships, which had been built in the country of the Meldi,[2] had been prevented by contrary winds from making the harbour, and had returned to the place from which they had started. The Portus Itius must be identified either with Boulogne or with Wissant. Strabo[3] says that the naval arsenal was at the mouth of the Seine ; and as the legions, by which the ships had been built, had wintered in the country of the Belgae,[4] it is certain that all the ships had been built or repaired on or east of the Seine. Long[5] argues that, as the wind had prevented those ships which had been built in the country of the Meldi, but not the others, from reaching the Portus Itius, and as the bulk of the fleet must have been constructed south of that harbour, we may look for the Meldi to the north of it. He goes on to say that 'the hypothesis of these ships being built on the Marne and carried down the Seine is inadmissible. If Caesar had built ships on the Seine, he would have built them lower down. . . . These ships of the Meldi returned to the place from which they set sail ; and it is absurd to suppose that they sailed back up the Seine and the Marne to the country of the Meldi.' But Long's argument notwithstanding, these ships may have sailed from the same side of the Portus Itius as the rest ; for the wind which blew them back may not have arisen until after the others had reached port.[6] On the other hand, it certainly seems unlikely that the ships should have been built so far from the sea as in the neighbourhood of Meaux ; and it is more than unlikely that, after having put out to sea, they should have sailed all the way back again up the Seine and the Marne. P. N. Bonamy, however, remarked that in his time—the middle of the eighteenth century—timber used in the construction of barges at Rouen came down the Marne from the neighbourhood of Meaux. Moreover, the reader will observe that Caesar does not say that the ships returned to any point in the country of the Meldi. He simply says that they returned to the point from which they had set sail (*eodem unde erant profectae revertisse*) ; and it seems possible that this point was at the mouth of the Seine, where they may have remained for a time after they had dropped down the river from the neighbourhood of Meaux. If, however, this conjecture is correct, and if the rest of the ships were also assembled at the mouth of the Seine, the ships that were driven

[1] *B. G.*, v, 5, § 2.

[2] Certain inferior MSS. read *Belgis* (Schneider's *Caesar*, ii, 22) : but this cannot be right ; for there would have been no point in saying that the ships in question were built in the country of the Belgae, when the rest of the ships, with which they were contrasted, were built there also. N. Sanson (*Les Comm. de César*, p. 55) makes the absurd conjecture that Caesar wrote not *Meldis* but *Venellis* ; in other words, that he had ships built in the Cotentin, far away in the west ! As Mommsen (*Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xx, 1894, p. 205) justly remarks, it is difficult to believe that *Meldis*—the name of a people who are seldom mentioned—should have been interpolated.

[3] iv, 3, § 3. [4] *B. G.*, iv, 38, § 4. [5] *Caesar*, pp. 221–2.

[6] I find that Bonamy used the same argument more than a century ago. See *Mém. de litt. tirés des registres de l'Acad. des inscr.*, &c., xxxi, 1768, p. 226.

back by the wind could not have sailed until after the rest, which did not encounter contrary winds, had put to sea.[1]

D'Anville[2] conjectures that the Meldi inhabited the country round Meld-felt, 'vulgairement Maldeghem-velt,' which, he affirms, means *Meldicus campus* and 'nous transmet le nom des *Meldi* sans aucune altération'. I cannot find Meld-felt in any map; but Maldeghem, of which d'Anville was thinking, is about 10 miles east of Bruges. Unhappily for his theory, Heller[3] observes that, according to the Academy of Amsterdam, *Maldeghem* is derived from the Dutch plant-name, *melde*.

Creuly,[4] who also regards the Meldi as a *pagus*, or sub-tribe, of the Morini, advances the following arguments against identifying them with the Meldi of Meaux. The Roman army, he says, was cantoned in the neighbourhood of Cassel, Thérouanne, and Amiens:[5] they had plenty of timber on the spot to build the fleet; and there was no lack of ports along the coast of the North Sea. What reason, then, asks Creuly, could there have been for having any ships built at Meaux, nearly 400 miles away? I cannot answer this question: but Caesar may have had some reason, which he did not think it necessary to state;[6] and I should like to know what were the ports which Creuly had in mind. Anyhow the notion that Caesar would have established a dockyard on the North Sea in the neighbourhood of Bruges is absurd; and if the Meldi were only a *pagus* of the Morini, why did not Caesar write *Morinis*?

Reviewing the arguments on both sides of the question, I conclude that Caesar's Meldi were identical with the Meldi of Meaux.[7]

Menapii.—I. We learn from Caesar[8] and from Strabo[9] that the

[1] Heller (*Philologus*, xxii, 1865, pp. 129–30) has an argument to prove that the ships came from the mouth of the Seine, which rests upon the assumption that the wind which drove them back was the Corus. Caesar (*B. G.*, v, 7, § 3) says that, after he reached the Portus Itius, he was prevented from sailing for Britain for between three and four weeks by the *corus ventus*, 'which commonly blows throughout a great part of the year on these coasts' (*qui magnam partem omnis temporis in his locis flare consuevit*). The *corus*, according to Pliny (*Nat. Hist.*, ii, 47 [46], § 119), blew from the quarter where the sun sets at the solstice: apparently it was from a point between NW. and W. by N. ⅓ N. (Rice Holmes, *Anc. Britain*, p. 555, n. 2). Obviously it is impossible to prove that this was the wind that blew back the 60 ships. Assuming that it was, Heller remarks that such a wind would not have driven back ships coming from the neighbourhood of Ostend to the Pas de Calais, but that it would have blown full against ships which were trying to get out of the mouth of the Seine. But no ancient ships could have sailed from Ostend to the Pas de Calais in the teeth of a NW. or WNW. wind.

[2] *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 452.

[3] *Zeitschr. f. allg. Erdkunde*, xviii, 1865, p. 186.

[4] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., viii, 1863, pp. 385, 387.

[5] They were certainly cantoned in the country of the Belgae, along or near the northern coast.

[6] No commentator, as far as I know, has remembered, in discussing this question, that during the civil war Caesar had ships built at Hispalis, the modern Seville, which is quite 70 Roman miles by river from the sea. *B. C.*, ii, 18, § 1.

[7] In the first edition (p. 456) I was rather inclined to adopt the opposite opinion; but, as I now see, I had not completely thought the matter out.

[8] *B. G.*, iv, 1, § 1; 4, § 2.

[9] iv, 3, § 4.

Menapii possessed land on the right bank of the Rhine, not far from the sea, as well as on the left, and from Caesar [1] that their territory was conterminous on the south with that of the Eburones : according to Strabo,[2] Pliny,[3] and Dion Cassius,[4] they were neighbours of the Morini ; [5] while, according to Ptolemy,[6] the eastern frontier of the Morini was the river Tabula. Walckenaer [7] argues that this was the Aa, which, he remarks, was actually the frontier in the seventh century. Every other ancient writer, he adds, who mentions the Scheldt, calls it *Scaldis* ; and Ptolemy is the only one who mentions the Tabula. Walckenaer's theory, however, is combated by Piot [8] and Desjardins.[9] The former remarks (1) that the Aa was always called *Agnio* or *Agniona* ; and (2) that Ptolemy placed the Tungri [10] on the right bank of the Tabula, a statement which, he says, is true of the Scheldt, but not of the Aa. Desjardins explains that most modern geographers identify the Tabula with the Scheldt, (1) because Ptolemy places its mouth between Gesoriacum (Boulogne) and the estuary of the Meuse, thus :—

Gesoriacum	22° 30′, 53° 30′
Tabulae fl. ost.	23° 30′, 53° 30′
Mosae fl. ost.	24° 40′, 53° 30′ ;

(2) because, on any other hypothesis, Ptolemy does not mention the Scheldt at all ; and (3) because the geographer, Ortelius, found in mediaeval documents the name *Tabula* applied to the Scheldt.[11] The balance of probability, then, is in favour of identifying the Tabula with the Scheldt. Pliny places the Menapii on the west of the Scheldt, and the Toxandri on the north of it.[12] But Caesar does not mention the Toxandri at all ; and it is certain that in his time the Menapii, whether they possessed any land on the west of the Scheldt or not, did possess land on the east of it. My conclusion is that the ancient writers do not help us much to trace the boundary between the Menapii and the Morini. Let us examine the other evidence.

II. *Castellum Menapiorum*, which is mentioned in the *Table*,[13] was undoubtedly Cassel, in the department of the Nord, east of the Aa, and about 11 miles north-east of St. Omer. Long [14] insists that for

[1] *B. G.*, vi, 5, § 4.
[2] iv, 3, § 5.
[3] *Nat. Hist.*, iv, 17 (31), § 106.
[4] xxxix, 44, § 1.
[5] This may be also gathered from Caesar, though he does not say it in so many words. See *B. G.*, ii, 4, § 9 ; iii, 28, § 1 ; iv, 22, § 5 ; 34, §§ 1–3. Creuly (*Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., vii, 1863, pp. 385–6) argues that the Menapii were separated from the Morini by the Eburones,—a view which I have examined in my note on the latter people.
[6] *Geogr.*, ii, 9, §§ 4–5.
[7] *Géogr. des Gaules*, ii, 446–7.
[8] *Annales de la Soc. d'émulation de Bruges*, iv, 1869, p. 290, n. 1.
[9] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, i, 137.
[10] The Tungri occupied the territory which had formerly belonged to the Eburones. See *La Gazette numismatique*, xii, 1907, pp. 41–6.
[11] What Ortelius actually says is this : 'huic [i. e. by Ptolemy] (Scaldis) TABVDA, Ταβοῦδα nominatur. Tabul, et Tabula etiam, apud scriptores media aetatis reperio.' *Thesaurus geographicus*, 1587, under *Scaldis*.
[12] 'A Scalde incolunt extera Toxandri . . . Deinde Menapii, Morini.'
[13] *La Table de Peutinger*, ed. Desjardins, p. 13, col. 2.
[14] W. Smith's *Dict. of Greek and Roman Geogr.*, i, 561. Cf. J. Ghesquière, *Acta SS. Belgii*, v, 1789, p. 603 (121).

Menapiorum we should read *Morinorum*. 'If,' he says, 'we were to admit that the Menapii extended so far (westward) as *Cassel*, which is improbable, we should not expect to find their Castellum there; and it is just the place where we might expect to find the Castellum of the Morini.' This is hardly a sufficient reason for making such a correction as Long proposes; and, as Walckenaer observes, it is stated in the archives of the church of St. Pierre at Cassel that the town was *in pago Mempisco*. The statement in the *Table* harmonizes with Walckenaer's theory that the Tabula—the eastern frontier, according to Ptolemy, of the Morini—was the Aa: but on the other hand, Ptolemy mentions the *Castellum* of the Menapii; and, as he makes the Meuse the western frontier of the Menapii, and places the Tungri between them and the Morini, it is clear that, unless he defined the position of the Menapii wrongly, the *Castellum* which he mentions was not Cassel.[1] Some writers believe that it was Kessel, on the left bank of the Meuse, between Roermond and Venloo;[2] but even on this theory, Ptolemy's tracing of the frontier was wrong. At all events the Morini possessed, in Ptolemy's time,[3] Gesoriacum (Boulogne) and Taruana (Thérouanne); that is to say, their territory comprised *Bononiensis pagus* and *Tervanensis pagus*. The latter extended a little beyond the western and the southern frontiers of the modern diocese of St. Omer: on the other hand, it did not extend so far as the eastern frontier of the original diocese, which comprised Bourbourg and other places included within the *pagus Mempiscus*. The diocese of Ypres, Walckenaer points out, also belonged to the *pagus Mempiscus*. He therefore concludes that the Aa, in its whole course, formed the eastern boundary of the Morini, and that their southern boundary was formed by that of the diocese of St. Omer.[4]

A. G. B. Schayes[5] remarks that there was probably no definite frontier between two tribes so little civilized as the Morini and the Menapii. In another place,[6] however, he maintains that, on the side of the Morini and the Atrebates, the frontier of the Menapii must have been marked by the rivers Scarpe, Deule, and Lys, which formed the boundary of the *pagus Mempiscus* in the early Middle Ages.

A. de Vlaminck[7] maintains that, in Caesar's time, the territory

[1] Ptolemy places the Tungri on the east of the Tabula, and the Menapii 'beyond the Meuse' (μετὰ τὸν Μόσαν). General Creuly (*Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., viii, 1863, pp. 27–8) infers from these words that the Meuse was the *eastern* boundary of the Menapii. But, to say nothing of the fact that, according to Caesar, the Menapii possessed lands on both sides of the Rhine, Creuly mistranslates Ptolemy. Just before mentioning the Menapii, Ptolemy says that the Morini were μετά the Ambiani, and that next to the Morini, μετά the river Tabula, were the Tungri. μετά the river Tabula confessedly means on its eastern bank: surely then, when Ptolemy immediately afterwards says that the Menapii were μετά the Meuse, he means that they were on the east of that river. See Müller's ed. of Ptolemy, note to p. 223.

[2] *Dict. of Greek and Roman Geogr.*, i, 561. [3] *Geogr.*, ii, 9, §§ 1, 4.

[4] See Walckenaer, *Géogr. des Gaules*, i, 441–3.

[5] *La Belgique et les Pays-Bas avant et pendant la domination romaine*, i, 1887, p. 38. [6] *Ib.*, p. 402.

[7] *La Ménapie*, &c., 1879, pp. 13, 16, 23, 26–7, 78–81; *Messager des sciences hist. de Belgique*, 1882, p. 427; 1884, pp. 441–2.

of the Menapii was much smaller than is commonly believed, and accordingly he refuses to trace their western frontier along the western boundary of the *pagus Mempiscus*. He refers to the small number of the contingent, only 7,000 men,[1] which was levied from the Menapii in 57 B. C., in comparison with the 25,000 contributed by the Morini, and remarks that no authentic document older than the *Table of Peutinger* indicates that the Menapii were established in Flanders. A considerable part of the *pagus Mempiscus* belonged to the diocese of Thérouanne, that is to say to the country of the Morini. The inference, he says, is that it was not until after Caesar's time that the Menapii established themselves in that part of the country. He also denies that there is any proof that the country round Cleve, which Napoleon assigns to the Menapii, ever belonged to them : on the contrary, he says, Caesar gives us to understand that it belonged to the Eburones, 'the greater part of whose territory is between the Meuse and the Rhine.' But Caesar's vague statement is quite consistent with Napoleon's view ; and on page 690 I give reasons for believing that Napoleon is right. De Vlaminck quotes Folquin de Lobbes, a writer of the eleventh century, who says that Flanders belonged to the Morini ; and remarking that the supremacy which Arras claimed in the Middle Ages over the communes of Flanders doubtless originated in the transference by Caesar of the sovereignty of the Morini to Commius, King of the Atrebates,[2] he finds in this circumstance a confirmation of the statement of Folquin. Finally, he conjectures that the Morini, as a punishment for their repeated revolts in the time of Caesar and in 29 B. C., were deprived of the northern part of their original territory ; that the *Castellum Menapiorum* was not built by the Menapii until after their immigration into these northern districts ; and therefore that no safe conclusion can be drawn from the geographical position of Cassel as to the original westward extension of the Menapian territory.

In a subsequent paper,[3] de Vlaminck reinforces these arguments. As Caesar, he remarks, informs us that, when invading the territory of the Menapii in 53 B. C., he was obliged to build bridges,[4] we may conclude that the Menapii did not occupy Flanders, the southern frontier of which is not protected by any large rivers. This is a feeble argument. Caesar does not mention rivers, large or small. He only says that he invaded the country of the Menapii, *celeriter effectis pontibus*. Even small rivers would have had to be bridged, unless they were fordable ; and Caesar says that the Menapii trusted for protection to woods and marshes. *Pontibus* may mean 'causeways' ;[5] and even if Caesar did invade the country on the east of Flanders, the fact does not prove that Flanders also did not belong to the Menapii.

Wauters, on the other hand, argues that when Caesar invaded the country of the Menapii in 53 B. C., he must have gone to the west of

[1] *B. G.*, ii, 4, § 9.
[2] *Ib.*, vii, 76, § 1.
[3] *Messager*, &c., 1887, pp. 352–5.
[4] *B. G.*, vi, 6, § 1.
[5] See *B. G.*, vii, 19, § 2.

the Scheldt, because he could not have made his bridges rapidly enough in the country on the east of that river.[1] But why not ? If Caesar operated on the east of the Scheldt, we are not obliged to assume that he crossed the Meuse and the Rhine ; and he would have had no more difficulty in bridging the smaller streams on the east of the Scheldt than those on the west. Wauters's argument is as futile as his opponent's.

III. My conclusion is that it is impossible to trace the common frontier of the Morini and the Menapii with certainty. If the Tabula was the Scheldt, the evidence of Ptolemy is at variance with the evidence of the *Table* and with the evidence of mediaeval documents. I cannot see any sufficient reason for denying that the *Castellum Menapiorum* of the *Table* really belonged to the Menapii ; but there is no proof that it belonged to them in Caesar's time. De Vlaminck has not proved his case : but it may be that, as he argues, the Morini, after Caesar's time, were deprived of a part of their territory ; and if this was the case, we can no more follow the western frontier of the *pagus Mempiscus* than we can follow the eastern frontier of the diocese of Thérouanne. My own belief is that the Scheldt, as a natural boundary, formed the common frontier of the two peoples. But all that can be said with certainty is that the Menapii, in Caesar's time, possessed lands on both sides of the Rhine, above its first bifurcation, where the Usipetes and Tencteri encountered them,[2] that is in the neighbourhood of Cleve and Xanten ; that as the *insula Batavorum*, which is mentioned by the writer of *B. G.*, iv, 10, was apparently not invaded by the Batavi before the time of Augustus,[3] they probably occupied it as well ; that their territory extended at least as far westward as the Scheldt ; that it was bounded by the territory of the Eburones on the south and by that of the Morini on the west ; and that the territory of the Morini was bounded on the west by that of the Ambiani and on the south by that of the Atrebates and possibly also by that of the Nervii, all of them fairly well ascertained.

Morini.—See Menapii.

Namnetes.—The Namnetes occupied the ancient diocese of Nantes, or that portion of the department of the Loire-Inférieure which lies on the right bank of the Loire and is bounded on the north-east by the river Semnon.[4] See Samnitae and Veneti.

Nantuates.—The Nantuates, the Veragri, and the Seduni, reckon-

[1] *L'Athenæum belge*, 1883, p. 77.

[2] *B. G.*, iv, 1, §§ 1–2 ; 4.

[3] See p. 692, n. 2.

[4] D'Anville, *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, pp. 471–2 ; J. Loth, *L'Émigration bretonne*, p. 51. M. Jullian (*Festschr. zu O. Hirschfelds sechzigstem Geburtstage*, 1903, p. 214), observing that in Gaul rivers were very rarely frontiers, is inclined to believe that the district of Retz, south of the Loire, also belonged to the Namnetes. The statement of Strabo (iv, 1, § 1) that the Loire bounded [Gallo-Roman] Aquitania, may, he thinks, have been only intended as approximately true. But Strabo (*ib.*, 2, § 1) also says that the Loire entered the sea between the Namnetes and the Pictones : it seems unlikely that the Pictones, who were much stronger than the Namnetes, would have suffered them to encroach upon the southern bank ; and, even supposing that Strabo's statements are both inaccurate, I would ask M. Jullian to consider whether the Pictones may not rather have possessed a strip of territory north of the Loire.

ing from west to east, dwelt in the valley of the upper Rhône. The Nantuates occupied the territory which extended on the south of the lake of Geneva as far west as the frontier of the Allobroges[1] (q.v.). What that frontier was is uncertain; but, speaking roughly, the Nantuates probably possessed the eastern part of the Chablais, or that part of Upper Savoy which lies between the Valais and the river Dranse, as well as the north-western part of the Valais, including St. Maurice (*Agaunum*), which was their chief town.[2] The Veragri occupied the western part of the Valais, their chief town, Octodurus, being situated between Martigny-la-Ville and Martigny-Bourg. The name of the Seduni is preserved by the town of Sion.[3]

In *B. G.*, iv, 10, § 3, it is said that the Rhine rises in the country of the Lepontii, and flows through the countries of the Nantuates, Helvetii, Sequani, Mediomatrici, Triboci, and Treveri (*Rhenus autem oritur ex Lepontiis, qui Alpes incolunt, et longo spatio per fines Nantuatium, Helvetiorum, Sequanorum, Mediomatricorum, Tribocorum, Treverorum citatus fertur*). This passage, which is probably spurious,[4] has caused the commentators much needless vexation of spirit. For it is absolutely certain that, if the unknown writer did not make a slip or a gross blunder, and if the Rhine did really flow through the country of the Nantuates, these Nantuates were different—different as a group, if not in blood—from the Nantuates whom I have just mentioned; and there is no evidence for fixing their whereabouts.[5] Among the various readings which are found instead of *Nantuatium* is *Nemetum*; and if the interpolator did not appear to be enumerating the tribes in question in geographical order from south to north, I should say that this was what he wrote. Schneider[6] tries to reconcile the two statements in *B. G.*, iii, 1 and iv, 10 by assuming that the Nantuates inhabited a long strip of land extending eastward from the lake of Geneva to the head-waters of the Rhine. But Caesar clearly implies that the Nantuates whom he mentions in *B. G.*, iii, 1, §§ 1, 4, and 6, § 5, were on the west of the Veragri. Desjardins suggests that the Nantuates of the Rhine may have emigrated from the Valais at the time when the Tigurini, who defeated Cassius Longinus, emigrated from their original home.[7] So they may; but who can tell?

[1] *B. G.*, iii, 1, § 1.

[2] G. Debombourg (*Rev. du Lyonnais*, 3e sér., ii, 1866, pp. 7–10) maintains that the basin of the Dranse, which flows into the lake of Geneva between Thonon and Évian, belonged not to the Nantuates but to the Allobroges, and that the Nantuates dwelt not in the Chablais but only in the Valais. It is unlikely, he argues, that they occupied both the eastern and the western slopes of the mountains which separate the Valais from the Chablais; and he affirms that the western slope has always belonged to the diocese of Geneva, and the eastern to the diocese of Martigny (Octodurus). But Martigny belonged to the Veragri, not to the Nantuates; and if the Nantuates possessed territory which afterwards belonged to the diocese of Martigny, why should they not have possessed territory which afterwards belonged to the diocese of Geneva? See my note on the ALLOBROGES.

[3] D'Anville, *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, pp. 472–3, 589–90, 639; Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 234, 241–2.

[4] See p. 692.

[5] Cf. C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, ii, 521, n. 1.

[6] *Caesar*, i, 328

[7] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 239–41.

Mommsen offered a drastic solution of the difficulty. According to him, Caesar thought that the upper Rhône, where it flows through the Valais, was the Rhine, and that the Rhône had its source in the lake of Geneva![1] The only argument that can be urged in support of this astounding conjecture is that Caesar says that the lake of Geneva flowed into the Rhône (*lacu Lemanno, qui in flumen Rhodanum influit*[2]); and this was only his way of saying that the surplus waters of the lake flowed off into the lower Rhône.[3] In the first edition of this book I criticized Mommsen's article, and the justice of the criticism was acknowledged;[4] but I shall not reproduce it, for Meusel[5] tells us that Mommsen, towards the end of his life, virtually admitted his error.

Nemetes.—The Nemetes are mentioned by Caesar[6] among the tribes who fought in the army of Ariovistus; and he relates that the few persons who survived the battle and the retreat recrossed the Rhine.[7] They were established on the left bank in the neighbourhood of Spires, in the time of Pliny,[8] of Tacitus,[9] and of Ptolemy;[10] but it is possible that in Caesar's time none remained on the left bank after the defeat of Ariovistus, because otherwise it would be necessary to admit that the Nemetes who formed part of Ariovistus's host were only a fraction of those who followed him into Gaul. The Nemetes mentioned by the later writers may only have been immigrants, descended from a portion of the tribe, which Ariovistus may have left behind.

Desjardins[11] says that, as the territories of the Sequani, the Mediomatrici, and the Treveri extended to the left bank of the Rhine, it is impossible to find room for the Nemetes on that side; but, even if we admit the doubtful evidence of the interpolated chapter[12] in which the Cisrhenane tribes are catalogued, this argument is not conclusive, because the host of Ariovistus, of whom the Nemetes formed a part, had settled, before they encountered Caesar, on the territory of the Sequani.[13]

Mommsen[14] says that 'Caesar . . . left the Germans settled by Ariovistus along the left bank of the Rhine—the Triboci about Strassburg, the Nemetes about Spires, the Vangiones about Worms—in possession of their new abodes, and entrusted them with the guarding of the Rhine-frontier against their countrymen.' This view he

[1] *Hermes*, xvi, 1881, pp. 445–6.—'Es scheint vielmehr, dass für ihn der Rhodanus aus dem Genfer See kommt und die obere Rhone ihm zwar bekannt war, aber als der oberste Theil des Rheines galt.'

[2] *B. G.*, i, 8, § 1.

[3] Similarly Caesar says (*B. G.*, vii, 57, § 4) that the waters of a marsh or marshy stream drained into the Seine. Various unnecessary attempts have been made to amend the passage on which Mommsen bases his theory.

[4] *Athenæum*, Jan. 13, 1900, p. 42.

[5] *Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xxxvi, 1910, p. 25.

[6] *B. G.*, i, 51, § 2.

[7] *Ib.*, 53, §§ 1–2.

[8] *Nat. Hist.*, iv, 17 (31), § 106.

[9] *Germ.*, 28.

[10] *Geogr.*, ii, 9, § 9.

[11] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 439, n. 5, 445.

[12] *B. G.*, iv, 10. See p. 692.

[13] *B. G.*, i, 31, § 10. See note on the TRIBOCI.

[14] *Hist. of Rome*, v, 1894, pp. 48–9 (*Röm. Gesch.*, iii, 1889, pp. 257–8).

defends in the following note :—'That Ariovistus settled these peoples on the middle Rhine is probable, because they fight in his army and do not appear earlier ; that Caesar left them in possession of their settlements is probable, because he in presence of Ariovistus declared himself ready to tolerate the Germans already settled in Gaul (*Caes.*, i, 35, 43), and because we find them afterwards in these abodes.' I venture to say that these reasons are insufficient. Caesar, in the presence of Divico, virtually 'declared himself ready to tolerate' the Helvetii, provided that they gave him hostages for their good behaviour ;[1] but after he had defeated them, he sent them back to their own country. And if we find the Nemetes and the Triboci 'afterwards in these abodes' on the left bank of the Rhine, we also find the Ubii afterwards on the left bank, whereas in Caesar's time they were on the right.

I have not marked the Nemetes on my map, because I only profess to represent Gaul as it was in the time of Caesar ; and while there is no evidence to show what territory was occupied by the Nemetes before the defeat of Ariovistus, it is doubtful whether any considerable number of them remained in Gaul after his defeat : for we are told that his entire host took part in the campaign,[2] and, as I have said before, the few who survived the battle and the retreat recrossed the Rhine. Still Caesar's words—*cum suis omnibus copiis*—may only mean 'with all his [available] forces' ; and I cannot agree with Walckenaer that the silence of Strabo *proves* that in Caesar's time there were no Nemetes in Gaul after the defeat of Ariovistus. See Triboci.

Nemetocenna.—Nemetocenna, where Hirtius says that Caesar wintered after his last campaign,[3] is usually identified with Nemetacum,[4] which stood upon the site of Arras. Desjardins asserts that Nemetacum was distinct from Nemetocenna ;[5] but M. d'Arbois de Jubainville shows that the former is simply a diminutive of the latter.[6]

Nervii.—The Nervii are not mentioned in the *Notitia provinciarum* : but in their stead we find the *civitas Camaracensium* ;[7] and accordingly it has been concluded that their territory corresponded with the ancient diocese of Cambrai, which comprised Hainault, that part of Brabant which lies west of the Demer and the Dyle, East Flanders, and part of the province of Antwerp.[8] D'Anville[9] makes the Nervian territory extend to the sea round the mouth of the Scheldt, thus separating the Morini from the Menapii. He also observes that, in the *Notitia dignitatum*,[10] *Nervicanus tractus* is mentioned as a continuation

[1] *B. G.*, i, 14, § 6. [2] *Ib.*, i, 38, § 1. [3] *Ib.*, viii, 46, § 6
[4] Ptolemy, *Geogr.*, ii, 9, § 4 (Müller's ed., i, 222).
[5] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 724–5.
[6] *Mém. de la Soc. de linguistique*, ix, 1896, p. 190. Cf. A. Holder, *Alt-celtischer Sprachschatz*, ii, 708, 711.
[7] Ed. O. Seeck, p. 266 (vi, 7).
[8] Walckenaer, *Géogr. des Gaules*, i, 470–1.
[9] *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 482–3.
[10] Ed. O. Seeck, p. 204 (xxxvii, 13). The *Notitia* actually mentions *tractus Armoricani et Nervicani.*

of *Armoricanus tractus*. But Walckenaer replies that the term *Nervicanus tractus* was loosely applied to the entire north-eastern seaboard of Gaul, including the coasts of the Morini and the Menapii: d'Anville's theory is opposed to a statement of Strabo,[1] from which we learn that the territories of the Morini and the Menapii were conterminous; and the testimony of Strabo is confirmed by Pliny.[2] Still, it is possible that the territory of the Nervii may have extended as far northward as the head of the estuary of the Scheldt, in which case it might not have been considered as breaking the continuity of the Morini and the Menapii. It might be urged, in support of this view, that Caesar tells us that the Nervii, before encountering him in 57 B. C., sent their non-combatants for safety *in aestuaria*,[3] which can only mean the low-lying tracts bordering the estuary of the Scheldt.[4] But it is not proved that the *aestuaria* were in Nervian territory.

. . . . . .

The clients of the Nervii, namely the Ceutrones, Geidumni, Grudii, Levaci, and Pleumoxii, are mentioned by no ancient writer, except Caesar, and only once by him.[5] He says that the Nervii, just before they marched, on the instigation of Ambiorix, against Quintus Cicero, sent messengers to summon their clients to join them, and advanced with them to the attack. He also says that time was precious to the Gauls;[6] and from this it may possibly be inferred that the territories of the client tribes were situated close together somewhere in the neighbourhood of Cicero's camp. But if this inference is correct, the statement upon which it is founded is the sole hint which Caesar gives towards fixing their geographical position. The aid of etymology has, however, been invoked. (1) Wauters places the Ceutrones south of Chimai, in the neighbourhood of a hamlet called Cendron;[7] while the French Commission[8] prefer to avow ignorance. (2) The position of the Geidumni is, so Wauters formerly considered, indicated by the village of Gourdinne, in the canton of Walcourt.[9] But he admitted that this identification required that the name of the tribe should be differently spelled; and accordingly for *Geidumni* he substituted *Gorduni*, a reading which is found in certain inferior MSS.[10] Subsequently, reverting to the reading *Geidumni*, he selected Geidines, near Dinant; and Desjardins[11] tentatively follows him. D'Anville[12] places the Gorduni, as he calls them, near the dunes between Dunkirk and Ostend. But if he is right, the Geidumni, though clients of the Nervii, dwelt in territory that belonged either to the Morini or to the Menapii; and the position which he assigns to them is too far from any place that could be

[1] iv, 3, § 5; 4, § 2. [2] *Nat. Hist.*, iv, 17 (31), § 106.
[3] *B. G.*, ii, 28, § 1. [4] See pp. 674–5. [5] *B. G.*, v, 39, §§ 1, 4.
[6] Omnem spem hostes in celeritate ponebant.
[7] *Bull. de l'Acad. Roy. de Bruxelles*, xiii, 1862, pp. 396–7.
[8] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 249.
[9] *Bull. de l'Acad. Roy. de Bruxelles*, xiii, 1862, pp. 396–7.
[10] See Schneider's *Caesar*, ii, 133. [11] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 436, n. 8.
[12] *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, pp. 357–8.

identified with the site of Cicero's camp.[1] (3) The Grudii are placed by d'Anville[2] in the canton of Groede, north-east of the tract which he assigns to the Geidumni; and the French Commission[3] think this a probable conjecture: but it is open to the same objection as d'Anville's choice in the case of the Geidumni, which the Commission reject.[4] Wauters finds their territory in the neighbourhood of Graux; and Desjardins[5] suggests that what Caesar wrote was not *Grudii* but *Gradii*. (4) Sanson,[6] who believes that the clients of the Nervii were *pagi* or sub-tribes of the Morini, assigns to the Levaci the district of Loëuve,—wherever that may be; for Sanson's spelling is probably different from the modern, and I cannot find the place in the map. D'Anville[7] finds an analogy between their name and that of the river Lieva, which joins the Scheldt at Ghent. Others point to the resemblance between their name and Louvain.[8] Wauters[9] places them 'entre l'Entre-Sambre-et-Meuse, où on rencontre Lesves, et le Brabant, où plusieurs localités présentent la syllabe *Lew*'. (5) The same writer[10] considers that the name *Pleumoxii* is preserved in Moxhe and Moxheron, villages situated near the river Méhaigne. A. Malengraen[11] places this people in the neighbourhood of the hill of Pleumont, near Chimay. Sanson[12] gives them the country round Peule, in which name his keen eye detects a resemblance to *Pleumoxii*.

These conjectures must be taken for what they are worth. Some of them may haply be right; but they all rest upon a frail foundation.[13]

Nitiobroges.—The Nitiobroges occupied the diocese of Agen (Aginnum[14]) and perhaps also that of Condom, which was severed from it, that is to say, the greater part of the department of the Lot-et-Garonne and a small fraction of that of the Tarn-et-Garonne.[15] The abbé A. Breuils, however, holds[16] that they had no territory south of the Garonne; for, he argues, the Bituriges Vivisci possessed lands on its left bank, and therefore if the river in its central course did not separate the Celtae from the Aquitani, it did so nowhere, and Caesar's statement in *B. G.*, i, 1, § 2 is stultified. I rather doubt whether this reason justifies the abbé in setting aside the principle of the dioceses; for, as I have already remarked,[17] Caesar's statements about frontiers were not always precise. It is true, indeed, that if the Nitiobroges possessed the diocese of Condom, the territory

[1] See p. 383.
[2] *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 362.
[3] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 471–2.
[4] *Ib.*, p. 437.
[5] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 436, n. 5.
[6] *Les Comm. de César*, pp. 40–1.
[7] *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, pp. 411–2.
[8] N. L. Achaintre, *Caesar*, iv, 299.
[9] *Bull. de l'Acad. Roy. de Bruxelles*, xiii, 1862, pp. 396–7.
[10] *Ib.*
[11] *Annales du Cercle arch. de Mons*, x, 469.
[12] *Les Comm. de César*, pp. 40–1.
[13] The omission of the clients of the Nervii from the list of tribes which contributed to the army raised for the relief of Alesia (*B. G.*, vii, 75) seems to show that they were regarded as incorporated with the Nervii.
[14] Ptolemy, *Geogr.*, ii, 7, § 11.
[15] D'Anville, *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, pp. 485–6.
[16] *Rev. de Gascogne*, xxxvi, 1895, pp. 235–6.
[17] See p. 344.

of the Sotiates (q.v.) was very small; but Strabo[1] emphasizes the general smallness and insignificance of the Aquitanian tribes.

Noviodunum (Biturigum).[2]—The only clues that Caesar gives as to the position of Noviodunum are, that it was situated on the road from Cenabum, that is to say from Orléans, to Gorgobina; that Vercingetorix, on hearing that Caesar was marching from Cenabum to relieve Gorgobina, abandoned the siege of that place, and marched against Caesar; that his cavalry, who had moved on in advance of his column, appeared before Noviodunum on the day on which Caesar reached it, and apparently a few hours after Caesar's arrival; that Caesar, after beating off this cavalry and receiving the surrender of Noviodunum, marched against Avaricum (Bourges); and that Vercingetorix followed him by easy stages. The passage in Caesar[3] runs thus:—*exercitum Ligerim traducit atque in Biturigum fines pervenit. Vercingetorix, ubi de Caesaris adventu cognovit, oppugnatione desistit atque obviam Caesari proficiscitur. Ille oppidum Biturigum positum in via Noviodunum oppugnare instituerat*, &c. The words *Biturigum positum in via Noviodunum* are omitted in the *a* MSS.; but these MSS. are obviously at fault, as Caesar would never have used such a vague expression as *Ille oppidum oppugnare instituerat*, without giving any intimation as to what or where the *oppidum* was. The word *Noviodunum* at all events must be genuine, as it is repeated in chapter 14. In *L* and also in certain inferior MSS. *Biturigum positum in via* is omitted, while *Noviodunum* is retained. Accordingly it has been suggested that Noviodunum was identical with the Noviodunum of the Aedui,[4] the modern Nevers. This astounding blunder, which has been adopted by Mr. Froude,[5] implies that Caesar would have crossed and recrossed the Loire, without saying a word about it, in order to attack a town belonging to a people with whom he had every motive to remain friendly. Besides, any one who reads chapter 55 in connexion with the chapters that immediately precede it, will see that Caesar is there mentioning the Aeduan Noviodunum for the first time. The words *Biturigum positum in via* are certainly genuine; or, if they are not, they express Caesar's meaning. For, as the Noviodunum of chapters 12 and 14 was certainly not the Aeduan town of the same name, and as, immediately before mentioning it, Caesar says that he entered the territory of the Bituriges, it is plain that it was in their territory. It is also certain that this Noviodunum was *positum in via*, that is to say, situated on the road from Cenabum to Gorgobina, because, when Caesar laid siege to it, he was marching from Cenabum to relieve Gorgobina, and did not yet know that Vercingetorix had raised the siege of Gorgobina and marched to meet him. It is probable, however, that he intended to march to Gorgobina by way of Avaricum; for by attacking or threatening so important a town as Avaricum he would have compelled Vercingetorix to abandon the siege.

[1] iv, 2, § 1.

[2] Sheet 18 of the *Carte de France* (1 : 320,000) will be found useful for the study of this question.

[3] *B. G.*, vii, 11–2.

[4] *Ib.*, 55, § 1.

[5] *Caesar, a Sketch*, ed. 1886, p. 354.

Not to mention mere guesses, Noviodunum has been placed by Napoleon at Sancerre ; by von Göler and Heller at Nouan-le-Fuzelier ; by d'Anville at Nouan, east-south-east of Bourges ; by a writer whose name I cannot discover at Argent, on the Grande-Sauldre, north-west of Sancerre ; by de Monvel at Neuvy-en-Sullias ; by J. Dumontet at Nohan-en-Graçay ; by various writers at Pierrefitte-sur-Sauldre ; by General Creuly at some unknown point in the neighbourhood of Châtillon-sur-Loire ; by M. Jacques Soyer at Neung-sur-Beuvron ; and by the French Commission and various independent writers at Neuvy-sur-Barangeon, or, with more probability, at the village of Villate, about 3 kilometres east by south of Neuvy-sur-Barangeon.

1. The reasons which Napoleon [1] gives are that Sancerre is about half-way between Gien, which he identifies with Cenabum, and the confluence of the Allier and the Loire, about 10 miles south-east of which, at St. Parize-le-Châtel, he places Gorgobina ; that Sancerre is at a sufficient distance from Avaricum to correspond with Caesar's narrative ; that it is situated on a hill, as, he maintains, Noviodunum must have been in order that its inhabitants might see 'in the distance, from the top of their walls, the cavalry of Vercingetorix' ; that the ground in the neighbourhood was suitable for a cavalry engagement ; and that the remains of a Gallo-Roman town have been discovered at the foot of the hill of Sancerre.[2]

Not one of these reasons is convincing. The Gallo-Roman town may have been any town but the successor of Noviodunum. It is unnecessary to assume that Noviodunum was on a hill ; [3] for from the top of an ordinary town-wall the range of vision, if the country were flat, would extend over several miles, and Lord Wolseley [4] tells us that good eyesight can hardly distinguish cavalry from infantry at a greater distance than 1,200 yards. Indeed, as the inhabitants made no attempt to defend themselves, it is probable that the town was not strongly situated.[5] The argument that Sancerre is situated at the right distance between Gien and St. Parize-le-Châtel is worthless ; for it is not proved that Gorgobina was at St. Parize-le-Châtel, and Cenabum was not at Gien but at Orléans. Lastly, the earliest known name of Sancerre was not Noviodunum, but Castrum Gordonicum.[6]

2. Von Göler [7] argues that Caesar must have taken two days to march from Cenabum to Noviodunum, and must have spent another day at Noviodunum before the cavalry of Vercingetorix appeared ; that the news of Caesar's approach must have taken one day to reach Vercingetorix, and that Vercingetorix must have taken two days to

[1] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 252, note.

[2] Napoleon's arguments are identical with those of A. Bréan (*Itinéraire de l'expédition de César d'Agendicum à Gergovia-Boiorum*, &c., 1865, pp. 83–4).

[3] See pp. 463–4.

[4] *The Soldier's Pocket-Book*, 5th ed., p. 491. Cf. p. 760, *infra*.

[5] I find that General Creuly makes the same remark. *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., viii, 1863, p. 400.

[6] See p. 429.

[7] *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, pp. 240 and 241, n. 1.

march from Gorgobina to Noviodunum. The geographical position of Nouan-le-Fuzelier, he affirms, satisfies these conditions. But, as General Creuly observes,[1] all this calculation is mere guess-work. Caesar does not say how long he took to march from Cenabum to Noviodunum; he does not say what time elapsed between his arrival and the appearance of Vercingetorix's cavalry; and moreover, on von Göler's theory, the cavalry of Vercingetorix would have marched 107 kilometres—the distance from La Guerche, which von Göler identifies with Gorgobina, to Nouan-le-Fuzelier—in the same time in which Caesar is assumed to have marched 43 kilometres,—the distance from Orléans to Nouan-le-Fuzelier; which is very improbable. Moreover, it is not proved that Gorgobina stood upon the site of La Guerche.

Among other reasons for rejecting Nouan-le-Fuzelier, d'Anville[2] observes that it was in the ancient diocese of Orléans, and therefore would have belonged not, as Caesar's text requires, to the Bituriges, but to the Carnutes. It may be added that no remains, Celtic or Roman, have been discovered on the site.[3]

3. In favour of Nouan,[4] his own selection, d'Anville[5] urges that it is at the right distance from the southern frontier of the Carnutes and from Moulins, which he tentatively identifies with Gorgobina; that its name is derived from *Novio*-dunum; and that its geographical position tallies with Caesar's account of the march of his army, followed by Vercingetorix, from Noviodunum to Avaricum.

I know of only one positive objection to d'Anville's view; but that one is fatal. Nouan is only 10 miles from Avaricum, and not more than 15 miles from any point within a radius of 16 (Roman) miles from Avaricum, where Vercingetorix can be assumed, according to Caesar's narrative, to have encamped. Now Vercingetorix could not have taken several stages[6] to traverse this short distance; and a glance at the map will show that he could not have followed Caesar at all; because, as Caesar encamped just outside Avaricum, and Vercingetorix 16 Roman miles from the same town,[7] Vercingetorix, marching from a point only 10 miles east of the town, must necessarily have taken a different route. Moreover, Moulins is certainly not identical with Gorgobina; and even if there were no positive objection to d'Anville's view, the reasons which he gives would be inadequate to prove it.

4. Argent, according to de Monvel,[8] shows evident traces of Roman occupation. But what of that?

5. At Neuvy-en-Sullias Gallo-Roman remains are said to have

[1] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., viii, 1863, pp. 394–5.
[2] *Éclaircissemens*, &c., p. 240.
[3] *Quelques notes sur Noviodunum Biturigum* (anon.), 1850, pp. 8–9; *Mém. lus à la Sorbonne*, 1866 (1867), pp. 114–5.
[4] Nohant-le-Gout, according to the Government Map (1 : 320,000), Sheet 18.
[5] *Éclaircissemens*, pp. 236–9.
[6] 'Vercingetorix *minoribus Caesarem itineribus subsequitur*, et locum castris deligit,' &c. *B. G.*, vii, 16, § 1.
[7] *Ib.*, and 17, § 1.
[8] *Mém. de la Soc. d'agriculture . . . d'Orléans*, vii, 1863, p. 65.

been found ;[1] but there is nothing else to be said for it. Besides, it is not in the territory which is generally assigned to the Bituriges.

6. Nohan-en-Graçay is about 38 kilometres, or 24 miles, north by west of Avaricum; that is to say, it is far to the west of the road which Caesar would have followed in marching either to Gorgobina or to Avaricum, and so nullifies the words *positum in via*. Moreover, in order to reach it and then to get to Avaricum, both Caesar and Vercingetorix must have crossed and recrossed the Cher.

7. Pierrefitte may be rejected at once. It is, indeed, on the Roman road from Orléans to Bourges : it is at a reasonable distance from Bourges ; and it possesses Roman remains.[2] But it is not in the country of the Bituriges.

8. General Creuly[3] selects the neighbourhood of Châtillon-sur-Loire because such a position harmonizes with his identification of Gorgobina with Sancerre. But this identification is most probably wrong.[4]

9. Neung-sur-Beuvron, the chief town of the arrondissement of Romorantin in the department of the Loir-et-Cher, is in the country of the Carnutes, and is not ' situated upon the line of march ' : but, says M. Soyer,[5] ' rien ne prouve que *Noviodunum* fût sur le territoire des *Bituriges* ' ; for is it not easy to sweep away those troublesome words *Biturigum positum in via* ? Besides, ' on a trouvé à Neung des traces de fortification gauloise,' and—most important of all—*Noviodunum* gave birth to ' *Neeun* (forme primitive hypothétique), puis *Neun*, et enfin *Neung*.' Thus everything is explained, or explained away,—except the hard fact that Neung is too near Orléans and too far from any site with which Gorgobina has been or can be identified.

10. There remains only Villate, near Neuvy-sur-Barangeon ; for Neuvy-sur-Barangeon itself has been rightly rejected. It is not on the Roman road, but about 3 kilometres west of it ; and no antiquities have been found in its environs.[6] Moreover, the name Neuvy is derived not from *Noviodunum*, but from *Noviacum*.[7] On the other hand, local tradition, or what passes for local tradition, and long-established opinion, whatever they may be worth, are in favour of Villate. It is on the Roman road from Orléans to Bourges ; and though it is only 30 kilometres from the northern side of Bourges, Caesar probably marched a much greater distance by a circuitous route, in order to avoid the forests on the north and the marshes which nearly surrounded the town, and to reach his camping-ground on the south-eastern side :[8] therefore the words *Vercingetorix minoribus itineribus Caesarem subsequitur* would not lose their

[1] *Mém. de la Soc. d'agriculture . . . d'Orléans*, vii, 1863, p. 66.

[2] Saint-Hypolite, *Recherches sur quelques points hist. relatifs au siége de Bourges*, &c., 1842, pp. 7–8.

[3] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., viii, 1863, p. 400.

[4] See pp. 428–9.

[5] *Bull. de géogr. hist. et descr.*, 1904, pp. 153–4.

[6] *Quelques notes sur Noviodunum Biturigum* (anon.), p. 10 ; *Mém. lus à la Sorbonne*, 1866 (1867), pp. 123–30.

[7] Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 673, n. 4.

[8] *B. G.*, vii, 15, § 5 ; 17, § 1.

force. Neuvy-sur-Barangeon was in the Middle Ages called *Novus Vicus*; and it has been argued [1] that this name implies the existence of an older town, which may have been *Noviodunum*. Celtic remains, Roman coins belonging to the period comprised between the reigns of Augustus and Gratian, the ruins of a building, which appears to have been a Gallo-Roman theatre, and inscriptions which have been referred to the Gallic epoch, have been discovered at the place in question.[2] On the other hand, d'Anville [3] maintains that Neuvy-sur-Barangeon is too near Orléans. But marching rapidly from St. Parize-le-Châtel—though not from the neighbourhood of Moulins, where d'Anville tentatively places Gorgobina—the cavalry of Vercingetorix could certainly have reached Villate in time; and therefore the objection disappears. D'Anville, however, adds that Vercingetorix, coming from Gorgobina, could not have *followed* Caesar from Neuvy-sur-Barangeon (or rather, as he ought to have said, Villate) to Avaricum. This objection has no more weight than the other. Vercingetorix may have been present in person in the combat before Noviodunum; and even if he was not, he doubtless marched up with his infantry to join his cavalry. Then, as Caesar tells us,[4] he held a council of war. By the time it was over, Caesar was well on his way to Avaricum. It is therefore no offence against language to say that Vercingetorix followed him thither.

Lancelot [5] objects that Neuvy-sur-Barangeon is not situated upon a hill; and the objection would also apply, though with less force, to Villate, which is on gently rising ground.[6] The termination *dunum*, says Lancelot, implies an eminence. *Caesarodunum* is no exception, for the original foundation must have been on one of the eminences near Tours, not on the low-lying site of the modern town. Plutarch, speaking of Lugdunum, confirms the view that *dunum* means a hill; and all other ancient towns in France, Germany, and England, the names of which ended in *dunum*, were situated on hills. Similarly the Abbé Fénel [7] quotes Hericus, a monk who wrote in the reign of Charles the Bald, according to whom

> Augustidunum demum tum coepta vocari,
> Augusti montem transfert quod celtica lingua.[8]

These arguments are hardly convincing. Lancelot's assertion about the site of Caesarodunum is not supported by any evidence; [9] and if it is true, it does not prove his case. The statements of Plutarch and Hericus on a question of Celtic etymology will not be taken seriously. There is certainly one instance of a low-lying Celtic town, the name of which ended in *dunum*,—Lugdunum Batavorum (Leyden). Fénel urges that Ptolemy called it Λουγόδεινον; but the

[1] *Quelques notes*, &c., p. 10.
[2] *Ib.*, pp. 13–32.
[3] *Éclaircissemens*, &c., p. 240.
[4] *B. G.*, vii, 14.
[5] *Mém. de litt. tirez des registres de l'Acad. Roy. des inscr.*, &c., vi, 1718–25, pp. 640–2.
[6] See *Carte de l'État-Major* (1 : 80,000), Sheet 122.
[7] *Mém. de litt. tirés des registres de l'Acad. Roy. des inscr.*, &c., xx, 1753, p. 44.
[8] *Acta Sanctorum*, Julii, vii, 29.
[9] See J. J. Bourrassé, *La Touraine*, 1855, p. 68.

best reading is Λουγόδουνον.[1] Moreover, Sir John Rhys[2] remarks that '*dūn-* is of the same etymology as the familiar English word *town* and the German *Zaun*, "a hedge or field-fence" '; and Zeuss[3] says that its proper meaning is that of a fortified position, not a hill ('*Munitum* enim *locum* proprie significat vox celtica *dûn*, non *eminentem* . . . vel *montem*: sunt etiam oppida quaedam eadem voce nominata non in monte sed in planicie sita'). The fact that Celtic strongholds were, as a rule, naturally built upon hills is no proof that the Celts would not have applied the word *dun* to a fortified town situated upon low ground.

The reader who has read so far will naturally exclaim with Desjardins,[4] 'Qui a raison? il est bien probable qu'on ne le saura jamais.' The reader will be right. It has been proved that nearly every place which has been identified with Noviodunum was not Noviodunum; and it cannot be proved that any of the other places was Noviodunum. But, as every conceivable site would appear to have been proposed, and as there is more to be said for Villate than for any other, I mark Noviodunum there on my map with a note of interrogation.

Noviodunum (Haeduorum).—The modern editors speak of the identity of Noviodunum with Nevers as a thing absolutely certain. But Caesar is the only ancient author who mentions this Noviodunum; and he simply describes the place as *oppidum Haeduorum ad ripas Ligeris oportuno loco positum*.[5] However, although there is no direct evidence, the probability that Noviodunum stood upon the site of Nevers is sufficient to justify one in marking it upon the map. It is proved by the itineraries[6] that the Gallo-Roman town of Nivernum was situated at Nevers. Aimoin, a monk of the tenth century, remarks that Nivernum is said to be identical with Noviodunum; and Hugo, a monk of Fleury, writing in 1109, unhesitatingly affirmed that identity.[7] The evidence, then, is simply the evidence of tradition. But this evidence is supported by the strong probability that an important place, like Noviodunum, would not have perished, but would have developed into a Gallo-Roman town. If so, we may be sure that Noviodunum was Nivernum, because there was no other Gallo-Roman town with which Noviodunum can be identified. Moreover, it seems possible that, as *Noviomagus* was corrupted into *Noviomum*, so *Nivernum* is a corruption of *Noviodunum*. Finally, the great strength of the site of Nevers—*oportuno loco positum*—would certainly have recommended it to Caesar; and this is the strongest argument of all.

Noviodunum (Suessionum).—The position of this Noviodunum cannot be fixed with absolute certainty, but was close to Soissons. Caesar tells us that Noviodunum was a strongly fortified town:[8]

[1] *Geogr.*, ed. C. Müller, i, 229.
[2] *Celtic Heathendom*, 1888, p. 34.
[3] *Gramm. Celt.*, 2nd ed., 1871, p. 52 (64), note.
[4] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 479.
[5] *B. G.*, vii, 55, § 1.
[6] *Itin. Ant.*, p. 367; *La Table de Peutinger*, ed. Desjardins, p. 32, col. 3.
[7] D'Anville, *Éclaircissemens sur l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 409–10.
[8] Propter latitudinem fossae murique altitudinem paucis defendentibus expugnare non potuit. *B. G.*, ii, 12, § 2.

we may, as I show on pages 668–70, gather from his narrative that it was a long day's march from his camp on the Aisne[1]; and we may reasonably infer that it was the chief stronghold of the Suessiones. Caesar's camp on the Aisne was either on the hill of Mauchamp, about a mile and a half NNE. of Berry-au-Bac, or on the plateau of Chaudardes, some five miles nearer Soissons.[2]

1. Napoleon[3] and von Göler,[4] following most of the best known commentators of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, identifyNoviodunum with Soissons; but Augusta Suessionum, the Gallo-Roman capital of the Suessiones, was, as its name suggests, an entirely new town.[5]

2. The Abbé Le Beuf[6] decided in favour of Noyant, which is on a hill a little south of Soissons. His argument is that Noviodunum must have been near Soissons; that the hill of Noyant is only two kilometres off; and that the name Noyant is derived from Noviodunum. Perhaps. Who can tell?

3. Dom Lelong[7] adopted Noyon. But Noyon, as the *Itinerary of Antonine*[8] proves, was not Noviodunum, but Noviomagus.

4. Wauters[9] thinks that Noviodunum is to be identified with Nouvion-le-Vieux, in the department of the Aisne; for, says he, 'Nouvion est la contraction la plus naturelle qu'il soit possible de trouver de la dénomination gauloise.' This is a fair sample of the 'evidence' which often satisfies antiquaries of vast learning and high authority.

5. Peigné-Delacourt[10] proposes Mont de Noyon, west of the Oise, which, he says, 'présente tous les caractères des oppides gaulois,' and is situated on a Gallic road leading from Pontarcy to Caply, near Breteuil. But Mont de Noyon was not in the territory of the Suessiones; the plateau is only 3 hectares, or about 7½ acres, in extent; and the site is far beyond the furthest point which Caesar could have reached in the longest day's march.

6. M. O. Vauvillé has excavated an important Gallic *oppidum* on the hill of Pommiers, which is on the *northern* bank of the Aisne, about 2½ miles north-west of Soissons.[11] The ruins have yielded over 2,500 Gallic coins and 19 Roman ones earlier than 57 B.C.;[12] and A. de Barthélemy[13] suggests that this *oppidum* was the old capital of the Suessiones, which was succeeded by the Gallo-Roman Augusta

[1] Or perhaps from another camp, a little lower down the valley. See p. 670.
[2] See pp. 659–66.
[3] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 105.
[4] *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 72.
[5] Cf. p. 401, and Rice Holmes, *Anc. Britain*, pp. 255, 704.
[6] *Mercure de France*, Avril, 1736, p. 637.
[7] *Hist. eccl. et civ. du diocèse de Laon*, 1783, p. 10, note. Cf. *Bull. de la Soc. arch. . . . de Soissons*, xii, 1903–4 (1907), pp. 196–9.
[8] Ed. Wesseling, p. 262.
[9] *Bull. de l'Acad. Roy. de Bruxelles*, 3e sér., i, 1881, pp. 564–5.
[10] *Recherches sur la position de Noviodunum Suessionum* (1856).
[11] See *Carte de l'État-Major* (1 : 80,000), Sheet 33.
[12] *Bull. de la Soc. arch. . . . de Soissons*, xii, 1903–4 (1907), pp. 317–61; *Mém. de la Soc. nat. des ant. de France*, lxv, 1904–5 (1906), pp. 45–90; lxvi, 1906 (1907), pp. 1–26.
[13] *Rev. celt.*, viii, 1887, p. 398.

Suessionum, just as Gergovia was succeeded by Augustonemetum and Bibracte by Augustodunum. Moreover, M. Vauvillé has revealed the entrenchments of a Roman camp quite close to and on the east of Pommiers; and he is probably justified in concluding that this was the camp which Caesar made.[1]

Ocelum.—See GRAIOCELI.

Osismi.—The Osismi dwelt in the department of Finistère. Pomponius Mela[2] says that the island of Sena, or Sein,[3] was opposite territory which belonged to them: on the other hand, Ptolemy[4] implies that the territory of the Veneti extended northward as far as the Gobaean promontory, or the Pointe du Raz; and, as Sein is nearly due west of the Pointe du Raz, the two statements are only reconcilable by the assumption that Mela was referring to the southernmost part of the country of the Osismi. We shall not go far wrong if we assume that the Montagnes Noires—a natural boundary—divided the two peoples.[5] One of the towns of the Osismi

[1] M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 258, n. 2), who agrees with me in identifying Noviodunum with Pommiers, believes that Caesar made his camp on the north.

[2] iii, 6, § 48.

[3] An attempt has been made to prove that Sein is not the same as Sena. According to R. F. Le Men (*Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., xxiii, 1872, pp. 51–4), the earliest document in which Sein is mentioned is 'un acte du cartulaire de Landevennec', belonging to the eleventh century, in which it is called 'l'île de Seidhun'. In the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, says Le Men, it was generally called 'Sizun'. 'Seidhun', or 'Seithyn', was, he says, the name of a Breton chief, who probably gave his name to the island. It has also been argued that as, according to Mela, Sena was situated in the *Oceanus Britannicus*, while Sein is not in the English Channel, Sein cannot be the same as Sena.

But Le Men's theory has been demolished by MM. A. de la Borderie and J. Loth. The resemblance between the names Sena and Sein is obvious. The cape opposite Sein is called Sizun. If, M. de la Borderie asks, the island itself was originally so called, why has its name become Sein, while the name of the cape remains unaltered? Finally, he remarks that the opponents of the identification of Sena with Sein identify it with Ouessant, a name which is much less like Sena than even Seidhun (*Géogr. gallo-rom. de l'Armorique*, 1881, pp. 20–2).

M. Loth, a distinguished Celtic scholar, says that the name Sena has nothing to do with Seidhun. He also observes that as Sena, according to the *Itinerary of Antonine*, was between Uxantis (Ouessant) and Vindilis (Belle-Île), it can only have been Sein. Further, he remarks, with perfect truth, that *Oceanus Britannicus* designated not merely the English Channel, but the Bay of Biscay as well, which the ancient geographers regarded as opposite the coast of Britain (*Rev. celt.*, x, 1889, p. 352; *L'Émigration bretonne*, p. 54. Cf. *Strabonis Geogr. tabulae XV*, instruxit C. Müller, 1880, p. 5 and tab. iv; *B. G.*, v, 13, §§ 1–2; Mela, ii, 6, § 85; and Vibius Sequester, *De fluminibus quorum apud poetas fit mentio*, ed. J. J. Oberlin, 1778, p. 13).

[4] *Geogr.*, ii, 8, §§ 5–6.

[5] A. Bertrand, remarking that the author of the legend of St. Menulfe calls St. Corentin, who was bishop of Quimper, bishop of the Osismi, infers that they possessed the whole of the territory which corresponded with the diocese of Quimper (*Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., ix, 1864, 324). Now, as I have shown already (p. 421), the diocese of Quimper was one of those dioceses which were founded without reference to the boundaries of Gallo-Roman states; and no safe conclusion as to the area of the Osismian territory can be drawn from a document so late as the legend in question (Bolland, *Acta Sanctorum*, Julii, iii, 292, F).

was Vorgum or Vorgium, which is identified with Carhaix.[1] See Coriosolites and Veneti.

Paemani.—See Caerosi.

Parisii.—The territory of the Parisii corresponded with the modern diocese of Paris,[2] that is to say, the department of the Seine and part of the department of the Seine-et-Oise.

Petrocorii.—The territory of the Petrocorii comprised the modern diocese of Périgueux and that of Sarlat, which was severed from the ancient diocese in the sixteenth century.[3] This territory is nearly identical with the department of the Dordogne.

Pictones.—The Pictones occupied the ancient diocese of Poitiers, from which the cantons of Retz and Mauges were transferred to the dioceses of Nantes and Angers respectively, and the dioceses of Luçon and Maillezais were severed in 1317.[4] From this territory, however, if we accept the conjecture of Maximin Deloche regarding the Lemovices Aremorici (q.v.), must be deducted the southern part of the Loire-Inférieure and the western part of the Maine-et-Loire. Roughly speaking, there would then remain for the Pictones the departments of the Vendée, Deux-Sèvres, and Vienne.

Pleumoxii.—See Nervii.

Ptianii.—The position of the Ptianii cannot be determined. Walckenaer [5] remarks that Caesar mentions them immediately after the Bigerriones; and that, after placing the surrounding peoples, there remains only the country whose chief town was Beneharnum. Following a suggestion of Sanson,[6] who observes that Béarn was divided into six districts called *parsans*, he inclines to place them in this country. It is difficult to see what connexion *parsans* can have with Ptianii; but Walckenaer, who adopted the erroneous reading *Preciani*, insists that Sanson's conjecture brings the text of Caesar into harmony with the works of later writers, none of whom places any people in the country referred to.

Rauraci.—See Latobrigi.

Redones.—The Redones are mentioned twice by Caesar, among the maritime states (*quae Oceanum attingunt*).[7] D'Anville [8] considers that their territory extended beyond the diocese of Rennes, and included the diocese of Dol and part of that of St. Malo; [9] for other-

[1] *La Table de Peutinger*, ed. Desjardins, p. 29, col. 2; *Bull. de la Soc. arch. du Finistère*, ii, 1874–5, pp. 18–72. *Corpus inscr. Lat.*, xiii, pars ii, fasc. 2, p. 679. F. Liger (*Les Osismiens*, 1907, pp. 20, 69) insists that Vorganium, not Vorgium, must be identified with Carhaix; but Desjardins (*Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, i, 317–20) proved that Vorganium was at Castell A'ch, some 20 kilometres, or about 12 miles, north of Brest. See also *Corpus inscr. Lat.*, xiii, pars i, p. 490, where Otto Hirschfeld confutes Liger.

[2] Walckenaer, *Géogr. des Gaules*, i, 404.

[3] D'Anville, *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 517; Walckenaer, *Géogr. des Gaules*, i, 361.

[4] D'Anville, pp. 519–20; Walckenaer, i, 365–6; A. Longnon, *Atlas hist. de la France*, p. 6. See also *Rev. arch.*, 3e sér., xviii, 1891, pp. 260–1.

[5] *Géogr. des Gaules*, i, 293–5.

[6] *Les Comm. de César*, ed. 1650, p. 65.

[7] *B. G.*, ii, 34; vii, 75, § 4. [8] *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 542.

[9] It should be noted that these dioceses were not founded until after the Gallo-

wise, he remarks, Caesar would have been wrong in saying that they were a maritime people. The French Commission [1] reject this view (1) because Caesar reckons the Aulerci, who had no sea-board, as maritime states ; (2) because in their opinion Aletum, or Aleth, and therefore probably also the diocese of Aleth, the see of which was transferred in the ninth century to St. Malo, belonged to the Coriosolites ; and (3) because after the tenth century Dol and St. Malo were closely connected with the Breton-speaking part of Brittany, while Rennes remained French. The Commission are further of opinion that if the territory of the Redones actually communicated with the sea, it did so along the valley of the Vilaine, which the Veneti could have afforded to let them retain. But it is not proved that no Aulercan state possessed a sea-board : it is not proved that Aletum belonged to the Coriosolites, and as the diocese of Aleth was not formed until after they had ceased to exist as a Gallo-Roman state, there is no evidence that it corresponded with their territory : it is incredible that the powerful Veneti, who, moreover, were conterminous on the south with the Namnetes, would have left the valley of the Vilaine in the possession of the Redones ; and, as Caesar says twice over that the Redones were a maritime people, we must assume that he was right. MM. Kerviler [2] and J. Loth [3] give them the strip of coast between the Rance and the Couesnon, which was included in the diocese of Dol. See CORIOSOLITES.

Remi.—The territory of the Remi, according to Walckenaer [4] and Desjardins,[5] included not only the diocese of Reims and that of Laon, which was severed from it in the fifth century, but also that of Châlons. The diocese of Châlons was formed out of the territory of the Catuvellauni, who are not mentioned by Caesar, or by any writer before the time of Constantine. Walckenaer remarks that, according to Caesar, the territory of the Remi was conterminous with Celtican Gaul ; [6] and he maintains that this would not have been true unless they had possessed the diocese of Châlons. But Caesar's statement would be equally true if the diocese in question had belonged, as M. Longnon [7] maintains, to the Lingones. Still, I believe that the diocese of Châlons did form part of the territory of the Remi, or that the Catuvellauni were one of their client peoples ; for Caesar tells us [8] that, in consequence of the favour which he showed the Remi, various tribes enrolled themselves as their clients.

D'Anville [9] believes that the Remi possessed only a part of the diocese of Laon, and that the other part belonged to the Viromandui. He thinks it likely that this part belonged originally not to the diocese of Reims, but to that of Noyon, which was formed out of the territory of the Viromandui ; and he finds it difficult to believe that

Roman period. The diocese of St. Malo included the broad headland east of the Rance.

[1] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., ix, 1864, pp. 328–30.
[2] *Bull. arch. de l'Ass[n] bretonne*, 3[e] sér., iv, 1885, pp. 225–8.
[3] *L'Émigration bretonne*, p. 52.
[4] *Géogr. des Gaules*, i, 487–8.
[5] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 455.
[6] *B. G.*, ii, 3, § 1.
[7] *Atlas hist. de la Gaule*, pp. 5–6. See my note on the LINGONES.
[8] *B. G.*, vi, 12, § 7.
[9] *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 693.

the Viromandui were confined within such narrow limits on the south of their chief town, Augusta (St. Quentin), as they must have been if they did not possess a part of the diocese of Laon. But there is no evidence for d'Anville's conjecture.

[See A. Piette's delimitation of the territory of the Remi (*Itin. gallo-rom. dans le dépt de l'Aisne*, 1856–62, pp. 29–31)].

Ruteni.—The territory of the Ruteni was identical with the ancient diocese of Rodez, that is to say, the greater part of the department of the Aveyron and the northern part of that of the Tarn.[1]

Samarobriva has always been generally and rightly identified with Amiens; and the arguments by which von Göler[2] and others attempted to upset this conclusion have never been taken seriously.[3] It is established not only by the evidence of the itineraries,[4] of the mile-stone of Tongres,[5] and of mediaeval writers,[6] but also by a well-known law of nomenclature. We have seen that at the time when the *Itinerary of Antonine* was compiled most of the towns of Gaul had two names,—the old Gallic name and the name of the people in whose territory the town was situated.[7] The chief town of the Ambiani, which, in the *Table*, is called *Samarobriva*, is mentioned in the *Itinerary of Antonine* under the name of *Ambiani*. The names of the capital and of most of the chief provincial towns of France are derived, not from the old Gallic names, but from the names of the tribes to which the towns belonged. Thus we have Paris (*Parisii*), Soissons (*Suessiones*), Reims (*Remi*), Bourges (*Bituriges*), and so on. Now Amiens is, beyond all doubt, derived from *Ambiani*.

Samnitae.—Strabo[8] says that, according to Posidonius, an island opposite the mouth of the Loire was inhabited by 'the women of the Samnitae', and that from time to time they visited their husbands, who dwelt on the mainland. Ptolemy[9] says that 'below', that is to say, south of the Veneti, and in the neighbourhood of the Loire, dwelt the Samnitae. A few lines further on,[10] he mentions the Namnetes (q.v.), placing them erroneously between the Cenomani and the Abrincatui.[11] Marcian[12] speaks of the Σαμνῖται. C. Müller[13] remarks that Ptolemy erroneously distinguishes Σαμνῖται from Ναμνῆται; and Desjardins[14] takes the same view, observing that

[1] D'Anville, *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 693.
[2] *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 168, n. 1.
[3] I refuted them in my first edition, pp. 477–8.
[4] *Itin. Ant.*, ed. Wesseling, pp. 362, 380; *La Table de Peutinger*, ed. Desjardins, p. 14, col. 2–3; p. 15, col. 3.
[5] See *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., iii, 1861, pp. 408–13.
[6] See L. P. Colliette, *Mém. sur le Vermandois*, 1771–3, p. 12.
[7] See p. 407, n. 3.
[8] iv, 4, § 6.
[9] *Geogr.*, ii, 8, § 6.
[10] *Ib.*, § 8.
[11] For a list of the blunders which Ptolemy made in dealing with Gallic geography see *Hist. de l'Acad. des inscr.*, xxxi, 1768, pp. 265–6.
[12] *Geogr. Graec. min.*, ed. C. Müller, i, 552, T. 18. According to M. de la Monneraye (*Bull. arch. de l'Assn bretonne*, 3e sér., iv, 1885, p. 271, n. 3), a good MS. of Marcian gives the reading Ναμνῖται.
[13] Ptolemy, i, 213, note.
[14] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, i, 143, n. 4; ii, 140, n. 2.

the error probably crept into the text of Strabo owing to the similarity between Σ, which was often written M, and N, and also to the fact that the name *Samnitae* was familiar to Italian ears; and that Ptolemy doubtless copied Strabo, and Marcian Ptolemy. Accordingly Desjardins concludes that in Strabo for Σαμνιτῶν (γυναῖκας) we ought to read Ναμνετῶν; and this conclusion is supported by the statements of Strabo[1] and Polybius,[2] that the Loire entered the sea between the Pictones and the Namnetes.[3]

Some coins belonging to the Aremorican type, stamped on the reverse side with the letter Σ, were found some years ago at Candé and at Ancenis, in the valley of the Loire. These places are east of the country which belonged to the Samnitae, if there ever was such a people; but M. Parenteau[4] believes that Σ stands for Σαμνῖται. Unbiased critics will, I think, agree that this argument is worthless.

To conclude, I am strongly inclined to believe, with C. Müller, Desjardins, and the majority of scholars, that the Samnitae never existed.[5]

Santoni.—The Santoni occupied the dioceses of Saintes and Angoulême and the Pays d'Aunis; in other words, the departments of the Charente and Charente-Inférieure and part of the Gironde.[6] To this M. Longnon[7] proposes to add the territory of the Bituriges Vivisci (q.v.), who are not mentioned by Caesar, and may conceivably have been clients of the Santoni. He points out that, if his conjecture were adopted, Caesar's statement,[8] that the territory of the Santoni was not far from that of the Tolosates, would be less open to objection. But, as I have already shown,[9] Caesar's statement throws no real doubt upon his good faith; and I do not see the use of making conjectures which there is no evidence to support, and which can neither be established nor refuted.

Seduni.—See NANTUATES.

Segni.—See CAEROSI.

Segusiavi.—According to all the good MSS., the people whom Caesar mentions in *B. G.*, i, 10, § 5, were the Sebusiani; the people whom he mentions in vii, 64, § 4, 75, § 2, the Segusiavi. It is now agreed that the two were identical.[10]

In *B. G.*, i, 10, Caesar says that, after crossing the Alps from Italy in 58 B. C., he passed into the country of the Vocontii, thence into that of the Allobroges, and thence into that of the Segusiavi. He

[1] iv, 2, § 1. [2] xxxiv, 10, § 6.

[3] De la Monneraye (*Bull. arch. de l'Ass^n bretonne*, 3^e sér., iv, 1885, p. 271) observes, further, that Ptolemy makes the Samnitae neighbours of the Andecavi, or Andes; and he argues that this proves that Ptolemy confounded them with the Namnetes.

[4] *Bull. de la Soc. arch. de Nantes*, ii, 1862, pp. 115–6.

[5] The Samnitae are identified by Mommsen (*Röm. Gesch.*, v, 1885, p. 87, note [*Hist. of Rome,—the Provinces*, i, 96, note]) with the Coriosolites!

[6] D'Anville, *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, pp. 576–7; Walckenaer, *Géogr. des Gaules*, i, 363.

[7] *Atlas hist. de la Gaule*, p. 6. [8] *B. G.*, i, 10, § 1. [9] See pp. 225–6.

[10] Cf. Nipperdey's *Caesar*, p. 792, with A. Bernard, *Descr^n du pays des Ségusiaves*, 1858, pp. 42, 46.

goes on to say that the Segusiavi were 'the first people outside the Province, beyond the Rhône'.[1] It is clear from *B. G.*, i, 12–3 that when he entered their country he was on the eastern bank of the Saône. The greater part of their territory, however, was on the western bank; for two of their towns, Rodumna (Roanne) and Forum Segusiavorum (Feurs), which Ptolemy[2] mentions, were on that side, and Rodumna was actually west of the Loire. Their chief town, Lugdunum (Lyons), is placed by Ptolemy in Aeduan territory, doubtless because they were dependants of the Aedui. The western part of their territory appears to have comprised that part of the diocese of Lyons which extended on the right bank of the Rhône and of the Saône.

It is impossible to define the extent of the tract which the Segusiavi possessed in the angle between the Rhône and the Saône. Desjardins[3] thinks that it may have extended as far north as Mâcon: but Valentin Smith[4] argues that Trévoux, which is 25 miles south of Mâcon, being situated between two places called Ambérieux, must have belonged to the Ambarri; and accordingly he restricts the eastern Segusiavi to a very small tract. A. Bernard[5] gives them a considerable territory, extending in a north-westerly direction from a point near the confluence of the Ain and the Rhône to Thoissey.

Caesar speaks of the Segusiavi as clients of the Aedui,[6] and of the Ambarri as *necessarii et consanguinei Haeduorum*.[7] Desjardins holds that we must understand the clientship of the Segusiavi in the same sense as that of the Cadurci, the Gabali, and the Vellavii, who were under the hegemony of the Arverni,[8] and yet ranked as states. It is clear, he remarks, that Caesar regarded the Segusiavi as forming a distinct state (*civitas*), because he says that the territories of the Aedui and the Segusiavi bordered on the Province (*finitimi provinciae*),[9] which proves that the Ambarri were regarded as forming part of the *civitas Haeduorum*, for the territory of the Aedui, properly so called, did not touch the Province. Besides, he goes on to say, the Segusiavi ranked as one of the sixty *civitates* of Augustus.[10] There is no doubt that the territory of the Segusiavi was distinct from that of the Aedui: but the argument by which Desjardins tries to prove that it was is wrong; for Caesar sometimes uses the word *finitimus* loosely. (See my note on the LATOBRIGI.)

B. Guerard,[11] who wrongly holds that client peoples were merely *pagi*, or subdivisions, of the people to whom they stood in that relation, includes the territory of the Segusiavi in that of the Aedui.

Senones.—The Senones undoubtedly occupied the diocese of Sens:

[1] Hi sunt extra provinciam trans Rhodanum primi.
[2] *Geogr.*, ii, 8, § 11.
[3] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 605.
[4] *Fouilles dans la vallée du Formans en 1862*, p. 5.
[5] *Description du pays des Ségusiaves*, pp. 41, 46.
[6] *B. G.*, vii, 75, § 2.
[7] *Ib.*, i, 11, § 4.
[8] *Ib.*, vii, 75, § 2.
[9] *Ib.*, 64, § 4.
[10] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 468–9.
[11] *Essai sur le système des divisions territoriales de la Gaule*, 1832, p. 8. Cf. pp. 344–5, *supra*, and *Mém. présentés par divers savants à l'Acad. des inscr.*, 2e sér., iv, 1860, p. 366.

the diocese of Auxerre (*civitas Autessiodurum*) is generally attributed to them ; and, according to Walckenaer,[1] they occupied the dioceses of Troyes and Meaux as well. That is to say, in Walckenaer's opinion, the Tricasses, who are not mentioned by Caesar, and the Meldi were clients (or *pagi*) of the Senones. It has been argued that the territory of the Tricasses was not included in that of the Senones, because Pliny[2] and Ptolemy[3] mention the two peoples separately : but Walckenaer replies (1) that from the silence of Caesar and Strabo in regard to the Tricasses we may infer that they and the Senones were practically one in the time of Caesar, and were only separated by Augustus, whose policy was to break up states that were unduly powerful ; (2) that as, according to Caesar,[4] the Senones were neighbours of the Belgae, the territories of the Tricasses and the Meldi must have been included in theirs ; and (3) that such a union harmonizes with Caesar's remark about the great power of the Senones.[5]

These arguments are not conclusive. It is obvious that the first and the second might be used to prove that the Tricasses and the Meldi were clients, not of the Senones but of the Remi or the Suessiones ; and in fact Desjardins[6] does infer that the Tricasses were clients either of the Senones or of the Remi. The conclusion is probable ; but which of the alternatives is right ? Walckenaer offers a further argument in support of his. He quotes from an inscription found at Auxerre, in which there is mention of *civitatis Senonum, Tricassinorum, Meldorum, Parisiorum, et civitatis Aeduorum ;* and he argues that the omission of *Autessiodurum* proves that Auxerre too was included in the country of the Senones. But, as Long[7] remarks, ' it is difficult to see what conclusion can be drawn from this inscription.' It would seem to imply that in the Gallo-Roman period the Senones, the Tricasses, the Meldi, and the Parisii formed only one *civitas*, which is certainly not true.[8] M. Longnon, as I have observed in my note on the Lingones, holds that the Tricasses were clients of that people. I should say that they were clients either of the Senones or of the Remi ; but, as these were both powerful tribes,[9] it would be useless to attempt to decide between them. M. Jullian,[10] indeed, unhesitatingly includes the Tricasses among the Senones, on the ground that the Belgae were separated from the Celtae by the Marne ; but the Remi acquired new dependencies through the influence of Caesar,[11] and their clients may not all have been in Belgic territory. If, however, the Tricasses were merely a *pagus*, M. Jullian's argument is sound.

It is rather puzzling to find that while Walckenaer argues that Auxerre was included in the country of the Senones, he maintains

[1] *Géogr. des Gaules*, i, 407.
[2] *Nat. Hist.*, iv, 18 (32), § 107.
[3] *Geogr.*, ii, 8, §§ 10–1.
[4] *B. G.*, ii, 2, § 3.
[5] *Ib.*, v, 54, § 2.
[6] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 470.
[7] W. Smith, *Dict. of Greek and Roman Geogr.*, i, 346.
[8] See Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, iv, 18 (32), § 107.
[9] *B. G.*, v, 54, § 2 ; vi, 12, §§ 7–9.
[10] *Hist. de la Gaule*, ii, 524, n. 6.
[11] *B. G.*, vi, 12, § 7.

that the diocese of Auxerre belonged to the Boi, whose territory was situated within the frontiers of the Aedui. Autessiodurum is not mentioned by any author earlier than Ammianus Marcellinus; but it appears in the *Notitia provinciarum*,[1] where it is assigned to the Senones. Walckenaer[2] thinks it natural to attribute the territory embraced by the diocese of Auxerre 'au seul peuple célèbre de la Gaule dont l'emplacement n'est pas clairement indiqué par les auteurs,' that is to say, to the Boi. In my article on GORGOBINA I have given reasons for dissenting from this view.

Desjardins[3] remarks that the Aedui, the Bituriges, and the Carnutes were all neighbours of the Senones: 'par conséquent l'Auxerrois faisait partie du domaine immédiat des *Senones*.' But the conclusion does not follow. Substitute Aedui (q.v.) for Senones; and the argument remains as good.

[Since I wrote this article the last (and posthumous) volume of Desjardins's work has appeared. I learn that a mile-stone has been discovered, bearing the date 245, which was erected at the distance of 72 Roman miles from Augustodunum, on the road to Autessiodurum. It stood in Aeduan territory (*in Aeduorum finibus*) and also in the territory of Autessiodurum; and, as Desjardins[4] points out, it proves that, at all events at the time when it was erected, the territory which afterwards belonged to the *civitas Autessiodurum* formed a part of the territory of the Aedui. Thus Desjardins recants his former argument.[5]]

Sequani.—The territory of the Sequani was bounded on the east by the Jura, which separated them from the Helvetii, and, according to the writer, or writers, of *B. G.*, i, 1, § 5, and iv, 10, § 3,[6] by the Rhine: they held the Pas de l'Écluse between the Jura and Mont Vuache: westward from the Pas de l'Écluse their territory was bounded, in part, on the south by the Rhône; but a part of the country between the Rhône and the Saône was occupied by the Allobroges, the Segusiavi, and the Ambarri.[7] The western boundary of Sequania was, according to Strabo[8] and Ptolemy,[9] the Saône; and on the north-west and north their neighbours were the Lingones, the Leuci (from whom, as d'Anville[10] says, they were doubtless separated by the Vosges), and the Mediomatrici. D'Anville argues that those parts of the dioceses of Chalon (Cabillonum) and Mâcon (Matisco)—both Aeduan towns—which are on the east of the Saône,

[1] Ed. O. Seeck, p. 265 (iv, 4).
[2] *Géogr. des Gaules*, i, 83–4.
[3] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 471–2.
[4] *Ib.*, iv, 184–5. Cf. *Corpus inscr. Lat.*, xiii, pars 2, fasc. 2, p. 711.
[5] M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, ii, 526, n. 2) argues that the Auxerrois probably belonged to the Senones, (1) because Caesar, when he was near Nevers, was probably not far from the Senones (*B. G.*, vii, 56, § 5); (2) because the Senones were a very powerful people (*ib.*, v, 54, § 2); and (3) because Auxerre belonged later to the Senones: but he is still doubtful. Naturally; for were not the Aedui also a very powerful people?
[6] See pp. 394, n. 6, and 692.
[7] *B. G.*, i, 1, § 5; 2, § 3; 6, § 1; 8, § 1; iv, 10, § 3.
[8] iv, 3, § 2.
[9] *Geogr.*, ii, 8, § 12.
[10] *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 599.

belonged to the Sequani, not the Aedui. The proof which he offers is that, according to Frédégaire, the monastery of St. Marcel, which was in the neighbourhood of Chalon and on the eastern bank of the Saône, was in Sequanian territory.[1] The French Commission[2] reject his view, preferring to follow the indications of the dioceses. Besides the diocese of Besançon, the Sequani may have possessed a portion of the northern part of that of Belley.[3] Moreover, if, as might be inferred from *B. G.*, i, 31, § 10, 51, § 2, the Triboci had settled before the defeat of Ariovistus in the territory of the Sequani, and if they then occupied, as they subsequently did, the territory which corresponded with the diocese of Strasbourg, that territory also belonged originally to the Sequani. According to Strabo,[4] however, the Triboci were established in the territory of the Mediomatrici (q.v.).

Stoffel[5] thinks that the river Ecken-Bach, between Gemar and Schlettstadt, was the boundary between the Sequani and the Mediomatrici; for, he observes, a strip of country bounded by two parallel lines running through Gemar and Schlettstadt respectively at right angles to the general direction of the Rhine, presents all the features which, in ancient times, would have constituted the natural obstacles desirable in a borderland.[6] See Aedui, Allobroges, Latobrigi, Rauraci, and Triboci.

Sibusates.—The Sibusates have been conjecturally placed in the neighbourhood of Sobusse, between Dax and Bayonne;[7] but there is no evidence except the resemblance between the names.

Sotiates.—The Sotiates occupied the northern part of the *civitas Elusatium*, or the country round Sos in the department of the Lot-et-Garonne. The evidence for this, which is the common view, is put together by d'Anville.[8] He observes that Sos was in the Middle Ages called Sotium; and that the *Jerusalem Itinerary*[9] mentions a place called Scittium, the distances between which and Elusa and Vasata respectively very nearly corresponded with the actual distances between Sos and Eauze and Bazas. *Scit*[t]*ium*, he suggests, was due to a wrong reading of *Sotium*, the scribe mistaking an ill-formed *o* for *ci*. He also points out that 'Crassus, having passed through the country of the Santoni, entered Aquitania by the north, and the Sotiates would be the first tribe on whom he fell',[10] which condition

[1] *Monumenta Germaniae historica*, ed. B. Krusch, ii, 1888, p. 124.
[2] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 14.
[3] *Anzeiger für schweizerische Alterthumskunde*, 1885, p. 112. Cf. p. 365, *supra*.
[4] iv, 3, § 4.
[5] *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, pp. 89–90.
[6] Regarding the territory of the Sequani see also *Congrès archéol. de France*, lviii[e] sess., 1890 (1893), p. 128.
[7] A. de Valois, *Notitia Galliarum*, p. 524. See Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 360–1. M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, ii, 452, n. 6), remarking that among the various readings of *B. G.*, iii, 27, § 1, we find *Sibulates*, identifies the Sibusates with the Sybillates of Pliny (*Nat. Hist.*, iv, 19 [33], § 108), who are supposed to have occupied the valley of the Soule in the department of the Basses-Pyrénées.
[8] *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, pp. 611–3. [9] Ed. Wesseling, p. 550.
[10] See W. Smith's *Dict. of Greek and Roman Geogr.*, ii, 1024.

is satisfied by the geographical position of Sos. This reasoning is sound enough ;[1] but many writers have refused to accept it.

1. A. Garrigou[2] places the Sotiates in the 'pays de Foix', in the department of the Ariège. Now the 'pays de Foix' was occupied by the Consoranni; but this difficulty in no way disconcerts Garrigou. Evidently, he says,[3] Caesar, impelled by a barbarous thirst for revenge, deprived the tribe of the Sotiates of their individuality; for when he mentions the general submission of the Aquitanian tribes which followed the victory of Crassus,[4] he says nothing about the Sotiates. It is true that they had submitted before[5] and that Caesar tells us that his list of the tribes which submitted is incomplete ;[6] but trifles like these do not shake Garrigou's conviction. Again, the 'pays de Foix', if it was in Caesar's Aquitania at all, was the very furthest part from the northern frontier, by which he invaded the country ; while the Sotiates were the very first people whom he encountered! This difficulty seems staggering ; but Garrigou fancies that he can dispose of it. He claims to have proved that L. Manlius was defeated by the Aquitani in the valley of the Ariège.[7] Now there is no evidence whatever to show where Manlius was defeated ; but I am willing to assume, for the sake of argument, that Garrigou is right. Well, he continues, Caesar says that Crassus was campaigning *in the same country* in which Manlius had been defeated, and that it was the Sotiates who had defeated Manlius ('César nous donne ce fait comme positif') ; and to make assurance doubly sure, Caesar tells us that the country of the Sotiates was conterminous with the territories of Tolosa, Carcaso, and Narbo,— Toulouse, Carcassonne, and Narbonne. The conclusion, says Garrigou, is inevitable that the territory of the Sotiates was in Ariège.

I reply that Caesar tells us none of these things. What he says is that Crassus, when he arrived in Aquitania, was aware that he would have to fight in a country from which Lucius Manlius had retreated in disorder. (*P. Crassus, cum in Aquitaniam pervenisset . . . cum intellegeret in iis locis sibi bellum gerendum . . . unde L. Manlius . . . impedimentis amissis profugisset.*)[8] Crassus waged war in different parts of Aquitania, first in the country of the Sotiates and afterwards in that of the Vocates and Tarusates ; and Caesar's statement proves nothing, except that Manlius had been defeated somewhere in Aquitania. So far from stating 'as a positive fact' that Manlius had been defeated by the Sotiates, Caesar never mentions the Sotiates or any other people in connexion with the disaster. Nor does he say that the country of the Sotiates was conterminous with the territories of Tolosa, Carcaso, and Narbo : he merely says that Crassus, on arriving in Aquitania, summoned to his standard 'a large number of excellent soldiers from Tolosa, Carcaso, and Narbo—

[1] Cf. C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 305, n. 1.
[2] *Études hist. sur l'ancien pays de Foix et le Conseran*, 1863.
[3] *Ib.*, pp. 46–7, 58. [4] *B. G.*, iii, 27, § 1. [5] *Ib.*, 22, § 4.
[6] maxima pars Aquitaniae sese Crasso dedidit . . . quo in numero fuerunt Tarbelli, &c. *Ib.*, 27, § 1.
[7] *Études*, &c., pp. 35–6. [8] *B. G.*, iii, 20, § 1.

states in the Province, adjacent to Aquitania—and marched his army into the country of the Sotiates ' (*multis praeterea viris fortibus Tolosa et Carcasone et Narbone, quae sunt civitates Galliae provinciae finitimae his regionibus, nominatim evocatis in Sotiatium fines exercitum introduxit*).[1] Garrigou assumes that Crassus marched unmolested right through Aquitania into the Province to fetch these reinforcements, instead of sending for them ; and he asserts that the words *in Sotiatium fines exercitum introduxit* prove that the country of the Sotiates was conterminous with the Province !

2. The fact that the Sotiates were the first enemy whom Crassus encountered after crossing the northern frontier of Aquitania is also fatal to the theory of B. de la Grèze,[2] who identifies the principal stronghold of the Sotiates with a rock, on which now stands a ruined castle, at Lourdes, in the department of the Hautes-Pyrénées. The only argument worth noticing which he advances is that there are mines in the neighbourhood of Lourdes and none in the neighbourhood of Sos.[3] But Caesar does not say that there were mines in the country of the Sotiates : he only says that the Sotiates undermined the terrace (*agger*) which Crassus constructed in besieging their stronghold, and then remarks parenthetically that ' the Aquitanians are very skilled in operations of this kind, as mining works exist in many parts of their country ' (*cuius rei sunt longe peritissimi Aquitani, propterea quod multis locis apud eos aerariae secturaeque sunt*).[4] He learned from Crassus's dispatch that the *agger* had been undermined : he knew that mines were worked in Aquitania ; and he connected the two facts. That was all.

3. M. Camoreyt [5] has advocated the claims of Lectoure, a town about 18 miles due south of Agen. His paper, which attracted undue attention, has been thoroughly examined by the Abbé A. Breuils,[6] who remarks that Lectoure belonged not to the Sotiates but to the Lactorates. M. Camoreyt's theory rests upon the assumption that Crassus did not trust Teutomatus, the king of the Nitiobroges who helped Vercingetorix four years later,[7] and that he therefore entered Aquitania, after a long *détour*, from the side of the Province. Is it necessary to reply that we do not know whether Teutomatus was reigning in 56 B. C. ; that, on M. Camoreyt's assumption, Crassus would not have trusted the Pictones or Caesar the Aedui ; or that, if Crassus had had reason to distrust the Nitiobroges, he would not have left them unsubdued on his rear ? Two of M. Camoreyt's arguments, however, are worth considering. First, the plateau of Sos only covers 14 hectares, or about 34 acres, an area which, he says, would not have sufficed to accommodate more than 12,000 souls, and therefore not more than 3,000 fighting-men. But the

[1] *B. G.*, iii, 20, § 2.
[2] *Mém. de la Soc. des ant. de France*, 2e sér., x, 1850, pp. 284–304.
[3] *Ib.*, pp. 290–1.
[4] *B. G.*, iii, 21, § 3.
[5] *L'emplacement de l'oppidum des Sotiates*, 1883.
[6] *Rev. de Gascogne*, xxxvi, 1895, pp. 225–44, 280–5. Cf. J. F. Bladé in *Annales de la Faculté des lettres de Bordeaux*, 1893, pp. 127–8.
[7] See *B. G.*, vii, 31, § 5.

host of Vercingetorix in Alesia enormously outnumbered the Mandubii who inhabited the town ; and it is not unreasonable to suppose that more than half of the 12,000 would have been soldiers, while Crassus's infantry were only 12 cohorts, say about 5,000 men. Moreover, as the Abbé Breuils points out,[1] it is quite possible that the *oppidum* extended beyond the limits of the modern town. Secondly, the principal Gallic towns did not exchange their names for those of the tribes to whom they belonged (for example, *Lutecia* became *Parisii*) before the close of the third century, and by that time the Sotiates were incorporated in the *civitas Elusatium* : M. Camoreyt concludes that the name of the town which Crassus captured can never have been effaced by *Sotiates*, and therefore that the town was not identical with Sos. Breuils replies that the well-known law of nomenclature to which M. Camoreyt refers is subject to exceptions : for instance, while *Avaricum* became Bourges (*Bituriges*), Bordeaux is derived from *Burdigala*,—the ancient name of the chief town of the Bituriges Vivisci.

Suessiones.—The Suessiones possessed the diocese of Soissons, that is to say, the greater part of the department of the Aisne, and possibly something more.[2] The diocese of Senlis (*civitas Silvanectum*), as I have shown in my article on the Bellovaci, probably belonged to the Suessiones, or, if it did not form part of their proper territory, was under their overlordship.[3] Desjardins[4] argues further that as, according to the description which the envoys of the Remi gave to Caesar,[5] the territory of the Suessiones was of great extent, it probably extended beyond the northern bank of the Oise, and thus included part of the diocese of Noyon, which is usually assigned in its entirety to the Viromandui (q.v.). This is a guess and nothing more. Longnon[6] assigns the diocese of Meaux (*civitas Meldorum* [q.v.]) to the Suessiones, but gives no reasons. See Bellovaci and Senones.

Tarbelli.—The territory of the Tarbelli, according to Ptolemy,[7] extended southward from the southern frontier of the Bituriges Vivisci (q.v.) to the Pyrenees ; and they are generally considered to have occupied that portion of the dioceses of Aquensis (Dax) and Lapurdensis (Bayonne) which did not belong to their clients, the Cocosates and the Sibusates. This territory comprised the western part of the departments of Les Landes and Basses-Pyrénées.[8] M. Longnon[9] holds that the Tarbelli also possessed the diocese of

[1] *Rev. de Gascogne*, xxxvi, 1895, pp. 273–4. Cf. *Carte de l'État-Major* (1 : 80,000), Sheet 216. [2] Walckenaer, *Géogr. des Gaules*, i, 486.

[3] See *Rev. des études anc.*, v, 1903, pp. 31–2.

[4] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 452–3. [5] *B. G.*, ii, 4, § 6.

[6] *Atlas hist. de la France*, p. 7. Cf. C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, ii, 483, n. 3.

[7] *Geogr.*, ii, 7, § 8. M. J. F. Bladé (*Annales de la Faculté des lettres de Bordeaux*, 1893, p. 119) remarks that Ptolemy was wrong in placing the Tarbelli immediately south of the Bituriges Vivisci, from whom they were actually separated by the Boiates. It is possible, however, that in Ptolemy's time the Boiates were included in the group of tribes to which was given the official name of Tarbelli. See p. 479.

[8] D'Anville, *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 632 ; Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 362, n. 6.

[9] *Atlas hist. de la France*, p. 7.

Aire (*civitas Aturensium*), which is generally assigned to the Tarusates (q.v.), that of Béarn (*civitas Benarnensium*), and that of Oloron (*civitas Iluronensium*). He quotes Ausonius [1] to prove that Paulinus, a traveller, returning from Zaragoza (Caesaraugusta) to Hebromagus on the Garonne, found himself, on leaving Spain, in the territory of the Tarbelli. Hebromagus is generally identified with Bram, about 12 miles north-west of Carcassonne.[2] But according to P. de Marca,[3] there was another Hebromagus, which stood upon the site of Embrau, near Blaye, on the right bank of the Gironde; and this is the place to which he believes that Ausonius referred. There is not, however, the slightest evidence that more than one Hebromagus ever existed. Desjardins, in his latest utterance on the subject,[4] expresses his agreement with M. Longnon. M. Longnon, he says, has shown that of the twenty-two peoples enumerated by Ptolemy as forming the imperial province of Aquitania, seventeen were on the right bank of the Garonne. The remaining five therefore occupied the whole of the Aquitania of Caesar; and this conclusion is confirmed by the fact that none of the ancient geographers who wrote between the time of Pliny and the time of Diocletian mentioned any other people besides those five as having dwelt in the Aquitania of Caesar. Those five, of whom Caesar mentions only two, the Ausci and the Tarbelli, were the Tarbelli, the Vassarii, the Datii [5] (whom M. Longnon identifies with the Lactorates, because the latter are not mentioned by any other writer), the Ausci, and the Convenae. (I may remark, in passing, that Ptolemy [6] only mentions seventeen Aquitanian peoples in all). Now according to the well-known inscription of Hasparren, this smaller Aquitania was occupied by nine peoples; and, according to M. Longnon, these nine peoples were the five already mentioned and the Boiates, the Elusates, the Bigerriones, and the Consoranni. But the inscription of Hasparren cannot be referred to an earlier period than the end of the third century, when the province of Novempopulana was created.[7] In the time of Theodosius this province comprised twelve peoples,—the nine just mentioned and the Aturenses, Benarnenses, and Iluronenses. Accordingly,

[1] The passage in Ausonius (ed. R. Peiper, 1866, pp. 281-2, vv. 123-9) runs as follows:—

> Ecquando iste meas impellet nuntius auras?
> 'Ecce tuus Paulinus adest: iam ninguida linquit
> Oppida Hiberorum, Tarbellica iam tenet arva,
> Hebromagi iam tecta subit, iam praedia fratris
> Vicina ingreditur, iam labitur amne secundo
> Iamque in conspectu est: iam prora obvertitur amni:
> Ingressusque sui celebrata per ostia portus.'

[2] D'Anville, *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, pp. 363-4.

[3] *Hist. de Béarn*, 1640, p. 32 (x).

[4] *Rev. arch.*, 3e sér., ii, 1883, pp. 217-20.

[5] M. J. F. Bladé (*Annales de la Faculté des lettres de Bordeaux*, 1893, p. 103) believes that the Datii were not in the Aquitania of Caesar's time.

[6] *Geogr.*, ii, 7.

[7] See Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, iii, 157, n. 2, and facsimile facing p. 158. The judgement regarding the date of the inscription is based upon the form of the letters. See also *Rev. arch.*, 3e sér., ii, 1883, pp. 216-7.

having regard to their geographical position, M. Longnon considers that, in Caesar's time, the territories of the Aturenses (or Tarusates), the Benarnenses, and the Iluronenses, who, so he infers from Ptolemy's not having mentioned them, were dependent peoples, were included in the territory of the Tarbelli.

M. Longnon may be right; for Tibullus[1] and Lucan[2] allude to the Tarbelli as a great people: but M. Jullian,[3] pointing out that the Aquitanian tribes, for the most part, were much smaller than those of the rest of Gaul,[4] suggests that it was only under the Empire that several smaller tribes were annexed to the Tarbelli and grouped with them under their name.

Tarusates.—The Tarusates appear to have been neighbours of the Vocates,[5] and are generally believed to have been identical with the Aturenses of the *Notitia provinciarum*.[6] If so, they occupied the country round Aire (Atura),[7] or the eastern part of the department of the Landes and the western part of that of the Gers. D'Anville and Walckenaer only assign part of the diocese of Aire—the 'vicomté de Tursan'—to the Tarusates, leaving the rest for the Oscidates Campestres of Pliny,[8] who, says d'Anville, if we may judge from the order in which the peoples among whom their name occurs are enumerated, lived on the common frontier of the dioceses of Auch, Bazas, and Aire.[9] M. Longnon[10] regards the Tarusates as dependants of the Tarbelli (q.v.).

Desjardins[11] says that Caesar's words, *Crassus in fines Vocatium et Tarusatium profectus est*,[12] appear to show that the territories of the Vocates (q.v.) and the Tarusates were not separated by the territory of the Sotiates (q.v.), as they must have been if the Vocates dwelt in the neighbourhood of Bazas, and the Tarusates in the neighbourhood of Aire. We must, then, he says, have the courage to admit that we do not know where the territories of the Vocates and the Tarusates were situated. I confess that I cannot follow this argument; for, as Sos lies well to the east of both Bazas and Aire, the Vocates and the Tarusates need not, in the case which Desjardins supposes, have been separated by the Sotiates. Still, if Caesar's statement was correct, the Vocates and the Tarusates were not separated at all.

[1] i, 7, 9. [2] i, 421. [3] *Hist. de la Gaule*, ii, 454 and nn. 5–6.

[4] Not counting the Datii, at least twenty-seven tribes occupied the small area of independent Aquitania. See *Annales de la Faculté des lettres de Bordeaux*, 1893, p. 104.

[5] *B. G.*, iii, 23, 27, § 1. [6] Ed. O. Seeck, p. 271 (xiv, 9).

[7] 'According to all appearance,' says d'Anville (*Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 634), 'the name of the Tarusates is preserved in a district of the diocese of Aire, under the name of Tursan.' Desjardins, however, says (*Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 645, n. 2) that the identification of *Tarusates* with *Aturenses* violates the most elementary phonetic rules.

[8] *Nat. Hist.*, iv, 19 (33), § 108.

[9] *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 510. Cf. Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 370–1. Pliny's order of enumeration proves nothing. See p. 426, *supra*.

[10] *Atlas hist. de la France*, p. 7.

[11] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 645, n. 2.

[12] *B. G.*, iii, 23, § 1.

P. de Marca,[1] who wrongly assigns the diocese of Aire to the Sotiates, places the Tarusates in the country round Tartas,[2] which is on the Adour, about 15 miles north-east of Dax. He is guided, I suppose, by the resemblance between the names *Tarusates* and *Tartas*. See VOCATES.

Tigurini.—The Tigurini were one of the four tribes (*pagi*) of the Helvetii.[3] Caesar gives no clue to their geographical position. The geographers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—Sanson, de Valois, d'Anville, and the rest[4]—believed, for reasons which are not worth mentioning, that they dwelt in the neighbourhood of Zurich. But an inscription, containing the words *Pag*(*i*) *Tigor*(*inorum*),[5] has been discovered in the neighbourhood of Avenches, south of the lake of Morat; and accordingly most modern scholars hold that the Tigurini dwelt in this part of Switzerland. Desjardins,[6] however, adheres to the old view. The fact that the inscription was found in the neighbourhood of Avenches does not, he says, prove that Avenches was in the *pagus Tigurinus*. No doubt; but it makes it more probable that it was in that *pagus* than in any of the other three. M. d'Arbois de Jubainville[7] says that the Tigurini have left a trace of their settlement in the name of Tegernau, which is in the canton of St. Gall. There is another Tegernau, about 15 miles NNE. of Basle, where he believes that they had a settlement before the Helvetii invaded Switzerland.

Tolosates.—The Tolosates occupied a part of the territory of the Volcae Tectosages, corresponding with the ancient diocese of Toulouse, that is to say, the greater part of the department of the Haute-Garonne and part of the department of the Gers.[8]

Treveri.—The position of the Treveri is roughly indicated by Caesar. He implies that their territory extended northward of that of the Mediomatrici (q.v.) along the left bank of the Rhine: he says that it was conterminous with that of the Remi (q.v.); and he adds that it was separated (in part) from the Eburones (q.v.) by the territories of the Segni and Condrusi (q.v.).[9]

Strabo[10] says that the Treveri were conterminous with the Nervii;

[1] *Hist. de Béarn*, 1640, pp. 35–6. Cf. C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 307, n. 3.

[2] So also tentatively does M. Jullian, *ib.*, ii, 451, n. 1.

[3] *B. G.*, i, 12, § 4.

[4] See d'Anville, *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 643.

[5] Th. Mommsen, *Inscr. confoederationis Helveticae latinae*, p. 29 (*Mittheil. d. ant. Gesellschaft in Zürich*, x, 1854). Mommsen (*ib.*, pp. 26–9) says that the passage (*B. G.*, i, 12) in which Caesar describes his defeat of the Tigurini proves that they dwelt on the common frontier of the Helvetii and the Sequani,—namely in the neighbourhood of Avenches; but any one who reads the passage in question will see that it proves nothing as to the habitat of the Tigurini. At the time of their defeat they and the rest of the Helvetii had emigrated from their original abode, and they had left not only the territory of the Helvetii but also that of the Sequani behind them. The one sound argument for placing the Tigurini in the neighbourhood of Avenches is based on the discovery of the inscription which I have mentioned in the text.

[6] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 240–1, n. 6 and 463.

[7] *Les Premiers Habitants de l'Europe*, ii, 1894, pp. 75–6.

[8] D'Anville, *Notice*, &c., pp. 648–9; A. Longnon, *Atlas hist. de la France*, p. v.

[9] *B. G.*, v, 3, § 4; 24, § 2; vi, 32, § 1.

[10] iv, 3, § 4.

but in Caesar's time they certainly were not. The territories of the Segni, Condrusi, Paemani, and Atuatuci separated the two peoples.

D'Anville [1] and Walckenaer [2] assign the Treveri that part of the diocese of Trèves which lies on the west of the Rhine: but their limits cannot be defined, except on the south, in part; on the east, in part, where their territory was limited by the Rhine; and on the west, where it was conterminous with the territory of the Remi. The difficulty of tracing the rest of their frontier arises from the fact that we cannot tell whether they or the Mediomatrici possessed the tract which afterwards belonged to the Vangiones (q.v.), and from the fact that we cannot exactly define the territories of the Eburones, Segni, Condrusi, Caerosi, and Paemani, with which no dioceses correspond. Long [3] thinks that 'the rugged valley of the Ahr would be a natural boundary of the Treveri on the north'. Zangemeister,[4] on the other hand, argues that their northern boundary was the little river Vinxtbach, between the Ahr and the Moselle. Roughly speaking, their territory may be said to have comprised the greater part of the province of Luxembourg, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, and the southern part of Rhenish Prussia.

Triboci.—The Triboci are mentioned by the unknown writer of *B. G.*, iv, 10 [5] among the tribes who dwelt on the banks of the Rhine; and, according to Strabo,[6] they had taken up their abode on the territory of the Mediomatrici (q.v.). D'Anville,[7] remarking that Ptolemy [8] places them on the north of the Rauraci (q.v.), concludes that they possessed the diocese of Strasbourg; and Argentorate, which stood upon the site of Strasbourg, was in their country.[9] Near the common frontier of the dioceses of Basle and Strasbourg, he observes, there is a place called Markolsheim, which means the same as the French Feins (*Fines*). But it is not certain that in the time of Caesar the Triboci occupied the same territory as in the time of Strabo or in the time of Ptolemy; and Desjardins [10] thinks it useless to attempt to fix their position, 'puisque César nous les montre sans cesse en mouvement.' Caesar, however, does no such thing either directly or by implication. He only mentions the Triboci once,[11]—in his list of the tribes that fought in the host of Ariovistus, which had for some time been settled in the northern

[1] *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 652. [2] *Géogr. des Gaules*, i, 510.
[3] W. Smith's *Dict. of Greek and Roman Geogr.*, ii, 1227.
[4] *Westdeutsche Zeitschrift*, iii, 317 (quoted by de Vlaminck, *Messager des sciences hist. de Belgique*, 1887, p. 40, n. 1).
[5] See p. 692.
[6] iv, 3, § 4. De Golbéry (*Mém. de la Soc. Roy. des ant. de France*, v, 1823, pp. 142–3) thinks that the writer of *B. G.*, iv, 10, in his enumeration of the peoples past whose territories the Rhine flowed, mentioned the Triboci after the Sequani and the Mediomatrici because they occupied portions of the territories of both the two latter peoples; and in support of this view he appeals to Strabo, who says that Σηκοανοὶ καὶ Μεδιοματρικοὶ κατοικοῦσι τὸν Ῥῆνον, ἐν οἷς ἵδρυται Γερμανικὸν ἔθνος . . . Τρίβοκχοι. οἷς is generally referred to Μεδιοματρικοί only: but de Golbéry refers it to Σηκοανοί as well.
[7] *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, pp. 653–4. [8] *Geogr.*, ii, 9, § 9.
[9] See d'Anville, p. 96, and C. Müller's ed. of Ptolemy, p. 230.
[10] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 621, n. 1. [11] *B. G.*, i, 51, § 2.

part of the territory of the Sequani. The doubtful passage in which they figure among the peoples who dwelt on the banks of the Rhine gives us no help; for who can tell when it was written? After the defeat of Ariovistus, the remnant of his host were driven across the Rhine; and, in the absence of any evidence, we have no right to assume that, in Caesar's time, they returned. If, as I am inclined, in view of Strabo's testimony, to believe, the Triboci remained upon the left bank when Caesar wrote, then those who fought in the army of Ariovistus were only a portion of the tribe; but I cannot explain why the remaining portion did not throw in their lot with their brethren,[1] and if they subsequently appear on the left bank, so do the Ubii, who, in Caesar's time, were certainly on the right bank.[2]

Desjardins[3] argues that the Triboci could not have been on the left bank in Caesar's time, because the territories of the Sequani, the Mediomatrici, and the Treveri touched the left bank, and therefore there could have been no room for the Triboci. But this is a bad argument; for if the Triboci were on the left bank, either they occupied a part of the territory which Ariovistus had wrested from the Sequani (see NEMETES) or, as Strabo[4] says, they had settled in the country of the Mediomatrici. Cluver[5] maintains that they had settled in Gaul before the invasion of Ariovistus,—a theory for which there is not a particle of evidence. Stoffel,[6] however, argues that it enables us to understand how it was that some of the Triboci remained in Gaul after the defeat of Ariovistus. They were, he suggests, entirely distinct from the later invaders who fought under the German king.

In any case, it is unsafe to attempt to determine the frontiers of the Triboci, as they existed in the time of Caesar.[7] See MEDIOMATRICI and SEQUANI.

[1] See pp. 455–6.

[2] Napoleon (Planche 2) may be right in assigning to the Triboci lands on both banks of the river. Perhaps he was guided by the fact that the diocese of Strasbourg (see *Gallia Christiana*, vol. v) included a tract on the east of the Rhine.

[3] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 445.

[4] iv, 3, § 4.

[5] *Germania antiqua*, ed. 1631, p. 365.

[6] *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, pp. 88–9.

[7] In *B. G.*, iv, 10 we read that the Rhine 'flows swiftly through the territories of the Nantuates, Helvetii, Sequani, Mediomatrici, Triboci, and Treveri' (*per fines Nantuatium, Helvetiorum, Sequanorum, Mediomatricorum, Tribocorum, Treverorum citatus fertur*). The word *Nantuatium* is probably corrupt (see p. 454). Setting aside the Triboci, all the other peoples undoubtedly lived on the left bank of the Rhine, and are mentioned in geographical order, from south to north. But there is one word which, so far as I could discover, had escaped the criticism of all the commentators before I called attention to it in my first edition,—I mean the word *per*. If the Triboci were all on the left bank of the Rhine, not one of the peoples (with the doubtful exception of *Nantuatium*) whom the writer mentions were on the right bank; and therefore it would appear that he used *per* not in the sense of 'through', but in the sense of 'past' or 'along'. But there is not one single other instance in the whole of Latin literature in which *per* is used in this sense. The inevitable conclusion is that the Triboci were wholly or partly on the right bank, or that the writer made a mistake; or, finally, that he wrote *praeter*, the abbreviated form of which was sometimes *p̄ter*. I confess myself unable to decide between these three possibilities.

Tulingi.—See LATOBRIGI.

Turoni.—The territory of the Turoni corresponded with the diocese of Tours, or, roughly speaking, the department of the Indre-et-Loire.[1]

Uxellodunum.—Hirtius says that Uxellodunum was in the country of the Cadurci, which is represented by the modern department of the Lot; that the stronghold was protected on all sides by steep rocks; that the ascent was difficult even when unopposed; that through the valley, which nearly surrounded the hill, there flowed a stream; that the stream flowed at the foot of the hill (*in infimis radicibus montis*) in such a way that it was impossible to divert its course; that the descent to it for the townspeople was difficult and steep; that below the stronghold itself, on that part of the hill which, for a space of about 300 feet, was not surrounded by the stream—in other words, on a part which overlooked the isthmus—there was a spring; and that the Roman engineers drove subterranean galleries towards the source of the spring, and diverted its flow.[2] Orosius[3] says that the river was of considerable size; but his unsupported testimony on such a point is of no value.

Now of the various sites that have been proposed several may be dismissed at once, because their pretensions have been shown to be absolutely groundless. Cahors[4] and Puy l'Évêque have no longer any supporters; Uzerche[5] has never received any but the faintest support, and besides it is in the Limousin, not the Quercy, and was therefore outside the limits of the territory of the Cadurci. There are only four about which there has ever been any serious discussion,—Capdenac, Ussel, Luzech, and Puy d'Issolu.

I. To Capdenac,[6] which is on the river Lot, about 35 miles east of Cahors, there are several objections. (1) The place has never, so far as is known, borne a name at all resembling that of Uxellodunum. Champollion-Figeac[7] affirms indeed that, according to a mediaeval charter, which was preserved in the archives of Capdenac, the town was formerly called Ucce-Lugdunum; but he only cites the charter as evidence that in 1320 tradition identified Capdenac with Uxellodunum. Moreover, MM. Creuly and A. Jacobs could learn nothing of the charter at Capdenac itself: the keeper of the archives at Cahors, whom they also consulted, could not enlighten them; and it should seem that the charter was a forgery.[8] (2) The hill is only

[1] See Walckenaer, *Géogr. des Gaules*, i, 374.

[2] *B. G.*, viii, 32, §§ 1–2; 33, § 1; 40, §§ 2–4; 41, §§ 1, 4; 43, § 4.

[3] vi, 11, § 21.

[4] N. Sanson (*Les Comm. de César*, pp. 90–4) advocated the claims of Cahors; but the Gallic town which stood upon the site of Cahors was, as every scholar now admits, Divona. See A. de Valois, *Not. Gall.*, p. 111, and *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 345. Moreover, the isthmus, if it can be so called, is not 300 feet, but 700 metres or about 2,300 feet wide.

[5] Uzerche is in the department of the Corrèze, between the river Vézère and the river Bradascon. The width of the isthmus is about 500 metres, or more than five times too great.

[6] See *Carte de l'État-Major* (1 : 80,000), Sheet 195.

[7] *Nouvelles recherches sur la ville gauloise d'Uxellodunum*, 1820, pp. 96–7, 110–1.

[8] *Examen des lieux proposés pour représenter Uxellodunum*, 1860, pp. 16–7; *Rev. d'Aquitaine*, ix, 1865, pp. 101–2.

protected by steep rocks on the east and the west; and on the north there was nothing to prevent the Roman army from undertaking a regular siege. (3) Assuming that Uxellodunum was at or near Capdenac, the description of Hirtius would lead one to suppose that the stronghold was at Vic, which is at all events nearly surrounded by the river Lot.[1] But Vic is completely dominated by Capdenac; and accordingly Champollion is compelled to place the stronghold there. In this case, however, the statement of Hirtius, that the stronghold was nearly surrounded by a stream, must be disregarded; while the isthmus which separates Capdenac from Vic is more than twice too broad.[2] Moreover, the area of the plateau of Capdenac is only 3 hectares, or about $7\frac{1}{2}$ acres;[3] and this is, of course, too small to have admitted of the existence of an *oppidum* which accommodated more than 5,000 men.[4] (4) The only spring which Champollion could find to identify with the spring described by Hirtius is more than 100 yards from the nearest point through which the wall of the town could have passed.[5] It would have been completely exposed to the fire of the Roman artillery and archers; and the terrace which Caesar constructed with such difficulty would have been unnecessary.[6]

[1] *Examen*, &c., pp. 18–21.

[2] In order to force the narrative of Hirtius into conformity with the geography of Capdenac, Champollion (pp. 50, 81) perverts the meaning of the famous passage, *magnus fons aquae prorumpebat ab ea parte quae fere pedum CCC intervallo a fluminis circuitu vacabat*, in a manner which is simply astounding. He says that when Hirtius spoke of the isthmus as 300 feet wide, he was only thinking of the terrain on which the Roman troops could manœuvre and construct their siege works (' Si l'on admet . . . que l'historien latin n'a pu parler que de l'étendue du terrain sur lequel les troupes romaines pouvroient manœuvrer et les travaux de siége s'exécuter, ce sera de la superficie de l'isthme qu'il faudra connoître l'étendue. Selon César (*sic*), l'isthme d'Uxellodunum étoit de 300 pieds; celui de Luzech n'en a plus de 40').

[3] Champollion-Figeac, p. 74.

[4] The garrison of Uxellodunum consisted of the *oppidani*, or townsfolk, who were there when Lucterius arrived, and of the force which he brought with him. Hirtius does not estimate the number of the *oppidani*. He says that when Drappes and Lucterius stole out of the fort to get corn, they left 2,000 armed men behind and took the rest with them (*B. G.*, viii, 34, § 2); and the words *duobus milibus armatorum relictis* seem to imply that there was an indefinite number of non-combatants as well: indeed, it is obvious that this must have been the case. Hirtius also says that when Drappes and Lucterius started on the flight that led them to Uxellodunum, they had ' not more than 5,000 men ' (*non amplius hominum milibus ex fuga quinque collectis. Ib.*, 30, § 1) or, according to the β MSS., 2,000. Accepting the smaller estimate, and remembering that a sufficient force must have been left to hold the fort in the absence of Drappes and Lucterius, I conclude that the whole garrison, including non-combatants, numbered at the very least 5,000.

[5] *Nouvelles recherches*, &c., pp. 81, 83.

[6] The Comte de Caylus (A. C. P. de Tubières de Grimoard), overlooking all the other objections which I have stated, says, ' La seule difficulté est que cette fontaine étoit située dans la partie de la montagne qui n'étoit point environnée de la rivière dans un espace d'environ 300 pieds. . . . La fontaine de Capdenac . . . n'est pas précisément dans cette situation; mais on peut croire que cette fontaine ayant été coupée et détournée par les Romains . . . sa source aura changé de place.' *Recueil d'ant. égyptiennes*, &c., 1752–67, v, 280. One can believe anything, when the wish is father to the thought.

II. Ussel, like Uzerche, is in the Limousin, and was therefore almost certainly outside the country of the Cadurci. Creuly and Jacobs, who personally examined every single locality that could conceivably be identified with Uxellodunum, considered that it in no way corresponded with the description of Hirtius, and that its claims were not worth discussing.[1] Still, as it is just possible that the territory of the Cadurci may have extended beyond the boundaries of the diocese of Cahors, and as, since Creuly and Jacobs wrote, the claims of Ussel have been twice advocated, it may be well to examine them.

Ussel—or rather the plateau of Peyrol near Ussel—is described as follows by Colonel A. Sarrette.[2] The plateau, which is 2,190 feet high, 1,540 yards long from north to south, and from 440 to 770 yards wide, is protected by sheer scarped rocks, and almost completely isolated by a deep valley. On the west flows a little stream, the Sarsonne, and on the east ' un très-petit affluent, faible filé d'eau '. The assumed *oppidum* was only accessible by a narrow ridge on the north-east. On this ridge was a spring, which gushed forth at the foot of the assumed wall. The three camps of Caninius[3] were on the north of the *oppidum*, on the heights of Sarsonne and Teil, which dominate Peyrol. I need hardly add that, in the environs of Ussel, the inevitable ' antiquités gauloises et gallo-romaines ' have been discovered.

Now there is one feature in this description which is fatal to the assumed identity of Uxellodunum and Peyrol. The position of the spring cannot, by any ingenuity, be forced to agree with the description of Hirtius,—*magnus fons aquae prorumpebat ab e a parte quae fere pedum CCC intervallo fluminis circuitu vacabat*. Colonel Sarrette struggles to meet this objection by saying that the word *fluminis* was substituted by some blundering copyist for *vallis*.[4] But this will not do. Unless a text is repugnant to reason or to undeniable and essential facts, one has no right to alter it, merely because it refuses to square with one's pet theory. Moreover, at Peyrol there is no isthmus ; and a tunnel, by which the source of the spring was cut, has been discovered at Puy d'Issolu, and has not been discovered at Peyrol. In the face of these objections, I do not see how any unbiased inquirer can identify Uxellodunum with Peyrol.

III. Luzech was the site adopted by General Creuly and Alfred Jacobs,[5] acting as the representatives of the French Commission. The town of Luzech is about 7 miles west-north-west of Cahors. It is situated on an isthmus at the foot and on the north of a hill which rises 87 metres, or 287 feet, above the level of the Lot, and is nearly surrounded by that river. The isthmus, according to Creuly and Jacobs, is 330 feet wide ; but this estimate is, I believe, too low.[6] The hill itself, according to the same authorities, occupies

[1] *Examen*, &c., pp. 14–5.
[2] *Quelques pages des comm. de César*, 1863, pp. 228, 244–5, 263.
[3] *B. G.*, viii, 33, § 2.
[4] *Quelques pages*, &c., p. 237.
[5] *Examen*, &c., pp. 27–32.
[6] J. B. Cessac, who holds a brief for the Puy d'Issolu, asserts (*Uxellodunum*, —*aperçus critiques*, &c., 1862, p. 44) that the width is 177 metres, or 621 feet ;

some 17 hectares, or 42 acres,—not more than one-third of the peninsula.[1] The spring described by Hirtius is, they maintain, represented by a slight oozing, so to speak, of water, which overlooks the isthmus. Finally, it has been asserted that trenches have been discovered, uniting those points on the north, east, and west of the hill, where the three camps of Caninius have been conjecturally placed ; but I have not been able to discover any proof of this assertion.

In many respects Luzech does not conform to the description of Uxellodunum. The one point which tells strongly in its favour is that, alone among all the sites that have been proposed, it is almost entirely surrounded by a river, and that the breadth of the isthmus approximately corresponds with the statement of Hirtius. At first sight, indeed, as has been remarked by a skilled observer,[2] the traveller might fancy that he saw Uxellodunum rising before him ; but a closer inspection suggests numerous doubts. First, the hill is only scarped on its northern side : the eastern face, indeed, is steep ; but on the south and west the slopes are so gentle that even carriages can ascend them without difficulty.[3] If it is objected that the hill may, in Caesar's time, have been as steep as Uxellodunum, the answer is that the rocks of which it is composed are so hard that they cannot have suffered any considerable change of form.[4] But, it has been replied, Hirtius does not distinctly say that the hill itself was steep (*praeruptum*) : he only says that the *oppidum* which stood upon the hill was *praeruptum*, and that it was ' protected by very steep rocks ' (*praeruptissimis saxis munitum*). Von Göler,[5] remarking that *saxis* is the word which Hirtius uses, not *rupibus*, argues that he could not have meant to describe a naturally scarped plateau (like that of the Puy d'Issolu), but rather boulders laid by the hand of man. The distinction between *saxum* and *rupes* is, however, not invariable ;[6] and Caesar does not always observe it.[7] Whether Hirtius did, we cannot tell. Secondly, the river does not flow, as the text requires, at the very foot of the hill ;[8] the least distance which separates it from the bank is over 100, the greatest 500 yards. What becomes, then, of Hirtius's statement that the garrison could only approach the river by a steep and difficult descent ? To this objection also von Göler[9] has an answer. He understands the words of Hirtius as applying, not to the descent from the hill to the bank of the river, but to the descent from the bank to the water. Such an interpretation is perhaps just possible ; but it is certainly not the one which would naturally be put upon Hirtius's words. Thirdly, the summit of the hill is not a plateau at all, but, so to speak, a platform, only 44 yards long by 15 or 16 wide, and barely capable of accommodating

but he is mistaken, as any one who examines Sheet 194 of the *Carte de l'État-Major* (1 : 80,000) may see for himself.

Cf. the next page and p. 388, n. 9.

[2] *Rev. d'Aquitaine*, x, 1866, p. 14.

[3] *Ib.*, ix, 1865, p. 251.

[4] *Ib.*, x, 1866, p. 16.

[5] *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 359.

[6] See Forcellini, *Totius latinitatis lexicon*, v, 1871, p. 355.

[7] See *B. C.*, i, 68, § 2.

[8] in imis radicibus montis.

[9] *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 365, n. 1.

200 men. Evidently this narrow space cannot have been the site of the *oppidum*. Nor could the *oppidum* have been placed, even partially, upon the flanks of the platform; for they are too steep. The platform, then, could only have been a citadel, and the *oppidum* itself could only have stood upon the lower plateau, called La Pistoule.[1] Fourthly, Captain Gallotti maintains that, at the point which Creuly and Jacobs indicate as the site of the spring, and indeed at any point of the hill facing the isthmus, it is geologically impossible that there could ever have been a spring. 'La partie du monticule,' he says, 'faisant face à l'isthme ne présente pas un talus d'une certaine largeur, mais simplement une arête anguleuse comme le tranchant d'un soc de charrue. Toutes les couches qui composent la masse sont inclinées du nord au sud, dans le sens opposé à l'isthme. Il y a solution de continuité entre ces couches et celles qui leur correspondent dans le massif voisin. Malgré ces faits, il fallait absolument trouver l'emplacement de la fontaine vis-à-vis de l'isthme, et cela ne pouvait se faire qu'en la plaçant sur ou contre l'arête anguleuse dont nous venons de parler. . . non-seulement en un point presque isolé dans l'espace, n'ayant aucune couche de terre soit au-dessus, soit à côté de lui, mais encore se trouvant situé au point le plus élevé du banc calcaire auquel il appartient, lequel banc ne communique à aucun autre du terrain circonvoisin. D'où l'eau a-t-elle jamais pu venir pour alimenter là . . . une *fontaine abondante*? Peut-être, objectera-t-on, qu'il a pu exister là une source artésienne naturelle tirant ses eaux du massif du nord. C'est une objection à laquelle la stratification du sol répond victorieusement. Ce phénomène ne pourrait exister que dans le cas où les couches sédimentaires du nord, s'inclinant vers l'isthme, se redresseraient ensuite pour former le monticule. . . . Mais . . . les bancs constitutifs du sol sont horizontaux dans le massif du nord et inclinés vers le sud dans celui de Luzech, ce qui rend la supposition impossible.'[2] But I should warn the reader that Sir Archibald Geikie, who was so kind as to consider this argument at my request, does not regard it as conclusive. 'There may of course,' he writes, 'be features of geological structure, not alluded to in the quotation you send me, which would show that the water could only flow along the planes of bedding. In that case, the argument would be valid enough. But in most limestone countries the water not only flows along the planes of bedding but rises through joints and gradually dissolves among their sides, forming open fissures, caverns and tunnels. It seems to me therefore quite possible that, supposing the form of the surrounding ground be favourable, a considerable body of water might issue from a line of joint on the spot indicated in your diagram.' Fifthly, even assuming that there was a spring at the point in question, Gallotti denies[3] that it could have been the spring which Hirtius describes; for the Gauls could not have come down in force to attack their assailants, as the only approach was a narrow *arête*; the assumed spring was not more

[1] *Rev. d'Aquitaine*, x, 1860, pp. 17–8.
[2] *Ib.*, pp. 180–1.
[3] *Ib.*, p. 188.

than 13 or 14 feet above the level of the isthmus; and the gigantic works which the Romans constructed[1] in order to place themselves on a level with it would therefore have been unnecessary. Sixthly, there is a hill immediately north of Luzech and considerably higher, on which are the remains of a Gallic fortress, known as Impernal, which stands in the same relation to Luzech as Capdenac does to Vic, and the close proximity of which makes it most unlikely that Luzech was a stronghold at all.[2] The seventh objection has not, so far as I know, been urged before; but it seems to me, if not unanswerable, the most weighty of all. If Uxellodunum was on the peninsula of Luzech, or on any peninsula with an isthmus only 300 feet wide, how could 3,000 men have got out of it, how could a long string of pack-horses have got into it again, when it was invested by two Roman legions?

Four other objections have been brought against this site; but they seem to me to have comparatively little weight. The hill of Luzech, we are told, is far too low to have been described as a *mons*; and, as some Roman cohorts climbed the slopes of Uxellodunum, with the object of making a feigned attack upon the fortress, the whole circuit of the river must have been fordable, whereas the Lot could not have been forded.[3] In answer to the former objection, I may point out that Caesar describes the hill which he occupied in the battle with the Helvetii as a *mons*,[4] and that this hill was certainly not more than 300 feet above the level of the plain.[5] With regard to the other objection, it has been strenuously maintained,[6] and as strenuously denied,[7] that the Lot, in the sweep which it makes round the hill of Luzech, is fordable in the autumn, the disputants apparently forgetting that the siege took place in the summer.[8] But was it necessary that the assaulting cohorts should cross the river at all? Could they not have made their way into the peninsula by way of the isthmus? Again, it has been objected that the Lot, in that part of its course which encircles the peninsula of Luzech, is more than 150 yards broad,—so broad that the archers of whom Hirtius speaks could not have shot across it with effect. But with the Turkish bow flights of from 600 to 800 yards have been made: even the English long bow—a much less powerful weapon—is known to have attained a range of 310 yards; and Sir Ralph Payne-Gallwey admits that our mediaeval archers could shoot 230 or perhaps 250

[1] *B. G.*, viii, 41–2.

[2] Some writers have contended that Impernal was itself Uxellodunum (P. Joanne, *Dict. géogr. . . . de la France*, iv, 1896, p. 2367, *s.v.* Luzech); and as it is conceivable that Hirtius, if he had not seen the stronghold, might have so far misunderstood his authority as to say that Impernal, which is washed by the Lot on two sides, was almost entirely surrounded by a stream, this theory might be defensible but for one stubborn fact,—there was nothing to prevent Caesar from undertaking a regular siege and erecting an *agger* on the northern side. See *Congrès archéol. de France*, 1874 (1875), pp. 444–6.

[3] *Rev. d'Aquitaine*, ix, 1865, pp. 240–1.

[4] *B. G.*, i, 24, § 3.

[5] See pp. 625–7.

[6] *Examen*, &c., pp. 30–1.

[7] *Rev. d'Aquitaine*, ix, 1865, p. 243.

[8] *B. G.*, vii, 46, §§ 1–2.

yards.[1] Lastly, R. Perié[2] points out that the struggle for the possession of the spring took place on an elevated position (*excelso loco*);[3] whereas the isthmus at Luzech is nothing of the sort. But the Romans were fighting on the *agger*, which might fairly have been called an *excelsus locus*.

IV. The Puy d'Issolu, near Vayrac, is isolated on every side except the north-east, where it is connected by a col with the Pech Demont, and rises about 650 feet above the valleys. Its summit is an undulating plateau, covering 80 hectares,[4] or about 198 acres, and nearly surrounded by steep escarpments of rock. On the north, east, and south, the plateau is practically impregnable; while the western slopes, where, between the hamlets of Loulié and Léguillat, there is a considerable break in the escarpments, are nevertheless sufficiently steep to justify the statement of Hirtius that, even if no resistance had been offered, the ascent would have been difficult for armed men. On this side, about 72 feet below the line which the walls of the alleged *oppidum* would have followed, there was a spring. The Dordogne flows past the south of the hill, about a mile from the nearest point of the plateau, and 1,200 yards from the foot of the slope. The western slopes are bathed by a stream, about 10 metres, or 11 yards, wide, called the Tourmente, which, flowing through a narrow valley, hemmed in on the right by another steep hill, empties itself into the Dordogne, and is itself fed by a rivulet, which bathes the north-western side of the hill. The southern and south-eastern slopes are washed by a little stream, the Sourdoire, which, like the Tourmente, empties itself into the Dordogne.

The hill itself corresponds almost exactly with the description of Hirtius. It has received the greatest number of suffrages: its name closely resembles the *Uxello* in *Uxellodunum*, and its character is exactly described by that word, which means 'a fort on a precipitous hill': a charter of the abbey of Tulle, dated 944, proves that it was then called *Uxellodunum*,[5] and, as J. B. Cessac remarks, there is no evidence that any other place in the country of the Cadurci was ever called by any such name:[6] a tradition, which is at all events some centuries old, identifies the Puy with Uxello-

[1] Sir R. Payne-Gallwey, *A Treatise on . . . Turkish and other Oriental Bows*, pp. 19–20 (the second part of his *Projectile-throwing Engines*, &c., 1907). Cf. *L'Anthr.*, xviii, 1907, p. 734 (summary of a paper in *Globus*, xci, 1907, no. 21).

[2] *Hist. du Quercy*, 1861, pp. 54–62.

[3] *B. G.*, viii, 42, § 4.

[4] Napoleon, *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 343.

[5] Inter praecipuas Veiracum (Vayrac), Mayronam et Wogaironum, in quorum vicinia, scilicet in podio vocato Uxelloduno, ubi olim civitas Romanorum obsidione nota. D. Bouquet, *Recueil des hist. des Gaules*, ix, 580 D.

[6] *Mém. lus à la Sorbonne*, 1866 (1867), p. 91, note. Mr. E. H. Barker says (*Two Summers in Guyenne*, 1894, p. 75) that an educated native of Vayrac told him that 'the stream'—I suppose the Tourmente—'where it issues near the base of the rocky height has been known in the neighbourhood from time immemorial as "lo foun Conino",—Conino's fountain. Conino is a natural Romance corruption of Caninius.' I attach less importance to this tradition than Mr. Barker appears to do. 'Time immemorial' is a vague expression; and the stream may have been named after Caesar's lieutenant by some antiquary of the seventeenth century.

dunum : numerous coins have been found on or quite close to it :[1] it is a position of great strength : it commands the northern entrance to the territory of the Cadurci ; and therefore it is the very stronghold which Lucterius might have been expected to choose. Paths such as those by which Hirtius says that the rebel chief endeavoured to throw his convoys into the town are easily recognizable. The Tourmente could not have been diverted at any point of its course which the besieged garrison could have reached.[2] The Sourdoire could not have been approached by the garrison at all, because the sheer rocks which overlooked it were practically inaccessible, and if the garrison had attempted to reach it by a circuitous route, they must have been exposed, going and coming, to the fire of the Roman archers and artillery : the Dordogne was too far off ; and access to it would have been barred by the Roman lines. Traces of those lines or, at all events, of some lines of investment, have been discovered ; and also a gallery driven through the western side of the hill to the source of the spring.[3] Creuly and Jacobs, indeed, deny that an army so small as that of Lucterius would have taken refuge on a hill so large as the Puy ;[4] but in this argument there is no force : the Puy was so strong that 5,000 soldiers, backed by an indefinite number of townsmen, could have easily defended it. It might also perhaps be objected that if the Romans had made a feint of storming the Puy on all sides, the garrison, unless fear had deprived them of their senses, would only have laughed at their efforts. If, then, Uxellodunum stood upon the Puy d'Issolu, the words *ex omnibus partibus*, in Hirtius's 43rd chapter, must be inaccurate ; for the assailants could hardly have mounted except by the paths of Loulié, Leguillat, and les Tourneries, and by the farm of Ronjon on the north-east.[5] But Hirtius, like Caesar, might naturally have used the word *omnibus* rhetorically ; and it must be remembered that the garrison would have been small in proportion to the size of the plateau. On the other hand, it is conceivable that the works of which traces have been discovered were not made by Caesar and his lieutenants at all ; and no unprejudiced inquirer can deny that, in two respects at least, the site does not conform to the description of Hirtius. He expressly says that Uxellodunum was almost entirely surrounded by a river ; and this cannot be said of the Puy d'Issolu. P. Bial, indeed, affirms that every year, about the beginning of October, the

[1] N. L. Achaintre, *Caesar*, iv, 381, 386–7 ; A. Blanchet, *Traité des monn. gaul.*, p. 288, n. 1.

[2] Walckenaer (*Géogr. des Gaules*, i, 355) says that the Tourmente could have been diverted ; but look at Sheet 183 of the *Carte de l'État-Major* (1 : 80,000), and read Napoleon, *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 343–4.

[3] See Napoleon, *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 343–7, and Planches 31–2. This gallery, which was minutely explored by Cessac, was already known in the sixteenth century (*Rev. des études anc.*, x, 1908, p. 352).

[4] *Examen*, &c., p. 25.

[5] C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 557, n. 3 ; 562, n. 3. M. Tamizey de Larroque, quoting the Abbé de Vayrac, says that at the Puy d'Issolu the rocks are ' tellement escarpés, qu'on n'y peut monter qu'en grimpant et par de petits sentiers qu'on a pratiqués dans le roc en quelques endroits ; car partout ailleurs, les rochers sont aussi perpendiculaires que les tours de Notre-Dame de Paris.' *Rev. d'Aquitaine*, ix, 1865, p. 108.

Tourmente overflows its banks, increases the volume of a little rivulet called the Hierle, and thereby mingles its waters with those of the Sourdoire, in such a way as to form 'une seule écharpe d'eau enceignant la montagne';[1] but Creuly and Jacobs say that, when they visited the Puy, in November, the Tourmente and the Sourdoire did not commingle their waters;[2] and no unbiased critic would lay any stress upon Bial's argument.[3] Again, Hirtius describes the spring as situated *ab ea parte quae fere pedum CCC intervallo fluminis circuitu vacabat*. Napoleon explains this passage as meaning that the spring was 300 feet from the Tourmente:[4] but he has to admit that the spring was 1,000 feet from the Tourmente; and therefore he is forced to read *passuum CC* instead of *pedum CCC*. Moreover, no scholar could accept his translation. The Latin can only mean that the spring was on that side of the hill which, for an interval of 300 feet, was not surrounded by the stream. Von Kampen,[5] remarking that, just above the spring, there is a break of 300 feet in the escarpment, proposes to substitute *rupium* for *fluminis*. But in that case Hirtius's statement would have no point. Another emendation has been proposed by Rudolf Schneider:—(ab ea parte quae fere) *passuum CC intervallum a fluminis circuitu habebat*.[6] In a passage which is supported by the unanimous authority of all the MSS. Schneider alters four words out of six and puts in another! He changes *pedum* into *passuum*, *CCC* into *CC*, *intervallo* into *intervallum*, *vacabat* into *habebat*; and he puts in *a*. Now Hirtius may not have been a stylist: but he did not write schoolboy's Latin; and if there were no fault to find with Schneider's Latinity, he would still say to himself, if he were a man of humour, 'It is long odds that this emendation of mine, although it may make people say that I am a clever fellow, is not what Hirtius wrote.'[7] Moreover, I would ask Schneider what would have been the relevancy of the statement which he attributes to the historian. Is it not obvious

[1] *Mém. de la Soc. d'émulation du Doubs*, 3e sér., iii, 1859, p. 600.

[2] *Examen*, &c., pp. 30–1.

[3] Cessac (*Uxellodunum,—aperçus critiques*, &c., p. 67) argues, on geological grounds, that the Dordogne itself once surrounded the whole of the Puy except the col on the north-east. But it is absurd to suggest that it did so in 51 B. C.; and even supposing that it did, the spring, according to Hirtius, must have been on the col, whereas Cessac, as the result of his excavations, identified the spring mentioned by Hirtius with the one on the western slope!

[4] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 344.

[5] *Quindecim ad Caesaris de b. G. Comm. tabulae*, xv. As a matter of fact, the extent of the break is much more than 300 feet. See Ch. Lenthéric, *La Grèce et l'Orient en Provence*, 1878, pl. ii.

[6] *Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xiii, 1887, pp. 362–4.

[7] Cessac (*Uxellodunum,—observations touchant les fouilles exécutées à Luzech*, 1863, pp. 12–3) appeals to the authority of Orosius as a proof that there was no isthmus at Uxellodunum. Orosius (vi, 11, § 21) describes the position in these words:—*hoc oppidum in editissima montis arce pendebat, duabus partibus per abrupta latera non parvo flumine cingebatur*. 'Duabus partibus' are the words on which Cessac relies. I believe that Orosius's description was merely a loose and rhetorical paraphrase of that of Hirtius; but at all events it must be clear to any one who has the slightest critical faculty that the authority of Orosius cannot be weighed against the authority of Hirtius.

that what Hirtius intended to convey was that the gap in the circuit formed by the river enabled Caesar to construct a terrace there, and that he could not have done so anywhere else ? To any unprejudiced mind it must be clear that either Hirtius made a gross blunder or the Puy d'Issolu is not Uxellodunum. Now Long suggests that Hirtius may never have seen Uxellodunum, and that his information or his interpretation of it may have been at fault.[1] Creuly and Jacobs, on the contrary, insist that Hirtius's narrative is worthy of the fullest confidence. His Preface, they argue, proves that he was a writer of scrupulous accuracy ; for he tells us that he would not undertake to describe the African and Alexandrian wars because he took no part in either of them.[2] What Hirtius really said was that he took no part either in the Alexandrian or in the African war ; and that, although he had gained some knowledge of them from conversation with Caesar, he listened to Caesar's story for the pleasure of hearing him, not with the object of writing history.[3] But, if this statement implies that Hirtius did take part in the eighth campaign of the Gallic war, he could not have been present in every operation of that campaign ; and there is no proof that he ever saw Uxellodunum.

Creuly and Jacobs also maintain that we must either accept Hirtius's narrative as it stands, literally in every detail, or else candidly admit that the question is insoluble. If, they argue, Hirtius was mistaken in describing the isthmus, how can we tell that he was not also mistaken in saying that Uxellodunum was in the country of the Cadurci ?[4] No experienced student will accept the principle which the authors lay down. Every historian makes mistakes ; and in describing facts of a certain class it is very difficult to avoid error, while in narrating others it is almost impossible to go astray. For instance, an historian of the Indian Mutiny might, if he had never seen Delhi, make some slight mistakes in describing its principal features. He might place the Jamma Masjid too near the Jumna ; but he would hardly say that the Jumna almost entirely surrounded the town. In short, it is not necessary to fling a book to the other end of the room because one suspects the writer of having made mistakes ; and it is necessary, in reading the most careful writer, to use one's critical faculty. At the same time I freely admit that the particular mistake which an advocate of the Puy d'Issolu must, if he honestly translates the Latin, believe Hirtius to have made, is one which is very difficult to understand.

And yet it is as certain as the Binomial Theorem that Uxellodunum did stand upon some one of the sites which I have examined. Scan closely the sheets of the great *Carte de l'État-Major* which embrace the department of the Lot and the surrounding country, and you will not be able to find any other site which is even worth discussing. Every conceivable site has been carefully examined by keen eyes ; and of the whole number there are, as we have seen, only four which

[1] *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv, 385.
[2] *Examen*, &c., p. 24
[3] *B. G.*, viii, *Praef.*, § 8.
[4] *Examen*, &c., p. 23.

have secured any real support. Two of the four have been, on closer examination, unhesitatingly rejected; and the final choice lies between Luzech and the Puy d'Issolu. Luzech is the only place where there is an isthmus even approximately corresponding with the description of Hirtius: the Puy d'Issolu is the only place which, in other respects, corresponds or even approximately corresponds with his description. It seems almost incredible that he should have described Uxellodunum as a peninsula surrounded by a river on every side, except an isthmus only 300 feet wide, if there was no isthmus at all. The mistakes which he is assumed to have made are nothing less than monstrous. If he had merely said that the hill was almost entirely surrounded by a river, I should say that there were ten chances to one against his having described the Puy d'Issolu in such terms. But when I consider that he made the further statement that the spring was just above the isthmus, I am inclined to say that there are ten times ten chances to one against his having been mistaken. On the other hand, I am obliged to admit that, if Luzech was Uxellodunum, he made gross mistakes in his description. Yet, compared with those other assumed mistakes, they are perhaps easily explicable. But again, I am constrained to assume that Caninius, whose generalship throughout the campaign had been admirable,[1] was so careless, or rather so imbecile as to let Lucterius get out of the place with 3,000 men, when he could have shut him in with the greatest ease.[2] Lastly, I am obliged to admit that the spring which he described is not to be found;[3] and that, if it was there, his account of the struggle which took place for its possession is absolutely incomprehensible. When I turn again to Cessac's circumstantial account of the way in which the spring on the Puy d'Issolu was diverted; when I consider the combined force of all the other arguments that have been urged by him and his fellow-advocates—the argument from tradition, from the charter which mentions Uxellodunum, from the discovery of lines of investment, from the great strength of the Puy d'Issolu, the difficulty of ascending it, and the geographical position, which would have recommended it to Lucterius, lastly, the obvious resemblance of its name to Uxellodunum—when I consider all these things, I can no longer hesitate. Hirtius did make that mistake which seems all but incredible; and Uxellodunum is to be identified with the Puy d'Issolu.

Vangiones.—The Vangiones, one of the German peoples who contributed a contingent to the host of Ariovistus,[4] occupied, in the time of Ptolemy,[5] the country round Borbetomagus (Worms). It is

[1] Cf. *B. C.*, ii, 34, § 4.

[2] I am glad to find that R. Schneider has anticipated me in this argument. See *Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xiii, 1887, p. 362.

[3] 'Luzech,' sarcastically remarks Cessac (*Uxellodunum retrouvé*, 1865, p. 13), 'eut la prudence de ne pas jeter en pâture aux hasards de la pioche le subside complémentaire mis à sa disposition par un membre de la commission de la carte des Gaules.'

[4] *B. G.*, i, 51, § 2.

[5] *Geogr.*, ii, 9, § 9. See d'Anville, *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 171.

doubtful, however, whether they were settled there in the time of Caesar. See Nemetes and Triboci.

Veliocasses.—The Veliocasses dwelt in that part of the diocese of Rouen which did not belong to the Caleti (q.v.), namely the southern part of the department of the Seine-Inférieure and the eastern part of the department of the Eure. Their name survived in the old 'Vexin'.[1]

Vellaunodunum.—Caesar says but little that can help us to find Vellaunodunum. He tells us distinctly why he laid siege to it: he wished to avoid leaving an enemy in his rear, in order that the supplies which he expected might reach him more quickly. He says that Vellaunodunum was a stronghold of the Senones; that it was on the road which he took from Agedincum (Sens) to Gorgobina, the stronghold of the Boi; and that, after leaving his heavy baggage at Agedincum, he reached Vellaunodunum *altero die*. As the garrison held out for two days, while he was making a line of contravallation, we may perhaps infer that the place was fairly strong. Finally he says that, after receiving the submission of Vellaunodunum, he marched thence in two days to Cenabum[2] (Orléans). On pages 738–40 I prove that *altero die* means 'the day after',—that if, for example, Caesar left Agedincum on the 1st of the month, he reached Vellaunodunum on the 2nd. It might be said that we are none the wiser for this knowledge; for Caesar may have arrived at Vellaunodunum early on the day which he calls *altero die*, or he may have arrived late: and the difference in time would involve a considerable difference in distance. Still, as Caesar marched the whole way from Agedincum to Cenabum in four days, and as Cenabum was not less than 108 kilometres, or about 67 miles, from Agedincum,[3] it is not likely that he made a short march on any one of the four days; and we may therefore perhaps infer that he did not reach Vellaunodunum until comparatively late in the day. On the other hand, as he took two whole days to march from Vellaunodunum to Cenabum, and arrived at Cenabum too late in the afternoon to begin the siege, it is tolerably certain that Vellaunodunum was at least as far from Cenabum as it was from Agedincum; and, as he says that, when he arrived at Vellaunodunum, he *oppugnare instituit*, which apparently means that he began his preparations for the siege on the day of his arrival, General Creuly[4] may be justified in inferring that Vellaunodunum was nearer to Agedincum than to Cenabum. It would be more to the purpose to ascertain the road by which Caesar marched. There was a Roman road from Agedincum to Cenabum, 108 kilometres long, which passed by Château-Landon, Sceaux, and Beaune. The road mentioned in the *Table*[5] passed through Aquae Segeste and a little to the north of Gien: its length, according to the MSS., was 59 Gallic leagues, or about 131 kilometres;

[1] See d'Anville, p. 684, Walckenaer, i, 397–8, and *Rev. des études anc.*, viii, 1906, p. 172.

[2] *B. G.*, vii, 10, § 4; 11, §§ 1–4.

[3] See p. 410.

[4] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., viii, 1863, p. 393.

[5] *La Table de Peutinger*, ed. Desjardins, p. 26, cols. 1–2.

but Desjardins believes that *LIX* ought to be reduced to *LIV*. Creuly[1] mentions a third—'l'ancien chemin'—of 116 kilometres, or about 72 miles, which passed through Montargis and Ladon. The distance from Sens to Château-Landon is 44 kilometres, or about 27 miles; from Sens to Sceaux 52 kilometres, or rather more than 32 miles; from Sens to Beaune 66 kilometres, or about 41 miles; from Sens to Montargis 50 kilometres, or about 31 miles; from Sens to Ladon 65 kilometres, or rather more than 40 miles.

Now there is no proof that any of these three roads existed in the time of Caesar. Neither the road by Château-Landon nor that by Montargis is marked in the *Itinerary of Antonine* or in the *Table*; and it has been argued that the Gauls would not have made a road through the Forest of Orléans and across the marsh of Sceaux. D'Anville,[2] it is true, says that the road by Château-Landon was commonly called the Chemin de César; but evidence like this, as the reader—if there is such a person—of the countless French monographs on questions of Gallic geography knows to his cost, is brought forward for almost every site that ingenious antiquaries have ever proposed.[3] The exact direction of the road mentioned in the *Table* cannot, except in part, be ascertained.[4]

On the other hand, though it is not proved that the road which runs by way of Sceaux, Château-Landon, and Beaune was a Gallic road, there is nothing to show that it was not. Though not mentioned in the itineraries, it was certainly a Roman road; and, Napoleon notwithstanding, it is probable that Caesar followed a route as direct or nearly as direct as this, because otherwise he could not have accomplished the march from Sens to Orléans in four days unless he had made forced marches. For the same reason, although it is not proved that a Gallic road passed through Montargis, the absence of proof is not a sufficient reason for denying that Vellaunodunum lay on the 'ancien chemin'.

I now come to the various conjectures that have been made as to the site of Vellaunodunum. 1. Napoleon,[5] who identifies Cenabum with Gien, pins his faith to Triguères, on the road from Sens to Gien-le-Vieux. His arguments appear to be an imperfect summary of those of an antiquary, A. Petit,[6] whom he does not mention. As Cenabum (q.v.) stood upon the site of Orléans, not of Gien, it is, as any reader who keeps his map open will see, useless to examine these arguments. For Caesar would have had to march in two days 56 miles, the distance from Triguères, by the road which Napoleon makes him take, to Orléans. Such a march would not, indeed, have been absolutely impossible; but, if Caesar had made

[1] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér. viii, 1863, p. 392.
[2] *Éclaircissemens sur l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 189.
[3] According to J. B. Jollois (*Mém. sur les ant. du dépt du Loiret*, 1836, pp. 16–20), that part of the road which lies between Sens and Nancré is called Chemin de César; while its continuation, which crosses the Forest of Orléans, is called Chemin Perré.
[4] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 68.
[5] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 251, note.
[6] *Dissertation sur Genabum-Gien*, &c., 1863, pp. 43–4.

two such extraordinary marches on two successive days, he would certainly have said so.[1] Therefore we must reject Triguères.

2. D'Anville[2] proves that Lebeuf[3] is wrong in selecting for the site the village of Vellan, near Auxerre : but I need not summarize his arguments ; for Lebeuf argued on the untenable hypothesis that Cenabum was on the site of Gien.

3. D'Anville himself decides for Beaune. He argues that the distance, both from Sens and from Orléans, answers to Caesar's narrative ; that the place was well situated for the interception of the supplies which Caesar expected ; that it was in the diocese of Sens, and must therefore have been in the country of the Senones ; that it was on the direct road from Sens to Orléans ; and finally that the name ' Beaune ' is etymologically connected with *Vellaunodunum*. To prove this, he contends that *Vellauna* would have been contracted into *Velna* ; and that *Velna* would have been changed into *Belna*, as *Vesuntio* was changed into *Bisuntio* (Besançon). ' Beaune,' he concludes, ' est nommé Belna dès le neuvième siècle.' But I believe that no Gallic or even Gallo-Roman antiquities have been found at Beaune ;[4] and there is really no positive evidence in its favour, save the very doubtful evidence of etymology, which cannot be also cited in favour of Montargis. Beaune, moreover, is, as General Creuly[5] points out, considerably nearer to Orléans than to Sens, whereas Vellaunodunum was probably nearer to Sens than to Orléans.

4. Jollois[6] decided for a site about a mile and a half east of Sceaux, which is on one of the Roman roads between Sens and Orléans, and has yielded Celtic remains and Roman coins to the excavator.[7] It has been objected to on the ground that the site is low-lying, and was therefore not suited for a *dunum*. But the word *dunum* means ' a town ' or ' strong place ',[8] not necessarily a stronghold built upon a hill. Like Avaricum (Bourges), Sceaux stands upon marshy ground ; and some of the Gallic *oppida* were no better situated for defence.

5. Walckenaer[9] is inclined to place Vellaunodunum at Cran-et-Chenevière, between Châtillon-sur-Loing and Château-Renard, where, according to a MS. Memoir by Jollois, have been discovered the ruins of an ancient town. But of course Walckenaer is only guessing ; and Cran-et-Chenevière, which is some 10 miles south-east of Montargis, is not situated upon the road by which Caesar would have marched to Cenabum.

6. Von Göler[10] decides for Ladon ; but Ladon is 14 kilometres

[1] He makes a point of telling us when he made forced marches. For a long list of passages see H. Meusel, *Lex. Caes.*, ii, 370–1.

[2] *Éclaircissemens*, &c., pp. 221–4.

[3] *Recueil de divers écrits pour servir d'éclaircissemens à l'hist. de France*, ii, 1738, pp. 179–207.

[4] A. Petit, *Dissertation sur Genabum-Gien*, pp. 87–8.

[5] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., viii, 1863, p. 393.

[6] *Mém. sur les ant. du dépt du Loiret*, pp. 22–30.

[7] *Rev. numismatique*, xxii, 1852, pp. 313–6.

[8] See pp. 463–4.

[9] *Géogr. des Gaules*, i, 410.

[10] *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 239.

nearer to Orléans than to Sens, and must therefore, as General Creuly says, be rejected.

7. Creuly[1] thinks that the choice lies between Château-Landon and Montargis. Both, he remarks, are at a reasonable distance from Agedincum (Sens) and from Cenabum (Orléans); but he considers the site of Montargis—the most defensible in a generally flat district—better adapted for a Gallic *oppidum*. If Lebeuf[2] is to be believed, Château-Landon can hardly be the place that we are looking for. 'Il est constant,' he asserts, 'par les Actes de saint Severin, qu'encore de son tems, c'est-à-dire sous le regne de Clovis I, Château-Landon n'étoit qu'un bois et qu'une forest.'[3] To Montargis, in the environs of which Roman antiquities have been discovered,[4] I know no serious objection. It has, indeed, been argued that Montargis is too far from Orléans; but I cannot see that the objection is valid. Montargis is not more than 66 kilometres, or about 41 English miles, from Orléans: Caesar implies that it was his object to march as fast as he conveniently could;[5] and 20 miles, though a more than ordinary, was not an impracticable day's march. Still, there is no sufficient reason for definitely accepting Creuly's choice.

8. Stoffel[6] has persuaded himself that he has solved the problem which has amused and baffled so many generations of inquirers. If he had not a deservedly high reputation as a Caesarian scholar, I should not notice his arguments; for they are based upon the untenable hypothesis that Cenabum stood upon the site of Gien: but, as a specimen of the reasoning which satisfied Napoleon's ablest collaborator, they have a certain interest. Vellaunodunum, he says, was on the site of Toucy, which stands on the direct road from Sens to Nevers. His main arguments are these. First, Caesar's words prove that he marched by the direct road from Sens to Nevers: 'Les mots . . . *ad Boios proficiscitur* (*B. G.*, vii, 10) ont un sens trop

[1] *Rev. arch.*, viii, 1863, p. 393.

[2] *Recueil de divers écrits pour servir d'éclaircissemens à l'hist. de France*, ii, 208; *Mém. de litt. tirez des registres de l'Acad. des inscr.*, &c., ix, 1731, p. 373. At the time of which Lebeuf speaks Château-Landon was called *Castrum Nantonis*.

[3] A fanciful etymological argument which has been offered in its favour (*Comptes rendus . . . de la Soc. du Berry*, 1863–4, p. 349) may safely be neglected. 'Vellaunos,' says Sir John Rhys (*Celtic Britain*, 3rd ed., 1904, p. 289), 'probably meant a prince or one who reigned, and so *Vellaunodunum* would have meant "the King's fort"'. According to A. Holder (*Alt-celtischer Sprachschatz*, iii, 149), it meant 'the fort of Vellaunos' or perhaps 'the safe fort'.

[4] Jollois, *op. cit.*, pp. 123–7.

[5] Ea qui conficeret, C. Trebonium legatum [Vellaunoduni] relinquit, ipse *ut quam primum iter faceret*, Cenabum Carnutum proficiscitur. *B. G.*, vii, 11, §§ 3–4. Meusel (*Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xxxvi, 1910, p. 53) deletes *ut . . . faceret* as an interpolation, remarking that it is absurd to say that the reason for Caesar's marching to Cenabum was the intention *ut quam primum iter conficeret* (v. l. *faceret*). I cannot see where the absurdity comes in. Is there anything absurd in this translation,—'He left Gaius Fabius to give effect to these orders, and, being anxious to finish his march as soon as possible, pushed on for Cenabum,' &c.? In other words, he left Trebonius at Vellaunodunum instead of staying there himself, because he wished to reach Cenabum without delay.

[6] *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, pp. 146–9, 154–5.

net pour qu'il ne soit pas évident que César marcha directement vers le pays des Boiens . . . par la route d'Agedincum à Noviodunum (Nevers).' Secondly, when Caesar says that, after leaving Agedincum, he arrived at Vellaunodunum *altero die*, he means that he arrived there on the second day after his departure. The proof of this is that the battle which Caesar fought with Vercingetorix immediately before the siege of Alesia undoubtedly took place on the river Vingeanne, at a distance of 72 kilometres from Alesia ; that Caesar arrived at Alesia *altero die* ; and that, as he could not have compassed that distance before nightfall on the day after the battle, he evidently did not reach Alesia until the second day after. Thirdly, Toucy is 61 kilometres from Sens. Caesar, being pressed for time, marched, on an average, 30 kilometres a day. That is to say, he marched from Sens, along the direct road on which Toucy stands, 60 kilometres before he reached Vellaunodunum. Therefore Toucy and Vellaunodunum are identical.

In the whole of this chain of reasoning there is not a single sound link. First, *ad Boios proficiscitur* does not necessarily mean that Caesar took the shortest road to the country of the Boi. Read in connexion with the context, the words mean that he marched to relieve the Boi : but that does not imply that he did not intend to punish Cenabum *en route* ; nor is it certain that there was a bridge over the Loire nearer than Cenabum. Secondly, as I shall hereafter prove,[1] there is no evidence that the battle which preceded the siege of Alesia was fought on the Vingeanne, while there is strong evidence that it was not ; and, as I prove on pages 738–40, the meaning which Stoffel, arguing from this questionable premiss, gives to *altero die* is entirely wrong. Thirdly, even if that meaning were right, even if it were certain that Caesar marched, on this particular occasion, at the rate of 30 kilometres a day—no more and no less—Stoffel's conclusion would not be justified ; for he has no right to assume that Caesar made two complete marches, no less and no more. Caesar might have marched 20 kilometres on the day on which he left Agedincum ; 30 on the second day ; and 20 on the third.[2]

The conclusion of the whole matter is that there is no decisive evidence for any one of the sites which I have mentioned. Beaune, Cran-et-Chenevière, Ladon, Triguères, and Toucy must be rejected ; and so apparently must Château-Landon. Montargis and the site near Sceaux remain. I believe that there is more to be said for the former than for the latter. But unless some decisive inscription should hereafter be discovered—and the chance of such a discovery is almost infinitesimal—we shall never get beyond conjecture.[3]

[1] See pp. 791–801.

[2] As Stoffel makes Caesar reach Vellaunodunum on the second day after his departure from Sens, and yet only accomplish two marches, I presume that, like Napoleon (*Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 251, note), he holds that the day of Caesar's departure was spent in concentrating the troops, whom Napoleon assumes to have been echeloned in the environs of Sens, and possibly in crossing the Yonne. This hypothesis is inconsistent with the meaning of *altero die*. The concentration, if it took place at all, must have taken place before.

[3] M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 435, n. 4), who agrees with me in provision-

Vellavii.—The Vellavii were clients of the Arverni.[1] Their territory corresponded, roughly, with the ancient Velay, or the department of the Loire-Supérieure.[2]

Venelli.—The Venelli dwelt in the Cotentin (the department of the Manche). The French Commission believe that they only occupied a part of the diocese of Coutances, because it is cut in two by marshes; and they suggest that the Ambibarii (q.v.), who perhaps occupied the southern part and possibly also the adjacent part of the diocese of Avranches, may have been originally their clients.[3] Walckenaer[4] believes that the diocese of Avranches, which was formed out of the territory of the Abrincatui (probably, he thinks, the same people as the Ambibarii), belonged to the Venelli; and M. Longnon takes the same view.[5]

Veneti.—The Veneti, according to the common opinion,[6] occupied the diocese of Vannes, or, roughly speaking, the department of the Morbihan. M. Longnon,[7] however, also gives them the alleged *civitas Coriosopotum* of the *Notitia provinciarum*,[8] which, if it ever existed, was perhaps in the territory of the Osismi;[9] and Desjardins[10] gives them, besides the Morbihan, the arrondissement of St. Nazaire, that is to say, the peninsula of Guérande.

Ptolemy[11] places the Veneti north of the Samnitae (q.v.) and south of the Osismi, whose southern boundary, he says, was marked by the Gobaean promontory, that is to say, the Pointe du Raz. On pages 469–70 I have shown reason for believing that the 'Samnitae' never existed. Strabo[12] says that the Loire enters the sea between the Pictones and the Namnetes (q.v.), who were the southern neighbours of the Veneti. Pomponius Mela[13] places the Osismi opposite the island of Sena, which is generally identified with Sein.[14]

The northern frontier of the Veneti cannot be traced with certainty. Unless Ptolemy made a mistake, it could not have coincided with the northern frontier of the diocese of Vannes, which struck the coast far south of the Pointe du Raz;[15] and all that can be safely said is that Venetia did not extend further northward than that promontory and the natural boundary formed by the Montagnes Noires. See Osismi.

The arguments that have been advanced to prove that the Veneti occupied the peninsula of Guérande are refuted on pages 680–3.

Veragri.—See Nantuates.

Viromandui.—The Viromandui, whose name was preserved in the old name of Vermandois, occupied the diocese of Noyon, or the

ally accepting Montargis, records one or two other guesses, which are not worth discussing.

[1] *B. G.*, vii, 75, § 2.

[2] D'Anville, *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 685; Walckenaer, *Géogr. des Gaules*, i, 344.

[3] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., ix, 1864, pp. 404–6.

[4] *Géogr. des Gaules*, i, 385–7.

[5] *Atlas hist. de la France*, p. 7.

[6] Walckenaer, *Géogr. des Gaules*, i, 378.

[7] *Atlas hist. de la France*, p. 7.

[8] See note on the Coriosolites.

[9] See p. 421.

[10] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 485.

[11] *Geogr.*, ii, 8, §§ 5–6.

[12] iv, 2, § 1; 4, § 6.

[13] iii, 6, § 48.

[14] See p. 466, n. 3.

[15] *Gallia Christiana*, xiv, map facing p. 1.

northern part of the department of the Aisne and the eastern part of that of the Somme. See Walckenaer, *Géogr. des Gaules*, i, 431–2, and also Remi and Suessiones.

Vocates.—The Vocates are generally believed to have occupied the diocese of Bazas, or the south-eastern part of the department of the Gironde.[1] Caesar says that Crassus, after he had defeated the Sotiates, marched for the country of the Vocates and Tarusates.[2] The Sotiates occupied the country round Sos, and the Tarusates (q.v.) dwelt either in the district of Aire or in that of Tartas. Ptolemy[3] mentions a people called the Vassarii (Οὐασσάριοι), whose chief town, Cossio, stood upon the site of Bazas. The people of Bazas are called in the *Notitia*[4] Vasates; and perhaps Ptolemy really wrote Οὐασσάτιοι. Desjardins[5] identifies the Vocates with the Vasates and the Vassarii. Pliny[6] mentions the Basabocates, a name which, as Meusel holds,[7] is merely an amalgamation of the forms *Vasates* and *Vocates*. The diocese of Bazas is divided by the Garonne, on the north of which Walckenaer places the Vocates and on the south the Vasates. This conjecture is certainly wrong; for how can any one believe that Crassus, who had invaded Aquitania from the north, would, after he had defeated the Sotiates—the first tribe that he encountered—have marched *back* from the neighbourhood of Sos to the north of the Garonne, in order to attack another people, whose allies came from the Pyrenees? Besides, on Walckenaer's theory, the Vocates were separated by a considerable tract from the Tarusates; whereas it is clear from Caesar's narrative that the two peoples were conterminous. The problem of determining the habitat of the Vocates is further complicated by the fact that Pliny mentions, immediately after the Basabocates, another people called the Vassei. I am inclined to believe that the Vocates and the Vasates were identical; but if so, it will be evident to any one who looks at the map that if Crassus invaded their country as well as that of the Tarusates, it must have extended south of Bazas into the department of Les Landes.

[Since the foregoing paragraph was written, the current theory, expounded by MM. Bladé and Jullian, has been that the Basabocates were really the Basates (or Vasates) and the Boiates, who are assumed to have been identical with the Vocates; that the former occupied the country round Bazas, and the latter the district of Buch near Arcachon.[8] The question is obscure; but I adhere to my former opinion because Caesar's narrative is irreconcilable with the view that Crassus invaded a country so far from Sos and from the Pyrenees (whence the allies of the Vocates and Tarusates came) as Buch. M. Jullian, indeed, as I learn from his latest volume,[9] now virtually agrees with me; for he holds that the Basates were probably included by Caesar with the Vocates; and he also observes, as I have

[1] Walckenaer, *Géogr. des Gaules*, i, 302. [2] *B. G.*, iii, 23, § 1.
[3] *Geogr.*, ii, 7, § 11. See note to vol. i, p. 205, of C. Müller's edition.
[4] Ed. O. Seeck, p. 271 (xiv, 10). [5] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 362–3.
[6] *Nat. Hist.*, iv, 19 (33), § 108. [7] MS. note sent to me by Meusel.
[8] *Annales de la Faculté des lettres de Bordeaux*, 1893, p. 118; C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, ii, 450, n. 9. [9] *Ib.*, iii, 307, n. 3.

done, that, according to Caesar, the Tarusates (whom he places near Tartas) and the Vocates were conterminous. At the same time he justly remarks that Caesar could not have simultaneously marched towards Bazas and Tartas; and, as I have done in my narrative,[1] he prefers the latter route. The Vocates had probably marched southward to reinforce the Tarusates; and Caesar may have meant that Crassus marched into the territories of the Vocates and Tarusates considered as a whole.]

Vocontii.—Caesar mentions the Vocontii once only.[2] He says that, after crossing the Alps—doubtless by Mont Genèvre[3]—he entered their territory, and passed thence into that of the Allobroges. Strabo[4] also describes the Vocontii as conterminous with the Allobroges; and he implies that Ebrodunum, or Embrun, marked their eastern boundary. According to Ptolemy,[5] Ebrodunum belonged to the Caturiges (q.v.); and Long suggests that Strabo probably meant that it was 'just on the borders of the Vocontii'.[6] Ptolemy says that the chief town of the Vocontii was Vasio, which occupied the site of Vaison: Pliny[7] gives them another town, Lucus Augusti, which is identified with Luc; and from the *Table* we learn that they had a third, Dea, the modern Die. From these data it has been inferred that their territory comprised the dioceses of Vaison and Die. D'Anville[8] believes that they also occupied a part of the diocese of Gap, 'dans lequel on ne connoît point d'aucun peuple en particulier,' as well as Val-Benois, that part of the diocese of Sisteron which borders on Vaison; and, if Strabo is to be believed, they probably also possessed territory extending as far eastward as the river Durance. D'Anville, who traces their eastern frontier far to the west of the Durance, ignores or overlooks the testimony of Strabo. But Chorges or Caturigomagus, which belonged to the Caturiges, is nearly due west of, and about 12 miles from Embrun. If, then, Chorges belonged to the Caturiges in the time of Strabo, he was wrong in making Embrun the eastern limit of the Vocontii; and their territory could not have extended to the Durance, except perhaps below Tallard.[9]

Maissiat,[10] remarking that, according to Strabo, the Vocontii were conterminous with the Allobroges and above the Cavares, infers that their territory extended northward as far as the Isère, and that they possessed the valley of the Graisivaudan as far eastward as Montmelian. But it does not follow that because the Vocontii were conterminous with the Allobroges, they were conterminous along their whole northern frontier: on Maissiat's theory the territory of the Vocontii must have included the territories of the Tricorii and the Uceni, and part of that of the Medulli as well; and these small tribes may just as likely have been clients of the Allobroges.

[1] See p. 93. [2] *B. G.*, i, 10, § 5. [3] See pp. 430–1.
[4] iv, 1, § 3. [5] *Geogr.*, iii, 1, § 35.
[6] W. Smith's *Dict. of Greek and Roman Geogr.*, i, 798.
[7] *Nat. Hist.*, iii, 4 (5), § 37. [8] *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 715.
[9] Cf. C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, ii, 517, n. 2.
[10] *Jules César en Gaule*, i, 1865, pp. 46–7, 334.

The task of determining the frontiers of the Vocontii is indeed rendered peculiarly difficult by the fact that the territory which undoubtedly belonged to them was surrounded by the territories of minor peoples, who may possibly have been *pagi* of theirs, actually incorporated within their proper territory, or may only have been connected with them by the loose tie of clientship; while some of these peoples may have been *pagi* or clients of the Caturiges or of the Allobroges. The minor peoples to whom I refer were the Memini, the Vulgientes, the Quariates, the Bodiontici, the Avantici, the Tricorii, and the Uceni. Desjardins[1] remarks that their insignificance must have caused them to be absorbed in the *clientela* of the Vocontii, although, if I understand him aright, he distinguishes their territories from those of the stronger people. But it seems more probable that the Uceni and the Tricorii, whose territories—the valleys of the Romanche and the Drac respectively—formed part of the diocese of Grenoble, were clients of the Allobroges (q.v.); and Desjardins himself elsewhere[2] says, rightly in my opinion, that the Memini must have been clients [if not a *pagus*] of the Cavares. For the district of Carpentras (*Carpentoracte*), which belonged to the Memini,[3] separates that of Cavaillon (*Cabellio*) from that of Orange (*Arausio*), both of which formed part of the territory which Ptolemy[4] assigns to the Cavares. The exact position of the Quariates, who were on the east of the Vocontii, is uncertain:[5] but there is no doubt that the Bodiontici dwelt in the neighbourhood of Digne; while, as Desjardins remarks, there is a striking resemblance between 'Avantici' and 'Avance', 'Avançon', and 'St. Étienne d'Avançon',—the names of a river and of two communes which are to be found on the west of Chorges. It seems to me probable that these three peoples, as well as the Vulgientes, who dwelt in the neighbourhood of Apt, were clients of the Vocontii.[6] Desjardins thinks that the eastern boundary of the Vocontii would naturally have been formed by the Devoluy, the Montagne d'Aurouze, and the chain 'popularly known as Monts de France'.

Volcae.—The Volcae (Arecomici and Tectosages) occupied the country comprised between the Rhône, the Cevennes, and the Garonne; and the territory of the Tectosages included that of the Tolosates (q.v.). According to Strabo,[7] Narbo belonged to the

[1] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 232. [2] *Ib.*, pp. 226–7.
[3] Ptolemy, *Geogr.*, ii, 10, § 8 (C. Müller's ed., p. 246).
[4] *Ib.* (Müller, pp. 243–4).
[5] Desjardins (ii, 228) is inclined to place them near Forcalquier.
[6] J. D. Long, who has devoted a monograph (*Mém. présentés par divers savants à l'Acad. des inscr.*, 2e sér., ii, 1849, pp. 284–313) to the Vocontii, holds that their territory comprised the dioceses of Die, Vaison, and Sisteron, part of the diocese of Gap, and part of the diocese of Grenoble (on the left bank of the Isère). But, seeing that Cularo (Grenoble) was one of the chief towns of the Allobroges, why should part of the diocese be assigned to the Vocontii? The passage in one of Cicero's letters—*Isara, flumine maximo, quod in finibus est Allobrogum* (*Fam.*, x, 15, § 3)—on which Long (p. 296) relies, only proves that the Isère was *in* the territory of the Allobroges; for *finibus* means 'territory', not, as Long thinks, 'frontier'. Cf. p. 364, n. 3, *supra*.
[7] iv, 1, § 12.

Arecomici; according to Ptolemy,[1] to the Tectosages. D'Anville[2] thinks that so long as Narbo was the capital of the Province, it probably belonged, as Strabo says, to the Arecomici, and afterwards to neither of the two peoples. A passage in Caesar—*praesidia in Rutenis provincialibus, Volcis Arecomicis, Tolosatibus, circumque Narbonem . . . constituit*[3]—seems, as C. Müller remarks in his edition of Ptolemy (p. 241), to imply that Narbo was not, at all events in 52 B. C., in the country of the Arecomici. Walckenaer,[4] who accepts d'Anville's theory, assigns to the Arecomici the dioceses of Agde, Lodève, Montpellier, d'Uzes, Nîmes, and Alais,—a territory corresponding roughly with the departments of the Gard and the Hérault; while the country of the Tectosages corresponded with the archbishopric of Toulouse and all that part of the diocese of Montauban which lies on the east of the Garonne. Desjardins[5] conjectures, in spite of Strabo, that the river Hérault, or else a line passing between the Hérault and the Orb, separated the two peoples.

[1] *Geogr.*, ii, 10, § 6.
[2] *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 717.
[3] *B. G.*, vii, 7, § 4.
[4] *Géogr. des Gaules*, i, 253.
[5] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 215.

SECTION IV.—SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND RELIGIOUS

MONARCHY IN GAUL

Fustel de Coulanges[1] asserts that kings in Gaul only attained power by the will of the majority ; and he refers to the words which Caesar puts into the mouth of Ambiorix, king of the Eburones—*sua esse eiusmodi imperia ut non minus haberet iuris in se multitudo quam ipse in multitudinem*[2] ('My authority is so far limited that the multitude has no less power over me than I over them')—to show that their power was extremely restricted. He holds that monarchy in Gaul was not a traditional institution, but rather a revolutionary power, created by a faction, which arose in troublous times.[3]

Let us examine these conclusions. Caesar mentions in all eleven Gallic kings, namely Catamantaloedis, king of the Sequani ; Diviciacus, king of the Suessiones ; Galba, king of the Suessiones ; Commius, king of the Atrebates ; Tasgetius, king of the Carnutes ; Moritasgus, king of the Senones ; Cavarinus, king of the Senones ; Ambiorix and Catuvolcus, each king of one half of the Eburones ; Vercingetorix, king of the Arverni ; and Teutomatus, king of the Nitiobroges.[4]

Three of these kings, Diviciacus, Galba, and Commius were Belgic. Diviciacus and Catamantaloedis had ceased to reign before Caesar arrived in Gaul. Commius, Tasgetius, and Cavarinus were nominees of Caesar : the ancestors of Tasgetius and Cavarinus had reigned before them, and Moritasgus, the brother of Cavarinus, was reigning when Caesar first entered Gaul ; Tasgetius was murdered by enemies belonging to his own country, and Cavarinus incurred bitter odium during his reign. Orgetorix, Casticus, Dumnorix, and Celtillus, the father of Vercingetorix, aimed at seizing the royal power ; Celtillus was put to death by his countrymen for having done so ; and an attempt was made to execute Orgetorix for the same offence.[5]

These facts prove that among those peoples which had discarded it, any attempt to revive the royal power was regarded by the republican party with extreme jealousy ;[6] and as among the Aedui, if not among

[1] *Hist. des inst. pol. de l'anc. France,—La Gaule rom.*, 1891, pp. 12–3.

[2] *B. G.*, v, 27, § 3.

[3] He refers to *B. G.*, vi, 8, § 9,—*Cingetorigi, quem ab initio permansisse in officio demonstravimus, principatus atque imperium est traditum.* But we are not told that Cingetorix was a king at all.

[4] *B. G.*, i, 3, § 5 ; ii, 4, § 7 ; iv, 21, § 7 ; v, 25, § 1 ; 54, § 2 ; vi, 31, § 5 ; vii, 4, § 5 ; 31, § 5.

[5] *Ib.*, v, 25, § 3 ; vi, 5, § 2 ; i, 2, § 1 ; 3, § 5 ; 4 ; 9, § 3 ; vii, 4, § 1.

[6] Cf. Sir J. Rhys's *Celtic Britain*, 3rd ed., 1904, p. 58.

other peoples, a supreme executive magistrate called the Vergobret was annually elected, and Caesar frequently mentions the senates of Gallic peoples in such a way as to imply that there were no kings to limit their power,[1] it has been concluded that, in his time, a monarchical form of government was the exception, and a republican the rule.

The conclusion to which this analysis leads is that monarchy had once prevailed throughout the whole of Gaul, but that by some revolution or series of revolutions, like those of which we read in the histories of Greece and Rome, it had, in the majority of states, perished. Among the Belgae, however, it should seem that the dislike of monarchy was less active and the proportion of kings greater than in Celtican Gaul. Powerful nobles, Caesar tells us,[2] still frequently seized royal power, or rather, as Sir John Rhys puts it, made themselves despots, just as Pisistratus did at Athens; but they attained this power not by the will of the majority but by the help of armed clients and mercenaries, and by ingratiating themselves with the masses.

DID TWO VERGOBRETS HOLD OFFICE IN ONE STATE AT THE SAME TIME?

It is generally held that, at all events among the Aedui, only one Vergobret could legally hold office at a time. This opinion is based upon the well-known passage:[3]—*summo esse in periculo rem, quod, cum singuli magistratus antiquitus creari atque regiam potestatem annum obtinere consuessent, duo magistratum gerant et se uterque eorum legibus creatum dicat.* On the other hand, Caesar writes:—*convocatis eorum principibus, quorum magnam copiam in castris habebat, in his Diviciaco et Lisco, qui summo magistratui praeera*[*n*]*t, quem vergobretum appellant Haedui, qui creatur annuus et vitae necisque in suos habet potestatem,*[4] &c. *Praeerant* is found in all the MSS.; but since Lipsius published his edition, the editors, following Nicasius, have almost unanimously substituted for it *praeerat*, on the ground that the other passage proves that there can only have been one Vergobret.[5] But M. Robert Mowat has disputed this opinion;[6] and Sir John Rhys agrees with him.[7] There is a coin of the Lexovii, bearing the inscription CISIAMBOS · CATTOS · VERGOBRETO. The words *Cisiambos Cattos*, M. Mowat argues, must be the names not of one man, but of two; (1) because the word which follows them would otherwise be *vergobretos*, not *vergobreto*; and (2) because by Gallic custom no man had more than one name, sometimes followed by a patronymic. Therefore to Cisiambos and

[1] *B. G.*, i, 16, § 5; 31, § 6; ii, 5, § 1; 28, § 2; iii, 16, § 4; 17, § 3; v, 54, § 3; vii, 32, § 5; 33, § 2; 55, § 4.

[2] *Ib.*, ii, 1, § 4. in Gallia a potentioribus atque iis qui ad conducendos homines facultates habebant vulgo regna occupabantur. Cf. i, 4, § 2; 17, §§ 1–2; 18, §§ 3–6.

[3] *Ib.*, vii, 32, § 3.

[4] *Ib.*, i, 16, § 5.

[5] See Schneider's *Caesar*, i, 35.

[6] *Rev. celt.*, v, 1881–3, pp. 121–4.

[7] *Celtic Britain*, 3rd ed., 1904, p. 59.

Cattos belongs in common the title *vergobreto*, which must be either plural or, more probably, dual.

M. Mowat's argument is controverted by M. P. Ch. Robert. He does not deny that Cisiambos and Cattos were two persons: but, remarking that *s* is often dropped in Gallic, he explains *vergobreto* as an abridged form of the nominative singular *vergobretos*;[1] and M. E. Ernault, who agrees with him, says, in opposition to M. Mowat, that the dual would be not *vergobreto* but *vergobretu*.[2]

Sir John Rhys admits the difficulty presented by the former of the two passages which I have quoted; but he struggles to get over it by suggesting that 'the two offices were not filled at the same time of the year'. I do not believe that anybody, reading the passage with an unbiased mind, could agree with him. How can the (assumed) two offices have been filled at different times of the year when Caesar distinctly says that the Vergobret held office for a whole year (*singuli magistratus . . . regiam potestatem annum obtinere consuessent*)? And if Caesar really wrote (summo magistratui) *praeerant*, as Sir John Rhys maintains, is it not obvious that the (assumed) two Vergobrets held office simultaneously? Also, is it not extraordinary that Sir John should have failed to see that if two Vergobrets were elected every year, of whom one held office during one part of the year and the other during the remaining part, the magistracy was not dual but single?[3] Besides, on Sir John's theory, how is one to explain the other passage:—*convocatis eorum principibus . . . in his Diviciaco et Lisco, qui summo magistratui praeera*[*n*]*t, quem vergobretum appellant Haedui, qui creatur annuus*, &c.? What can be the antecedent to *quem*, if it is not the preceding clause *qui . . . praeera*[*n*]*t*? And if *praeerant* is the right reading, what becomes of the grammar of the sentence? Surely Caesar would have written *quos vergobretos* (appellant Haedui).

[Since I wrote the foregoing note, I have seen in the *Dictionnaire archéologique de la Gaule* (1er fascicule, Planches des monnaies, No. 78) an illustration of the coin in question.[4] It bears on the reverse side this inscription:—

Speaking of the Vergobret, Cotus, the writer of the article *Aedui* says,[5] 'comme au moment de sa magistrature la cité des Éduens exerçait une suprématie de fait sur la Celtique entière, nous trouvons

[1] *Comptes rendus de l'Acad. des inscr.*, xiii, 1885, pp. 283–4. [2] *Ib.*
[3] See M. d'A. de Jubainville's remarks in *Rev. celt.*, viii, 1887, p. 222, n. 8.
[4] No. 7163 in the *Cat. des monn. gaul. de la Bibl. Nat.*, by E. Muret and M. A. Chabouillet. [5] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 15.

de beaux semis frappés chez les Lixoviates, par le chef Cisiambos, avec la mention purement honorifique du vergobret Cottus' (*sic*). To the same effect writes the imaginative numismatist, Caignart de Saulcy,[1] who is surely wrong in identifying Cattos with the Cotus whom Caesar displaced in favour of Convictolitavis.[2]

M. Robert offers a different explanation.[3] The Gauls, he remarks, formed their coinage upon Greek models. Now many Greek coins bear the name both of a magistrate and of a monetary agent. Possibly, then, Cisiambos may have been an official of this kind.]

CLANSHIP, SENATES, AND LAW IN GAUL

J. G. Bulliot[4] holds that the so-called 'states' (*civitates*) of Gaul—the Aedui, the Arverni, and the rest—were merely aggregates of clans; for, he maintains, when Caesar uses the word *familia* or *clientela*, he means 'clan'. The *pagus* was the territory of the clan. Each clan was ruled by its own chief; and all these chiefs were subject to the tribal chief, whether he was an elected magistrate, like the Vergobret, or an hereditary ruler. This tribal chief, however, was himself virtually subject to the control of the senate, which was not a definite body, but comprised all the free landowners,—in fact all the influential men in the community. In a body politic of this kind 'the clan was everything, the state little or nothing' (le clan était tout, la cité rien ou peu de chose). Written law did not exist: everything was regulated by custom—*more patrio*, *more maiorum*—expressions which 'se retrouvent à chaque ligne [!] dans César, dans Strabon, dans Diodore, dans Tacite.' The word *lex*, when used of Gaul, means 'custom', as we may gather from Caesar's statement that *Germani multum ab hac consuetudine differunt;* from his remark that an armed gathering *more Gallorum initium est belli, quo lege communi omnes puberes armati convenire consuerunt*; and from his saying that Convictolitavis, who, as well as his rival Cotus, claimed to be legally Vergobret, was afterwards duly elected by the priests, in accordance with Aeduan custom.[5]

Fustel de Coulanges,[6] on the other hand, remarks that neither Caesar, nor Strabo, nor Diodorus Siculus makes any mention of clans in Gaul.[7] There is only one passage in Caesar in which *clientela* can possibly mean 'clan',[8]—the passage in which he describes, on the

[1] *Ann. de la Soc. num.*, 1867, p. 11. The article *Aedui* in the *Dictionnaire* was inspired, if not written, by de Saulcy.

[2] *B. G.*, vii, 32–3. See A. Blanchet, *Traité des monn. gaul.*, p. 83.

[3] *Comptes rendus de l'Acad. des inscr.*, xiii, 1885, pp. 283–4.

[4] *La cité gauloise*, 1879, pp. 51–2, 62, 193–4, 198, 204–6, 209–2.

[5] *B. G.*, vi, 21, § 1; v, 56, § 2; vii, 33, § 3; 34, § 3.

[6] *Hist. des inst. pol. de l'anc. France,—la Gaule rom.*, pp. 8–9.

[7] I have already (p. 21, n. 1) quoted the passage in which Sir H. Maine records his conviction that Caesar failed to notice the existence of 'the natural divisions of the Celtic tribesmen, the families and septs or sub-tribes'.

[8] See Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, i, 562–3.

authority of the Aeduan envoys, the struggle between Cotus and Convictolitavis (*civitatem esse omnem in armis ; divisum senatum, divisum populum, suas cuiusque eorum clientelas*).[1] Here *clientelas* obviously means 'groups of *clientes*'; and there is nothing to show that a Gallic chief might not have clients who were not his clansmen.[2] Similarly there is only one passage in which it could with any plausibility be argued that *familia* means 'clan',—the passage in which Caesar says that Orgetorix assembled his *familia* and debtors to overawe his judges (*Orgetorix ad iudicium omnem suam familiam ad hominum milia decem undique coegit, et omnes clientes obaeratosque suos . . . eodem conduxit*).[3] It is curious that M. Bulliot should not have noticed that *familia*, in this passage, is distinguished from *clientes*, and that if, as he maintains, *clientes* were clansmen, *familia* was necessarily something different. If Caesar used the latter word in its usual sense, Orgetorix's *familia* comprised his slaves.

Nevertheless, M. d'Arbois de Jubainville holds that the clan system did prevail in Gaul.[4] After pointing out that the number of senators in each state was large,[5] and that, among the Aedui at all events, two members of one family might not sit in the senate simultaneously,[6] he remarks that 'Il semble que ces deux faits nous mettent en présence d'une organisation analogue de Rome primitive. En Gaule la race dominante dans chaque *civitas* se compose d'un certain nombre de *gentes* représentée chacune au sénat par son chef'. And again, 'Chaque peuple gaulois . . . était formé de *gentes* ou clans, au-dessus de chacun desquels s'élevait une famille plus noble et plus riche que les autres, c'est-à-dire un petit groupe aristocratique qu'entouraient des clients de race moins distinguée.' Does not all depend upon what is to be understood by the word 'clan'? The primitive social, political, and military unit in Gaul was the *pagus*, which M. Jullian calls the 'tribu'. *Pagi* may, as he remarks,[7] have been originally groups of families, descended, or traditionally supposed to have been descended from a common ancestor; for the Helvetian *pagus Verbigenus* bore a real or mythical ancestral name: but in Caesar's time the *pagus* was simply a community, which had its own standards in war and common worship.[8]

When M. Bulliot says that the state was 'little or nothing', he exaggerates: strife existed between the *pagus* and the *civitas*, and *pagi*, as we have seen,[9] occasionally acted independently in their relations with Caesar; but, however imperfectly welded the *pagi* may have been, their aggregate, the 'state', was the unit with which Caesar had to reckon. As for the senates, such a passage as that in which Caesar tells us that the Nervian elders informed him

[1] *B. G.*, vii, 32, § 5.
[2] See pp. 514–6.
[3] *B. G.*, i, 4, § 2. See Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, i, 1280–2.
[4] *Recherches sur l'origine de la propriété foncière*, &c., 1890, pp. 51–2. 'Cette théorie,' says M. A. Blanchet (*Traité des monn. gaul.*, p. 225, note), 'concorde parfaitement avec l'explication que je propose pour le monnayage infiniment varié de la Gaule.'
[5] *B. G.*, ii, 28, § 1.
[6] *Ib.*, vii, 33, § 3.
[7] *Hist. de la Gaule*, ii, 14–6.
[8] *B. G.*, i, 12, §§ 2–7; vii, 64, § 6; 88, § 4.
[9] See p. 21.

that their senators had been reduced in number from 600 to 3,[1] would seem to point to the conclusion that they were definite bodies; and Fustel, while admitting that we do not know how they were composed, conjectures that they comprised, in each state, all the members of the class which Caesar called *nobiles*.[2] Probably, as M. Jullian suggests,[3] they were the chiefs of villages and the magistrates of *pagi*. M. Bulliot's view of the meaning of *lex*, when used by Caesar in speaking of the Gauls, is certainly not established by the passages which he quotes; but there is not enough evidence to determine the question, though, as the Druids were 'unwilling to allow their doctrine to become common property', and therefore would not commit it to writing, I believe that Gallic law was not codified.[4] It is, however, worth while to point out that of the two expressions, *more patrio* and *more maiorum*, which, M. Bulliot says, are found 'à chaque ligne dans César', the former is never used by Caesar at all, while the latter is used once only, and then with reference not to the Gauls, but to the Romans.[5]

DID THE GAULS, IN CAESAR'S TIME, RECOGNIZE PRIVATE PROPERTY IN LAND?

M. d'Arbois de Jubainville[6] holds that, in Caesar's time, private property in land did not exist in Gaul. Each community, he says, had over the whole of its land a right analogous to that which the Roman people had over their *ager publicus*. He remarks (1) that, according to Polybius,[7] the Cisalpine Gauls did not cultivate the soil, but that their property consisted in cattle and gold, which could be easily moved from place to place; (2) that the Helvetii never would have consented to emigrate if they had possessed private property in land; (3) that the tribute (*stipendium*) which the Aedui exacted from the Boi whom they invited to settle in their country[8] was simply rent due for a share of the *ager publicus*; (4) that when Caesar said that the Druids decided disputes 'regarding inheritance' (*de hereditate*),[9] he used the word *hereditas* in the sense of 'l'héritage de la royauté', and that the author of *Bellum Alexandrinum* (66, § 6) speaks of *hereditas regni*; (5) that when Caesar said that the Druids decided boundary disputes (*de finibus*), he meant by 'boundaries'

[1] *B. G.*, ii, 28, § 1.
[2] *Hist. des inst. pol. de l'anc. France*, &c., pp. 13–4.
[3] *Hist. de la Gaule*, ii, 49–50.
[4] Cf. C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, ii, 379, n. 1, and see J. Bryce, *Studies in Hist. and Jurisprudence*, i, 1901, p. 89.
[5] *B. G.*, vi, 44, § 2. See Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, ii, 641–2. De Coulanges (*Hist. des inst. pol. de l'anc. France*, &c., p. 15 and n. 2) is disposed to infer from *B. G.*, vi, 20, that the Gallic laws *were* written.
[6] *Comptes rendus de l'Acad. des inscr.*, 4e sér., xv, 1887, pp. 66–9, 74, 79–83; *Recherches sur l'origine de la propriété foncière*, &c., 1890, pp. xxiii–xxxi, 61.
[7] ii, 17.
[8] *B. G.*, i, 28, § 5; vii, 10, § 1.
[9] *Ib.*, vi, 13, § 5.

the frontiers of states ; and (6) that, according to Caesar, it was the custom for a Gaul, when he married, to add to his wife's dowry an equivalent from his own personal estate, and to administer the whole as a joint piece of property, which, with its accumulated produce (*fructus*), went to the survivor.[1] M. d'Arbois's reason for denying that the dowry or its equivalent could have been land will be given presently.

Fustel de Coulanges[2] and M. Ch. Lécrivain[3] have no difficulty in disposing of these arguments. To the first Fustel replies that Polybius was only speaking of the Gauls who had invaded Italy several centuries before the time of Caesar, and were in a nomadic state. In reply to the argument based upon the emigration of the Helvetii, he points out that they emigrated simply because they preferred the fertile plains of the Charente to their own wild and mountainous country.[4] Have peasant proprietors, he asks, never been known to emigrate in order to seek more productive property elsewhere ? To M. d'Arbois's third argument he replies that the Aedui might well have had sufficient unoccupied public land to accommodate the small Boian community, and yet have been themselves landed proprietors. And, asks M. Lécrivain, why should we infer from the fact that the Aedui assigned a portion of their territory to the Boi, that the whole of that territory was *ager publicus* ? Is it not more likely that with the Aedui, as with the Italians, private and public property in land existed side by side ? In answer to the fourth argument, Fustel remarks that, if the author of *Bellum Alexandrinum* uses the phrase *hereditas regni*, he only does so because the word *hereditas*, by itself, could not be taken as meaning ' l'héritage de la royauté '. Besides, he points out, M. d'Arbois has failed to notice that, while Caesar speaks again and again of sons who desired to succeed to the kingdoms of their fathers, their claims were never referred to Druids. Again, says Fustel, Caesar, in his digression on the manners and customs of the Gauls and Germans, twice uses *fines* in the obvious sense of boundaries of landed estates ;[5] and whenever he uses the word in the sense of frontiers, that meaning is unmistakably defined by the name of the state in question or by a phrase of equivalent meaning. Replying to the sixth argument, Fustel remarks that M. d'Arbois tries to prove that the joint property of husband and wife, to which Caesar refers, could not have consisted of land, because the produce of the land must have been stored in granaries and kept there till husband or wife died, or, if it had been sold, the proceeds would simply have been hoarded in a strong box,[6] and the joint owners would have perished of hunger ! The joint property, according to M. d'Arbois, must have consisted of cattle ; and the *fructus* of which Caesar speaks were simply ' le croît des troupeaux ',—the cattle

[1] *B. G.*, vi, 19, §§ 1, 2.
[2] *Questions hist.*, ed. 1893, pp. 104–12.
[3] *Annales de la Faculté des lettres de Bordeaux*, 1889, pp. 182–94, esp. 184.
[4] *B. G.*, i, 3, § 5 ; 10, § 1.
[5] *Ib.*, vi, 13, § 5 ; 22, § 2. Fustel might have added vi, 22, § 3.
[6] *Comptes rendus de l'Acad. des inscr.*, 4e sér., xv, 1887, p. 74. Cf. *Rev. celt.*, xxii, 1896, p. 329.

which were bred from the original stock. But, says Fustel, M. d'Arbois forgets that *fructus* means profits made out of property of every kind, cultivated land, cattle, money lent at interest, and what not. The dowry and its equivalent may have consisted, wholly or in part, of cattle ; but if so, the fact is no evidence that the Gauls did not recognize private property in land.

Independently of the arguments which I have summarized, Fustel proves conclusively that private property in land was recognized in Gaul. It is significant, he remarks, that Caesar, while professing to tell us in what respects the customs of the Germans differed from those of the Gauls, says expressly that the former did not recognize private property in land,[1] and implies, in the passage *Si de finibus controversia est*, that the latter did. Again, the existence in Gaul of the institution of clientship, and the oft-quoted passage, *in omni Gallia eorum hominum qui aliquo sunt numero atque honore genera sunt duo ; nam plebes paene servorum habetur loco*[2] ('Everywhere in Gaul two classes only are of any account or enjoy any distinction ; for the masses are regarded almost as slaves') clearly point to a state of society in which the land belonged to the rich. I may add that Caesar expressly says that the Germans refused to sanction private property in land 'to prevent the growth of avarice' (*ne qua oriatur pecuniae cupiditas*) and 'to keep the masses contented' (*ut animi aequitate plebem contineant*), neither of which objects was attained in Gaul ;[3] and that it is simply inconceivable that a people who had a coinage, a wealthy class, and an extensive commerce, and with whom slavery was an institution, should not have recognized private property in

[1] See an article by F. de Coulanges, entitled 'Recherches sur cette question : Les Germains connaissaient-ils la propriété des terres ?' in *Séances et travaux de l'Acad. des sciences morales et pol.*, nouv. sér., xxiv, 1885, pp. 5–10.

[2] *B. G.*, vi, 13, § 1.

[3] *Ib.*, 22, § 4. M. d'Arbois indeed asserts (*Comptes rendus de l'Acad. des inscr.*, 4e sér., xv, 1887, pp. 80–1) that when Caesar says that none of the Germans have *agri modum certum aut fines proprios*, he means that none of them enjoyed the perpetual possession of a definite number of acres of *ager publicus* ; for, he says, *modus agri* was the regular term used at Rome to denote the extent of *ager publicus* which a citizen might occupy ; and *fines proprios* obviously means the boundaries of *possessiones*—a word which Caesar uses almost in the same breath—'c'est-à-dire, de champs qui font partie de l'*ager publicus*.' I call this a triumph of special pleading. M. d'Arbois refers to Livy, vi, 35, and *Corpus inscr. Lat.*, i, pp. 79–86, neither of which authorities proves his point. They simply show that the term *modus agri* was used in regard to *ager publicus* : they do not show that it was not used in regard to land owned by individuals. Listen to Fustel. 'I doubt,' he says, 'whether M. d'Arbois has grasped the exact meaning of *ager publicus*. . . . *Ager publicus* was not common landed property, but property belonging to the state, which existed side by side with private property in land. . . . Where did M. d'Arbois learn that *modus agri* was the regular term used in speaking of *ager publicus* ? In Varro (*De re rustica*, i, 15) he will find the words *de modo agri* used unmistakably to denote the extent of a private estate. He will also find in Varro (i, 18) the words *agri modum certum* in a passage in which the writer says that the number of slave-labourers ought to be duly proportioned to the size of the estate.' [Here are the passages to which Fustel refers :—*Igitur primum haec, quae dixi, quattuor videnda agricolae, de fundi forma, de terrae natura, de modo agri, de finibus tuendis* (M. T. Varronis *Rerum rusticarum* i, 15). *De familia Cato dirigit ad duas metas, ad certum modum agri et genus sationis* (*ib.*, i, 18, § 1).]

land. See my quotation, on page 516, from Sir H. Maine, *Early History of Institutions*, pp. 167–9.

[In a review[1] of the first edition of this book M. d'Arbois says that he is in no way convinced by my arguments or by those of M. Lécrivain. I did not expect that he would be; but I am not sure that his conversion has not begun.[2] The possessors of the public land were, he now says, separated from one another by boundaries (*fines*) and transmitted their possessions by heredity. If so, except that they could not sell the land, they were proprietors: did private property in land not exist under the law of primogeniture? I now have the additional support of M. Jullian,[3] who reinforces the arguments of Fustel and Lécrivain. Is it, he asks, credible that Ambiorix was not the owner of the land which surrounded his country house;[4] or that Lucterius owned no land though the whole of Uxellodunum formed part of his *clientela*;[5] or that the authority of the state would have been as weak as it undoubtedly was[6] if it had controlled cultivation and disposed of the crops?][7]

THE GALLIC *NOBILES*

Fustel de Coulanges[8] holds that the Gauls whom Caesar describes as *nobiles* formed a class apart, superior to the *equites*; but this view is, I think, refuted by Caesar's express statement that in Gaul there were two classes and only two who were held in any esteem, namely Druids and *equites* (*In omni Gallia eorum hominum qui aliquo sunt numero atque honore genera sunt duo . . . Sed de his duobus generibus alterum est druidum, alterum equitum. B. G.*, vi, 13, §§ 1–3). The passages in the *Gallic War* which might seem to lend some support to Fustel's view are the one in which Diviciacus is made to say that the Aedui had lost *omnem nobilitatem, omnem senatum, omnem equitatum* (*ib.*, i, 31, § 6) and the one in which Litaviccus is made to say that all the Aeduan *equitatus* and *nobilitas* had perished (*ib.*, vii, 38, § 2). But in these passages *nobilitas* does not mean a class of men who were superior to the *equites* as such: it simply means 'men of rank'. The proof is that between the two sentences, quoted above, in which Caesar says (1) that there were only two classes which were held in any esteem, and (2) that of these two classes one consisted of *equites* and the other of Druids, there occurs the following, *Plerique cum aut aere alieno aut magnitudine tributorum aut iniuria potentiorum premuntur, sese in servitutem dicant nobilibus.* Is it not clear that if the *nobiles* had formed a definite class, superior to the

[1] *Rev. celt.*, xxi, 1900, pp. 107–8.
[2] I regret that since the words in the text were written M. d'Arbois has died.
[3] *Hist. de la Gaule*, ii, 71–4, 407–8.
[4] *B. G.*, vi, 30, § 3.
[5] *Ib.*, viii, 32, § 2.
[6] *Ib.*, i, 4, § 2; 17, § 1; 18, § 3; vii, 4, § 4.
[7] See also *Rev. crit. d'hist. et de litt.*, nouv. sér., xxx, 1890, pp. 441–2; and G. Dottin, *Manuel pour servir à l'étude de l'ant. celt.*, pp. 184–6.
[8] *Hist. des inst. pol. de l'anc. France,—La Gaule rom.*, p. 14, n. 1.

equites, Caesar would have written, *In omni Gallia eorum hominum qui aliquo sunt numero atque honore, genera sunt tria . . . Sed de his tribus generibus primum est druidum, alterum nobilium, tertium equitum?* The men whom Caesar described as *nobiles* were simply the most prominent, in birth or in power or in both, of the *equites*.[1]

It is worth noticing that the *equites* were not a caste : in Caesar's time a man could rise by ability or influence ' from a humble position to the highest dignity '.[2] Probably, as M. Jullian[3] says, there were wealthy plebeians in the Gallic cavalry ; but when he goes on to suggest that the possession of a war-horse was a mark of nobility, I find it difficult to follow him. Does not Caesar use the word *equites* in relation to the Gauls in two senses,—in the sense of cavalry and in that of knights?[4] This seems to result from a comparison of *B. G.*, i, 18, § 5, with vi, 15, § 2. In the former passage Caesar says that Dumnorix maintained a large number of *equites* (which I translate by ' horsemen') at his own expense ; in the latter he says that ' when war breaks out . . . the knights . . . all take the field and surround themselves with as many armed servants [?] and retainers as their birth and resources permit '. If the Gallic cavalry were all knights, it is obvious that when a knight took the field his armed retainers were all on foot. But Dumnorix, himself a knight, evidently took the field with his ' large number of *equites* ', who were certainly mounted. Was each of these *equites* followed by his own armed retainers on foot ? Would a knight have condescended to follow another knight for pay ? Is it not clear that Dumnorix's *equites* were, or at least included, simple troopers and were his ' armed retainers ' ?[5]

THE POWER OF THE NOBLE FAMILIES IN GAUL

' The leading families,' says Mommsen, ' of the different clans were closely connected, and through intermarriages and special treaties formed virtually a compact league, in presence of which the single clan was powerless ; '[6] and he goes on to say that the nobility were ' sufficiently powerful to allow no king and no canton to accomplish the work of union '.[7] There is not sufficient evidence for these sweeping statements. Before the invasion of the Helvetii we find their chieftain, Orgetorix, trying to establish a triumvirate with Dumnorix and a Sequanian chief called Casticus. Orgetorix was brought to trial for this by the Helvetii : but the three chiefs were

[1] Cf. C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, ii, 69–71.

[2] *B. G.*, vii, 39, § 1,—Viridomarus . . . quem Caesar ab Diviciaco sibi traditum ex humili loco ad summam dignitatem perduxerat.

[3] *Hist. de la Gaule*, ii, 68.

[4] *B. G.*, vi, 13, § 3 ; 15, § 1.

[5] I find that in *Vercingétorix*, p. 99, M. Jullian himself endorses what I have said.

[6] *Hist. of Rome*, v, 1894, p. 21 (*Röm. Gesch.*, iii, 1889, p. 235). The word ' clan ' is here used in the sense of *civitas* or community.

[7] *Ib.*, p. 24 (*Röm. Gesch.*, iii, 1889, p. 237).

not combining against any king or against any one 'clan';[1] and their combination was broken up by the action of a single people,—the Helvetii. Celtillus, the father of Vercingetorix, was put to death for trying to make himself king: but he was put to death by the nobles of his own tribe;[2] and apparently he brought his doom upon himself by trying to make his power hereditary in his own family. Of course the nobles of different tribes combined against Caesar; but what evidence is there that they combined 'to form a separate alliance hostile to the power of the community?' If they did, how are we to explain the internecine war which prevailed among them?[3] It is quite true that Dumnorix formed family alliances with the nobles of other tribes; but evidently he did this simply in order to strengthen his own position.[4] Again, what evidence is there that the nobility attempted to prevent any king or any canton from accomplishing 'the work of union'; or that any canton or any king, except Bituitus, the Arvernian, whose power was broken in 121 B.C., and perhaps Vercingetorix, attempted to accomplish that work?

But I am not denying that Mommsen's theory contains a kernel of truth. The dread of tyranny which led to the overthrow of monarchy and impelled the Aedui and doubtless also other peoples to restrict the powers of their magistrates would of course have hampered any statesman who attempted to unite the tribes of Gaul. Only I cannot see that this check would have operated through the combination of nobles of different tribes.

ON THE MEANING OF THE WORDS *AMBACTI*, *CLIENTES*, AND *OBAERATI*

I. Caesar says that the Gallic *equites* surrounded themselves with '*ambacti* and clients' (*eorum* [sc. equitum] *ut quisque est genere copiisque amplissimus, ita plurimos circum se ambactos clientesque habet*).[5] According to the epitomator of Festus[6], *ambactus apud Ennium Gallica lingua servus appellatur*, which I take to mean that Ennius used the Gallic word *ambactus*, learned by the Romans from the Cisalpine Gauls, in the sense of *servus*. Polybius,[7] in a passage which, as M. Jullian observes, might seem to have been copied by Caesar, evidently translates *ambacti* by *συμπεριφερομένους*,—the *entourage* or retainers of a lord. But were all these *συμπεριφερόμενοι* on the same footing? If Ennius was right, *servus*, as the equivalent of *ambactus*, clearly means, not a slave, but, according to a gloss[8]

[1] *B. G.*, i, 3-4. [2] *Ib.*, vii, 4, § 1. [3] *Ib.*, vi, 15, § 1.
[4] *Ib.*, i, 3, § 5; 9, § 3; 18, § 7.
[5] *Ib.*, vi, 15, § 2.
[6] *De significatione verborum*, ed. Müller, 1839, p. 4.
[7] ii, 17, § 12,—*περὶ δὲ τὰς ἑταιρείας* [the Cisalpine Gauls] *μεγίστην σπουδὴν ἐποιοῦντο, διὰ τὸ καὶ φοβερώτατον καὶ δυνατώτατον εἶναι παρ' αὐτοῖς τοῦτον, ὃς ἂν πλείστους ἔχειν δοκῇ τοὺς θεραπεύοντας καὶ συμπεριφερομένους αὐτῷ.*
[8] G. Loewe, *Corpus gloss. Lat.*, ii, 1888, p. 163.

quoted in the editions of Festus, δοῦλος μισθωτός,—a paid servant; and this is the meaning which Mommsen[1] and others attach to *ambactus*: in other words, they regard *ambacti* as retainers inferior to *clientes*.[2] Other writers, including M. Jullian,[3] hold that *ambacti* were clients of the highest order, akin to the Aquitanian *soldurii*,[4] and bound to their lord by ties of gratitude, honour, and religion. There is no evidence for this; and the evidence of Festus, whatever it may be worth, is against it.[5] Caesar in another passage draws a distinction between *servi* and *clientes*. Describing Gallic funerals, he says, 'shortly before our time slaves [?] and retainers who were known to have been beloved by their masters were burned along with them after the conclusion of the regular obsequies' (*paulo supra hanc memoriam servi et clientes quos ab iis dilectos esse constabat iustis funebribus confectis una cremabantur*).[6] I am not quite sure whether *servi* here means 'slaves' or, as A. Holder[7] thinks, δοῦλοι μισθωτοί, that is, *ambacti*. As Schneider says, Caesar appears to use *ambactus* as an established Latin word, though it was of Gallic origin, and does not explain its meaning, as he does that of the Aquitanian word *soldurius*; and this militates against M. d'Arbois's theory, that he wrote *clientesque* as a gloss upon *ambactos*.[8]

M. d'Arbois, in another work,[9] draws a distinction between the words *ambactus* and *cliens*. 'The Gallic word *ambactus*,' he says, 'had no exact equivalent in Latin; its meaning was intermediate between that of *servus* and that of *cliens*; the tie which bound an *ambactus* to his lord was looser than that which bound a *servus* to his owner, closer than that which bound a Roman client to his patron.' M. d'Arbois is here substantially in agreement with those who believe that *ambacti* were inferior retainers. Schneider thinks that the term *ambactus* applies to those who, as Caesar says, entered the service of nobles because they were oppressed by debt or taxation or wronged by powerful individuals, and over whom their respective lords had 'all the rights that masters have over their slaves';[10] while he identifies the *clientes* with the retainers of whom Caesar says in another passage[11] that if their lord failed to protect them against oppression, he lost all authority over them. I am not sure that there is enough evidence to establish this distinction; but I so far agree with Schneider that I incline to regard *ambacti* as retainers of a lower grade than *clientes*; and this is the only theory that has any documentary support.

II. Caesar says that Orgetorix, in order to resist arrest, assembled his *familia*, his 'clients' and his *obaerati* or debtors (*omnem suam familiam ad hominum milia decem undique coegit, et omnes clientes*

[1] *Röm. Gesch.*, iii, 1889, p. 234, note (*Hist. of Rome*, v, 1894, p. 20, note).
[2] Daremberg and Saglio, *Dict. des ant. grecques et rom.*, i, 223.
[3] *Hist. de la Gaule*, ii, 77–8.
[4] *B. G.*, iii, 22, §§ 1–3.
[5] M. Jullian insists that *ambactus* was 'traduit à tort par *servus* chez les lexicographes', that is, Fabius.
[6] *B. G.*, vi, 19, § 4.
[7] *Alt-celtischer Sprachschatz*, i, 115.
[8] Cf. A. Klotz, *Caesarstudien*, p. 46.
[9] *Recherches sur l'origine de la propriété foncière*, &c., 1890, p. 64, n. 1.
[10] *B. G.*, vi, 13, § 2.
[11] *Ib.*, 11, § 4.

obaeratosque suos . . . eodem conduxit).[1] By *obaerati*, says J. Flach,[2] Caesar means not only enslaved debtors, but also clients who rendered military service in return for grants of cattle. This seems to me a gratuitous assertion. Possibly in the phrase *clientes obaeratosque* the latter word might grammatically be regarded as explanatory of the former ; but it seems more natural to identify the *obaerati* with the debtors,[3] mentioned in *B. G.*, vi, 13, § 2. In this passage, as I have already observed, Caesar says that it was usual for men who were burdened with debt or taxes or wronged by powerful individuals to take refuge in servitude to some noble ; and, he adds, the nobles possess the same rights over them that masters have over their slaves (*plerique, cum aut aere alieno aut magnitudine tributorum aut iniuria potentiorum premuntur, sese in servitutem dicant nobilibus : in hos eadem omnia sunt iura quae dominis in servos*).[4] M. d'Arbois de Jubainville,[5] however, concludes from the passage in which Caesar describes the following of Orgetorix that a Gallic chieftain had two classes of retainers, free and non-free ; and assuming that Orgetorix's *familia* included his slaves, and remarking that Caesar distinguishes the *familia* from the *clientes* and *obaerati*, he infers that the *obaerati* were free. The free retainers (*vassaux*) were the companions of their lord, and, although poor, held a rank almost equal to his : they resembled the *sóer-chéli* of Ireland. The other class of ' vassaux ', who resembled the Irish *doer-chéli*, comprised shepherds and rural labourers, whose condition was analogous to that of Roman slaves. I do not altogether agree with M. d'Arbois. He appears to me to overlook the fact, expressly stated by Caesar, that those debtors who sought the protection of a lord, and who surely are to be identified with the *obaerati*, were virtually his slaves, even though they may have been distinct from the slaves, born in slavery or purchased, whom Caesar calls simply *servi*. If I am right, the free retainers, whose position was analogous to that of the Irish *sóer-chéli*, were not the *clientes* and the *obaerati*, but the *clientes* only.[6]

[1] *B. G.*, i, 4, § 2.

[2] *Les origines de l'ancienne France*, 1884, i, 57.

[3] P. Geyer (*Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, v, 1879, p. 341) assumes that these debtors were *clientes* : but Caesar does not call them by that name and there is nothing to show that it was applicable to them.

[4] *B. G.*, vi, 13, §§ 2–3.

[5] *Recherches sur l'origine de la propriété foncière*, &c., pp. 64–5.

[6] The following remarks of Sir Henry Maine (*Early Hist. of Institutions*, pp. 167–9) illustrate the position of the *obaerati* :—' We obtain from the [Irish] law-tracts a picture of an aristocracy of wealth in its most primitive form ; and we see that the possession of this wealth gave the nobles an immense power over the non-noble freemen who had nothing but their land. Caesar seems to me to be clearly referring to the same state of relations in the Celtic sister society, when he speaks of the Gaulish chiefs, the Equites, having one principal source of their influence in the number of their debtors (*B. G.*, i, 4 ; *B. G.*, vi, 13). Now you will remember how uniformly, when our knowledge of the ancient world commences, we find plebeian classes deeply indebted to aristocratic orders. At the beginning of Athenian history we find the Athenian commonalty the bond-slaves through debt of the Eupatrids ; at the beginning of Roman history we find the Roman commons in money bondage to the Patricians. The fact has been accounted for in many ways, and it has been

SLAVERY IN GAUL

It has been denied that slavery existed in Gaul; but, as Fustel de Coulanges [1] remarks, three passages in the *Commentaries*, namely v, 45, § 3,[2] vi, 19, § 4,[3] and viii, 30, § 1,[4] prove that it did.

INTER-TRIBAL RELATIONS IN GAUL

C. A. Serrure [5] infers from certain passages in the *Commentaries* that inter-tribal relationship in Gaul was of three kinds, namely (1) simple alliance (*in amicitia esse, in fide esse*), (2) protectorate (*in clientela*), and (3) dependence (*sub imperio esse*). According to the Aeduan, Diviciacus, the Bellovaci had always been *in fide atque amicitia civitatis Haeduae*: in 53 B.C. the Senones sued for Caesar's pardon *per Haeduos quorum antiquitus erat in fide civitas*; and in the following year the Bituriges asked the aid of the Aedui, *quorum erant in fide*, against Vercingetorix.[6] It is clear to my mind that *in fide* denotes something more than mere alliance: it is usually, and I think rightly, translated 'under the protection of': after the submission of the Bellovaci Caesar says that, out of regard for the Aedui and Diviciacus, who had interceded for them, he will himself receive them *in fidem*,[7]—'under his protection'; and Cicero says, speaking of the assassins who had been employed by Chrysogonus, *quaere in cuius fide sint et clientela*.[8] Long [9] is, I believe, right in saying that the Bituriges (and of course he meant the Senones and the Bellovaci as

plausibly suggested that it was the occurrence of repeated bad seasons which placed the small farmers of the Attic and Roman territory at the mercy of wealthy nobles. But the explanation is imperfect unless we keep in mind the chief lesson of these Brehon tracts, and recollect that the relative importance of land and capital has been altering throughout history. . . . In very ancient times land was a drug, while capital was extremely perishable, added to with the greatest difficulty, and lodged in very few hands. . . . The ownership of the instruments of tillage other than the land itself was thus, in early agricultural communities, a power of the first order, and, as it may be believed that a stock of the primitive capital larger than usual was very generally obtained by plunder, we can understand that these stocks were mostly in the hands of noble classes whose occupation was war, and who at all events had a monopoly of the profits of office. The advance of capital at usurious interest, and the helpless degradation of the borrowers, were the natural results of such economical conditions.'

[1] *Hist. des inst. pol. de l'anc. France,—La Gaule rom.*, p. 22.

[2] hic (Vertico) *servo* spe libertatis magnisque persuadet praemiis ut litteras ad Caesarem deferat.

[3] Funera sunt pro cultu Gallorum magnifica . . . ac paulo supra hanc memoriam *servi* et clientes, quos ab iis dilectos esse constabat, iustis funebribus confectis una cremabantur.

[4] Qua ex fuga cum constaret Drappetem Senonem, qui, ut primum defecerat Gallia, collectis undique perditis hominibus, *servis ad libertatem vocatis*, &c.

[5] *Étude sur la numismatique gaul. des Comm. de César*, 1885, p. 35.

[6] *B. G.*, ii, 14, § 2; vi, 4, § 2; vii, 5, § 2.

[7] *Ib.*, ii, 15, § 1.

[8] *Pro Roscio Amerino*, 33, § 93.

[9] *Caesar*, p. 335.

well) were among the *veteres clientes* of the Aedui mentioned in *B. G.*, vi, 12. It is clear, then, that to be *in fide* was consistent with being *in clientela*.

In 53 B.C., the Carnutes, when soliciting Caesar's pardon, availed themselves of the intercession of the Remi, *quorum erant in clientela*.[1] To my mind *in clientela* here denotes virtually the same relationship as *in fide*.

Certain passages in the *Commentaries* prove that *clientela*, which Serrure distinguishes from the state of dependence denoted by the words *sub imperio esse*, was sometimes identical with it. The *clientes* of the Nervii were under their *imperium* ; and the new clients who placed themselves under the protection of the Aedui after Caesar's arrival in Gaul found that they enjoyed in consequence *aequiore imperio*.[2]

The truth is that the word *clientela* was elastic. A state which had clients exercised over them whatever power it could ; and some clients were less dependent upon the same overlord than others. The Bellovaci, the Bituriges, and the Senones were in one sense no doubt clients of the Aedui and the Carnutes of the Remi ; but they were not under their *imperium*, for the Senones and the Carnutes rebelled when the Aedui and the Remi remained loyal. In *B. G.*, vii, 75, § 2, Caesar specifies those clients of the Aedui who contributed along with them contingents for the relief of Vercingetorix, and therefore were presumably under their *imperium* : they were the Segusiavi, the Ambivareti, and the Aulerci Brannovices. The Eleuteti, the Cadurci, the Gabali, and the Vellavii stood in a similar relation to the Arverni.[3]

One wishes, however, that Caesar had or could have told us more of the nature of the hegemony exercised by the Aedui and their principal rivals. Mommsen says that ' A powerful canton induced a weaker to become subordinate on such a footing that the leading canton acted for the other as well as for itself in its external relations and stipulated for it in state treaties, while the dependent canton bound itself to render military service, and sometimes also to pay a tribute '.[4] At all events the dependent canton did sometimes render military service ; and we find the Eburones paying tribute to the Atuatuci.[5] The dependent peoples evidently managed their own internal affairs ; and, as we learn from *B. G.*, vi, 12, §§ 6–8, client tribes, even when they were under *imperium*, occasionally transferred their allegiance from one overlord to another.

What again was the nature of the *imperium* which Diviciacus, king of the Suessiones, exercised over South-Eastern Britain,[6] and how

[1] *B. G.*, vi, 4, § 5. [2] *Ib.*, v, 39, §§ 1, 3 ; vi, 12, § 6.

[3] M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, ii, 440) distinguishes between the Vellavii, who, he holds, were the ' subjects ' of the Arverni, and the Gabali, who perhaps only paid them tribute and owed military service. I cannot see any sufficient reason for this distinction ; for Caesar says that all three tribes were ' under the sway ' of the Arverni (*Cadurcis, Gabalis, Vellaviis, qui sub imperio Arvernorum esse consuerunt* [*B. G.*, vii, 75, § 2]). See, however, p. 345, *supra*.

[4] *Hist. of Rome*, v, 1894, p. 24 (*Röm. Gesch.*, iii, 1889, p. 238).

[5] *B. G.*, i, 31, § 6 ; v, 27, § 2 ; 39, § 1. [6] *Ib.*, ii, 4, § 7.

had it been acquired ? One cannot believe that he had invaded Britain and conquered his Belgic kinsmen. May we suppose that after he had made himself overlord of a 'large part of the Belgic territory', some of the British tribes had sought his aid against their rivals, and had purchased it by recognizing his supremacy and perhaps also by paying tribute ? When Caesar came to Gaul the tribes of South-Eastern Britain were divided into antagonistic groups, headed respectively by the Catuvellauni and the Trinovantes; and perhaps this rivalry may explain both the supremacy of Diviciacus and its decay.[1]

M. d'Arbois de Jubainville[2] warns us not to confound 'les *États* clients avec les *peuples* clients qui ont cessé de former un État séparé et dont l'armée est fondue dans celle de l'État sous l'autorité ou *imperium* duquel ils se sont placés. Ces clients de second ordre ou sujets ne reçoivent pas dans les *Commentaires* . . . le titre d'État, *civitas*, donné par l'auteur aux clients de premier ordre.' The contingents, he goes on to say, of the Aeduan client peoples—the Segusiavi, the Ambivareti, and the Aulerci Brannovices—who formed part of the host which marched to relieve Alesia,[3] 'se confondaient avec celui des Aedui.' This is true: but the contingent of the Cadurci was also lumped with that of the Arverni; yet, as M. d'Arbois has to admit, Caesar calls the Cadurci a *civitas*.[4]

One other inter-tribal tie requires notice,—that which Caesar denotes by the words *fratres consanguineosque*[5] (brethren and kinsmen), which united the Remi and the Suessiones, and by the words *necessarii et consanguinei*[6] (friends and kinsmen), which united the Aedui and the Ambarri. The Reman ambassadors told Caesar that the Suessiones 'had the same rights and laws as themselves and jointly owned the authority of one and the same magistrate', who in their case was a king (*qui eodem iure et isdem legibus utantur, unum imperium unumque magistratum cum ipsis habeant*); and the connexion between the Senones and the Parisii had once apparently been similar.[7] It is remarkable that Caesar uses the same words—*fratres consanguineosque*—to denote the relation into which the Aedui had entered in the second century B. C. with the Roman People.[8]

[1] Rice Holmes, *Anc. Britain*, pp. 299–300.
[2] *Recherches sur l'origine de la propriété foncière*, pp. 30–2, 34.
[3] *B. G.*, vii, 75, § 2. [4] *Ib.*, vii, 6, § 7.
[5] *Ib.*, ii, 3, § 5. [6] *Ib.*, i, 11, § 4. [7] *Ib.*, vi, 3, § 5.
[8] *Ib.*, i, 33, § 2. Cf. 44, § 9. O. Hirschfeld (*Sitzungsberichte d. Königl. preuss. Akad. d. Wissenschaften*, 1897, pp. 1110–2) devotes some interesting pages to this form of alliance.

WERE THE PHILO-ROMAN AND THE ANTI-ROMAN PARTIES IN GAUL IDENTICAL WITH THE REPUBLICANS AND THE ADVENTURERS RESPECTIVELY?

Fustel de Coulanges[1] thinks that the philo-Roman party among the Gauls was identical with the supporters of republican institutions, and the party hostile to Caesar with the powerful adventurers, such as Dumnorix, who aimed at making themselves kings, and with the 'clients' and members of the lower orders who supported them. There is no inconsistency, he maintains, between this general principle and the individual instances in which Caesar set up a king over such and such a people.

Desjardins, on the other hand, says that the object of Caesar in setting up these kings was to curb the democratic spirit and to paralyse the aristocratic leagues.[2]

I show in another article that no democratic spirit worth noticing, in the sense in which Desjardins understands the term, existed in Gaul in Caesar's time;[3] and I do not know what he means by the aristocratic leagues. Caesar set up three kings, Commius, Tasgetius, and Cavarinus; and his object was to reward useful adherents and to strengthen his own hold upon the country.[4]

For the rest, Dumnorix certainly was hostile to Caesar: so was Vercingetorix; and so in general were the powerful adventurers who aimed at making themselves kings: but I do not think that Fustel has proved that the philo-Roman party—if there was such a *party*—was identical with the supporters of republican institutions. Tasgetius and Cavarinus both belonged to royal families, and were no doubt opposed to the supporters of republicanism in their respective states before Caesar appointed them. In Caesar's first campaign there is no evidence that any opposition was offered to him by any of the Gauls, except Dumnorix and his followers. In his second campaign all classes among the Belgae, with the exception of the Remi, appear to have been unanimous in opposing him. In the history of the campaign against the maritime tribes there is no trace of any philo-Roman party, except perhaps among the Eburovices and the Lexovii, whose senates, republican no doubt, were opposed to war; and it is reasonable to suppose that they wished to keep the peace because they had the good sense to perceive that they had no chance of contending successfully against Caesar. In the fifth and sixth campaigns, with the exception of the persistently servile Remi, Tasgetius, Cavarinus, and Cingetorix are the only philo-Romans who are mentioned, and we do not know whether Cingetorix was a republican or not; while Ambiorix and Catuvolcus, both constitutional

[1] *Hist. des inst. pol. de l'anc. France,—la Gaule rom.*, pp. 52–3.
[2] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 548.
[3] See pp. 529–41.
[4] *B. G.*, iv, 21, § 7; v, 25, § 2; 54, § 2.

kings, rebel; and after the disaster at Atuatuca, Caesar has reason to suspect every Gallic people, except the Aedui and the Remi, of rebellious designs. Even then no doubt he had interested adherents among other peoples besides the Aedui and the Remi; but he does not mention them. The opponents of Tasgetius and Cavarinus were his opponents, and surely they were republicans: the Senones and Carnutes, apparently of all parties, were anti-Roman. In the seventh campaign, who were philo-Romans, except the Arvernian opponents of Vercingetorix, republicans, it is true—and their friendship to Rome was a compound of shrewd calculation and hatred of Vercingetorix—a section of the Aedui, the Remi, and the Lingones? Towards the close of the campaign 'so intense was the unanimous determination of the entire Gallic people to establish their liberty and to recover their ancient military renown that no favours, no recollection of former friendship had any influence with them, but all devoted their energies and resources to the prosecution of the war' (*tanta tamen universae Galliae consensio fuit libertatis vindicandae et pristinae belli laudis recuperandae, ut neque beneficiis neque amicitiae memoria moverentur, omnesque et animo et opibus in id bellum incumberent* [vii, 76, § 2]). A passage in Hirtius's narrative of the eighth campaign, however, supports the theory of Fustel: the constitutional party among the Bellovaci appear to have been opposed to hostilities; at least they throw the blame of rebellion upon Correus, the adventurer and leader of the *plebs*.[1]

I believe that there is some truth in Fustel's theory; but it is too broadly stated. Our knowledge amounts to little more than this:—Caesar's friends were his friends, republican or royalist, as the case might be; all whom he could gain over by favours or expectation of favours, all who hoped by his support to triumph over or to pay off old scores against enemies among their own countrymen, all who were shrewd enough to see that he was going to win.

It is remarkable that, with the exception of the Veneti and their allies, and of the Senones, Carnutes, and Treveri, not a single Celtican tribe rose in rebellion against Caesar until the seventh year of the war. I have tried in my narrative to account for this as far as the evidence would allow; but it is possible that if Caesar had chosen to take us into his confidence, there would have been more to say.[2]

Signor Ferrero has recently made a characteristic contribution to the discussion of the subject of this article. He asserts that Caesar after his second campaign 'learnt that the Diets and Assemblies of Notables [that is to say, the tribal councils] were feeble and decadent bodies . . . he made up his mind to abandon the Conservatives . . . and to depend upon the popular party, which had been hitherto steadily opposed to him'.[3] Let us analyse the evidence upon which this theory rests. After the overthrow of the Atrebates in

[1] *B. G.*, i, 17–20; ii, 1–4, 24, § 4; iii, 8, 16, 17, § 3; v, 3–4, 6–7, 26, § 1; 53–4; vi, 3–4, 8, § 9; vii, 4, § 2; 33, § 1; 63, § 7; viii, 21, § 4.

[2] See *B. C.*, iii, 59, which gives us an inkling of his methods.

[3] *Grandezza e decadenza di Roma*, ii, 85–6 (*The Greatness and Decline of Rome*, ii, 61–2).

57 B.C. Caesar nominated Commius as their king,[1] and in acknowledgement of his diplomatic services in Britain 'granted his tribe immunity from taxation, restored to it its rights and laws, and placed the Morini under his authority'.[2] So far as we know, the appointment was not unacceptable to the Atrebates. Tasgetius was a Carnutian 'of noble birth . . . whose ancestors had held sovereignty in their own country, and to whom Caesar, in recognition of his energy and devotion (for in all his campaigns he had found his services exceptionally valuable) had restored their position'. He was made king in 56 B.C., and was assassinated two years later 'with the avowed sanction of many of the citizens'.[3] Cavarinus's 'brother, Moritasgus, had held sovereignty [over the Senones] when Caesar came to Gaul, and his ancestors before him'. In 54 B.C. Cavarinus was sentenced to death by the council of the Senones, and, as he contrived to escape, was formally dethroned and banished.[4] Signor Ferrero, referring to the assassination of Tasgetius, remarks that 'it looked as if the Nationalists intended to make his assassination the beginning of a series of reprisals against all the Gallic leaders who had consented to recognize the Roman dominion'.[5] Evidently, then, if Signor Ferrero is right, Caesar had only succeeded in inducing Tasgetius to betray the Nationalists in his own country, and had completely failed to gain the support of 'the popular party'. But what are the facts? There is not the least evidence that Tasgetius was ever a Nationalist: he was from the first an ardent philo-Roman. The citizens who sanctioned his assassination may have been members of the 'Diet' themselves; and it is clear that if Cavarinus was sentenced to death by the Nationalists, the Nationalists and the council were identical, and the action of the council, which Signor Ferrero assumes to have been republican and 'conservative', was neither 'decadent' nor 'feeble', but rather headstrong. About the state of parties among the Atrebates we know absolutely nothing: Commius was, for aught that we know, not only originally a philo-Roman himself but the most influential representative of the philo-Roman party. M. Jullian,[6] who does not commit himself to any theory about the Nationalists, thinks that in promoting Tasgetius and Cavarinus, Caesar so far renounced his policy of protecting the oligarchies. But we do not know whether that had been his settled rule; and, as I have just remarked, the Senonian oligarchy at all events was vigorously anti-Roman.

It all comes to this. There is not one tittle of evidence that Caesar ever changed his policy. He appointed Tasgetius and Cavarinus because they seemed the best instruments that he could find to keep the Carnutes and the Senones respectively under control; and, as far as we can tell, they succeeded for a time in doing so. Those two tribes were the most irreconcilable of all Caesar's enemies; and their 'feeble and decadent' councils were evidently 'plus nationalistes que les nationalistes'.

[1] *B. G.*, iv, 21, § 7. [2] *Ib.*, vii, 76, § 1. [3] *Ib.*, v, 25, § 1. [4] *Ib.*, 54, § 2.
[5] *The Greatness and Decline of Rome*, ii. 81. The passage is not in the Italian ed. of 1902. [6] *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 315

Nothing is easier for a clever man than to compose a plausible and interesting account of *la haute politique* in Gaul, as practised by Caesar, if he is ready to ignore facts and give the rein to his imagination. But even with all the help that we can get from Cicero's letters, we know too little of the course of politics in Italy; and of the course of politics in Gaul we know hardly anything.

THE DRUIDS[1]

1. Where and when did Druidism originate? Caesar in a well-known passage remarks that it was believed to have been discovered in Britain and to have been imported thence into Gaul;[2] and some scholars accept this tradition as literally true. The earliest extant mention of Druids, the substance of which was reproduced in Diogenes Laertius's *Lives of the Philosophers*,[3] was made by Sotion of Alexandria[4] about the commencement of the second century before Christ,—not long after the Belgic conquest of Britain began; and it has been supposed that the conquerors found Druidism flourishing there, and made it known in the land from which they had set out. But the Belgae were not the first Celtic conquerors of Britain; and it is reasonable to suppose that if Druidism was of British origin, it had been imported into Gaul before. Maximin Deloche argued that it could not have originated in Gaul, since the Gallic invaders of Italy knew nothing of it:[5] but A. Réville replied, first, that Caesar did not affirm its British origin, but only recorded the belief which he found prevalent among the Gauls; and, secondly, that if the Gauls who invaded Italy had no Druids, Druids may nevertheless have existed in Gaul before the invasion 'à l'état d'humble compagnie de sorciers-médecins'.[6] This of course is a mere conjecture; but the assumption that Brennus and his followers were not accompanied by Druids is only an inference from the silence of the historians and from the statement of Pausanias[7] that the Gallic chief who attacked Delphi did not employ any Greek priests or 'diviners';[8] and in the third century B.C. at all events the Cisalpine Boi had priests.[9] Indeed the prevalent theory is that Druidism was pre-Celtic and developed in the Neolithic Age in Gaul or in Britain, possibly in both; and if this belief were well founded, it would

[1] The etymology of the word 'Druid' is still disputed. M. d'Arbois de Jubainville (*Rev. celt.*, xxix, 1908, p. 83) defends Thurneysen's view—that it was derived from '*dru* (fortement), *uid* (savant)'—against M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, ii, 85, n. 7).

[2] *B. G.*, vi, 13, § 11,—Disciplina in Britannia reperta atque inde in Galliam translata existimatur.

[3] Ed. Didot, p. 1, ll. 9–12.

[4] Or possibly in the treatise called τὸ Μαγικόν, once erroneously ascribed to Aristotle. Diogenes cites both.

[5] *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, 3e pér., xxiv, 1877, p. 466.

[6] *Ib.*, pp. 473–5.

[7] x, 21, § 1.

[8] Cf. C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, ii, 89.

[9] Livy, xxiii, 24, § 12.

follow that, unless Druidism was a late importation from Britain, the Gallic invaders of Italy must have known it before they left their own country. M. Salomon Reinach[1] attributes the megalithic monuments of Gaul to Druidical influence, arguing that their construction is inexplicable except on the hypothesis of 'a religious aristocracy exercising an almost absolute dominion over a numerous population'. But is it necessary to suppose that this aristocracy was a hierarchy? And if it is a fair conclusion that the supposed hierarchy was composed of Druids, might it not be argued that Druidism was a world-wide institution, or at least co-extensive with rude stone monuments?[2] M. Jullian,[3] remarking that the Germans, who were congeners of the Celts and had always been more or less closely connected with them, had no priests in Caesar's time,[4] but had a century later,[5] argues that among the Celts also the priestly office had once been exercised by the tribal kings, but had naturally become specialized: in other words, he holds that Druidism was a Celtic institution, which made its appearance comparatively late,—probably in the third century B.C. But Druidism, as we may infer from Caesar's words, had flourished in Britain long before his time, and, as we may infer from the *Annals*[6] of Tacitus, especially in the western and less civilized districts; and it may be doubted whether at the time of its birth remote British tribes were politically or socially more advanced than the German contemporaries of Caesar. M. Jullian indeed urges that if the Druidical doctrine originated in Britain, Druids may nevertheless have first appeared in Gaul; for, he says, 'la doctrine et le clergé d'une religion peuvent avoir des berceaux fort différents: voyez le Christianisme.'[7] But, replies M. d'Arbois de Jubainville, Christianity was introduced into the Roman Empire by Jews,—the disciples of Jesus: besides, how could an unwritten doctrine like Druidism have been imported into Gaul from Britain unless Druids had brought it?[8] M. Jullian's theory implies that in Britain Druidism was a religion without a clergy; that after it was imported into Gaul, a clergy was formed, who were called Druids; and that subsequently Britain, which had given Druidism to Gaul, borrowed from Gaul the idea of appointing Druids. Is not this very improbable?

[1] *Comptes rendus de l'Acad. des inscr.*, 4e sér., xx, 1892, pp. 6–7. See also Rice Holmes, *Anc. Britain*, p. 291, n. 2.

[2] M. Reinach (*Orpheus*, 1909, p. 177) is now inclined to believe that Druidism originated in the Neolithic Age in the British Isles; that it flourished principally in Ireland; and that it early spread to the Continent. Julius Pokorny (*Celtic Review*, v, 1908–9, p. 19) insists that 'the fact that the oak plays no part in the life of the Irish Druid and a very small one in the popular superstition can be explained only if we assume that the Druids were originally the priests of a people who did not know the oak worship', that is (*ib.*, p. 6) of 'the pre-Celtic aborigines of the British islands'. I cannot follow this argument. If Pokorny has stated the facts correctly, they only prove that oak-worship was unknown to the Irish aborigines, and that the Celtic invaders of Ireland, who undoubtedly knew it, were unable or unwilling to impose it upon them.

[3] *Hist. de la Gaule*, ii, 88–9.

[4] *B. G.*, vi, 21, § 1.

[5] Tacitus, *Germania*, 10.

[6] xiv, 30.

[7] *Hist. de la Gaule*, ii, 87, n. 3.

[8] *Rev. celt.*, xxix, 1908, p. 81.

My own belief is that there will always be room for hypotheses; but that we can never get behind Caesar's report of the Gallic tradition that the *disciplina*—the Druidical doctrine—originated in Britain, and, in the absence of other positive testimony, had better cling to it. Caesar's statement is sometimes explained in the sense that in his time Druidism was more vigorous in Britain than in Gaul, and that Gallic Druids therefore travelled to Britain in order to be initiated into its mysteries;[1] but why should we not accept it in its natural sense?

2. Desjardins[2] points out that there is no evidence that Druidism existed in Caesar's time in Aquitania or in the Roman Province; and, he says, it seems clear from Caesar's narrative that the Romans came in contact with Druids for the first time when they had passed beyond the northern boundary of Roman territory. But neither is there any evidence that Druidism did not exist in the Province; and it seems clear that it must have existed there before the inhabitants became Romanized. Sir John Rhys[3] maintains further, that there is no evidence that Druidism was ever the religion of any Brythonic people; and since he assigns almost the whole of Britain south of the firths of Forth and Clyde to the Brythons, he appears to restrict the British area of Druidism to a narrow western fringe. This hardly accords with Caesar's statement that Britain was the stronghold of Druidism. Moreover, when Caesar tells us that the Druids were the religious aristocracy of the Gauls, he plainly gives us to understand that Druidism was common to all the peoples who lived between the Seine and the Garonne; and it is certain that among these peoples the Gallo-Brythonic element was predominant. Indeed, although it is commonly assumed that the Belgae had no Druids, there is absolutely no ground for the assumption. Caesar often used the word *Galli* in a comprehensive sense, including the Belgae; and it is not improbable that when he was describing the manners and customs of the Gauls, and Druidism, which was their most remarkable institution, he intended his description to apply to the Belgae.[4]

3. It has often been alleged that Caesar overestimated the power of the Druids.[5] Réville, observing that there is no evidence that Vercingetorix received any support from them, holds that Caesar was misled by Diviciacus, who hoped by exaggerating the importance

[1] See *Neue Jahrb. f. Philologie*, &c., cxlv, 1892, p. 770.

[2] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 515.

[3] *Celtic Britain*, 3rd ed., 1904, p. 69.

[4] 'The political condition of the people of Brythonic Britain,' says Sir John Rhys (*Celtic Britain*, 3rd ed., 1904, pp. 57, 61), 'towards the end of the Early Iron Age and the close of their independence, is best studied in connection with that of Gaul as described by Caesar. . . . The state of things, politically speaking, which existed in Gaul, existed most likely among the Belgic tribes in Britain.' That is to say, Sir John accepts the political part of Caesar's description as applying to the Belgic and the other Brythonic tribes of both Gaul and Britain. Yet he insists that that part of the same description which deals with Druidism, and which is indissolubly connected with the political part, has nothing to do either with the Belgae or the other Brythons.

[5] Cf. Roget de Belloguet, *Ethnogénie gauloise*, 1858–68, iii, 310, and *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 430.

of his own order[1] to secure for himself 'l'hégémonie spirituelle de la Gaule'.[2] Desjardins,[3] however, points out that by such misrepresentation Diviciacus would have defeated his own object; and he believes that Vercingetorix regarded the Druids as antagonistic to his own power and therefore would have nothing to do with them. Desjardins's view is that Caesar's account is correct as far as it goes, but that it refers to a state of things anterior to the Roman conquest, especially as regards the custom of human sacrifice. This is a pure guess, based, I suppose, upon the notion that the Gauls, in Caesar's time, were too civilized to sacrifice human victims. But Caesar tells us that it was their custom to torture to death the warrior who was the last to present himself at the general muster which preceded a military expedition;[4] and if the Romans, in the second Punic war, offered human victims to the gods,[5] if suttee prevailed two generations ago in India, why should it be incredible that human sacrifice was practised in Gaul? Moreover, Tertullian[6] affirms that the Druids offered human sacrifices to Mercury, and Suetonius[7] speaks of 'the superstition of the Druids with its terrible cruelty'. Sir John Rhys[8] says that 'in Ireland . . . druidism and the kingship went hand in hand; nor is it improbable that it was the same in Gaul, so that when the one fell, the other suffered to some extent likewise'; while Duruy[9] affirms that the nobles had dealt a fatal blow at the power of the Druids. I cannot find a scrap of evidence in support of this assertion; on the contrary, Caesar expressly says that in 52 B.C. the Aeduan Vergobret, or chief magistrate, was elected by the priests.[10] Mommsen[11] takes a different view from Duruy's. 'It may readily be conceived,' he says, 'that such a priesthood attempted to usurp,

[1] Fustel de Coulanges (*Hist. des inst. pol. de l'anc. France,—la Gaule rom.* p. 29, n. 2) remarks that Caesar, who knew Diviciacus intimately, does not say that he was a Druid. But Cicero, who conversed with him on matters of religion, says that he was; and Caesar's silence proves nothing. When one reads the passage in Cicero, his testimony appears conclusive:—*eaque divinationum ratio ne in barbaris quidem gentibus neglecta est, siquidem et in Gallia Druidae sunt, e quibus ipse Divitiacum Haeduum . . . cognovi, qui et naturae rationem, quam φυσιολογίαν Graeci appellant, notam esse sibi profitebatur et partim auguriis, partim coniectura, quae essent futura dicebat,* &c. *De Divin.*, i, 41, § 90. M. Salomon Reinach (*Orpheus*, 1909, p. 179) thinks that we must distinguish between nobles who had been merely educated by Druids, 'comme était sans doute ce Divitiac,' and 'the sacerdotal body properly so called'; but the fact of Diviciacus's having received a Druidical education does not invalidate Cicero's statement,—that he was himself a Druid.

[2] *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, 3e pér., xxii, 1877, p. 849.

[3] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 532.

[4] *B. G.*, v, 56, § 2.

[5] Livy, xxii, 57, §§ 1–6.

[6] *Apologeticus*, 9, *Adversus Gnosticos*, 7, quoted by M. M. P. Monceaux in *Rev. hist.*, xxxv, 1887, p. 255.

[7] *Claudius*, 25,—'Druidarum religionem dirae immanitatis.' A. Bertrand, remarking (*La religion des Gaulois*, p. 252) that there is no trace of human sacrifice in the history of Ireland—'le pays druidique par excellence'—argues (pp. 68–73, 386) that the Druids did not originate, but merely tolerated and sanctioned this rite, which he believes to have been a survival of prehistoric times.

[8] *Celtic Heathendom*, 1888, p. 231.

[9] *Hist. des Romains*, iii, 1889, pp. 119, 131.

[10] *B. G.*, vii, 33, § 3.

[11] *Hist. of Rome*, v, 1894, p. 20 (*Röm Gesch.*, iii, 1889, p. 237).

as it partially did usurp, the secular government. . . . The Gauls were not much removed from an ecclesiastical state with its pope and councils, its immunities, interdicts, and spiritual courts.' If we are entitled to infer from Caesar's silence that the Druids did not play the part of a national priesthood in the Gallic war, does the truth of the inference prove that their power had been broken by the nobles?[1]

But the silence of Caesar regarding the part which the Druids played in the great rebellion has exercised the ingenuity of many commentators. 'A singularly powerful priesthood,' says Professor Haverfield,[2] 'numbering political leaders, like Divitiacus, among its ranks, might be expected in a national crisis to take some definite line, requiring notice in the *Commentaries*. Yet omit two chapters, and so far as the *Commentaries* go, the Druids might never have existed.' M. Jullian[3] argues that they did take an active part in the rebellion, but that Caesar chose to ignore the fact: Caesar '*a laïcisé à outrance l'esprit et l'histoire de la Gaule . . . Nul ne croira que la Gaule n'ait pas appelé prêtres et dieux à son secours*'. Professor Haverfield, who naturally asks 'What motive had Caesar for this?' suggests that an analogy 'to these powerful non-political priests . . . is provided by various priestly *collegia* at Rome, which include political teachers, but which in their augural or other capacity take no political action', and maintains that the Druids, 'as Druids, uttered no word against Caesar or for him.' But if so, why, at a time when their power had certainly diminished, did they aid and abet the insurrection of Civilis?[4] To my mind Caesar's attitude hardly needs explanation. Unless he had a motive for concealment, he omitted nothing which had an important bearing upon his operations, but he omitted everything else. I agree with M. Jullian that Druids, as Druids or as individuals, sided with or against the rebels in the movement of 52 B. C.: it is inconceivable that they held aloof.[5] That they interfered as a corporation is, however, most improbable. It is incredible that in the inter-tribal politics of Gaul they should have habitually acted with unanimity; otherwise, in the event, for instance, of a war between the Aedui and the Sequani, the Druids in one state or the other would have been ranged against their fellow-countrymen. Froude's assertion[6] that, 'So far as can be seen, the Druids were on the Roman side,' is, I suppose, based upon the facts that Caesar's friend and ally, Diviciacus, was a Druid, and that Convictolitavis, whose candidature for the office of Vergobret Caesar supported, was the nominee of the Druids.[7] But one swallow does not make a summer; and even if the Aeduan Druids

[1] Michelet (*Hist. de France*, i, 63, ed. 1835) fancies that *B. G.*, vii, 1–2 show that Druids played an important part in initiating the great rebellion; but, as Fustel remarks (*Hist. des inst. pol. de l'anc. France,—la Gaule rom.*, p. 31, n. 2), this whimsical notion is unsupported by any evidence.

[2] *Eng. Hist. Rev.*, xviii, 1903, p. 336.

[3] *Vercingétorix*, pp. 107–11.

[4] Tacitus, *Hist.*, iv, 54.

[5] Commentators generally forget that Cotuatus, one of the two 'desperadoes' who sacked Cenabum, was a priest (*gutuater*). See pp. 831–2.

[6] *Caesar, a Sketch*, ed. 1886, p. 24.

[7] F. de Coulanges, indeed, says (*Hist. des inst. pol. de l'anc. France,—la*

had been opposed to Caesar, I am not sure that he would have thought it worth while to accentuate their hostility and outrage public opinion by deliberately setting at naught the constitution of his principal allies.[1] I conclude that in the rebellion, save in the case of Convictolitavis,[2] neither the Druids nor any individual Druid exercised an influence which, at all events so far as Caesar knew, sensibly affected the result.[3]

4. Fustel[4] remarks that Caesar does not say that the Druids acted as judges in all suits, but only in almost all (*de omnibus fere controversiis*);[5] and also that he does not say that their jurisdiction,

Gaule rom., p. 27, n. 2) that there is no evidence that the priests by whom Convictolitavis was elected were Druids: but I take leave to say that there is, and that of the most convincing kind. Caesar distinctly says (*B. G.*, vi, 13, §§ 1–3) that in the whole of Celtican Gaul there were only two classes of men who were held in any esteem, the 'knights' (*equites*) and the Druids. He mentions no other priests, except the Druids; and he implies (*ib.*, 13, §§ 4–7, 10) that there were no other. The Aedui were in Celtican Gaul. The priests who elected Convictolitavis were certainly important personages. Is it to be supposed that the Druids, to whom Caesar ascribes such importance, would have permitted any other priests, if there were any, to oust them? The only other Gallic word that denoted a priest was *gutuatros*, which occurs (see p. 832, *infra*) in Gallo-Roman inscriptions, and the Latin form of which was *gutuater*. *Gutuatri*, as M. Salomon Reinach says (*Orpheus*, 1909, p. 179), regulated local cults. I doubt whether it is possible to prove that in pre-Roman times they were not Druids; but if they were a distinct, they were also an inferior order.

[1] M. d'Arbois de Jubainville (*Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., xxxviii, 1879, p. 378) asserts that Caesar 'avait triomphé des chevaliers, grâce à l'appui du sacerdoce qu'il était parvenu à détacher de la cause nationale'. There is simply no evidence for this sweeping assertion except the fact that Diviciacus was on Caesar's side; and if the Druids were so powerful that their alleged support enabled Caesar to triumph over the 'knights', why were they powerless to prevent or even to put the least drag on the insurrection in 52 B. C.?

[2] The procedure of the Druids in the election of Convictolitavis is somewhat obscure. Caesar says that he 'authorized Convictolitavis, who had been appointed by the priests, in accordance with tribal custom in a period of interregnum (or "when the magistrates failed to attend" [?]), to continue to hold office' (*Convictolitavem, qui per sacerdotes more civitatis intermissis magistratibus esset creatus, potestatem obtinere iussit* [*B. G.*, vii, 33, § 4]). Schneider (*Caesar*, ii, 430) interprets *intermissis magistratibus* in the sense that there was *regularly* a period of interregnum after the expiration of the Vergobret's term of office, in which the priests, acting as *interreges*, appointed his successor; but the words leave on my mind the impression that the right of appointment did not ordinarily belong to the priests, and, moreover, *per sacerdotes* is different from *a sacerdotibus*. M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, ii, 48, 103) appears to hold that the right of appointment belonged to the magistrates, or headmen, of the various clans, and that in their default it was exercised by the priests. But why should the magistrates have waived their right? M. Jullian's interpretation of *intermissis* seems to me to conflict with Caesar's use of the word (see Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, ii, 221–2). *Intermissis magistratibus* must, I think, mean 'when the magistracy was (or remained) vacant'; but who the regular electors were is doubtful.

[3] M. Jullian in his *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 373–6, suggests that the prominent part which the Carnutes played against Caesar not only in the great rebellion but also in the two years that preceded it may have been due to the instigation of the Druids, whose annual council was held in their territory (*B. G.*, vi, 13, § 10). Perhaps; but how little we know!

[4] *Hist. des inst. pol. de l'anc. France,—la Gaule rom.*, pp. 19–20.

[5] *B. G.*, vi, 13, § 5. Cf. H. d'A. de Jubainville in *Rev. celt.*, viii, 1887, p. 519,

as far as it extended, was obligatory, but rather leaves on our minds the impression that litigants sought it voluntarily. M. G. Bloch[1] argues that the suitors who appealed to Druids probably all belonged to the upper class, who, having unlimited rights over their dependants,[2] doubtless decided their disputes. Moreover, the Aeduan Vergobret had 'the power of life and death over his countrymen',[3] just as fathers had over their wives and children;[4] and the chief magistrate adjudicated on offences against the state,[5] though the punishment which he inflicted may have been sanctioned and superintended by Druids. Fustel infers, moreover, from Caesar's statement that every one submitted to the verdicts of the Druids,[6] that they had no power of enforcing them. No power, though they could and did excommunicate those who were refractory! Besides, Caesar distinctly says that those who were excommunicated were outside the pale of the law (*neque his petentibus ius redditur*).[7] Whether the law here spoken of was that administered by the Druids themselves or by the secular authorities, matters nothing. Practically, if Caesar was not misinformed, the Druids had the most irresistible power of enforcing their judgements.

5. Desjardins[8] and others hold that the Druids and the oligarchical nobles were leagued together to repress the democratic aspirations of the populace; but, as Fustel points out,[9] there is no evidence whatever in support of this view. Nor, I may add, is there any evidence that such aspirations existed,[10] at all events that any leader had arisen to formulate and sustain them. As the knights, or many of them, sent their sons to be educated by Druids, and as many Druids must have belonged to noble families, it may be reasonably inferred that the two orders had common interests; and when an ambitious noble endeavoured to raise the populace for his own purposes, the Druids may have used their spiritual powers against him: but all this is mere conjecture.

WAS THE REBELLION OF VERCINGETORIX A DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT?

Albert Réville has written two very interesting and very ingenious articles upon Vercingetorix in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* for August and September, 1877. One of his objects is to show that the rebellion of which Vercingetorix was the leader was not merely a national

and *Les premiers habitants de l'Europe*, ii, 1894, p. 375, and C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, ii, 100–1. M. Jullian remarks (p. 101, n. 3) that 'la formation des cités [*civitates*] . . . a dû contribuer à affaiblir l'autorité judiciaire des druides'. But were not many of the 'cités' formed by the union, more or less loose, of *pagi* before the late date to which M. Jullian assigns the rise of Druidism?

[1] *Rev. internat. de l'enseignement*, Août 1895, p. 151.
[2] *B. G.*, vi, 13, §§ 3, 5. [3] *Ib.*, i, 16, § 5. [4] *Ib.*, vi, 19, § 3.
[5] *Ib.*, i, 4; v, 56, § 3; vii, 4, § 1. [6] *Ib.*, vi, 13, § 10. [7] *Ib.*, §§ 6–7.
[8] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 529. Cf. C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, ii, 107.
[9] *Hist. des inst. pol. de l'anc. France,—la Gaule rom.*, p. 31, n. 1.
[10] See pp. 529-41.

movement for the overthrow of the Roman dominion, but also a movement for the vindication of popular rights. 'Notre démocratie,' he says, 'remonte par ses origines premières jusqu'au parti égalitaire, impatient de l'oligarchie, déjà national, qui permit à Vercingétorix de grouper un instant sous ses ordres les forces de la Gaule entière.' [1] Similarly, Mommsen, who asserts that most of the Gallic attempts to throw off the Roman yoke 'were to an undue extent the work of certain prominent nobles', appears to think that in 52 B.C. the situation was reversed. Describing how rapidly the insurrectionary movement spread after Vercingetorix had declared himself, he says, 'where the common council made any difficulty, the multitude compelled it to join the movement.' [2] Desjardins takes the same view. Of the nobles and the Druids he says that the rebellion of Vercingetorix was 'un mouvement national accompli sans eux et malgré eux'. Indeed he appears to consider that the democratic movement had begun or was beginning when Caesar first set foot in Gaul. He tries to prove that the state of society described by Caesar in *B. G.*, vi, 13, 15, in which the lower classes had no political power, belonged to a period anterior to Caesar's arrival. 'Pendant les huit années qu'il passa dans les Gaules, il semble qu'une révolution fut, sinon accomplie, du moins en voie de s'accomplir, car cette infériorité politique du peuple s'était déjà profondément modifiée au temps de Vercingétorix, que nous voyons en effet, avec l'aide de ses clients, et malgré la noblesse arverne, malgré sa famille, appeler son pays aux armes . . . il n'est pas possible de se méprendre sur le double caractère du soulèvement qui se produisit alors, non pas seulement en faveur de la patrie—de la patrie mal défendue jusque-là par la noblesse—mais encore en faveur de la liberté.' In another passage, alluding to the statement which Ambiorix, king of the Eburones, is reported to have made regarding the popular rights by which his own authority was limited—*suaque esse eius modi imperia ut non minus haberet iuris in se multitudo quam ipse in multitudinem*—Desjardins says, 'il faut donc admettre que, dans certaines cités de la Gaule,—exceptionnellement, peut-être même seulement chez les nations qui cachaient et défendaient si bien leur liberté dans les épaisses profondeurs de l'Ardenne, il existait,—chez un peuple au moins,—avant la révolution politique accomplie par le héros arverne,—une constitution admettant la classe inférieure au partage de certains droits publics.' [3]

Two questions, then, of considerable historical importance have to be discussed. First, whether a democratic revolution was in progress in Gaul, or was in process of inception, during the first six years of Caesar's proconsulship; in other words, whether Caesar's account of the condition of the Gallic *plebs* is to be regarded as applying

[1] *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, 3e pér., xxiii, 1877, p. 75.

[2] *Hist. of Rome*, v, 1894, pp. 76, 99 (*Röm. Gesch.*, iii, 1889, pp. 280, 299).

[3] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 539–43. I omit the arguments of F. Monnier (*Vercingétorix et l'indépendance gauloise*, 3rd ed., 1883, pp. 174, 282), based upon a gross mistranslation of *B. G.*, vii, 29, § 6 and 43, § 1, which I refuted in the first edition (p. 537).

not to those six years but to an earlier period. Secondly, whether such a revolution began during, and was stimulated by, the rebellion of Vercingetorix. I shall quote and examine *seriatim* every single passage in Caesar's narrative that bears upon either question.

(1) In i, 2–4 Caesar describes the origin of the Helvetian emigration. Orgetorix *apud Helvetios longe nobilissimus et ditissimus* concocted a plan with his brother nobles (*coniurationem nobilitatis fecit*), and persuaded the state (*civitati persuasit*)—which, if it does not mean the government, must mean either the whole community, whom an individual would not have had time to persuade, or those leading men who could influence the community—to emigrate *en masse*. Orgetorix was chosen to superintend the necessary arrangements. He undertook a diplomatic mission to Gaul, and secretly formed a triumvirate with Dumnorix and Casticus, son of a former king of the Sequani. The plan devised by Orgetorix was that the three should seize the disused royal power in their respective states; that Orgetorix should help the other two to secure their thrones; and finally that the three should divide between them the supremacy of Gaul. The Helvetii got information of the conspiracy, and summoned Orgetorix to answer for his conduct. He appeared before his judges with an army of clients, debtors, and slaves. Then comes the passage which we are in search of. It tells us that 'the state' was provoked to assert its authority by force of arms; that 'the magistrates' raised a posse from the country side; and that Orgetorix perished (*cum civitas ob eam rem incitata armis ius suum exsequi conaretur, multitudinemque hominum ex agris magistratus cogerent, Orgetorix mortuus est*). *Civitas* here plainly means the state or the leading men as represented by the magistrates, who take the initiative. There is nothing in the three chapters that indicates anything like a popular revolution, anything different from the state of society depicted by Caesar, in which the *plebs* are without political power. Even if *civitas* in the expression *civitati persuasit* means 'the whole community', including the *plebs*, that does not prove that the *plebs* had begun to enjoy political rights; for of course a whole people could not be coerced into leaving their country.

(2) Some passages in i, 17–20 may throw light upon the question. Liscus, Vergobret of the Aedui, when he and his brother chiefs were taxed by Caesar with neglecting to fulfil their engagement to supply him with corn, replied that 'there were certain individuals who had great influence with the masses' (*esse nonnullos quorum auctoritas apud plebem plurimum valeat*), which simply implies that the Aeduan *plebs*, like the mass of the people in every nation, whether they enjoy definite political power or not, had to be reckoned with, and that clever leaders could work upon them for their own purposes. So in chapter 18 we read that Dumnorix 'was extremely popular with the masses from his open-handedness' (*magna apud plebem propter liberalitatem gratia*). In chapter 20, Diviciacus, begging Caesar not to punish Dumnorix too severely for his treachery, pleads that 'public opinion as well as fraternal affection had weight with him' (*sese et amore fraterno et existimatione vulgi commoveri*). But this only

proves that, even in a country governed by a powerful aristocracy, it is dangerous to ride roughshod over pronounced popular sentiment; and this needs no proof.

(3) The next passage tells more in favour of Desjardins's theory, though, strange to say, he has overlooked it:—*Aulerci Eburovices Lexoviique senatu suo interfecto, quod auctores belli esse nolebant*,[1] &c. Who put the senate to death? One would be inclined to say that they fell victims to an outburst of popular fury; and this is how Mommsen[2] understands the passage. I do not think that such an interpretation can be regarded as certain; because there is no proof that the senate comprised the whole of the *equites*; and those of that class who dissented from the policy of the senate may have been the authors or the instigators of the massacre. Obviously the actual murderers must have been comparatively few in number; and the natural conclusion is that they were hounded on by influential men. But assuming that what Caesar describes was a spontaneous outburst of popular fury, should we be warranted in concluding that 'une révolution fut, sinon accomplie, du moins en voie de s'accomplir'?

(4) When the motley host of Viridovix had been duped by Sabinus's emissary, 'they would not suffer Viridovix and the other leaders to leave the assembly until they had agreed to let them arm and make a dash for the camp' (*non prius Viridovicem reliquosque duces ex concilio dimittunt quam ab iis sit concessum arma uti capiant et ad castra contendant*).[3] This passage proves that Viridovix and his officers were incapable of restraining their undisciplined followers; but it no more invalidates Caesar's general statement about the political nullity of the Gallic populace than the attack which the 53rd Regiment made at the Kali Naddi in defiance of Sir Colin Campbell[4] proves that the British army in 1857 was administered on democratic principles.

(5) The only remaining scrap of evidence is the well-known statement which Caesar attributes to Ambiorix,—*sua esse eiusmodi imperia ut non minus haberet iuris in se multitudo quam ipse in multitudinem*. But in the first place, Caesar can only have written his account of Ambiorix's speech at second, or rather at third hand,—from the report of the report of the deputies who were sent by Sabinus to confer with Ambiorix;[5] and in the second place, supposing that Ambiorix was correctly reported, is it not possible that, as his speech was confessedly intended to deceive Sabinus and Cotta, this particular statement of his may have been intended to give an air of plausibility to his arguments? I will assume, however, that, among the lies which Ambiorix told, this particular statement was true; that, among the Eburones, the multitude—if, indeed, *multitudo* necessarily means 'multitude', and not simply the *equites*, who alone,

[1] *B. G.*, iii, 17, § 3.
[2] *Röm. Gesch.*, iii, 1889, p. 263 (*Hist. of Rome*, v, 1894, p. 55).
[3] *B. G.*, iii, 18, § 7. See p. 92.
[4] Rice Holmes, *Hist. of the Indian Mutiny*, ed. 1904, p. 430.
[5] *B. G.*, v, 27, § 3; 37, § 9.

according to Caesar's express statement, were held in any account, and their clients—did enjoy political power.[1] How little, after all, the statement proves! Desjardins, who begins by affirming that a popular revolution was, if not accomplished, at least in a fair way of being accomplished, can find nothing more to say, after examining his evidence, than this,—that there existed, in one state at least, before the rebellion of Vercingetorix, a constitution which admitted the *plebs* to a share in political power. In *one* state out of more than sixty! Truly this is a lame and impotent conclusion!

. . . . . .

I now proceed to examine the passages in the Seventh Book of the *Gallic War* that bear upon the question whether a democratic revolution in Gaul began during, and was stimulated by, the rebellion of Vercingetorix. (1) The first is in chapter 1. *Indictis inter se principes Galliae conciliis . . . queruntur de Acconis morte; posse hunc casum ad ipsos recidere demonstrant . . . omnibus pollicitationibus ac praemiis deposcunt qui belli initium faciant,* &c. In this passage, the nobles (*principes*), of whom Desjardins says that the rebellion took place 'sans eux et malgré eux', are represented by Caesar as having been its authors![2]

[1] That *multitudo* does not necessarily mean 'the multitude' in the sense of 'the masses', is proved by a passage in vii, 63, § 6, which I shall examine in its turn.

[2] The meaning of the words *princeps* and *principatus*, as used in the *Gallic War*, has been the subject of a good deal of discussion. Deloche (*Mém. présentés par divers savants à l'Acad. des inscr.*, 2e sér., iv, 1860, p. 308) thinks that the term *princeps*, as used in such passages as *indictis inter se principes Galliae conciliis . . . queruntur de Acconis morte* (vii, 1, § 4) and (Dumnorix) *principes Galliae sollicitare . . . coepit* (v, 6, § 4), denoted a magistrate; to which M. d'Arbois de Jubainville (*Rev. celt.*, viii, 1887, p. 226, n. 1) replies that the passage on which Deloche relies—*in pace nullus est communis magistratus, sed principes regionum atque pagorum inter suos ius dicunt controversiasque minuunt* (vi, 23, § 5)—refers to Germany and not Gaul. But the truth is that the word is used in several different senses by Caesar, as any one may convince himself by studying Meusel's *Lexicon Caesarianum*, ii, 1196–1203; and although some of the *principes* mentioned by Caesar were certainly magistrates, it is doubtful whether the word, as such, bears that meaning, except in a very few passages. When used absolutely, *principes* would, as a rule, be most safely translated by 'leading men'. Deloche (*Mém. présentés*, &c., p. 308, n. 3), admits that it sometimes has this meaning; but he nevertheless insists that *princeps* frequently denotes the holder of an office. He cites the passage (vii, 39, § 2) in which Caesar describes the struggle between Convictolitavis and Cotus for the *principatus* of the Aedui; the passage in which we read that Celtillus once held the *principatus* of Gaul (*ib.*, 4, § 1); and the passage in which Caesar describes Sedulius as *dux et princeps Lemovicum* (*ib.*, 88, § 4). 'Since,' he argues, '*dux* evidently denotes the military chief, *princeps* naturally denotes the civil magistrate.' This I freely admit; and I would say the same of *C. Valerio Domnotauro . . . principe civitatis* (vii, 65, § 2) and of *Vertisco, principe civitatis* (viii, 12, § 4). Moreover, when we read that after the death of Indutiomarus *Cingetorigi . . . principatus atque imperium est traditum* (vi, 8, § 9), we can hardly deny that the *principatus* transferred to Cingetorix was the first magistracy. On the other hand, in vi, 22, § 2 the *magistratus* of the Germans are differentiated from those who were only *principes*; while in vii, 39, § 2 (*his* [Eporedorix and Viridomarus] *erat inter se de principatu contentio*) *principatus* is obviously vague, for Convictolitavis had already been appointed chief magistrate, and the meaning is simply that the two men 'were rivals for power'.

(2) In chapter 4 we read that Vercingetorix, on hearing that the Carnutes had actually commenced the insurrection, *convocatis suis clientibus facile incendit. Cognito eius consilio, ad arma concurritur. Prohibetur a Gobannitione patruo suo, reliquisque principibus, qui hanc temptandam fortunam non existimabant; expellitur ex oppido Gergovia; non desistit tamen, atque in agris habet delectum egentium ac perditorum. Hac coacta manu, quoscumque adit ex civitate ad suam sententiam perducit . . . magnisque coactis copiis, adversarios suos, a quibus paullo ante erat eiectus, expellit ex civitate. Rex ab suis appellatur. Dimittit quoque versus legationes . . . omnium consensu ad eum defertur imperium.* These last words cannot, except by a most forced interpretation, refer to a popular election. They probably mean that Vercingetorix was elected commander by a general council of the chiefs of the insurgent states, or recognized as such by the senate of each several state: they may also imply that this arrangement was sanctioned by popular sentiment.[1] The rest of the passage contains nothing to warrant us in supposing that the populace were asserting their rights against the nobles: it only shows that Vercingetorix, at the head of his clients and his popular levies, banished from Gergovia his brother chiefs, who objected to rebellion. Nor is there

Finally, the passage in which Celtillus is mentioned tells directly against Deloche; for every one who has the most elementary knowledge of Gallic history knows that the *principatus totius Galliae* was not a definite office. The Sequani at one time held that *principatus* (vi, 12, §§ 4, 6), and at another time the Aedui (i, 43, § 7). Caesar only means that Celtillus, as the most powerful chief of the Arverni, exercised at one time a kind of loose and indefinite supremacy over Gaul. Again, C. Valerius Troucillus was certainly not the chief civil authority of the Province, though Caesar (*ib.*, 19, § 3) calls him *principem Galliae provinciae*; and Cingetorix, the Treveran, who is called *alterius principem factionis* (v, 56, § 3), was simply the leader of the party opposed to Indutiomarus, which does not prove that he then held any civil appointment.

G. Braumann (*Die Principes der Gallier und Germanen bei Cäsar und Tacitus*, reviewed in Bursian's *Jahresbericht*, lxviii, 1868, p. 73, with which cf. H. d'A. de Jubainville's *Recherches sur l'origine de la propriété foncière*, &c., 1890, pp. 46–9) agrees with the opinion, now modified, which I expressed in my first edition: the *principes*, he holds, were simply the most prominent among the *nobiles* or *equites*, and had no special office as such. With the few exceptions which I have noted, I still hold that this, as far as we can ascertain, is true; but it is possible that the *principes civitatum* whom Caesar occasionally mentions were, or included, the magistrates of their respective states or *pagi*. Whether the word *principes* denoted their official character is another question. Cf. C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, ii, 39, n. 6; 46, n. 1.

[1] Desjardins (*Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 543) admits that, in this passage, there is no allusion to a regular *concilium*; but he goes on to say, 'il y eut du moins acclamation populaire.' Very likely; but popular acclamation does not imply popular revolution. Desjardins believes that Strabo was thinking of this passage when he said (iv, 4, § 3) that Gallic generals were elected by popular suffrage. This may be true; though it seems more likely that Strabo was thinking of a passage in *B. G.*, vii, 63, § 6, to which I shall presently refer. At all events there is no better authority in Caesar for Strabo's statement; and commentators have attached to it an importance which it does not deserve. If such a law or custom had really existed, Caesar would certainly have mentioned it; but, as a matter of fact, Strabo's statement, if by τὸ πλῆθος he meant *plebs*, is absolutely irreconcilable with what Caesar says about the condition of the lower orders.

any evidence that the course of events in the country of the Arverni had its counterpart in any other state.

(3) Chapter 14 relates that Vercingetorix, *tot continuis incommodis Vellaunoduni, Cenabi, Novioduni acceptis suos ad concilium convocat*, and explained to them that thenceforward they must adopt a guerrilla warfare. In the next chapter (15) we are told that this plan was approved *omnium consensu*. Caesar goes on to relate how *deliberatur de Avarico in communi concilio, incendi placeat an defendi. Procumbunt omnibus Gallis ad pedes Bituriges.... Datur petentibus venia, dissuadente primo Vercingetorige, post concedente et precibus ipsorum et misericordia vulgi.* Probably the council mentioned in this chapter was identical with that mentioned in the fourteenth. I will assume, however, that there were two. The former *concilium* is obviously a council of war.[1] *Suos* cannot possibly mean *all* the troops : it means the insurgent chiefs under the command of Vercingetorix. The same may be said of *omnium consensu* and of *omnibus Gallis*. As for *misericordia vulgi*, if *vulgi* does not simply mean the mass of the officers present at the council,[2] the sense must be that Vercingetorix was influenced by the general sympathy which was felt for the Bituriges ; in fact that, like other commanders, he could not ignore the pronounced sentiment of his army.

(4) Chapter 20 contains the famous speech in which Vercingetorix defends himself from the charge of treason :—*Vercingetorix cum ad suos rediisset, proditionis insimulatus... regnum illum Galliae malle Caesaris concessu quam ipsorum habere beneficio—tali modo accusatus ad haec respondit*, &c. ; and chapter 21 describes the effect produced by his vindication :—'*conclamat omnis multitudo ... summum esse Vercingetorigem ducem ... statuunt*,' &c. The expression *omnis multitudo* may refer to the entire host, or as many of them as could hear what Vercingetorix said. But I cannot see that the fact of their having shouted their approval of their general's speech, proves that a popular revolution was in progress. Similar scenes must often have been enacted in Gallic history long before. Nothing is proved except that the most popular and powerful noble could not afford to disregard the wishes of his followers.

(5) Chapter 29 reports the speech which Vercingetorix made after the fall of Avaricum. *Concilio convocato*, writes Caesar, *consolatus cohortatusque est.* Desjardins himself calls this a '*concilium* des officiers' ;[3] and so it obviously was.

(6) Chapter 31 tells us that Vercingetorix tried to gain over the

[1] Meusel bids me remember that '*concilium* is never "a council of war", the word for which is *consilium*'. But does not all depend upon what is to be understood by 'a council of war' ? Caesar calls Roman councils of war *consilia* : but Meusel himself rightly speaks of *concilia principum* ; it is self-evident that when Vercingetorix had to discuss grave matters of state (*B. G.*, vii, 14, § 1 ; 77, § 1) he did not summon 80,000 men to the discussion, but only his officers ; and surely a council assembled to consider military operations may be called a council of war. M. Jullian (*Vercingétorix*, pp. 166, 169) agrees with me. Cf. Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, i, 628–30.

[2] Cf. C. Jullian, *Vercingétorix*, p. 169.

[3] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 541.

dissentient tribes, and bribed their *chiefs* or leading men to join him,[1] and that the *king* of the Nitiobroges came over to his side.

(7) In chapter 32 Caesar relates that when Cotus and Convictolitavis were contending for the office of Vergobret, 'the people were all up in arms; the council and the commonalty were divided; and the rivals were each supported by their own retainers,'[2] who were instruments in their hands.

(8) Chapter 36 shows Vercingetorix at Gergovia in daily consultation with the '*principes* civitatium'.

(9) In chapter 37 we find Convictolitavis trying, in conjunction with others, 'who belonged to a very illustrious family,'[3] to get up a rebellion.

(10) In chapter 42 the Aedui rob and murder Roman citizens; and Convictolitavis, still taking the lead, 'adds fuel to the flame and hounds on the masses to frenzy.'[4]

(11) From chapter 55 we learn that Convictolitavis has gained over 'a large proportion of the [Aeduan] council'. Eporedorix, 'a young Aeduan of noble birth and commanding influence in his own country,'[5] and Viridomarus, whom Caesar had raised 'to the highest dignity',[6] now join the rebellion. Among the Aedui, at all events, the *plebs* are merely instruments in the hands of the nobles.

(12) Chapter 57 says that, when the Parisii and their allies assembled to oppose Labienus, *summa imperii traditur Camulogeno.* It is conceivable perhaps that this may mean that Camulogenus was elected by a *plébiscite*; but it is, in my judgement, certain that the election rested with the chiefs or the *equites.* I am aware that Strabo says, in a passage which has been quoted *ad nauseam*, that Gallic generals used to be elected by 'the multitude' (εἰς πόλεμον εἷς ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους ἀπεδείκνυτο στρατηγός);[7] but I am strongly inclined to believe that Strabo simply based this statement upon the following passage in *B. G.*, vii, 63, § 6:—*Petunt a Vercingetorige Haedui ut ad se veniat rationesque belli gerendi communicet. Re impetrata contendunt ut ipsis summa imperii tradatur; et re in controversiam deducta totius Galliae concilium Bibracte indicitur. Conveniunt undique frequentes. Multitudinis suffragiis res permittitur: ad unum omnes Vercingetorigem probant imperatorem.* Generally, when Caesar speaks of *totius Galliae concilium*, he means a council of chiefs;[8] and undoubtedly that is what he means here.[9] For it is simply absurd to suppose that *concilium* denotes the whole aggregate of tribal contingents which composed the army of Vercingetorix; and when Caesar goes on to say that the Remi, the

[1] animo laborabat ut reliquas civitates adiungeret, atque earum *principes* donis pollicitationibusque adliciebat.

[2] civitatem esse omnem in armis, divisum senatum, divisum populum, suas cuiusque eorum clientelas.

[3] amplissima familia nati.

[4] adiuvat rem proclinatam Convictolitavis plebemque ad furorem impellit.

[5] summo loco natus adulescens et summae domi potentiae.

[6] ad summam dignitatem.

[7] iv, 4, § 3.

[8] *B. G.*, i. 30. § 4; v, 24. § 1; vi, 3, § 4; 14, § 1; vii. 63, § 5; 75, § 1.

[9] Here also Meusel disagrees with me.

Lingones, and the Treveri kept aloof from the council, he evidently implies that it consisted of delegates from the various states. Is it credible that those delegates included representatives of the masses, who could not have borne the expenses of the journey, and who, we are distinctly told, *nulli adhibetur consilio* ? At the most, the *multitudo* can only have comprised the *equites* who were present and the clients who may have accompanied them. [I find that Desjardins regards this *concilium* also as composed of ' chefs '.[1]]

(13) In chapter 75 the *principes* unmistakably take the lead :— *Dum haec ad Alesiam geruntur, Galli concilio principum indicto non omnes qui arma ferre possent, ut censuit Vercingetorix, convocandos statuunt, sed*,[2] &c.

(14) In chapter 76 we read :—*haec in Haeduorum finibus recensebantur numerusque inibatur. Praefecti constituebantur. Commio . . . summa imperii traditur. His delecti ex civitatibus attribuuntur quorum consilio bellum administraretur*.[3] Considering that the number of troops assembled in the country of the Aedui exceeded 250,000, it is clear that both the officers and the civil delegates were chosen, not by a *plébiscite* but by the chiefs.

The above list comprises every single passage in Caesar's *Seventh Commentary* that bears upon the question at issue. That, with all these passages before him, Desjardins should have asserted that the insurrection of 52 B. C. was ' un mouvement national accompli sans eux '—the nobles—' et malgré eux,' only shows how the judgement even of a man of vast learning may be warped by prejudice. A national movement the insurrection assuredly was ; but, so far from having been accomplished ' sans et malgré ' the nobles, it could never have been begun, much less accomplished, without them. It was the nobles of Gaul who planned it. It was the Carnutian nobles who undertook to strike the first blow. It was an Arvernian noble who thenceforth became the life and soul of the movement. At Gergovia he regularly consulted with all the *principes* in his force. When he had proved his natural right to command, the majority of the Aeduan nobles joined him ; and their action encouraged a multitude of waverers. Finally, when he was in extremest peril, the nobles of all Gaul raised and organized the host who marched to rescue him. Yet we are told that the insurrection was accomplished ' sans eux et malgré eux ' ! The passages which I have quoted prove that it was accomplished ' malgré ' the Arvernian nobles,—all except

[1] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 542. Judge then of the amazement with which I have read this passage in his book (p. 691) : ' Chefs et soldats s'y rendirent en foule, et, par un vote populaire—on pourrait même dire par le suffrage universel —le commandement fut confirmé à Vercingétorix.' Evidently the distinguished geographer did not know his own mind.

[2] ' While this was going on at Alesia, the Gauls convened a council of their leading men, who decided not to adopt Vercingetorix's plan of assembling all who could bear arms, but,' &c.

[3] ' The levies ' (destined for the relief of Alesia) ' were reviewed and numbered in the country of the Aedui, and their officers appointed. The chief command was entrusted to Commius. . . . Delegates from the various tribes were associated with them, in accordance with whose advice they were to conduct the campaign.'

Vercingetorix, his cousin Vercassivellaunus, and Critognatus; but that does not greatly support the thesis of Desjardins and Réville. There is nothing which proves—nothing which even renders it in the smallest measure probable—that a democratic revolution had begun.

The statements which Caesar makes about the condition of the *plebs* are so emphatic and so precise that I cannot see what right any commentator has to modify them without the very strongest evidence:—*In omni Gallia eorum hominum qui aliquo sunt numero atque honore genera sunt duo; nam plebes paene servorum habetur loco, quae nihil audet per se, nulli adhibetur consilio. Plerique, cum aut aere alieno aut magnitudine tributorum aut iniuria potentiorum premuntur, sese in servitutem dicant nobilibus; in hos eadem omnia sunt iura quae dominis in servos. Sed de his duobus generibus alterum est druidum, alterum equitum.*[1] We are told that Caesar's words refer to a period anterior to his arrival in Gaul. This cannot be proved; and it is intrinsically most improbable. It is clear at all events that he intended to describe the Gauls of his own time. Partly no doubt he got his information from Gauls whom he trusted, like Diviciacus: partly, keen observer as he was, he saw and judged for himself. I cannot see what motives his informants could have had for trying to mislead him: still less can I see how, after he had passed eight seasons in Gaul and had enjoyed ample opportunities for observation, he should have allowed himself to be misled. It is possible, though it is not proved, that, among the Eburones, the power of the king was limited by the power of the people. But it would be very bad logic to generalize from a doubtful particular, in defiance of the plain statement of our best authority. Still, it is one thing to deny that the Gallic *plebs* had begun, in Caesar's time, to acquire definite political power; quite another thing to deny that they had the power of making their wishes felt. It may be that, as Sir John Rhys supposes, 'the common people were collectively beginning to acquire influence, and already here and there to understand their own power, though they had not yet taken the initiative.'[2] Nor would I deny that, if there was a democratic tendency 'in the air', it became stronger during the rebellion of Vercingetorix: I simply deny that there is any sufficient evidence to decide the question. And when a great historian, whose word with the majority of his readers is law, says of the rebellion of Vercingetorix that, 'where the common council made any difficulty, the multitude compelled it to join the movement,'[3] it is necessary to say that for such a statement there is no evidence at all.[4]

[1] 'Everywhere in Gaul there are two classes only who are of any account or have any distinction; for the masses are looked upon almost as slaves, never venture to act on their own initiative, and are not admitted to any council. Generally when crushed by debt or heavy taxation, or ill treated by powerful individuals, they bind themselves to serve men of rank, who exercise over them all the rights that masters have over their slaves. One of the two classes consists of the Druids, the other of the Knights.' *B. G.*, vi, 13, §§ 1–3.

[2] *Celtic Britain*, 3rd ed., 1904, pp. 60–1.

[3] Mommsen, *Hist. of Rome*, v, 1894, p. 76 (*Röm. Gesch.*, iii, 1889, p. 280).

[4] Since I wrote the rough draft of this article I have come across a paper by

I have lately been reading the chapters in which Fustel de Coulanges describes the political condition of Gaul in Caesar's time. On the whole, he appears to agree with Réville and Desjardins. 'La question,' he says, 'qui divisait le plus la Gaule, à cette époque, était celle de la démocratie.'[1] 'Chaque fois,' he insists, 'qu'un peuple est vaincu, nous voyons les principaux personnages de ce peuple se présenter devant César, l'assurer qu'ils ont combattu malgré eux, et rejeter la responsabilité de la guerre sur "la multitude";'[2] and in support of this assertion he refers to *B. G.*, ii, 13–4, v, 27, vi, 13, and vii, 43. He remarks further that Caesar almost always spoke with contempt of the Gallic forces which opposed him, as composed of the dregs of the population; and he holds that 'la monarchie démocratique' of Vercingetorix was viewed with distrust and even hatred by the aristocracy, and that he counted so little on willing obedience that he required all the Gallic states to give him hostages. 'Il ne régnait qu'à force de se faire craindre.'[3]

Let me examine these arguments. The first is based upon a serious exaggeration. It is not true that every time a Gallic people was conquered the leading men of the state assured Caesar that 'the multitude' had set at naught their authority and insisted upon making war. The Bellovaci did so in the last campaign, and the Aedui assured Caesar that the outrages which followed the defection of Litaviccus had been perpetrated without the sanction of the government: but Caesar refused to accept the excuses of the Bellovaci and only pretended to accept the excuses of the Aedui, and I see no reason why we should be more credulous; while in both cases it is clear that 'the multitude' was a mere tool in the hands of leading men. What Fustel represents as having happened on every occasion did not happen in the Belgic war of 57 B. C.; or in the war with the maritime states in the following year; or, excepting the case of Ambiorix and the Eburones, in the campaigns of 54 and 53 B. C.; or, except in the cases of the Aedui and the Bellovaci, in the great rebellion or in the final campaign.

Caesar says that the army of Viridovix was *reinforced* by a rabble; that the army of Indutiomarus was *reinforced* by 'exiles and condemned criminals', who most probably had belonged to the upper classes; and that the *nucleus* of Vercingetorix's Arvernian contingent consisted *partially* of 'needy and desperate men'. Hirtius tells us that the host of Drappes and Lucterius was reinforced by 'broken men', emancipated slaves, exiles, and bandits. That is all. On the other hand, the huge Belgic host, in the second year of the war, was composed of regular levies; the host of the Veneti and their allies included all the foremost men of each state; the army of Vercingetorix was almost entirely composed of regular levies, raised, certainly in part and perhaps altogether, by the *principes* of the various states; and the huge host which marched to the relief of Vercingetorix

M. d'Arbois de Jubainville (*Rev. celt.*, vii, 1886, p. 9), which supports the view for which I am contending.

[1] *Hist. des inst. pol. de l'anc. France,—la Gaule rom.*, p. 43.

[2] *Ib.*, pp. 54–6.

[3] *Ib.*, p. 58.

was, we are expressly told, similarly composed and similarly raised.[1] Moreover, the fact that a small fraction of the vast multitude of Gauls who fought against Caesar consisted of the dregs of the population in no way proves that democracy was in the ascendant; it only proves that the leaders enlisted every man whom they could get.

Finally, if Vercingetorix required hostages from the states which joined the insurrection of 52 B.C., he only followed an established custom.[2] His monarchy may have been democratic in the sense that he was the idol of the populace; and he may have been distrusted by those aristocrats who supported oligarchical institutions. But that does not prove that democracy, properly so called, was even in process of inception.

Fustel refers to various other passages, which I have discussed, and to one which I overlooked,—the passage from which we learn that Indutiomarus, the Treveran, excused himself to Caesar for not having repaired to his camp by the plea that he had desired 'to keep the tribe loyal', as there was a danger that 'if all the men of rank abandoned them, the masses in their ignorance might fall away'.[3] Indutiomarus was confessedly making a false excuse; but, accepting his statement, where is the evidence that a democratic movement was afoot? The ignorant populace of any country occupied by an invader, even if they were as destitute of political power as the Russian serfs under Nicholas I, might readily fall to committing excesses if they were left to themselves.

I have considered Fustel's arguments with the attention which every utterance of his deserves; but I cannot see that they lend any support to the theory of MM. Réville and Desjardins. After all, a good deal depends upon the meaning which one attaches to the word 'democracy'. If a state in which a rich adventurer with a glib tongue can ingratiate himself with the populace and hire their bows and spears and thereby exalt himself to power is governed by democracy, then democracy flourished in Gaul and flourished in Greece also long before the constitution of Cleisthenes or even of Solon. But, for all that I can see, such a democracy is not inconsistent with the state of society described by Caesar, in which 'the masses are regarded almost as slaves, never venture to act on their own initiative, and are not admitted to any council'. And if there is any inconsistency in Caesar's narrative, if among the Eburones, say, the *plebs* really did enjoy political power, the inconsistency is easily explained. Caesar did not profess to be a constitutional historian. He had neither the time nor the inclination, if he had the knowledge, to modify his general statements.

M. Jullian's view differs somewhat from my own (for he attaches

[1] *B. G.*, ii, 4, §§ 4–10; iii, 16, § 2; 17, §§ 2–4; v, 55, § 3; vii, 4, §§ 3, 7; 31, § 4; 75, § 1; viii, 30, § 1.

[2] Cf. *B. G.*, vii, 2, § 2.—principes, . . . quoniam in praesentia obsidibus cavere inter se non possint, &c.

[3] quo facilius civitatem in officio contineret, ne omnis nobilitatis discessu plebs propter imprudentiam laberetur. *B. G.*, v, 3, § 6.

more importance than I do to the passage in Strabo), but not very seriously. While he emphasizes the ' toute-puissance des grands dans la cité ',[1] he holds, quoting *B. G.*, iii, 17, § 3, and vii, 32, § 5, that the aristocracies ' dégénéraient sans cesse, sous la puissance des vieilles habitudes militaires, en démocraties bruyantes et brutales ' ;[2] and that ' lorsque l'homme se détachait de sa demeure, qu'il marchait et combattait pour tuer ou mourir, il recouvrait quelques-uns de ses droits naturels, il reprenait une part de sa liberté ' ;[3] in fact that in time of war ' c'était une démocratie tumultuaire qui remplaçait le gouvernement normal par le sénat et les princes de la cité '.[4] The word ' démocratie ' is, I think, misleading.

[1] *Hist. de la Gaule*, ii, 79–83.
[2] *Ib.*, p. 51.
[3] *Ib.*, p. 53.
[4] *Ib.*, p. 203.

SECTION V.—RELATING TO THE NARRATIVE OF CHAPTER I

THE CELTIC INVASION OF ITALY

I. The date of the Celtic invasion of Italy has been the subject of much controversy. According to Livy,[1] it was contemporaneous with the foundation of Massilia, which took place in 606 B. C. Mommsen [2] rejects this date. 'The association,' he argues, 'of the migration of Bellovesus with the founding of Massilia, by which the former is chronologically fixed down to the middle of the second century of Rome, undoubtedly belongs, not to the native legend which of course specified no dates, but to later chronological research; and it deserves no credit. Isolated incursions . . . may have taken place at a very early period; but the great overflowing of Northern Italy by the Celts cannot be placed before the age of the decay of the Etruscan power, that is, not before the second half of the third century of the city.'

Desjardins,[3] on the other hand, argues that even during the continuance of the Etruscan power the Celts may have been established in the country between the Alps and the Po for a century and a half before they invaded the country of the Senones, from which they started on their march against Rome. He remarks further that Livy [4] mentions four distinct Celtic invasions of Italy, namely those of Bellovesus, of Elitovius, of the Boi and the Lingones, and of the Senones; and he maintains that three-quarters of a century, the period which elapsed between the foundation of Massilia and the 64th Olympiad (527–524)—the date assigned by Dionysius of Halicarnassus [5] for the fall of the Etruscan power—is not too much to allow for these successive immigrations.

M. d'Arbois de Jubainville [6] declines to accept Desjardins's reasoning. He argues that the date which Livy assigns to the invasion is irreconcilable with the fact that the Etruscan hegemony in the country north of the Po was, according to Polybius,[7] contemporaneous with their supremacy in Campania, which ended in the last quarter of the fifth century B. C.; and he rightly observes that the passage in Dionysius to which Desjardins refers only means that the fall of the Etruscan power was later than the 64th Olympiad. The Gauls, he

[1] v, 34.
[2] *Hist. of Rome*, i, 1894, p. 423, n. 1 (*Röm. Gesch.*, i, 1888, p. 327, n. **).
[3] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 68, n. 1, 203–4.
[4] v, 35, §§ 1–3.
[5] vii, 3.
[6] *Rev. celt.*, iii, 1876–8, p. 471.
[7] ii, 17, §§ 1–3.

maintains,[1] conquered Northern Italy from the Etruscans about 396 B. C. ; for the most ancient recorded event of the conquest was the capture of Melpum, which took place on the day on which the Romans captured Veii.[2] Polybius[3] tell us that the Etruscans were expelled from Lombardy only a short time before the Gauls captured Rome. According to Appian,[4] the Celts invaded Italy in the 97th Olympiad (392–389 B. C.) ; and according to Diodorus Siculus,[5] in the second year of the 98th (387 B. C.). Both indeed are wrong as to the exact date ; for they suppose that the first operation of the war was to attack Clusium, and the capture of Melpum, which they overlook, belonged to the year 396 B. C. : but Dionysius of Halicarnassus[6] also makes the period which elapsed between the invasion of Italy and the capture of Rome very short.[7]

Alexandre Bertrand,[8] who substantially agrees with M. d'Arbois, infers from a passage in which Livy[9] describes the invaders who captured Clusium as 'an unfamiliar and unheard-of enemy' (*invisitato atque inaudito hoste*) that the invasion took place only a short time before the capture of Melpum and the battle of the Allia. But Bertrand did not, perhaps, consider Livy's narrative as a whole. In this matter Livy handled his authorities in a way with which his more critical readers are painfully familiar. He was perfectly aware[10] of the chronology which was adopted by Diodorus, and afterwards by Appian : he took pains to explain that he preferred another chronology, which made the first Gallic invasion of Italy two centuries earlier ;[11] yet, having, from impatience of drudgery, failed to think the problem out, he inadvertently committed himself in more than one passage to the chronology of Diodorus.[12] The invaders whom he described as 'unfamiliar and unheard-of'—the captors of Clusium and victors of the Allia—were on his theory merely the last of four bands whose incursions had been spread over two centuries.

It appears to me that the data are insufficient. If we can trust our authorities at all, the invasion which preceded the capture of Melpum occurred shortly before 396 B. C. M. d'Arbois supposes that the chronology which Livy preferred was invented by his contemporary, Timagenes ;[13] but are we to suppose that Livy's authority also concocted the details of the earlier invasions which Livy describes ? Unless we are to follow Bertrand and reject three-fourths of Livy's account altogether, we must admit that the invasion which

[1] *Les premiers habitants de l'Europe*, i, 1889, p. 166.
[2] See Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, iii, 17 (21), § 125.
[3] ii, 17, § 3 ; 18, § 1. [4] *Celtica*, 2, § 1 (ed. Didot), pp. 25–6.
[5] xiv, 107, § 1 ; 111, § 1 ; 113, §§ 1–4. [6] xiii, 10–2.
[7] See H. d'A. de Jubainville's *Les premiers habitants de l'Europe*, ii, 1894, pp. 297–9, and *Rev. celt.*, xx, 1899, pp. 376–80.
[8] *Les Celtes dans les vallées du Pô et du Danube*, 1894, pp. 20–8.
[9] v, 37, § 2. Cf. 35, § 6.
[10] v, 33, §§ 1–4. [11] *Ib.*, §§ 5–6. [12] *Ib.*, 35, § 4 ; 37, § 2.
[13] Otto Hirschfeld rejects M. d'Arbois's theory and gives reasons for believing that Livy relied upon a lost geographical work of Cornelius Nepos. See M. Salomon Reinach's article in *Les Celtes dans les vallées du Pô*, &c., pp. 205–12.

was immediately followed by the capture of Melpum had been preceded by others, the dates of which it is useless to attempt to fix; and this assumption, which is intrinsically not improbable, is perhaps supported by Polybius,[1] who seems to imply that the Celts by whom the Etruscans were expelled from the valley of the Po had been for some time their neighbours, and that the invasion of the Boi, Lingones, and Senones was subsequent to that of the Insubres and Cenomani.[2]

II. Bertrand rejects *in toto* Livy's statement, that the Gallic invaders of Italy came from Transalpine Gaul. He argues (1) that it may be inferred from Polybius[3] that they came from the country north of the Alps, that is to say from the valleys of the Inn and the Danube; (2) that of the six tribes—the Aedui, Ambarri, Arverni, Aulerci, Bituriges, and Carnutes—which, according to Livy, emigrated under Bellovesus from Gaul, not one finds mention in the histories of Polybius or in any history of Cisalpine Gaul;[4] (3) that, according to Livy, Gallia Celtica was occupied about 600 B.C. by the same tribes which occupied it in the time of Caesar, which is not credible; (4) that the population of Gaul could not, as Livy says, have been so great as to necessitate emigration; and (5) that the king of the Bituriges could not have been supreme over the whole of Gallia Celtica and certainly could not have induced 600,000 of his subjects to quit their fertile country.[5]

These reasons do not appear to me sufficient to warrant the absolute rejection of the legend reported by Livy. It is not necessarily to be inferred from Polybius that the invaders came from the country *north* of the Alps. In the passages to which Bertrand refers he states that the slopes of the Alps 'on the north towards the Rhône' (ἐπὶ τὸν Ῥοδανὸν καὶ τὰς ἄρκτους) are inhabited by 'Gauls called Transalpine',[6] and he describes the whole course of the Rhône, and particularly that part of its course which is in the Valais.[7] These passages lend no support to Bertrand's theory; for Polybius knew perfectly well that there were Transalpine Gauls in Gaul properly so called as well as in the Valais. I cannot see anything absurd in the notion that Gallia Celtica should have been occupied, at the time of the Gallic invasion of Italy, by some of the tribes which occupied it in the time of

[1] ii, 17.

[2] M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, i, 281, n. 2) would explain the discrepancy between the two chronological systems thus: the invasion of Bellovesus was contemporary with a threatened attack by the Salyes on Massilia (cf. Livy, v, 34, §§ 7–8); and it was supposed that the threat was a consequence of the landing of the Phocaeans who founded the town, and that the Celts had assisted them to make their settlement. M. Jullian also thinks it probable that the invasion was synchronized with the foundation of Massilia owing to the obscurity of some Greek text, which mentioned the Phocaean emigrants as the founders, and was taken to mean that they were attacked when they were about to lay the first stone.

[3] ii, 15, § 8; iii, 47, §§ 2–3.

[4] The Aulerci are mentioned by Polybius under the name of Cenomani.

[5] *Rev. d'anthr.*, ii, 1873, pp. 430, 643, n. 1; *Les Celtes dans les vallées du Pô et du Danube*, pp. 19–27.

[6] ii, 15, § 8.

[7] iii, 47, § 2.

Caesar; and we know that Pytheas in the latter half of the fourth century B. C. found the Osismi in the same peninsula which they occupied in 56 B. C. It must be remembered that even in the time of Caesar large parts of Gaul were overgrown by dense forests;[1] and if the Helvetii, the Usipetes and Tencteri, the Cimbri and the Teutoni emigrated from their respective abodes, why should not Gallic tribes have emigrated from Gaul? If Bituitus, king of the Arverni, was overlord of half Transalpine Gaul in the second century B. C., it is hard to see why the king of the Bituriges should not have ruled over as wide an area; and Bertrand appears to forget that Caesar,[2] as well as Livy, reports that Gauls had emigrated, in bygone times, from Transalpine Gaul, properly so called, and that he also assigns as a reason for their emigrations over-population. It may, however, be admitted that the argument which Bertrand bases upon the absence of any mention of the Aedui, Ambarri, Arverni, Bituriges, and Carnutes in the later history of Cisalpine Gaul does militate against the complete acceptance of Livy's account; but M. Jullian[3] suggests that *Insubres* may have been adopted as a federative name by the various tribes whom Livy mentions.

Professor Niese,[4] however, attempts to reinforce the arguments of Bertrand. He remarks that among the allies of the Insubres and the Boi at the battle of Telamon were the Taurisci[5] and the Gaesatae, who, according to Polybius,[6] lived 'about the Alps and on the Rhone' (*κατὰ τὰς Ἄλπεις καὶ τὸν Ῥοδανὸν ποταμόν*). This, says Niese, points to the conclusion that they came from the north of the Alps and the valley of the Danube. For Polybius[7] says that the Rhône rises north-west of the Adriatic, on the northern slopes of the Alps, and flowing south-westward, discharges itself into the Sardinian sea (*ὁ δὲ Ῥοδανὸς ἔχει τὰς μὲν πηγὰς ὑπὲρ τὸν Ἀδριατικὸν μυχὸν πρὸς τὴν ἑσπέραν νενούσας, ἐν τοῖς ἀποκλίνουσι μέρεσι τῶν Ἄλπεων ὡς πρὸς τὰς ἄρκτους· ῥεῖ δὲ πρὸς τὰς χειμερινὰς δύσεις, ἐκβάλλει δ' εἰς τὸ Σαρδῷον πέλαγος*). In other words, says Niese, the Rhône, according to Polybius, did not rise in the Alps, but the Alps lay between the valley of the Rhône and the plain of Lombardy. It is easy, he continues, to see how this false conception arose: in South-Eastern Gaul the Rhône does really follow the Alpine chain; and Polybius assumed that mountains and river were in close proximity throughout. When he says[8] that Transalpine Gauls inhabited the parts of the Alps 'on the north towards the Rhône' (*ἐπὶ τὸν Ῥοδανὸν καὶ τὰς ἄρκτους*), he means, in the language of reality, the country north of the Alps. In fact, the relations of the Italian Celts were always with the north: they received no help from the Gauls of Southern Gaul.

Now the Taurisci inhabited the southern slopes of the Alps, overlooking the Cisalpine plain: how Polybius's vague geographical

[1] L. F. A. Maury, *Hist. des grandes forêts de la Gaule et de l'ancienne France*, 1850, p. 166.
[2] *B. G.*, vi, 24, § 1.
[3] *Hist. de la Gaule*, i, 291, n. 6.
[4] *Zeitschr. f. deutsches Alterthum*, xlii, 1898, p. 146.
[5] Polybius, ii, 28, § 4.
[6] ii, 22, § 1.
[7] iii, 47, § 2.
[8] ii, 15, § 8.

statement about the Gaesatae points to the conclusion that they[1] came from the valley of the Danube, is to me incomprehensible; and, supposing that the Italian Celts were assisted by Danubian mercenaries long after they themselves appeared in Italy, how does that affect the question of their own origin? Polybius's description of the course of the Rhône has been said to ruin his credit as a geographer; but is it, after all, so very faulty? The Rhône does rise north-west of the Adriatic: its source is north of that section of the Alpine chain which was known to the Romans; and its general direction, so far as it can be indicated in a few words, may be loosely called south-westward. If Polybius (evidently referring to the tribes of the Valais whom Galba encountered)[2] said that Transalpine Gauls inhabited the slopes of the Alps 'on the north towards the Rhône', he does not say that they were the invaders of Italy; and, I repeat, he knew perfectly well that other Gauls lived in Transalpine Gaul properly so called.

Desjardins, whose views on the question are conservative, may possibly be right when he suggests that the invaders may have come from the valley of the Danube as well as from Transalpine Gaul.[3]

THE CIMBRI AND TEUTONI

Where did the Teutoni and the Cimbri respectively dwell immediately before they set out on the wanderings which first brought them into contact with the Romans? When did the Teutoni first join the Cimbri? To what races did the Teutoni and the Cimbri respectively belong? All these questions have provoked much controversy.

I. The Cimbri, according to the common opinion, came from Jutland, or at all events from the peninsula formed by Jutland, Schleswig, and Holstein. This view is based upon the evidence of Augustus,[4] Strabo,[5] Pliny,[6] Pomponius Mela,[7] Tacitus,[8] Florus,[9] and Ptolemy;[10] but of these writers Strabo was the only one who affirmed that the Cimbri still occupied the lands from which the emigrants whom Marius encountered had come. Strabo vaguely located them in Northern Germany, between the mouths of the Rhine and the Elbe;[11] Tacitus, 'in a remote corner of Germany, bordering on the

[1] Cf. A. Bertrand and S. Reinach, *Les Celtes dans les vallées du Pô et du Danube*, pp. 142, 144.

[2] *B. G.*, iii, 1–6.

[3] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 207.

[4] *Res gestae divi Augusti*, ed. Th. Mommsen, 1883, 5, ll. 14–8 (p. lxxxxii).

[5] vii, 2, § 1.

[6] *Nat. Hist.*, ii, 16 (67), § 167; iv, 13 (27), §§ 96–7.

[7] iii, 3, § 32.

[8] *Germ.*, 37.

[9] iii, 3, § 1.

[10] *Geogr.*, ii, 11, § 7.

[11] Mommsen (*Res gestae divi Augusti*, 1883, p. 103) thinks that Strabo misplaced the Cimbri between the mouths of the Rhine and the Elbe because, when they sent their embassy to Augustus, the Romans had not yet crossed the Elbe. It is clear, he adds, from the monument of Ancyra that the Cimbri lived beyond—that is, east of—the Elbe; for at that time Roman dominion was limited by the river.

Ocean' : Pliny called Jutland the 'Cimbric peninsula' ; Mela and Ptolemy imply that this was their abode ; and Florus says that the host which overran Germany, Gaul, and Spain came 'from the uttermost parts of Gallia', by which he meant Northern Germany. Florus states, further, that they were compelled to abandon their country by a flood ; while Appian[1] attributes their emigration to an earthquake, which might have caused a tidal wave. We learn from the monument of Ancyra[2] that the Cimbri and several other German tribes sent envoys to Augustus, soliciting his friendship and that of the Roman People, and that a Roman fleet sailed eastward from the mouth of the Rhine to the country of the Cimbri ; while Strabo adds that the Cimbri offered Augustus one of their sacred vessels and implored pardon for the outrages of their forefathers. All this evidence, however, is set aside by Karl Müllenhoff.[3] Remarking that Posidonius[4] rejected the story of the flood as absurd, and that, according to Timagenes,[5] the Druids taught that some of the Gauls had been forced by an inundation to leave their homes beyond the Rhine, he conjectured that when the Cimbri appeared in 113 B.C. they were supposed to be Celts, and that 'the legend of the flood' had been transferred to them. But, as J. F. Marcks observes,[6] to stigmatize the story as a legend is pure assertion ; there are numerous well-attested instances of disastrous inundations in mediaeval and modern times ; and unless good reason can be given for rejecting the tradition, it must be regarded as historical. Besides, Müllenhoff has to account for the facts that Jutland was known to Pliny and Ptolemy as the Cimbric Chersonese, and that Roman officers found the Cimbri inhabiting it. He extricates himself from this *impasse* with characteristic ingenuity. Reminding us that Columbus called the natives of the Bahamas Indians, he affirms that the Roman officers, misled by Greek geographers, fancied when they reached Jutland that they had got to the extremity of Celtica, and that the people whom they saw in Jutland were Cimbri ; and Augustus, wishing the Romans to feel that the memory of old defeats had been wiped out by the humiliation of the Cimbri, let them believe that the ambassadors from Jutland belonged to that people. But Columbus erred because, groping, as it were, in the dark, he hoped to discover an Oriental people by a westward route, the direction and length of which he had miscalculated : as Marcks points out,[7] the victories of Marius had sufficed to soothe Roman self-love ; and, moreover, Müllenhoff's desperate conjecture fails to explain why so remote a tribe should have sent their envoys across Europe, and requires us to believe that they asked forgiveness for outrages which their forefathers had not committed. He considers that the original home of the Cimbri is plainly indicated by the first known fact in their

[1] *Illyr.*, 4.
[2] *Res gestae divi Augusti*, ed. Th. Mommsen, 1883, 5, ll. 14–8 (p. lxxxxii). Cf. Strabo, vii, 2, § 1.
[3] *Deutsche Altertumskunde*, ii, 282–90.
[4] Strabo, vii, 2, § 2. [5] Ammianus Marcellinus, xv, 9, §§ 2, 4.
[6] *Bonner Jahrbücher*, xcv, 1894, pp. 36–7. [7] *Ib.*, p. 40.

history, namely their attack on the Boi,[1] who lived in the upper valley of the Elbe. Accordingly he contends that they migrated from the central valley of the Elbe, that is to say, Saxony. But the fact that they had attacked the Boi in the course of their wanderings does not prove that they had not marched from the north before they encountered them.

Georg Wilke[2] has recently endeavoured to support Müllenhoff's theory by archaeological arguments. He observes that the kingdom of Saxony, the western part of Niederlausitz, and the south-eastern part of the province of Saxony are rich in finds of the periods of the Early Iron Age known as La Tène I and La Tène II, while remains of the final period—La Tène III—are very rare ; that in the northern part of Brandenburg and the western part of the province of Saxony this difference is not noticeable ; and that in the eastern part of 'our area' (*unseres Gebietes*)—which, if I do not misunderstand a vague expression, means the area comprising all the above-mentioned lands—antiquities of La Tène III are very numerous. The phenomena cannot, he insists, be accidental, and can only be explained by the assumption that towards the end of La Tène II, between 150 and 100 B.C., the population of the region in which finds of La Tène III are rare was considerably diminished by a great emigration. The argument is ingenious ; but no one who is familiar with archaeological maps—no one who remembers that up to the end of 1907 only one interment of the Early Iron Age had been found in Scotland —will admit that it outweighs the testimony of the ancient writers. Notwithstanding the general vagueness of their statements, it is clear that they believed the Cimbri to have set out from Northern Germany, and that at the beginning of our era the remnant of the nation was domiciled in Jutland.[3]

The Teutoni, according to Müllenhoff and almost every other writer, ancient[4] and modern, originally dwelt somewhere in Northern Germany. But the Teutoni were probably neighbours of the Cimbri. Accordingly Dr. Kossinna, who accepts Müllenhoff's theory regarding the latter, logically develops it, and places the Teutoni in Northern Bavaria.[5] As his premiss is questionable, it is needless to discuss his conclusion.[6]

II. Regarding the chronology of the Teutonic invasion, the ancient authorities are not agreed. The portion of Livy's work which narrated the history of the period is lost. According to Plutarch,[7] the Teutoni and Cimbri made their first appearance side by side, and pursued their wanderings together until after Marius had been appointed to take command against them. But Mommsen[8] attaches

[1] Strabo, vii, 2, § 2.

[2] *Deutsche Geschichtsblätter*, vii, 1906, pp. 291–303, especially 292–3 and 300.

[3] The article on the Cimbri in Pauly's *Real-Encyclopädie*, iii, 1899, col. 2449–52, is well worth reading. Cf. C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 53, n. 1.

[4] Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, xxxvii, 2 (11), § 35 ; Mela, iii, 4, § 32 ; 6, § 54 ; Ptolemy, *Geogr.*, ii, 11, § 9.

[5] *Westdeutsche Zeitschr. f. Gesch. und Kunst*, ix, 1890, p. 213.

[6] See *Rev. celt.*, xii, 1891, pp. 11–2.

[7] *Marius*, 11–2, 15, 19, 25.

[8] *Röm. Gesch.*, ii, 1889, p. 183, n.* (*Hist. of Rome*, iii, 1894, p. 444, n. 1).

more weight to the *Epitome* of Livy,[1] in which the Teutoni are mentioned for the first time in the narrative of the events of 102 B.C. Mommsen's view has, of course, been widely accepted; but Müllenhoff[2] dissents from it. His argument is as follows. The *Epitome*, in recording the battles of 113, 109, and 105 B.C., mentions the Cimbri, but not the Teutoni. In all three cases, however, Livy himself must have mentioned the Teutoni as well; for, according to Julius Obsequens[3] and Velleius Paterculus,[4] the Teutoni fought in the battle of 113; according to Florus[5] and Velleius Paterculus,[6] they fought in the battle of 109; and according to Florus, Eutropius,[7] Orosius,[8] Valerius Maximus,[9] and Velleius Paterculus, they fought in the battle of 105; and the authority of all these writers was probably Livy. Moreover, two passages in Plutarch[10] appear to show that Posidonius, who was probably Livy's authority, had mentioned the Teutoni in his allusion to the battle of 105.[11]

There is a passage in Caesar's narrative which may help us to understand the silence of the *Epitome*. In the speech which he puts into the mouth of the Arvernian chief, Critognatus,[12] he makes him allude to the war which the combined forces of the Cimbri and Teutoni waged against the Gauls; but a few lines further on he makes him say, without mentioning the Teutoni, that the Cimbri left Gaul to invade other lands. So I believe that the epitomizer, in the passages in which he mentioned the Cimbri alone, hastily used the word *Cimbri* as a general expression for the united hosts of the two peoples.[13]

III. Dr. Kossinna maintains that *Teutoni* is a Celtic word, for, he argues, it could only be German if it belonged to the time, long anterior to the first century B.C., when the transmutation of mute consonants (under Grimm's law) had not yet begun; and he infers, in opposition to the general opinion, that the Teutoni were not a Germanic but a Celtic people.[14] M. d'Arbois de Jubainville, however, remarking that the Celts knew the Germans before that change occurred, and that the Gallic alphabet had no *th*, suggests that *Teutoni* was only the Gallic form of a German name *Theudanâs*. 'Quand nous Français,' he says, 'nous disons Cologne au lieu de *Koeln*, Mayence au lieu de *Mainz*, nous obéissons à une sorte d'instinct conservateur, comparable à celui qui, vers la fin du second siècle avant J.-C., faisait prononcer par les Gaulois . . . *Teutoni* le nom de peuple transformé en *Theudanâs* depuis un siècle ou deux sur la rive droite du Rhin inférieur.'[15]

The prevalent view is that the Cimbri were Germans. Festus[16]

[1] c. 63, 65, 67–8.
[2] *Deutsche Altertumskunde*, ii, 292, 295, 298.
[3] c. 98, 103.
[4] Ed. I. C. H. Krause, ii, 8, § 3; 12, § 2.
[5] i, 38 (iii, 3, §§ 1–4).
[6] ii, 12.
[7] v, 1.
[8] v, 16, § 9.
[9] iv, 7, § 3.
[10] *Marius*, 16; *Sertorius*, 3.
[11] See *Rev. celt.*, xii, 1891, pp. 3–7.
[12] *B. G.*, vii, 77, §§ 12, 14.
[13] See also Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 309–10, 316–7.
[14] *Westdeutsche Zeitschr. f. Gesch.*, &c., ix, 1890, p. 213, n. 37.
[15] *Rev. celt.*, xii, 1891, p. 16.
[16] *De significatione verborum*, ed. Müller, 1839, p. 30.

says that *Cimbri* was a Gallic word, meaning 'freebooters' (*Cimbri lingua gallica latrones dicuntur*); Plutarch[1] that freebooters were called *Cimbri* by the Germans (Κίμβρους ἐπονομάζουσι Γερμανοὶ τοὺς λῃστάς): but the word *Gallicus* was used so loosely that the two statements are not necessarily irreconcilable.[2] Most of the arguments on either side have been stated by Canon Rawlinson.[3] The arguments for the prevalent view are as follows:—(*a*) the name *Cimbri* is believed to be of Teutonic origin. It has been variously derived from *Kämpfer* (a warrior), from *chempho* (a champion), and from the Scandinavian *kimpari* (to rob).[4] Rawlinson, however, pleads that the Latin form *Cimbri* could not have been evolved either from *Kämpfer* or from *chempho*, but that from *Kämpfer* would have come 'Camfi' or 'Camferi', from *chempho* 'Camfones' or 'Camphi'. But, if there is no known German stem from which *Cimbri* with the meaning of 'freebooters' could be derived, *Cimbri* is nevertheless regarded by scholars as a German word.[5] (*b*) Jutland, which is generally believed to have been the original home of the Cimbri, was, we are told, bordered by lands the inhabitants of which were mainly German. But it is admitted that Celtic tribes once occupied the valleys of the Rhine and upper Danube. Why then, asks Rawlinson, may we not suppose that Jutland also was peopled by Celts? (*c*) As the Cimbri were allied with the Teutoni, and as the Teutoni were confessedly German, it is reasonable to infer that the Cimbri were German also. The answer is that the Cimbri were also allied with the Helvetii, and that the Helvetii were Gauls. (*d*) The Cimbri had blue eyes and fair hair. This argument, it is replied, is worthless; for, if our authorities are to be believed, the Gauls had the same. (*e*) The host of the Cimbri was accompanied, and their movements were directed, by priestesses, not by priests. Now Caesar tell us that the Gauls had priests, and that the movements of the German army of Ariovistus were directed by women. But Caesar does not say that there were no priestesses in Gaul; and, if Pomponius Mela is to be believed, there were. Moreover, Rawlinson argues that Strabo's account[6] of the priestesses of the Cimbri agrees 'better with what we know of the bloody rites of the Druids . . . than with what the most trustworthy writers tell us of the religious temper of the ancient Germans'. But Rawlinson had apparently forgotten the 'bloody', or at least fiery rites with which Ariovistus and his priestesses intended to sacrifice Troucillus.[7] (*f*) Caesar,[8]

[1] *Marius*, 11, § 5. In *Camillus*, 15, § 1, Plutarch calls the Cimbri Celts. This confusion, as every scholar knows, was common.

[2] See J. C. Zeuss, *Die Deutschen*, &c., 1837, p. 141, note, and *Bonner Jahrbücher*, c, 1891, p. 12.

[3] *Journ. Anthr. Inst.*, vi, 1877, pp. 150–8.

[4] See J. C. Zeuss, *Die Deutschen*, &c., p. 141, note.

[5] See A. Holder, *Alt-celtischer Sprachschatz*, i, 1015. Fr. Matthias connects *Cimbri* with *Kimm* (old Germ. *Kimba*), meaning 'bank', or 'coast', so that *Cimbri* would mean 'dwellers on the shore'. See *Mittheil. aus d. hist. Lit.*, xxxiii, 1905, pp. 7–8.

[6] vii, 4, § 3.

[7] *B. G.*, i, 53, § 7. See p. 67.

[8] *Ib.*, 40, § 5.

Strabo,[1] Augustus,[2] Pliny,[3] Seneca,[4] and Tacitus[5] agree in calling the Cimbri Germans. To this argument Rawlinson replies that if Caesar had been personally familiar with the Cimbri, great weight might be attached to his testimony, but that there is no proof that he had ever seen a single individual of the Cimbrian nation.[6] As for Strabo, Tacitus, and Pliny, in the canon's opinion, 'the terms "Gaul" and "German" are with them geographical rather than ethnological.' I believe, however, that, as one may infer from the care with which Tacitus discriminated between those tribes who only 'affected' a Germanic origin and those whom he regarded as genuinely German,[7] he aimed, at all events, at ethnological accuracy.

To prove that the Cimbri were Celts, it has been argued (*a*) that the word 'Cimbri' is a Latin corruption of *Cymry*. But this argument, although Professor Ridgeway has rushed into the linguistic arena to revive it,[8] is obsolete. 'Whether the Kymry have ethnologically anything to do with the Cimbri or not, the names,' says Sir John Rhys,[9] 'have absolutely nothing in common, in spite of what charlatans continue to say to the contrary': (*b*) Sallust,[10] Florus,[11] Appian,[12] Diodorus Siculus,[13] and Dion Cassius,[14] agree in calling the Cimbri Celts; and, says Rawlinson, 'the importance of these witnesses is the greater because they evidently intend their assertions ethnically.' Perhaps they do; but how can we tell that their ethnological information was correct? Sallust was a grossly inaccurate writer.[15] Florus was a blundering rhetorical compiler, whose worthless chapter on the Gallic war[16] gives the measure of his authority. Dion, as every scholar knows, confused the Celts with the Germans. As M. d'Arbois de Jubainville[17] observes, Caesar was the first writer who drew a marked distinction between the two peoples; and even after his time there persisted, in the writings of Appian and others, 'par une sorte de routine, l'usage de la confusion entre les Celtes et les Germains.' (*c*) *Boiorix*, the name of the

[1] vii, 1, § 3.
[2] *Res gestae divi Augusti*, ed. Th. Mommsen, 5, 14–8 (p. lxxxxii).
[3] *Nat. Hist.*, iv, 13 (28), § 99.
[4] *ad Helv.*, 7, § 2. [5] *Germ.*, 37.
[6] As to the sense in which the word *Germani* was used by the Roman envoys who told Caesar that the Belgae were of 'German' origin, see pp. 332–3.
[7] *Germ.*, 28.
[8] *Cambridge University Reporter*, March 3, 1908, p. 649.
[9] *Celtic Britain*, 3rd ed., 1904, p. 281. Cf. *Rev. celt.*, xxix, 1908, pp. 217–8; xxx, 1909, pp. 384–91. Nobody would call Professor Ridgeway a charlatan; but he has rashly associated himself with charlatans.
[10] *Jug.*, 114. [11] iii, 3.
[12] *B. C.*, i, 29; *Celtica*, 2. [13] v, 32, §§ 4–5. [14] xliv, 42, § 4.
[15] Henri Martin (*Bull. de la Soc. d'anthr. de Paris*, 2e sér., xii, 1877, p. 487) laid stress upon the fact, if it is a fact, that Sallust had seen Cimbrian prisoners in the streets of Rome. But unless Sallust was also familiar with the appearance of Gauls, and was as acute an observer as Dr. Beddoe, it does not follow that his conclusion was correct; and Pliny, who visited the country of the Cimbri, described them as Germans.
[16] i, 45 (iii, 10).
[17] *Rev. celt.*, xii, 1891, p. 16. See also the same writer's *Les premiers habitants de l'Europe*, ii, 1894, pp. 401, 419–20.

Cimbrian leader, is admittedly Celtic. This argument looks strong; but may not the true inference be that the Cimbrian host was composed of mingled Celtic and Teutonic elements, and that, as Mommsen[1] suggests, the leader may have arisen from the Celts who joined the Cimbri on the march? (*d*) The Romans, in the war with the Cimbri, employed Celts as spies; and it has been inferred that the Cimbri must have spoken a Celtic dialect. But Mr. Hyde Clarke considers that Celtic spies would have been employed even if the Cimbri had been Germans, as 'they would have had more practice in communicating with them than the Romans, who were not at that time in contact with the Germans'.[2] (*e*) The Cimbrian system of warfare was, as Mommsen himself admits, 'substantially that of the Celts;'[3] and Rawlinson adds that the same may be said of the Cimbrian use of wagons and the Cimbrian practice of sacrificing prisoners to the gods. But the Cimbrian system of warfare was likewise 'substantially' that of Ariovistus and his German host. As to wagons, what would the canon propose as a substitute? At all events, Ariovistus and his Germans were, like the Cimbri, sensible enough to use wagons;[4] and Ariovistus and his Germans sacrificed prisoners to the gods.[5] Arguments like these might be used to prove that all Celts were Germans, and all Germans Celts.

Professor Rolleston[6] was inclined to identify the Cimbri with the Celts on craniological grounds. The skulls found in the tombs of the Neolithic Age in Denmark closely resemble those found in the British round barrows, which are or were believed by many ethnologists ignorant of archaeology and history to have belonged to Belgae: they also resemble the skulls of the modern Walloons, the assumed descendants of the continental Belgae, and those of the Sion type, which the Swiss ethnologists, His and Rutimeyer, ascribed to the Helvetii. But it is certain that the men whose skeletons have been found in our round barrows were not Belgae;[7] it is certain that the Sion skulls did not belong to the Helvetii properly so called; and it is not certain that the Cimbri themselves were of the same race as the men whose skulls have been found in the neolithic tombs of Denmark.

Dr. J. Thurnam[8] adduced, as an argument, 'the resemblance of the armour of the Cimbri, as described by Plutarch (*Marius*, 25), to that of the Gauls as described by Diodorus (v, 30), and its dissimilarity to that of the Germans as described by Tacitus.' He remarks further that a passage in Pliny[9] seems to show that the

[1] *Röm. Gesch.*, ii, 1889, p. 172 (*Hist. of Rome*, iii, 1894, p. 431). According to Müllenhoff (*Deutsche Altertumskunde*, ii, 120), 'Boiorix' is simply a German word 'Baiarik' Gallicized. But there was another Boiorix, king of the Boi, a Celtic people. See Livy, xxxiv, 46, § 4.

[2] *Journ. Anthr. Inst.*, vi, 1877, p. 157.

[3] *Hist. of Rome*, iii, 431 (*Röm. Gesch.*, ii, 173).

[4] *B. G.*, i, 51, § 2.

[5] *Ib.*, 53, § 7.

[6] Greenwell's *British Barrows*, 1877, p. 632, note.

[7] See Rice Holmes, *Anc. Britain*, pp. 429–30.

[8] *Crania Britannica*, pp. 88, n. †, 147, n. §.

[9] *Nat. Hist.*, iv, 13 (27), § 95.

language of the Cimbri was Celtic:—'Morimarusam a Cimbris vocari; hoc est, mortuum mare.' (*Mor y marw* in Welsh = Dead Sea.[1]) But Much holds that *marus*, meaning 'dead', was an old German word;[2] and A. Holder[3] says the same of *mori*: in other words, *Morimarusa*, so far as we know, may just as probably be German as Celtic.

When we ask ourselves whether the Cimbri were Celts or Germans, we should be careful to settle exactly what we mean. Two thousand years hence, perhaps, ethnologists will be disputing as to whether the English were a Celtic or a Teutonic people. We English know that we are neither one nor the other, but both; and that the blood of ancestors who were neither Celtic nor Teutonic is also coursing in our veins. We may indeed be sure that the Cimbri were not as composite a people as ourselves; but we may be equally sure that they were not homogeneous. It would only be true in a limited sense to say that even the Arverni, for instance, were a Celtic people. In point of fact, they were a Celtic-speaking people, among whom the aristocracy were men of more or less pure Celtic blood, while the populace was a medley of races. Even assuming that the familiar descriptions of the physical characteristics of the Cimbri applied to the entire people, the people might have been composed both of Celtic and Teutonic elements; for the physical characteristics of the Celts and the Germans are described by the ancient writers in terms which are practically identical. If the Cimbri all spoke a Celtic, or if they all spoke a Teutonic dialect, Celts or Teutons may, for aught we know, have formed the conquering, and Teutons or Celts the conquered section of the population. We know that Celts lived for centuries in Germany; and they may have become intermingled with Teutons.[4] I do not deny that the Cimbri were mainly a Teutonic, or that they were mainly a Celtic people. I simply deny that either the one theory or the other can ever be proved. But, as the only ancient writers whose opinions on such a point are worth considering are unanimous in calling the Cimbri *Germani*, I incline to accept, with the necessary limitations, the orthodox view.[5]

WHEN DID ARIOVISTUS ARRIVE IN GAUL?

Caesar puts into Ariovistus's mouth the statement that for fourteen years his Germans had not sought shelter beneath a roof.[6] It has been inferred that Ariovistus entered Gaul in 71 B.C.; and Mommsen[7] endorses this conclusion. But, Schneider asks, is it certain that the wanderings of Ariovistus and his host had not begun in Germany itself? Ariovistus, in his interview with Caesar, tauntingly remarked

[1] Cf. Zeuss, *Gram. Celt.*, pp. 13, 785.
[2] A. Holder, *Alt-celtischer Sprachschatz*, ii, 449. [3] *Ib.*, 628–9.
[4] See pp. 331–2, 340; and cf. C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, i, 244, note.
[5] Cf. *ib.*, iii, 53, n. 3. [6] *B. G.*, i, 36, § 7.
[7] *Röm. Gesch.*, iii, 1889, p. 247, n.* (*Hist. of Rome*, v, 1894, p. 35, n. 1).

that the Aedui had not helped the Romans 'in the recent war with the Allobroges'.[1] This war took place in 61 B.C. Merivale[2] infers that it must have taken place 'before the Aedui were menaced by the Suevi', and therefore that 'the date of the arrival of the Germans cannot be placed earlier than 61 B.C.' He means of course that the Aedui would not have been in a position to help the Romans after they were themselves threatened by Ariovistus; but I doubt whether this consideration would have prevented Ariovistus from making what he thought a telling remark. I am inclined to believe that he arrived in Gaul, if not as early as 71 B.C., at all events before the rebellion of the Allobroges. For, according to Caesar, Ariovistus affirmed that he would never have left his own home and his kindred without strong inducements;[3] and this statement, if true, is hardly consistent with the theory that his wanderings had begun in Germany. The general impression which the *First Commentary* leaves upon my mind is that his stay in Gaul had been prolonged.

THE BATTLE OF MAGETOBRIGA

Stoffel[4] infers from a passage in one of Cicero's letters[5] that the battle of Magetobriga took place in 60 B.C. Mommsen,[6] following the same authority, and also referring to *B. G.*, i, 35, § 4, says 61. I agree with Stoffel. Cicero, in the letter referred to (written in 60 B.C.), tells Atticus that the Aedui have recently suffered a defeat [evidently at the hands of Ariovistus]; while Caesar says that in the consulships of Messala and Piso, that is to say in 61, the Senate had decreed that the Governor of Gaul for the time being, whoever he might be, should protect the friends and allies of the Roman people. This decree, as Long[7] remarks, 'appears to have been made on the occasion of the ineffectual efforts of the Aedui to oppose Ariovistus.' But, as it appears from Cicero's letter that the Gauls were still at war with Ariovistus in the following year (60), and as the battle of Magetobriga appears to have been the closing event in the war, I infer that it took place in 60 and not in 61 B.C.[8]

Mommsen[9] says that this battle was fought between Ariovistus and the Aedui and their clients only: Thierry,[10] on the other hand, thinks that Ariovistus encountered the united forces of the Aedui and the

[1] *B. G.*, i, 44, § 9.

[2] *Hist. of the Romans under the Empire*, i, 273, note.

[3] *B. G.*, i, 44, § 2—non sine magna spe magnisque praemiis domum propinquosque reliquisse.

[4] *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, p. 29, n. 1.

[5] *Att.*, i, 19, § 2. The text is uncertain. See Tyrrell and Purser, *The Correspondence of Cicero*, vol. i, 3rd ed., 1904, p. 426.

[6] *Röm. Gesch.*, iii, 1889, p. 247 (*Hist. of Rome*, v, 1894, p. 35).

[7] *Caesar*, p. 35.

[8] M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 158, n. 1) takes the same view, but somewhat doubtfully.

[9] *Röm. Gesch.*, iii. 247 (*Hist. of Rome*, v, 35).

[10] *Hist. des Gaulois*, 6e éd., ii, 1866, p. 70.

Sequani. According to Caesar,[1] Ariovistus, as the ally of the Sequani, defeated the Aedui and their dependants 'repeatedly'. 'But,' says Diviciacus, whose speech Caesar reports,[2] 'a worse fate had befallen the victorious Sequani than the beaten Aedui;' and he goes on to say that 'Ariovistus, having defeated the united Gallic forces in one battle, which took place at Magetobriga',[3] &c. The use of the words *semel* (once) as opposed to *semel atque iterum* (armis contendisse) and *proeliis compluribus* and of *Gallorum* as opposed to *Haeduos eorumque clientes* would seem to imply that the Sequani, finding that they had not profited by their victories, had joined forces with the Aedui and made a desperate effort to get rid of their masterful ally; and this view is supported by the fact that Caesar, in the speech[4] which he made at Vesontio (Besançon), alluded to a single battle—not one of a series—in which Ariovistus defeated the *Galli*. Evidently this was the battle of Magetobriga. I believe, therefore, that Thierry is right.

WHERE WAS L. CASSIUS DEFEATED BY THE TIGURINI?

According to the MSS. of the *Epitome* of Livy (ch. 65),[5] Lucius Cassius was defeated in the country of the Nitiobroges, who dwelt in the departments of the Lot-et-Garonne and Tarn-et-Garonne; and although the *editio princeps* has *Allobrogum* instead of *Nitiobrogum*, the MS. reading is supported by Orosius,[6] who places the battle-field in the west of Gaul. The alleged pursuit of the Tigurini as far as the basin of the Garonne by a general whose mission was simply to protect the Province, may appear improbable; but it must be remembered that the Helvetii, who included the Tigurini, intended to settle in the country of the Santoni; and Mr. W. E. Heitland suggests to me that they may have been influenced by the recollection of the enterprise of the Tigurini. A. de Valois[7] conjectured that what Orosius really wrote was *usque ad Rhodanum*.

WAS DUMNORIX VERGOBRET OF THE AEDUI?

Merivale affirms that Dumnorix had succeeded Diviciacus 'in the office of Vergobret'.[8] Now there is no evidence that Diviciacus had himself been Vergobret; and if he had been, Dumnorix could not have succeeded him without violation of the law.[9] Merivale of course

[1] *B. G.*, i, 31, § 6; vi, 12, § 3.
[2] *Ib.*, i, 31, § 10.
[3] *Ib.*, § 12.
[4] *Ib.*, 40, § 8.
[5] *T. Livii . . . periochae*, ed. O. Jahn, 1853, p. 69.
[6] L. Cassius consul in Gallia Tigurinos usque Oceanum persecutus rursusque ab isdem insidiis circumventus occisus est. v, 15, §§ 23–4. Desjardins (*Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 241, note, 311, n. 4) argues that the testimony of Orosius cannot outweigh that of Livy!
[7] *Notitia Galliarum*, p. 553.
[8] *Hist. of the Romans under the Empire*, i, 281.
[9] *B. G.*, vii, 33, § 3.

admits this; but he suggests that the law was relaxed because Dumnorix was 'a popular favourite'. Thus does one assumption beget another. Besides, Caesar only says that Dumnorix held the *principatus* at the time of Orgetorix's mission; and *principatus* does not necessarily mean 'the office of Vergobret'.[1] In *B. G.*, vi, 8, § 9, it denotes 'the chief magistracy'; but in vii, 39, § 2, where we learn that between Eporedorix and Viridomarus there was *de principatu contentio*, the meaning is simply that they 'were rivals for power'; for the Vergobret was then Convictolitavis. Still, I am inclined to think that Dumnorix was Vergobret; for otherwise we should have to assume that at the time to which Caesar refers he was strong enough to overpower the Vergobret; and if so, he would probably have made himself king.

WHEN WAS CAESAR BORN?

According to Velleius Paterculus[2] Caesar was about 18 in the year when Sulla became supreme, that is to say in 82 B.C. Plutarch[3] says that he died at the age of 56. Suetonius[4] and Appian[5] say that he died in his 56th year. Eutropius[6] says that he was 56 at the time of the battle of Munda, which was fought in March, 45 B.C. Macrobius[7] says that he was born in July. Until Mommsen wrote, the date of his birth was fixed, on the evidence of Suetonius and Appian, as 100 B.C.; but Mommsen[8] proposed 102. Mommsen's reasoning has been developed and supported by the Comte de Salis;[9] and it is only necessary to summarize his arguments.

Cicero was born on the 3rd of January, 106 B.C.,[10] and became consul in 63. It may be inferred from a passage in his speech *De lege agraria*[11] that a man could not legally become consul until he had entered his forty-third year. This rule was broken in the case of Pompey, who became consul in 70, when he was only 35: but he had not served as quaestor or as praetor; and his election was irregular. Caesar became consul in 59, four years after Cicero; and, as there is no direct evidence that he was elected before he had reached the legal age, we may infer that he was born not later than 102, four years after the birth of Cicero. Again, Caesar and Cicero were both praetors three years before their respective consulships, and aediles three years before their respective praetorships. It therefore seems clear that, if any exception was made in Caesar's favour, which permitted him to stand for the consulship before the legal age,

[1] *B. G.*, i, 3, § 5. See p. 533, n. 2.
[2] ii, 41, § 2.
[3] *Caesar*, 69.
[4] *Divus Iulius*, 88.
[5] *B. C.*, ii, 149.
[6] vi, 24.
[7] *Sat.*, i, 12, § 34.
[8] *Röm. Gesch.*, iii, 1889, p. 16, note (*Hist. of Rome*, v, 1894, p. 278, n. 1).
[9] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., xiv, 1866, pp. 17–22. A futile objection which Napoleon III makes to Mommsen's view is disposed of by Long, *Decline of the Roman Republic*, ii, 377, note.
[10] Aulus Gellius, xv, 28.
[11] ii, 2.

that exception must have been made at least six years in advance, before he stood for the aedileship. 'L'histoire,' says the Comte de Salis, 'ne nous dit rien d'une pareille exception, sans raison ni précédent, qui n'aurait servi qu'à avancer d'un an ou deux l'accès à ces charges.' Furthermore, certain coins of Caesar (numbered 25–29 by E. Babelon in his *Description historique et chronologique des monnaies de la république romaine*, ii, 18–9) bear the number LII. These coins were probably struck in 49 B.C., immediately after Caesar's entry into Rome; and the Comte de Salis, with whom M. Babelon agrees, believes that the number indicates Caesar's age. Similarly, M. Babelon remarks, coins of Mark Antony bear the numbers XL and XLII, 'indiquant l'âge du futur triumvir.'

It is impossible to fix the date of Caesar's birth with certainty; but the weight of evidence is in favour of the view that he was born in 102 B.C.

HOW MANY LEGIONS DID CAESAR RECEIVE FROM THE SENATE AND THE ROMAN PEOPLE?

According to Appian[1] and Dion Cassius,[2] the Roman People and the Senate only gave Caesar four of the legions which served under him in Gaul. Desjardins,[3] who prefers the authority of Orosius,[4] says that Caesar obtained seven legions from the Roman People, in virtue of the Vatinian Law. Fustel de Coulanges[5] remarks that, if we compare the eighth with the tenth chapter of the *First Commentary*, we can see that Caesar only got four legions from the Senate; for, after he had raised two new ones on his own responsibility, he only had six. But the question is whether he did raise the two new ones on his own responsibility. In strict accuracy, he received three legions from the people; and the Senate added another. In 57 B.C. he raised two more legions; and thus, at the time of the conference at Luca, when his term of office was prolonged, he was master of eight. That the four which he raised himself were raised without special authority from the Senate, is proved by the facts that it was agreed, in the conference at Luca, that he should receive a grant for the payment of the legions which he had raised, and that this grant was duly voted by the Senate.[6] Willems,[7] however, supposes that the Vatinian Law authorized him to raise new legions in Cisalpine Gaul.

[1] *B. C.*, ii, 13.
[2] xxxviii, 8, § 5.
[3] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 355.
[4] vi, 7, § 1.
[5] *Hist. des inst. pol. de l'anc. France,—la Gaule rom.*, p. 45, n. 2.
[6] Cicero, *Fam.*, i, 7, § 10. Cf. Mommsen, *Röm. Gesch.*, iii, 1889, p. 320 (*Hist. of Rome*, v, 1894, p. 125).
[7] *Le sénat de la république rom.*, ii, 1883, p. 651.

DID CAESAR INTEND, BEFORE HE ENTERED GAUL, TO CONQUER IT?

Long[1] says that 'Caesar's object'—before he set foot in Gaul—'and the policy of the Senate was the complete subjugation of Gallia'; and in support of this assertion he refers to *B. G.*, i, 35, § 4, and Cicero, *De Prov. Cons.*, 13, § 32. But Caesar merely says that, if Ariovistus declines to accept his terms, 'then, in accordance with the resolution which the Senate had passed in the consulship of Marcus Messala and Marcus Piso—that the Governor of Gaul for the time being should, so far as the public interest would permit, protect the Aedui and the other friends of the Roman people—Caesar would not suffer the wrongs of the Aedui to go unavenged' (*sese, quoniam M. Messala, M. Pisone consulibus senatus censuisset, uti quicumque Galliam provinciam obtineret, quod commodo rei publicae facere posset, Haeduos ceterosque amicos populi Romani defenderet, se Haeduorum iniurias non neglecturum*); and Cicero merely says that 'he concluded that he would not only have to wage war with the tribes who were already visibly in arms against the Roman People, but also to bring the whole of Gaul beneath our sway' (*non enim sibi solum cum eis quos iam armatos contra populum Romanum videbat bellandum esse duxit, sed totam esse Galliam in nostram dicionem redigendam*). There is nothing in either of these passages to show what policy, if any, Caesar had sketched out before he started for Gaul.

Fustel de Coulanges, on the other hand, holds that, at the time when Caesar was made Governor, he did not meditate the conquest of Gaul:—'le jour où il se trouva en présence de 200,000 Helvètes, il avait si peu songé à la guerre qu'il ne disposait que d'une seule légion.'[2] At all events, it should seem that he was surprised by the sudden emigration of the Helvetii; for he had to return from Geneva to Italy to fetch reinforcements.[3]

But whether the conquest was premeditated or was not definitely planned before the campaigns of the first year had made it practicable, Caesar was ambitious: his ambition needed riches and an army proved in the field; and even to a pacific governor the Helvetian and the German peril would have presaged a fresh outburst of that perennial fount of war,—the need of securing a frontier which could only be secured by indefinite extension.

[1] *Caesar*, p. 36.
[2] *Hist. des inst. pol. de l'anc. France,—la Gaule rom.*, pp. 45–6.
[3] *B. G.*, i, 10, § 3. Cf. *Class. Quarterly*, iii, 1909, p. 208.

SECTION VI.—MILITARY

THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE CAESARIAN LEGION

Colonel Stoffel pours ridicule on Fröhlich and other scholars for wasting their time in trying to calculate the normal strength of the legion. 'Qu'entendent-ils,' he asks, 'par l'effectif normal de la légion ? Peuvent-ils affirmer qu'il y en eût un ?'[1] Colonel Stoffel does not indeed, as I understand him, mean to deny that the legion had a fixed numerical standard on paper, just as an English battalion of infantry, on a war footing, is supposed to number 1,096 men of all ranks.[2] What he means, I suppose, is that the effective strength of this or that legion varied from time to time, and that the legions of Caesar had no normal effective, as distinguished from an ideal strength. But all this Fröhlich admits: by 'Normalstärke' he simply means the fixed numerical standard which the legion, at its full strength, was supposed to attain.

C. C. L. Lange[3] argues that the normal strength of the legion in the time of Marius was 6,000 (or, according to Festus,[4] 6,200) men, because when Mithridates reorganized his army on the Roman model he fixed the strength of the cohort at 600.[5] The legions of Sulla[6] and of Lucullus[7] were, Lange points out, of the same strength. But he holds that in Caesar's time the normal strength had fallen below this standard, first because those of his legions which were at their full strength numbered less than 6,000 men;[8] and secondly because 28 legions of Octavian, which were at their full strength, together with the auxiliaries (*μετὰ τῶν συνταξομένων*), numbered only 170,000.[9] But how can Lange tell what legions of Caesar or of Octavian were at their full strength ?[10]

[1] *Rev. de philologie*, xv, 1891, p. 139.
[2] Lord Wolseley, *The Soldier's Pocket-Book*, 5th ed., p. 183.
[3] *Hist. mutationum rei mil. Rom.*, 1846, p. 18.
[4] S. P. Festi *De verborum significatione*, ed. C. O. Müller, p. 336.
[5] Appian, *Mithr.*, 87, 108.
[6] Plutarch, *Sulla*, 9; *Marius*, 35. [7] Appian, *Mithr.*, 72.
[8] Appian, *B. C.*, i, 82; ii, 32; Caesar, *B. C.*, i, 7–8; Plutarch, *Caesar*, 32, 44; *Pompey*, 60, 71.
[9] Appian, *B. C.*, iv, 108; v, 5.
[10] Guischard (*Mém. crit. et hist.*, iii, 295), referring to the statement of Appian, says 'It is clear that Antony, in reckoning the number of soldiers at 170,000, did not form his estimate with reference to the existing strength of the legions (for they were all much weakened by the recent war), but reduced the whole number of survivors to the corresponding number of legions at their full strength; so that, reckoning all his effective troops, he only estimated them as forming

Le Beau[1] remarks that Cicero had two legions when he was proconsul in Cilicia, and that this force amounted to 12,000 men. So Plutarch[2] says; but Cicero himself complains that he only has 'the nominal command of two skeleton legions' (*me nomen habere duarum legionum exilium*).[3]

'At the outbreak of the civil war,' says Mr. H. P. Judson,[4] 'Caesar had with him . . . only the 13th legion.[5] But Plutarch[6] says that Caesar had at that time 5,000 men. So we may fairly assume that that number was in round numbers the strength of a legion when its ranks were full.' This is a very hasty inference. Plutarch is not a trustworthy authority, least of all about numbers. His estimate of the strength of Cicero's army, flatly contradicted, as we have seen, by Cicero himself, proves this, and proves also that he believed the full strength of a legion to be not 5,000, but 6,000 men. Fröhlich[7] undertakes to demonstrate that he mis-stated the strength of the 13th legion. He shows that Plutarch's figures are sometimes wrong; and he shows, on the authority of Caesar himself,[8] that the legions had suffered heavy losses in the Gallic war. The 13th legion took part in the campaigns of 54 B.C. and the three following years: therefore it could not, at the outbreak of the civil war, have numbered as many as 5,000 men. But Fröhlich is as hasty as Mr. Judson. How can he tell that the losses of the 13th legion had not been made good by fresh drafts (*supplementa*)?[9] And if the normal strength of a legion was 6,000, how can he tell that the 13th had lost more than 1,000 men?

Mr. Judson[10] endeavours to support Plutarch's statement by a calculation founded upon certain statements in the Fourth Book of the *Gallic War*. 'In the return from Britain in 55 B.C.,' he says, 'two transports came to land below the main port, and the soldiers debarked and marched overland. From these two ships 300 soldiers landed. Assuming the two transports to have been of about the same size, that would average 150 men to a ship. Now Caesar had 80 transports and an unknown number of galleys. He lost 12 vessels in the storm. It seems likely that those 12 were transports, as they lay at anchor, and hence would be more exposed to the storm than the galleys, which were hauled up on the beach. Then at that rate the 68 transports remaining carried 10,200 men. Allowing for staff-officers and servants, the two legions must have averaged somewhat less than 5,000 men.' All this is highly ingenious; but it is simply

twenty-eight complete legions, instead of the forty-three which the triumvirs had at the outset of the war.' But Guischard estimates the normal strength of the legion at 6,000. How then does he account for the auxiliaries who were included in the 170,000 men?

[1] *Mém. de litt. tirés des registres de l'Acad. Roy. des inscr. et belles-lettres*, 1752–4 (1759), pp. 488–9.

[2] *Cicero*, 36.

[3] *Att.*, v, 15, § 1. Cf. R. Y. Tyrrell and L. C. Purser, *The Correspondence of Cicero*, iii, 1890, p. 60.

[4] *Caesar's Army*, pp. 5–6.

[5] *B. C.*, i, 7, § 7.

[6] *Caesar*, 32.

[7] *Das Kriegswesen Cäsars*, 1891, p. 9.

[8] *B. C.*, iii, 2, § 3.

[9] I find that Stoffel (*Guerre civile*, i, 203) has anticipated this suggestion.

[10] *Caesar's Army*, p. 5; *B. G.*, iv, 22, § 3; 29; 31, § 3; 36, § 4; 37, §§ 1–2.

labour thrown away. For (1) Mr. Judson has no right to assume that 'the two transports'—still less all the transports—were of 'about the same size'; (2) he forgets to mention that, according to Caesar, not 300, but about 300 soldiers (*milites circiter CCC*) landed from the two ships, and that, according to the same authority, there were originally not 80 but about 80 transports (*navibus circiter LXXX onerariis coactis*, &c.); (3) he forgets to mention that part of the two legions were carried in the galleys;[1] and (4) he cannot tell whether the two legions were or were not at their full strength.

But if Mr. Judson is a bad advocate, it does not follow that his case is bad; and Stoffel[2] maintains that Plutarch was probably right in saying that the 13th legion, when it crossed the Rubicon, numbered 5,000 men. Fröhlich indeed says that the only *supplementum* which Caesar received in Gaul formed a separate corps:[3] but, says Stoffel, Fröhlich must not assume that, because Caesar only mentioned one *supplementum*,[4] he only received one; and furthermore, this particular *supplementum* did *not* form a separate corps, but was incorporated in the rest of the force. It was, indeed, sent to Agedincum (Sens), the grand dépot of the Roman army, probably to be drilled, armed, and equipped; but, though Caesar does not mention the fact, we may be sure that it was subsequently distributed among the legions.[5]

Fröhlich[6] adduces evidence to show that, even in Caesar's time, the normal strength was 6,000. Cicero, in one of his letters to Atticus,[7] tells him that Pompey had crossed the Adriatic with 30,000 *milites*. *Milites*, says Fröhlich, means legionaries: Caesar says that Pompey crossed with five legions;[8] therefore each legion averaged 6,000 men. Fröhlich goes on to argue that, even if, under the head of *milites*, Cicero included cavalry and light-armed auxiliaries, the average strength of the five legions could not have fallen much below 6,000; because the light troops whom Pompey employed to cover his retreat from Brundisium could not have been numerous; and the archers and slingers whom he employed in Greece, coming as they did from Pontus and Syria,[9] could not have joined his army until after he left Italy.

I do not think that Fröhlich succeeds in proving his case, because the evidence of Cicero is not enough to go upon. He may have written from hearsay. Even if Pompey himself had been Cicero's authority, there would be room for doubt; for modern generals have been known to make statements in their letters regarding the numbers of the armies under their command which the adjutant-general's returns have subsequently shown to be incorrect. Stoffel[10] ridicules

[1] Meusel in a MS. note objects that *B. G.*, iv, 29, § 2 (*longas naves . . . curaverat*) is certainly corrupt. No doubt; but it is not less certain that the galleys carried troops. Cf. iv, 25, § 1.

[2] *Rev. de philologie*, xv, 1891, pp. 140–1.

[3] *Das Kriegswesen Cäsars*, p. 9.

[4] *B. G.*, vii, 7, § 5; 57, § 1.

[5] This view is supported by the fact that after *B. G.*, vii, 57, § 1, we hear no more of the *supplementum*, while in chap. 90 all the legions are accounted for.

[6] *Das Kriegswesen Cäsars*, p. 10.

[7] ix, 6, § 3.

[8] *B. C.*, iii, 4, § 1.

[9] *Ib.*, iii, 4, § 3.

[10] *Rev. de philologie*, xv, 1891, p. 140.

Fröhlich's calculations. Pompey's legions could not, he insists, have numbered, at Brundisium, 6,000 men apiece; for at Pharsalia their average strength was only 4,000, and they could not have lost a third of their number in the interval. Still, the view for which Fröhlich contends is probable in itself: there is no evidence against it; and, as he points out, it is supported by the fact that each of the two cohorts of slingers which Pompey commanded in Greece numbered 600 men.[1]

Sextius Rufus[2] says that Caesar conquered Gaul with ten legions, each numbering 3,000 men; but this statement is of no use. The number is suspiciously 'round'; and, for aught that we can tell, it may merely represent the writer's own rough estimate, based upon such data as we possess ourselves. Besides, the statement is hopelessly vague. It may mean that Caesar kept his legions at an average effective strength of 3,000 by regularly filling up with fresh drafts the gaps caused by casualties or disease; or it may mean something quite different.

We are told, in such a way as to suggest that the number was remarkably small, that, in the fifth year of the Gallic war, two legions, including, it should seem, the 400 cavalry that accompanied them, numbered barely 7,000 men;[3] and we know that the average strength of the eight legions which Caesar commanded at Pharsalia was 2,750.[4] As he tells us that these eight legions had suffered heavy losses since the conclusion of the Gallic war, I infer that, during that war, their average effective strength never fell below 3,000 men, and was generally a good deal higher.

My conclusions are these. The ideal strength of the Marian legion was 6,000.[5] There is perhaps no positive proof that that of the Caesarian legion was the same: but neither is there any reason to believe that it had changed; and the evidence of Cicero, such as it is, as well as the inference which Fröhlich draws from the recorded strength of Pompey's cohorts of slingers, goes to show that it had not. But, as Mr. Judson sensibly remarks, 'From the experience of modern armies we know that the number of effectives ready for duty in the field always falls considerably below the number on the rolls; and again, that even the number on the rolls rarely approximates very closely to the full strength of any organization as prescribed by the tactics.'[6] What we want to know is the effective force which Caesar brought into action at any and every given time. Now Caesar, as we have seen, twice gives us the information that we require. When he fails us, there is but one way of obtaining it for ourselves. It is idle to say, The average effective strength of a legion

[1] *B. C.*, iii, 4, § 3.
[2] *Breviarium*, ch. 6.
[3] *B. G.*, v, 49, § 7.
[4] *B. C.*, iii, 89, § 2.
[5] Even in pre-Marian days, when the ideal strength of the legion was 4,200 (Livy, xxii, 36, § 3), legions were occasionally raised of 5,000 men (*ib.*), 6,000 (*ib.*, xlii, 31, § 2; xliii, 12, § 4; xliv, 21, § 8), or even 6,200 (*ib.*, xxxv, 2, § 4).
[6] *Caesar's Army*, p. 5. 'General Sherman,' remarks Lord Wolseley (*The Soldier's Pocket-Book*, 5th ed., pp. 118–9), 'says that all experience proves that in a large organized modern army not more than 66 per cent. of the total force can be reckoned upon for actual battle.'

was so much : multiply this amount by the number of legions. The only sound method is to consider what legions were employed at any given time, how long they had been enlisted, what service they had seen, and how far, if at all, the losses which they had sustained had been made good ; and it is obvious that, for want of sufficient information, even this method can only lead, at the best, to fairly approximate results.

WHO MADE THE COHORT THE TACTICAL UNIT OF THE ROMAN INFANTRY ?

There is good reason, as Marquardt [1] remarks, to believe that it was Marius who made the cohort the tactical unit of the Roman army ; for, as far as we know, Metellus, in the Jugurthine war, was the last Roman general who employed the manipular organization ; [2] and from the time of Marius the size of Roman armies is reckoned by both Greek and Roman historians in cohorts.[3]

THE LEGATI

Legati were officers of senatorial rank, appointed by the Senate [4] and immediately responsible to the proconsul to whom they were assigned. They were his lieutenants, as their name implies, and were expected to perform any duty with which he might entrust them. On Monday a *legatus* might be placed in command of a legion and lead it in battle : on Tuesday he might be charged with the duty of raising a fresh levy of troops. O. Sumpff [5] observes that the chief difference between *legati* and our generals of division consists ' in the want of permanence of their position '.

Stoffel,[6] remarking that a passage in *B. G.*, i, 52, § 1, proves that the *legati* were not the regular commanders of legions in the first year of the Gallic war, suggests that each legion was probably then ordinarily commanded by the principal tribune, and that the other five tribunes, acting under his orders, commanded groups of cohorts. In *B. G.*, ii, 26, § 1, Caesar says that, in the battle with the Nervii, he ordered the tribunes to bring the 7th and 12th legions together. From this Stoffel infers that in the second year of the war the position of the *legati* was unchanged ; but he believes that subsequently they became ' véritables chefs de légion '. There is no doubt that in

[1] *Röm. Staatsverwaltung*, 2nd ed., ii, 1884, p. 435.
[2] See Sallust, *Jug.*, 49, § 6.
[3] See C. C. L. Lange, *Hist. mutationum rei mil. Rom.*, pp. 16–7, and Pauly's *Real-Encyclopädie*, vi, 1909, col. 1600.
[4] Cicero, *Fam.*, i, 7, § 10. Cf. Appian, *Mithr.*, 94, and Plutarch, *Pomp.*, 25.
[5] *Caesars Beurteilung seiner Offiziere in den Comm. vom gall. Kriege*, Zweiter Teil, 1893, p. 10.
[6] *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, pp. 126–7.

Caesar's time the office of *legatus* was passing through a transitional stage and gradually tending to crystallize into the form which it assumed under the empire, when the *legatus* became a *legatus legionis*. But Stoffel is not quite right. No *legatus* was a 'véritable chef de légion', that is to say a permanent 'chef', in Caesar's time. If the legion had any recognized commander, that commander was a tribune, who was, however, of course frequently superseded by a *legatus*; and after the second campaign in Gaul, as before, any *legatus* who commanded a legion was specially appointed to his command by Caesar and held it only so long as Caesar pleased. Stoffel has overlooked several passages which prove this. If Caesar placed individual *legati* in command of individual legions in the battle with Ariovistus, he did the same in his attack on Gergovia;[1] and the *legati* who commanded legions in the winter of 55–54 B.C. and in the winter of 54–53 were specially appointed by him to their commands for those two periods;[2] in other words, when they received their commands, they were not 'chefs de légion'.

It is worth mentioning that Caesar sometimes appointed a *legatus* whom he specially trusted to the command of several legions.[3]

Caesar mentions the following officers as *legati*,—C. Antistius Reginus, M. Antonius, L. Aurunculeius Cotta, L. Caesar, C. Caninius Rebilus, T. Labienus, L. Munatius Plancus, Q. Pedius, T. Sextius, M. Silanus, P. Sulpicius Rufus, Q. Titurius Sabinus, and C. Trebonius; while, according to Hirtius, Q. Calenus and P. Vatinius, who are not mentioned by Caesar at all, held the same rank. Besides these, Quintus Cicero, whom Caesar does not call a *legatus*, is designated as such by his brother, Marcus;[4] and that Servius Galba was one we know from Hirtius.[5] The rank of several other officers, however, who exercised independent commands in Gaul, namely, D. Brutus, P. Crassus, L. Minucius Basilus, L. Roscius, M. Sempronius Rutilus, and C. Volcacius Tullus, is doubtful. Brutus was apparently a *legatus* at the outset of the civil war,[6] but he could not have been one before, unless the Gabinian Law had been either violated or superseded; for he was not yet a senator. Publius Crassus, who commanded Caesar's cavalry in the battle with Ariovistus and was commander-in-chief in the Aquitanian campaign, is said by Dion[7] to have been a *legatus* in the latter year (56 B.C.), and Caesar's silence does not prove that he was not; but he too was not a senator.[8] Caesar, without giving Basilus any title, mentions him in the same breath with Fabius, whom he calls a *legatus*;[9] but this proves nothing, for Caesar does the same in the case of Cicero.[10] From the other passage, however, in which Basilus is mentioned, and in which Caesar says that he was sent in command of all the cavalry to hunt

[1] legatis, *quos singulis legionibus praefecerat*, quid fieri velit, ostendit. *B. G.*, vii, 45, § 7.
[2] *Ib.*, v, 1, § 1; 25, § 5.
[3] *Ib.*, i, 54, § 2; ii, 11, §§ 3–4; iii, 11, § 4; v, 17, § 2; vii, 34, § 2, &c.
[4] *Fam.*, i, 9, § 21.
[5] *B. G.*, vii, 50, § 4.
[6] Livy, *Epit.*, 110.
[7] xxxix, 31, § 2.
[8] Cf. P. Willems, *Le sénat de la rép. rom.*, ii, 1883, p. 614.
[9] *B. G.*, vii, 90, § 5.
[10] *Ib.*, v, 24, § 2.

down Ambiorix,[1] Nipperdey[2] infers that he was simply a *praefectus equitum*, or commander of cavalry. Roscius is designated by Caesar in v, 53, § 6, as a *legatus* according to the α MSS., as a quaestor according to the β. P. Groebe[3] thinks it unlikely that he was quaestor, because Marcus Crassus held this office in the same year. But, unless all the MSS. are wrong, Caesar had more than one quaestor in that year,[4] though he only had one in 55[5] and in 58 B.C.[6] Rutilus, who is only mentioned by Caesar in one passage,[7] is there said to have been placed under the command of Labienus; and we may perhaps infer that he was not a *legatus*. Volcacius Tullus was probably not a *legatus* in 53 B.C.,[8] because he was not yet a senator. Groebe,[9] however, thinks that he would not otherwise have been entrusted with the command of twelve cohorts,—an argument which would apply equally to Brutus and Publius Crassus. It has been suggested that he may be alluded to by Hirtius in a passage in which Tullius (*sic*) is mentioned among other *legati*.[10] Groebe[11] denies that this Tullius could have been Quintus Tullius Cicero; for, he says, at the time of which Hirtius was speaking—51 B.C.—Quintus was in Cilicia. This argument is sound; for, although it is not absolutely certain that Quintus arrived in Cilicia before January, 50,[12] it is more than unlikely that he would have quitted his winter camp in Gaul at the close of the previous year, immediately after he had been placed in command of it.

Irregular things were done in those times; and I would suggest that if Brutus and Crassus were not already *legati* when Caesar entrusted them with important commands, he may have conferred the titles upon them.

THE MILITARY TRIBUNES

We are generally taught that Caesar chose his military tribunes, as a rule, for political reasons rather than for military efficiency; that he was therefore obliged to relegate them to a position of comparative insignificance; and that the *legati* and centurions gained in importance at their expense. Thus Long[13] says 'It is plain from Caesar's *Commentaries* that the tribuni were not employed by him to command legions . . . we may infer that, though he could not remove the tribunes[14] . . . he reduced them to insignificance'; and,

[1] *B. G.*, vi, 29, § 4.
[2] *Caesar*, p. 111. See also Schneider's *Caesar*, ii, 640.
[3] W. Drumann, *Gesch. Roms*, iii, 1906, pp. 697–8.
[4] *B. G.*, v, 25, § 5.
[5] *Ib.*, iv, 13, § 3.
[6] *Ib.*, i, 52, § 1.
[7] *Ib.*, vii, 90, § 4.
[8] *Ib.*, vi, 29, § 3.
[9] W. Drumann, *op. cit.*, p. 699.
[10] *B. G.*, viii, 46, § 4.
[11] W. Drumann, *op. cit.*, p. 699.
[12] Cicero, *Fam.*, xv, 4, § 8.
[13] *Decline of the Roman Republic*, ii, 26.
[14] That Caesar could not remove tribunes whom he had himself appointed—and he apparently had the right or at all events the power of choice—is incredible. Cf. P. Willems, *Le sénat*, &c., ii, 633; C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 185, n. 12, and p. 566, n. 2, *infra*.

according to Kraner-Dittenberger,[1] 'their duties in Caesar's army are insignificant; with the solitary exception of C. Volusenus Quadratus . . . they commanded only small detachments . . . or were employed in various administrative duties.'

There is some truth in this view; but it is, as a rule, stated too broadly. The only direct evidence in the *Commentaries* for the assertion that Caesar chose his tribunes without regard to their military efficiency is his statement that the panic which seized his army at Vesontio (Besançon) before his campaign against Ariovistus 'began with the tribunes, the auxiliary officers, and others who had left the capital to follow Caesar in the hope of winning his favour, and had little experience in war' (*hic* [timor] *primum ortus est a tribunis militum, praefectis reliquisque qui ex urbe amicitiae causa Caesarem secuti non magnum in re militari usum habebant*). But if *qui* refers to *tribunis militum*,[2] it also refers to *praefectis*; and it is obviously incredible that auxiliary officers and tribunes alike were generally chosen without regard to efficiency. It is quite untrue that the duties of the tribunes were 'insignificant' or that they 'commanded only small detachments'. The *Commentaries* prove that their duties were most important; and it is evident that Caesar must have taken care, with due regard no doubt to political exigencies, to choose the best men that he could get for the places. The tribunes, like the centurions of the first rank, attended councils of war.[3] In the battle on the Sambre Caesar instructs the tribunes, not the centurions, of the 7th and 12th legions to bring them closer together;[4] and as each legion in that battle was apparently commanded by a *legatus*, I think we must infer that the tribunes commanded groups of cohorts. In the sea-fight with the Veneti each ship was commanded by a tribune or by a centurion.[5] When Caesar was about to land for the first time in Britain, he gave special instructions to the *legati* and to the tribunes;[6] but of the centurions he says nothing. Certain

[1] *Caesar*, ed. 1890, p. 47. See also G. Veith's remarks in *Klio*, vii, 1907, p. 322.

[2] *B. G.*, i, 39, § 2. G. Hubo (*Neue Jahrbücher f. Philologie*, &c., cxlix, 1894, pp. 272–4), who has such a high opinion of the tribunes that he refuses to believe that the panic began with them, proposes to read *tironibus* (militum, praefectis, &c.). This conjecture is rightly rejected by Wesener (*ib.*, p. 576), who remarks that some tribunes, e. g. Volusenus, were experienced, others the reverse. Anyhow, the conjecture is unnecessary; and if the text is wrong, nobody can put it right. The centurions and veterans, whose bravery and experience no one denies, yielded to panic: why then should Hubo refuse to believe that the tribunes did the same? Lange observes (*Hist. mutationum rei mil. Rom.*, p. 22) that 'although [in Caesar's time] military tribunes were sometimes, as formerly, appointed by the people (Sallust, *Jug.*, 63; Plutarch, *Cato min.*, 8; *Caes.*, 5; Suetonius, *Caes.*, 5), it should seem that they were usually nominated by the generals themselves'. The evidence which he cites for this view is to be found in Cicero, *Att.*, vi, 3, § 5, and *Fam.*, vii, 5, § 3, from which it would appear that Caesar offered Trebatius a tribuneship. Cicero also tells his brother (*Q. fr.*, ii, 13 [15 A], § 3) that he asked Caesar for a tribuneship for M. Curtius. It is clear then that whether Caesar appointed all his tribunes or not, he had tribuneships in his gift.

[3] *B. G.*, v, 28, §§ 3–4; vi, 7, § 8.

[4] *Ib.*, ii, 26, § 1.

[5] *Ib.*, iii, 14, §§ 3–4.

[6] *Ib.*, iv, 23, § 5.

tribunes were personally thanked by Caesar for the gallantry which they had shown in the defence of Quintus Cicero's camp.[1] When the foraging detachment which Cicero sent out from his camp at Atuatuca was attacked by the Sugambri, the young recruits looked for orders to the tribune, who probably commanded the whole detachment, as well as to the centurions.[2] When Caesar attempted to surprise Gergovia, each legion was, it is true, commanded by a *legatus* : but the tribunes evidently played a more important part in the action than the centurions ; for in describing the efforts which the officers made to keep the troops in hand, Caesar couples the tribunes with the *legati*, and does not mention the centurions.[3] Finally, in the battle of Lutecia, the tribunes jointly commanded the 7th legion ;[4] and in this connexion Caesar makes no mention either of a *legatus* or of centurions. Still, it remains certain that the position of the tribunes was not what it had once been : Caesar was ready to grant sinecure tribuneships to men who had no experience of war, in order to oblige political associates ;[5] and there is no evidence that any one tribune ever commanded an entire legion in action in any of Caesar's battles in Gaul.

From the fact that Caesar, in the *Civil War*, speaks of *tribuni cohortium*,[6] it has been argued that, in his time, each cohort was commanded by a tribune : but, as Fröhlich[7] points out, it would follow from this view that the number of tribunes in each legion had been raised from six to ten, of which there is no evidence ; and Caesar was only speaking of tribunes who had been placed in command of six cohorts which were sent to Cadiz.[8]

WHO WERE 'THE CENTURIONS OF THE FIRST RANK'?

'The *primorum ordinum centuriones* were the centurions who ranked highest in a legion. This obvious statement is almost the only one that can be made about them with absolute certainty. We do not know, for certain, how many centurions of the first rank (*primi ordines*) there were in each legion. We do not know, for certain, to what cohorts and to what maniples the centurions of the first rank belonged. We do not even know—at least Mommsen[9] does not—whether the *primorum ordinum centuriones* formed, in Caesar's time, a definite class, or whether their number was fixed. Our information being so scanty, it is only natural that many theories should have been formed upon the subject.' Since these words were originally printed the conclusion which I reached in the first edition—that

[1] *Ib.*, v, 52, § 4.
[2] *Ib.*, vi, 39, § 2.
[3] *Ib.*, vii, 47, § 2.—ab tribunis militum legatisque, ut erat a Caesare praeceptum, [milites] retinebantur.
[4] *Ib.*, vii, 62, § 6.
[5] Cicero, *Fam.*, vii, 8, § 1.
[6] *B. C.*, ii, 20, § 2.
[7] *Das Kriegswesen Cäsars*, p. 21.
[8] *B. C.*, ii, 18, § 2.
[9] *Ephemeris Epigraphica*, iv, 1881, pp. 238–9.

'the centurions of the first rank' were the centurions of the 1st cohort —has been confirmed by A. von Domaszewski.[1] But do not take it upon trust. Before examining the other theories, I will set down a few essential facts.

1. The ten cohorts in the legion were numbered. As the 1st cohort ranked above the rest,[2] it appears to me morally certain that they took rank according to their numbers ;[3] but this view, as will presently appear, is not universally accepted. 2. The 1st centurion of the 1st maniple in each cohort was called *pilus prior*, the 2nd *pilus posterior* :[4] the 1st of the 2nd maniple *princeps prior*, the 2nd *princeps posterior* ; the 1st of the 3rd maniple *hastatus prior*, the 2nd *hastatus posterior*. The 1st centurion of the 1st maniple of the 1st cohort was called *primus pilus* or *primipilus*, and definitely ranked as the chief of the 60 centurions of the legion.[5] 3. Whether the *primi ordines* did or, as Mommsen thinks, did not form a definite class in the time of Caesar, they certainly did so, as he admits, after the time of Hadrian. 4. If it had not been disputed, I should also say that it was indisputable that there were at least eight (and therefore obviously ten) definite classes of centurions in the time of Caesar ; for he relates that, for gallantry at Dyrrachium, a centurion named Scaeva was promoted from the 8th class to the rank of *primipilus* (*ab octavis ordinibus ad primipilum*).[6] 5. If we may trust a passage in Tacitus,[7] there were, in the time of Galba, at least six *primorum ordinum centuriones* in the 7th legion. Describing the battle between Vitellius and Antonius Primus, he writes, *Urguebatur maxime septima legio, nuper a Galba conscripta. Occisi sex primorum ordinum centuriones*, &c. But if Mommsen's view is correct, it does not necessarily follow that there were six *primorum ordinum centuriones* in the other legions, even in Galba's day.

But Mommsen's view is so strained that, if it were not sanctioned by his great name, it would hardly be worth noticing. In *B. G.*, i, 41, §§ 1–3, we read that the legions, ashamed of having yielded to panic at the prospect of encountering Ariovistus and his Germans, asked the tribunes and the *primorum ordinum centuriones* to make their excuses

[1] *Bonner Jahrbücher*, cxvii, 1908, pp. 90–5.

[2] 'At least from the time of Hadrian,' says Mommsen (*Eph. Epigr.*, iv, 230). But there is a passage in Caesar which, I think, proves that, in his time, the 1st cohort of the legion was also the highest in rank :—*duabus missis subsidio cohortibus a Caesare atque his primis legionum duarum. B. G.*, v, 15, § 4.

[3] See pp. 575–7.

[4] Under the Empire, if not before, there was no *pilus posterior* in the 1st cohort. See the next note. The 1st cohort contained five centuries only (although, like the rest, it had six centurions [Tacitus, *Ann.*, i, 32]) under the Empire ; and A. von Domaszewski (*Bonner Jahrbücher*, cxvii, 1908, pp. 91–2) gives reasons for believing that this division probably originated at the time when the manipular organization was superseded.

[5] Primus centurio erat, quem nunc primi pili appellant. Livy, vii, 41, § 5. The centurions of the 1st cohort under the Empire were called *primus pilus* (there being two with this title), *princeps*, *hastatus*, *princeps posterior*, and *hastatus posterior*. *Corpus inscr. Lat.*, viii, suppl., pars ii, 18,065, 18,072, and *Bonner Jahrbücher*, cxvii, 1908, pp. 90, 92, 97.

[6] *B. C.*, iii, 53, § 5.

[7] *Hist.*, iii, 22.

to Caesar.[1] This, as Marquardt observes,[2] proves that the privates recognized the *primorum ordinum centuriones* as such no less clearly than they recognized the tribunes, and therefore that the *primorum ordinum centuriones* formed a definite class. Moreover, whenever Caesar alludes to the *primi ordines*, he does so in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt that they formed a definite class. Describing the defeat of Sabinus and Cotta, he writes, *Tum T. Balventio, qui superiore anno primum pilum duxerat . . . utrumque femur tragula traicitur : Q. Lucanius, eiusdem ordinis . . . interficitur : L. Cotta legatus omnes cohortes ordinesque adhortans . . . vulneratur.*[3] It has never been denied that the *primipilus* was one of the *primi ordines*. Would Lucanius have been described as *eiusdem ordinis* unless the description implied that that *ordo* was a definite class ? Again we read, *Erant in ea legione fortissimi viri, centuriones, qui iam primis ordinibus adpropinquarent.*[4] Would the words *qui . . . adpropinquarent* have been used if the *primi ordines* had been, not a definite class, but merely those centurions who stood highest in general estimation ? A passage in *B. G.*, vi, 40, § 7—*Centuriones, quorum non nulli ex inferioribus ordinibus reliquarum legionum virtutis causa in superiores erant ordines huius legionis traducti*, &c.—is meaningless unless it means that the centurions in question had been promoted to definite higher grades, the highest of which was of course composed of the *primorum ordinum centuriones*. Tacitus would not have used the words *sex primorum ordinum centuriones* unless the *primi ordines* had formed a definite class. Besides, the *primi ordines*, as well as the *tribuni militum* and the *legati*, were called to councils of war.[5] Would it not have been invidious to summon them if they had been simply the centurions of the greatest weight and reputation in the legion, and had not attained a definite rank, which gave them a formal right *ex officio* to attend ?

For all these reasons, I unhesitatingly state as a fact that the *primi ordines* formed, not only after the time of Hadrian, but also in the time of Caesar, a definite class.

I shall now proceed to examine the various theories that have been constructed upon these facts, or upon such of them as the theorist took into account.

1. H. Bruncke [6] holds that the only difference in rank among the centurions was between *primi ordines* and *inferiores ordines* ; but he also holds that the *primorum ordinum centuriones* were the centurions of the 1st cohort. In this I am sure that he is right ; but the other part of his theory, which assumes that the centurions of all the cohorts below the 1st were of equal rank, appears to me inconsistent with his identification of the *primorum ordinum centuriones*. In *B. G.*, v, 44, § 1, Caesar writes, *erant in ea legione . . . centuriones, qui*

[1] Reliquae legiones cum tribunis militum et primorum ordinum centurionibus egerunt uti Caesari satis facerent.

[2] *Röm. Staatsverwaltung*, ii, 1884, p. 371, n. 3.

[3] *B. G.*, v, 35, §§ 6–7.

[4] *Ib.*, 44, § 1.

[5] *Ib.*, 28, § 3 ; 30, § 1 ; vi, 7, § 8. See also v, 37, § 1 and *B. C.*, i, 74, § 3.

[6] *Die Rangordnung der Centurionen*, 1884.

iam primis ordinibus adpropinquarent; and in *B. C.*, ii, 35, § 1, *Fabius Paelignus quidam ex infimis ordinibus*, &c. I hold that Caesar, who uses the comparative *inferiores ordines*, would not have used the superlative *infimi ordines* in exactly the same sense, and would not have used that expression to denote nine cohorts of equal rank, to which only one, the 1st, was superior. The expression *qui iam primis ordinibus adpropinquarent* obviously means that the centurions in question had already gained one or more steps in rank, and would soon be promoted to the highest class of all.[1] This meaning is established in the very next sentence, in which Caesar says that these two centurions 'every year contended *for promotion* with the greatest acrimony' (*omnibus annis de locis summis simultatibus contendebant*). Again, the expression *ab octavis ordinibus*, &c., which I have already quoted, can only mean one of two things. Either it means, as I hold, that Scaeva was promoted from the 8th class, that is to say, the 8th cohort; or it means that he was promoted from the 8th cohort, the six centurions of which belonged to different classes. In either case, Scaeva, before his promotion, was below the rank of *primi ordines*. But why should Caesar have taken the trouble to indicate his original rank, if all the centurions below the *primi ordines* had been on a footing of equality? Moreover, under the Empire the 10th cohort was certainly the lowest; for an *evocatus*, or time-expired volunteer[2] was promoted to be a centurion therein.[3] Finally, the fact that there were *superiores ordines* as well as *primi ordines* simply pulverizes Bruncke's theory that all the centurions except those of the 1st cohort were grouped together in *inferiores ordines*.[4]

[1] Bruncke actually says (*Die Rangordnung*, &c., p. 19), 'Only by accepting the view that there were two classes, can we explain why Pullo and Vorenus contended with one another *quinam anteferretur*, i. e. who should be first admitted to the *primi ordines*.' This is simply begging the question. Caesar's words can be just as well explained on the hypothesis that Pullo and Vorenus, having reached the 2nd class, contended with one another who should be first admitted to the *primi ordines*; and Bruneke ought to have said, 'Only by accepting the view that there were *more than two classes* can we explain why Caesar, in describing the rivalry of Pullo and Vorenus, said that "they were getting close to the first grade" (primis ordinibus *adpropinquarent*), and why he added that "every year they contended for promotion" (omnibus annis *de locis . . . contendebant*).'

[2] See p. 166.

[3] *Corpus inscr. Lat.*, xiii, pars ii, fasc. 1, 6728. Cf. *Bonner Jahrbücher*, cxvii, 1908, p. 90.

[4] Bruncke calmly denies that *superiores ordines* are ever mentioned ('dieser Ausdruck existiert nicht.' *Die Rangordnung*, &c., p. 19, n. 9). Let him turn to *B. G.*, vi, 40, § 7, and he will find his mistake. Bruncke also maintains (pp. 18–9) that 'if promotion really took place according to cohorts'—that is to say, that if, for example, the centurions of the 9th cohort ranked above those of the 10th—'one would think that a newly appointed centurion would have entered as *decimus hastatus posterior*.' But, he continues, from *Corpus inscr. Lat.*, v, 7004, we learn that an *optio*, or sub-centurion, on being promoted to a centurionship, became *octavus pilus prior*. On the theory which Bruncke combats, the 17 centurions below would, he maintains, have had reason to feel aggrieved. This argument is unavailing. If these centurions would have had reason to feel aggrieved, so would those over whose heads Scaeva was promoted. This *optio* may have had great merit; and besides, for aught we know, there may have been numerous vacancies. Cf. *B. G.*, vi, 40, § 7.

2. Marquardt [1] groups the centurions in six classes, the *primi ordines* being the ten *pili priores* of the ten cohorts, the 2nd class the ten *principes priores*, the 3rd class the ten *hastati priores*, and so on.

This scheme is plausible at the first glance, because, as each cohort must have been commanded by some one, it might be argued that the *pilus prior* of each cohort must have commanded the cohort; [2] and one would certainly say *a priori* that the centurions who commanded cohorts must have been higher in rank than any of the other centurions, and therefore must have been the *primi ordines*.

Nevertheless, Marquardt's scheme must be rejected, because it flatly contradicts the fact, attested by Caesar himself, that there were at least eight (and therefore naturally ten) classes of centurions. It is true that *octavis ordinibus*, in the passage to which I refer, has been differently interpreted. Kraner [3] agrees with Marquardt in thinking that the *primi ordines* were the ten *pili priores*. Yet, with manifest inconsistency, he says that the centurion who was promoted *ab octavis ordinibus ad primum pilum* was *octavus pilus prior*. On his own showing, this man, being a *pilus prior*, had belonged to the *primi ordines*. Therefore *primi ordines* and *octavi ordines* were identical! The only way of escaping from this absurdity is to assume that in the expressions *primi ordines* and *octavis ordinibus* the word *ordo* is used in two different senses,—that *primi ordines* means 'the 1st class', and *octavis ordinibus* 'the 8th cohort' without reference to any class.[4]

Marquardt's explanation has been condemned, but on different grounds, by Mommsen. Referring to the passage in the *Civil War* to which I have alluded—*quem Caesar . . . ab octavis ordinibus ad primipilum se traducere pronuntiavit*—he says, 'si octavus pilus, octavus princeps, octavus hastatus dignationis tam diversae fuissent quam fuisse eos adversarii statuunt, non octavos ordines Caesar ponere debuit, sed eum in quo Scaeva erat gradum;' [5] and Dr. L. C. Purser, echoing this objection says, 'On Marquardt's theory . . . *octavis ordinibus* would be 8th, 18th, 28th, &c.' [6]

The well-known passage in which Vegetius describes the system of promotion has, however, been quoted in favour of Marquardt's view. The passage runs thus:—*Nam quasi in orbem quemdam per diversas scholas milites promoventur, ita ut ex prima cohorte ad gradum quempiam promotus vadat ad decimam cohortem; et rursus ab ea, crescentibus stipendiis, cum maiore gradu per alias recurrit ad primam.*[7] But,

[1] *Röm. Staatsverwaltung*, ii, 1884, pp. 368–72. [2] See, however, p. 576.

[3] *Caesar*, ed. Kraner-Dittenberger, 15th ed., pp. 48–9.

[4] As Bruncke (p. 14) justly remarks, if the *primi ordines* had been the ten leaders of the ten cohorts, there would have been no room in the legion for *octavi ordines*, seeing that there were only 60 centurions in all. And, he adds, if Caesar had meant to convey that Scaeva was *octavus pilus prior*, he would have written not *ab octavis ordinibus* but *ab octavo pilo priore*.

[5] *Eph. Epigr.*, iv, 230, n. 2. [6] W. Smith's *Dict. of Ant.*, i, 799.

[7] 'Soldiers, as they advance in rank, proceed as it were by rotation through the different grades [of the several cohorts], in such a manner that one who is promoted passes from the first cohort to the tenth, and returns again regularly through the others . . . to the first.' Clarke's translation, p. 77 (ii, 21), modified.

as Dr. Purser observes, 'this only means that a common soldier of the 1st cohort, if advanced to be a centurion, begins at the bottom of the centurions of the 10th cohort and works his way up.'[1] That Dr. Purser is right is proved by another passage in which Vegetius says that the *primus princeps* was regularly promoted to the post of *primipilus*.[2] Except in rare instances, such as that of Scaeva, when a man was promoted over the heads of his fellows to the post of chief centurion, or when casualties or disease had caused several simultaneous vacancies, the officer who was chosen to succeed to this post must have been the 2nd centurion of the legion. Therefore, if Vegetius was right, the 2nd centurion of the legion was the 2nd centurion of the 1st cohort. But on the theory of Marquardt the 2nd centurion of the legion was the 1st centurion of the 2nd cohort. Von Göler[3] tries to wriggle out of this *impasse* by insisting that Vegetius was only speaking of the earlier period when the tactical unit of the legion was not the cohort, but the maniple. This is a mere assumption and an absurd one; for Vegetius goes on, in the same chapter, to describe the organization of the 1st cohort when it was twice as strong as any of the remaining nine, that is to say, as it existed in the time of Hadrian, if not later. Moreover, the statement of Vegetius is supported by three inscriptions,[4] two of which show that, in the time of Augustus, a *primus princeps* became *primus pilus*; while a fourth[5] shows that a *primus hastatus* was promoted to the rank of *primus princeps*.

There is yet another objection to Marquardt's theory. I have shown that the 1st cohort, even in Caesar's time, ranked above all the other cohorts in the legion. That being the case, is it conceivable that the 6th centurion of the principal cohort should have been only the 51st in the legion?

3. Von Göler's scheme[6] embraces twelve classes, the first of which comprised the ten *pili priores*; the 2nd the ten *pili posteriores*; the 3rd the ten *principes priores*; and so on down to the 6th. The last six classes are composed of sub-centurions, or *optiones*, the 7th class consisting of ten sub-centurions serving respectively under the ten *pili priores*, and so on.

This theory must also be rejected, not only because its arrangement of the *primi ordines* is identical with that of Marquardt, but also because, although it does provide for the necessary eight classes and more, it only does so by including *optiones*. Now although there is evidence that an *optio* might rise to be a centurion,[7] *optiones* were not centurions, and Caesar never mentions them. Von Göler, indeed,

[1] *Dict. of Ant.*, i, 799. See also Bruncke, pp. 15–6.

[2] Vetus consuetudo tenuit ut ex primo principe legionis promoveretur centurio primipili. ii, 8. Cf. *Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, 1886, p. 250.

[3] *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, ii, 228.

[4] *Inscr. regni Neapolitani* (ed. Mommsen), 5712, and *Corpus inscr. Lat.*, viii, 2768, 2941. See Bruncke, pp. 16–7.

[5] *Eph. Epigr.*, iv, 231. Cf. Bruncke, p. 16.

[6] *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, ii, 222–6.

[7] *Corpus inscr. Lat.*, iii, 3445. See also v, 7004, and *Bonner Jahrbücher*, cxvii, 1908, pp. 43, 95.

argues that Caesar might have spoken loosely of *centuriones* when he meant *optiones*, just as we speak loosely of colonels when we mean lieutenant-colonels. But this is an unwarrantable assumption. If the *optiones* formed the last six classes, Caesar must have been thinking of them when he wrote of the centurions who had risen *ab inferioribus ordinibus*; and this is more than unlikely.

4. L. Müller[1] thinks that the *primi ordines* were only three, namely *primus pilus*, *primus princeps*, and *primus hastatus*. This theory is irreconcilable with the implied statement of Tacitus that there were not less than six *primorum ordinum centuriones* in the legion.

5. F. Giesing groups the centurions of each legion in three classes, the 2nd and 3rd of which have each three subdivisions. The 1st class consisted of the three *primi priores*,—the *primus pilus prior*, *primus princeps prior*, and *primus hastatus prior*. These three were the *primi ordines*. The 2nd class consisted of all the remaining *priores*, the 1st subdivision comprising the *pili priores* of the nine cohorts below the 1st, the 2nd the *principes priores* and the 3rd the *hastati priores* of the same nine cohorts. The 3rd class consisted of all the thirty *posteriores*, the first subdivision comprising the ten *pili posteriores*, the 2nd the ten *principes posteriores*, and the third the ten *hastati posteriores*.[2] As regards the *primi ordines*, this view is identical with that of L. Müller.

In support of his theory Giesing cites a well-known passage in which Vegetius[3] says that the 1st cohort comprised ten centuries, which were officered by five *ordinarii*; that in the same cohort there were also ten centurions, each of whom had charge of one century; that each of the remaining cohorts had five centurions; and that there were fifty-five in the whole legion. Giesing concludes that the five *ordinarii* and the ten other centurions did not constitute a 'closed rank-class'; that the former were the *primi ordines*; and therefore that their prototypes, who, he assumes, were the three *primi priores* of Caesar's time, were also the *primi ordines*. I do not believe that any conclusion can be safely drawn from this passage. To begin with, there were, as we have seen,[4] not five only, but six centurions in the 1st cohort under the Empire;[5] and there were not five but six centurions in each of the other cohorts. Moreover, according to Vegetius, two of the *ordinarii* commanded each one century and a half, and yet the ten centurions commanded each one century. Well might Mommsen call the passage a *locus perturbatus*.[6] If there is any truth in it, the ten centurions of the 1st cohort were certainly inferior to the *ordinarii* even if they were not *optiones*. But this tells against Giesing's theory, not in its favour. For in

[1] *De re mil. Rom. quaedam e Caesaris comm. excerpta*, p. 9.
[2] *Neue Jahrb. f. Philologie*, &c., cxlv, 1892, pp. 495–503.
[3] *De re mil.*, ii, 8.
[4] See p. 568, nn. 4–5.
[5] As A. von Domaszewski shows (*Bonner Jahrb.*, cxvii, 1908, pp. 91–2), Mommsen (*Eph. Epigr.*, iv, 227–8) was wrong in concluding from *Corpus inscr. Lat.*, viii, 18,072, that in Hadrian's time there were only five centurions in the 1st cohort.
[6] *Corpus inscr. Lat.*, v, 8295.

Caesar's legions there were also *optiones*; and in Caesar's legions the 1st cohort was officered by six centurions. Therefore the five *ordinarii*, who commanded all the centurions of the 1st cohort, corresponded, not with the first three centurions of the 1st cohort of the Caesarian legion, but with all six centurions of that cohort. Therefore, if the five *ordinarii* were the *primi ordines*, so were the six centurions of the 1st cohort of the Caesarian legion.

Giesing does not ignore the passage in which Tacitus says that *sex primorum ordinum centuriones* of one legion were killed in a single battle, or the passage in which Scaeva was said to have been promoted *ab octavis ordinibus*; but he believes that both these passages can be reconciled with his theory. Like Madvig,[1] he holds that Tacitus was not speaking of the *primi ordines* as a definite class, but used the phrase in a wide sense; in other words, that by *primorum ordinum* he meant *superiorum ordinum*. But to explain away is not to explain"; and I hold that we are bound to believe that Tacitus meant what he said. Giesing's explanation of the passage in Caesar is at least ingenious. *Octavis ordinibus*, he says, refers not to the 8th cohort of Scaeva's legion, but to several legions: Scaeva was the leader of 'one of the 8th centuries' (*Zug*)—that is to say, of the 2nd century of the 2nd cohort. In other words, he was *secundus princeps prior*, or, on Giesing's theory, the 13th centurion of the legion. How this meaning is to be dragged out of the Latin, I am unable to discover. And even if Giesing is right, even if Caesar used such a ridiculous expression as 'from the 8th centuries' (of the several legions), to only one of which '8th centuries' Scaeva could have belonged, Giesing contradicts himself. For if the 8th century of a legion was the 2nd century of the 2nd cohort, surely all the six centuries of the 1st cohort ranked above all the centuries of all the remaining cohorts, which is what Giesing denies.

6. B. de Launay[2] reckons no less than fifteen *primi ordines*, namely, all six centurions of the 1st cohort and the chief centurions of the other nine cohorts. The first three places he assigns to the *primipilus*, *primus princeps prior*, and *primus hastatus prior*: after them he places the nine *pili priores* of the nine remaining cohorts; and last of all the *primus pilus posterior*, *primus princeps posterior*, and *primus hastatus posterior*. He maintains that, when Caesar spoke of *octavi ordines*, he meant the 3rd cohort; but that, when he spoke of *primi ordines*, *superiores ordines*, *inferiores ordines*, and *infimi ordines*, he designated a hierarchy, the several grades of which did not correspond with the numbers of the cohorts.

This view, in so far as it agrees with that of Marquardt, is open to the same objection. Moreover, the reader will have no hesitation in rejecting it when he has reflected on what I shall have to say of Rüstow's scheme.

7. According to Lange,[3] there were seven classes. He holds

[1] *Kleine philologische Schriften*, 1875, p. 515, n. 1.
[2] *L'ordre en bataille et les centurions à l'époque de Jules César*, 1873, pp. 26–32.
[3] *Hist. mutationum rei mil. Rom.*, pp. 20–2.

that Caesar took over the relations of rank from the manipular organization, making, however, one change: owing to the growing importance of the 1st cohort, he placed its centurions in a class by themselves. Like Rüstow, he identifies the *primi ordines* with the six centurions of the 1st cohort: the 2nd class he identifies by a cross division with the nine *pili priores* of the nine remaining cohorts; the 3rd with the nine *pili posteriores*; and so on. I agree with his identification of the *primi ordines*: the other part of his scheme is open to the objections which are fatal to the schemes of Marquardt and von Göler.

8. Rüstow,[1] who is followed by F. Fröhlich,[2] believes that there were ten classes of centurions, each composed of the six centurions of a single cohort; and consequently that the *primi ordines* were the six centurions of the 1st cohort.[3] This theory clashes with none of the proved facts; but it is open to two objections. First, it provides only for six centurions of the first rank in each legion. Now Tacitus, as we have seen, says that in the battle between Antonius Primus and Vitellius, six centurions of the first rank were killed in the 7th legion alone. On Rüstow's theory, therefore, unless the number of *primi ordines* had been increased between the time of Caesar and the time of Galba,[4] all the centurions of the first rank in one legion were killed in one battle. But, however improbable this may seem, it is quite possible. Caesar's famous battle with the Nervii is a parallel case. Speaking of the 12th legion, Caesar writes, *quartae cohortis omnibus centurionibus occisis . . . reliquarum cohortium omnibus fere centurionibus aut vulneratis aut occisis*.[5] Still, even if we admit that all the centurions of the first rank in a single legion may have been killed in a single battle, would not Tacitus have written not *sex* but *omnes* (primorum ordinum centuriones)?[6] The two difficulties combined appear to me almost insuperable—unless we assume that Tacitus made a mistake. But this assumption is not extravagant. The most accurate historian, unless he had access to carefully compiled returns, might blunder on such a point.[7]

The other objection has been stated by Marquardt.[8] Suppose that a centurion had reached the rank of *secundus pilus prior*—that is, of 1st centurion of the 2nd cohort. He would then, according to

[1] *Heerwesen und Kriegführung C. J. Cäsars*, 1855, pp. 8–10.

[2] *Das Kriegswesen Cäsars*, pp. 23–8.

[3] This theory is nowadays generally spoken of as Rüstow's, but Lipsius (*Opera*, 1637, iii, 52–3) advocated it nearly three centuries ago.

[4] See *Philologus*, xxxviii, 1877, p. 142.

[5] *B. G.*, ii, 25, § 1. Cf. *B. C.*, iii, 64, § 4, where we read that five centurions of the 1st cohort of the 9th legion were killed in one engagement,—*aquila conservatur omnibus primae cohortis centurionibus interfectis praeter principem priorem*.

[6] I find that Madvig has made the same remark. *Kleine philologische Schriften*, p. 515, n. 1.

[7] Assuming that there were only six centurions of the first rank in each legion, Tacitus might perhaps have been ignorant of the fact, and accordingly have written *sex* instead of *omnes*. Many a modern historian would be puzzled if he were asked how many captains there are in a regiment.

[8] *Röm. Staatsverwaltung*, 1884, pp. 371–2.

Marquardt, have commanded the cohort. But, according to Rüstow, on his next promotion, he would, supposing that he only gained one step, become *primus hastatus posterior*; that is to say, while *rising* to the coveted grade of *primi ordines*, he would *sink* from the position of commander of a cohort to that of centurion of the lowest maniple of another cohort. But this objection may, I think, be satisfactorily answered. First, it is certain that, little more than a century before Caesar's time, centurions were sometimes called upon to serve in grades lower than those to which they had attained in previous campaigns. Livy[1] relates that in 171 B.C. 23 centurions *qui primos pilos duxerant* appealed to the tribunes of the plebs against having to serve on such terms, but that they were induced to desist from their appeal. He also states that in 341 B.C. a law was passed *ne quis, ubi tribunus militum fuisset, postea ordinum ductor esset.* Of course I do not mean to say that the appointment of a centurion, on public grounds, to a post lower than one which he had previously filled, is analogous to a system of promotion which might involve descent from the command of a cohort to the command of a maniple. Still, the facts which Livy relates tend to show that such a system of promotion would not have been as startling to a Roman as it sounds to us. Secondly, even if we must infer that the *pilus prior* of a cohort commanded that cohort, no ancient writer mentions that the cohort, as such, had any commander at all:[2] groups of cohorts, as I have shown in a former note, were commanded by tribunes;[3] and it is probable that the *pilus prior* of a cohort was more highly esteemed as *pilus prior* than as *ex officio* commander of the cohort. Lastly, whatever may be the force of Marquardt's objection to Rüstow's scheme, it cannot be sustained unless we accept Marquardt's own scheme or some one of the other schemes which have already been examined and condemned.

There are, on the other hand, very strong arguments in favour of Rüstow's scheme. Mommsen, in the article from which I have quoted, agrees with the theory of rank on which it is based, that is to say, he regards each and every centurion of any cohort as superior to all the centurions of the cohort or cohorts below.[4] His reasoning amounts in brief to this. The 1st cohort ranked above all the other nine, certainly in Hadrian's time, and probably long before. It is therefore simply incredible that the 2nd centurion of the 1st cohort should have been, as Marquardt tries to make out, only the 11th centurion of the legion. By way of further proof, Mommsen adds that the bulk of the inscriptions referring to centurions which throw light upon the matter contain the names of *primi principes* and *primi hastati*, and that very few inscriptions mention the *cohortes posteriores*. Moreover, putting aside a passage in *B. C.*, iii, 64, § 4, and two inscriptions (numbered 49 and 56 in his article), he shows that all centurions except the first three of the 1st cohort are

[1] xlii, 32–5.

[2] Cf. *Dict. of Ant.*, i, 799. Bruncko (p. 15) argues that the cohort no more had a special commander than the maniple had had in earlier times.

[3] See p. 566.

[4] *Eph. Epigr.*, iv, 229, n. 1, 230–1, 235.

designated by the numbers of their respective cohorts and the grades which they held therein, for example *centurio legione III Cyrenaica, cohorte V princeps posterior*; and from this fact he concludes that the first three centurions of the 1st cohort were distinguished above all their fellows. Finally he refers to an inscription (numbered 50 in his article) from which it appears that a centurion named Modestus, after serving for eighteen years in four grades of rank, held the position of *hastatus posterior* in the 3rd cohort. It is incredible, he argues, that Modestus, after such a long service, should have been only the 53rd centurion of his legion; but he may well have been the 17th, as he would have been if all the centurions of any one cohort had ranked above all the centurions of the next.

Giesing objects to Rüstow's theory that it compels us to assume that the cohorts in the third line of the *acies triplex*—the army formed in order of battle—were commanded by the youngest and least experienced centurions. 'What an idiotic expenditure,' he exclaims, 'of the best materials in the first line at the cost of the reserve.'[1] To this I reply first, that the reserve would sometimes not come into action at all; secondly, that the cohorts of the third line, or rather groups of those cohorts, were commanded by tribunes, who sometimes acted under the orders of an experienced *legatus*; thirdly, that the younger centurions must have been in command somewhere, and that it would be more natural to look for them in the reserve than anywhere else; and fourthly, that there is no reason to suppose that the younger centurions were inefficient, while there is abundant evidence that they did their work thoroughly well.

Again, unless we are to accept von Göler's theory or Giesing's, both of which have been shown to be absolutely inadmissible, *octavis ordinibus* can only mean the six centurions of the 8th cohort.[2] The conclusion is irresistible that the six centurions of the 1st cohort were *primi ordines*.

I have already, in discussing Marquardt's theory, adduced evidence from Vegetius and from inscriptions, which proves that the *primus pilus prior*, *primus princeps prior*, and *primus hastatus prior* were the first three centurions of the legion, and therefore *primi ordines*. If there were any others, those others must, as every scholar admits, have been the 4th, 5th and 6th centurions of the 1st cohort, or the nine chief centurions of the nine remaining cohorts, or both these two groups. But if the first three centurions of the 1st cohort ranked above all the centurions of all the other cohorts, it seems logical to infer that the 4th, 5th and 6th centurions of the 1st cohort did the same; and if so, why should not all the centurions of the 2nd cohort have ranked above all the centurions of the remaining eight cohorts, and so on? These arguments complete the proof that the *primi ordines* were the centurions of the 1st cohort.

9. One other scheme, however, appears possible. It would be identical with that of Rüstow, except that any centurion who had

[1] *Neue Jahrb. f. Philologie*, &c., cxlv, 1892, p. 498.
[2] So also argues Brunckc, p. 14.

once filled the office of *primipilus* or had belonged to the 1st cohort, would rank with the *primi ordines*. We have already seen that a little more than a century before Caesar's time a centurion who had been the first of his legion might be called upon afterwards to serve in a lower grade. May we explain this apparent anomaly by supposing that it might sometimes have been advisable to place a centurion of proved capacity in command of a maniple or century of low rank and consisting mainly of raw recruits ? It seems possible, at all events, that the same liability existed in Caesar's time. Otherwise, how is one to explain the following passages:—*Tum T. Balventio, qui superiore anno primum pilum duxerat, viro forti et magnae auctoritatis*,[1] &c., and (perhaps also) *Publius Sextius Baculus, qui primum pilum apud Caesarem duxerat*,[2] &c.? It will be replied that Balventius and Baculus were *evocati* ; in other words, that they had completed their term of service, and were serving again as volunteers.[3] This is not absolutely certain ; but, assuming the truth of the conjecture, is it likely that two centurions who had been the first in their respective legions and who belonged to the highly privileged *evocati*, should have ceased to rank with the *primi ordines* ? Caesar calls Balventius 'a man of commanding influence' (*vir magnae auctoritatis*) ; and Baculus, the Hector Macdonald of the Roman army, was the most distinguished of all his centurions. Both men, if *evocati*, must still, like the volunteer, Crastinus, at the battle of Pharsalia, who had, in the previous year, been the chief centurion of the 10th legion, have held positions of trust : whether they commanded other *evocati*, who, as at Pharsalia, may have been dispersed among the ranks to 'stiffen' them, or were employed in some other way, matters little. My suggestion is that centurions *qui primos pilos duxerant* or who had belonged to the 1st cohort and had, whether as *evocati* or not, been appointed on public grounds to some other command, probably still ranked with the *primi ordines*.[4] If so, there might sometimes have been more than six centurions of the first rank in a legion. At all events, Rüstow's scheme, or the modification of it which I have suggested, is the only one that agrees with all the known facts, and is open to no real objection.

One word more. It is certain that those who reached or approached the rank of *primi ordines* were not obliged to pass through each and every grade in the list of centurions ; for if that had been the case, the *primipilus* would have had to climb no less than 59 successive steps before he reached the top of the ladder. No doubt the majority

[1] *B. G.*, v, 35, § 6. [2] *Ib.*, vi, 38, § 1.

[3] Cf. Schneider's *Caesar*, ii, 127. Long (*Caesar*, p. 252) suggests that Caesar may mean that Balventius had only received his promotion in the preceding year and was still *primipilus*. I believe that if Caesar had meant this, he would have written *qui superiore anno ad primipilum promotus erat*. Cf. *B. C.*, i, 46, § 4. Moreover, in *B. C.*, iii, 91, § 1, he says that Crastinus, *qui superiore anno apud eum primum pilum duxerat*, was an *evocatus*.

[4] I find that the author of the article *Evocati* in Daremberg and Saglio's *Dict. des ant. grecques et rom.*, ii, 867, remarks that 'il est bien difficile de supposer qu'ils [*primipili*] aient accepté, en reprenant du service, un rang inférieur à celui qu'ils avaient en le quittant.' Cf. *Eph. Epigr.*, v, 1884, p. 143.

of centurions never reached the rank of *primi ordines* at all. Sometimes several steps of rank may have been gained at a time, owing to vacancies caused by death or superannuation. Sometimes, as in the case of Q. Fulginius [1] and Scaeva,[2] an officer of exceptional merit may have risen at one bound from nearly the lowest to one of the highest or even to the very highest rung of the ladder. Anyhow it seems tolerably certain that the *primipilus*, in the course of his career, had seldom served in more than six or seven grades. To quote Mommsen once more, ' It is clear that the conditions of service were such that a man would reach the rank of *primipilus* before his fiftieth year, and generally after passing through six or seven grades of rank. I am aware that many scholars nowadays are of opinion that a centurion had regularly to pass through the whole of the sixty grades of rank. But this view is at once refuted by the inscriptions, which mention a much smaller number of grades, and is condemned by common sense ; for who would allow himself to be convinced that a centurion only remained some six months in each grade ? ' [3]

THE *FABRI*

Some writers assert that the *fabri*, in Caesar's time, still formed a separate corps : [4] but there is no evidence for this statement ; and it is refuted by a passage [5] in which Caesar says that, in order to repair the ships which had been damaged on his second expedition to Britain, he selected *fabri* from the various legions.[6]

CAESAR'S CAVALRY

Caesar's cavalry consisted entirely of foreigners,[7]—Gauls, Spaniards, and Germans. They were organized in *alae* or squadrons of from 300 to 400 men, divided into *turmae* or troops, and were commanded by *praefecti equitum*, who were often their national chiefs.[8]

It is commonly asserted that legionary cavalry, that is to say cavalry organized as permanent corps and attached to the legions, no longer existed in Caesar's time ; and that this arm was not revived before the imperial epoch.[9] Nipperdey, however, maintains that this view is erroneous. In *Bellum Africanum*, 51, § 7, 52, § 2 the following passage occurs :—*Dum haec opera, quae ante dixi, fiebant a legionibus, interim pars acie ante opus instructa sub hoste stabat ; equites barbari levisque armaturae proeliis minutis comminus*

[1] *B. C.*, i, 46, § 4. [2] *Ib.*, iii, 53, §§ 4–5. [3] *Eph. Epigr.*, iv, 235–6.
[4] E.g. Long, *Decline of the Roman Republic*, ii, 19.
[5] *B. G.*, v, 11, § 3.
[6] See Daremberg and Saglio, *Dict. des ant. grecques et rom.*, ii, 957–8 ; Fröhlich, *Das Kriegswesen Cäsars*, pp. 51–3 ; and Pauly's *Real-Encyclopädie*, vi, 1909, col. 1919–20. [7] See, however, p. 581. [8] *B. G.*, viii, 12, § 4.
[9] See, for instance, P. Geyer in *Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, v, 1879, p. 345 ; and C. C. L. Lange, *Hist. mutationum rei mil. Rom.*, p. 13.

dimicabant. Caesar ab eo opere cum iam sub vesperum copias in castra reduceret, magno incursu cum omni equitatu levique armatura Iuba, Scipio, Labienus in legionarios impetum fecerunt. Equites Caesariani vi universae subitaeque hostium multitudinis pulsi parumper cesserunt. According to this passage, as it stands, the *equites Caesariani* were apparently identical with the *legionarii*, though Stoffel,[1] if I do not misunderstand him, takes *legionarios* as meaning 'the legions followed by the cavalry'. Davies, however, remarking that *legionarii* properly means 'legionary infantry', concluded that the words *in legionarios impetum fecerunt* were corrupt; and R. Schneider in his edition of *Bell. Afr.* reads (in legionarios impetum fecerunt) *equites. Caesariani*, &c.: but Nipperdey,[2] who accepts the text, remarks that *legionarios* must mean *legionarii equites*, as opposed to *equites barbari levisque armaturae.* He points out that, according to Plutarch,[3] there were legionary cavalry in the army of Antonius; and Fröhlich[4] quotes a passage from Appian,[5] from which it should seem that there was a similar force in the army of Pompey. Madvig[6] and O. Schambach[7] endorse the argument of Nipperdey; and Schambach undertakes to prove from the *Commentaries* that in the Gallic War also a permanent corps of cavalry was attached to the legion. He quotes three passages, from *B. G.*, v, 2, § 4, 5, § 3, 8, § 1. In the first passage Caesar says that he marched (in 54 B.C.) for the country of the Treveri with four legions and 800 cavalry (*ipse cum legionibus expeditis IV et equitibus DCCC in fines Treverorum proficiscitur*): in the second he says that the cavalry of Gaul, to the number of 4,000, assembled at the Portus Itius before he set sail for Britain (*eodem equitatus totius Galliae convenit numero milium IV*); and in the third he says that when he set sail, he left Labienus behind with three legions and 2,000 cavalry, while he himself took the same number of cavalry and five legions (*Labieno in continente cum III legionibus et equitum milibus duobus relicto . . . ipse cum V legionibus et pari numero equitum quem in continenti relinquebat . . . naves solvit*). From the first two passages, says Schambach, one would expect to find that Caesar had 4,800 cavalry, not 4,000 only, to divide between himself and Labienus. It is clear that none of the 4,000 Gallic cavalry took part in the expedition against the Treveri. It follows that Caesar immediately before his embarkation must have had at least 4,800 cavalry under his command. Since he ignores the odd 800, 'we may gather that their connexion with the legion was already firmly established and was taken for granted.'[8] Guischard,[9] however, says that Caesar's account of his interview with Ariovistus proves that at that time (58 B.C.) legionary cavalry no longer existed, as he had none to form his escort, and was obliged

[1] *Guerre civile*, ii, 129.

[2] *Caesar*, p. 216.

[3] *Anton.*, 37.

[4] *Das Kriegswesen Cäsars*, p. 38, n. 7.

[5] *B. C.*, ii, 49.—Πομπηίῳ δὲ πέντε μὲν [τέλη] ἐξ Ἰταλίας . . . καὶ τούτοις ὅσοι συνετάσσοντο ἱππεῖς.

[6] *Kleine philol. Schriften*, p. 502, note.

[7] *Die Reiterei bei Caesar*, 1881; Bursian's *Jahresb. über d. Fortschritte d. class. Alterthumswissenschaft*, xxxvi, 1883, pp. 258–9.

[8] In *B. C.*, iii, 29, § 2, we find 800 cavalry mentioned in connexion with four legions.

[9] *Mém. crit. et hist.*, iii, 310.

to mount the soldiers of the 10th legion on the horses of his Gallic cavalry, to whom he dared not entrust his safety. The fact may prove that there were no legionary cavalry in this, the first year of the Gallic War: but I am not sure that it even proves this; for, as Caesar's escort numbered 4,000, the legionary cavalry, if there were any, would have been far too few.

Nevertheless, it appears to me that Schambach has failed to prove his case; for it is by no means clear that the 4,000 cavalry who assembled at the Portus Itius did not include the 800 who had accompanied Caesar to the country of the Treveri; and he did not 'take for granted' the existence of those 800 when he described the expedition on which they accompanied him, but thought it necessary to mention them expressly. Apparently it was his practice to raise his Gallic cavalry at the outset of each campaign; and the passage in which he says that he assigned Quintus Cicero 200 horse when he left him with the 14th legion at Atuatuca[1] seems to imply that he had no legionary cavalry in Gaul.[2] Since, on the other hand, it is probable that his Gallic cavalry, or the bulk of them, used to return home at the close of each campaign, the Spanish and German cavalry, who remained with the legions, may possibly have been brigaded with them.

In the seventh campaign some of Caesar's cavalry may have been Italian. After he left Brutus in the country of the Arverni he hastened to Vienne, and there 'picked up his cavalry, which he had sent on a considerable time before, in good condition'.[3] This corps had certainly not been raised from the independent Gallic tribes, many of whom were already in revolt; nor were they part of the cavalry which he had had in the previous campaign, for he had not yet succeeded in opening communication with his legions. It is therefore possible that he had raised them in Italy,[4] foreseeing that he would not be able to complete his usual levy in Gaul;[5] but probably they belonged to the Province.[6]

Guischard[7] says that Caesar had raised the 400 German cavalry whom he employed against Vercingetorix in the combat at Noviodunum, in the first year of the war. Caesar speaks of them as *equites . . . quos ab initio secum habere instituerat*.[8] As Long[9] says, 'it is not clear what he means by "ab initio"': but it is quite clear that he did not employ these troops in his first campaign; and we may be sure that he did not raise them until after he had learned their value in his campaign against Ariovistus. Either *ab initio* means 'from the outset' (of the seventh campaign) or, more probably, it is used in a loose sense,—from the time when he first employed German cavalry, recognizing their value.

[1] *B. G.*, vi, 32, § 6.

[2] See *ib.*, i, 42, § 5; iv, 6, § 5; 7, § 1; 35, § 1; and *Bonner Jahrbücher*, exiv–cxv, 1906, p. 182.

[3] *B. G.*, vii, 7–9.

[4] Cf. *ib.*, 65, § 4.

[5] *B. G.*, vii, 13, § 2, however, proves that Caesar was not without Gallic cavalry even in the first stage of the seventh campaign.

[6] Cf. *ib.*, 7, § 5.

[7] *Mém. crit. et hist.*, p. 305.

[8] *B. G.*, vii, 13, § 1.

[9] *Caesar*, p. 338.

CAESAR'S ARTILLERY

Neither *ballistae* nor *catapultae* are ever mentioned in the *Gallic War*: but both are perhaps included under the generic name of *tormenta*, which Caesar mentions often; and, as that name suggests, both derived their power from the recoil of tightly twisted cordage.[1] How the Roman engines were constructed, we are not told; but it is generally assumed that they were identical or virtually identical with those of the Greeks. The latter are described by Rudolf Schneider, the highest authority, in Pauly's *Real-Encyclopädie*, vii, 1910, col. 1297–1322, with which compare Schneider's monograph in *Ergänzungs-Heft zum Jahrbuch der Gesellschaft für lothringsche Geschichte*, &c., ii, 1907.

As the Greek engineer, Heron,[2] explained, the idea of both was suggested by the ordinary long bow. Roughly speaking, they resembled huge crossbows, the main difference being that instead of one bow there were two arms, connected by a rope which formed the bowstring; and both catapult and ballista could discharge either stones or feathered javelins.[3] It is impossible, however, to state exactly what the difference between them was.[4] Dictionaries of antiquities explain that they were identical in principle, but that the pipe or groove of the ballista, which directed the flight of its projectile, was inclined at an angle of 45° to the ground, whereas the catapult could shoot either point-blank or at any required angle. But Caesar[5] relates that at the siege of Massilia the defenders used *ballistae* which discharged javelins with such force as to penetrate the *vineae*, or sheds, that screened the besiegers; and it is obvious that these engines could not have been used with effect unless their trajectory could have been altered at will.

Ammianus Marcellinus[6] describes an engine, called the *onager*, which differed radically both from the catapult and from the ballista. Unlike them, it had nothing in common with a bow: it had no groove to direct the flight of its missile, which it necessarily cast at a high elevation; and it could only discharge stones. Its principal feature was one enormous arm or beam, mounted on a frame-work of timber, and carrying a sling, in which was placed the projectile. Before the sling was loaded the arm was drawn backwards and held by a catch: when this was withdrawn the released arm flew forward and the missile sped on its path.

Caesar, in his description of the siege of Avaricum, mentions a piece of artillery called *scorpio*,[7] which was used for shooting at

[1] Sir R. Payne-Gallwey, *The Crossbow*, &c., 1903, p. 250.

[2] Ed. C. Wescher, 1867, p. 75.

[3] Polybius, xi, 11, § 3; Caesar, *B. C.*, ii, 9, § 3; Diodorus Siculus, xx, 48, § 3; Vitruvius, x, 11, § 3; Josephus, *Bell. Iud.*, iii, 7, 9, § 167; Tacitus, *Hist.*, iv, 23.

[4] See Pauly's *Real-Encyclopädie*, vii, 1309. The word *ballista* does not exist in Greek.

[5] *B. C.*, ii, 2, §§ 1–2.

[6] xxiii, 4, § 5.

[7] *B. G.*, vii, 25, §§ 2–3.

individuals. Polybius,[1] says that in the siege of Syracuse 'scorpions' were used in conjunction with archers by Archimedes for picking off marines. Livy[2] distinguishes 'scorpions' from catapults and ballistas; the writer of *Bellum Africanum*[3] and Vitruvius[4] from catapults. Vegetius[5] calls the 'scorpion' a 'hand-ballista' and says that it shot small arrows; while Ammianus Marcellinus[6] affirms that it threw stones and identifies it with the *onager*! According to Heron[7] it was a catapult. As Caesar's *scorpio* discharged missiles which pierced individuals in rapid succession, I conclude that it was, so to speak, a quick-firing weapon with two arms, or what Livy[8] calls a *scorpio minor*.[9] That it was identified both with the catapult and the ballista is easy to understand, when we consider the general resemblance between those weapons. It need hardly be added that Ammianus was mistaken; for how could a man have been 'pierced' by a stone, and how could the most skilful artilleryman have taken aim with an *onager* at so small a mark?

I have shown in my narrative (page 65 and note 2) that Caesar occasionally used, or was prepared to use, artillery in the field as well as in the defence or attack of fortified places.

The Roman weapons were probably inferior to their Greek models;[10] but the latter are said to have attained ranges which would be hardly credible if Sir Ralph Payne-Gallwey had not verified them by experimenting with models of his own construction. Josephus[11] states that at the siege of Jerusalem engines threw stones weighing a talent, or about 57 pounds, more than 400 yards; and, according to Agesistratus[12], a range of 4 stades—over 800 yards—was occasionally reached. Sir Ralph Payne-Gallwey has himself succeeded with an *onager* which he describes as 'much smaller and less powerful' than the best ancient machines in hurling a stone ball weighing 8 pounds 'from 450 to nearly 500 yards'.[13]

[1] viii, 7, § 6. [2] xxiv, 34, § 9; xxvi, 47, §§ 5–6.
[3] 31, § 6. [4] x, 15, § 4.
[5] ii, 13; iv, 22. [6] xviii, 7, § 7; xxiii, 4, §§ 4–7; xxxi, 15, § 2.
[7] Ed. C. Wescher, p. 74. [8] xxvi, 47, § 6.

[9] Mr. Judson's illustration of the *scorpio* (*Caesar's Army*, p. 24) appears to represent a crossbow, which, so far as we can tell, was unknown in ancient warfare.

[10] Caesar's artillery was evidently no match for that of the Massiliots (*B. C.*, ii, 2, § 5; 9, § 3); and for the siege of Alexandria he was obliged to import engines from Greece or Asia (*Bell. Alex.*, 1, § 1).

[11] *Bell. Iud.*, v, 6, 3, § 270.

[12] Quoted by Athenaeus, ed. C. Wescher, 1867, p. 8.

[13] *Projectile-throwing Engines*, &c., 1907, p. 9. Sir Ralph Payne-Gallwey's books would have been more useful if he had taken a scholar into partnership. Such value as they possess is due to his having made practical experiments which illustrate the power of ancient artillery.

THE CLOTHING AND DEFENSIVE ARMOUR OF CAESAR'S REGULAR INFANTRY

I. Daremberg and Saglio [1] give a woodcut, after Trajan's column, representing soldiers wearing *braccae*, which resembled tightly-fitting drawers and reached down to the middle of the calf. There is no direct evidence that they were worn by Caesar's troops; but they appear to have been part of the equipment of Roman soldiers generally when they were serving in the comparatively cold climates of Central Europe. Bandages (*fasciae*) were also worn in the imperial epoch; and I should think that they were probably used, as they are now, in order to prevent or to support varicose veins.

II. Greaves were worn, according to Livy,[2] in the early republican period; and Polybius [3] mentions them in his inventory of the arms of the legionaries. Numerous monuments prove that under the Empire they were worn by centurions; [4] but, although Lampridius [5] says that Alexander Severus rewarded deserving soldiers with presents of greaves, there is no trace on the columns of Trajan and Antonine that privates wore them,[6] nor are they mentioned in the *Notitia Dignitatum* [7] in the list of arms which were made in the imperial factories. Nevertheless, as E. Hübner [8] remarks, we must not assume, in the absence of express testimony, that their use was abandoned in the time of Caesar.

Livy, in the passage already referred to, implies that greaves were worn on both legs; and this, according to Lebeau,[9] is confirmed by various monuments. Arrian,[10] on the other hand, says that Roman soldiers wore greaves on their right legs only, because, when they were fighting, their right legs were advanced, and their left legs protected by their shields. Vegetius [11] supports this statement; and Lebeau infers that the soldiers represented in the monuments were either foreigners, officers, or gladiators.[12]

III. Caesar nowhere mentions the *lorica* or cuirass; but it is supposed that in his time legionaries wore cuirasses consisting of bands of leather covered with metal. On Trajan's column legionaries are depicted, wearing cuirasses of this kind. According to Polybius, a metal breast-plate was worn by the private soldiers without any *lorica*;[13] but there is no evidence that it was still in use in Caesar's

[1] *Dict. des ant. grecques et rom.*, i, 746. See also *Rev. celt.*, xi, 1890, pp. 34–6.
[2] i, 43, § 2. [3] vi, 23, § 8.
[4] *Corpus inscr. Lat.*, v, 3374; vii, 90; *Hermes*, xvi, 1881, pp. 304–5. Cf. *Philologus*, xxxiii, 1874, p. 651; xl, 1881, p. 249. [5] *Vita Alex.*, 40.
[6] Daremberg and Saglio, *Dict. des ant. grecques et rom.*, iv, 149.
[7] Ed. O. Seeck, pp. 31–3 (c. xi), 144–6 (c. ix).
[8] *Hermes*, xvi, 1881, pp. 304–5.
[9] *Mém. de litt. tirés des registres de l'Acad. Roy. des inscr.*, &c., xxxix, 1770–2. pp. 475–6.
[10] *Ars tactica*, 3, § 5. [11] *De re mil.*, i. 20.
[12] Gladiators, however, sometimes wore only one greave (Daremberg and Saglio, *Dict. des ant. grecques et rom.*, iv, 149).
[13] Marquardt (*Röm. Staatsverwaltung*, ii, 1884, pp. 336–7) says that the

time. *Loricae* of other kinds are portrayed on monuments: on the column of Antonine there is one with scales like those of a serpent (*θώραξ φολιδωτός*): on the arch of Trajan there is one with plates like a bird's feathers: on the column of Antonine there is a representation of a shirt of chain-mail; and on a monument preserved in the museum of Verona a centurion is represented wearing a cuirass with scales like those of a fish (*lorica squamata*).[1] Cuirasses of this kind and coats of mail were worn in the time of the Republic as well as under the Empire.

Lebeau remarks that at Dyrrachium Caesar's soldiers improvised cuirasses of cloth and leather, in order to protect themselves from the arrows of the Pompeians, which, he says, proves that their ordinary cuirasses were not missile-proof.[2] Perhaps the arrows had penetrated between the joints of the *loricae*.

THE RATIONS

According to Cicero,[3] Ammianus Marcellinus,[4] and Lampridius,[5] the legionary used to carry rations for 16 or 17 days. The soldiers of Afranius, indeed, in their retreat from Ilerda, are said to have carried supplies for 22 days;[6] but the number *XXII* in the MSS. has been variously corrected by suspicious editors.[7] Rudolf Schneider[8] shows that if ordinary provisions for such long periods had been carried, the men would have been overburdened, and that the rations in question must therefore have been compressed food, which, as we learn from Ammianus Marcellinus,[9] the Romans knew how to prepare. It is of course obvious that such rations would only have been served out in exceptional cases, when, for example, it was undesirable or impossible for pack-horses to accompany the column.[10] Josephus[11] speaks of a 3 days' ration; and common sense suggests that the amount must have varied according to circumstances.

breast-plate was worn *under* a cuirass; but this is a mistake. See Polybius, vi, 23, § 14.

[1] *Mém. de litt. tirés des registres de l'Acad. Roy. des inscr.*, &c., xxxix, 1770–2, pp. 465–6, 468; *Hermes*, xvi, 1881, p. 304; Daremberg and Saglio, *op. cit.*, iii, 1314. Cf. *Proc. Soc. Ant.*, N.S., xxi, 1905–6, p. 135.

[2] Omnes fere milites aut ex coactis aut ex centonibus aut ex coriis tunicas aut tegimenta fecerant, quibus tela vitarent. *B. C.*, iii, 44, § 7.

[3] *Tusc.*, ii, 16, § 37.

[4] xvii, 9, § 2.

[5] *Alex. Sev.*, 47, § 1.

[6] *B. C.*, i, 78, § 1.

[7] Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, vol. ii (*Tabula coniecturarum*, p. 51), and Kübler's edition, p. xxiv.

[8] *Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xix, 1893, pp. 279–85.

[9] xvii, 8, § 2. Cf. *Thesaurus ling. Lat.*, ii, 2228, s.v. *buccellatum*.

[10] See Vegetius, *De re mil.*, i, 19.

[11] *Bell. Iud.*, iii, 5, 5, § 95.

THE FORTIFICATION OF CAESAR'S CAMPS

It is unnecessary, for the purpose of this book, to describe the interior arrangement of a Roman camp. The only questions with which I am concerned are the average size, which it is necessary to know in order to decide whether certain camps discovered on French soil are really the camps of Caesar with which they have been identified, and the nature of the fortifications. On the former point what we know amounts to this :—the camp described by Polybius [1] and intended for 18,400 foot and 2,400 horse was 2,150 Roman feet square, or about 106 acres in extent ; and the camp described by Hyginus,[2] and intended for at least 40,000 men, was 2,320 × 1,620 feet or about 86 acres.

Caesar's camps were of two kinds, temporary and permanent. The former were constructed at the close of each day's march : the latter were occupied during the winter, and occasionally in the course of a campaign. Vegetius [3] says that the rampart of the temporary camp was made of sods of turf, cut in the form of large bricks, or, when the earth was too loose, of earth simply, and surmounted with stakes. Permanent camps were, as he observes, of course fortified more elaborately. When it was necessary to guard against attacks in force the ditch was 12 feet broad and 9 deep, backed by a rampart 4 feet high, on the edge of which was planted a stout palisade, made of stakes, which the soldiers regularly carried.[4] In another passage Vegetius [5] says that the ditches were 9, 11, 13, or even 17 feet wide ; for, he remarks, an uneven number was prescribed by custom (though probably he was unaware that in this, as in so many other instances, custom embodied a survival of superstition); and the rampart, which, as in temporary camps, was no doubt compacted of sods, was faced with fascines or branches of trees, to ensure its stability, and finished by an embattled parapet. Such a parapet, which Caesar erected upon the rampart in his line of contravallation round Alesia, is minutely described in *B. G.*, vii, 72, § 4. The dimensions of the ditch and rampart of course varied according to circumstances. The camp which Caesar constructed on the Aisne, and which he occupied for several days, had a rampart 12 feet high [6] and a ditch 18 feet wide. It should be noted, however, that when he mentions the height of the *vallum*, he means the combined height of the rampart, properly so called, and of the palisade.[7] Guischard,[8] referring to Polybius as

[1] vi, 27–37, 41.

[2] *De munitionibus castrorum*, § 21 (ed. A. von Domaszewski, 1887).

[3] iii, 8. [4] i, 24. [5] iii, 8.

[6] *B. G.*, ii, 5, § 6. P. Bial (*Chemins. habitations et oppidum de la Gaule au temps de César*, 1864, pp. 214–5) holds that when Caesar mentioned the height of a rampart, he reckoned not from the level of the ground, but from the bottom of the trench. He refers to *B. C.*, iii, 63, § 1, which does not prove his point. Here is the passage :—*Erat eo loco fossa pedum XV et vallum contra hostem in altitudinem pedum X, tantundemque eius valli agger in latitudinem patebat.* Cf. A. Klotz, *Caesarstudien*, p. 220, n. 2.

[7] See p. 71, n. 1. [8] *Mém. crit. et hist.*, 1774, p. 468.

his authority, says that the palisade was generally planted on the edge of the ditch and at the foot of the rampart : but there is nothing in Polybius which supports this view ; and it is irreconcilable with the description of Vegetius, and, as it seems to me, with common sense. Polybius[1] gives an interesting description of the palisade, as it was made in his time. 'As soon as they fix their stakes,' he says, 'they interlace them in such a manner that it is not easy to know to which of the stems fixed in the ground the branches belong, nor on which of these branches the smaller shoots are growing. Moreover, it is impossible to insert the hand and grasp them owing to the closeness of the interlacing of the branches and the way they lie one upon another, and because the main branches are also carefully cut so as to have sharp ends.'[2]

Hyginus[3] describes two kinds of trenches,—*fossa fastigata*, of which both the scarp and the counterscarp were sloping, and *fossa punica*, of which the scarp was sloping and the counterscarp vertical. Caesar does not tell us what was the usual form of his trenches : but as he once mentions a trench, evidently exceptional, both the scarp and the counterscarp of which were vertical (*directis lateribus*[4]), we may infer that his trenches were usually either *fastigatae* or *punicae* ; and Colonel Stoffel's excavations have proved that they were *fastigatae*.[5]

In conclusion, it should be noted that, although the normal form of the Roman camps was oblong, they were sometimes, owing to the lie of the ground, necessarily irregular in outline.[6]

CAESAR'S ORDER OF BATTLE

Caesar, when about to fight a battle, formed his army sometimes in two lines (*duplex acies*), once, for a special purpose, in four (*quadruplex acies*), but generally in three (*triplex acies*).[7] The questions

[1] xviii, 18 (E. S. Shuckburgh's translation, modified, ii, 217).

[2] Commandant J. Colin (*Pro Alesia*, 1907, pp. 149–52), after quoting Vegetius, in so far as Vegetius supports his own conclusions, ignores him when his testimony is inconvenient. He argues, if I have succeeded in grasping his meaning, that there was no palisade on the rampart ; but his reasoning depends on the assumptions that the distinction commonly drawn between *vallum* (the rampart with its palisade) and *vallus* (the palisade alone) is imaginary, and that the word *vallum* (except as the accusative of *vallus*) does not exist. *Vallus*, he says, generally denotes 'l'ensemble du retranchement, ou au moins du rempart', and, when its sense is restricted, 'le parement extérieur, l'*escarpe* du rempart' or, in other words, 'l'*escarpe* qui fait face à l'ennemi.' If the commandant will turn to Varro, *De lingua Latina*, v, 24, § 117, he will acknowledge that he was hasty in denying the existence of the word *vallum*. Cf. A. Klotz, *Caesarstudien*, p. 220, n. 2.

[3] *De munitionibus castrorum*, § 49.

[4] *B. G.*, vii, 72, § 1.

[5] See Atlas (Planches 9, 22, 27–8) to Napoleon's *Hist. de Jules César*.

[6] Daremberg and Saglio, *Dict. des ant. grecques et rom.*, i, 950.

[7] Von Göler (*Gall. Krieg*, &c., 1880, ii, 214–5, 267–71), while admitting that Caesar's army was generally formed for battle in three lines, rejects the obvious interpretation of the phrases *duplex acies*, *triplex acies*, and *quadruplex acies*. A *triplex acies*, according to him, was so called because it contained three

which we must try to answer are (1) what was the normal depth of each line; (2) what interval separated each cohort from the one next to it; and (3) how was the relief or the reinforcement of the fighting line effected during a battle?

1. Von Göler[1] believes that the three maniples of each cohort stood one behind another, and that the two centuries of each maniple stood side by side, in two ranks. According to this arrangement, the cohort, that is to say the line, would have been six men deep. Stoffel[2] considers that this depth would not have been sufficient to stand the shock of ancient warfare. Frontinus[3] says that in the battle of Pharsalia Pompey ranged his cohorts ten men deep. Stoffel maintains, I think rightly, that Frontinus mentions this depth as something exceptional; and he concludes that the normal depth of the cohort was eight men. The conclusion appears probable; but the point to notice is that if the maniples of each cohort were arranged in the manner indicated by von Göler, then in the battle of Pharsalia they could not have been of equal depth. But, argues Fröhlich,[4] as they were of equal strength, they must have been of equal depth: therefore von Göler's theory must be rejected. It must be remembered, of course, that, in point of fact, the different maniples must often have been of unequal *effective* strength. Nevertheless, Fröhlich's argument holds good; for it is most improbable that in every cohort, all along each of the three lines, one maniple should have been of greater or less depth than the other two. It is then, if not certain, at least in the highest degree probable that the three maniples in each cohort were placed side by side;[5] and if so, it is probable that the two centuries in each maniple were placed one behind the other.

2. The theory, based upon a famous passage in Livy,[6] which finds

divisions in the same line, namely a right wing (*cornu dextrum*), a centre (*acies media*), and a left wing (*cornu sinistrum*); while a *duplex acies* consisted only of a right and a left wing. This theory has, so far as I know, gained no converts; and the common sense of most readers would reject it: but it may be worth while to prove that it is false. First, it fails to explain the formation known as *simplex acies*, or the single line, which Caesar once employed in Africa, and which, as the writer of *Bellum Africanum* (13, § 2) expressly says, included a right and a left wing. Secondly, the *duplex acies* which Crassus formed when he offered battle to the Aquitani (*B. G.*, iii, 24, § 1), had a centre (*media acies*), and therefore ought, on von Göler's theory, to have been a *triplex acies*. To quote Mr. Judson, 'it seems plain enough that Caesar used the terms *right wing*, *left wing*, and *centre* quite as they are used of a modern army; applying them in an indefinite way to those parts of a line of battle, but not necessarily implying distinct divisions under separate commanders' (*Caesar's Army*, pp. 44–5. Compare Fröhlich's *Das Kriegswesen Cäsars*, p. 150). Thirdly, it is clear from Caesar's account of the battle with Ariovistus (*B. G.*, i, 52, § 7) that the third line (*tertia acies*) acted as a reserve, and was therefore not brought into action unless and until its services were required. Fourthly, we read (*Bell. Afr.*, 60, § 3) that on one occasion Caesar's left wing was *triplex*. See *Neue Jahrb. f. Philologie*, &c., lxxxv, 1892, pp. 214–6, and cf. Frontinus, *Strat.*, ii, 3, §§ 16, 22, and Caesar, *B. C.*, i, 41, which, by itself, overthrows von Göler's theory.

[1] *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, ii, 216–8.
[2] *Guerre civile*, ii, 327.
[3] ii, 3, § 22.
[4] *Das Kriegswesen Cäsars*, p. 144.
[5] Cf. *Neue Jahrb. f. d. klass. Altertum*, &c., ix, 1902, p. 187.
[6] viii, 8, §§ 5, 9–13.

favour in dictionaries of antiquities and handbooks is that, in the period of the manipular organization, the maniples in each of the three lines were separated from one another, not only before but during close combat, by intervals equal to the breadth of a maniple; and that the maniples of the second line stood immediately behind the intervals of the first. The passage in Livy runs as follows:— 'The first line consisted of the *hastati*,—fifteen maniples, separated by intervals of moderate size. . . . The *hastati* began the battle. If they failed to overthrow the enemy, they stepped slowly back, the *principes* receiving them into the intervals between their companies. The *principes* then came into action, followed by the *hastati*; while the *triarii* remained with their colours. . . . If the *principes* also failed to win the battle, they fell back gradually from their frontal position to the *triarii*: hence originated the proverb, applied to men in a difficult position, "the last resource is in the *triarii*." The *triarii*, springing to their feet, and receiving *principes* and *hastati* into the intervals between their companies, quickly closed their ranks, shut the passages as it were, and, with no hope to fall back upon, in one compact column fell upon the enemy' (*prima acies hastati erant, manipuli quindecim, distantes inter se modicum spatium . . . hastati omnium primi pugnam inibant. Si hastati profligare hostem non possent, pede presso eos retro cedentes in intervalla ordinum principes recipiebant. Tum principum pugna erat; hastati sequebantur. Triarii sub vexillis considebant. . . . Si apud principes quoque haud satis prospere esset pugnatum, a prima acie ad triarios sensim referebantur. Inde rem ad triarios redisse, cum laboratur, proverbio increbuit. Triarii consurgentes, ubi in intervalla ordinum suorum principes et hastatos recepissent, extemplo conpressis ordinibus velut claudebant vias, unoque continenti agmine iam nulla spe post relicta in hostem incidebant*). The principal modern exponent of the theory is Rüstow.[1] From certain statements in Caesar he inferred that during the later period, when the tactical unit was the cohort, the formation of the army in battle was the same. He argues, first, that Caesar once states that there was an interval between two cohorts standing in the same line;[2] secondly, that the expression 'cohortes *dis*ponere'[3] proves that such intervals were usual; and thirdly, that Caesar appears to have always regarded it as an evil that cohorts in the same line should have been huddled together.

None of these arguments has any value. In the first passage quoted by Rüstow[4] Caesar describes an attack made by a number of Britons upon a Roman force on guard in front of a camp in process

[1] *Heerwesen und Kriegführung Cäsars*, 1855, p. 45. Since the appearance of Delbrück's article, referred to on p. 591, the tendency of German writers has been to adopt his view,—that, after the light troops had done their work, the closed formation was general.

[2] *B. G.*, v, 15, §§ 3–4. [3] *Ib.*, 33, § 1.

[4] At illi . . . imprudentibus nostris atque occupatis in munitione castrorum, subito se ex silvis eiecerunt impetuque in eos facto qui erant in statione pro castris conlocati, acriter pugnaverunt, duabusque missis subsidio cohortibus a Caesare . . . cum hae perexiguo intermisso loci spatio inter se constitissent, novo genere pugnae perterritis nostris, per medios audacissime perruperunt, &c.

of construction. He sent two cohorts to the rescue ; and the Britons broke through the 'very narrow space' that separated the two cohorts. Now, first of all, it is absurd to argue from the fact that two cohorts, fighting in the same line, were on one occasion separated from each other by 'a very narrow space', that, as a general rule, a large number of cohorts fighting in the same line, in a pitched battle, were separated from each other by intervals each equal to the front of a cohort : secondly, Caesar may have had some special reason for placing these cohorts apart ; and thirdly, the two cohorts may have issued from two opposite gates of the camp.[1]

In the second passage Caesar describes the efforts which Titurius Sabinus made to repel the troops of Ambiorix. The Roman column was attacked in front and in rear, on right and left, at the same moment. Sabinus had to arrange his cohorts in such a way as to repel this attack ; and *cohortes disponere* simply means 'to make his dispositions', not necessarily, as Rüstow imagines, 'to arrange the cohorts with regular intervals between them.'

With regard to Rüstow's third argument, it is of course perfectly true that Caesar regarded it as an evil that his troops should be huddled together : but the passages which Rüstow quotes only show that the evil was that the soldiers composing each maniple were so crowded that they had no room to strike : they do not show that Caesar considered it necessary to leave intervals between the several cohorts.

The theory of intervals has been strenuously opposed,—in the eighteenth century by Guischard, afterwards by Renard, and of late years by Delbrück, Giesing, Stoffel, and Rudolf Schneider. These writers indeed admit that, in the period of the manipular organization, there were intervals between the maniples, to allow of the free passage to and fro of the *velites* or light-armed troops, who opened the action, up to the moment when close fighting began ;[2] but they insist that from that moment the intervals were closed, either by the extension of the ranks in the several maniples, or, as Guischard thought, by the advance of the maniples in the second line into the intervals in the first.[3] Schneider[4] also, though he admits that in Caesar's army the auxiliary troops played a minor part, remarks, referring to the 41st chapter of Plutarch's *Antonius*, that even then intervals were left, before close fighting began, for the passage of these light-armed troops ; and he infers that in Caesar's time, as in the period of the manipular organization, the intervals, after they

[1] See Fröhlich's *Das Kriegswesen Cäsars*, p. 156.

[2] R. Schneider, *Legion und Phalanx*, 1893, pp. 135–6. Schneider (p. 146) holds that when the *acies duplex* (see p. 587, *supra*) was adopted, the light-armed troops did not begin the battle, but that the first line was closed throughout, while the second served as the reserve. But even in the *acies triplex* the light-armed troops did not always begin the battle : in fact in the *Bellum Gallicum* they are never said to have done so. See p. 594.

[3] *Mém. mil*, ii, 91. See also R. Schneider, *op. cit.*, pp. 137–8. I am sure that Guischard was wrong on this point. His view is irreconcilable with Appian, *B. C.*, iv, 128. Cf. *Klio*, vii, 1907, pp. 323–4, 330–2, and pp. 594–5, 597, *infra*.

[4] *Op. cit.*, p. 139.

had served their purpose, disappeared.[1] If, says Guischard, intervals had been left in the fighting line, the inevitable result would have been that the enemy would have rushed through, attacked the maniples in flank and rear, and destroyed the whole formation.[2] When, he adds, Livy says that in the Latin War the Roman first and second lines retreated between the intervals of the third, he simply exposes his own ignorance.[3] The Roman tacticians did not tie themselves down to any one formation; and the intervals were merely intended to facilitate the movements necessary for taking up any order which circumstances might require. The German writers whom I have mentioned take the same view; and Delbrück[4] adds that it would have been impossible, in the stress of battle, to preserve the prescribed intervals; and further, that the maniples of the second line could not have relieved those of the first, when they were tired, by advancing through the assumed intervals, since, when the tired maniples began to fall back, the enemy would have pressed after them and thrown the whole array into confusion. Renard[5] quotes from Livy the passage *inde tribunis centurionibusque imperat ut viam equitibus patefaciant . . . panduntur inter ordines viae*[6] ('he then ordered the tribunes and centurions to make room for the cavalry . . . and passages were opened between the centuries'); and he remarks that since it was necessary to make these intervals in the heat of battle, they evidently did not exist before. Rüstow's opponents also point to the famous passage in which Livy says that Scipio, before the battle of Zama, '*did not form his cohorts in close order*, but drew up his maniples at considerable intervals, in order that there might be room for the enemy's elephants to pass without breaking the formation' (*non confertas autem cohortes . . . instruebat, sed manipulos aliquantum inter se distantes, ut esset spatium quo elephanti hostium accepti nihil ordines turbarent*),[7] from which it is inferred that the normal intervals between maniples or cohorts were only sufficient to mark their individuality. Schneider[8] remarks, further, that it is absurd to conclude from the unsupported testimony of Livy that only the first line was utilized in the earlier part of the battle: evidently, he insists, the first two

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 141. [2] Stoffel (*Guerre civile*, ii, 328) says much the same.

[3] Renard, on the other hand (*Hist. pol. et mil. de la Belgique*, 1847, p. 311, note), observing that, according to Livy, the maniples stood at 'moderate distances apart' (*distantes inter se modicum spatium*), argues that what he meant was, not that the maniples of the first line retreated between the intervals which separated the maniples of the second, but that the several files of the first line retreated between the files of the second; but this interpretation is stultified by the later sentence in which Livy says that if the *principes* also failed, the *triarii*, or third line, received both them and the *hastati* into the intervals between their *ordines*, and that then, suppressing the intervals (*viae*) and closing the *ordines*, the whole army in one unbroken line (*uno continenti agmine*) fell upon the enemy.

[4] *Hist. Zeitschrift*, N. F., xv, 1883, pp. 240–3.

[5] *Hist. pol. et mil. de la Belgique*, pp. 310–3. [6] x, 41, §§ 8–9.

[7] xxx, 33, § 1. Frontinus (*Strat.*, ii, 3, § 16) says much the same,—*nec continuas construxit cohortes*; sed manipulis inter se distantibus spatium dedit, &c. [8] *Op. cit.*, pp. 136–7, 143.

lines were in action throughout, and only the third served as a reserve. To prove this, he refers to various passages in the *Commentaries*—*B. G.*, i, 49, § 2; 52, § 6; *B. C.*, i, 41, § 4; iii, 94—which shall be presently considered.

The theory that the legion fought in groups has, however, recently gained a powerful advocate, Captain G. Veith,[1] who attacks Stoffel, Delbrück, and Rudolf Schneider with impartial vigour. The young Austrian officer begins by reminding presumptuous historians and philological pedants that they are incompetent to solve the problems of ancient warfare unaided, and must ask practical soldiers like himself to help them. But the historian, however patiently he may submit to being put in his proper place, cannot help reminding Captain Veith that doctors are not the only professional men who disagree; and when he finds that three such practical soldiers as Rüstow, Stoffel, and the captain are at variance on vital points,[2] and, moreover, remembers that the captain is the only one of the three who has not seen active service, he feels that, after he has listened humbly to professional opinions, he must still use his own judgement.

It must not be supposed that Veith maintains that the quincunx formation of 4 cohorts in the first line, 3 in the second, and 3 in the the third was unalterable, or that the intervals were necessarily equal to the breadth of a cohort, or even that intervals in all circumstances existed.[3] On the contrary, he argues that as the battle neared its decisive phase, the fighting line must have tended, by the successive arrival of reserves, to approach continuity.[4] The source of his inspiration is the famous passage in which Polybius[5] explains why and how the legion defeated the degenerate Macedonian phalanx. Elasticity, says Polybius, was the secret of Roman victory: the essence of Roman tactics, says Veith,[6] was to dispose the cohorts in a way which would make it possible to bring into action groups of any required strength, and in any desirable formation at any point and at any moment; and, he asks,[7] what would have been the use of adhering slavishly to a prescribed scheme when the utility of the Roman system lay in freedom from restriction? This, as the reader will have observed, is substantially what Guischard said a century and a half ago; and indeed Veith is careful to point out that the difference between his theory and that of the advocates of a continuous formation is not so great as might at first sight appear.[8]

Veith begins by endeavouring to show that the danger of leaving intervals between cohorts is imaginary, while it would have been very dangerous for the enemy to penetrate between two intact cohorts—far more so than to break a continuous line—especially as there was a third in reserve before him. Moreover, Veith continues, every scholar admits that the continuity of the line was broken by intervals of some sort, however small: why were they not dangerous if larger ones were?[9] Again, Polybius explains that Roman tactics enabled

[1] *Klio*, vii, 1907, pp. 303–34.
[2] *Ib.*, p. 325.
[3] *Ib.*, pp. 309–10.
[4] *Ib.*, p. 328, n. 1.
[5] xviii, 29–32 (12–5).
[6] *Klio*, vii, 327.
[7] *Ib.*, p. 333.
[8] Cf. R. Schneider, *op. cit.*, pp. 138, 149.
[9] *Klio.*, vii, 306–7.

the legion to utilize the features of the country; and in broken country a continuous line could not have acted.[1] The opponents of Rüstow's theory forget that even in Alexander's army there were intervals between the Macedonian phalanx and the auxiliary corps which accompanied it.[2] Caesar's statement[3] that at Pharsalia Crastinus and his company were the first to charge alone pulverizes the theory that the line of battle was continuous;[4] and the contrast, so sharply emphasized by Polybius, between the legion and the phalanx, would have been insignificant if there had been no intervals in the former.[5] In short, says Veith,[6] the continuous formation imagined by Delbrück would have been merely a bastard phalanx,—a phalanx with all its defects and none of its advantages. For let us suppose that such a line encountered a genuine phalanx. What would happen? The phalanx, by dint of its immensely superior weight, would inevitably break the line: intervals would be formed involuntarily; and the fragmentary groups, overpowered, driven back, and shattered, would prevent their own reserves from acting. On the other hand, if intervals had been left intentionally, any portions of the phalanx that attempted to penetrate would be exposed to attack in flank and rear, if not to disaster.[7] Unlike Schneider, Veith believes that the second line as well as the third acted as a reserve.

And now, reader, having profited by Veith's professional knowledge and Schneider's learning, let us endeavour, with due humility, to draw our own conclusions. To begin with, we must take account of the arguments, drawn from Livy, which Veith has left unanswered. Assuming Livy's accuracy, the words *inde tribunis centurionibusque imperat ut viam equitibus patefaciant . . . panduntur inter ordines viae*[8] may prove that before the order was given intervals had not existed; but nobody maintains that intervals were an invariable feature of the Roman order of battle. Livy's description of the peculiar order which

[1] *Klio*, vii, 309.

[2] 'Under Philip and Alexander,' says Professor Oman (*Companion to Greek Studies*, ed. L. Whibley, 1905, p. 468), the phalanx 'had still some mobility, and its various τάξεις could act independently of each other and execute individual movements. But in the third century [B. C.] it became a single clump of spears of most unwieldy size. . . . Pyrrhus seems to have been the only general among the Epigoni [the inheritors of Alexander's dominions] who tried to keep the phalanx mobile: in his Roman wars we read that he drew it up in a row of small columns, not in one mass,' &c.

[3] *B. C.*, iii, 91, § 3.

[4] *Klio*, vii, 313.

[5] G. Veith, *Gesch. d. Feldzüge C. J. Caesars*, p. 484.

[6] *Klio*, vii, 312.

[7] *Ib.*, p. 314. Th. Steinwender (*Philologus*, lxviii, 1909, p. 262) says that the maniples [or cohorts] in the second line would have been unable to encounter the portions of the phalanx that penetrated through the intervals because they were too far behind the first line. Surely this is a weak argument. The second line was never more than 50 or 60 yards behind the first, and could have advanced in a few seconds to stem a threatened attack.

Veith seems over-anxious to prove his case; and I have omitted some of his weaker arguments, e.g. (pp. 308, 311) those based upon *B. G.*, v, 34 and *B. C.*, iii, 88–9, which, as any intelligent reader will see, are inconclusive.

[8] See p. 591.

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Scipio adopted at the battle of Zama[1] certainly suggests that he believed that in 202 B.C. the usual formation was a closed line; but if he did, he is contradicted by Polybius, who says that behind the *hastati* Scipio stationed the *principes*, 'their maniples not covering the intervals between those of the *hastati*, as the Roman custom is, but being posted immediately behind them at some distance, on account of the multitude of the enemy's elephants' (*ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις τοὺς πρίγκιπας, τιθεὶς τὰς σπείρας, οὐ κατὰ τὸ τῶν πρώτων σημαιῶν διάστημα, καθάπερ ἔθος ἐστὶ τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἀλλήλους ἐν ἀποστάσει, διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν παρὰ τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἐλεφάντων*).[2] I do not infer from the words 'as the Roman custom is' that the intervals usually remained open after the light-armed troops had done their work; but there is sufficient evidence that they sometimes did. Schneider is mistaken in asserting that Livy is the only writer who says that the second line did not come into action until after the first stage of close fighting ended; for Polybius distinctly states that this happened at Zama.[3] There, as in Livy's famous chapter, after the preliminary skirmishing the *hastati* separately attacked the Carthaginians; then the *principes* were ordered to advance; and finally *hastati*, *principes*, and *triarii* fought in unison. Scipio, says the historian, 'ordered the *principes* and *triarii* to take close order . . . and deploy into line with the *hastati* on either flank.' Do not the words 'to take close order' show that before their order had not been close? As to the period which followed that of the manipular organization, when Schneider affirms that the light-armed auxiliaries regularly opened the action, he forgets that in the battle with the Helvetii and apparently also in the battle with Ariovistus the auxiliaries took no active part; nor is there a single word in the *Commentaries* which confirms his theory. Again, the passages which he quotes from Caesar do not prove that the second line was from the commencement of close fighting incorporated with the first: they only prove that the first two lines formed in some sort a whole as distinct from the third, which remained in reserve. Consider the description of the battle with the Helvetii, where the usual *triplex acies* was adopted. On Schneider's theory intervals did not exist even at the outset of this battle, because the auxiliaries, who, as he believes, would normally have filled them, were far removed from the fighting line: if, then, as he insists, the second line was from the commencement of the battle incorporated with the first, why was it formed at all, and what was the sense of the expression *triplex acies*? Evidently no *triplex acies* existed; and Caesar ought to have written *duplicem aciem instruxit*! Yet it is

[1] See p. 591. Weissenborn in his edition of Livy (1858, vol. vi, p. 382) observes that *cohortes* is not to be understood in its later sense, but was used instead of *manipulos* for the sake of variety. But is it not conceivable that Livy may have been guilty of an anachronism and have meant that the maniples of each (imaginary) cohort were not close together, but separated by intervals?

[2] xv, 9, § 7.

[3] *συνέχεαν ἐπιπεσόντες τὰς τῶν ἀστάτων σημαίας· οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν πριγκίπων ἡγεμόνες συνθεασάμενοι τὸ γεγονὸς, ἐπέστησαν τὰς αὑτῶν τάξεις . . . τοὺς δ' ἐπιδιώκοντας τῶν ἀστάτων ἀνακαλεσάμενος . . . τοὺς δὲ πρίγκιπας καὶ τριαρίους πυκνώσας ἐφ' ἑκάτερον τὸ κέρας προάγειν παρήγγειλε διὰ τῶν νεκρῶν* (xv, 13, § 7; 14, §§ 3–5).

clear from his narrative that even after the first stage of the battle was over the first two lines still existed as such. Again, take Polybius's account of the battle of Cannae. He says that Varro 'stationed the maniples closer together than usual' (*πυκνοτέρας ἢ πρόσθεν τὰς σημαίας καθιστάνων*),[1] and that he 'placed the light troops in advance of the whole army' (*πάσης δὲ τῆς δυνάμεως προέστησε τοὺς εὐζώνους ἐν ἀποστάσει*).[2] The light troops, therefore, did not occupy the diminished intervals before close fighting began; and unless Polybius means that the maniples stood closer than usual when and after close fighting began, his remark has no point. For, according to Schneider, the maniples habitually stood close together after hand-to-hand fighting had begun; and what would have been gained by placing them closer than usual if, immediately after hand-to-hand fighting had begun, the intervals had disappeared?

There is, indeed, another passage in Polybius which may appear to support the theory that the line of battle was generally continuous. At the end of his account of the battle of Zama he remarks that 'though the Roman line is hard to break, yet each individual soldier and each company . . . can fight in any direction' (*οὔσης γὰρ δυσδιασπάστου τῆς Ῥωμαίων τάξεως καὶ δυνάμεως, τὸν ἄνδρα συνέβη καὶ καθόλου · καὶ κατὰ μέρη μάχεσθαι πρὸς πάσας τὰς ἐπιφανείας*).[3] These words might suggest that the Roman line, though it was composed of units which could act independently, was normally continuous: but Polybius's account of the battle of Zama (not to mention Cannae) shows that on that occasion it was not connected until the final stage when the *hastati*, *principes*, and *triarii* formed a compact line; and he may only have meant that it was hard to break because the second and third lines were always ready to support the first. Let us examine his comparison of the Roman line with the degenerate Macedonian phalanx. 'The Romans,' he says, 'do not attempt to extend their front to equal that of a phalanx, and then charge it directly with their whole force; but some of their divisions are kept in reserve, while others encounter the enemy. Now, whether the phalanx in its charge drives its opponents from their ground, or is itself driven back, in either case its peculiar order is dislocated; for whether in following the retiring, or flying from the advancing enemy, they quit the remaining divisions of their force; and when this takes place, the enemy's reserves can occupy the space thus left and the ground which the phalanx had just before been holding, and . . . fall upon them on their flank and rear' (*Οὐ γὰρ ἐξισώσαντες τὴν παράταξιν πᾶσιν ἅμα συμβάλλουσι τοῖς στρατοπέδοις μετωπηδὸν πρὸς τὰς φάλαγγας, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἐφεδρεύει τῶν μερῶν αὐτοῖς, τὰ δὲ συμμίσγει τοῖς πολεμίοις. Λοιπόν, ἄν τ' ἐκπιέσωσιν οἱ φαλαγγῖται τοὺς καθ' αὑτοὺς προσβάλλοντες, ἄν τ' ἐκπιεσθῶσιν ὑπὸ τούτων, λέλυται τὸ τῆς φάλαγγος ἴδιον. Ἢ γὰρ ἑπόμενοι τοῖς ὑποχωροῦσιν, ἢ φεύγοντες τοὺς προσκειμένους, ἀπολείπουσι τὰ λοιπὰ μέρη τῆς οἰκείας δυνάμεως. Οὗ γενομένου, δέδοται τοῖς ἐφεδρεύουσι τῶν πολεμίων διάστημα καὶ τόπος, ὃν οὗτοι κατεῖχον, πρὸς . . . παρεισπέσοντας πλαγίους παρίστασθαι καὶ κατὰ*

[1] iii, 113, § 3. [2] *Ib.*, § 4. [3] xv, 15, § 7.

νώτου τοῖς φαλαγγίταις).'[1] What is the meaning of the words 'The Romans do not attempt to extend their front to equal that of a phalanx'? Either that the Roman line, though continuous, was overlapped on right and left by the phalanx; or that, although the Roman wings were opposite those of the enemy, there were intervals in their line which made the combined width of the several maniples less than the width of the phalanx. *Prima facie* I should say that the former was the meaning; and if so, Polybius here supports Schneider: but Caesar's description of his battle with Ariovistus proves that his wings were not overlapped by the German phalanx, and seems to me to imply that his army began by fighting in groups. The auxiliaries were certainly not posted in intervals between the cohorts, but, as Caesar expressly says,[2] were massed in front of his smaller camp. Schneider therefore holds that the second line was from the outset incorporated with the first. That, for the reasons which I have given, seems to me out of the question. Stoffel, on the other hand, who agrees with Schneider that there were no considerable intervals, insists that the second line was posted behind the first, and relieved—not reinforced—it as occasion required. But Stoffel surely forgot that, as the Germans outnumbered the Romans, the first line would in this case have been less than one-third as strong as the German phalanx, and must have been speedily overpowered. And if the first line was, as he holds, continuous, evidently it could not have been *reinforced* for want of room. I am therefore inclined to agree with Veith that the Roman lines fought in groups. It might, indeed, be objected that if the intervals had been considerable, either the greater part of the phalanx would have done absolutely nothing, which is incredible, or they would have penetrated the intervals, in which case the second line would of course have advanced to meet them, and the chequer formation would, temporarily or permanently, have disappeared. But it would not have disappeared until it had done its work; and surely it is significant that Philopoemen in the battle of Mantinea, as Polybius[3] is careful to point out, deliberately left intervals, which were not intended for the passage of light troops, between the component parts of his phalanx.

It is true that Vegetius,[4] describing an order of battle that was customary at some period of the Empire, says nothing about intervals, while the words which he uses in explaining the collocation of the several cohorts—*coniungitur* and *adnectitur*—suggest that the line was then continuous; and in another passage he observes that panic must ensue if the line is broken and the enemy are able to attack it in the rear.[5] But may we not suppose that this continuous formation was a symptom of decadence, analogous to that which we have already noticed in the case of the later Macedonian phalanx?

Now let us test Veith's argument. Neither Schneider nor any other writer argues that the Roman line was invariably continuous; and therefore Veith's remark about Crastinus, which, by the way, does

[1] xviii, 32 (15), §§ 2–5. [2] *B. G.*, i, 51, § 5. [3] xi, 11, § 6.
[4] *De re mil.*, ii, 15. [5] *Ib.*, i, 26.

not prove the existence of *lateral* intervals, is irrelevant. Even if the Roman line was generally continuous, it was still sharply contrasted with the Macedonian phalanx; for its continuity was not rigid but elastic, and its component parts were capable of independent action. But these are minor points: my only serious complaint against Veith is that he is too fond of tilting at windmills, that he has neglected passages which tell in favour of his theory, and that he has left certain objections unanswered.

I have tried to show that the arguments of Veith and Schneider are both vulnerable; and my own conclusions are not as dogmatical as theirs. I only claim to have called attention to matters which have been overlooked, and to have shown that the whole question is more difficult than Delbrück and Schneider on the one hand, Veith on the other, appear to suppose. Unhappily no ancient writer has left a description of the tactics of the Caesarian as complete as that which Polybius gives of the manipular legion, which itself leaves much to be desired: we can only have recourse to scattered scraps of information. But this much is clear:—there is no evidence that in Caesar's time the auxiliaries ever opened the battle; and certainly they did not in the battle with the Helvetii or in the battle with Ariovistus. The first two lines appear to have maintained their individuality even after close fighting had begun, though, as the battle neared its end, the second may have become gradually incorporated with the first. As for intervals, I believe, for the reasons which I have given, that Veith is nearer the truth than Schneider, though both are right in denying that, when they existed, their width was invariable. No doubt the Roman line was never absolutely unbroken; but the size of the intervals must have depended upon circumstances which we cannot ascertain. The main point is that, as Polybius says, the Roman order of battle was 'flexible; for every Roman, once armed and on the field, is equally well equipped for every place and time, and for every appearance of the enemy. He is, moreover, quite ready and needs to make no change, whether he is called upon to fight in the main body, or in a detachment, or in a single maniple, or even by himself' (ἡ δὲ Ῥωμαίων [σύνταξις] εὔχρηστος. Πᾶς γὰρ Ῥωμαῖος, ὅταν ἅπαξ καθοπλισθεὶς ὁρμήσῃ πρὸς τὴν χρείαν, ὁμοίως ἥρμοσται πρὸς πάντα τόπον καὶ καιρόν, καὶ πρὸς πᾶσαν ἐπιφάνειαν· Καὶ μὴν ἕτοιμός ἐστι, καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει διάθεσιν, ἄν τε μετὰ πάντων δέῃ κινδυνεύειν, ἄν τε μετὰ μέρους, ἄν τε κατὰ σημαίαν, ἄν τε καὶ κατ' ἄνδρα).[1]

3. The next problem which we have to solve is this: how were the men in the fighting line relieved? Fröhlich,[2] postulating that the tactical unity of each cohort must be preserved, originally held that the ranks of the tired cohorts closed up, and thus created intervals for fresh cohorts to enter and take their places. The tired cohorts retired fighting, while the ranks of the relieving cohorts immediately spread out on both sides and filled up the intervals. Soltau,[3] improving a little upon this theory, held that, instead of

[1] xviii, 32 (15), §§ 9–11.
[2] *Realistisches und Stilistisches zu Cäsar*, &c., 1887, pp. 11–4.
[3] *Hermes*, xx, 1885, pp. 264–7.

the relieving cohort's waiting patiently until the whole interval was ready for it to enter, the men of whom it was composed gradually insinuated themselves into the interval the moment it began to be formed. Then and not till then, Soltau thought, the tired cohort began to fall back. The thing sounds easy, says Giesing ;[1] but there is one difficulty to be reckoned with. The moment the tired cohort begins to fall back, 'the plaguy enemy' press after : the relieving cohort finds itself surrounded ; and the line of battle is destroyed. Giesing's theory is as follows. In hard fighting the foremost ranks of the first line inevitably become thinned : the gaps are filled up by the advance of the rear ranks between the files of those in front ; and this process goes on until the depth of the first line is in danger of becoming unduly thinned. Should it be necessary to relieve any of the cohorts as a whole, the relief is accomplished in the same way : the ranks of the relieving cohort advance between the files of the tired cohort ; and the enemy never gets a chance of breaking the formation.[2] The theory that entire groups were relieved has, however, I believe, been generally abandoned.[3] Veith,[4] remarking that no modern commander withdraws troops from the fighting line when he reinforces them, argues that in Caesar's time at all events relief had ceased to be a regular feature of Roman tactics and was replaced by reinforcement : in other words, he believes, if I do not misunderstand him,[5] that fresh troops were brought into the fighting line through the intervals, which thus, as the battle neared its end, disappeared or tended to disappear. But this suggestion, although it is supported by Caesar's account of the last stage in the battle of Pharsalia,[6] does not remove all perplexities ; for modern warfare is not characterized by prolonged hand-to-hand fighting. I can only suggest that, according to circumstances, relief or reinforcement or both were adopted when they were practicable, and effected in the way which under the circumstances seemed best ; and I agree with Schneider that for the relief of individual soldiers the method suggested by Giesing is the best. Superintendent Froest, of the Criminal Investigation Department, tells me that it would be adopted by the police in street fighting ; and indeed no other method appears practicable. When, as in the battle with Ariovistus, the third line

[1] *Neue Jahrb. f. Philologie*, &c., cxxxvii, 1888, pp. 852–9.

[2] So also Stoffel (*Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, pp. 120–1) writes, 'comme le légionnaire était pesamment armé et que les combats étaient des luttes d'homme à homme, il est à croire qu'au bout de quinze à vingt minutes la première ligne avait besoin d'être soutenue ou relevée. Alors les soldats de la deuxième ligne passaient dans les intervalles des combattants pendant que ceux de la première se retiraient,' &c. I ought to say that Fröhlich (*Das Kriegswesen Cäsars*, p. 164) was converted by Giesing's arguments.

[3] See R. Schneider, *op. cit.*, p. 147. Stoffel consistently adhered to the theory, which, as we have seen (p. 589), is supported by Livy, that entire cohorts were relieved.

[4] *Klio*, vii, 316.

[5] *Ib.*, p. 328, n. 1.

[6] Eodem tempore tertiam aciem Caesar . . . procurrere iussit. Ita cum recentes atque integri defessis *successissent* . . . sustinere Pompeiani non potuerunt, &c.

was brought into action, the cohorts that composed it may have been directed against one or both of the enemy's flanks or on his rear.

It may be worth while to add that Fröhlich[1] affirms, on the strength of certain passages in Plutarch[2] and Appian,[3] that, after the first two ranks of the first line had thrown their javelins and while they were using their swords, the rear ranks threw their javelins over the heads of the first two. I do not dispute this statement; but I can find nothing in the passages referred to which proves it. Stoffel[4] simply remarks that the first two ranks opened the battle by throwing their javelins, the second rank throwing theirs 'à travers les intervalles du premier'.

THE *AGGER*

I. No ancient writer has left any detailed account of the mode in which the *agger*, or siege mound, as used by Caesar, was constructed; but there is evidence enough to enable us to piece together an accurate, if not complete description of its material, form, and mode of construction.

Before the construction of the *agger* could be begun, the ground upon which it was to be erected had to be levelled, or if, as at Avaricum, it formed an irregular hollow or depression, which could not be reduced to one plane surface, it was probably levelled, so to speak, in step-like sections;[5] and this was done by men working under the cover of a *testudo*,[6] or sapper's hut. The *agger* was made largely, if not mainly, of wood; and sometimes, if not always, it contained earth and rubble as well.[7] The woodwork consisted of logs, piled in successive layers, the logs in each layer being laid at right angles with those in the layer below. When, as at Avaricum and Massilia, the *agger* was very large, this elaborately constructed woodwork probably served only as a wall on either side, to prevent the more loosely heaped interior from scattering.[8] The *agger* was sometimes undermined and fired by the enemy. The workmen were protected from the enemy's missiles by *vineae*,[9] or sheds.[10]

[1] *Das Kriegswesen Cäsars*, p. 148.
[2] *Sulla*, 18.
[3] *B. C.*, iv, 128.
[4] *Guerre civile*, ii, 339.
[5] See pl. 10 of the Atlas accompanying Stoffel's *Guerre civile*.
[6] See pp. 609–10, and *B. C.*, ii, 2, § 4. Stoffel (*Guerre civile*, ii, 358) asserts that when, as in the Gallic war, the besieged had no artillery, the workmen were protected merely by mantlets, ranged in their front and on their flanks. How about arrows?
[7] Stoffel (*ib.*, ii, 356) thinks that timber, being much lighter than earth or stones, would, in places where it was sufficiently abundant, have been used almost exclusively, earth being only employed 'à combler les espaces vides, à égaliser et à affermir la masse'. See Thucydides, ii, 75, § 2; Lucan, iii, 394–8.
[8] Thucydides, ii, 75, § 2.
[9] See p. 608.
[10] *B. C.*, ii, 2, § 4; *B. G.*, vii, 24, §§ 2–3; Thucydides, ii, 75; Lucan, iii, 394–8, 455; Appian, *Mithr.*, 30; Silius Italicus, xiii, 109–10. See also Stoffel, *Guerre civile*, ii, 355–6, and Daremberg and Saglio, *Dict. des ant. grecques et rom.*, i, 141.

II. 1. Mr. Judson,[1] following Rüstow,[2] has propounded a theory regarding the construction of the *agger*, which it would be useless to examine, because it is based upon the fantastic assumption that the structure was not solid, but contained galleries. Von Göler,[3] who agrees with Rüstow, cites a passage in which Caesar, describing the siege of Avaricum, says that the Gauls endeavoured, by means of sharp stakes, molten pitch, and huge stones, to prevent the Romans from bringing their open (?) galleries up to the wall (*apertos cuniculos praeusta et praeacuta materia et pice fervefacta et maximi ponderis saxis morabantur moenibusque adpropinquare prohibebant*).[4] This passage is omitted in the ϕ MSS.:[5] but I have little doubt that Caesar wrote it; for I cannot frame any theory to account for its having been interpolated. Von Göler holds that by *apertos cuniculos* Caesar meant the ends, open towards the town, of galleries which ran through the whole length of the *agger*. Fröhlich,[6] on the other hand, believes that these *cuniculi* were subterranean galleries, by which Caesar intended to undermine the enemy's wall or to make his way into the town; and this view is supported by a passage in Curtius,[7] from which we learn that Alexander the Great, while constructing an *agger* during the siege of Tyre, made galleries for the purpose of undermining the wall. But if the galleries of which Caesar speaks were subterranean and had not yet reached the wall, how could he have called them 'open'? Long[8] says, 'If the text is right . . . the Galli . . . contrived to work into the Roman "cuniculi", to open into them,' &c. This explanation is supported by a passage in which Appian[9] describes how, when Sulla was besieging Athens, the mines of the besiegers and of the besieged met; but it seems doubtful whether *apertos* can be taken as a participle.[10] Those commentators who hold that the *cuniculi* were galleries in the *agger* believe that they were intended to protect the workmen; but, as protection

[1] *Caesar's Army*, pp. 93–5.

[2] *Heerwesen und Kriegführung C. J. Cäsars*, 1855, pp. 147–51.

[3] *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 252.

[4] *B. G.*, vii, 22, § 5.

[5] Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, i, 800.

[6] *Das Kriegswesen Cäsars*, p. 254.

[7] *De rebus gestis Alexandri Magni*, iv. 6, § 21. Alexander . . . aggerem quo moenium altitudinem aequaret, exstruxit, et pluribus cuniculis muros subrui iussit. Cf. Livy, xxiii, 18, §§ 8–9; xxxviii, 7. Meusel in a MS. note asks, 'Must not these *cuniculi*, then, have been *in* the *agger*?' Surely not! Of what use would such *cuniculi* have been for undermining the wall?

[8] *Caesar*, p. 346. See also Schneider's *Caesar*, ii, 399.

[9] *Mithr.*, 36.

[10] See W. Paul in *Zeitschr. f. d. Gymnasialwesen*, 1878, pp. 168–9. Paul, who holds that the *cuniculi* were subterranean, conjectures that Caesar wrote *repertos*. P. Geyer (*Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, v, 1879, p. 353), objecting to Paul's emendation, argues that the *cuniculi* must have been galleries *in* the *agger*, (1) because the second *agger* which the Romans constructed at Massilia contained galleries, and (2) because the use of boiling pitch by the besieged would have been more applicable to such galleries than to underground ones. But the second *agger* at Massilia contained one gallery only: it consisted of 'two walls of brick, 6 feet thick, and a planking of timber laid across those walls': Caesar expressly says that it was of 'a novel and unheard-of kind' (*aggerem novi generis atque inauditum . . . facere instituerunt* [*B. C.*, ii, 15, § 1]); and, as far as I can see, boiling pitch would have been as inconvenient to workmen underground as above.

could have been obtained just as well by the use of *vineae*, it is clear that if the *agger* was made with galleries, the object must have been to save material. Such a saving, however, would have been more than counterbalanced by the enormous increase of labour that would have been entailed by making an *agger* with galleries sufficiently strong to carry the host of soldiers, the *vineae*, and the huge towers that stood upon it. Indeed, it is hardly credible that, without bricks, the Romans could have made such an *agger*. There is absolutely no evidence for the view that *aggeres* were ever built with galleries, except the passage which I have quoted from *B. G.*, vii, 22 ; and of the scholars who admit the genuineness of that passage the majority understand by the word *cuniculus* not galleries in the *agger* but subterranean galleries. It is true that the writer of the article *Agger* in Daremberg and Saglio's *Dictionnaire des antiquités grecques et romaines* [1] points to a drawing which he reproduces from S. Bartoli's *Colonne Trajane* as evidence that the Roman *agger* did contain galleries. 'Dans la figure,' he says, 'on voit des soldats romains occupés à construire un *agger* et entassant des troncs d'arbres entrecroisés. On remarque une sorte de voûte formée de poutres disposées en arc-boutant et peut-être destinée à protéger un de ces chemins couverts (*cuniculi*) par lesquels on pouvait faire avancer des sapes et des mines jusqu'aux murs.' But it is very doubtful whether the drawing in question represents an *agger* at all. Mr. Judson argues that the *agger* could not have been destroyed by fire unless it had been built with galleries. Thinking over this argument, it occurred to me that Caesar would hardly have played into his enemies' hands by affording them facilities for destroying his handiwork ; and when I consulted scientific men and members of the London Fire Brigade, I found that they did not agree with Mr. Judson. If he had read his Josephus, he would have understood how an *agger* could be set on fire, even though it had no galleries. In the defence of Jerusalem 'John undermined the ground between the citadel and the banks [*aggeres*] and propped up the works above [namely the banks] by beams placed at intervals in the mines. Then he brought in wood smeared with pitch and bitumen and set fire to it : the beams were consumed ; the mine all at once collapsed, and the banks fell into it with a tremendous noise. At first there arose thick smoke and dust, as the fire was choked by the fall ; but when the wood which pressed it down was burnt through, a flame was seen bursting forth '.[2] Stoffel,[3] who ridicules the notion that the *agger* contained galleries, sensibly remarks that at Avaricum the besiegers only learned that the *agger* was on fire by seeing smoke rising from its surface.[4] If, he argues, there had been galleries in the *agger*, 'on se serait aperçu de l'accident plus tôt,' &c. Moreover, there is direct evidence that some *aggeres*, at all events, had no galleries. The *agger* which the Lacedaemonians constructed at the siege of Plataea was solid, and had tiers of logs on either side to prevent the interior wood, earth, and stones from

[1] i, 142.
[2] *Bell. Iud.*, v, 11, 4, §§ 469–71.
[3] *Guerre civile*, ii, 363.
[4] *B. G.*, vii, 24, §§ 2–3.

scattering.[1] Finally, Lucan says that the first *agger* [or rather one of the two original *aggeres*] constructed at Massilia was made of a core of earth and faggots supported by walls of timber on either side :—

> tunc omnia late
> Procumbunt nemora, et spoliantur robore silvae,
> Ut cum terra levis mediam virgultaque molem
> Suspendant, structa laterum compage ligatam
> Aretet humum, pressus ne cedat turribus agger.[2]

Ciacconius,[3] contrasting *apertos cuniculos* with the *tectos cuniculos*[4] ('covered galleries') which were driven into the rock at Uxellodunum, in order to divert a spring, maintains that the former were open trenches ; and this view is perhaps supported by a passage in which Ammianus Marcellinus[5] describes besiegers as attempting under the protection of *plutei*, or mantlets, to undermine a wall. I am rather doubtful whether the word *cuniculus* could be used of an open trench ; but if so, Ciacconius's explanation is probable enough. Whatever the true explanation may be, I am absolutely certain that the *agger* was never built with galleries ; and my conviction was shared not only by Stoffel but also by the late General McLeod Innes, R.E., V.C., who had had great experience in military mining.

2. Colonel Stoffel has devised a theory entirely different from that of Rüstow. He holds that Caesar's terraces were of two kinds,—the 'terrasse-viaduc' and the 'terrasse-cavalier'. The former, which was perpendicular to the wall of the besieged town and carried only one tower, was used, he explains, when the attack was to be directed 'sur un seul point déterminé',—when it was intended to breach the wall with the battering-ram, and not to take the town by escalade. To this type the colonel refers the terraces which Caesar constructed in besieging the stronghold of the Atuatuci, Uxellodunum, and Massilia. When, on the other hand, the besieged town was situated, like Avaricum, in a plain, and when (as was the case throughout the Gallic war) the besieged had no artillery, he holds that the terrace was a 'cavalier', parallel with the wall.[6]

Now, if the colonel means that there was no 'terrasse-viaduc' at Avaricum,[7] Caesar's narrative does not support his contention. Though Caesar does not say in so many words that the terrace at Avaricum was built at right angles to the wall, he implies that those sections of it which carried the towers were. Describing the siege, he uses the words *cum iam muro turres adpropinquassent*,[8] &c. (the towers had now *got close to* the wall). The towers stood on

[1] Thucydides, ii, 75, § 2.
[2] iii, 394–8.
[3] *Caesar*, ed. G. Jungermann, 1606, p. 288.
[4] *B. G.*, viii, 41, § 4.
[5] xxi, 12, § 6.
[6] *Guerre civile*, ii, 354–61. The colonel means, as I understand, that the dimension of the terrace from front to back was less than its dimension parallel with the wall ; but I am not sure whether he means that it was as narrow as the 'cavalier' shown in Napoleon's Planche 20.
[7] One would certainly infer that this was his meaning from pages 354–5 of the second volume of his *Guerre civile* ; but when I look at Planche 10 of his Atlas, I am doubtful.
[8] *B. G.*, vii, 18, § 1.

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

PLAN OF THE *AGGER* AT AVARICUM

ACCORDING TO NAPOLEON III. AND GENERAL DE REFFYE

the terrace ;[1] and the word *adpropinquassent* would be misleading, not to say meaningless, if the terrace had been *merely* a ' cavalier ', parallel with the wall. Again, describing the measures which he took to repel the sortie from Avaricum, Caesar says that some of his men drew back the towers (*turres reducerent*),[2] in order to prevent the fire which the Gallic miners had kindled under the terrace from destroying them. The word *reducerent* speaks for itself.

I conclude, then, that the *agger* at Avaricum was a ' terrasse-viaduc ', in so far that it carried two towers, on the right and on the left, which, as the work progressed, gradually approached the wall. But it was also a ' terrasse-cavalier ' ; for its width, or extension parallel to the wall, was 330 feet, and it served as a platform over which the legionaries advanced to storm the town.[3] The question is whether the ' cavalier ' occupied the entire space between the two viaducts or only the front part of that space. Napoleon adopts the latter view. According to General de Reffye,[4] whose explanation he borrows, the *agger* consisted of two parallel viaducts, with an empty space between, on each of which, flanked by two rows of *vineae*, moved one of the two towers. The 'cavalier', which joined the two viaducts, was, from front to rear, very narrow : it was ascended from the rear by an elaborate system of steps ; and along its whole extension, parallel with the wall, stood two rows of *vineae*, the *vineae* in each row being placed end to end. Now I cannot understand how, on this theory, the assault was delivered at all. The steps, or rather staircases, are of course conjectural. There would have been little or no room on the ' cavalier ' for any troops except those who stood under the *vineae* : if the sides of the *vineae* which faced the wall were closed, the troops could not have got out of them ; and if they were open, the *vineae* would have afforded no protection! I have always understood from Caesar's description of the assault that the *vineae*, the ends of which were open, stood end to end in a direction perpendicular to the wall. Moreover, on Napoleon's theory, the gap between the edge of the ' cavalier ' and the top of the wall of Avaricum was at least 50 feet ; and I cannot understand how the assaulting columns were to get across that space.

Nevertheless, I am inclined to think that there is some truth in Napoleon's view. He estimates the length of each viaduct at about 250 feet ; and to construct a terrace of which the dimensions were 330 feet by 250 would have been a work of enormous labour. Would it have been necessary? An engineer whom I have consulted agrees with me in thinking that the ' cavalier ' would probably only have occupied so much space as was requisite to afford room for the leading

[1] See p. 745.

[2] *B. G.*, vii, 24, § 5.

[3] *Ib.*, 27, §§ 2–3. Caesar took Avaricum by escalade ; but it is evident from vii, 23, § 5, where he says that the timber in the wall ' protects it against the ram ' (*ab ariete materia defendit*), that, unless he had previously ascertained that such walls could not be breached, he must have attempted to batter down the wall of Avaricum and failed.

[4] There is a model of the *agger* at Avaricum by General de Reffye in Salle XIII of the Musée de St. Germain. See also R. Oehler's *Bilder-Atlas zu Cäsars Büchern de B. G.*, 2nd ed., 1907, pp. 77–8 and fig. 62.

companies of the assailants, and that fresh troops could have moved up to support them through the rows of *vineae* which stood upon the viaducts.

Stoffel does not attempt to explain in detail the construction of the 'terrasse-cavalier', which he believes to have been used at Avaricum; but he offers a very elaborate explanation of the 'terrasse-viaduc'.[1] The following is a summary. Stoffel assumes that the ground sloped, as at Avaricum, towards the town. As soon as the inequalities of the surface had been removed, logs were passed from hand to hand to a group of workers, who arranged them in layers, descending like huge steps, those of each tier being laid crosswise on those of the tier immediately underneath. As soon as the first series, so to speak, of layers, was finished, two galleries of sheds (*vineae*) were placed upon the rearmost pile. Under cover of these, workmen passed fresh logs to others standing upon the pile immediately below; and so on. The third and fourth series were laid in the same way.

Nothing could be gained by criticizing this theory. Right or wrong, it can neither be disproved nor proved.[2] But Stoffel does not explain how the work would have been executed when the ground, as at Uxellodunum, sloped *upward* in the direction of the town.

M. Jullian, remarking that no ancient text supports the distinction which Stoffel draws between the 'terrasse-cavalier' and the 'terrasse-viaduc', refuses to accept it. It is a mistake, he says, to imagine that terraces were ever long and narrow: on the contrary, the *agger* was 'a vast embankment, sometimes as broad as it was long'.[3] But if no text directly supports Stoffel's contention, numerous texts do so indirectly. The width of the *agger* must have depended upon its object; and it is self-evident that if the object was simply to make a breach or to batter down a tower, a vast embankment, as broad as it was long, would have been superfluous. M. Jullian's criticism is involved in the singular theory, which he has defended with great ingenuity as well as learning,[4] that in the siege of Massilia there was originally only one *agger*. Caesar tells us that at the outset of the siege 'he proceeded to construct a terrace, to form a line of sheds, and to bring towers to bear against the town at two points,—one close to the harbour and the docks, the other near the gate which is approached from the side of Gaul and Spain' (*duabus ex partibus aggerem, vineas turresque ad oppidum agere instituit. Una erat proxima portui navalibusque, altera ad portam qua est aditus ex Gallia atque Hispania*).[5] M. Jullian argues

[1] *Guerre civile*, ii, 357–9. See also de Folard, *Hist. de Polybe*, ii, 1727, pp. 488–508, and especially 495–7.

[2] Stoffel refers to Planches 89 and 90 of Fröhner's *La Colonne Trajane* for illustrations of an *agger* in course of construction. But Fröhner himself describes these illustrations as 'construction d'un camp et rempart de troncs d'arbres et catapultes'; and what Stoffel calls an *agger* Fröhner regards as 'un énorme rempart de troncs d'arbres derrière lequel l'armée s'est retranchée'. See also S. Reinach, *La Colonne Trajane au musée de Saint-Germain*, 1886, p. 56.

[3] *Rev. des études anc.*, ii, 1900, p. 337, n. 2.

[4] *Ib.*, pp. 331–8.

[5] *B. C.*, ii, 1, §§ 1–2.

that Lucan mentions only one terrace ; that Caesar speaks of one *agger* (*agger*, *aggerem*, or *aggeri*),[1] not two (*aggeres*) ; that he specifies the height of only one *agger* ;[2] that, in alluding to the right attack, he speaks of the soldiers ' who had charge of the right-hand portion of the work' (*qui dextram partem operis administrabant*),[3] whereas, if there had been two *aggeres*, he would have written *qui dextrum opus administrabant*; that if there had been two *aggeres*, the labour of the troops would have been more than doubled, because the imaginary second *agger* would necessarily have been constructed on marshy ground near the harbour ; and that in no other siege did Caesar erect more than one *agger*. Accordingly, M. Jullian understands by the words ' he proceeded to construct a terrace . . . at two points ' that at those two points the construction of one terrace was commenced simultaneously. Meusel,[4] who has examined M. Jullian's arguments with his usual dispassionate fairness, admits their force, but nevertheless concludes that they are irreconcilable with the passage from which we learn that on the day after the Massiliots had destroyed one *agger* and its movable tower by fire they ' set fire to the other tower and the other *agger*.[5] M. Jullian does not refer to this passage, but perhaps he has it in mind when he says[6] that Caesar's *agger*, while it only formed one system of construction, was really double ' ; and although it would seem to be straining language to contend that *alterum aggerem* meant ' the other viaduct of the whole *agger* ', such an expression is perhaps conceivable. Nevertheless the *agger* which was burnt on the second day was entirely distinct from that which had been already destroyed. For, as the one object of the besiegers was to batter down the stone towers opposite to each of their own movable towers, what would have been the use of constructing an embankment 300 feet wide[7] between the two viaducts ? Surely M. Jullian, when he lays stress upon the labour that would have been involved in building two *aggeres*, forgets that it would have been far easier to build two ' terrasses-viaducs ' than two such viaducts *plus* a useless embankment. Another proof that this embankment would have been superfluous is furnished by the description of the brick *agger* (*aggerem novi generis atque inauditum*)[8] which was constructed after the fire. It was of the same breadth as the original *agger* (or *aggeres*) :[9] it consisted of two brick walls, each six feet thick, connected by a roof

[1] *Ib.*, § 4 ; 2, § 6 ; 14, § 2 ; 15, § 1.
[2] *Ib.*, 1, § 4.
[3] *Ib.*, 8, § 1.
[4] *C. I. Caesaris comm. de b. c.*, 1906, pp. 301–3.
[5] *B. C.* ii, 14, §§ 2, 5,—Hunc [ignem] sic distulit ventus uti uno tempore agger, plutei, testudo, turris, tormenta flammam conciperent . . . Temptaverunt hoc idem Massilienses postero die. Eandem nacti tempestatem maiore cum fiducia *ad alteram turrem aggeremque* eruptione pugnaverunt multumque ignem intulerunt.
[6] *Rev. des études anc.*, ii, 337.
[7] *Ib.*, p. 340.
[8] *B. C.*, ii, 15.
[9] Unless indeed Nipperdey (*Caesar*, p. 149), whose arguments have been reinforced by Ph. Kraus (*Berl. phil. Woch.*, 1899, col. 729–31), was right in adopting Stephanus's conjecture, *altitudine*, instead of the MS. reading *latitudine*. But anyhow my argument remains unshaken ; for Kraus holds that the brick *agger* was narrower than the original.

or deck of timber; and obviously it was no wider than each of the two viaducts had been. Furthermore, Thucydides's account of the siege of Plataea seems to show that an *agger* which was only constructed to carry a battering-ram was a 'terrasse-viaduc',—long and narrow; for he says[1] that 'the Plataeans . . . made a hole in that part of the wall against which the mound pressed and drew in the earth'.[2] Meusel[3] accounts for Caesar's having omitted to describe one of the two original *aggeres* by the supposition that his account of the siege of Massilia merely embodies the reports of Trebonius, Decimus Brutus, and the engineers; and he believes that in the passages in which *agger* and *turres* are mentioned together[4] the text is corrupt, and that both words ought to be either singular or plural.

Finally, I would ask M. Jullian whether he has not forgotten that in the siege of Jerusalem there were not two *aggeres* only, but four (*μέγιστα γὰρ ἐχώσθη τὰ τέσσαρα*[5] [*χώματα*]).

III. Von Göler[6] holds with Lipsius[7] that the terrace must have sloped gradually upwards as it approached the wall of the besieged town. They infer this from Caesar's statement that the daily rise in the height of the terrace at Avaricum raised, in a corresponding degree, the elevation of the towers.[8] There is a drawing in the *Journal asiatique* (4e série, tome v, 1845, planche lii) taken from a bas-relief found at Khorsabad, which represents an *agger* forming an inclined plane.[9]

IV. Guischard,[10] pointing to a passage in which Livy[11] says that an *agger* collapsed into a trench because it was ill compacted, maintains that the front part of the *agger* was, as a rule, strongly revetted and constructed with especial care. But the *agger* of which Livy speaks was merely the rampart of a camp! Moreover, it is hard to see how the work which Guischard imagines could have been done unless a wide gap was left between the *agger* and the wall; and if so, how was the storming party to get into the town? Stoffel[12] maintains, on the contrary, that the *agger*, in the last 20 feet of its length, could only be made by shooting material into the vacant space in the manner which I have described on page 144; but I am not quite sure whether he is referring to terraces in general or only to the 'terrasse-viaduc'.

V. As to how the *vineae*, or sheds, were used, it is impossible to give a full and satisfactory account. Guischard[13] explains the phrase

[1] ii, 75, § 6.
[2] B. Jowett, *Thucydides translated into English*, i, 1881, p. 144.
[3] *C. I. Caesaris comm. de b. c.*, p. 303.
[4] *B. C.*, ii, 1, § 1; 2, § 6.
[5] Josephus, *Bell. Iud.*, v, 11, 4, § 467.
[6] *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 251 and n. 4.
[7] *Opera*, 1637, iii, 295.
[8] *B. G.*, vii, 22, § 4. Cf. p. 746. According to Napoleon's Plan (20), which I reproduce, the whole rise in the elevation of the towers would not have been more than 6 or 7 feet.
[9] In Planche 10 of the Atlas to Stoffel's *Guerre civile* there is an illustration of a 'terrasse-viaduc', which forms an inclined plane.
[10] *Mém. mil.*, ii, 7.
[11] x, 5, § 11.
[12] *Guerre civile*, p. 359.
[13] *Mém. mil.*, ii, 5–9.

vineas agere as follows:—two rows of *vineae* inclined gradually inwards until each reached a certain point, where they were joined by a third row, which served as a protection to the front of the *agger*. But on this theory, after the *agger* had risen to the very moderate height of the *vineae*, the latter would have been useless. Caesar[1] says that the men who brought up the material for the construction of the first *agger* at Massilia passed it from hand to hand under the protection of *vineae*; but he does not say how the *vineae* were placed when the *agger* was actually being constructed. We read in his description of the siege of Avaricum[2] (though the passage may be an interpolation)[3] that *vineae* were placed *on* the *agger*; but were they placed there to protect columns of assault or to protect workmen or for both these purposes? I believe that the last is the true explanation;[4] and Stoffel, as I understand him, takes the same view.[5]

VI. Rüstow[6] says that the surface of the *agger* was on a level with the top of the enemy's wall, or even higher. That this was not always the case is proved by Caesar's statement that the troops who assaulted Avaricum had to climb the wall,[7]—doubtless by ladders. At the same time Stoffel[8] is wrong when he concludes that the *agger* never reached the top of the wall; for Lipsius quotes instances to the contrary from Josephus and Zosimus. 'The banks,' says Josephus, 'erected by the Romans'—at the siege of Jotapata—'overtopped the wall.'[9]

VII. Stoffel[10] asserts that when a town was assaulted by the aid of a terrace, such as he believes to have been constructed at Avaricum, drawbridges were let down from the towers on to the wall. Vegetius[11] says that drawbridges were used in this way: but he also says that scaling-ladders were used in storming towns; and we learn from Josephus[12] that they were used in the assault of Jotapata. Caesar merely says that at Avaricum his soldiers scaled the wall (*murum ascendissent*);[13] and this statement stultifies Napoleon's illustration, which represents the 'cavalier' as actually higher than the wall and, moreover, separated from it by a gap at least 50 feet wide!

The whole subject is very difficult; and neither Marquardt nor Daremberg and Saglio nor, as far as I know, any other writer has given an adequate explanation. Stoffel's is the most satisfactory; but I wish he had explained more fully his views as to the way in which the *agger* at Avaricum was constructed.

[1] *B. C.*, ii, 2, § 3.
[2] *B. G.*, vii, 27, § 2.
[3] See pp. 749–51.
[4] See pp. 749–51.
[5] Guischard, on the other hand, asserts (*Mém. mil.*, ii, 6) that 'les Galeries étant trop basses pour protéger ce travail, lorsque l'ouvrage approchoit de son étendue et de sa hauteur projettées, on avoit recours aux Mantelets.'
[6] *Heerwesen und Kriegführung*, &c., pp. 147–8.
[7] *B. G.*, vii, 27, § 2.
[8] *Guerre civile*, ii, 362.
[9] *Bell. Iud.*, iii, 7, 33, § 316.
[10] *Guerre civile*, ii, 361.
[11] *De re mil.*, iv, 21.
[12] *Bell. Iud.*, iii, 7, 24, § 257.
[13] *B. G.*, vii, 27, § 2.

THE *VINEA*, THE *MUSCULUS*, THE *TESTUDO*, AND THE *PLUTEUS*

I. The *vinea*, as described by Vegetius,[1] was a stout movable wooden hut, 16 feet long, 8 feet high, and 7 feet wide. The sides were defended by wicker-work; and the roof was made of planks and protected against fire by raw hides. According to A. Rich,[2] one only of the four sides of the *vinea* was open; but constructed in this way, it would have been useless. The *vineae* mentioned in the *Gallic War* were intended to protect soldiers while they were constructing the *agger* and perhaps also while they were forming on the *agger* prior to delivering the assault;[3] and it seems clear that they were placed end to end in a row. Therefore, in order to enable soldiers to move from one to another, they must have been open at the ends. Marquardt[4] and Stoffel[5] represent them as open both at the ends and on one side, the roof being supported by the solid side and by posts at the corners. Rich, who ignores the purpose for which *vineae* were used in constructing the *agger*, says that 'a sufficient number of them were joined together in a line, and run up close to the walls, so that the ram . . . could be securely plied . . . underneath them'. On this theory, if the *vineae* were built in the way which Rich describes, there would have been one ram for each *vinea*, and there would have been no room to work the ram.[6] Stoffel[7] holds that *vineae* were occasionally placed parallel to the wall; and possibly Vegetius[8] may have meant this when he said that several *vineae* 'are joined together in a row and afford safe shelter to the besiegers as they advance to undermine the foundations of the walls': but if so, these *vineae* must have been far stronger than those which he describes in the same chapter. Is it not more probable that the besiegers advanced through a row of *vineae* placed at right angles to the wall, and that the work of undermining was done under cover of a *testudo* or a *musculus*?[9]

Vineae must occasionally have been built of very stout timbers; for they served to protect the *musculus* which was used in the siege of Massilia while it was in process of construction within short range of powerful artillery; and for this purpose *vineae* like those which Vegetius describes would have been absolutely useless.

II. The *musculus* is only mentioned once in the *Gallic War*; and there the reading is open to suspicion.[10] If it is right, Caesar says

[1] *De re mil.*, iv, 15.
[2] *Dict. of Rom. and Gk. Ant.*, 4th ed., p. 727.
[3] See pp. 749–51.
[4] *Röm. Staatsverwaltung*, ii, 1884, p. 530.
[5] *Guerre civile*, Atlas, Planche 10.
[6] Of course the ram was really worked under the cover of a *testudo* or a *musculus*, not of *vineae*, which would have been much too weak.
[7] *Guerre civile*, ii, 352.
[8] *De re mil.*, iv, 15.
[9] See Guischard, *Mém. crit. et hist.*, 1774, pp. 455–68, and Stoffel, *Guerre civile*, ii, 352.
[10] *B. G.*, vii, 84, § 1. *Musculos* is only found in AQ: $\phi\beta$ have *mulculos*, which occurs nowhere else.

that Vercingetorix brought out *musculi* from Alesia when he was about to make his final attempt to break through the Roman lines. The *musculus*, as used at the siege of Massilia, is described fully in *B. C.*, ii, 10. It was a sapper's hut, 60 feet[1] long, 4 feet wide, and 5 feet high, made of timbers so strong that no heavy weights thrown upon its roof could break through. The roof was two-sided and sloping, so that missiles might roll off. It was covered by a layer of unbaked bricks and of clay: hides were spread over the bricks, to prevent their being dissolved by water; and above the hides again wet mattresses or cushions, to guard against fire and to break the impact of stones. This *musculus* was used for protecting Trebonius's soldiers while they were trying to undermine the wall of Massilia, and perhaps in the first instance for protecting the battering-ram.[2] As Caesar describes it so fully and gives its dimensions, I believe that it was a novel kind, devised for a special purpose. Vercingetorix must have used his, if he used *musculi* at all, to protect his men while they were attempting to fill up Caesar's trenches.[3]

III. The *testudo* used for protecting soldiers when they were filling up ditches (*quae ad congestionem fossarum paratur*), as described by Vitruvius,[4] and by Athenaeus and Apollodorus, who call it χελώνη χωστρίς,[5] was 25 feet square and mounted upon rollers; and the men who worked inside it were protected in front by a sloping roof or, so to speak, shutter, which almost reached the ground, and descended from the line joining the corners of the two sloping sides of the roof, properly so called. Another kind (χελώνη διορυκτρίς), described by the same writers,[6] was used for protecting soldiers when they were undermining a wall. According to Marquardt,[7] the front was perpendicular, to enable the *testudo* to be rolled right up against the wall; and the line of the roof formed by the two sides, which themselves sloped down to the ground, declined backwards, in order that stones dropped on to the *testudo* by the besieged might slide off harmlessly.

[1] Lipsius (*Opera*, 1637, iii, 281) believes that Caesar wrote *IX* not *LX*. He argues that it would have been impossible to procure beams 60 feet long, and that the number *IX* would harmonize with the statement of Vegetius (iv, 16),—*musculos dicunt minores machinas*. But Lipsius was not a practical man. It was not necessary that the individual beams should be as long as the *musculus*; and the *musculus* itself was evidently of a special kind.

[2] *B. C.*, ii, 10, 11, §§ 1–3; Stoffel, *Guerre civile*, i, 296–9.

[3] It has been urged that he could not have transported sappers' huts from his camp to the contravallation; but did not the Nervii bring up *testudines* to the attack of Q. Cicero's camp (*B. G.*, v, 43, § 3)?

[4] x, 14.

[5] The illustration of the χελώνη χωστρίς in Smith's *Dictionary of Antiquities*, ii, 808, which differs from that given by Marquardt (*op. cit.*, p. 531), is identical with the one in A. de Rochas d'Aiglun's Traité de Fortification, d'attaque et de défense des places, par Philon de Byzance (*Mém. de la Soc. d'émulation du Doubs*, 4e sér., vi, 1872, pp. 286, 365), and is taken from Heron of Byzantium. See C. Wescher's *Poliorcétique des Grecs*, 1867, p. 211. The editor of the *Dictionary of Antiquities* offers an illustration of the χελώνη διορυκτρίς identical with that given by Marquardt (p. 529), which is borrowed from Rüstow and Köchly (*Gesch. d. griech. Kriegswesens*, 1852, p. 207, fig. 83).

[6] See C. Wescher, *op. cit.*, pp. 19–20.

[7] *Op. cit.*, p. 529.

The Nervii used *testudines* when they were attacking Quintus Cicero's camp.[1] It is only in reference to this episode that Caesar mentions *testudines* in the *Gallic War* : but in the civil war Trebonius used a *testudo* 60 feet long to protect his men in levelling the ground for the construction of the *agger* at Massilia ;[2] and Caesar may have used one for the same purpose in Gaul.

I have done my best ; but I am aware that the result is unsatisfactory. What I wanted to find out was (1) the nature of Caesar's *vineae* ; (2) of the *musculi* which Vercingetorix is supposed to have used ; and (3) of the *testudines* employed by the Nervii. About the *vineae* we do know enough : but it is extremely unlikely that Vercingetorix's *musculus* was like the one which Caesar describes ; and the *testudines* of the Nervii may, for aught we know, have been different from those described by Vitruvius. However, the *testudines* of the Nervii and the *musculi* of Vercingetorix were intended to serve practically the same purpose,—namely to protect men in the attempt to fill up trenches and to tear down ramparts : the Nervii built their *testudines* under the direction of Roman captives ; and it is probable that they were built and protected against damage on the same general principles, the nature of which has been sufficiently explained. More detailed information it is impossible to obtain. Again, the dimensions of the *testudo* which Caesar used at Massilia differed widely from those given by Vitruvius : Vitruvius borrowed his description from a Greek, Philo : there is no evidence that Caesar's *testudines* were identical with those of the Greeks ; and the descriptions of Vitruvius, of Athenaeus, and of Apollodorus are so obscure in certain points that commentators differ widely in their interpretation. All these difficulties are ignored, perhaps wisely, by the compilers of dictionaries of antiquities and hand-books.

IV. The *pluteus*, as described by Vegetius,[3] which was used to protect soldiers when they were constructing siege works, was a convex wicker shield with an arched roof, covered with hides and running on three rollers.[4]

But although Caesar doubtless used *plutei* of this sort, it is not certain that he uses the word in this sense in the *Gallic War*. In *B. G.*, vii, 25, § 1, he speaks of *pluteos turrium*, which Napoleon[5] explains as 'les mantelets protégeant les approches des tours'. Long[6] says that they were 'the planks on the "turres", the breastworks which protected the soldiers' ; and in support of this view he refers to *B. G.*, vii, 72, § 4, where Caesar uses the word to designate the breastworks which protected the rampart in his line of contravallation round Alesia. But there is no evidence that these *plutei* were identical with the *plutei turrium*. Köchly,[7] as far as I under-

[1] *B. G.*, v, 42, § 5. [2] *B. C.*, ii, 2, § 4. [3] *De re mil.*, iv, 15.

[4] Rich (*Dict. of Rom. and Gk. Ant.*, 4th ed., p. 513), who misunderstands Vegetius, defines the *pluteus* which he mentions as 'a movable tower with a roof overhead . . . fixed upon wheels'. [5] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 261.

[6] *Caesar*, p. 349. Cf. A. von Göler (*Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 255, n. 9), who supposes that the breastworks were themselves protected as far as possible against fire by raw hides.

[7] See von Göler, *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 256, note.

stand him, thinks that these latter were separate from the towers, and placed some in front and others along the sides of the terrace, in order to protect the workers. But if so, why were they called *plutei turrium*? Köchly gets over this difficulty by deleting *turrium*, which is too drastic a remedy for my taste. Curtius[1] speaks of *plutei* which were intended to protect the men who moved towers; and accordingly Schneider[2] concludes that the *plutei* used at Avaricum were identical with those which Vegetius describes. We must not, he argues, regard them as breastworks attached to the stories of the tower itself, because Caesar says that, in consequence of the burning of the *plutei*, it was difficult for the Romans *adire apertos ad auxiliandum*. I do not regard this argument as conclusive, because the men who are described as *aperti* might have been the men who were stationed in the towers, and not those who moved them. I am inclined, however, to believe with Schneider and Napoleon that the *plutei turrium* were of the kind to which Curtius alludes, because, if they had been breastworks attached to the towers and had been burned, the flames would probably have consumed the towers themselves.

In *B. G.*, vii, 41, § 4, 72, § 4, Caesar uses the word *pluteus* in the sense of breastworks, which were used as an extraordinary defence. In the former chapter we read that Fabius, whom Caesar left in command of his camp at Gergovia when he went to meet the Aeduan infantry, added *plutei* to the rampart. In the other passage Caesar, describing the line of contravallation which he constructed round Alesia, says that he 'constructed a rampart and palisade 12 feet high, which he strengthened by an embattled breastwork, with large forked branches projecting along the line where the breastwork joined the rampart' (*aggerem ac vallum XII pedum extruxit. Huic loricam pinnasque adiecit grandibus cervis eminentibus ad commissuras pluteorum atque aggeris*). These *plutei* were identical with the *lorica pinnaeque*, and perhaps also with the palisade.

THE *FALX MURALIS*

The *falx muralis* was used for loosening and dragging down the stones and timbers in the wall of a besieged town,[3] and was worked by men who were protected by a *testudo* or *musculus*.[4] According to Vegetius,[5] it was a wooden beam with a piece of iron at the end, bent into the shape of a hook. A specimen, of which Daremberg and Saglio give an illustration, was discovered in 1862 in the Gallic wall of Vesontio (Besançon).[6]

[1] Caesa materia . . . pluteis faciendis, ut qui turres admoverent extra teli ictum essent. *De rebus gestis Alexandri Magni*, v, 3, § 7.
[2] *Caesar*, ii, 407–8.
[3] *B. G.*, vii, 22, § 2.
[4] See Stoffel, *Guerre civile*, ii, 354, and his Atlas, Planche 10.
[5] *De re mil.*, iv, 14.
[6] *Dict. des ant. grecques et rom.*, ii, 970.

CAESAR'S BRIDGES

Caesar does not describe any of his bridges, except the one which he built over the Rhine in 55 B.C. He tells us, however, that Labienus crossed the arm of the Seine which separated him from the island on which Metlosedum was situated by lashing boats together; and he also says that he himself threw his army across the Saône (not far from its junction with the Rhône) in a single day.[1] We may infer that he generally used bridges of boats of some sort.[2] His legionaries crossed a narrow tributary of the Nile by means of long hollowed out trunks of trees, which stretched from bank to bank, the hollows being filled with *agger*—probably earth or rubble—to render them easily passable; and during his second Spanish campaign the river Baetis was hastily spanned by an impromptu bridge, which was kept in position by means of baskets weighted with stones.[3]

[1] *B. G.*, i, 13, §§ 1–2; vii, 58, § 4.

[2] Cf. Fröhlich, *Das Kriegswesen Cäsars*, pp. 213–4, and Guischard, *Mém. crit. et hist.*, i, 45–52.

[3] *Bell. Alex.*, 29, § 4; *Bell. Hisp.*, 5, § 1. See also Fröhlich, p. 213.

SECTION VII.—RELATING TO THE NARRATIVE OF CAESAR'S CAMPAIGNS

THE ROUTES OPEN TO THE HELVETII

Caesar says that 'there were only two routes by which it was possible for the Helvetii to leave their country' (*erant omnino itinera duo quibus itineribus domo exire possent*),[1] namely the route through the Pas de l'Écluse, which they actually took, and the route leading across the Rhône into the Roman Province.[2] On this question Long[3] writes a sensible note. 'It has been objected,' he says, 'to Caesar's text, that there are other practicable passes through the Jura; but that is nothing to the purpose. All he says is that there was only one road through the Jura by which the Helvetii could leave the country, encumbered with their women, children and wagons. The Helvetii had formed their plan to go through the Provincia, as the shortest and easiest way, and accordingly had mustered . . . in the neighbourhood of Geneva. If they had anticipated opposition, they might have mustered somewhere else, and crossed by the road that leads to Pontarlier . . . or by any other, if there was any other wagon-road at that time, and at this season of the year. But they would choose the shortest route to the Santones, and not the longest.' Desjardins, however, who believes that the Helvetii dared not go through any of the more northerly passes, for fear of Ariovistus, insists that detachments of the host went through the more southerly. 'Le texte,' he argues, 'n'exige

[1] *B. G.*, i, 6, § 1.

[2] A. Klotz (*Caesarstudien*, p. 31) roundly asserts that Mommsen (*Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xx, 1894, p. 200) 'was undoubtedly right' in identifying the *unum iter* of *B. G.*, i, 6, § 1—the first of the two routes which Caesar indicates—with the pass of Pontarlier; and he goes on to remark that Mommsen was accordingly obliged to delete the words, *inter montem Iuram et flumen Rhodanum*, which identify the route with the Pas de l'Écluse. Meusel, as Klotz regretfully observes, is here conservative. He is, very wisely. Behold the corner in which the revolutionary Klotz finds himself pinned. Mommsen maintained that the Helvetii did actually march through the pass of Pontarlier. But, objects Klotz (*op. cit.*, pp. 33–4), in this case they could not have ravaged the lands of the Allobroges; and Caesar (i, 11, § 5) says that they did. Therefore we must admit that they went through the Pas de l'Écluse [although we have just been told that Caesar pointed to the pass of Pontarlier as the only alternative to the route through the Province !]; and accordingly the interpolator, who had an accurate knowledge of the events of the campaign, but not of the geography, inserted the words, *inter montem Iuram . . . Rhodanum*. Was ever conclusion lamer or more impotent? And all because Klotz submissively bowed to Mommsen's pontifical dogmatism.

[3] *Caesar*, p. 44.

nullement que la sortie ait été accomplie en entier par le pas de l'Écluse.'[1] Desjardins is certainly wrong. 'What can be clearer than the text?—*Erant omnino itinera duo . . . Relinquebatur una per Sequanos via, qua Sequanis invitis propter angustias ire non poterant.*

CAESAR'S LINES ON THE RHÔNE

I. Caesar says[2] that the distance from the Lake of Geneva *ad montem Iuram* was 19 Roman miles, or about 28 kilometres. Desjardins,[3] who assumes that the terminus of Caesar's entrenchment was the Pas de l'Écluse, finds fault with Napoleon for saying that the distance is 28 kilometres, measured along the bank, and says that it is really 28 kilometres in a straight line. Desjardins, however, is himself mistaken; for, as any one may see who will examine Sheets 150 and 160 of the *Carte de l'État-Major*, the distance in a straight line is only 20½ kilometres. According to Stoffel,[4] the distance, 'following the sinuosities of the river,' is 32 kilometres. My own measurement agrees more closely with Napoleon's: but at all events Caesar was thinking of the distance 'following'—as far as it was necessary to do so—'the sinuosities of the river;' for how was he to measure the distance in a straight line? His measurements were rough and ready, and we have no right to assume that by *ad montem Iuram* he meant the Pas de l'Écluse *exactly*; but he was not far wrong.

II. *A lacu Lemanno*, writes Caesar, *qui in flumen Rhodanum influit, ad montem Iuram . . . milia passuum XVIIII murum in altitudinem pedum sedecim fossamque perducit. B. G.*, i, 8, § 1.

Napoleon points out[5] that Caesar's description is not to be understood literally, because it would have been impossible for the Helvetii to attempt the passage of the Rhône, between Geneva and the Pas de l'Écluse, with any prospect of success, except at a few places. Those places are described in full detail by Napoleon, in a summary of the report of Colonel Stoffel, who was sent by him to examine the ground; and they are marked accordingly in his map.

Long believes, in spite of Stoffel, that the lines were continuous, (1) because Caesar says so, and (2) because continuous lines would have been a better protection, as the Helvetii might otherwise have climbed the banks.[6] But how could they have done so, where the banks were precipitous, with their wagons? And, supposing that some of them had crossed the river without the wagons and had climbed the precipitous banks, they would also have been able to climb the (assumed) rampart unless Roman soldiers had been there to defend it; while if they had been there, the bank would have served as a natural rampart, and the Helvetii would not have been allowed

[1] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 601–2.
[2] *B. G.*, i, 8, § 1.
[3] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 598, n. 5.
[4] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 49–51, note.
[5] *Ib.*, ii, 48.
[6] *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv, 2, note. Cf. p. 225, n. 4, *supra*.

to climb. Caesar was not writing a technical treatise, but a popular narrative; and he doubtless expressed himself loosely, as he did, on certain points of detail, in describing his works at Alesia. Dion Cassius had the wit to perceive his meaning; for he tells us that Caesar fortified the most important points (τὰ ἐπικαιρότατα διετάφρευσε καὶ ἀπετείχισεν, xxxviii, 31, § 4).

WHAT ROUTE DID CAESAR TAKE WHEN HE MARCHED IN 58 B.C. *VIA* OCELUM AGAINST THE HELVETII?

Caesar[1] says that he took the shortest route over the Alps into Transalpine Gaul; that the Ceutrones, Graioceli, and Caturiges attacked him on the way; that seven days after he left Ocelum he reached the territory of the Vocontii; and that he made his way thence into the country of the Allobroges, and thence into the country of the Segusiavi.

I have shown on pages 430–1 that Ocelum was close to Avigliana, from which it follows that, in the first stage of his march, Caesar moved along the valley of the Dora Riparia. On this point von Göler and Napoleon are wrong. But they and almost all other modern commentators are agreed that Caesar crossed the Mont Genèvre, and passed by Brigantio (Briançon); and, as he went by way of the Dora Riparia, he must have done so. From Brigantio divergence begins. According to von Göler,[2] Caesar subsequently advanced by the left bank of the Romanche and the right bank of the Drac to Cularo (Grenoble), where he crossed the Isère, and thence to Vienna (Vienne) and Lugdunum (Lyons). This itinerary, says General Creuly,[3] contradicts Caesar's implied statement that he crossed the country of the Vocontii; and Long,[4] who agrees with this argument, concludes that 'Caesar took the comparatively easy road'—from Brigantio—'through Embrun, Gap, Die (Dea) to Valence (Valentia) on the Rhône.' The route traced by Kiepert[5] leads from Brigantio to Cularo along a slightly different line from that indicated by von Göler: from Cularo to Lugdunum his route and von Göler's coincide. Napoleon[6] also takes Caesar to Cularo; but thence he leads him by a nearly direct route to a point on the Rhône a few miles above Lugdunum. His route and Kiepert's are both open to the objection which Creuly makes to the theory of von Göler.

As far as Brigantio, I repeat, the route is certain. As Caesar's objective was that part of the country of the Segusiavi which extended between the Rhône and the Saône, in the neighbourhood of

[1] *B. G.*, i, 10, §§ 3–5.
[2] *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 13 and Taf. I.
[3] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., viii, 1863, p. 255.
[4] *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv, 6.
[5] *Tabula Galliae Cisalpinae et Transalpinae in usum scholarum descripta.*
[6] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 57, note, and Planche 19.

Lyons, it will be obvious to any one who consults a good map[1] that his shortest route would have led past Grenoble, if between Briançon and Grenoble there was a practicable road ; and, at the time when the Peutinger Table was constructed, there certainly was.[2] From Briançon to Grenoble the modern traveller must go either by the valleys of the Guisane, the Romanche, and the Drac, or, by a longer road, past Embrun, Chorges, and Gap, and thence down the valley of the Drac. But it is doubtful whether either of these routes would have led Caesar into the country of the Vocontii.[3] I am therefore disposed to believe that he did not pass Grenoble at all, but took the road, indicated by Long, which leads past Embrun, Chorges, Gap, and Die.

CAESAR'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE HELVETII[4]

I. The route which the Helvetii pursued, after threading the Pas de l'Écluse, to the Saône, cannot be traced exactly. We only know that they passed through the outlying territory of the Allobroges[5] on the northern bank of the Rhône, and that they struck the Saône not far north of Lyons. Napoleon, following Valentin-Smith,[6] assumes that they moved along the right bank of the Rhône as far as Culoz, and then struck off to the west, along the line of the Roman road which led past Virieu-le-Grand, Tenay, and St. Rambert, and across the plateau of Dombes to the Saône. By following this route, says A. Bernard,[7] they would have avoided incommoding the Sequani. Spreading out, as Valentin-Smith thinks, in the latter part of their route, they crossed the Saône at various points between St. Bernard and Montmerle, or, according to C. Cadot[8] and Thomann,[9] at Villefranche, Messimy, Montmerle, and Belleville. Cadot points out that above Belleville access to the river would have been barred by ' des forêts inextricables, dont le défrichement, assez récent, n'est même pas complètement achevé ', and he argues that if the Helvetii had crossed the Saône at one spot, they would have opposed Caesar's passage. A. Senault[10] also brings them to St. Bernard, but by a different route, namely Nantua, La Cluse, and Brion. He maintains that they could not have marched along the bank of the Rhône, because, if they had done so, Caesar, instead of going to Italy for reinforcements, would have attacked them in flank. How Caesar

[1] The best is Feuille 60 of the *Carte de France* (1 : 200,000).
[2] Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, vol. ii (map facing p. 224), vol. iv, p. 155.
[3] See pp. 501–2.
[4] See *Carte de France* (1 : 200,000), Sheets 41 and 47, and *Carte de l'État-Major* (1 : 80,000), Sheet 136, NE. and SE.
[5] See pp. 363–5.
[6] *Fouilles dans la vallée du Formans en 1862*, map facing p. 6.
[7] *Mém. de la Soc. Roy. des antiquaires de France*, nouv. sér., xviii, 1846, pp. 372–3.
[8] *Note sur l'invasion des Helvètes*, 1862, pp. 6–8, 11.
[9] *Neue Jahrb. f. Philologie*, &c., xci, 1865, p. 697.
[10] *L'Œuvre de Jacques Maissiat*, 1892, pp. 24–5, 28–9.

was to attack in flank a vast host from which he was separated by a broad and rapid river, I cannot see ; nor, even if such an operation had been practicable, would he have attempted it with his insignificant force.

M. Jullian,[1] on the other hand, believes that the Helvetii followed the direct route, which passes through Châtillon, Nantua, and Bourg, and crossed the Saône at Mâcon. He argues that if they had taken the road indicated by Napoleon, the Allobroges would have been able to stop them from plundering their villages, and that unless they had moved away from the Rhône after threading the Pas de l'Écluse, Caesar would not have felt safe in leaving Geneva. He selects Mâcon as the place of crossing, first because it is on the direct road from the Pas de l'Écluse to Toulon-sur-Arroux, near which (as we shall presently see) the decisive battle of the campaign was fought ; secondly, because the Helvetii could only have found the necessary boats at a frequented spot ; and thirdly, because the main roads that lead into the interior of the Aeduan territory converge at Mâcon. Moreover, he doubts whether the road by which the Helvetii must have approached the Saône if they crossed it between Belleville and Trévoux passed through Aeduan territory. I do not think that these arguments are valid. Why should the Allobroges have been able to prevent a powerful army, which, even when it had lost a fourth of its strength, Caesar only overcame after a desperate struggle, from plundering their villages in one direction rather than in another ? Caesar was obliged to leave Geneva ; for he could not attack the Helvetii until he reinforced his feeble army. Mâcon is certainly on the direct route from the Pas de l'Écluse to Toulon ; but, as we shall presently see, there is reason to believe that the Helvetii, after they crossed the Saône, moved up its right bank until they reached Mâcon. Surely the necessary boats might have been found between Belleville and Villefranche, which are both on great roads ; and such boats as the Helvetii found were not sufficient, for they used rafts as well.[2] Why should we suppose that they entered Aeduan territory before they crossed the Saône ? And if they had crossed it at a place so renowned as Mâcon, which Caesar mentions in vii, 90, § 7, would he not have said so ? But the most cogent reason for deciding that they crossed it south of Mâcon must be reserved for the next section of this article.

II. Where did Caesar defeat the Tigurini—the rearguard of the Helvetii—and from what place did he march against them ? These questions are closely connected with that which I have just discussed.

De Saulcy makes Caesar cross the Rhône at Vienne in his march from Italy, then cross the Saône, and finally recross it after defeating the Tigurini.[3] But this itinerary is obviously wrong. Why should Caesar have three times performed the troublesome operation of crossing a river when it was only necessary to do so twice ? De

[1] *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 205, n. 1 ; 207, n. 1.
[2] *B. G.*, i, 12, § 1.
[3] *Les campagnes de Jules César dans les Gaules*, 1862, p. 287.

Saulcy misunderstands the passage (Caesar) *ab Allobrogibus in Segusiavos exercitum ducit. Hi sunt extra provinciam trans Rhodanum primi.*[1] These words mean that Caesar, after crossing the Rhône, found himself in that part of the territory of the Segusiavi which lay between the Rhône and the Saône. General Creuly, however, agrees with de Saulcy. He says that *in Segusiavos* must mean ' le véritable pays ségusiave, le Forez ', even if the Segusiavi possessed any territory on the eastern bank of the Saône.[2] I have proved on pages 470–1 that they did possess territory on this bank. Why should not that part of their territory have been ' véritable ' as well as the other ? Creuly's theory leads him to an absurd conclusion. He is forced to make Caesar cross the Saône in order to attack the Tigurini, although Caesar does not say one word about any such crossing. If Caesar did cross the Saône, he must either have made a bridge or found one. But if so, he would surely have recrossed the Saône, after destroying the Tigurini, by the same bridge. Yet he tells us that, in order to cross from the eastern to the western bank, he was obliged to make a bridge.[3] It is therefore clear that he crossed the Saône once only, and that that part of the country of the Segusiavi in which he encamped on his return from Italy was on the eastern bank of the river.

When he set out on his night march to attack the Tigurini he was somewhere in this territory. Valentin-Smith argues that his camp could not have been so far north as Trévoux, because Trévoux, being situated between two places called Ambérieux, must have been in the country of the Ambarri ;[4] and this may be a reasonable conclusion. Now in the country south of Trévoux the most suitable spot for a camp is on the heights which command Sathonay. The Tigurini were attempting to cross the Saône at some point where it was so sluggish that one could hardly tell, by merely looking at it, in which direction it was flowing. Caesar left his camp soon after midnight, doubtless with the intention of attacking the Tigurini before sunrise, and succeeded in surprising them as they were attempting to cross the Saône.[5] We may infer, then, that he had not far to march, and that the lie of the ground had masked his approach.

1. De Saulcy believes that the defeat of the Tigurini took place a little north of Mâcon.[6] But that it did not take place so far north as this, still less at Chalon, where it has also been placed, is proved by the following facts. First, the current of the Saône answers most closely to Caesar's description in that part of its course which lies between Trévoux and Thoissey ;[7] secondly, Caesar would not have taken the trouble to leave his camp in the country of the Segusiavi at midnight, in order to march to a spot which he could hardly have reached at any time on the following day ; and thirdly, if the Helvetii had started from a point so far north as Mâcon on their march

[1] *B. G.*, i, 10, § 5.
[2] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., viii, 1863, p. 256.
[3] *B. G.*, i, 13, § 1.
[4] *Fouilles dans la vallée du Formans*, p. 5.
[5] *B. G.*, i, 12, §§ 1–3.
[6] *Les campagnes de Jules César dans les Gaules*, pp. 289–94.
[7] Ch. Cadot, *Note sur l'invasion des Helvètes*, pp. 6–8, 10.

towards a point south-east of Mont Beuvray, they would not have taken a fortnight or more to accomplish so short a distance.[1] M. Jullian,[2] indeed, argues that when Caesar began his march against the Tigurini he was perhaps not in the country of the Segusiavi, but had already made one or two marches northward from the camp which he had occupied there. This seems to me utterly inconsistent with his narrative : if the Helvetii had crossed the Saône, and the Tigurini had been about to cross it, at Mâcon, surely he would have written *in Ambarros*, not *in Segusiavos* (exercitum ducit).

2. Napoleon places the attempted passage of the Saône by the Tigurini at the point where it is joined by the Formans.[3] If their encampment was not more than a few miles north of Trévoux, the route by which they had approached the Saône must have been the valley of this stream. This valley is dominated on the left by hills which would have screened the Roman column from observation as it marched from Sathonay. Napoleon, however, simply asserts that ' the excavations carried on in 1862 leave no doubt of the place of this defeat '. The excavations were carried on in the valley of the Formans, on the plateau of St. Bernard, and at the hamlet of Cormoz. The finds, which included cinders, human bones, fragments of flint weapons, pottery, bronze bracelets, a bronze sword, and a couple of iron weapons, belonged to all periods from the neolithic to that of La Tène ;[4] and no archaeologist would allow that they lend more than the flimsiest support to Napoleon's theory. Moreover, Desjardins objects that, if the Tigurini had been encamped near Trévoux, Caesar, who, according to Napoleon, was only 18 kilometres off at Sathonay, would not have needed scouts to tell him what they were doing ; and that the Tigurini would not have been such fools as to attempt to cross the Saône ' under the eyes, so to speak, of six Roman legions '.[5] But these objections have no force. Caesar could not have seen what the Tigurini were doing 18 kilometres off ; and if he wanted to know, he had no choice but to employ scouts. If the Tigurini had attempted to move their unwieldy wagons further up the bank, they would have gained nothing, for Caesar could have overtaken them whenever he pleased ; and, whether they were fools or not, they certainly attempted to cross the Saône at a point which was within a night's march from Caesar's camp. By far the strongest argument, indeed, which can be urged in favour of Napoleon's site is the purely geographical one which I have already stated.

3. General Creuly believes with Heller that Caesar crossed the Saône at Belleville ;[6] but it is much more likely that the Tigurini had approached the river by the valley of the Formans.

III. Assuming that Caesar defeated the Tigurini in the valley of the Formans, and there crossed the Saône, we have next to inquire by what route the Helvetii marched to the scene of their final overthrow. Their object was to reach the country of the Santoni,—that

[1] *B. G.*, i, 15, § 5 ; 16, §§ 1–3 ; 23, § 1.
[2] *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 207, n. 3.
[3] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 60, 61, n. 1.
[4] *L'Anthr.*, xvii, 1906, p. 336.
[5] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 606.
[6] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., viii, 1863, pp. 257–8.

is to say, the valley of the Charente. After telling us that they marched for a fortnight about five miles ahead of his vanguard, Caesar remarks that they had moved away from the Saône,—*iter ab Arare averterant.* He does not say when they began to move away; but the phrase which he uses seems to imply that for some time they had marched parallel with the river. When he had reached a point not more than 18 Roman miles from Bibracte (Mont Beuvray), he changed his direction and marched towards Bibracte. It is therefore clear that the general direction of the march up to that point had been towards the north-west.

1. Napoleon's route leads by way of Belleville, over the Col d'Avenas, through the valley of the Grosne, past Cluny to St. Vallier, thence westward across the river Arroux, about three miles south of Toulon, past Issy-l'Évêque and Mont Tauffrin to Remilly on the Alène. From a point near Remilly, he thinks, Caesar struck off for Bibracte; but he does not say by what road the Helvetii marched back to attack Caesar.[1]

Heller, who, like Napoleon, makes Caesar diverge from the Saône near Belleville, argues, in a criticism of the map published by the *Commission de la topographie des Gaules*, that if he had marched up the valley as far as Chalon, he could have procured grain from his boats on the river and would never have felt any anxiety about his supplies, since, for the short distance between Chalon and the scene of the final overthrow of the Helvetii, the legionaries could have carried enough food on their backs.[2]

2. General Creuly so far agrees with Heller that he admits the absurdity of the theory which makes Caesar march up the valley of the Saône as far as Chalon; but he holds that he must have gone as far as Mâcon, remarking that his words, *quod iter ab Arare Helvetii averterant*, imply that he had pursued the road along the valley for a considerable distance after crossing the river. Moreover, if the Helvetii, whom Caesar followed, had diverged from the Saône at Belleville, they would have found themselves walled in between abrupt hills, on the flanks of which it would have been impossible to deploy.[3] From Mâcon Creuly suggests that Caesar followed the Helvetii by way of Cluny, Joucy, and St. Eusèbe or Blanzy.[4] The latter part of this route, as the reader will presently see, is too far east.

3. Stoffel believes that the Helvetii marched up the right bank of the Saône till they neared Mâcon; then struck off in a north-westerly direction towards Prissé; followed the line of the modern road leading from Mâcon to Autun by way of Cluny, Salornay, and Mont St. Vincent, where they were at the lowest point of the mountains which separate the valley of the Saône from the valley of the Loire; and thence turned westward, past Sanvigne to Toulon-sur-Arroux.[5]

[1] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 62–6 and Planche 4.
[2] *Philologus*, xix, 1863, pp. 558–9. See also Ch. Cadot, *op. cit.*, p. 13.
[3] *Ib.*, pp. 12–3. [4] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., viii, 1863, pp. 259–60.
[5] *Guerre civile*, ii, 443–4. The route traced by Cadot (*op. cit.*, pp. 12–7) coincides with that of Stoffel as far as Mont St. Vincent. In tracing the

The tracing of the last few miles of the route must depend upon the identification of the battle-field.

I believe that Stoffel has indicated the route accurately; for, as I shall presently show, his identification of the battle-field, certain topographical details excepted, is almost certainly correct; and if the Helvetii moved up the Saône as far as Mâcon, as they must have done unless they quitted it at Belleville,[1] no other route was available. It remains to look for the scene of the battle.

IV. Caesar, in his description of the battle, says that, when the Roman army, formed in three lines, was pursuing the Helvetii, after their first repulse, the Boi and Tulingi attacked the Romans on their exposed flank,—*ex itinere nostros ⟨ab⟩ latere aperto adgressi circumvenire*.[2] The meaning of the words ⟨*ab*⟩ *latere aperto* has been much discussed, because it affects the question of the identity of the battle-field.[3]

The words are usually taken to mean 'on the right flank',—unprotected, because the shield was worn on the left arm; and Napoleon quotes, in support of this interpretation, a passage in which Livy describes the escape of 600 Roman soldiers from Cannae. The 600 were formed in the shape of a wedge; and, says Livy, 'As the Numidians aimed at their right flank, which was exposed, they changed their shields to their right arms, and escaped to the number of six hundred into the greater camp'[4] (*cum in latus dextrum, quod patebat, Numidae iacularentur, translatis in dextrum scutis, in maiora castra ad sexcentos evaserunt*).[5] I do not regard this passage as decisive, because the 600 were not fighting in line, but in the shape of a wedge; and therefore they were of course completely exposed, on the unshielded side, along the whole depth of the formation.

F. Fröhlich[6] quotes two passages in support of the orthodox view. In the former we read that when the legions were fighting outside the wall of Gergovia, they were panic-stricken by the sight of an Aeduan force, which they mistook for an enemy, suddenly appearing on their exposed flank (*subito sunt Haedui visi ab latere nostris aperto*).[7] In the latter we read that, at Pharsalia, Pompey determined to attack Caesar's right wing on its exposed flank (*persuasi equitibus nostris . . . ut . . . dextrum Caesaris cornu ab latere aperto adgrederentur*).[8]

later stages, however, he argued on the untenable hypothesis that Bibracte was on the site of Autun.

[1] See *Carte de France* (1 : 200,000), Sheet 47.

[2] *B. G.*, i, 25, §§ 6–7.

[3] In the first edition (p. 617) I remarked that 'Caesar, if the MSS. are right, does not use the phrase *ab latere aperto*, but simply *latere aperto*'. This, I suggested, might 'mean that the Boi and Tulingi attacked the Romans in flank, as their flank was exposed'; and I added that if so, 'there would be nothing to show whether the exposed flank was the right or the left'. Professor H. Delbrück (*Gesch. d. Kriegskunst*, i, 440) admits the possibility of this tentative interpretation; but I have no longer any doubt that Meusel (*Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xi, 1885, p. 201) is right in supplying *ab* before *latere aperto*.

[4] I modify Messrs. Church and Brodribb's translation.

[5] xxii, 50, § 11.

[6] *Das Kriegswesen Cäsars*, p. 225.

[7] *B. G.*, vii, 50, § 1.

[8] *B. C.*, iii, 86, § 3.

The 'exposed flank', in each of these cases, is universally admitted to have been the right flank; and Fröhlich infers, perhaps hastily, that *ab latere aperto* always means 'on the right flank'.

Stoffel[1] ridicules Fröhlich's arguments. At Gergovia, he observes, the Roman left was covered by Sextius's legion, and therefore the right, which was unprotected, was *of course, on this particular occasion*, the *latus apertum*. In the battle of Pharsalia, Caesar's left rested on the Enipeus, and his right was exposed in the Pharsalian plain;[2] therefore here too his right flank was the exposed flank, not because it was the right, but simply because it happened to be exposed. Again, Stoffel asks, if the right flank of a line of battle rested upon a river and the left were uncovered in a plain, how could the soldiers' shields prevent an enemy from turning that flank? Every soldier would call the left flank of an army so situated its exposed flank. To prove his point, Fröhlich ought to have shown that no Latin writer ever called the left flank of an army *latus apertum*.

With all respect, however, for the professional knowledge of Stoffel, his reply, at least in so far as it relates to Gergovia, is inconclusive. Let him look at Napoleon's (in other words, his own) map of Gergovia, and he must admit that, if the Roman left was covered by the legion of Sextius, the Roman right was equally covered by the 10th legion. As a matter of fact, neither the left nor the right was, strictly speaking, covered at all, except during the retreat. But, if Stoffel's reply is inconclusive, so is Fröhlich's argument, at least in so far as it relates to Pharsalia. Heller,[3] indeed, argues that the right flank of Caesar's right wing was covered by his cavalry, and yet was called *latus apertum*.[4] But to this I reply that it was not until Caesar's right wing had become exposed by the rout of his cavalry that Pompey's cavalry attacked the right wing *ab latere aperto*.

Nevertheless, there are several passages in Caesar which show that *ab latere aperto* does mean 'on the right flank'. In *B. G.*, v, 35, § 2, describing the destruction of Sabinus's division by the Eburones, he tells us that one of the Roman cohorts occasionally charged forth from the hollow square in which the division was formed. 'Meanwhile,' he continues, 'the cohort was necessarily exposed, and missiles fell on its exposed flank' (*interim eam partem nudari necesse erat et ab latere aperto tela recipi*). Now here is a fact which Stoffel would find it difficult either to contradict or to explain away: that cohort was equally uncovered, in the modern sense of the word, on its left flank and on its right. Therefore, unless *ab latere aperto* means *ab utroque latere* (on both flanks), either it must have had a technical meaning, which Caesar's Roman readers would have at once understood, or it must have conveyed no meaning whatever! *Ab latere aperto* 'may mean', says Long,[5] 'that the cohort was altogether exposed after leaving the "orbis".' Of course it

[1] *Rev. de philologie*, xv, 1891, pp. 139, 144–5.
[2] Cf. my article in *Class. Quarterly*, ii, 1908, pp. 271–92.
[3] *Philologus*, xxvi, 1867, p. 659.
[4] *B. C.*, iii, 93, §§ 3–4.
[5] *Caesar*, p. 252.

was,—as regarded position. But if *ab latere aperto* meant what Long suggests, why did not Caesar write *ab utroque latere* (or *ab lateribus*) and make his meaning clear ?

In *B. G.*, vii, 82, § 2, Caesar describes the night attack which the Gallic army of relief made upon the Roman line of circumvallation in the plain on the west of Alesia. Towards daybreak the Gauls retreated, for fear they might be attacked on their exposed flank by a Roman force sallying forth from one of the camps on the high ground (*veriti ne ab latere aperto ex superioribus castris eruptione circumvenirentur*). The Gallic left was exposed, as regarded position, no less than the Gallic right. There were Roman camps on high ground on the left and also on the right. Either, then, *ab latere aperto* signified the right and unshielded flank, or it signified nothing. There is no escape from this conclusion unless *ab latere aperto* means *ab utroque latere* or *ab lateribus*.

But if Caesar had meant *ab utroque latere* or *ab lateribus*, surely he would have said so ? It would have been so easy to make his meaning clear ; and he does use the phrases *ab utroque latere* and *ab lateribus*[1] when they are required. According to Stoffel, *ab latere aperto* means either ' on the left flank ' or ' on the right flank ', as the case may be : in other words, Caesar does not take the trouble to say which flank he means. Perhaps. But it would have been so easy to say *ab latere dextro* or *ab latere sinistro* ; and he does use the phrase *ab dextro latere*.[2] Is there not some ground, then, for arguing that *ab latere aperto* had a fixed technical meaning ?

One word more. Thucydides,[3] in his description of the battle of Mantinea, tells us that, ' All armies, when engaging, are apt to thrust outwards their right wing ; and either of the opposing forces tends to outflank his enemy's left with his own right, because every soldier individually fears for his exposed side, which he tries to cover with the shield of his comrade on the right, conceiving that the closer he draws in the better he will be protected. The first man in the front rank of the right wing is originally responsible for the deflection, for he always wants to withdraw from the enemy his own exposed side, and the rest of the army, from a like fear, follow his example.' [4] Does not this passage lend some support to the view that *ab latere aperto* means ' on the right flank ' ?

Lastly, Lucan, in his description of the rash attack which some of Caesar's troops made upon those of Afranius and Petreius at Ilerda, calls the left flank of the Roman cavalry ' their protected flank ' (*munitum latus*),[5] which is an additional argument in support of my view, that *apertum latus* was a technical phrase, meaning ' the right flank '.[6]

[1] *B. G.*, ii, 8, §§ 3–4 and vii, 24, § 3.

[2] *Ib.*, 49, § 1. A third passage, which is strictly analogous to the two which I have just examined, is to be found in iv, 26, § 3.

[3] v, 71, § 1.

[4] B. Jowett, *Thucydides, Translated into English*, i, 389.

[5] iv, 43–5.

[6] Since my first edition was published Fröhlich (*Die Glaubwürdigkeit Caesars*, &c., p. 29) and H. Delbrück (*Gesch. d. Kriegskunst*, i, 440) have remarked

The battle-field, according to Caesar,[1] was not more than 18 Roman miles from Bibracte, or Mont Beuvray, and close to a point where a road leading to that town diverged from the route by which the Helvetii would have marched to Saintonge.[2] This is all that is certainly known; but we may be sure that it was somewhere to the south-east, south, or south-west of Bibracte, because the Helvetii could have had no motive for passing by the east and north of that town, in order to reach the Loire.

1. De Saulcy, writing before the results of M. Bulliot's investigations had been published, identified Bibracte with Autun, and placed the battle-field near Cussy-la-Colonne, 16 miles, in a direct line, north-east by east of Autun and about 25 miles east-north-east of Mont Beuvray.[3]

2. Other writers, also assuming the identity of Bibracte with Autun, indicated various sites more than 18 Roman miles from Beuvray, and remote from the route which Caesar must have followed.[4]

3. Von Göler,[5] who also argues on the untenable hypothesis that Bibracte was at Autun, concludes that when Caesar struck off towards Bibracte, he had reached Château-Chinon. But Château-Chinon is at least 9 miles further north than Beuvray and than Autun.

4. Kiepert,[6] who makes the Helvetii march along the right bank of the Saône as far north as Chalon, and then turn sharply to the west, places the battle-field about 8 miles east by south of Autun.

that I have demonstrated, against Stoffel, that *ab latere aperto* means 'on the right flank'. In the first edition, however, I overlooked a passage which might perhaps be regarded as supporting Stoffel's view. In the operations near Ilerda, when Afranius and Petreius were encamped on the hill of Gardeny, Caesar, who was encamped opposite them, probably on their north-west, attempted to seize a knoll, now called the Puig Bordel, about midway between Ilerda and the Pompeian camp. Accordingly he formed three legions in line of battle, and sent a picked force of *antesignani*, belonging to the 14th legion, to seize the knoll (*B. C.*, i, 43, § 3; 46, § 4). The enemy, however, were too quick for him; and their outposts beat off the *antesignani* and drove them back upon the legions. Caesar goes on to say that his men were afraid of being attacked on their exposed flank (*ab aperto latere*); that the *antesignani* were thrown into confusion; that thereupon the legion 'posted on that wing' (*quae in eo cornu constiterat*) abandoned its post and took refuge on a hill close by; and that he then sent the 9th legion to the rescue (*ib.*, 43–4, 45, § 1). Stoffel (*Guerre civile*, i, 51, 269) affirms that the 14th legion was on the left of Caesar's line, and that the 9th was therefore on its right. If so, what was the hill to which the 14th fled? Stoffel (*ib.*, i, 52) says 'la hauteur de las Collades', which on his map (pl. 5) is invisible. It has been argued that as the right flank of the 14th was covered by the 9th, its *latus apertum* must have been its left (A. von Göler, *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, ii, 39, n. 1). But at the moment when the *antesignani* feared for their exposed flank they were isolated from the rest of the line.

[1] *B. G.*, i, 23, § 1. [2] Cf. C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 213, n. 1.

[3] *Les campagnes de Jules César dans les Gaules*, pp. 317–74. Even Signor Ferrero (*Grandezza e decadenza di Roma*, ii, 1902, p. 14), misled by his anxiety to reconstruct Caesar's narrative, has committed himself to this absurdity, although he rightly identifies Bibracte with Beuvray.

[4] See *Rev. des Soc. savantes*, 3e sér., iv, 1864, pp. 120 ff., and M. Jullian's bibliography in *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 213, n. 1.

[5] *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 24.

[6] *Galliae Cisalpinae et Transalpinae . . . tabula in usum scholarum descripta.*

But the Helvetii would have needlessly increased the length of their journey by taking this route ; and I have proved that they did not follow the line of the Saône as far as Chalon.

5. Heller insists that the battle must have taken place on the east of Bibracte ; for, he argues, if the Helvetii had got westward of that town by the time when Caesar moved off towards it, they would have tried to push on as far ahead of him as possible, and would not have turned back, and if they had been on the west of Caesar when they changed their line of march, they would not have brought back their wagons. His view is that they only attacked Caesar in order to force a passage towards the west.[1] But he overlooks several important considerations. First, the Helvetii must have known that Caesar could easily overtake their unwieldy host. Secondly, they would have taken their wagons with them to the battle-field in any case : partly because they would not have been so foolish as to leave them alone and unprotected with the women and children ; partly, as we may gather from Caesar's description of the battle, to serve as a *laager*. Thirdly, even if they had been on the east of Bibracte, they would not have been obliged to attack Caesar : when he moved off towards Bibracte, they would only have had to move on and leave him to his own devices. Finally, if they were actuated by the motive which Heller imputes to them, why did Caesar impute to them a motive wholly different ?[2]

6. Napoleon[3] points to a site on the rivulet of La Roche, about 7 miles, in a direct line, south-south-west of Mont Beuvray ; and he identifies the *proximus collis*, on which Caesar formed his line of battle, with a hill between the villages of Grand-Marié and Petit-Marié. But 7 miles would hardly have been called ' not more than 18 miles ' ; and, as M. Jullian observes,[4] Napoleon's site was not, apparently, on a natural route.

7. Stoffel claims to have established the identity of the site beyond all doubt ; and he has certainly written a most valuable and interesting essay on the campaign.[5] He tells us that he was commissioned by Napoleon to search for the battle-field ; that, after a careful study of the country round Mont Beuvray, he selected two possible sites,—the one which Napoleon adopted, and Montmort, about 3 miles north-west of Toulon-sur-Arroux ;[6] that he himself very decidedly preferred the latter : but that, as his choice involved a heterodox interpretation of the phrase ⟨*ab*⟩ *latere aperto*, he deferred to the authority of certain scholars who assured the emperor that the phrase in question could only mean ' on the right flank '. He goes on to say that in later years he became so strongly convinced of the truth of his original opinion that he determined to put it to a practical test. He believed that the hill on which Caesar formed

[1] *Philologus*, xxvi, 1867, p. 658.
[2] *B. G.*, i, 23, § 3.
[3] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 68, 71, n. 1.
[4] *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 213, n. 1.
[5] *Guerre civile*, ii, 439–52.
[6] I suspect that Stoffel was indebted to Xavier Garenne, who had already (*Bibracte*, 1867, pl. 1 [p. 16] and pp. 34–62) pointed to Montmort as the battle-field.

his line of battle was Armecy, just south of Montmort, and that the hill to which the Helvetii fell back after the failure of their first attack was just north of that village. Concluding from Caesar's narrative [1] that an entrenchment had been thrown up on the plateau of Armecy, he in 1886 set navvies to work, who presently discovered the remains of an entrenchment. West of Montmort, in the neighbourhood of a farm called La Bretache, numerous fragments of Gallic pottery were found ; and in 1889 on the hill of Armecy itself were discovered nine trenches, filled with ashes and charcoal, and containing bones, which crumbled under the touch.

Now there is not the slightest doubt about the genuineness of Colonel Stoffel's discovery. His good faith is above suspicion : his skill as an excavator has been proved beyond question.[2] The entrenchment which he discovered is not that of a camp : it can only have been intended to serve a temporary purpose. Its shape is that of a crescent, the width from horn to horn being about 300 yards. The colonel points out that the work of entrenching must have been hurriedly going on while the battle was raging on the lower slope of the hill ; and, he remarks, ' ainsi s'explique que les fossés soient simples sur divers points, doubles sur d'autres.' The depth of the trenches was only 1 metre 50, or about 4 feet 11 inches. If the entrenchment was not that which Caesar mentions, it is difficult to account for its existence. Since the colonel made his discovery, M. Carion, mayor of Montmort, has found calcined bones and *débris* of Gallic weapons hard by the entrenchment.[3] The distance of the hill of Armecy from Mont Beuvray tallies with Caesar's statement, that on the morning of the battle he was not more than 18 Roman miles from Bibracte. But can Stoffel's view be reconciled with the words ⟨*ab*⟩ *latere aperto* ? If my interpretation of those words, which has been accepted on the Continent as conclusive, is correct, then either (1), as I suggested to General Sir Frederick Maurice, who was inclined to agree with me, the Boi and Tulingi may have worked round to their left so as to strike Caesar's right flank ; or (2) Stoffel's theory, so far as it concerns the hill to which the Helvetii fell back, must be wrong.

Fröhlich [4] admits that the entrenchment proves that a battle was fought hard by ; but he maintains that it was not made by Caesar. It would have been useless, he argues, as a protection against the Helvetii, for they could easily have turned it ; if they had beaten Caesar's veteran legions, they would have attacked the hill from the rear as well as in front ; and therefore it may be assumed that the entrenchment which Caesar constructed was not crescent-shaped but a complete enclosure. I would, however, ask Fröhlich to consider whether the men who threw it up, and who would certainly have begun it on the side which was most exposed to attack, may not

[1] Sarcinas in unum locum conferri et eum ab his qui in superiore acie constiterant muniri iussit. *B. G.*, i, 24, § 3.

[2] See pp. xxv–xxvii.

[3] *Mém. de la Soc. éduenne*, xx, 1892, pp. 304–5.

[4] *Die Glaubwürdigkeit Caesars*, &c., p. 30.

have stopped work when they saw that the battle was going in favour of their comrades.

Colonel H. Bircher,[1] on the other hand, holds with Stoffel that the irregularities in the entrenchment show that it was constructed in haste; and accordingly he regards the battle-field as determined. This conclusion, indeed, is now generally accepted. Bircher, however, agrees with me and Fröhlich in considering Stoffel's theory irreconcilable with the words ⟨*ab*⟩ *latere aperto*; and, after a thorough examination of the ground, he informed Fröhlich that the hill of Armecy was steeper on the north-western side than it appears in Stoffel's map. On Stoffel's theory, therefore, the extremity of the Roman right wing would have been posted on a steep declivity, whereas the Romans preferred a gentle slope. For these reasons Bircher concluded that the veteran legions were posted on the lower slopes, facing west-south-west, and that the hill to which the Helvetii retreated was not, as Stoffel supposed, the hill near Montmort, but on the further side of the valley through which runs the road from Toulon-sur-Arroux to Luzy. This was the road by which the Boi and Tulingi would have marched to reinforce their comrades; and thus they would have struck the Roman army on its right flank[2] (*ab latere aperto*).

But Professor Walter Dennison[3] has come to the rescue of Stoffel. Bircher's theory, he argues, robs the word *circumvenire* (which Caesar uses in his description of the manœuvre of the Boi and Tulingi) of all point; and it is demolished by the fact that the Helvetii finally retreated northward, whereas, according to Bircher, when they withdrew, after the first stage of the battle, to the hill about a mile off, they moved southward: 'it is contrary,' says the professor, 'to the recognized laws of the human mind and of self-preservation to suppose that the enemy should have turned about arbitrarily and fled . . . almost in the face of the Roman soldiers.' But if Professor Dennison will look at his map again, he will, I think, acknowledge that he has somewhat misrepresented Bircher's theory. The Helvetii, according to Bircher,[4] withdrew after their first repulse, not southward, but west-south-west; and neither he nor Captain Veith, who, after exploring the country, independently reached the same conclusion,[5] saw anything improbable in a final northward retreat of the beaten force from this position.[6] As to the word *circumvenire*, it does not, as Professor Dennison supposes, imply that the Boi and Tulingi made a *détour*: it simply means that they not only made a lateral attack on the Roman right, but also attempted to lap round it so as to strike it from the rear.[7]

[1] *Bibracte*, 1904, pp. 22–8.
[2] See C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 215, n. 4.
[3] *Class. Philology*, 1909, pp. 200–1.
[4] *Bibracte*, Taf. III.
[5] *Gesch. d. Feldzüge C. J. Caesars*, p. 508, note.
[6] M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 218, n. 1) supposes that the Helvetii may have retreated in the first instance south-eastward to Toulon-sur-Arroux, and thence struck north-eastward towards Dijon. See pp. 633–4, *infra*.
[7] See H. Meusel, *Lex. Caes.*, i, 536.

V. Describing the dispositions which he made for the battle, Caesar says that he had the *sarcinae* stacked on a hill, fortified the spot on which they lay, and detailed two legions and his auxiliary corps for their protection (*ipse interim in colle medio triplicem aciem instruxit . . . in summo iugo duas legiones . . . et omnia auxilia conlocari . . . sarcinas in unum locum conferri et eum ab iis qui in superiore acie constiterant muniri iussit*).[1] As *sarcinae* generally means, not heavy baggage (*impedimenta*), but only the bundles which the soldiers carried, von Göler[2] and Stoffel[3] infer that the heavy baggage had been sent on, under a slender escort, towards Bibracte. Napoleon,[4] on the contrary, maintains that *sarcinas* here includes *impedimenta*; but the phrase *sarcinaria iumenta*,[5] to which he refers, does not prove that *sarcinae* can be used in such an extended sense; and when he goes on to argue that if Caesar had sent on the baggage-train in advance, he would have sent two legions to escort it, he apparently forgets that the road to Bibracte led through the country of the Aedui, who were his allies. It is true that many of them sympathized with the Helvetii; but they were not likely to attempt a serious attack. Two legions, however, and the auxiliaries would seem to have been a large force to detail merely for the protection of the men's bundles; and if Caesar had sent on the heavy baggage, we should have expected him to say so. Moreover, as his army apparently remained near the battle-field for three days after the victory, it seems reasonable to suppose that they must have wanted some of their baggage. On the other hand, it has occurred to me that the baggage-cattle, or some of them, may have been sent on to Bibracte in order to fetch a supply of corn, as the legions had only two days' rations left. May we suppose that the necessary baggage was left upon the hill, and that the cattle and their drivers were sent on to Bibracte?[6]

VI. Stoffel, whom Bircher and I have followed, places the Helvetian laager on the plateau of La Bretache, west of Montmort. M. Jullian,[7] on the contrary, argues that 'the fact that Caesar attacked and took possession of the Gallic camp proves that it was not on high ground'. Why? Did not Caesar attack and defeat the Helvetii when they were on a hill? And is it not likely that they would have formed their laager on a strong position? I see no reason to differ from Stoffel.[8]

[1] *B. G.*, i, 24, §§ 2–3.
[2] *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 26.
[3] *Guerre civile*, ii, 449.
[4] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 68, n. 2.
[5] *B. C.*, i, 81, § 6.
[6] I doubt whether the entrenchment on the hill of Armecy would have been large enough to hold the entire baggage-train. Cf. H. Bircher, *Bibracte*, p. 24.
[7] *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 214, n. 3; 217, n. 1.
[8] Miss (?) Elizabeth Reed (*Classical Journal*, iii, 1908, pp. 192–3) quaintly raises the question whether 'the baggage and the camp' (*impedimentis castrisque* [*B. G.*, i, 26, § 4]) which Caesar captured were 'in the same place' or whether *castris* means 'the earlier camp which the Helvetians had left on the morning of the battle?' Quite correctly she decides for the former alternative; but why did she suggest a doubt? The 'camp which the Helvetians had left on the morning of the battle' ceased to exist as a camp when the Helvetians marched on: it was simply a wagon laager.

VII. Describing the first stage of the battle, Caesar says: 'The Gauls were greatly hampered in action by the fact that in many cases several shields were transfixed and pinned together by the impact of one javelin; and as the iron bent, they could not pull the javelins out or fight properly with their left arms encumbered; so that many, after repeated jerks, preferred to drop their shields, and fight bare' (*Gallis magno ad pugnam erat impedimento quod pluribus eorum scutis uno ictu pilorum transfixis et conligatis, cum ferrum se inflexisset, neque evellere neque sinistra impedita satis commode pugnare poterant, multi ut diu iactato bracchio praeoptarent scutum manu emittere et nudo corpore pugnare*).[1] V. Wenning finds serious difficulties in this passage. Must not *pluribus*, he asks, mean at least three? Could one javelin have pierced three shields? And could *pluribus* have been used in a distributive sense?[2]

I think we had better accept the passage as it stands; for Caesar could have had no motive for misrepresentation or invention. No doubt *pluribus* strictly means at least three; but we are not obliged to suppose that, in every instance of the occurrence which Caesar describes, more than two shields got fastened together. One javelin might certainly have pierced two light shields and stuck in a third; and *pluribus* is obviously used in a distributive sense. Wenning has overlooked a passage in which Livy[3] describes a similar incident.

VIII. Adverting to the words *pedem referre*, which Caesar uses in describing the conclusion of the first stage of the battle, Long[4] says that 'the Helvetii drew back, still facing the Romans, to a hill a mile distant'. Apparently he supposes that they backed for a mile, like *débutantes* in the presence of royalty.

IX. Describing the flank attack which the Boi and Tulingi made upon the Romans, Caesar says, *Boi et Tulingi, qui . . . agmen hostium claudebant, et novissimis praesidio erant*,[5] &c. Stoffel understands this passage to mean that the Boi and Tulingi *habitually* served as the rearguard of the enemy's train of wagons, but in front of the Helvetian column of fighting men, and therefore on the day of the battle, after the emigrants had begun their retrograde movement, marched in rear of the Helvetian column. In other words, he takes *qui novissimis praesidio erant* as referring to the habitual order of the whole column, and *agmen hostium claudebant* as referring to the position of the Boi and Tulingi on the day of the battle.[6] Now, apart from the obscurity with which it charges Caesar, there are two objections to this interpretation. First, it compels Stoffel to assume that the Boi and Tulingi were [needlessly] separated, on the march, from the Helvetii by a space, to traverse which required the whole time that was occupied by the first portion of the battle and

[1] *B. G.*, i, 25, §§ 3–4.

[2] *Correspondenz-Blatt f. d. Gelehrten- und Realschulen Württembergs*, 1881, p. 80.

[3] xxxviii, 22, § 9.—In eos qui portas . . . clauserant legionum antesignani pila coniecerunt. Hi vero non vulnerabantur, sed, transverberatis scutis, plerique inter se conserti haerebant.

[4] *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv, 16.

[5] *B. G.*, i, 25, § 6.

[6] *Guerre civile*, ii, 450.

the retreat of the Helvetii to the hill on which they rallied. Stoffel maintains that this time was short. I maintain, on the contrary, that the words *diu* and *tandem* in Caesar's description of the first portion of the battle suggest that it was considerable. Secondly, Stoffel's interpretation appears opposed to Caesar's implied statement that the wagons immediately followed the Helvetian fighting column, and began to encamp as the action was about to begin.[1] If the order of Caesar's narrative does not prove that the Boi and Tulingi arrived upon the field after the wagons began to be parked, the narrative is obscure. One might suppose, then, that the words *qui novissimis praesidio erant* mean that, after the emigrants retraced their steps, the Boi and Tulingi served as the rearguard of the wagon-train, which they marched past in order to come into action. This interpretation, however, which is generally accepted, presents a difficulty. According to Stoffel's calculation of the length of the entire column,[2] the nearest company of the Boi and Tulingi must have been nearly 15 miles from the battle-field when the column began to retrace its steps. The battle began about one o'clock,—between two and three hours, as Stoffel argues, after the Helvetian vanguard began to harass the Romans: would the first stage of the fighting have lasted long enough to enable the Boi to hurry up on to the field? M. Jullian[3] agrees with Stoffel that the Boi and Tulingi marched in front of the wagons, but holds apparently that they were not separated from the Helvetii by any considerable interval; and he understands the words *novissimis praesidio erant* in the sense that the Helvetii left the Boi and Tulingi on the road, to guard the wagons. Notwithstanding the obscurity which it imputes to Caesar, this explanation seems probable; but if it is right, the wagons must evidently have been also protected in the rear by another force, which never came into action.

X. Describing the last stage of the battle, which followed the attack made by the Boi and Tulingi upon the Romans, Caesar writes: 'Thus two battles went on at once; and the fighting was prolonged and fierce. When the enemy could no longer withstand the onslaughts of the Romans, one division drew back, in continuation of their original movement, up the hill, while the other withdrew to their baggage and wagons'. (*ita ancipiti proelio diu atque acriter pugnatum est. Diutius cum sustinere nostrorum impetus non possent, alteri se, ut coeperant, in montem receperunt, alteri ad impedimenta et carros suos se contulerunt*).[4] The common view is that the first *alteri* denotes the Helvetii, the second the Boi and Tulingi. Schneider,[5] however, holds that some of the Helvetii joined the Boi and Tulingi at the wagon laager.[6] He argues that Caesar would not have praised

[1] *B. G.*, i, 24, § 4.

[2] 30 kilometres (*Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, p. 36). G. Veith (see p. 240, *supra*) apparently believes that Stoffel overestimated the length of the column.

[3] *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 214.

[4] *B. G.*, i, 26, § 1.

[5] *Caesar*, i, 53.

[6] A. Hug (*Rhein. Mus.*, N. F., xv, 1860, pp. 480–1) conjectures, for reasons which are not worth discussing, that *Diutius . . . contulerunt* is an interpolation.

the valour of the Helvetii, as he did, if they had kept away from the fight at the laager, and remarks that *carros suos*, if written only with reference to the Boi and Tulingi, would have been inaccurate, as the wagons belonged to the whole host. But the Helvetii could have fought just as bravely on the hill as at the laager; and, as Caesar distinctly says that two separate battles went on, some of them at all events must have remained on the hill. He had a perfect right to say that the Boi and Tulingi retreated *ad carros suos*, even though only some of the wagons belonged to them; and if *Diutius . . . contulerunt* is taken in its plain sense, the first *alteri* can only refer to the Helvetii and the second to the Boi and Tulingi. Bircher holds that the Helvetii made good their retreat under cover of the resistance which their allies offered in the laager.

XI. Stoffel estimates that the Helvetii had only about 32,000 men actually engaged in the battle before the Boi and Tulingi came into action; but his calculations,[1] which are very elaborate, are based upon insufficient data.

XII. What route did the Helvetii take after their defeat? What route did Caesar take, after he had overtaken them, in his march to Vesontio (Besançon)?

Caesar says that they fled all night without stopping, and reached the territory of the Lingones 'on the fourth day' (*ex eo proelio circiter milia hominum CXXX superfuerunt eaque tota nocte continenter ierunt: [nullam partem noctis itinere intermisso] in fines Lingonum die quarto pervenerunt*).[2] Before starting in pursuit he was obliged to remain three days on the battle-field. The fugitives sent envoys to meet him, and halted, in obedience to his orders, at the spot which they had reached when the envoys returned. After he had overtaken them, a portion of their host made a vain attempt to escape in the direction of the Rhine. After this, Caesar received a deputation from the states of Celtican Gaul, and then resolved to march against Ariovistus, who was in the country of the Sequani (Alsace). He advanced by forced marches for three days, and then, hearing that Ariovistus was hastening to occupy Besançon, pushed on at the top of his speed (*magnis nocturnis diurnisque itineribus*), in order to anticipate him.[3] The phrase which I have just quoted proves that, after he was informed of the movement of Ariovistus, Caesar must have marched, at the very least, two days and two nights before he reached Besançon. It is therefore clear that his journey was sufficiently long to occupy three days of forced and at least two days of extraordinarily rapid marching. We shall be well within the mark if we assume that its extent was not less than 110 Roman miles.

1. The route which Napoleon traces leads by way of Moulins-Engilbert, Lormes, and Avallon to Tonnerre, where he believes Caesar to have overtaken the Helvetii; thence by way of Tanlay, Gland, Laignes, Étrochey, and Dancevoir to Arc-en-Barrois, where

[1] *Guerre civile*, ii, 450–1; *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, p. 77.
[2] *B. G.*, i, 26, § 5. [3] *Ib.*, 27, 30–8.

he believes Caesar to have received the news of Ariovistus's advance; and thence by way of Langres, Grenant, Seveux, and Oiselay to Besançon.[1]

Now, as regards the flight of the Helvetii, everything depends upon the meaning of the words *die quarto*. Kraner, arguing that the Helvetii would not have required four days and nights to reach the country of the Lingones, proposed to regard these words as a gloss or to substitute for them *postero die*[2] ('on the next day'), which shows that he did not know how far the country of the Lingones was from the battle-field; and A. Hug[3] conjectured that Caesar had written *die orto* ('at daybreak'). But this part of the text, at all events, requires no alteration; and it is certain that when we translate *die quarto* by 'on the fourth day', we must, remembering the Roman method of reckoning, regard the day of the battle as the first day. Thus, if the battle was fought on a Sunday, the Helvetii reached the country of the Lingones on Wednesday. According to Napoleon, they would have reached it on Thursday. But Napoleon made the same mistake here which he made in his note on the meaning of *altero die*.[4] Another question is whether the words *nullam partem noctis itinere intermisso* (supposing that they are genuine) are simply a reaffirmation of *ea tota nocte continenter ierunt* or whether they convey fresh information. In other words,—did the Helvetii march all Sunday night, and then march on on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday; or did they, throughout their journey, march in the night only and rest in the day-time? Napoleon's view, that they marched 'without interruption day and night', may be set aside as absurd.[5] Schneider[6] holds that Caesar wrote the words *nullam partem noctis itinere intermisso* in order to emphasize the fact that it was only because the Helvetii marched throughout the whole of the first night that they reached the territory of the Lingones on the fourth day:—'quod si illa nocte vel paululum quievissent, die quarto fines Lingonum non attigissent.' B. Müller,[7] who calls this a very naïve explanation, holds that the Helvetii marched by night only, and rested in the day-time. After marching the whole of the first night, they naturally, he argues, had to rest the next day. In the evening they made a fresh start; and so on till they reached the country of the Lingones. I am sure that Müller is wrong; for

[1] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 70, 80.

[2] *Caesar*, ed. Dittenberger-Kraner, 1890, p. 87.

[3] *Rhein. Mus.*, N. F., xv, 1860, pp. 477–8.

[4] See pp. 738–40.

[5] It is hardly necessary to point out that, even if the Helvetii marched on four consecutive days and nights, they must have rested during a large part of each day and of each night, except the first; or that when Caesar says of his own march in 52 B.C., *neque diurno neque nocturno itinere intermisso* (*B. G.*, vii, 9, § 4), he did the same. B. Müller (*Zur Kritik und Erklärung von Caesars gall. Kriege*, 1877, pp. 23–4) points out that, to say nothing of the superhuman endurance with which Napoleon credits the Helvetii, if Caesar had meant to describe a march by day and night, he would have expressed himself as he has done in *B. G.*, vii, 9, § 4, and 56, § 3 (*admodum magnis diurnis nocturnisque itineribus confectis . . . ad Ligerim pervenit*).

[6] *Caesar*, i, 55.

[7] *Zur Kritik und Erklärung von Caesars gall. Kriege*, p. 23.

a succession of night marches seems very unlikely; and I believe that if Caesar had meant to describe such a thing, he would not have laid stress on the fact, if it had been a fact, that the Helvetii marched *all* night (*nullam partem noctis itinere intermisso*): he would, I believe, have used some such expression as *nocturnis itineribus confectis* or simply *nocturnis itineribus*. Moreover, as Meusel says, he would have written, not (nullam partem) *noctis*, but *noctium*.[1] I have no doubt that Morus was right in deleting *nullam . . . intermisso* as a gloss; for the words are absolutely superfluous, and although Caesar has a way of repeating statements which he wishes to emphasize, he only does so, as Meusel says, in order to make his meaning more clear. But this by the way. The important point is that, as Napoleon exaggerates the duration of the flight and also the duration of each day's march, the Helvetii could hardly, as he believes, have arrived 'on the fourth day' at Tonnerre.[2]

2. Von Göler[3] thinks that Caesar overtook the Helvetii in the neighbourhood of Langres, which is as far from the battle-field as Tonnerre; and if there was no course open to them but to return to Switzerland, what would have been the use of marching far out of their way?

3. According to Kiepert,[4] Caesar first marched to Dijon, then struck off in a south-easterly direction, crossed the Saône at Segobodium (Seveux), and marched thence to Besançon. But on this theory the distance which he had to march from the country of the Lingones to Besançon was so short that he would not have required at least five days' forced marching to perform it. Still, Dijon was the point in the country of the Lingones for which the Helvetii would naturally have made if they already intended to return to Switzerland; and, if M. Jullian[5] is right in believing that the Pan-Gallic council which was held with Caesar's permission after their defeat[6] met, not at the place where they were overtaken, but at Bibracte, he is perhaps also right in believing that they retreated to Dijon,

[1] *Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xxxvi, 1910, p. 39.

[2] Stoffel (*Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, p. 78) takes the sensible view that the Helvetii arrived in the country of the Lingones on the fourth day, counting that on which the battle took place as the first. Yet his map agrees with that of Napoleon; and accordingly he requires from the unhappy fugitives and their still more unhappy cattle exertions even more herculean than had satisfied his imperial master. The retreat, he says, lasted about 60 hours: the length of the retreat was 160 kilometres or about 100 miles; and the Helvetian wagons were tugged, for the most part, by oxen. Was any bullock ever yet required to drag a cart 100 miles in two days and a half? It is safe to say that if the Helvetian oxen had been goaded in this way, not one of them would have reached Tonnerre alive.

[3] *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, pp. 31, 332.

[4] *Galliae Cisalpinae et Transalpinae . . . tabula in usum scholarum descripta.*

[5] *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 222, n. 2; 223, n. 2. M. Jullian's reason—that all the other Pan-Gallic councils which Caesar mentions took place in towns—seems hardly sufficient. The council in question was exceptional,—not one of the annual councils summoned by Caesar, but held with his permission at the request of the delegates themselves; and we can only be sure that it was held at a place which suited his convenience.

[6] *B. G.*, i, 30, §§ 4–5.

for the distance from Bibracte to Besançon corresponds closely enough with Caesar's account of his march. His narrative suggests, indeed, that the council was held in the country of the Lingones at the place where he received the submission of the Helvetii and where the Gallic deputies congratulated him; but political reasons may have influenced him to go to Bibracte, the capital of his subservient allies, and to emphasize by his presence there at the head of his victorious army the fact that he was the protector and the master of Gaul.

I am afraid that this is one of our insoluble problems. If we cannot tell where Caesar overtook the Helvetii, or where the council was held, neither can we tell by what route Caesar marched to Besançon. This conclusion will not please those who require positive results. But I did not promise to solve all the problems connected with the Gallic war; and to know that a problem is insoluble is the next best thing to solving it.

WHAT GALLIC STATES WERE REPRESENTED IN THE DEPUTATION WHICH CONGRATULATED CAESAR AFTER THE OVERTHROW OF THE HELVETII?

Bello Helvetiorum confecto, writes Caesar, *totius fere Galliae legati, principes civitatum, ad Caesarem gratulatum convenerunt.*[1] On this Long[2] remarks that 'Gallia here means Celtica,'—that is to say, the whole of Gaul, except the Province, Aquitania, and the country of the Belgae.[3] Desjardins,[4] who expresses the same opinion, excludes the Belgae, on the ground that they made war upon Caesar in the following year (57 B.C.). Mommsen goes further, and calls the *concilium totius Galliae*,[5] which met, with Caesar's sanction, just after the conclusion of the Helvetian campaign, 'a diet of the Celtic tribes of Central Gaul.'[6] My belief is that Mommsen is right, because we may gather from *B. G.*, ii, 34 that the maritime states between the Seine and the Loire did not acknowledge Caesar's authority until towards the end of 57 B.C. Besides, the envoys of the more distant tribes would not have had time to reach Caesar.[7]

[1] *B. G.*, i, 30, § 1. [2] *Caesar*, p. 70. [3] See *B. G.*, i, 1.
[4] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 616. See, however, *ib.*, p. 542.
[5] *B. G.*, i, 30, § 4.
[6] *Hist. of Rome*, v, 1894, p. 45 (*Röm. Gesch.*, iii, 1889, p. 255).
[7] It might perhaps be inferred from *B. G.*, iii, 11 that the Pictones and Santoni, who assisted Caesar in 56 B.C., but are not mentioned in ii, 34, had acknowledged the supremacy of Rome in 58 B.C.; but they may only have done so under the influence of the victorious campaign of 57.

The words *omni pacata Gallia* (*B. G.*, ii, 1, § 2), which I quoted in the first edition (p. 626), are irrelevant. See p. 69, n. 2.

THE PROBABLE LENGTH OF CAESAR'S MARCH FROM VESONTIO AGAINST ARIOVISTUS

Vegetius[1] says that Roman soldiers used to march 20 miles in full armour, by way of practice, three times a month; and from this statement Rüstow[2] and others infer that the length of an ordinary day's march was 20 Roman miles, or between 29 and 30 kilometres. This estimate is certainly exaggerated; for when Caesar marched from Besançon to the Belgic frontier in 57 B.C. in 'about a fortnight',[3] his average daily march, allowing two days for rest, was not more than 20 kilometres; and in the last five days of his march from Decetia to Gergovia, of which, it is true, the first stage and the fifth may have been comparatively short, he accomplished, at the most, no more than 100 kilometres.[4] On the other hand, he once made a forced march of 50 Roman miles, or 74 kilometres, with four legions in less than 30 hours;[5] and he marched from Agedincum (Sens) to Cenabum (Orléans), a distance of at least 108 kilometres, in two periods of two days each, separated by an interval of three days, during which he captured Vellaunodunum.[6] The *Commentaries on the Civil War* supply another instance. On the 21st of February, 49 B.C., Caesar left Corfinium, and marched thence to Brundisium, a distance of 465 kilometres, arriving on the 9th of March. If he marched on every one of these 17 days, his daily average was $27\frac{1}{3}$ kilometres: if he allowed his troops two days' rest, it was 31.[7]

From these data it may be concluded with certainty that, although Caesar's usual daily march was probably much less than 30 kilometres, he could have marched, in an open country, at least 27 kilometres a day, for seven days, if he had wished to do so. The Duc d'Aumale, an experienced soldier, holds that as many as ten legions could have easily marched 28 kilometres a day.[8]

[1] *De re mil.*, i, 9.
[2] *Heerwesen und Kriegführung C. J. Cäsars*, 1855, pp. 92–3.
[3] *B. G.*, ii, 2, § 6.
[4] See pp. 754–5.
[5] *B. G.*, vii, 40–1.
[6] See pp. 410, 494–5.
[7] See Stoffel's *Guerre civile*, i, 196–7, and F. Fröhlich, *Das Kriegswesen Cäsars*, p. 207. According to O. E. Schmidt's itinerary (*Der Briefwechsel des M. T. Cicero*, 1893, pp. 149–50, 379), the averages were respectively $28\frac{9}{17}$ and $32\frac{1}{3}$.
[8] *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, 2e pér., xv, 1858, p. 95. According to Lord Wolseley (*The Soldier's Pocket-Book*, 5th ed., p. 322) the 'length of ordinary marches, for a force not stronger than one division, moving by one road, should be from 12 to 16 miles a day, for 5 days out of 6, or at most 6 days out of 7'. Guischard, however, remarks (*Mém. crit. et hist.*, 1774, pp. 40–3) that ancient armies could march faster than modern because 'ils étoient dispensés d'un grand nombre de besoins, que nous nous sommes rendus nécessaires, et délivrés par conséquent de l'obligation de traîner après eux tout cet attirail de guerre, et ce grand train d'équipages, qui ne peuvent qu'embarrasser les mouvemens de nos armées'.

CAESAR'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARIOVISTUS[1]

I. The data for drawing a map of Caesar's campaign against Ariovistus are very scanty. The gist of his narrative is as follows. He marched from the place where he received the Gallic deputies after his victory over the Helvetii, to encounter Ariovistus. After he had marched for three days he heard that Ariovistus was hastening with his whole force to seize Vesontio (Besançon), and (if the words *triduique viam a suis finibus processisse* in *B. G.*, i, 38, § 1 are not an interpolation[2]) that he had—apparently at the time when Caesar's informant started on his errand—advanced three days' journey beyond his own frontier. Thereupon Caesar pushed rapidly on, and making forced marches by day and night, seized Besançon himself. He remained a few days in the neighbourhood. Marching from Besançon, he reached his final camping ground on the seventh day; and he marched on every one of those seven days. After leaving Besançon, he took a circuitous route, in order to gain the advantage of moving in an open country. I shall discuss in the proper place the disputed passage in which he describes this movement. When he reached his camping ground, he was 24 Roman or about 22 English miles from Ariovistus. A few days later the two leaders had an interview at or on an earthen mound or a knoll of considerable size, nearly equidistant between the two camps and situated in a great plain. Two days after the interview Ariovistus broke up his encampment, marched to a point 6 Roman miles from Caesar's camp, and encamped at the foot of a mountain. Next day he marched past Caesar's camp and encamped two Roman miles beyond it, with the object of intercepting the supplies which were being brought up to the Romans from the territories of the Aedui and the Sequani. Five days later Caesar made a retrograde march past Ariovistus's camp and constructed a smaller camp about 1,000 yards (*circiter passus DC*) from it, in order to re-establish his communications. Two days later he marched against Ariovistus. Thereupon the Germans moved out to fight, leaving their wagons ranged in rear of their line, in order to deprive themselves of all hope of flight. The Germans were beaten and fled, and 'did not cease their flight until they reached the Rhine', which, according to the *Commentaries*, was 5 Roman miles from the battle-field.[3] For reasons which I shall presently examine the word *quinque* (5) has been altered by some editors to *quinquaginta* (50).

II. I have already argued[4] that it is impossible to trace Caesar's route with certainty from the place where he received the Gallic deputies to Besançon; and it therefore appears to me safest to make

[1] See *Carte de France* (1 : 200,000), Sheets 28, 36, 55, and *Carte de l'État-Major* (1 : 80,000), Sheet 101.

[2] Meusel (*Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xxxvi, 1910, p. 44) argues that they were. See pp. 637–8, *infra*.

[3] *B. G.*, i, 37–53.

[4] See pp. 631–4.

Besançon the starting-point in any attempt to trace his line of march against Ariovistus. The first question is, what was the territory from which Ariovistus marched to seize Besançon.

III. According to the speech which Caesar puts into the mouth of Diviciacus,[1] Ariovistus annexed one-third of the Sequanian territory, 'which is the best land in the whole of Gaul.' L. W. Ravenèz,[2] like Napoleon, holds that the territory which Ariovistus annexed was Upper Alsace, which, he remarks, is the most fertile part of Sequania.[3] It may be added that he would naturally have settled in the part from which he could most easily communicate with his countrymen beyond the Rhine, and further that, as I shall presently show, it is impossible, on any other theory, to explain Caesar's narrative of the campaign.[4] All commentators, indeed, now agree that Ariovistus had settled in the plain of the Rhine; but it is surely probable that he had annexed not only Upper, but also Lower Alsace,—the northern part of the country.

Were the words *triduique viam a suis finibus processisse* written by Caesar? Meusel contends that they were not. Read the whole sentence:—*Cum tridui viam processisset, nuntiatum est ei Ariovistum cum suis omnibus copiis ad occupandum Vesontionem, quod est oppidum maximum Sequanorum, contendere triduique viam a suis finibus processisse. Id ne accideret, magnopere sibi praecavendum Caesar existimabat.* ('After a march of three days he received news that Ariovistus was hurrying with all his forces to seize Vesontio, the largest town of the Sequani, and had advanced three days' journey beyond his own frontier. Caesar felt it necessary to make a great effort to forestall him.') Meusel argues, first, that *triduique viam . . . processisse*, following (cum) *tridui viam processisset*, is suspicious (which I admit); secondly, that the words break the connexion between *ad occupandum Vesontionem . . . contendere* and *id ne accideret*,—a fault of style of which Caesar would never have been guilty; and thirdly, that as the *fines* of Ariovistus were simply the territories of the Sequani, he could not have made a three days' march *beyond* them in order to seize Vesontio, which was *in* them. The last reason is unsound, for Meusel apparently forgets that Ariovistus had only annexed one-third of the country of the Sequani;[5] and I do not think that the others are more than enough to justify suspicion. Caesar was a great writer; but he had no time for revision, and his style was occasionally careless. Moreover, I find it difficult to conceive that an interpolator would have been guilty of an invention even more puerile than the marginal exclamations of some of Mr. Mudie's subscribers.

M. Jullian[6] supposes that *a suis finibus* means from Ariovistus's

[1] *B. G.*, i, 31, § 10. [2] *L'Alsace illustrée*, 1849, i, 382–3.

[3] C. Martin (*Questions alsaciennes*, &c., 1867, pp. 19–20) maintains that Ariovistus's territory was bounded by the Vosges, the Jura, and the frontiers of the Aedui and the Lingones; but any one who may take the trouble to examine his argument will see that it recoils against himself.

[4] See also Stoffel, *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, pp. 88–90.

[5] *B. G.*, i, 31, § 10. [6] *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 227, n. 3; 231, n. 4.

territory on the German side of the Rhine; but Caesar's narrative shows that Ariovistus had long since left this territory:[1] what reason is there to suppose that he had returned? Surely *suis finibus* can only mean the territory which he had wrested from the Sequani. Stoffel,[2] indeed, argues that it means the country of the Triboci, one of the tribes which fought under Ariovistus; and that they already possessed that part of the country of the Mediomatrici—just north of the river Ecken-Bach—which they occupied later.[3] But is it not evident that *a suis finibus processisse* must mean that Ariovistus had left *all* his territories behind? If a king of Scotland, about to invade England, had made three marches beyond the southern boundary of Sutherland, would he have marched *tridui viam a suis finibus*?

Stoffel assumes that Caesar was at Arc-en-Barrois, 125 kilometres from Vesontio, when he heard that Ariovistus was marching to seize it. But this is a mere conjecture: we only know that he was at a distance of at least two very long marches—say between 50 and 60 miles—from Vesontio;[4] and we may conclude that Ariovistus was nearer. Assuming that my explanation of *suis finibus* is right, and that he possessed Upper Alsace, the words *triduique viam . . . processisse* can be explained, if we may suppose that Ariovistus had only just completed the three days' journey when Caesar began his 'great effort to forestall him'. But, as I have already said, the passage would seem to imply that he had already completed the journey when Caesar's informant started on his errand. If so, he would nearly have reached Besançon when the messenger arrived; and the suspected words would be inexplicable. Therefore, although I can frame no theory to account for the supposed interpolation, Meusel may be right. Anyhow, as we shall presently see, Ariovistus, after he had failed to seize Besançon, must have marched back into the plain.

IV. Speaking of the circuitous route which he took after leaving Vesontio, Caesar says *itinere exquisito per Diviciacum . . . ut milium amplius quinquaginta circuitu locis apertis exercitum duceret*,[5] &c. It has been argued that these words mean that the whole length of the march was rather more than 50 Roman miles. But it is incredible that Caesar should have marched barely seven English miles a day through an open country. Von Göler[6] indeed reads *XC* instead of *L*; but *L* or *quinquaginta* is found in all the MSS. It has also been suggested that Caesar meant that the whole length of the march was 50 miles more than it would have been if he had taken the direct road. But it is impossible to get this meaning out of the Latin.[7] The words can only mean that the circuitous part of the march was

[1] *B. G.*, i, 31 ff., especially 31, § 10; 34, § 4; 44, § 2.
[2] *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, p. 90.
[3] See p. 482.
[4] See p. 631.
[5] *B. G.*, i, 41, § 4.
[6] *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 46, n. 3.
[7] Napoleon (*Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 84, note) concludes from a passage in *B. C.*, i, 64, § 8—*ac tantum fuit in militibus studii ut, milium VI ad iter addito circuitu*, &c.—that 'when Caesar means to speak of a turn of road to be added to the total length of the route, he is careful to indicate it'.

50 miles long; and this is just what it would have been if Caesar had taken the natural circuitous route which Napoleon and Stoffel trace on their maps.

1. According to Napoleon,[1] Caesar marched by way of Pennesières, Vallerois-le-Bois, Villersexel, and Belfort, to a point about a mile and a half south-west of Cernay, and there encamped. Ariovistus was, he supposes, encamped at the time near Colmar. The interview between Caesar and Ariovistus took place at a knoll near Feldkirch. Two days afterwards Ariovistus made his long march southward, and encamped between Hartmannswiller and Roedersheim. Next day he made his flank march, which, according to Napoleon, led him by an immense *détour*, south-eastward and then westward, past Pulversheim and Pfasstadt, to a hill about a mile north-east of Schweighausen. Caesar made his smaller camp on rising ground west of Ariovistus's camp and north of Schweighausen. But von Kampen[2] remarks that Caesar would not have pitched his larger camp in the plain, as Napoleon makes him do; and that the site which Napoleon selects for the smaller camp is dominated by a hill which Ariovistus might have easily occupied. 2. Accordingly von Kampen places the larger camp on rising ground just south of the river Thur and about a mile and a half west-south-west of Cernay; the final camp of Ariovistus on a hill just north-east of Nieder Aspach on the river Klein-Doller; and Caesar's smaller camp on a hill half a mile south-west of Ariovistus's camp. According to him, Ariovistus made his flank march along the line of an old Roman road, which crossed the Thur between Cernay and Wittelsheim.

Caesar, as we have seen, says that, at the end of his seven days' march from Vesontio, he encamped at a distance of 24 Roman miles from Ariovistus.[3] A week later Ariovistus broke up his camp and in a single day marched to within 6 Roman miles from Caesar's.[4] 'It is probable,' observes Napoleon,[5] 'that, during the negotiations, Ariovistus had approached nearer to the Roman camp, in order to facilitate intercommunication; for if he had remained at a distance of 36 kilometres from Caesar, we should be obliged to admit that the German army, which subsequently advanced towards the Roman camp, in a single day, to within 9 kilometres, had made a march of 25 kilometres at least, which is not probable when we consider that it dragged after it wagons and women and children.'[6] But Napoleon was obliged to assume that 'during the negotiations, Ariovistus had advanced nearer to the Roman camp', in order to make the knoll which he identified with the *tumulus terrenus*,[7] at which the conference between Caesar and Ariovistus took place, equidistant between the Roman and the German camp.

It is generally taken for granted that the *tumulus* was a natural

[1] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 84–5.
[2] *Quindecim ad Caesaris de b. G. comm. tabulae*, ii.
[3] *B. G.*, i, 41, § 5.
[4] *Ib.*, 48, §§ 1–2.
[5] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 85, n. 1.
[6] Stoffel (*Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, pp. 62–3) sees nothing improbable in such a march.
[7] *B. G.*, i, 43, § 1.

feature,—a knoll. But if so, why did Caesar describe it as *terrenus* (earthen) ? He mentions a *tumulus* near the camp which Labienus occupied in the country of the Treveri ; another near Atuatuca ; a third near Ilerda ; a fourth near Dyrrachium : but to none of them does he apply the epithet *terrenus*.[1] It is certainly possible that the *tumulus terrenus* was simply an earthen mound or barrow.[2]

But, wherever the *tumulus* may have been, I cannot see how, on either Napoleon's theory or von Kampen's, the flank march of Ariovistus is to be explained. J. Schlumberger[3], indeed, appeals to Dion Cassius,[4] who says that the German cavalry engaged and defeated Caesar's, and that Ariovistus thus succeeded in passing Caesar's camp unscathed. But the unsupported testimony of Dion is not to be trusted : Caesar says that Ariovistus, before making the flank march, encamped at the foot of a mountain (*sub monte*[5]) ; and both von Kampen and Napoleon rob these words of their significance.

3. Von Göler[6] conducts Caesar from Besançon by way of Vesoul, Lure, and Belfort to Damerkirch, near which he assumes that he encamped after his seven days' march. He identifies the *tumulus* with the gently rising ground immediately north of Nieder Aspach. He makes Caesar continue his march on the day after his conference with Ariovistus, and encamp about a mile south-east of Cernay ; he places the smaller camp on the site which von Kampen chooses for the final camp of Ariovistus, and he places the latter in the plain on the left bank of the Klein-Doller and about half a mile north of Ober Aspach. The flank march of Ariovistus he traces along the lower slopes of the Vosges, north of the Thur from Soultz to Alt-Thann and thence southward to his camp.

The assumption that Caesar, after his interview with Ariovistus, marched from Damerkirch to the neighbourhood of Cernay is unauthorized. Von Göler admits that this additional march is not mentioned in the *Commentaries* ; but he argues that it must nevertheless have taken place, or else Ariovistus could not have approached to within 6 miles of Caesar's camp in a single march. Napoleon, as we have seen, gets over the difficulty, which is hardly serious, by assuming that Ariovistus had himself 'approached nearer to the Roman camp' ; and perhaps neither of the two assumptions is right. Von Göler's explanation of the flank march is perfectly reasonable : but I do not understand why he made Ariovistus encamp in the plain instead of on a commanding position ; and nobody will believe that the *tumulus terrenus* was the site of Caesar's smaller camp. Napoleon argues further that von Göler is wrong in making Caesar fight the battle with his back to the Rhine. 'It would be impossible,' he says, 'to understand in this case how, after their

[1] *B. G.*, vi, 8, § 3 ; 40, § 1 ; *B. C.*, i, 43, § 2 ; iii, 51, § 8.

[2] It is true that Livy (xxxviii, 20, § 4) speaks of *colles terrenos* ; but he is contrasting them with rocky heights.

[3] *Caesar und Ariovistus*, 1877, p. 168.

[4] xxxviii, 48, § 2.

[5] *B. G.*, i, 48, § 1.

[6] *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, pp. 47–51, and Taf. I and III.

defeat, the Germans would have been able to fly towards that river, Caesar cutting off their retreat; or how Ariovistus, reckoning upon the arrival of the Suevi, should have put Caesar between him and the reinforcements which he expected.'[1] This objection does not appear to me conclusive. If the Germans had fought, as Napoleon holds, with their backs to the Rhine, it is evident that, their rear and perhaps their flanks being closed by their line of wagons, they could only have *commenced* their flight in a northerly or southerly direction. If they had fought facing the Rhine, they would have done just the same. As to the expected arrival of the Suebi, it must be remembered that the great object of Ariovistus was to cut Caesar's line of communication. In order to do this, it may have been necessary for him, as Stoffel thinks, to hold to the line of the Vosges. Moreover, if a man compares von Göler's map with Napoleon's, he will, I think, find it hard to believe that Ariovistus would have found it more difficult to effect a junction with the Suebi in one case than in the other.

Stoffel,[2] following Plutarch,[3] places the camp of Ariovistus on the slope of a hill. Plutarch is certainly no authority on a point of this kind. He may have been thinking of Caesar's statement that Ariovistus *sub monte consedit*, and have forgotten that Ariovistus marched 8 miles further on the day after he encamped there. Still it is very likely that Ariovistus did encamp on a hill; and if that hill was a spur of the Vosges, he probably fought the battle with his face towards the Rhine.

C. Martin, who denies that the territory of Ariovistus was in Alsace, gives various other reasons to show that every explanation of the campaign which is based upon the hypothesis that the decisive battle took place in the plain of Alsace, is wrong. First, he says, Caesar tells us that, while he was encamped in the country of the Lingones, and before he started on his march against Ariovistus, the Harudes devastated the territory of the Aedui. If, he concludes, Ariovistus had encamped in the plain of Alsace, the Harudes could not have rejoined him before the battle without being destroyed by Caesar on the march.[4]

The conclusion is inconclusive. The Harudes may have got the start of Caesar, while he was waiting at Besançon; or, if they were afraid to go through the pass of Belfort, they may have gone through one of the passes in the Vosges.

Secondly, says Martin, on Napoleon's theory, it is impossible to discover the earthen mound or knoll (*tumulus terrenus satis grandis*) at which Caesar says that the interview between himself and Ariovistus took place. Napoleon thinks that the *tumulus* was either near Feldkirch or between Wittenheim and Ensisheim. But, objects Martin, the alleged *tumulus* near Feldkirch 'N'EXISTE MÊME PAS: nous avons été sur les lieux'. And the one between Wittenheim and

[1] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 91, n. 2. G. Veith (*Gesch. d. Feldzüge C. J. Caesars*, p. 508) endorses Napoleon's objection, which would also apply to Stoffel's theory (pp. 648–51, *infra*).

[2] *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, pp. 10–1.

[3] *Caesar*, 19.

[4] *Questions alsaciennes*, p. 25.

Ensisheim does not deserve the name of knoll; for its summit is only 2 metres above the level of the plain at its base![1]

Martin's statement is, I believe, correct. I was at Mühlhausen in September, 1895, but was unable, from want of time, to make a personal exploration of the country. I was so fortunate, however, as to meet an English gentleman, who had lived at Mühlhausen for six years and was in the habit of cycling in the plain of Alsace, which he knew thoroughly. He assured me that there was no such thing as a knoll at either of the places which Napoleon mentions. Von Kampen indeed, who professes to have constructed his map (Tab. 2) on the basis of that of the German military staff, marks two knolls near Feldkirch, one just outside Wittelsheim, and a fourth near Ensisheim. The last, which, I suppose, is the one to which Martin alludes, is marked on the German Government map (1 : 25,000), Sheet 3678 : but its height is not indicated ; and I can discover no traces of the others on Sheet 3677. Still, Martin has, at the most, only succeeded in discrediting Napoleon's map of the campaign : the theory which finds the theatre of the war in the plain of Alsace remains unshaken. And if it is true, as I have suggested, that the *tumulus* may have been not a natural feature at all, but a mound or barrow, he has not shaken even the theory that the battle was fought near Cernay.

Thirdly, says Martin, on Napoleon's theory, the flank march by which Ariovistus endeavoured to cut off Caesar's communication with the convoys which he expected from the Sequani and the Aedui would have been useless ; for Caesar could still have communicated with the Sequani by the valley of the Lauch.[2]

This argument breaks down unless Martin can prove that the Sequanian convoy would have taken the route through the valley of the Lauch ; whereas it is much more likely that it was coming by the pass of Belfort.

4. Schlumberger[3] takes the words *ut milium amplius quinqua-*

[1] *Questions alsaciennes*, pp. 32–3.

[2] *Ib.*, p. 36. From Caesar's statement that he made his second camp *ne diutius commeatu prohiberetur* ('in order to reopen communication with his convoys without delay') Thomann (*Der französische Atlas zu Cäsars gall. Kriege*, pp. 12–3) argues that his communications were, for a time, completely broken. With the Sequani and the Aedui certainly ; but I do not see that we can draw any conclusion about the other two peoples.

Mommsen (*Hist. of Rome*, v, 1894, p. 47, n. 1 [*Röm. Gesch.*, iii, 1889, p. 256, note]) says, 'The corn exported from the Sequani, Leuci, and Lingones was not to come to the Roman army in the course of their march against Ariovistus, but to be delivered at Besançon before their departure and taken by the troops along with them; as is clearly apparent from the fact that Caesar, while pointing his troops to those supplies, comforts them at the same time with the hope of corn to be brought in on the route.' What Caesar says on the matter is merely this :—*frumentum Sequanos, Leucos, Lingones subministrare, iamque esse in agris frumenta matura* (*B. G.*, i, 40, § 11). Caesar quitted Besançon the night after he gave this assurance to the troops (*ib.*, § 14), so that he did not give much time for Mommsen's imaginary 'delivery' of the corn. Moreover, Mommsen notwithstanding, Caesar distinctly says (*ib.*, 48, § 2) that the Sequani were to supply him with corn *during the campaign*.

[3] *Caesar und Ariovistus*, p. 148.

ginta circuitu locis apertis exercitum duceret to mean that the distance which Caesar actually covered in his seven days' march was 50 Roman miles more than he would have had to do if he had taken the direct route. This interpretation compels him to take Caesar quite unnecessarily out of his way. He makes him, after leaving Besançon, march by way of Cussey on the Oignon to the Saône, and by Seveux to Port-au-Saône, where he found the road which led by way of Lure, Chalonvilliers, and Belfort into Alsace. Schlumberger assumes that Caesar marched at the rate of 20 Roman miles a day, and that his march lasted not seven whole days, but six days and a fraction, say $6\frac{1}{8}$, $6\frac{1}{4}$, or $6\frac{1}{2}$. On this hypothesis, the whole distance marched would have been $122\frac{1}{2}$, 125, or 130 Roman miles; and the direct distance, being about 50 Roman miles shorter, would have been $72\frac{1}{2}$, 75, or 80 Roman miles. Schlumberger reckons that, after travelling $72\frac{1}{2}$ Roman miles by the shortest road from Besançon into Alsace, one would arrive at La Chapelle-sous-Rougemont, on the rivulet St. Nicholas, about 50 Roman miles from the Rhine;[1] and in this neighbourhood accordingly he looks for the battle-field.

The elaborate calculations which lead Schlumberger to this result are useless, because (*a*) he misunderstands the most important passage in Caesar's narrative; (*b*) when he assumes that Caesar marched 20 Roman miles, or nearly 30 kilometres a day, he almost certainly exaggerates; and (*c*) he cannot tell whether he made a full march or only a fraction of a march on the last day. Besides, where are we to look for that 'great plain'? Schlumberger admits, indeed insists, that it was the plain of Alsace; but from the fact that Caesar only mentioned it in relation to his interview with Ariovistus, he infers that it was not visible from his camp.[2] The inference seems to me strained. But is the site which Schlumberger selects otherwise objectionable? I think it is, because, rightly interpreted, the words *ut milium amplius quinquaginta circuitu locis apertis exercitum duceret* show that Caesar must have marched considerably further northward than La Chapelle-sous-Rougemont.[3]

5. The absence of the great plain is only one among many reasons for rejecting the innumerable attempts that have been made to find the battle-field in Franche-Comté. One of these attempts, however, which appeared in the *Revue archéologique* of July, 1898, has attracted considerable attention; and, as M. Salomon Reinach has recommended it as an 'admirable study', I am bound to examine its claims. M. Colomb begins by insisting that his extraordinary knowledge of the whole theatre of the war places him in a position to speak with authority; and his conclusion is that the defeat of Ariovistus took place not in the plain of Alsace but between Arcey and Présentevillers. Readers who do not know the country as intimately as M. Colomb will find that Sheets 101 and 114 of the *Carte de l'État-Major* ($\frac{1}{80000}$) will enable them to control his arguments.

[1] In a straight line La Chapelle-sous-Rougemont is barely 40 kilometres (about 27 Roman miles) from the Rhine.

[2] *Caesar und Ariovistus*, pp. 152–3.

[3] See p. 649.

M. Colomb makes Caesar advance from Vesontio (Besançon) by way of Oiselay to Pennesières, that is to say, by a longer and more westerly route than the one adopted by Napoleon, and, as we shall see, by Stoffel; but from Pennesières to Arcey the route which he adopts coincides with theirs. He argues that Caesar marched by way of Oiselay in order to approach the river Saône, 'by which the Aedui and the Lingones were forwarding him supplies.'[1] But a glance at the map will show that, by following the route indicated by M. Colomb, Caesar would, in the most favourable circumstances, only have begun to receive supplies from the Aedui and the Lingones one day earlier than if he had gone by Vovay, Rioz, and Filaine,—the route adopted by Stoffel: for the first few days his troops unquestionably carried their food with them; and the Aedui and the Lingones were obliged to forward supplies right up to the actual theatre of war.

According to Napoleon and Stoffel, Caesar marched on from Arcey through the pass of Belfort into the plain of Alsace: according to M. Colomb,[2] his march terminated at Arcey. M. Colomb defends his view by the following arguments:—(1) Caesar, he insists, could not venture to advance beyond Arcey either north-eastward in the direction of Héricourt, or eastward in the direction of Montbéliard, because, if he had taken either of these routes, Ariovistus would have seized the other, planted himself in the rear of the Romans, and thus severed their line of communication. (2) The distance from Besançon by Oiselay to Arcey is 90 kilometres, and M. Colomb argues that Caesar would not have marched more than this in seven days. He says that in 52 B.C. Caesar took four days to march from Sens to Gien by way of Triguères, that is to say, that he marched not more than 25 kilometres a day at the very outside; and he infers that from Besançon to Arcey he only marched 14 kilometres a day. He admits that Caesar marched from Sens to Gien very early in the year, when the roads were in bad condition, whereas he marched against Ariovistus at the most favourable season; but he says that the road from Besançon to Arcey must, at the best of times, have been bad, and he maintains that Caesar had no motive for hurrying. (3) He points out that in the Hungarian invasion of A.D. 929 and in Bourbaki's campaign of 1871 fighting took place along the line Villersexel—Arcey—Montbéliard; and he holds that these examples prove that this is the natural route for all invasions coming from the east and for all attacks coming from France and having the pass of Belfort as their objective.

The first argument depends upon the unverifiable assumption that Ariovistus waited for Caesar in the pass of Belfort; but I am willing, for the sake of argument, to grant the assumption. Now if Ariovistus had attempted, with his whole force, to cut Caesar's line of communication, he would have played a dangerous game; for, by doing so, he would have found himself cut off from his own dominions in the plain of Alsace. If, in the case which M. Colomb supposes,

[1] *Rev. arch.*, 3e sér., xxxiii, 1898, p. 36.

[2] *Ib.*, pp. 34–5, 40–5.

Caesar had advanced beyond Arcey, he would have left detachments to guard Arcey, or the gorge of Présentevillers on the road leading to Montbéliard, or both, and would have advanced himself by way of Héricourt. Now, supposing that Ariovistus had been so rash as to quit Belfort and advance by the Montbéliard road in order to seize Arcey, what would have happened ? In the gorge of Présentevillers he would have found a force ready to dispute his passage. Meanwhile would Caesar have neglected his opportunity ? Turning to the right, he would have hotly pursued the German column, and Ariovistus would have found himself caught inextricably in a trap. If he had merely sent a detachment to operate against Caesar's communications, he would evidently have had no prospect of success. Besides, as we shall presently see, M. Colomb, contradicting himself, holds that Caesar *did* advance a few kilometres from Arcey in the direction of Héricourt, and *did* leave Arcey undefended! The second argument depends upon a string of blunders. Caesar, as I have demonstrated elsewhere,[1] never went near Triguères or Gien : he marched from Sens not to Gien but to Orléans, a distance of at least 108 kilometres. Moreover, the argument that because Caesar marched 25 (or rather 27) kilometres a day on a bad road in the winter, therefore he did not march more than 14 kilometres a day on a bad road in the summer, is one which I find rather difficult to follow. I maintain, in opposition to M. Colomb, that Caesar marched against Ariovistus as fast as he conveniently could : otherwise, why did he make a point of telling us that he marched for seven consecutive days without allowing one day for rest (*septimo die cum iter non intermitteret*, &c.) ? [2] The historical precedents which M. Colomb quotes might perhaps have weight if it could be proved that Ariovistus waited for Caesar in the pass of Belfort ; but I find it difficult to believe that Ariovistus would ever have committed himself to an offensive movement against Caesar westward of the pass.[3]

But when we come to scrutinize the kernel of M. Colomb's argument, we find that his case completely breaks down. Caesar says that his conference with Ariovistus took place at a *tumulus terrenus* in a great plain. I have argued that the great plain was the plain of Alsace ; and I agree with Stoffel, who is not a bad topographer, that there is no other great plain in which the conference can possibly be supposed to have taken place. No ! says M. Colomb : the great plain was that in which Montbéliard is situated ; it was between the Savoureuse and the Lisaine, which flow into the Allan, and it was bounded on the south by the Doubs. Its extent from east to west was more than 6 kilometres, and from north to south nearly 7.[4] Well, I will not quarrel about measurements, although, if M. Colomb's description is just, Port Meadow, near Oxford, might fairly be called a great plain. But is M. Colomb's great plain a plain at all ? Certainly it looks like one in M. Colomb's sketch-map : he contrives to

[1] pp. 405–15, 494–8.

[2] *B. G.*, i, 41, § 5.

[3] H. Delbrück (*Gesch. der Kriegskunst*, i, 451) remarks that Ariovistus deliberately waited for Caesar in the plain of Alsace because he was conscious of his own superiority in cavalry.

[4] *Rev. arch.*, xxxiii, 1898, p. 49.

make it do so by the simple process of leaving the area blank and shading the surrounding hills. By a similar process I could produce a map in which the Matterhorn would look like a plain. If the reader will take my advice, he will check M. Colomb's map by Sheet 114 of the *Carte de l'État-Major*. He will there find that the entire area of M. Colomb's plain is covered by hill-shading. The *tumulus terrenus*, according to M. Colomb, was the hill called *La Chaux*. M. Colomb observes that, viewed from the summit of this hill, the plain 'semble être rigoureusement plate'. I can only reply that within a fraction of the area, not including La Chaux itself, I find the following different elevations, expressed in terms of metres above the level of the sea,—312, 320, 347, 349, 366. Is not this 'great' little plain somewhat uneven ?

Let us now examine M. Colomb's explanation of the flank march by which Ariovistus succeeded in temporarily cutting Caesar's line of communication. According to M. Colomb, the hill at the foot of which Ariovistus halted on the night before he made this march was a hill overlooking Montbéliard : Caesar's camp was on the north-west, between Sémondans and Desandans, and on the road leading from Arcey to Héricourt ; and Ariovistus advanced through the gorge of Présentevillers, passed Ste-Marie, and encamped at Arcey. When the reader looks at the map, he will want to know how Ariovistus came to undertake so desperately hazardous a movement, and why Caesar tamely allowed him to execute it. But M. Colomb[1] is ready with an answer. He shall speak for himself :—'César *oublie* assez volontiers de raconter les événements qui n'ont pas tourné à son honneur. Dion Cassius . . . dit en effet qu'il y eut une lutte acharnée dans laquelle la nombreuse cavalerie germaine . . . ayant fait éprouver de grandes pertes aux Romains, les força à se renfermer dans leur camp et à y demeurer spectateurs impuissants de la marche hardie qui, conduisant Arioviste à Arcey même, c'est-à-dire à l'orifice supérieur du col de Granvillars et au point de croisement de toutes les routes de Séquanie, coupait César et l'isolait.' I take leave to say that Dion Cassius says nothing of the kind. What he says is that Ariovistus, having been warned by his 'wise women' not to fight a pitched battle before the new moon,[2] contented himself at first, although the Roman infantry challenged him, with engaging in cavalry combats, in which he handled the Romans severely ; and that, in consequence of this success, he conceived a contempt for the Romans, and occupied a position beyond their camp, &c. (*διὰ τοῦτο ὁ Ἀριοούιστος . . . οὐχ ἁπάσῃ εὐθὺς τῇ δυνάμει καίτοι τῶν Ῥωμαίων προκαλουμένων σφᾶς συνέμιξεν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἱππέας μετὰ τῶν συντεταγμένων σφίσι πεζῶν μόνους ἐκπέμπων ἰσχυρῶς αὐτοὺς ἐλύπει. κἀκ τούτου καταφρονήσας χωρίον τι ὑπὲρ τοῦ ταφρεύματος σφῶν καταλαβεῖν ἐπεχείρησε. καὶ κάτεσχε μὲν αὐτό, ἀντικαταλαβόντων δὲ καὶ ἐκείνων ἕτερον*, &c.[3]). This is obviously an inaccurate paraphrase of Caesar's narrative ; for the challenges of the Roman infantry and the cavalry combats took

[1] *Rev. arch.*, xxxiii, 1898, p. 53.
[2] Cf. *B. G.*, i, 50, §§ 4–5.
[3] xxxviii, 48, § 2.

place not before but after Ariovistus occupied the position in question : [1] but even if Dion's account were correct, it would lend no support to M. Colomb's theory, that Ariovistus succeeded in forcing his way through the gorge of Présentevillers and accomplishing his flank march by dint of a single ' lutte acharnée ' in which he defeated Caesar's cavalry. The notion that Caesar would have attempted to stop his march with cavalry alone, while the legions looked idly on, is truly comical : Caesar at all events had no scruples about employing his infantry before the new moon. The whole episode of the march, as conceived by M. Colomb, is absolutely incredible. If Ariovistus had attempted it, he must inevitably have been driven back with heavy loss. Nothing would have been easier for Caesar than to seize the commanding position at Arcey, which Ariovistus is assumed to have occupied, when the head of Ariovistus's column began to debouch from the gorge of Présentevillers, even if he had not secured it before : nothing, I say, would have been easier, except to destroy the unwieldy column as it was slowly emerging from the gorge. M. Colomb asks us to believe that Caesar, who, a few days later, utterly defeated Ariovistus in a pitched battle, was so imbecile as to allow him to execute a movement which any intelligent centurion would have known how to frustrate.[2]

M. Colomb points triumphantly, in support of his theory, to Caesar's statement of the distance which separated the battle-field from the Rhine : ' les *Commentaires*,' he asserts, ' disent que le champ de bataille se trouve à 50,000 pas du Rhin.' [3] M. Colomb will pardon

[1] *B. G.*, i, 48–50.

[2] Delbrück (*Gesch. der Kriegskunst*, i, 452) makes substantially the same objection to M. Colomb's theory of the turning movement that I have done; and M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 231–2, note) gives other good reasons for rejecting his explanation of the campaign.

The site of the battle has also been placed by various writers (*a*) at the Pas de Ronchamp (*Mém. de la Soc. d'émulation du Doubs*, v^e^ sér., i, 1876, pp. 442–55); (*b*) within a triangle whose points are formed by Belfort, Montbéliard, and Lure (Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 621); (*c*) just west of Gonvillars, about midway between Malbouhans and Bavans (*Mém. de la Soc. d'émulation de Montbéliard*, xiii, 1881, pp. 17–9, 21–4, 29–31, 36–8, 41–4); (*d*) about 3 miles west of Luxeuil (see the map in the last-mentioned periodical, in which are also marked the following sites); (*e*) between Ronchamp and Champagney ; (*f*) just south of Arcey ; (*g*) just west of Bavans ; (*h*) just south of Bavans and of the Doubs (P. Cluver, *Germania antiqua*, ed. 1631, p. 361); (*i*) just east of Porrentruy ; and (*j*) 5 miles from Basle, between Mühlhausen and the Rhine (Beatus Rhenanus, *Rerum Germ. libri tres*, ed. 1610, p. 13). All these guesses are wrong. All, except the second and the two last, are irreconcilable with the words *ut milium amplius quinquaginta locis apertis exercitum duceret* : all, except the last, are irreconcilable with the statement that the meeting of Caesar with Ariovistus took place in a great plain ; and the last is irreconcilable with the statement that Ariovistus halted, on the night before he marched past Caesar's camp, at the foot of a mountain, unless we are to assume that the ' mountain ' was one of the low hills between Altkirch, Mühlhausen, and Basle, or that it was one of the northern heights of the Jura; and in either case it will be obvious to any one who can read a map that Ariovistus would not have succeeded in cutting Caesar's line of communication with the source of his supplies. Some other futile guesses are recorded in *Rev. d'Alsace*, 1905, pp. 194–6.

[3] *Rev. arch* , xxxiii, 1898, p. 44. See also p. 61.

me for correcting him. *Milia passuum quinquaginta* (50,000 paces, or 50 Roman miles) does not occur in any *MS.* of the *Commentaries* : *milia passuum circiter quinque* ('about five miles') occurs in almost all. But on this question I must refer to a later paragraph.

6. Rüstow[1] originally fixed the site in the valley of the upper Saar, a view which nobody who looks at the map will consider worthy of refutation, but which Rüstow himself subsequently refuted. According to his revised conclusion,[2] the battle was fought in the plain of Alsace, between Ostheim and Sigolsheim ; and in order to reach this spot, Caesar marched, not through the pass of Belfort, but *across the Vosges*, travelling at the rate of 30 kilometres a day for seven days !

7. C. Winkler has recently discovered a camp with remains which he calls Roman, near Epfig, about 7 miles north of Schlettstadt. The camp is 700 metres long and from 310 to 333 broad, with ditches 3 metres broad and 1 metre 20 to 1 metre 50 deep.[3] Its area—not more than $22\frac{1}{2}$ hectares, or about 55 acres—is much too small for 6 legions;[4] and, as it has not yet been thoroughly excavated, evidence is still wanting that it was made in Caesar's time.[5] Moreover, the site is so far north that in order to reach it Caesar would have been obliged to march almost 30 kilometres a day.

All the theories which I have hitherto examined are not only incapable of proof, but open to serious objection. Two only remain ; and one or the other is almost certainly right.

8. Colonel Stoffel's itinerary agrees with that of Napoleon, as far as the latter goes.[6] But the battle-field to which he ultimately brings Caesar is much further north than the sites selected by von Göler, Napoleon, and von Kampen ; and his explanation of the operations described in *B. G.*, i, 48–53 differs radically from each of theirs.

Caesar says that he marched from Besançon to the spot where he encamped immediately before his interview with Ariovistus, in seven days. How far did he march in that time ? Napoleon says 20 kilometres or 12 miles a day. But, according to Stoffel, 20 kilometres was too short a distance for the average day's march. Arguing from Caesar's narrative that he must have advanced rapidly, and yet not by forced marches, he assumes an average daily march of 27 kilometres, and accordingly conducts Caesar to a point 189 kilometres from Besançon, between Ostheim and Gemar, on the left bank of the Fecht. The *tumulus*, at or on which the interview took place, he identifies with the 'tertre de Plettig', a hill which rises to the height of 55 metres, or about 180 feet, above the plain. The slopes of this

[1] *Einleitung zu Cäsars Comm.*, 1857, p. 117.
[2] See Thomann, *Der französische Atlas zu Cäsars gall. Kriege*, pp. 13–5.
[3] *Mitteilungen d. Vereinigung d. Saalburgfreunde*, March 22, 1908, pp. 250–1.
[4] See p. 664.
[5] *Lit. Zentralblatt*, 1907, p. 1429.
[6] M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 230, n. 5) thinks that the circuitous part of the route, as traced by Stoffel, past Voray, Rioz, Filain, and Vallerois-le-Bois, was needlessly long, and that Caesar marched by way of Voray and the valley of the Oignon to Villersexel, from which point to Belfort M. Jullian's itinerary and Stoffel's coincide. But see p. 639, *supra*.

hill are very gentle ; and although it is close to the eastern side of the Vosges, ' il se présente, surtout à qui s'en approche par le nord ou par le sud, comme . . . entièrement isolé dans la plaine.' Subsequently the colonel examines Caesar's description of the manœuvre by which Ariovistus cut his line of communication with the Aedui and the Sequani. Caesar's description[1] is even more laconic than usual. Ariovistus broke up his encampment, marched southward to a point 6 Roman miles north of Caesar's camp, and encamped at the foot of a mountain (*sub monte consedit*). Next day he marched past Caesar's camp, and encamped two (Roman) miles beyond it. The key to this description, says Stoffel, is in the words *sub monte consedit*. Why, he asks, did not Caesar attack Ariovistus while he was making this flank march ? Evidently because Ariovistus was protected by the nature of the ground along which he was marching. To secure this protection, he must have marched either along high ground or across a plain covered by forests or marshes. But the words *sub monte consedit* prove, as every contemporary reader of the *Commentaries* would have understood, that he marched along high ground,—that is to say, along the lower slopes of the Vosges. Now in the whole length of the chain, between Cernay and Schlettstadt, the only part in which Ariovistus could have executed his manœuvre is that comprised between the defiles of the Weiss and the Strengbach. Having marched past Caesar's camp along the heights of Zellenberg, he encamped between the defiles, on rising ground which dominated the road by which Caesar's supplies were coming up. We have next to fix the spot on which Caesar, after re-establishing his communications, constructed his smaller camp. Caesar describes it as an *idoneus locus*,—doubtless a strong position commanding the same road. Stoffel finds it on a spur of the Vosges, between Bebelnheim and Mittelweier, about 900 metres, or 980 yards, south of the extreme right of the assumed German position.[2]

Now if Stoffel's determination of the site of the battle rested solely upon his calculation of the distance which Caesar covered in his march from Besançon, it would not be worth examining. We may, indeed, infer from Caesar's narrative that, after quitting Besançon, he marched at more than his usual speed. But it would be very rash to fix his daily average at exactly 27 kilometres. Besides, he does not tell us how far he marched on the seventh day. That last march may, for aught we know, have been a short one. All that we are justified in saying is that, as he was moving in an open country, he could have marched at the rate which Stoffel fixes.[3]

But it is upon his other arguments that Stoffel mainly rests his case. The deduction which he draws from the words *sub monte consedit* appears to me wellnigh irresistible. It is a truism to say that Caesar was economical of words. He would hardly have told us that Ariovistus encamped at the foot of the mountain, unless the

[1] *B. G.*, i, 48, §§ 1–2.
[2] *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, pp. 8–10, 13–5, 19, 64–5, 94–6, 98–100.
[3] See p. 635.

statement had been essential to his narrative ; nor would the statement have been essential unless it had implied that Ariovistus, after encamping there, ascended the slopes in order to execute his flank march without the risk of being attacked. If we may accept Stoffel's further statement, that the only part of the Vosges along which the flank march would have been practicable is the part between Hestenholz and the defile of the Weiss, his map of the campaign must be regarded, at least in its main features, as the most satisfactory which we have. Now Stoffel was a trained observer, and he studied the ground carefully ; but I am not sure that the map bears out his contention.[1] Would not the lower slopes of the Vosges between Cernay and Thann (where Ariovistus would also have been protected by the river Thur) and between Thann and Roderen have been practicable for a flank march ?[2] Stoffel insists, moreover, that the ' tertre de Plettig ' corresponds exactly with the description, *tumulus terrenus satis grandis*, and that between Cernay and Barr ' no other height, separated from the chain of the Vosges, is to be found '.[3] This last statement is true ; and unless, as I have suggested, the *tumulus* was artificial, it settles the question. It has been objected, however, to Stoffel's view that the Germans could not have fled eastward after a battle in which they had faced the east ;[4] but Delbrück,[5] without denying the force of the objection, argues that it can be removed. It is quite possible, he says, that the Germans did not begin the battle in front of their camp, but had previously made a movement which enabled them to face south ; and he thinks that this movement may be inferred from Caesar's observation that they had closed their flanks and rear with their wagons.[6] But the answer, as far as Stoffel is concerned, is simply that he makes the Germans flee northward.[7] Another objection is raised by Colomb, who, observing that if Caesar marched 27 kilometres a day, he must have had an urgent motive for speed, says that it is unintelligible that he should then have halted 24 Roman miles, or 36 kilometres, from Ariovistus, instead of attacking him at once. Delbrück, however,

[1] *Carte de France* (1 : 200,000), Sheets 28 and 36. The English gentleman whom I met at Mühlhausen (see p. 642) confirmed Colonel Stoffel's statement.

[2] When I expressed the contrary opinion in the first edition I had not examined the map of the country near Cernay with sufficient care. But I have not been able to explore this region ; and Stoffel may be right.

[3] *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, pp. 14–5.

[4] See also pp. 640–1.

[5] *Gesch. d. Kriegskunst*, i, 449.

[6] *Ib.*, p. 450. I agree with Veith (*Gesch. d. Feldzüge C. J. Caesars*, pp. 508–9) that Delbrück's suggestion is improbable.

[7] Like Napoleon, Stoffel traces the German line of retreat down the valley of the Ill ; and he remarks that the distance from the site which he identifies with the battle-field to the confluence of the Ill and the Rhine, is just 50 Roman miles. The Ill now joins the Rhine 12 kilometres north of Strasburg. If M. Reclus (*Nouv. Géogr. Univ.*, iii, 1878, pp. 514–5) is to be believed, the confluence in Caesar's time was above Strasburg. ' Un proverbe patois,' he adds, ' de la haute Alsace . . . dit . . . " Die Ell geht wo sie well " ' (The Ill floweth where it listeth). However, if Caesar wrote *quinquaginta* (see p. 655, *infra*), he qualified it by *circiter* (about).

reminds us that many errors crept into the memoirs of Frederick the Great in places where he had no motive for falsification, and that Caesar also may [as Pollio said] have had lapses of memory. For my part I cannot see the difficulty. Doubtless Caesar had a motive for speed, for he expressly says that he marched seven days without a halt:[1] but he also tells us [2] that Ariovistus, on learning his approach, sent envoys to propose an interview; and to reject this proposal would obviously have been bad policy.

Apart from these objections, Stoffel's explanation of the campaign is probable enough; but I fear that it is not conclusive. Let us examine the last attempt that has been made to supersede it.

9. M. Jullian, who has explored the theatre of the campaign, acutely remarks that commentators have sometimes been led astray by the assumption that Gallo-Roman roads were generally laid down on the lines of old Gallic roads; whereas in certain cases, for example when a Gallic town was abandoned in favour of a new Gallo-Roman capital, they necessarily assumed new directions. Arguing from this premiss, he observes that while the neighbourhood of Cernay, which was selected by Napoleon III and von Göler, would have been the most convenient for Caesar's purpose, he would have marched, not by the so-called Roman road to which they pointed, but by a Gallic road on a higher elevation and closer to the Vosges. M. Jullian concludes that Caesar encamped about a mile and a half south-west of Cernay—that is, on the site selected by von Kampen—where he would have been protected both by marshes and by the river Thur; that Ariovistus, after halting *sub monte*, north-east of Wattwiller, marched on the northern bank of the river, along the foot of the Vosges from Cernay to Thann and thence southward to Roderen, where he encamped, in order to cut Caesar's communications, near the 'bench-mark' (*signal*) fixed by the surveyors who mapped the country; and that Caesar re-established his communications by pitching his smaller camp on the plateau between Michelbach and Guerwenheim. M. Jullian notes that his theory is analogous to that of Stoffel, which 'corresponds so closely to the principal data of the problem that it very rapidly became popular'; but he claims that his own site 'has the advantage of being at the place of intersection of various routes' and that it is not in a remote corner of Alsace, but 'at the principal point of the opening which leads into the plain'.[3] It appears to me that his theory is probable enough, but not more probable than that of Stoffel. For M. Jullian argues as though Caesar was free to choose his own battle-field, whereas the choice evidently belonged to Ariovistus; and it is not improbable that Ariovistus, after he had failed to seize Vesontio, may have thought it expedient to lure Caesar as far as possible from his base

[1] *B. G.*, i, 41, § 5. [2] *Ib.*, 42, § 1.

[3] *Rev. des études anc.*, xi, 1909, pp. 351–6. Cf. C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 232, note. M. Jullian says that the *tumulus terrenus* was near Merxheim; but I cannot find it either in the German map (1 : 25,000), Sheet 3669, or in the *Carte de l'État-Major* (1 : 80,000), Sheet 101.

into that 'remote corner of Alsace'. Between Stoffel and Jullian excavation alone could decide.[1]

V. Meusel, to whom I am indebted for an elaborate and most valuable review[2] of the first edition of this book, tells me that I am mistaken in identifying Procillus, whom Caesar sent to confer with Ariovistus, with Troucillus, the interpreter through whom he communicated with Diviciacus. I was certainly wrong in calling the interpreter Procillus, in doing which I adopted the emendation of Manutius; for in the passage[3] in which he is mentioned the *MS.* readings are *Troucillum*, *Troacillum*, and *Traucillum*, and the accuracy of Troucillum is confirmed by inscriptions.[4] The question, however, remains whether the man who was sent to Ariovistus was not Troucillus. In the two passages[5] in which he is mentioned he is designated as Procillus in all the *MSS.*, except Vind. I, which calls him Troicillus. Dittenberger[6] says that he was not Troucillus, arguing that the way in which Caesar first describes him[7] shows that he had not been mentioned before; and also that Caesar calls him a young man (*adulescens*), whereas he evidently implies that Troucillus was well advanced in years.[8] The reader will draw his own inferences from Caesar's language: I will only observe that the mere fact that Troucillus was called a *princeps* does not prove that he was old. Assuming that the interpreter and the *adulescens* were two different men, it is a remarkable coincidence that both were named Gaius Valerius; that both belonged to the *Provincia*; that Caesar had the utmost confidence in both; and that he described each of them as *familiarem suum*. In these circumstances I am inclined to conclude that Troucillus and Procillus were one and the same.

VI. Napoleon[9] and Stoffel[10] assume that Ariovistus took the auxiliaries, whom Caesar drew up on the morning of the battle in front of the smaller camp, for the two legions which had previously

[1] Stoffel was not able to test his theory by excavation, as the site was covered by vineyards (*Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, p. 19).

Caesar says (*B. G.*, i, 54, § 2) that, after the rout of Ariovistus, he led his army into the country of the Sequani, into winter-quarters (*in hiberna in Sequanos exercitum deduxit*); and from this expression it has been inferred that the battle-field was not in the country of the Sequani. Stoffel, however, argues (*Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, p. 117) that if, as he believes, it was in the extreme north of Sequania, Caesar might have used the words in question. But, be this as it may, there is no need to suppose that the battle-field was, strictly speaking, in the territory of the Sequani. It was most probably in that of Ariovistus (*B. G.*, i, 31, § 10), which he had wrested from the Sequani. See p. 637.

[2] *Berl. phil. Woch.*, Jan. 12, 1901, col. 39–45.

[3] *B. G.*, i, 19, § 3.

[4] *Corpus inscr. Lat.*, iii, 5037; v, 7269, 7287.

[5] *B. G.*, i, 47, § 4; 53, § 5.

[6] *C. Iulii Caesaris comm. de b. G.*, 15th ed., 1890, p. 394.

[7] Commodissimum visum est C. Valerium Procillum, C. Valeri Caburi filium, summa virtute et humanitate adulescentem, cuius pater a C. Valerio Flacco civitate donatus erat, et propter fidem et propter linguae Gallicae scientiam ... ad eum mittere, &c. *B. G.*, i, 47, § 4.

[8] Diviciacum ad se vocari iubet et ... per C. Valerium Troucillum, principem Galliae provinciae, familiarem suum, cui summam omnium rerum fidem habebat, cum eo conloquitur. *Ib.*, 19, § 3.

[9] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 90–1.

[10] *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, p. 112.

occupied it. But there is nothing in Caesar to justify such an assumption. What he says is that he 'posted all his auxiliaries, in view of the enemy, in front of the smaller camp, with the object of creating a moral effect, as his regular infantry, compared with the enemy, were numerically rather weak' (*alarios omnes in conspectu hostium pro castris minoribus constituit, quod minus multitudine militum legionariorum pro hostium numero valebat, ut ad speciem alariis uteretur*);[1] and, as Long remarks,[2] Ariovistus would not have been duped. I may add that, if Caesar had intended to dupe him, he would have had to distribute and form up the men of the six legions which he brought into the line of battle, so as to make them look like four; just as he afterwards, in order to deceive Vercingetorix, distributed the men of four legions in order to make them look like six.[3] But the circumstances were very different. Vercingetorix was only deceived because a considerable distance separated him from Caesar's army, which was marching in column, parallel with his own. Moreover, the auxiliaries were dressed and equipped differently from the legionaries. Caesar's object was simply to make as imposing a display as possible.[4]

VII. Stoffel conjectures that some of Caesar's light-armed troops ascended the slope on which he believes the German encampment to have stood, and, by hurling missiles into the encampment, provoked the Germans to descend.[5] This conjecture is founded upon the statement of Plutarch that Caesar 'attacked their entrenchments and the hills upon which they were posted; which provoked them to such a degree that they descended in fury to the plain'.[6] It is not safe to follow Plutarch; but it may be true that Caesar adopted this method of enticing the Germans from a strong position which he could not have safely attempted to storm.

VIII. Caesar says that he began the battle by attacking the enemy's left, because he noticed that that part of their line was the weakest (*ipse a dextro cornu, quod eam partem minime firmam hostium esse animadverterat, proelium commisit*).[7] These words are generally explained in the sense that the Roman right wing, commanded by Caesar in person, struck the first blow. But Stoffel denies this. 'A moins de circonstances exceptionnelles,' he says, 'il était de

[1] *B. G.*, i, 51, § 1.

[2] *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv, 41.

[3] *B. G.*, vii, 35, §§ 3–4.

[4] Guischard (*Mém. crit. et hist.*, 1774, p. 304), who believes that Ariovistus did take the auxiliaries for legionaries, says, as I have said, that he would not have been duped unless they had been armed and accoutred like legionaries; and accordingly he assumes that they were not auxiliaries at all, but the nucleus of the legion which Caesar called *Alauda*: but it is needless to tell scholars that this is nonsense.

M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 237, n. 3) believes that the auxiliaries (*alarios*) were simply Caesar's cavalry. I do not agree with him. In *B. C.*, i, 73, § 3 (with which cf. ii, 18, § 1), *cohortes alariae* are expressly distinguished from cavalry; and it is matter of common knowledge that after the Social War the term *alarii* denoted auxiliary infantry, unless (as in Tacitus, *Ann.*, iii, 39; iv, 73; xii, 27; xiii, 35) the word *equites* was added.

[5] *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, p. 68.

[6] *Caesar*, 19.

[7] *B. G.*, i, 52, § 2.

principe, dans les combats de l'antiquité, que l'attaque se fit . . . en même temps sur tous les points de la ligne.' [1] He takes the passage to mean that Caesar reserved the command of the right wing for himself 'dans l'espoir de remporter un prompt succès qui déconcerterait les Germains de l'aile droite et lui faciliterait la victoire complète'. But may not Caesar have temporarily refused his left wing in the manner described by Vegetius (iii, 20) :—*cum instructae acies ad congressum veniunt, tunc tu sinistram alam tuam a dextra adversarii longius separabis . . . dextram autem alam tuam sinistrae alae illius iunge, et ibi primum inchoa proelium ?*

IX. Caesar, in his description of the battle, says that 'many of our men actually leaped on to the phalanx [or phalanxes], tore the shields out of their enemies' hands, and stabbed them from above' (*reperti sunt complures nostri qui in phalanga* [v.l. *phalangas*] *insilirent, et scuta manibus revellerent, et desuper vulnerarent*).[2] Meusel [3] maintains that the reading *phalangas* is wrong, because a phalanx fought not in divisions but 'in one mighty column'; and Caesar, after saying that the Germans formed their host 'at equal intervals in tribal groups' (*generatimque constituerunt paribus intervallis*),[4] adds that in the battle they formed in *a* phalanx (*phalange facta*,[5] not *phalangibus factis*). This reasoning leaves me unconvinced. Very likely Caesar wrote *phalanga* : but if so, he only meant that Ariovistus adopted the phalanx formation, not that the phalanx was one and undivided ; for what would have been the use of elaborately forming up the tribal groups 'at equal intervals' if the intervals were immediately afterwards to be suppressed ? Moreover, as M. Jullian [6] observes, it may be inferred from Tacitus [7] that the Germans fought in divisions ; and, as I have remarked before,[8] the Macedonian phalanx, before it degenerated, did the same.

X. Allowing for the losses which Caesar had suffered in the battle with the Helvetii, Stoffel calculates that he had about 27,000 legionaries in the battle with Ariovistus.[9] This calculation rests on the assumption that when he began his campaign against the Helvetii, the strength of each of his six legions was about 5,000 men ; but I have given reasons for believing that, if those legions, two of which were newly raised, were of normal strength, they were each 6,000 strong.[10] It is, however, impossible to tell whether the four veteran legions had been brought up to the normal standard when Caesar took command of them. Nor can we tell what loss Caesar had suffered in the battle with the Helvetii : we only know that it was heavy.

Of the assumed 27,000 men Stoffel believes that six cohorts, or, according to his estimate, about 2,700 men, were left to guard the large camp ; that there were about 300 invalids ; and therefore that

[1] *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, p. 113. [2] *B. G.*, i, 52, § 5.
[3] *Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xxiv, 1894, pp. 229–30.
[4] *B. G.*, i, 51, § 2. [5] *Ib.*, 52, § 4.
[6] *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 42, n. 10, 238, n. 5. Cf. Stoffel, *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, p. 69. [7] *Ann.*, ii, 45 ; *Hist.*, iv, 20.
[8] See p. 593, and cf. Daremberg and Saglio, *Dict. des ant. grecques et rom.*, iv, 425. [9] *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, p. 83. [10] See pp. 559–63.

there were some 24,000 legionaries in the line of battle. The small camp, he assumes, was guarded by some of the auxiliaries. When Caesar joined Fabius near Ilerda, and was about to march towards the camp of Afranius, he left six cohorts to guard Fabius's camp and the lower bridge over the Sicoris; and Stoffel infers that he detached the same number of cohorts in the battle with Ariovistus, in which he had the same number of legions.[1] But during the battle with Ariovistus there was no bridge to be guarded. Still, the colonel's estimate may be not far from the truth; for in the battle of Pharsalia, where Caesar had 80 weakened cohorts, or about 22,000 men, in action, he left seven cohorts to hold his camp.[2]

XI. Stoffel believes that Ariovistus had about 36,000 men in the battle.[3] He points out that, according to Caesar,[4] the entire German host amounted to 144,000 souls; and from the estimate which Caesar gives of the Helvetian forces [5] he infers that one-fourth of these were fighting men, of whom 6,000 were cavalry.[6] Of course we cannot implicitly trust the figures with which Diviciacus supplied Caesar; but it should seem from his account of the battle that the Germans outnumbered the Romans.

XII. It has often struck me that there is an apparent inconsistency between the fact that the Germans escaped from the battle-field and Caesar's statement that, before the battle, they closed their rear with a semicircle of wagons, 'to do away with all hope of escape' (*ne qua spes in fuga relinqueretur*).[7] Frontinus [8] offers a solution of the puzzle, but we cannot tell on what authority. 'As the Germans,' he says, 'being hemmed in, were fighting desperately, Caesar ordered that they should be allowed an exit, and fell upon them when they were fleeing' (*Caesar Germanos inclusos, ex desperatione fortius pugnantes, emitti iussit fugientesque aggressus est*).

XIII. 'The enemy,' writes Caesar, 'all turned tail, and did not cease their flight until they reached the Rhine, about five miles from the battle-field' (*omnes hostes terga verterunt, nec prius fugere destiterunt quam ad flumen Rhenum milia passuum ex eo loco circiter V pervenerunt*).[9] All the MSS.—except Vind. C., which has *II*, a number often confounded by the copyists with *V*—have the reading *quinque* or *V*. Plutarch,[10] on the other hand, writes σταδίους τετρακοσίους (50 miles), or, according to some MSS., τριακοσίους (37½ miles), and Orosius [11] and Eutropius [12] *quinquaginta milia passuum*; and all of these writers must, one would think, have followed some MS. of Caesar. If so, it is certain that MSS., several centuries older than any which are now extant, had the reading *quinquaginta*. Schneider [13] thinks that the word *circiter* ('about') agrees better with *quinquaginta* than with *quinque*. Mommsen [14] places the battle-

[1] *B. C.*, i, 41. See *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, pp. 110–1.
[2] *B. C.*, iii, 89, § 2. [3] *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, pp. 84–5.
[4] *B. G.*, i, 31, §§ 5, 10. [5] *Ib.*, i, 29, §§ 2–3. See, however, p. 241.
[6] *Ib.*, 48, § 5. See also Dion Cassius, xxxviii, 47, § 5; Plutarch, *Caesar*, 19; and Appian, *Celtica*, 1, § 3. [7] *B. G.*, i, 51, § 2.
[8] ii, 3, § 6. [9] *B. G.*, i, 53, § 1. [10] *Caesar*, 19.
[11] vi, 7, § 10. [12] vi, 17. [13] *Caesar*, i, 115.
[14] *Röm. Gesch.*, iii, 1889, p. 256, note (*Hist. of Rome*, v, 1894, p. 47, n. 1).

field at Cernay, the spot fixed upon by von Göler and Napoleon, which is at least 15 miles from the Rhine, as the crow flies : he does not say that the channel of the Rhine, in the latitude of Cernay, was different then from what it is now ; and yet he argues that ' the whole description of the pursuit continued as far as the Rhine, and evidently not lasting for several days but ending on the very day of the battle, decides—the authority of tradition being equally balanced—in favour of the view that the battle was fought five, not fifty, miles from the Rhine ' ! Long[1] says, ' A flight or pursuit of fifty miles after a hard battle is impossible ' ; and again, ' Caesar says nothing of night coming on ; which would have stopped the pursuit in an unknown country even if fatigue did not. But he says that the routed Germans did not stop and the horsemen pursued them to the Rhine : and some of the Germans swam the river ; a thing impossible after a heat of fifty miles.' Napoleon[2] insists that the distance was 50 miles, because (1) Caesar would not have used the words *neque prius fugere destiterunt* (' did not cease their flight ') of ' a flight of merely a few miles ' ; and (2) the Germans probably retreated down ' the valley of the Ill, which they had previously ascended '.

All that I have to say is this. Schneider's argument that *circiter* harmonizes better with *quinquaginta* than with *quinque* is futile ; for in *B. G.*, ii, 13, § 2, Caesar uses the phrase *circiter milia passuum V.* On the other hand, assuming that the battle took place at any point west of the Ill, the distance cannot have been only five miles, unless the Ill was then regarded as an arm of the Rhine. As to Long's argument, the pursuit after the siege of Alesia was not stopped by night, for it began just after midnight. The country was open : the Germans, at any rate, knew it ; and the Romans only had to follow. But there is considerable force in Long's other objection ; and there is very little force in the argument which Napoleon bases upon the phrase *neque prius fugere destiterunt.* Caesar uses the very same phrase in *B. G.*, iv, 12, § 2, where he is describing a flight which could not have extended over anything near 50 miles. Von Göler asserts, on the authority of a pamphlet by an engineer named Tulla, that the Ill was at that time a branch of the Rhine.[3] As Long says,[4] ' this hypothesis or assumption settles all difficulties, and makes Caesar's narrative perfectly intelligible.' Yes, if it is true : but is it ? It is scarcely credible that Caesar should not have known that a very few miles east of the Ill flowed the main stream of the Rhine ; and if he did know this and yet spoke of the Ill as the Rhine, he used the word *Rhenus* in two consecutive chapters to describe two different streams. For in chapter 53 he describes the flight of the Germans, and in 54 he tells us that, on hearing of the defeat of their countrymen, the Suebi, who had advanced to the banks of the Rhine, returned home ; and

[1] *Caesar*, pp. 97–8.

[2] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 93, n. 1. Napoleon assumes that the fugitives crossed the Ill first, and afterwards crossed the Rhine at Rheinau.

[3] *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 58 and n. 2.

[4] *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv, 43.

by the Rhine in this passage he could not have meant the Ill. If I am right, Caesar could not have written *quinque* unless he made a slip, because the Rhine is nowhere nearer than 12 miles from any site with which the battle-field can be identified. But I agree with Long that it is hardly credible that the Germans should, after a desperate battle, have fled 50 miles in one heat,[1] still less that some of them should have then swum the Rhine : I cannot see why they should have fled 50 miles when the Rhine, to cross which was their only object, was not more than 12 to 15 miles away ;[2] and I can therefore only make the lame suggestion that Caesar may have written *XV*.

XIV. The battle with Ariovistus was fought in September ; for we may gather from a statement in *B. G.*, i, 40, § 11—'the standing corn was already ripe' (*iam esse in agris frumenta matura*)—that Caesar was at Vesontio during the latter half of August. It was new moon on September 18 ; and the battle was fought before the new moon. The date of the battle was therefore, Stoffel infers, about September 14.[3]

CAESAR'S ACCOUNT OF ONE OF THE MOTIVES OF THE BELGAE FOR CONSPIRING IN 57 B.C.

Coniurandi has esse causas . . . quod ab non nullis Gallis sollicitarentur, partim qui . . . mobilitate et levitate animi novis imperiis studebant.[4] Schneider[5] understands Caesar to mean that some of those who had (virtually) submitted to the Romans were tired of their supremacy and wished to exchange it for that of the Belgae.[6] This is the sense in which I had myself understood the passage. But perhaps Caesar's meaning is not as definite as this. He may perhaps only mean that the Gauls, being tired of Roman supremacy, were bent on making a revolution of some sort.[7]

[1] Even the exhausting retreat from Waterloo to Charleroi was not more than 25 miles. See, however, E. Desjardins, *Alesia,—suivie d'un appendice renfermant des notes inédites écrites de la main de Napoléon I^er^ sur les campagnes de Jules César*, p. 148.

[2] M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 231, n. 4) thinks that the Germans fled to Strasburg because, except Basle, it was the nearest of the 'principaux lieux de passage' : but there must have been boats elsewhere ; and apparently very few found them (*B. G.*, i, 53, § 2). May we suppose that some fled to the nearest point of the Rhine, and others, who escaped pursuit, towards Strasburg ?

[3] *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, p. 80.

[4] *B. G.*, ii, 1, § 2.

[5] *Caesar*, i, 121.

[6] Dr. W. G. Rutherford (*Caesar*, Bk. ii, p. 47) refers to *B. G.*, i, 17, § 3, where the Aeduan malcontents are said to have argued that 'it was better . . . to have Gauls for their masters than Romans' (*praestare . . . Gallorum quam Romanorum imperia perferre*).

[7] See Long's *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv, 44.

DID ADRA SUCCEED GALBA AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE BELGAE?

According to Dion Cassius, who, if the MSS. are right, does not mention Galba, the commander-in-chief of the Belgae in 57 B.C. was named Adra.[1] De Saulcy affirmed that a Gallic coin had been found at Pasly, bearing the name *Adra*; and he identified the personage whose name appears on the coin with the Adra of Dion Cassius, and suggested that he might have succeeded Galba. The name on the coin, however, is not *Adra*, but *Arda*.[2] Moreover, A. Michaux pointed out that, according to Dion Cassius, Adra was appointed at the beginning of the war, and argued that he commanded the Bellovaci alone.[3] If so, Dion Cassius made a mistake; but it seems more likely that the MSS. are at fault.

WHERE DID THE BELGAE MUSTER IN 57 B.C.?

Von Göler[4] believes that the Belgae mustered in the country of the Suessiones, apparently at or near Noviodunum, which was close to Soissons. The reason which he gives is that their commander-in-chief was the king of the Suessiones[5]; and M. Jullian[6] adds that the valley of the Aisne was the natural route for the Bellovaci and the Suessiones, who furnished the strongest contingents to the confederate army. On the other hand, as General Creuly points out,[7] the king may have wished to avoid the injury which the presence of such a huge host could not but have inflicted upon his standing crops. Besides, there is a passage in Caesar which suggests that the muster could not have taken place anywhere in the valley of the Aisne. Describing his own movements at the outset of the campaign, he writes, 'Finding that all the Belgic forces had concentrated and were marching against him, and learning from the reconnoitring parties which he had sent out and from the Remi that they were not far off, he pushed on rapidly, crossed the Aisne . . . and encamped near its banks' (*postquam omnes Belgarum copias in unum locum coactas ad se venire vidit, neque iam longe abesse ab iis, quos miserat, exploratoribus et ab Remis cognovit, flumen Axonam . . . exercitum traducere maturavit atque ibi castra posuit*).[8] He was indisputably on the south of the Aisne when he began his march. If the Belgae had mustered

[1] xxxix, 1, § 2. Xylander and Bekker read Γάλβαν instead of Ἀδράν.

[2] See *Cat. des monnaies gaul.*, ed. Muret and Chabouillet, pp. 204–5, nos 8841–57, and H. de la Tour's *Atlas de monnaies gaul.*, 1892, pl. xxxvi. The coins of Arda are assigned in the Catalogue and the Atlas to the Treveri, who, in this war, were on the side of Caesar. See *B. G.*, ii, 24, § 4.

[3] *Bull. de la Soc. arch. de Soissons*, ix, 1878, pp. 64–71.

[4] *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 67.

[5] *B. G.*, ii, 4, § 7.

[6] *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 251, n. 5.

[7] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., viii, 1863, p. 298.

[8] *B. G.*, ii, 5, § 4.

in the valley of the Aisne, is it likely that they would have marched, as they undoubtedly did, on the north of that river, to attack him ?[1] Nay, they would hardly have done so even if he had already encamped on the north ; for, if they had marched on the south, they would, by the mere fact of doing so, have compelled him to abandon his position for fear his communications should be cut ;[2] and M. Jullian himself admits that if they had concentrated on the Aisne, their natural line of march would have been the road from Soissons to Reims. Moreover, it is, as I have shown,[3] impossible to find a satisfactory site for Bibrax, the stronghold which they attacked when they were marching against him, at any point on or near the road leading from Soissons to the place where he crossed the Aisne.[4] Finally, as I show on page 670, it is difficult to explain why the fugitive Suessiones, after the defeat of the Belgae, reached Noviodunum some hours later than Caesar, although they had begun their flight long before he began his march, except on the hypothesis that in the early part of their flight they had moved northward from the Aisne. It is probable, therefore, that the point where the Belgae concentrated was somewhere north of the Aisne, and at a considerable distance from it. Assuming that Caesar crossed the Aisne at Berry-au-Bac, Creuly infers that it must have been somewhere north of Laon ;[5] for otherwise, he argues, their line of march would have been threatened by Berry-au-Bac, and Caesar would not have hesitated to seize that point at the earliest possible moment. We must conclude, he continues, that they were at least as far north as the neighbourhood of La Fère on the Oise, whence they could march against Caesar and his allies, the Remi, by way either of Laon or of Soissons ; and that it was only when Caesar had ascertained from his scouts which route they had decided upon, that he put his own troops in motion.

Although we cannot be absolutely sure that Caesar was ready to march before he actually did so, General Creuly's conclusion appears to me well grounded ; for it may be inferred from Caesar's narrative that the Belgae had begun to move against him before he marched to meet them ; he probably had to make a whole day's march at least before he could reach his camping-ground ; and on the night of his arrival the Belgae were still at Bibrax, eight Roman miles away.

WHERE DID CAESAR CROSS THE AISNE IN HIS FIRST CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE BELGAE ?

The number of pamphlets and articles that have been published upon this question is bewildering. It has been discussed as hotly as the question of Cenabum or the question of Alesia.

[1] *B. G.*, 5–6.

[2] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., viii, 1863, p. 298.

[3] See pp. 398–400.

[4] Unless that place was Berry-au-Bac—and this, as I shall show in the next article, is doubtful—Bibrax was certainly not in the valley of the Aisne.

[5] Creuly's argument would hold good if Caesar crossed the Aisne at Pontavert.

I. 1. Since Napoleon published his *Histoire de Jules César*, the prevalent view has been that Caesar crossed the Aisne at Berry-au-Bac, and pitched his camp near Mauchamp, on a hill between the Aisne and the Miette, a small stream which flows into the Aisne on its northern bank. Napoleon was not, indeed, the first to adopt this site; for von Göler and more than one French antiquary[1] had anticipated him: but he claimed that the results of the excavations which had been undertaken by his orders had established its identity. Besides Berry-au-Bac, however, Condé-sur-Suippe, which is about 3 miles higher up, and Pontavert and Pontarcy, which are respectively about 4 and 11 miles, as the crow flies, lower down the Aisne, have found ardent champions.

Caesar tells us that he marched from the country of the Sequani to the frontier of the Belgae, entered the territory of the Remi, and remained there some days. It is probable that, during this time, his head-quarters were at or near their chief town, Durocortorum (Reims). Hearing that the hostile Belgae were marching against him, he put his own army in motion, crossed the Aisne by a bridge at a point which was within an easy march of the eastern frontier of the Suessiones, and 'there' (*ibi*)—that is to say, close to the right bank—pitched his camp on a hill, while on the left bank he stationed six cohorts to guard his communications.[2] He describes the hill and the measures which he took to render it impregnable in the following sentences:—*Ubi nostros non esse inferiores intellexit, loco pro castris ad aciem instruendam natura oportuno atque idoneo, quod is collis ubi castra posita erant paululum ex planitie editus tantum adversus in latitudinem patebat quantum loci acies instructa occupare poterat, atque ex utraque parte lateris deiectus habebat et in fronte leniter fastigatus paulatim ad planitiem redibat, ab utroque latere eius collis transversam fossam obduxit circiter passuum CCCC et ad extremas fossas castella constituit ibique tormenta conlocavit, ne, cum aciem instruxisset, hostes, quod tantum multitudine poterant, ab lateribus pugnantes suos circumvenire possent. Hoc facto duabus legionibus quas proxime conscripserat in castris relictis ut, si quo opus esset, subsidio duci possent, reliquas VI legiones pro castris in acie constituit. Hostes item suas copias ex castris eductas instruxerunt.*[3] According to my unbiased comprehension of this passage, the hill rose gradually from level ground on the right bank of the Aisne: it descended gradually to level ground in front: its flanks, on the right and left, did not insensibly merge into the plain, but descended to it, so to speak, with a strongly marked slope; and its length, or extension from right to left, was just sufficient to allow six legions to be drawn up on it in line of battle. Between this hill and the enemy's camp, which was in front of it, was a small marsh. In order to prevent the enemy from outflanking him, Caesar drew a trench, about 400 paces, or 650 yards long, crosswise—that is, at right angles with the extension of the hill—on either flank of it; and at each end of each ditch he constructed a redoubt. Then,

[1] e.g. A. Piette in *Bull. de la Soc. acad. de Laon*, viii, 1858, p. 188.
[2] *B. G.*, i, 1, § 2; ii, 2, § 6; 3–5. [3] *Ib.*, 8, §§ 3–5.

leaving two legions in reserve in his camp, he drew up the other six in line of battle in front of his camp.

I am certain that the foregoing description would agree substantially with the interpretation of Caesar's narrative that any unprejudiced scholar, examining the passage without reference to other sources of information, would give ; and I find that it is substantially identical with the interpretation given by Long.[1] If it represents Caesar's meaning, Napoleon's Plan,[2] which traces one of the trenches from the north-western angle of the camp to the Miette, and the other from the south-eastern angle to the Aisne, is obviously wrong.[3] Accordingly Dr. Gunion Rutherford offers a different interpretation ; and, what is more, he maintains that he alone of all the editors has explained Caesar's narrative correctly.[4] ' The key of this description,' he says, ' is *pro castris*, which proves that Caesar was looking westward towards the Aisne along the axis of the hill.' Where the proof is, I cannot see. In fact Rutherford himself supplies *dis*proof. In his Vocabulary (p. 124) he translates *pro castris* by ' in front of the camp.' The front of the camp, it is needless to say, was that side of it which faced the enemy ; and the side of this particular camp which faced the enemy was confessedly the north. Rutherford's Vocabulary is justified by Caesar's usage : in every other passage in which he writes *pro castris* he means ' on the side of the camp which faced the enemy ' (see *B. G.*, i, 48, § 3 ; 51, § 1 ; iv, 35, § 1 ; v, 15, § 3 ; 16, § 1 ; 37, § 5 ; vii, 24, § 5 ; 66, § 6 ; 68, § 1 ; 70, § 2 ; 83, § 8 ; 89, § 4 ; *B. C.*, i, 43, § 4 ; iii, 56, § 2). The ' key ' which Rutherford found only opens the door to fresh mistakes. Having mistranslated *pro castris*, he is compelled to mistranslate *in fronte*. ' *In fronte*,' he says, ' refers to that end of the hill's ridge furthest removed from the camp.' A scholar like Rutherford could not have made such a mistake as this if he had not been biased by Napoleon's Plan. Let any one look at the Plan, and he will see at once that the front of the hill can only be that side of it which faced the enemy. Again, Rutherford's translation of *in fronte* obviously involves a forced interpretation of the words *ex utraque parte* [collis] *lateris deiectus habebat* (' on either side its flanks descended abruptly '). Moreover, he forgets that, according to Caesar, the hill, from its right to its left flank, was just wide enough to enable the line of battle to be formed along it ; whereas, according to his interpretation of Caesar and according to Napoleon's Plan, the hill was wide enough to allow the line of battle to be formed upon it *alongside of the camp*, that is to say, wider, by the length of one side of the camp, than Caesar says. It is perfectly clear that, *if Caesar's narrative was not misleading*, the line of battle was formed in front of, not alongside of, the camp. Finally, Caesar says that his object in constructing the two trenches was to prevent the enemy from surrounding his troops on their flanks (*ne, cum aciem instruxisset, hostes . . . ab lateribus pugnantes suos circumvenire possent*). Would

[1] *Caesar*, p. 115. See also Schneider's *Caesar*, i, 140–1.
[2] *Hist. de Jules César*, Planche 8. See Plan facing p. 71 of this volume.
[3] Cf. G. Long, *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv, 50, n. 5.
[4] *Caesar, Books II–III*, Preface and pp. 55–6.

he have used the plural *lateribus* if he had only meant his right flank ?

And now, having acted as *Advocatus Diaboli*, I will say all that can be said for the defence.[1] It might possibly be argued that Caesar loosely used the phrase *a lateribus* (on the flanks) instead of *a dextro latere* (on the right flank), because he uses the words *ripas* and *in ripis* more than once when he is only speaking of one bank of a river.[2] Again, a glance at the Plan will show that the camp near Berry-au-Bac (assuming that it was made by Caesar) could only have faced the extreme left of the Roman line : the Roman troops would naturally have been drawn up on the left of the camp ; and, as they would have been confronting the enemy and at the same time resting upon the support of the camp, even though not, so to speak, between it and the enemy, it might be pleaded that the ground which they occupied could have fairly been described as *loco pro castris*. But I fear that the plea would be brushed aside ; for Caesar says clearly that the hill ' extended, facing, the enemy, over the exact space which the line would occupy ' ; and Rutherford's interpretation of *in fronte* and *ex utraque parte* could by no ingenuity be upheld.[3]

Dittenberger [4] suggests that Caesar may have forgotten the nature of the ground and the direction of the trenches. To my mind such a lapse of memory is inconceivable ; and it is safe to say that Rutherford would never have explained Caesar's text as he did if he had not assumed the correctness of Napoleon's Plan and been guided by it.

I shall now examine the other objections that have been made to Napoleon's view.

(1) The western slope of the hill of Mauchamp, where it descends towards the Miette, is so extremely gentle that it could not be described by the words *lateris deiectus*.[5] This objection does not directly touch Rutherford's interpretation of the text ; for, as we have seen, he identifies the *lateris deiectus* with the northern and southern sides of the hill : if he is wrong, the objection, as any one who has seen the ground will admit, can only be removed by

[1] In the first edition (pp. 646–8, 651), although I printed a criticism of Rutherford's explanation, which I had written after I first read it, and which I have just presented anew in a slightly modified form, I tried to show that he was substantially right: but I was biased by the belief that Stoffel's discovery was conclusive ; and my defence, which, except one unsound argument, was also virtually identical with what I have said here on Rutherford's behalf, involved the unwarrantable assumption that Caesar's description was misleading. Professor Lehmann's articles, to which I refer on p. 666, first led me to reconsider the question.

[2] H. Meusel, *Lex. Caes.*, ii, 1750–1.

[3] M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 255, n. 1), who refers his readers to my former defence of Rutherford, interprets *in fronte* as ' du côté regardant Beaurieux ', which he identifies with Bibrax. But Bibrax was no longer important ; and Caesar was not ' regarding ' Beaurieux, but the enemy, who had quitted Bibrax and were on his north (*B. G.*, ii, 7–8). M. Jullian's explanation could only be accepted if Caesar's line of battle had faced Beaurieux.

[4] *Caesar*, 1890, p. 122.

[5] *Bull. de la Soc. acad. de Laon*, xiii, 1863, p. 177.

supposing that the word *deiectus* could be applied to the slightest perceptible slope. I doubt whether such an interpretation is admissible; and Professor A. Gudeman, the learned author of the article *Deiectus* in the *Thesaurus linguae Latinae*, agrees with me.[1] 'I am convinced,' he writes, 'that you are absolutely correct in taking *deiectus* of a sharp, fairly steep gradient. This interpretation is confirmed by the use of *deicio*, which, apart from its tropical uses, invariably denotes "*praecipitem* or *praeceps dare*".' And, even supposing that Rutherford's explanation can be accepted, the northern and southern slopes of the hill are hardly less gentle than the others.

(2) The trench which, according to Napoleon's Plan, touched the Aisne, is only 400 metres long, whereas, according to Caesar, each trench measured about 400 paces, or nearly 592 metres; and it shows no trace of a redoubt.[2] To this, E. Fleury replied by anticipation that the Aisne had changed its course since Caesar's day and thereby destroyed all traces of the end of the trench and of the redoubt.[3] But, according to M. Jullian (who nevertheless accepts the results of Stoffel's excavations), there is no evidence that the Aisne has changed its course.[4] A. E. Poquet[5] indeed affirms that the change is attested by the archives of the commune of Juvincourt for 1791, in which it is stated that the Aisne 'a formé une île et changé l'état des lieux'; and he goes on to speak of 'son ancien lit qu'on reconnaît parfaitement encore': but I can find no evidence that its course in Caesar's day corresponded with Napoleon's Plan.

(3) The northern trench shown in Napoleon's Plan is cut, 80 metres from its termination, by four small trenches, which were supposed by Stoffel to be the remains of the northern redoubt; but if so, why was the northern trench prolonged 80 metres beyond them?[6] And since the small trenches were at the most one metre, and in some places only 20 centimetres deep, and the potsherds and other antiquities found near them in pits were post-Caesarian, how can they be identified with one of Caesar's redoubts?[7] Poquet replies that the prolongation of the trench 'was simply intended to complete the defence of the redoubt'; but this argument is unsound, for Caesar says distinctly that the redoubts were 'at the ends of the trenches' (*ad extremas fossas*). On the other hand, the contents of the pits—fragments of jars (*amphorae*), a piece of wrought iron, two coins of the Remi, and a stone axe[8]—though the circumstances of

[1] The professor kindly sent me a list, taken from a proof of the article, of the passages in which *deiectus* occurs,—Caesar, *B. G.*, ii, 8, § 3; 22, § 1; 29, § 3; Livy, ix, 2, § 9; Ovid, *Met.*, i, 571; Vitruvius, vi, 3, § 1; Valerius Maximus, iii, 2, § 1; Seneca, *Dial.*, v, 1, § 5; vi, 8, § 14; *Nat.*, iii, 11, § 6; *Epist.*, 56, § 3; Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, ii, § 179; xxxiii, § 75; xxxvii, § 88; Statius, *Theb.*, iv, 272; Sidonius, *Epist.*, v, 13, 1.

[2] *Bull. de la Soc. acad. de Laon*, xiv, 1864, p. 103. [3] *Ib.*, xiii, 1863, p. 185.

[4] Oral communication from M. Jullian. Cf. his *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 253, note.

[5] *Bull. de la Soc. hist. . . . de Soissons*, xvii, 1863, p. 362, n. 1.

[6] *Bull. de la Soc. acad. de Laon*, xiii, 1863, p. 179.

[7] *Ib.*, xiv, 1864, p. 104.

[8] *Bull. de la Soc. hist. . . . de Soissons*, xvii, 1863, p. 361; *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., v, 1862, p. 360.

their discovery were not recorded with modern precision, do not appear to preclude the attribution of the works to Caesar.

The remaining objections are unimportant. It has been said that the camp at Mauchamp, being only 41 hectares, or about 101 acres, in area, was insufficient for Caesar's six legions;[1] that the trenches were only from 4 to 5 metres (about 13 to 16 feet) wide, not, as Caesar's statement requires, 18 feet; and that the camp had five gates, whereas Roman camps had only four.[2] But a smaller camp, described by Hyginus, was intended for three legions, which, with the foreign auxiliaries and the camp-followers who accompanied them, amounted to at least 40,000 men;[3] in digging the trenches Caesar's instructions may not have been punctiliously observed; and we do not know whether the number of gates in a Roman camp was invariable. Again, it has been objected, on the one hand, that the Miette never could have flowed through a marsh, for one of the transverse trenches actually touches it;[4] on the other, that if the marsh which Caesar described had been traversed by a stream, he would have mentioned it.[5] But the surrounding land, according to Poquet,[6] is still known as the 'marais de la Miette', a name which, as a local innkeeper assured me, it frequently deserves; and Caesar did not mention the Essonne,—the stream that undoubtedly traversed the marsh which Labienus attempted to cross in 52 B. C.[7] Besides, Poquet affirms that the channel of the Miette itself was dug in order to drain the stagnant waters.

Let us now test the claims of the other places that have been proposed for Caesar's passage of the Aisne.

2. On behalf of Pontarcy all that can be said has been said by Caignart de Saulcy. After the publication of the results of Stoffel's excavations he acknowledged that he was wrong;[8] but it may be well, in order finally to settle the question, to prove that his former opinion was untenable. First, Pontarcy has always formed part of the diocese of Soissons, and was therefore probably in the country of the Suessiones, not, as Caesar's narrative requires, in that of the Remi.

Secondly, according to A. Piette,[9] who made a special study of the ancient roads in the department of the Aisne, no ancient road passed through Pontarcy.

Thirdly, from Caesar's statement that one side of his camp was covered by the Aisne, de Saulcy infers that the hill on which the

[1] *Bull. de la Soc. acad. de Laon*, xiv, 1864, p. 103.
[2] *Ib.*, xiii, 1863, pp. 182–3.
[3] Hyginus, *De munitionibus castrorum*, § 21 (ed. A. von Domaszewski, 1887). Cf. Daremberg and Saglio, *Dict. des ant. grecques et rom.*, i, 951.
[4] *Bull. de la Soc. acad. de Laon*, xiv, 1864, p. 104.
[5] *Neue Jahrb. f. d. klass. Altertum*, vii, 1901, pp. 506–9. I have ignored one or two objections which seem to me frivolous.
[6] *Jules César et son entrée dans la Gaule belgique*, 1864, p. 64.
[7] *B. G.*, vii, 57, § 4; 58, § 1. Cf. pp. 775–8.
[8] *Journal de l'Aisne*, 7 mai, 1862.
[9] *Itin. gallo-rom. dans le dép^t de l'Aisne*, 1862, map at end of volume.

camp stood 's'étendait *perpendiculairement* au cours de l'Aisne et dominant le terrain compris entre elle et la rivière, ne laissait pas d'attaque à craindre dans cette direction'.[1] He was driven to adopt this singular interpretation of Caesar's words because the plateau of Comin, the only hill which he could find near Pontarcy, extends in a direction perpendicular to the course of the river. Caesar meant of course that the hill extended in a direction parallel with the Aisne. Moreover, as Piette observes,[2] the hill of Comin is about 200 feet above the level of the valley beneath it, and is surrounded by steep escarpments; whereas the hill which Caesar describes rose only a little above the plain, and its slope was very gentle.

Fourthly, the slope of the hill descending towards the valley which de Saulcy believed to have separated the Romans from the Belgae is bounded, he says, by two parallel trenches. These trenches he identified with Caesar's *transversae fossae*, which, I need hardly say, would have been filled up by the inhabitants after his departure. The distance between them is about 450 metres, or nearly 500 yards. This space corresponded, on de Saulcy's theory, with the width of the Roman line of battle. There were, he assumes, 800 men in each rank,[3] and, as there were six legions in order of battle, or perhaps about 24,000 men, who were probably arranged in three lines, each eight men deep, this estimate is not very far from the truth. Now observe that, on de Saulcy's theory, each man would have had a space of just five-eighths of a yard, or $22\frac{1}{2}$ inches, to stand in! In other words, the men would have been packed like sardines in a box, not like Roman soldiers, who had to use their swords and shields.

3. Before Napoleon's book appeared, the spot which most antiquaries favoured was Pontavert,[4] where a Gallic road from Durocortorum (Reims) to Bagacum (Bavay) is believed to have crossed the river by a bridge.[5] If this was the bridge which Caesar mentions, the hill on which he encamped can only have been the plateau of Chaudardes; but this site was carefully examined by General Creuly and various members of the *Société académique de Laon*, and unhesitatingly rejected.[6] Professor Konrad Lehmann has, however,

[1] *Les campagnes de Jules César dans les Gaules*, 1862, p. 95.
[2] *Itin. gallo-rom. dans. le dép^t de l'Aisne*, p. 251.
[3] *Les campagnes*, &c., pp. 98, 107.
[4] *Bull. de la Soc. hist. et arch. de Soissons*, xv, 1860, pp. 127, 129.
[5] *Bull. de la Soc. acad. de Laon*, vii, 1858, p. 188. M. Melleville (*Le passage de l'Aisne par J. César*, 1864, p. 19) asserts that this was the only ancient road within the line of the Aisne from Neufchâtel to Pontavert; but A. Piette, the principal authority on the ancient roads of the department of the Aisne, maintains (*Itin. gallo-rom. dans le dép^t de l'Aisne*, p. 92) that the road which leads from Reims to Arras by way of Berry-au-Bac existed in the Gallo-Roman period.
[6] A. E. E. Poquet, *Jules César*, &c., pp. 69–70. Melleville (*Le passage de l'Aisne*, &c., pp. 21–2, 25, 27–8) placed Caesar's camp on the hill of St. Thomas, which is at least 6 miles from the nearest point of the Aisne! Of the various objections that are fatal to this theory one is so obvious that I wonder that it did not occur to Melleville himself:—how could Caesar have said that one side of his camp was protected by the Aisne (*latus unum castrorum*

recently attempted to vindicate its claims;[1] and Creuly's condemnation must not be accepted as final. Still, when I went over the ground I noted one or two objections. Although definitely sloping flanks (*lateris deiectus*) are there, the plateau did not appear to me to correspond in other respects with Caesar's description as closely as the hill of Mauchamp. The western end, where his left wing would have been posted, does not 'gradually merge in the plain by a gentle slope' (*in fronte leniter fastigatus paulatim ad planitiem redibat*),[2] but is actually lower than the ground immediately north of it which would have been occupied by the Belgae; the northward slope of the central and eastern parts of the plateau is perhaps rather too marked; and I did not feel sure that the marsh would have been suitable for cavalry. Lehmann,[3] affirming that the plateau was exactly wide enough to admit of the formation of the Roman line, assigns 1,100 metres for the aggregate breadth of the cohorts and 600 for the intervals between them and for the cavalry. But he can only allow a front of one metre, or about 3 feet 3 inches, for each man, which, as Polybius[4] and common sense alike show, was little more than half of the necessary room. Stoffel[5] shows that one legion of only 3,600 men would have occupied a front of 348 metres; and the intervals between the legions have to be allowed for. This objection can only be removed by assuming that Caesar's line was unusually deep. Finally, Piette[6] argues that Caesar would not have attempted to cross the Aisne at Pontavert, as to reach it he would have had to traverse the broken country which stretches north-westward from Reims. But if there was a road,[7] does not this objection disappear?

The choice lies between Chaudardes and Mauchamp. The topography of the latter, with the very important exception of (lateris) *deiectus*, conforms perhaps somewhat more closely to Caesar's description; but the results of Stoffel's excavations cannot be reconciled with Caesar's text except by Rutherford's forced interpretation. Let the advocates of Chaudardes excavate in their turn.

II. One or two minor points remain to be settled. Piette says that Caesar probably marched by the route along which subsequently ran the Roman road from Reims to Bavay, and which crossed the Aisne about 4 kilometres east of the confluence of the Suippe and the Aisne; that he left Sabinus in the so-called 'camp of Condé', close to the confluence; and that he encamped himself on the hill

ripis fluminis muniebat) if the camp had been 6 miles from that river? Craonne has also been suggested; but Thillois (*Bull. de la Soc. acad. de Laon*, xix, 1869–70, p. 272) points out that it is scarped on all sides, and that it is 6 kilometres, or nearly 4 miles, from the river.

[1] *Neue Jahrb. f. d. klass. Altertum*, iv, 1901, pp. 506–9; *Klio*, vi, 1906, pp. 237–48.

[2] It will be observed that I take *in fronte* in its natural sense, not in that which Rutherford attributes to it.

[3] *Klio*, vi, 1906, p. 240.

[4] xviii, 30 (13), §§ 6–8.

[5] *Guerre civile*, ii, 327–8.

[6] *Itinéraires*, &c., pp. 97–8. See Sheet 34 of the *Carte de l'État-Major* (1 : 80,000).

[7] See p. 665.

of Mauchamp, that is to say, in the position selected by Napoleon.[1] But whether Caesar encamped on the hill of Mauchamp or not, Piette is certainly mistaken. For the camp of Condé, if it is a Roman camp at all, is far too large to have been occupied by the small force of Sabinus:[2] it is tolerably clear from Caesar's narrative that he encamped just north of the point where he crossed the Aisne, not several miles to the west of it, and that the camp of Sabinus was immediately south of and opposite to the *tête de pont*, not 4 kilometres to the west of it: if we may believe Napoleon, 'the entrenchments of this *tête de pont* . . . are still visible at Berry-au-Bac;'[3] and, as Piette believes that the road leading from Reims to Arras by way of Berry-au-Bac existed in the Gallo-Roman period, I cannot see why he refuses to believe that Caesar marched by it.

III. Referring to the *tête de pont* which is shown in Napoleon's Plan, Long says, 'this tête-de-pont would be of little or no use on the north side of the river; and if the "praesidium" of c. 5 and the "castellum" of c. 9 are the same, as I think they are, Caesar placed the tête-de-pont on the south side of the Aisne.'[4]

This note is unworthy of Long. How could he have thought that the *praesidium* of chapter 5 and the *castellum*, which Sabinus occupied, of chapter 9 were the same, after reading this passage:— *In eo flumine pons erat. Ibi praesidium ponit et in altera parte fluminis Q. Titurium Sabinum legatum cum sex cohortibus relinquit*?[5] These words immediately follow Caesar's description of the position which he himself took up on the northern side of the Aisne. *Altera parte fluminis*, then, must mean the southern side; and the *praesidium* must have been on the northern. Besides, from chapter 9 it is clear that the *castellum* was on the southern side.[6] Therefore, as the *praesidium* was on the north, the *castellum* and the *praesidium* were not the same.

Of course Long made a great mistake when he asserted that 'this tête-de-pont would be of little or no use on the north side of the river'. The *tête de pont* made it absolutely impossible for any hostile force to cross the river by the bridge.

IV. According to Napoleon and von Kampen, the Belgae attempted to cross the Aisne by the ford of Gernicourt, between Berry-au-Bac and Pontavert; but Piette thinks that they marched to attack Sabinus by the north-east, concealed themselves behind the hill of Proviseux, and then gained the ford of St. Pierre, near Guignicourt.[7] The map shows that the route indicated by Napoleon

[1] *Bull. de la Soc. acad. de Laon*, vii, 1858, p. 188.
[2] See A. E. Poquet, *Jules César*, &c., pp. 28–9.
[3] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 100, n. 1.
[4] *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv, 51, n. 6.
[5] 'The river was spanned by a bridge, at the head of which he established a strong post, while on the other side of the river he left six cohorts under one of his generals, Quintus Titurius Sabinus.' *B. G.*, ii, 5, § 6.
[6] Ibi vadis repertis partem suarum copiarum traducere conati sunt, eo consilio ut, si possent, castellum . . . expugnarent, &c.
[7] *Itin. gallo-rom. dans le dép^{t} de l'Aisne*, pp. 100–1.

was the easier; but of course Piette was obliged to choose the other because he had made the mistake of placing Sabinus's camp, which the Belgae intended to attack, at Condé-sur-Suippe. And if Caesar's camp was on the plateau of Chaudardes, they could only have crossed by the ford of Gernicourt.

HOW LONG DID CAESAR TAKE TO MARCH FROM HIS CAMP ON THE AISNE TO NOVIODUNUM?

Caesar's words are *Postridie eius diei Caesar . . . in fines Suessionum, qui proximi Remis erant, exercitum duxit et magno itinere* [*confecto*] *ad oppidum Noviodunum contendit.*[1] The question is whether he reached Noviodunum on the day of the *magnum iter* or on the next day.

Nipperdey[2] says that the words *magno itinere confecto* would be absurd unless some place were indicated as the terminus of the *magnum iter*; and Schneider[3] virtually takes the same view, remarking that in other passages where Caesar uses the words *itinere confecto*, the general who performed the march is said to have reached some definite place, or to have fallen upon his enemy.[4] But as, in this particular passage, no place is, in Schneider's opinion, expressly indicated as the terminus of the *iter*, he concludes that, after *confecto*, we must understand *in fines Suessionum pervenit*; that is to say, that Caesar reached the territory of the Suessiones by a forced march, and then marched on for Noviodunum. But, to say nothing of the fact that Caesar had already told us that he had entered the territory of the Suessiones (*in fines Suessionum . . . exercitum duxit*), the point from which he started was close to that territory; and therefore, on Schneider's theory, the word *parvo* would be more applicable than *magno*. We are to assume, then, says Nipperdey, who waxes very sarcastic at his brother editor's expense, that Caesar marched about to amuse himself, and deliberately wasted his time for want of something better to do (*scilicet animi causa ambulavisse Caesarem putabimus et de industria tempus trivisse in summa rerum gerendarum inopia*). Nipperdey concludes that the word *confecto* is spurious, and that Caesar reached Noviodunum in a single march. Long,[5] on the other hand, while admitting with Schneider that *contendere ad* 'properly means to march towards a place', suggests that 'it does not seem to exclude the notion of reaching it also'. No! it does not exclude that notion; but in order that Long's suggestion should have any weight, it would be necessary that *contendit* should in this passage mean the same as *pervenit*. Of course, if this were so, the difficulty presented by the suspected word *confecto* would disappear; and the passage

[1] *B. G.*, ii, 12, § 1. [2] *Caesar*, pp. 60–1. [3] *Caesar*, i, 148–9.
[4] *B. G.*, iv, 4, § 5; 14, § 1; vi, 30, § 1; vii, 56, § 3; 83, § 7.
[5] *Caesar*, p. 119.

would mean 'Caesar led his army into the country of the Suessiones, and, after making a forced march, arrived at Noviodunum'. But *contendit* cannot mean the same as *pervenit*.[1]

Still, Nipperdey's argument involves one difficulty. Caesar began to attack *Noviodunum* immediately after his arrival, and, having failed in an attempt to take it by storm, proceeded *on the same evening* to make preparations for a regular siege. Could he, it might be asked, have done all this if he had already marched 28, or even 24 miles[2] on the same day? It may, however, be replied that, as Schneider says, the word *postridie* proves that Caesar hastened to Noviodunum (*ad oppidum Noviodunum contendit*) on the same day on which he made the *magnum iter*. Similarly Dr. W. G. Rutherford,[3] who also retains the word *confecto*, translates the passage thus, 'the long march accomplished, he hastens to Noviodunum.' It is astonishing that neither of the two editors should have seen that Caesar could not have said that, *after* having made a forced march (*magno itinere confecto*), he 'hastened' *on the same day* to Noviodunum; seeing that the hastening would itself have formed a part of the forced march, and would have changed the *magnum iter* into a *maximum iter*.

But another explanation has been proposed. 'Perhaps,' remarks Mr. Peskett,[4] 'as Vielhaber suggests, this word [*confecto*] is to be explained by the consideration that "we occasionally find *ablativi consequentiae* formed with the participle perfect to express a circumstance which does not precede but accompanies or follows the main action", Madvig, L. G., § 431, obs. 2: in the present passage the forced march is not *prior* to his hastening to Noviodunum but synchronous with it. "Caesar hastened to Noviodunum, making a forced march."' If Caesar reached Noviodunum on the same day on which he made the *magnum iter*—and, considering the force of *postridie*, we must admit that he did—then either we must accept Vielhaber's explanation or with Nipperdey and Meusel we must expunge *confecto*. Whoever is familiar with Caesar's language or will consult the relevant passages in Meusel's lexicon[5] will conclude, without any hesitation that Vielhaber's suggestion is inadmissible. But there remains the difficulty of understanding how, at the end of a *magnum iter*, Caesar's troops could have attempted to take Noviodunum by storm, and then begun their preparations for a regular siege.

[1] In the first edition I put this question: 'Supposing that Caesar had wished to say that he made a forced march, which did not take him the whole way to Noviodunum, and that on the following day he pushed on for Noviodunum, would not the words *magno itinere confecto ad oppidum Noviodunum contendit* have adequately expressed his meaning? And how was he to indicate the terminus of the *iter*, if it had no name?' I now see that, in the case which I supposed, Caesar would have written (magno itinere confecto) *proximo* (or *altero* or *postero*) *die ad oppidum Noviodunum contendit*.

[2] The march would have been shortened by about 4 miles if Caesar encamped near Pontavert.

[3] *Caesar*, p. 59.

[4] Caesar, *B. G.*, ii, 1888, Notes, pp. 26–7.

[5] *Lex. Caes.*, i, 640–2.

[Since I wrote the rough draft of this note, I have remembered that during the Indian Mutiny, Colonel Greathed's column fought the battle of Agra almost immediately after making a forced march of 44 miles, and that the famous corps of Guides went into action at Delhi two hours after they had finished their wonderful march of 580 miles in 22 days. See my *History of the Indian Mutiny*, 5th ed., 1898 (or the reprint of 1904), pp. 339, 392–3.]

The following suggestion may be worth considering. Is it certain that the starting-point of the forced march was Caesar's original camp on the Aisne ? Immediately before describing the march he says that 'towards sunset' the force which he had detached in pursuit of the Belgae stopped and 'returned, in obedience to instructions, to camp' (*sub occasum solis sequi destiterunt seque in castra, ut erat imperatum, receperunt*).[1] Consider what is involved in the assumption that they returned to the original camp. If their pursuit had been directed down the valley of the Aisne, they would have been obliged, after an extraordinarily long day's work and immediately before another prodigious march, to return the whole distance which they had covered between dawn and sunset; while Caesar, although his object was to reach Noviodunum as soon as possible, would needlessly have imposed this heavy labour upon them and imposed both upon them and the rest of the army a march of nearly twice the ordinary length on the next day. Is it not more likely that, instead of sitting idle in camp while the detachment was hard at work, he would have marched down the valley to within a short distance of the frontier of the Suessiones ?

But why did he order the detachment to *return* at all ? If the pursuit was directed down the valley, I cannot answer this question. If, on the other hand, the Suessiones fled, as I have before suggested,[2] down the road towards Laon,[3] the answer is easy. While Caesar moved a few miles down the valley and thus shortened the inevitable *magnum iter*, the detachment would have rejoined him by a road leading to Pontavert or by a road leading to Beaurieux. M. Jullian,[4] however, holds that the various Belgic contingents dispersed at the beginning of their flight, the Bellovaci and the Suessiones going down the valley and all the others towards Laon. The former, he believes, marched by the 'chemin des Dames', on the heights parallel with the right bank of the river. But if so, how could they have failed to detect that Caesar in the valley below was overtaking and outstripping them, and why should they have allowed him to do so ?

[1] *B. G.*, ii, 11, § 6.

[2] See pp. 658–9.

[3] General Creuly (*Bull. de la Soc. acad. de Laon*, xv, 1865, p. 12) conjectures that the Suessiones and the other contingents retreated to La Fère, where (see p. 659, *supra*) he believes that they had concentrated before they began their final march against Caesar; but M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 257, n. 5) rightly objects that the Suessiones would not have had time to make so long a circuit.

[4] *Ib.*, 256, n. 2.

THE BATTLE WITH THE NERVII

I. 1. I have followed Creuly and Bertrand,[1] who carefully examined the course of the Sambre, and on whose notes Napoleon evidently relied, in placing this battle on the left bank, on the heights of Neuf-Mesnil, opposite Hautmont; and before the publication of Napoleon's book von Göler[2] had selected the same site. 'Cette position,' says Desjardins, 'convient en effet assez bien, mais ce n'est pas la seule du cours supérieur de la Sambre qui présente les conditions exigées par le texte; nous n'avons donc pas plus de certitude à cet égard que pour le reste, le texte de César étant, comme toujours, d'une désespérante sobriété de renseignements topographiques.'[3] But Caesar's description, the substance of which I have embodied in pages 76–79 of my narrative, is perfectly clear; and, besides Creuly and Bertrand, Long and Camille Jullian give reasons for believing that the site adopted by von Göler is the only one which exactly corresponds with it. Let us, however, hear what other commentators say.

2. J. Des Roches[4] and V. Gantier[5] find the battle-field at Presles. This place, which is about 8 kilometres, or 5 miles, east of Charleroi, is on the right bank of the Sambre, not, like Napoleon's site, on the left. Gantier maintains that if Caesar had marched against the Nervii by the left bank, he must have crossed the country of the Atrebates before entering that of the Nervii, which would be contrary to his statement[6] that the country of the Nervii, where he entered it, bordered on that of the Ambiani. Furthermore, says Gantier, the western frontier of the Nervii was probably the Scheldt, not, as Napoleon, who is anxious to allow space enough for a march of three days across the Nervian territory[7] to Neuf-Mesnil, maintains, close to Fin and Bapaume. Hautmont, he continues, is only 50 kilometres from the Scheldt: even from Bapaume it is only 80; and this distance is not enough to answer the requirements of Caesar's narrative. Presles satisfies all the conditions: tradition is in favour of Presles; and at Presles, as at Hautmont, antiquarian discoveries have been made. Dewez adds that the name 'Presles', or, as he spells it, 'Prêle,' is derived from *proelium*; and that human bones have been found on the spot. There is no record, he says, of a later battle having been fought there; and we may therefore conclude that the bones are those of men who were killed in the battle with the Nervii. Finally, Des Roches says that the lie of the ground at Presles and the depth of the river correspond with Caesar's description.[8]

[1] *Rev. arch.*, 2e sér., iv, 1861, pp. 453–67.
[2] *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, pp. 75–7.
[3] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 635–6.
[4] *Hist. anc. des Pays-Bas autrichiens*, ii, 1787, pp. 37–40.
[5] *La conquête de la Belgique par Jules César*, 1882, pp. 113–4, 156–64.
[6] *B. G.*, ii, 15, § 2.
[7] *Ib.*, 16, § 1.
[8] *Nouv. mém. de l'Acad. Roy. de Bruxelles*, ii, 1822, pp. 238–9.

These arguments will not bear examination. It is quite possible that, as d'Anville[1] argued, Caesar's statement that the country of the Nervii bordered on that of the Ambiani is not to be taken literally: when he was marching from Samarobriva (Amiens) into the country of the Nervii in 54 B.C. he did cross the country of the Atrebates;[2] and, moreover, on Gantier's theory, he must have crossed the country of the Viromandui before entering that of the Nervii. Finally, it is strange that Gantier should have overlooked the fact, directly pointed out by Caesar,[3] that the legions could not have marched at their ordinary speed across a country intersected by thick hedges which had to be cut through.

The arguments of Des Roches and Dewez are not more convincing than those of Gantier. If the lie of the ground at Presles corresponds with Caesar's description, so does the lie of the ground at Neuf-Mesnil: the name 'Presles' is common to eight places in France alone, and, as Dinaux sensibly remarks, 'nous serions bien embarrassés de leur assigner huit champs de bataille';[4] and the argument drawn from the alleged discovery of bones has been so often used by rival antiquaries on behalf of their pet sites that cautious investigators have come to regard it with suspicion. Besides, ancient weapons, human remains, and rows of graves have also been discovered in the wood of Quesnoy, near Hautmont.[5]

3. Colonel A. Sarrette,[6] who observes that Caesar did not mention Samarobriva in his account of this campaign, and rashly concludes that he did not pass through it, takes him from Breteuil (which he identifies with Bratuspantium) direct to Péronne and thence to Wassigny: there he makes him turn sharply to the right, round the headwaters of the Sambre, advance to Avesnes, and thence move on to Hautmont. In other words, he places the battle-field at the same point of the Sambre as von Göler and Napoleon, but on the opposite bank. Caesar was obliged, he says, to march down the right bank, for fear his communications with the Remi, from whom he drew his supplies, should be cut.

I reply that, separated from the Remi by the Sambre, Caesar would have been in no more danger than he was when he penetrated into the hostile country of Ariovistus, when he invaded the country of the Veneti, when he marched into the heart of Britain, when, in the seventh campaign, he again and again ran risks about supply to gain a great end; or than his lieutenant, Crassus, was when he penetrated far into hostile Aquitania; finally, that, on Colonel Sarrette's theory, his convoys would equally have been exposed to attack from the Viromandui. Besides, as General Creuly asks, what business had Caesar on the right bank of the Sambre? Why should he have gone out of his way to avoid the country which he wished

[1] *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 62.
[2] *B. G.*, v, 46, § 3.
[3] *Ib.*, ii, 17, §§ 4–5.
[4] *Archives hist. et litt. du Nord de la France et du Midi de la Belgique*, 3e sér., iii, 1852, p. 187.
[5] Von Göler, *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 86.
[6] *Quelques pages des comm. de César*, 1863, pp. 102–4 and map facing p. 75.

to invade ? His objective was probably Bagacum (Bavay), the Nervian capital,[1] which lay on the direct road from Samarobriva to the Sambre. Von Moltke, in 1870, might as well have marched for Marseilles or Toulouse, instead of Paris.

4. V. Ganchez[2] finds the battle-field near Hantes-Wihéries, on the right bank of the Sambre, about 20 kilometres, or 12 miles, below Hautmont. He bases his choice on the hypothesis that Caesar marched 20 Roman miles a day ; and in justification of this hypothesis he refers to *B. G.*, v, 47–8. Caesar there tells us that in 54 B.C., on an occasion when everything depended upon speed,[3] he marched 20 miles in one day through the territory of the Nervii. So we are to assume that in 57 B.C., when he had no motive for making haste, he marched 60 miles in three days !

5. Nicholas Le Long points to Landrecies, but gives no reasons.[4] Nor can any be given ; for the country near Landrecies does not correspond with Caesar's description.

6. A. de Vlaminck,[5] following P. G. Baert,[6] decides for the village of La Buissière, about 7 kilometres, or $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles, south-west of Thuin. There is nothing to be said for this site or for Thuin itself, where the battle has also been placed ;[7] and, as Thuin is about 14 and La Buissière about 13 miles further down the Sambre than Neuf-Mesnil, it is unlikely that Caesar could have marched to either place, across such a difficult country, in the time which he mentions.

7. L. Caudet makes Caesar march, after the submission of Samarobriva, to Vermand, establish there a magazine, and then begin his three days' march *per Nerviorum fines*, along the right bank of the Oise. The battle took place, according to Caudet, at Catillon-sur-Sambre.[8]

All this is simply wild imagination. Caudet ignorantly translates *per fines* by ' along the frontier ', whereas of course *fines* means, in this as in almost every other passage where it occurs in Caesar, ' territory,' and *per* means not ' along ' but ' through '.[9]

8. Achaintre,[10] Le Glay,[11] and others believe that Caesar wrote *Sabim* by mistake for *Scaldem*, and that the battle was fought on the banks of the Scheldt. Achaintre argues, first, that Caesar, marching from the country of the Ambiani against the Nervii, would have traversed the district in which are situated Cambrai, Bouchain, and Valenciennes, and thus would necessarily have come to the Scheldt ; secondly, that it is absurd to suppose that, if he had marched to

[1] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., viii, 1863, p. 36.
[2] *Annales de l'Acad. d'arch. de Belgique*, 3e sér., viii, 1882, pp. 422–7.
[3] unum salutis auxilium in celeritate ponebat.
[4] *Hist. eccl. et civ. du diocèse de Laon*, 1783, p. 12.
[5] *Messager des sciences hist. de Belgique*, 1882, p. 385.
[6] *Mém. sur les campagnes de César dans la Belgique*, 1833, p. 58.
[7] *Archives hist. et litt. du Nord de la France et du Midi de la Belgique*, 3e sér., v, 1856, p. 326 ; N. Le Long, *Hist. eccl. et civ. du diocèse de Laon*, p. 12.
[8] *Comptes rendus et mém. du Comité arch. de Senlis*, 2e sér., iv, 1878, pp. 28–9, 34.
[9] See *B. G.*, i, 6, § 4 ; 9, § 4 ; 11, § 1 ; 19, § 1 ; 28, § 1, &c.
[10] *Caesar*, i, 82.
[11] *Mém. de la Soc. d'émulation de Cambrai*, 1830, p. 87.

Neuf-Mesnil, the Nervii would have abandoned the left bank of the Sambre and waited for him on the other side ;[1] and thirdly, that in *B. G.*, vi, 33, § 3, Caesar confounds the Sambre with the Scheldt.

It is difficult to say which of these reasons is the worst. To argue that Caesar, marching from the country of the Ambiani into that of the Nervii, 'would necessarily come to the Scheldt' and not the Sambre, is about on a par with arguing that an invader having effected a landing in England, would 'necessarily' come to the Severn and not the Thames. The second reason is not much better. The Nervii chose the strongest position that they could find. If Caesar had determined to attack it, he would first have had to cross a river. They attacked him from ambush ; and it was all that he could do to avoid defeat. As for the third reason, there is no proof that Caesar ever confounded the Sambre with the Scheldt ;[2] and it is not credible that he should have mistaken the name of a river which was the scene of one of his most memorable exploits.

Le Glay,[3] who finds the battle-field on the hill of Bonavis, opposite Vaucelles, reasons no better than Achaintre. He says that the Nervii, being a brave people, would have defended the threshold of their territory. The answer is that they did not defend the threshold of their territory ; for Caesar says that, when he was still 10 Roman miles from the battle-field, he had already marched for three days across their territory. In order to get over the difficulty presented by the extreme nearness of the site which he selects to Caesar's starting-point, Le Glay asserts that the Romans marched with extreme slowness in order to avoid being surprised. No doubt they marched more slowly than usual, owing to the difficulty of the country ; but I will not believe that they crawled, like old ladies out for an airing.

It has been argued, as Isidore Lebeau[4] remarks, that the Sambre, in that part of its course near which the battle must have taken place, if it took place on the Sambre at all, was not wide (*latissimum*) ; and that there were no marshes in the country of the Nervii such as those in which Caesar says that the non-combatants took refuge, except near the sea-coast. But Lebeau replies that, in Caesar's time, when the climate was much damper than it is now, the country in the neighbourhood of the Sambre must have been constantly flooded, and that the epithet *latissimum* has a purely relative signification. This, however, is no answer to the one reasonable argument which has been brought against the theory that the battle was fought on the Sambre. For Caesar does not only say that the non-combatants took refuge in marshes : he also says that they took refuge in *aestuaria* ; and there is no evidence that the word *aestuaria* can be used of marshes formed by a river which does not flow into the

[1] So also A. Eberz in *Neue Jahrb. f. Philologie*, &c., lxxxv, 1862, p. 221.

[2] See pp. 734–5. Since my first edition was printed the Sabis has actually been identified with the Selle ! See C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 261, n. 2.

[3] *Mém. de la Soc. d'émulation de Cambrai*, 1829, pp. 87, 92–3.

[4] *Archives hist. et litt. du Nord de la France et du Midi de la Belgique*, 3e sér., v, 1856, pp. 315–7.

sea. It must therefore, I think, be admitted that the *aestuaria* to which Caesar refers were formed by the tide. But there is nothing incredible in the hypothesis that the Nervii sent some of their non-combatants to a place of refuge in the remotest parts of their country, while they themselves prepared to defend the all-important line of the Sambre ;[1] and it is incredible that they abandoned the basin of the Sambre, which was the heart of their territory.

The battle, then, was undoubtedly fought somewhere on the left bank of the upper Sambre. But is there any proof that it was fought opposite Hautmont ? Long offers a most ingenious and, I think, almost conclusive proof. ' The banks of the river,' he says,[2] ' opposite to the enemy's left were, as Caesar describes them (c. 27), very high, a statement which is the strongest proof that the site of this great battle has been truly determined. The heights of Neuf-Mesnil . . . descend to the river with a uniform slope ; but at Boussières, a little farther up the stream, the heights which are connected with Neuf-Mesnil terminate on the river in escarpments from sixteen to about fifty feet high, which are not accessible at Boussières, but may be scaled lower down. The bank of the river on the right side opposite to Boussières is flat.'[3] I should add that, as M. Jullian[4] acutely observes, the battle must have been fought at a place where Caesar would have been obliged to cross the Sambre, for the Nervii were awaiting him ; and at Maubeuge, which has always been the strategical point of the river, the valley is crossed by the old Roman road from Bavay to Reims. To every site that has been proposed, except the site opposite Hautmont, the objections are fatal. There is no objection worth considering to the latter, except that, according to Caesar, the Sambre opposite the battle-field was only three feet deep, whereas the depth opposite Hautmont is much more. But the Sambre at Hautmont is deeper now than it was in Caesar's time, because it has been canalized.[5] The site may therefore be regarded as fixed beyond all reasonable doubt.

II. In his description of the battle, Caesar states that he could not see all the legions at once, because thick hedges interrupted the view (*saepibusque densissimis, ut ante demonstravimus, interiectis prospectus impediretur*[6]). A. Eberz contends that this passage is either a gloss or a fiction. Caesar's own words, he says, prove that there were no hedges on the battle-field. He was not stopped by hedges when he moved from the 10th legion to the right wing ; nor were the 9th and 10th legions when they drove the Atrebates down to and across the Sambre.[7]

Now any one who examines the Plan of the battle-field may convince himself that the statement in the *Commentaries* is not *necessarily*

[1] I find that General Creuly has a similar argument in *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., viii, 1863, p. 36.

[2] *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv, 59.

[3] I do not know whether Long wrote from personal observation or followed von Göler (*Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 90).

[4] *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 261, n. 2. [5] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., iv, 1861, p. 457.

[6] *B. G.*, ii, 22, § 1. [7] *Neue Jahrb. f. Philologie*, &c., lxxxv, 1862, p. 221.

false. If there was a hedge in Caesar's way, as he was moving from one part of the field to another, he might have turned it; or, if that was impossible, a few sappers could have cut a passage for him in a trice; and hedges might have run in such a way as to intercept his view and yet not to hinder the free passage of troops moving down or up the slope, to or from the Sambre. It is just possible that the passage of which Eberz complains may be a gloss: but I do not believe that it is a fiction; for I cannot see that Caesar could have had any motive for telling an untruth. The rest of his narrative made it clear that he had allowed himself to be surprised, and that, hedges or no hedges, the difficulties which he had brought upon himself were serious enough. He would not have exaggerated his difficulties by making a statement the falsity of which would have been noticed at once by every officer who had served under him.

III. According to von Göler, Napoleon, and von Kampen, the 10th legion stood on the extreme left of the Roman line. There is no direct evidence for this view; and M. Crain[1] adduces an argument against it. He points out that in chapter 23 Caesar mentions the six legions in three pairs, the 9th and 10th, the 11th and 8th, the 12th and 7th; and he draws attention to the fact that in the first pair the smaller number takes precedence, in the other two the larger. Now it is clear from chapters 25 and 26 that the 7th legion was on the extreme right; and it is therefore probable that the 9th was on the extreme left.[2]

IV. On page 79 of my narrative I have written 'Caesar told the tribunes to bring the two legions gradually closer together, and form them up so as to face the enemy on every side'. The passage on which this sentence is based runs as follows:—*Caesar, cum VII. legionem, quae iuxta constiterat, item urgeri ab hoste vidisset, tribunos militum monuit ut paulatim sese legiones coniungerent et conversa signa in hostes inferrent. Quo facto cum aliis alii subsidium ferrent neque timerent ne aversi ab hoste circumvenirentur, audacius resistere ac fortius pugnare coeperunt.*[3] The exact meaning of the words *conversa signa in hostes inferrent* is doubtful. In *B. G.*, ii, 24, § 4 Caesar says that, before he ordered the manœuvre which I have briefly described, the 7th and 12th legions were almost surrounded (*paene circumventas*), and in 25, § 1, that the Nervii were attacking the 12th legion in front and on either flank (*hostes neque a fronte ex inferiore loco subeuntes intermittere et ab utroque latere instare*). It seems certain, therefore, that the object of the formation which he describes was to enable the two legions to face the enemy on all sides. They certainly had to repel attacks in front and on either flank; and Caesar says that when they had effected the movement which he ordered, they no longer feared an attack in the rear. Roesch gives an ingenious description, which Long[4] reproduces with a plan, of

[1] *Zeitschrift f. d. Gymnasialwesen*, 1866, pp. 485–6.

[2] It is true that in the battle of Pharsalia the 10th was on the extreme left (*B. C.*, iii, 89, § 1); but that does not prove that it occupied the same position in this disorderly fight.

[3] *B. G.*, ii, 26, §§ 1–2.

[4] *Caesar*, pp. 144–5.

a complicated evolution by which the movement may have been effected. Fröhlich[1] supposes that the 7th legion moved to the rear of the 12th, and stood back to back with it. Giesing[2] ridicules this conjecture. 'This going one behind the other,' he says, 'of two legions, which were hemmed in, in front and on the flanks, by a victorious enemy, is quite impossible.' It was only necessary, he adds, for the rear companies of the two legions to turn round and for the wing companies to make a quarter-turn, thus forming a closed parallelogram. I believe that Giesing is right; but it is enough to get a clear general idea of Caesar's meaning.

V. The battle must have been as brief as it was eventful. The Nervii began their charge when they saw the head of the approaching Roman baggage-train, which immediately followed the legions that were already on the ground: the decisive blow was struck by the two legions which had immediately followed the train; and they marched up at their utmost speed to join in the action.[3]

THE ASSAULT ON GALBA'S CAMP AT OCTODURUS

I. Everybody admits that Octodurus was between Martigny-la-Ville and Martigny-Bourg; but the topographical details of the struggle are disputed. De Saulcy maintains that Galba encamped on the right, or eastern, bank of the Dranse, and the Gauls on the left; first, because on the right bank, but not on the left, the Romans would have been near the timber which they required for the camp; secondly, because on the right bank Galba would have cut the communications of the Gauls with the rest of the Veragri and with the Seduni; thirdly, because on the right bank, he would probably have been on the road which led over the Pennine Alps; and fourthly, because the Gauls could not have attacked him from the steep heights that overlook the left bank.[4]

These reasons have no weight. The mere advantage of being a few hundred yards nearer timber would not have led Galba to encamp on the right bank unless it had been advisable, on more important grounds, to do so. Besides, there is timber on the left bank now (1893), south of the vineyards; and why should there not have been then? If on the right bank Galba would have cut the communications of the Gauls with the rest of the Veragri and with the Seduni—and a glance at the map will show that he could not have done so without quitting his camp—the Gauls, on the left bank, would have effectually cut his communications with the two cohorts which he had left among the Nantuates; and in the event of an attack he would have been compelled to cross the Dranse in the face of an enemy, or else to surrender. Finally, the Gauls *could*

[1] *Das Kriegswesen Cäsars*, p. 183, with which cf. A. von Göler, *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 84.
[2] *Neue Jahrb. f. Philologie*, &c., cxlv, 1892, p. 495.
[3] *B. G.*, ii, 19, 26-7
[4] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., iv, 1861, pp. 4–7.

have attacked him from the heights overlooking the left bank. I arrived at this conclusion after examining Blatt 526 of the *Topographischer Atlas der Schweiz* (1 : 50,000); and my conclusion was confirmed by a visit to Martigny. It is true that for a space of about 1,000 yards leading southward up the valley of the Dranse from the so-called Roman tower, the slope of the hill is very steep, and, at certain points, too steep and too rocky to be rapidly descended by armed men: but south of this space the gradient is no steeper than that of the opposite mountain; while in the immediate vicinity of the tower there is a slope which can be easily descended. I think it probable, however, that men were posted on the eastern as well as on the western hills, in order to cut off the Romans from all possibility of escape; and in fact Caesar says that almost all the high ground which dominated the valley was occupied (*omnia fere superiora loca multitudine armatorum completa conspicerentur*).[1] Desjardins holds that Galba must have compelled the Veragri to encamp on the right bank not only of the Dranse, but also of the Rhône;[2] but Caesar says nothing about this. When he says that Galba left one bank of the river, that is of the Dranse, for the Veragri, he doubtless means only the Veragri who inhabited Octodurus.

II. Caesar says that Galba destroyed 10,000 of the enemy.[3] De Saulcy[4] and Desjardins[5] with good reason declare that this is a gross exaggeration. The former remarks that, as the entire population of the country occupied by the Nantuates, Veragri, Seduni, and Viberi amounted, at the time when he wrote (1861), to no more than 81,559 souls, the Seduni and Veragri could not, in Caesar's time, have numbered more than 40,000; and that, deducting women and children, they could not have put more than 10,000 men into the field. Galba, says Desjardins, must have misled Caesar in his report. I should say that he was also misled himself.[6]

TO WHAT TRIBE WAS TERRASIDIUS SENT IN 56 B.C.?

Speaking of the envoys whom Crassus sent in 56 B.C. to make requisitions of corn, Caesar says, according to the α MSS., *quo in numero est T. Terrasidius missus in Esubios, M. Trebius Gallus in Curiosolitas, Q. Velanius cum T. Silio in Venetos.*[7] Instead of *Esubios* the β MSS. have *Unellos Sesuvios.* Napoleon[8] reads *Unellos* simply, on the ground that the geographical position of the Unelli (or rather Venelli), who dwelt in the Cotentin, agrees better with Caesar's narrative than that of the Esuvii, who probably dwelt in the department of the Orne. I cannot understand this argument, unless Napoleon means that the Venelli played a prominent part in the

[1] *B. G.*, iii, 3, § 2.
[2] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 610.
[3] *B. G.*, iii, 6, § 2.
[4] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., iv, 1861, p. 8.
[5] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 610.
[6] See p. 242, n. 10, and p. 342.
[7] *B. G.*, iii, 7, § 4.
[8] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 121, n. 1.

campaign, and that the Esuvii did not. Heller points out that the reading of β cannot be right, first because it is not to be believed that Terrasidius was sent to two peoples, and secondly because *Unellos Sesuvios*, without a conjunction, is nonsense. It is unlikely, he continues, that any copyist would have added *(S)esuvios*, as this people are not mentioned again in the narrative of the campaign. On the other hand, somebody might have inserted *Unellos* for the same reason which I assume to have influenced Napoleon. Therefore it is probable that Caesar wrote *Esuvios*. Besides, argues Heller, the country of the Esuvii (q.v.) is a rich corn-growing district; and it was probably for this reason that Caesar sent Roscius and his legion there in 54 B.C., when there was a drought in Gaul.[1]

THE THEATRE OF THE WAR WITH THE VENETI[2]

I. Caesar says that the Veneti were 'by far the most influential of all the maritime peoples in that part of the country'; that all the ports on the coast, which was exposed to the full force of the open sea, were in their hands; and that almost all the tribes who navigated the sea paid them toll. He goes on to say that, on hearing that the Veneti had committed an act of rebellion, he ordered ships of war to be built on the Loire; and that, as soon as the season was sufficiently advanced, he joined his army, which had been cantoned in the territories of the Carnutes, the Turoni, and the Andes,—that is, along the valley of the Loire, from the neighbourhood of Orléans to the neighbourhood of Angers.[3] The Veneti, he says, assembled their fleet in Venetia; and they were confident of victory, because they knew that the Romans would find it much harder to navigate the vast open Atlantic than the Mediterranean. The roads running through their country were interrupted by estuaries; and their strongholds were situated upon promontories and tongues of land, which were insulated at high water. Caesar, as soon as he had completed his arrangements, made his way with his army into the country of the Veneti, ordering Decimus Brutus to follow as soon as possible with the fleet and also with a number of Gallic ships, borrowed from the Pictones, the Santoni, and other peoples. He besieged and captured a considerable number of the Venetian strongholds; but, as he found that his labour was futile, he determined to wait for his fleet, which had been detained by storms and by the difficulty of navigating in a vast and open sea, where there were hardly any harbours. When the fleet did at last arrive and was sighted by the enemy, they sailed out of port; and the decisive battle, which immediately followed, was witnessed by the Roman legions, who, from the position which they occupied on the cliffs, had a full view of every detail of the fighting.[4]

[1] *Philologus*, xxvi, 1867, p. 667.

[2] Sheets 88, 89, 103, and 104 of the *Carte de l'État-Major* (1 : 80,000) may be consulted.

[3] See p. 709, n. 14.

[4] *B. G.*, ii, 35, § 3; iii, 8, § 1; 9, §§ 1–8; 11, § 5; 12, 14, §§ 1–2, 9.

II. According to Napoleon,[1] whose theory is founded upon a paper written by a naval officer, the Comte de Grandpré,[2] the strongholds of the Veneti which Caesar attacked were situated on the coast of the Morbihan : the Venetian fleet issued from the river Auray to fight the battle : the battle took place in Quiberon Bay off Point St. Jacques ; and the Roman army was encamped meanwhile on the heights of St. Gildas.

The chief opponents of Napoleon's system are MM. Sioc'han de Kersabiec, Kerviler, Blanchard, and Desjardins. They contend that the theatre of the war was the peninsula of Guérande, which lies between the Loire and the Vilaine ; and they naturally endeavour to show that the territory of the Veneti extended southward as far as the Loire.

M. de Kersabiec[3] insists that, according to Caesar, the Veneti possessed all the harbours on the coast of Brittany as far south as the estuary of the Loire. What Caesar really says is that 'the sea being very stormy and open, with only a few scattered harbours, which they keep under their control, they compel almost all who sail those waters to pay toll' (*in magno impetu maris ⟨vasti⟩ atque aperti, paucis portibus interiectis, quos tenent ipsi, omnes fere qui eo mari uti consuerunt habent vectigales*).[4] But it does not follow that the Veneti possessed the seaboard between the Vilaine and the Loire. The natural conclusion to be drawn from Caesar's statement is that they possessed, or were able, owing to their naval strength, to blockade harbours in territory which was not theirs. There would have been no point in saying that they were masters of the harbours in their own country, unless those were the only harbours on the coast to which Caesar alludes. And if they were, de Kersabiec's argument falls flat.

Desjardins[5] urges that writers of the early Middle Ages constantly speak of the country of the Veneti as having extended as far south as the Loire. But, although the Veneti, retreating before the British invaders, may in the fifth century have taken possession of the southern bank of the Vilaine, we have no right to assume that they possessed it in the time of Caesar.

According to Kerviler, the name of *insulae Veneticae*, which, he affirms, is applied by Pliny to the group of islands that extends from Belle-Ile to Noirmoutier, tends to prove that the Veneti possessed the peninsula of Guérande, which is opposite the southern islands of the group.[6] But there is no reason for including Noirmoutier among

[1] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 124–5, 126, n. 2.

[2] *Mém. de la Soc. des ant. de France*, 1820, pp. 325 ff. See also A. M. Blancho, *Guerre maritime de César*, &c., 1890, pp. 12–5, 17.

[3] *Études archéol.*, &c., 1868, pp. 62–3. I omit the refutation, which I gave in the first edition (pp. 664–5), of worthless arguments, depending upon the assumption that Strabo, when he says (iv, 2, § 1) that the Loire discharges between the Pictones and the Namnetes (*μεταξὺ Πικτόνων τε καὶ Ναμνιτῶν ἐκβάλλει*), does not mean 'discharges itself (into the Ocean)', and upon his statement about the priestesses of the so-called Samnitae (q.v.).

[4] *B. G.*, iii, 8, § 1.

[5] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 284–5.

[6] *Comptes rendus de l'Ass^n bretonne*, 1874, p. 46.

the *insulae Veneticae*;[1] and whoever looks at the map will see that, if the Vilaine had been the southern boundary of the Veneti, the name might well have been applied to the more northerly islands.

To sum up. There is no evidence that the territory of the Veneti extended, in Caesar's time, as far south as the Loire; and there is evidence that it did not. Nevertheless, if Caesar was correctly informed, and if he meant precisely what he said, the Veneti did control the harbours, if any existed, on the coast of Guérande. But Caesar says distinctly that he invaded the actual territory of the Veneti; and therefore I conclude that he invaded not the peninsula of Guérande, but only Venetia proper, which lay to the north of it. Still, although I have come to this conclusion, I will examine the arguments by which de Kersabiec and his school have tried to prove that Caesar did not invade the country north of the Vilaine.

III. De Kersabiec[2] argues that the theatre of the war, in its first stage, was an ancient group of quasi-insular headlands on the northern bank of the estuary of the Loire. The modern explorer will look in vain for these headlands, and find nothing in their place but the plain of La Grande-Brière, which is only thinly covered even by the floods of winter; but according to de Kersabiec, the configuration of the coast has completely changed. He holds that Caesar crossed the (assumed) gulf in flat-bottomed boats and captured the (assumed) strongholds; that afterwards, moving westward into the peninsula of Guérande, he captured successively the (assumed) strongholds of Guérande, Saillé, Batz, and Pen-château; that the Veneti finally took refuge in Le Croisic; that their fleet anchored in the Grand-Trait; that the Roman fleet, which had hitherto been weather-bound in a harbour opposite the Grande-Brière, sailed to join Caesar; and that the decisive battle took place off the promontory of Castelli. Napoleon's theory, that the sea-fight took place off the mouth of the Auray, that is to say, some 50 miles from the mouth of the Loire, he covers with ridicule. 'Comment!' he exclaims, 'ces deux flottes qui n'ont aucune communication entre elles, sans s'être donné le mot et *sans se voir*, sont parties toutes les deux le même jour, à la même heure, ont mis le même temps pour franchir une très-grande distance, et sans désemparer et se reposer, se sont rangées en bataille, se sont battues, et tout a été fait en une demi-journée.' All this rhetoric, however, is directed merely against a suggestion of Napoleon's which in no way touches his real argument; and it may safely be disregarded.

But further proof is offered that the theatre of the war could not have been the gulf of the Morbihan. It is nothing less than this,—that in Caesar's time the gulf of the Morbihan did not exist! If, argues Desjardins,[3] it had existed then, it would have had a Roman name. Jules Girard, moreover, affirms that it has been proved by the investigations of MM. Ariondeau and de Closmadeuc that the

[1] See d'Anville, *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 687.
[2] *Études archéol.*, pp. 78, 80–1, 84–7, 89–90.
[3] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, i, 281–3, 304.

bed of the gulf has undergone a subsidence of some 5 or 6 metres. They found knives of flint in a part of the bed which is never exposed even at the lowest tide.[1]

Now I freely admit that there has been subsidence since the time when flint knives were dropped and megalithic monuments were erected in Brittany. Any tourist can verify the fact for himself. There are two stone circles on the islet of Er-Lamic in the gulf of the Morbihan, one of which is only visible when the tide is exceptionally low.[2] But this does not prove that the gulf did not exist in 56 B.C. The flint knives and the stone circles were probably two thousand years old or more, even in Caesar's time. Obviously the facts are consistent with the hypothesis that some of the islands which now stud the surface of the gulf were then headlands insulated at high tide. As Colonel de la Noë suggested, the promontories which Caesar described have disappeared, partly from subsidence, partly from erosion.[3]

The theory that the plain of the Grande Brière was in Caesar's time covered by a gulf is as baseless as the theory that the gulf of the Morbihan did not then exist. The plain of the Grande-Brière produced, at some remote epoch, abundant vegetation. Upon a bed of clay there is a layer of peat 2 metres thick. The surface of the peat is 85 centimetres above the mean level of the sea. The subsoil therefore is hardly more than a metre below this level, and, if the peat did not exist, would only be partially covered during some hours of each tide.[4]

About 500 yards north-east of Bréca, there is a menhir 5 feet 3 inches high, which is submerged by the floods of winter; and E. Orieux points out that on the borders of the plain of the Grande-Brière are various monuments of stone, notably the menhirs of Clos d'Orange and La Vacherie.[5] 'Est-ce,' he asks, 'que sous les eaux on

[1] *Bull. de la Soc. de géogr.*, Sept., 1875, p. 234.

[2] See *Bull. de la Soc. polym. du Morbihan*, 1882, pp. 8–24; and *L'Homme*, i, 1884, p. 421. I do not know whether Professor C. Vallaux is referring to these monuments when he argues (*Annales de géogr.*, xii, 1903, p. 27) that no subsidence can be inferred from 'the fact that certain megaliths . . . are now below the level of high tides', and that, as they were originally built 'on a low coast, almost at the level of the sea', their present position is due simply to 'erosion'. If so, I cannot follow him. The lower of the two circles mentioned in the text was only discovered (in 1872) when the tide was extraordinarily low, and is between 5 and 6 metres below the level of high tides. As M. de Closmadeuc says (*Bull. de la Soc. polym. du Morbihan*, 1882, p. 16), the gently sloping line which is now formed by the southern declivity of the islet of Er-Lamic has no sensible break, and is prolonged uninterruptedly to the base of the stones which form the circle. Therefore, he concludes, the submergence of the circle has not been caused merely by encroachment of the sea, but also by subsidence. See also *Bull. de la Soc. géol. de France*, 4e sér., vi, 1906, pp. 142, 147, and J. Déchelette, *Manuel d'archéologie*, i, 444.

[3] *Bull. de géogr. hist. et descr.*, 1889 (1890), pp. 29–30. Before the publication of my first edition I found that M. Le Moyne de la Borderie (*Hist. de Bretagne*, i, 7) had rejected Desjardins's argument.

[4] *Bull. de géogr. hist. et descr.*, 1889 (1890), pp. 29–30. Cf. *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, 2e pér., lxxix, 1869, p. 432; *Bull. de la Soc. arch. de Nantes*, xxi, 1882, p. 189; and P. de Lisle du Dréneuc, *Des Gaulois venètes*, 1887, pp. 3, 5–7.

[5] *Bull. de la Soc. arch. de Nantes*, xxi, 1882, pp. 185–6. The positions of these monuments are marked on Sheet 104 of the *Carte de l'État-Major* (1 : 80,000).

a construit ces monuments de pierre ? ' [1] Orieux's argument of course is that the level of the Grande-Brière, so far from having risen, as de Kersabiec maintains, since Caesar's time, has actually sunk ; at all events it is lower now than it was when the monuments in question were erected.

The Grande-Brière, then, is out of the question ; and, with the possible exception of the islands of Batz and Le Croisic, there was not a single stronghold on the coast of Guérande which Caesar could not have approached by land at high tide.[2] But even if the campaign began in the peninsula of Guérande, it did not end there. For Caesar distinctly says that he captured *several* of the Venetian strongholds, and that, before his fleet could join him, it had to sail across a ' vast open sea '. His statements can only mean that he penetrated far northward into Venetia. Therefore, even if Venetia included the peninsula of Guérande, it is very probable that he pushed far to the north of it ; and, as it is more than unlikely that Venetia did include the peninsula, the probability amounts to a certainty.

IV. C. de la Monneraye has proposed a compromise.[3] He too contends that Caesar must have penetrated far into Venetia ; but he then brings him back again far to the south, and places the sea-fight off the miniature peninsula enclosed by the entrenchments of St. Lyphard. He argues that when Caesar decided to wait for his fleet, he must have chosen for his encampment some spot near the place where the fleet was to assemble,—that is to say, near the mouth of the Loire ; for otherwise he could not have got supplies. The best place, continues de la Monneraye, would have been the peninsula enclosed by the entrenchments of St. Lyphard. These, he argues, were probably the very fortifications which the legions constructed. He admits that Caesar's statement regarding the difficulty which his admiral experienced in joining him appears to militate against his theory ; but he disposes of this difficulty by appealing to the authority of Dion Cassius. When, he argues, Caesar says that the fleet was weather-bound, he is probably referring to the ships which, according to Dion, were coming from the Mediterranean. Therefore there is no need to assume that there was a ' vast open sea ' between Caesar's camp and the mouth of the Loire. The sea in question was the sea between the mouth of the Loire and the Straits of Gibraltar.

This theory will not bear examination. No unbiased mind could detect in Caesar's narrative anything to warrant the assumption that he marched back from the northernmost of the forts which he captured into the peninsula of Guérande. His commissariat was always perfectly organized ; and if he was able to feed his army during the time which he spent in reducing the forts of the Veneti, there was no reason why he should not be able to feed it during the time that he passed in waiting for his fleet. To assume that the ' retranchements ' of St. Lyphard are the remains of his camp is simply a wild

[1] *Bull. arch. de l'Ass[n] bretonne*, 3[e] sér., vii, 1887, p. 27. See also *Bull. de la Soc. arch. de Nantes*, xix, 1880, pp. 61–4 ; xxi, 1882, p. 215.

[2] *Ib.*, xix, 1880, p. 63.

[3] *Géogr. de la péninsule armoricaine*, pp. 149–52, 156, 166–7.

guess. Finally, the authority of Dion Cassius, where it contradicts the authority of Caesar, is worth nothing. For these reasons I believe not only that Caesar penetrated into Venetia far to the north of Guérande, but also that the sea-fight took place in some higher latitude.

V. This is also the view of P. de Lisle du Dréneuc.[1] He maintains that cliffs answering to Caesar's description of those from which the Roman legions watched the battle are not to be found until, moving towards the north, one approaches the Pointe du Raz, the seaward termination of the northern frontier of Venetia. Accordingly he maintains that the battle took place off the 'Pointe de la Cornouaille'. But Caesar's description of the place from which he watched the battle is vague: he simply tells us that he watched it from high ground overlooking the sea, and that in the vicinity of his camp there was a harbour. As he says that, after the battle, the survivors had no means of defending the strongholds which had not yet been captured, one might be inclined to argue that he had not advanced nearly as far as the northern frontier of the Veneti. On the other hand, it is possible that the strongholds of which he speaks did not belong to the Veneti, but to their allies.[2] Be this, however, as it may, I find it difficult to reconcile the theory that Brutus had sailed so far northward as the Pointe de la Cornouaille with Caesar's narrative.

After studying the whole literature of the question, I conclude that the theory which Napoleon borrowed from the Comte de Grandpré, although its truth cannot be demonstrated, is highly probable.[3] M. Jullian,[4] however, although he admits that it may be right even in detail, differs from Napoleon on one important point. Contrary to the prevailing opinion, he believes that Caesar penetrated into Venetia not from the south but from the north of the gulf of the Morbihan: he thinks that Caesar watched the battle not from the heights of St. Gildas but from the peninsula of Locmariaquer, on the opposite bank of the estuary of the Auray; and he suggests that the Venetian fleet may have put out to sea not from the Auray but from Port Navalo,—a roadstead off the peninsula of Sarzeau and between St. Gildas and Locmariaquer. He argues, first, that the northern district—Vannes, Auray, and Hennebont—has always been the centre of the economic, political, and religious life of Venetia; secondly, that if Caesar had come from the south, he would have risked being blockaded in the peninsula of Sarzeau; thirdly, that the 'spits and headlands' (*lingulis promunturiisque*)[5] on which the strongholds which he attacked were situated, were principally on the northern coast of the gulf; fourthly, that the mention of the 'shoals, harbours, and islands' (*vada, portus, insulas*)[6] which were the theatre

[1] *Des Gaulois venètes*, pp. 8–9.
[2] Cf. *B. G.*, iii, 9, § 3.
[3] It may or may not be true that, as Tranois affirmed (*Mém. de la Soc. arch. . . . des Côtes-du-Nord*, i, 1852, pp. 363, 365, 367), traces of the dykes which Caesar built when he was besieging the strongholds of the Veneti still existed in 1852 at the islands of Conlo, Goalabre, and Gavernis.
[4] *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 295, n. 6, 297, n. 7.
[5] *B. G.*, iii, 12, § 1.
[6] *Ib.*, 9, § 6.

of the war makes us think of the gulf rather than of the coast of Sarzeau ; fifthly, that the ' roads interrupted by estuaries ' (*pedestria itinera concisa aestuariis*[1]) correspond with the route which leads from Blain past Rieux and Elven to Vannes, Auray, and Hennebont ; and, lastly, that the topography of Locmariaquer and Port-Navalo agrees better than the sites adopted by Napoleon with certain details in Dion Cassius's description of the battle,[2] which M. Jullian prefers to that of Caesar.

I do not share M. Jullian's appreciation of Dion's description ; but his other arguments demand attention. None of them, as far as I can see, is really opposed to Napoleon's opinion. Whatever route Caesar may have followed, he doubtless intended originally to penetrate to the political centre of Venetia ; I question whether he would have run the slightest risk of being blockaded in the peninsula of Sarzeau, for he was too strong, and the Veneti, who belonged to the ' Blue Water School ', had staked their fortunes on the sea ; he was originally prepared to attack every stronghold that might defy him, and there was nothing to prevent him from attacking the strongholds north of the gulf even if he entered Venetia from the south ; the Vilaine had a considerable estuary, and if he had pushed far into Venetia, he would necessarily, even if he had come from the south, have met with other estuaries, and may have actually done so before he desisted from the fruitless labour of besieging elusive garrisons. No certain decision, as M. Jullian wisely acknowledges, is attainable ; but what leads me to adhere to the current opinion is the belief that Caesar must have wished to keep in touch with Brutus and the fleet, and therefore would not have cut himself off from them by marching far away from the Loire in order to enter Venetia from the north.

CAESAR'S OPERATIONS AGAINST THE VENETI

I. Caesar describes the dykes which he constructed for the purpose of capturing the strongholds of the Veneti, in these words :— *si quando, magnitudine operis forte superati, extruso mari aggere ac molibus atque his oppidi moenibus adaequatis suis fortunis desperare coeperant*,[3] &c. Napoleon,[4] following von Göler, interprets this passage as follows :—' the Romans constructed two parallel dykes. . . . During the process of construction, the space between the two dykes was regularly inundated at high tide ; but as soon as the besiegers had brought them into contact with the stronghold, the water could no longer find its way into the space, and it served them as a kind of " place d'armes ".' Thomann,[5] however, agrees with Rüstow in questioning the necessity for two dykes, and justly remarks that Caesar's text does not support von Göler's view.

[1] *B. G.*, iii, 9, § 4.
[2] xxxix, 41–3.
[3] *B. G.*, iii, 12, § 3.
[4] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 124–5.
[5] *Der französische Atlas zu Cäsars gall. Kriege*, p. 22.

II. Did Caesar employ any ships while he was besieging the Venetian strongholds ?

'The Romans,' says Long,[1] describing the battle between the Roman fleet and that of the Veneti, '*in previous conflicts*[2] had discovered that they could not injure the enemy's ships by the beaks of their vessels.' The passages upon which he bases this statement are, *rostro enim noceri non posse cognoverant*, which occurs in Caesar's narrative of the battle,[3] and—in the general description of the Venetian ships[4]—*neque enim iis nostrae rostro nocere poterant, tanta in iis erat firmitudo* ; and accordingly, when Caesar writes that, after capturing a number of the Venetian strongholds, he determined to wait for his fleet,[5] Long explains, 'He means all his fleet, the complete fleet.' Of course he does : but he does not mean that he already had a part of the fleet with him ; for he says distinctly[6] that the weather was too stormy for his ships to put to sea. Also, after telling us that he placed Decimus Brutus in command of the fleet, which he had ordered to assemble in the estuary of the Loire, he says that he marched in person for Venetia with the land forces (*D. Brutum adulescentem classi Gallicisque navibus, quas ex Pictonibus et Santonis reliquisque pacatis regionibus convenire iusserat, praeficit et cum primum possit, in Venetos proficisci iubet. Ipse eo pedestribus copiis contendit*).[7] Not a word to show that he sent on any ships to meet him. Besides, if he had been foolish enough to employ a part of his fleet, any that escaped shipwreck would have been destroyed by the powerful fleet of the enemy. His meaning is clear enough. In the two passages which Long quotes he is simply stating, as a fact, that the enemy's ships were too stout to be rammed by his light galleys. Immediately before the second passage he writes that the only advantage which his fleet had over the enemy's ships was in speed (*cum his navibus nostrae classi eius modi congressus erat ut una celeritate et pulsu remorum praestaret*).[8] It is clear that this is only a general statement, and does not mean that the enemy's fleet and Caesar's fleet, or any part of it, came to blows before the decisive battle ; because a few lines further on, Caesar, using the word *classis* again, says that he was obliged to wait for his fleet. A moment's reflection might have convinced Long that the word *cognoverant* does not support his argument ; for it is obvious that Brutus and his officers, who had been weather-bound for weeks and had only just arrived upon the scene of action, could not have 'discovered in previous conflicts that they could not injure the enemy's ships by the beaks of their vessels'. *They*, at all events, had not engaged in any 'previous conflicts' ; and the same storms which had prevented them from putting to sea would probably have also prevented any of the imaginary ships which might have engaged in 'previous conflicts' from communicating with them.' Is it credible that, if Caesar

[1] *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv, 112.
[2] The italics are mine.
[3] *B. G.*, iii, 14, § 4.
[4] *Ib.*, 13, § 8.
[5] Compluribus expugnatis oppidis Caesar . . . statuit expectandam classem. *Ib.*, 14, § 1.
[6] *Ib.*, 12, § 5.
[7] *Ib.*, 11, § 5.
[8] *Ib.*, 13, § 7.

had used ships when he was besieging the Venetian forts, he would have said that the Veneti were able to escape in their ships from one port to another because the Roman ships were prevented by storms from joining him (*quod nostrae naves tempestatibus detinebantur*)? And if the fleet, as a whole, was unable to put to sea, how could individual ships belonging to that fleet have encountered the storm with impunity? *Cognoverant* means not 'they had discovered (in previous conflicts)', but 'they had ascertained' (by inquiry[1] or by inspecting Gallic ships in the estuary of the Loire).

Blanchard, indeed, says that we may gather from the narrative of Dion Cassius that Caesar did employ ships when he was besieging the Venetian *oppida*.[2] But Caesar himself distinctly says that it would have been impossible to do so.[3] What Dion says is that when Caesar marched for Venetia, he conveyed a number of ships, specially constructed to stand the ebb of the tide, which he had caused to be built 'in the interior', down the Loire.[4] But Dion, as usual, misunderstood Caesar, and invented. Caesar says that when he marched for Venetia, he put Brutus in command of the Roman fleet and of the ships of the Pictones and Santoni, and ordered him to set sail as soon as he could.[5] If Dion is right, the ships which were built on the Loire set sail at once in spite of the storms, while Brutus remained weather-bound with the rest of the fleet. As a matter of fact, it is plain from Caesar's narrative that Brutus's fleet included the ships which had been built on the Loire. Dion, however, says that after Caesar had spent nearly the whole summer in besieging the Venetian strongholds, Brutus arrived with his fleet from the Mediterranean! This ridiculous fiction flatly contradicts Caesar's narrative. Evidently Dion imagined that the ships which were built on the Loire were flat-bottomed, like those of the Veneti; whereas Caesar expressly says that they were galleys (*naves longae*).[6]

III. Napoleon[7] says that the Venetian fleet was more numerous than the Roman: Thomann[8] holds that Caesar's statement that certain Venetian ships were hemmed in, each by two and, in some cases, three Roman ones,[9] proves the contrary. Thomann's argument is futile; for the Romans may have destroyed their unwieldy opponents in detail; but there is nothing to show which of the two fleets was numerically the stronger.

[1] Schneider (*Caesar*, i, 255) denies that *cognosco* can bear this meaning, unless it relates to an event which has actually happened (*nisi ad rem factam relatum*). But refer to *B. G.*, v, 19, §§ 1–2, and you will see that Schneider is wrong.

[2] *Bull. de la Soc. arch. de Nantes*, xxii, 1883, p. 166.

[3] Erant eius modi fere situs oppidorum, ut posita in extremis lingulis promunturiisque neque pedibus aditum haberent . . . neque navibus, quod rursus minuente aestu naves in vadis adflictarentur. *B. G.*, iii, 12, § 1. On the force of the subjunctive *adflictarentur* see Schneider's *Caesar*, i, 245.

[4] αὐτὸς ἐπὶ τοὺς Οὐενετοὺς ἤλασε· καὶ πλοῖα ἐν τῇ μεσογείᾳ, ἃ ἥκουεν ἐπιτήδεια πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὠκεανοῦ παλίρροιαν εἶναι, κατασκευάσας, διά τε τοῦ Λίγρου ποταμοῦ κατεκόμισε. xxxix, 40, § 3.

[5] *B. G.*, iii, 11, § 5.

[6] *Ib.*, 9, § 1.

[7] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 126, n. 2.

[8] *Der französische Atlas*, &c., pp. 23–4.

[9] cum singulas binae ac ternae naves circumsteterant. *B. G.*, iii, 15, § 1.

IV. Dion's account of the battle[1] differs, in certain respects, from Caesar's; and when they differ, MM. de la Monneraye and Jullian[2] prefer the testimony of Dion. In my essay on 'The Credibility of Caesar's Narrative' (pages 236–237) I have criticized Dion's account.

WHERE DID SABINUS ENCAMP WHEN HE INVADED THE COUNTRY OF THE VENELLI?

Napoleon[3] places the camp of Sabinus 'on a hill [Châtelier], about 4 miles east of Avranches, belonging to the line of heights which separates the basin of the Sée from that of the Célune'. A Roman camp has been discovered there; but Napoleon admits that it was probably made at a time later than that of the conquest of Gaul. L. Fallue says that local tradition identifies the camp with Montcastre;[4] but local tradition is easily manufactured, and usually originates in the opinion of some local antiquary. Moreover, the area of this camp is 40 hectares, or about 100 acres, which, tested by the standard of Caesar's camp at Gergovia, would have been much too large for Sabinus's three legions. 'Sabinus,' says Caesar, 'made his way into the country of the Venelli' (*in fines Venellorum pervenit*[5]). L. Mayeux-Doual,[6] misunderstanding the meaning of *fines*, says that the camp must have been on the frontier of the Venelli, and places it at Champrepus, which, he says, answers exactly to Caesar's description. Perhaps it does; but so do other places in the country of the Venelli. It is useless to attempt to fix the site;[7] for Caesar tells us nothing about the camp, except that it was in the country of the Venelli, and on high ground, which sloped gently down for the distance of about one Roman mile to the plain.[8]

CRASSUS'S ATTACK ON THE AQUITANIAN CAMP

W. Paul, remarking that the four cohorts which attacked the Aquitanian camp in the rear made their way thither quickly, in spite of the long *détour* which they took in order to avoid observation, argues that they must have ridden to the scene of action on horseback.[9] Caesar's account runs as follows:—*Crassus equitum praefectos cohortatus ut magnis praemiis pollicitationibusque suos excitarent, quid fieri vellet ostendit. Illi, ut erat imperatum, eductis iis cohortibus, quae praesidio castris relictae intritae ab labore erant, et*

[1] xxxix, 41–3. [2] *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 297, n. 4.
[3] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 129, 130, note 1.
[4] *Études arch. sur l'hist. de Jules César par . . . Napoléon III*, 1867, p. 30.
[5] *B. G.*, iii, 17, § 1. [6] *Mém. hist.*, 1876, pp. 259–72.
[7] M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 301, n. 6) offers us a choice among three, including Châtelier and Champrepus, but himself prefers Vire—'grand carrefour de routes'—about 33 miles east of Granville.
[8] *B. G.*, iii, 17, § 1, 19, § 1. [9] *Berl. phil. Woch.*, v, 1885, col. 1185–6.

longiore itinere circumductis, ne ex hostium castris conspici possent, omnium oculis mentibusque ad pugnam intentis, celeriter ad eas quas diximus munitiones pervenerunt,[1] &c. On this Paul observes that Caesar never uses *educo* in the *Gallic War* in its present sense without mentioning the point of departure: accordingly he proposes, as an emendation, *devectis*.

This is a striking instance of the perverted ingenuity which is responsible for many of the conjectural emendations that swarm in German periodicals. *Celeriter* is a relative term, and simply means that the cohorts made haste. And if Caesar does not use *educo* in the sense required in any other passage in the *Gallic War* without mentioning the point of departure, he does so in no less than eight passages in the *Civil War*, namely in i, 41, § 2; 64, § 6; 81, § 4; iii, 41, § 1; 54, § 2; 64, § 6; 67, § 3; 81, § 4; and 85, § 4.

[Meusel holds that the words *Illi, ut erat imperatum, eductis iis cohortibus quae*, &c., are inconsistent with *Crassus equitum praefectos . . . ostendit*, for it seems to him inexplicable that cavalry officers should have commanded infantry; and accordingly he supposes that between *imperatum* and *eductis* some words have been lost.[2] But is not Schneider's explanation (*Caesar*, ii, 286–7) satisfactory? Crassus, he says, requested his cavalry officers to pick out the troopers who knew the ground best, to employ them as guides for the cohorts, and to stimulate their zeal by rewards and promises.]

DID CAESAR ATTACK THE MORINI OR THE MENAPII IN 56 B.C.?

Caesar says that he intended to attack both the Morini and the Menapii;[3] and Napoleon[4] carelessly infers from his narrative that he actually did so. But close study will show that he invaded the territory of one only of the two tribes; and a passage in *B. G.*, iv, 38, §§ 1–2,[5] proves that, as we might expect from their geographical position, it was the Morini whom he attacked, not the Menapii.

WHERE DID THE USIPETES AND TENCTERI CROSS THE RHINE?

Caesar says that the Usipetes and Tencteri crossed the Rhine 'not far from the sea' (*non longe a mari*), and that, at the point where they crossed it, the country on both banks belonged to the Menapii.[6]

[1] *B. G.*, iii, 26, §§ 1–2.
[2] *Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xi, 1885, p. 201.
[3] *B. G.*, iii, 28, § 1. [4] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 134–5.
[5] Caesar postero die T. Labienum legatum cum iis legionibus quas ex Britannia reduxerat in Morinos qui rebellionem fecerant misit. Qui cum propter siccitates paludum quo se reciperent non haberent, quo perfugio superiore anno erant usi, omnes fere in potestatem Labieni venerunt.
[6] *B. G.*, iv, 1, § 1; 4, § 2.

General Creuly[1] holds that by *Rhenum* Caesar meant the Meuse below its junction with the Waal at Gorkum, a view which I have combated on page 370.[2] If the Usipetes and Tencteri crossed the Rhine anywhere below the point where the Waal diverged from the main stream, they must have crossed either the Waal or, if they crossed the lower Meuse at the point which Creuly indicates, the Meuse as well; but of two passages Caesar says nothing. Fölir remarks that if Caesar used the word *Rhenum* in its strict sense, the passage must have taken place above the first bifurcation of the Rhine;[3] and this is the common opinion. It has been objected that, in that case, the words *non longe a mari* would be inaccurate; but *longe* is a relative term, and, in relation to the whole length of the Rhine, Emmerich or Cleve might fairly be described as 'not far from the sea'. On the left bank of the Rhine, above its first bifurcation, between Xanten and Nymegen, there is a chain of heights. The only practicable points of passage for the Germans would have been at Xanten itself and lower down, near Cleve. Napoleon[4] asserts that they crossed at both these points. It would appear, however, from Caesar's narrative[5] that they crossed at one point only; and, having regard to the words *non longe a mari*, it seems reasonable to look for that point as near the sea as possible. I feel little hesitation, then, in concluding that the Usipetes and Tencteri crossed the Rhine near Cleve.[6]

ON A DIFFICULTY RAISED BY G. LONG REGARDING ONE OF CAESAR'S REASONS FOR ATTACKING THE USIPETES AND TENCTERI

Stating his reasons for having determined, after the treacherous attack of their cavalry upon his, to march against the Usipetes and Tencteri without further delay, Caesar writes:[7] *cognita Gallorum infirmitate, quantum iam apud eos hostes uno proelio auctoritatis essent consecuti sentiebat; quibus ad consilia capienda nihil spatii dandum existimabat. Gallorum*, according to Long,[8] means Caesar's Gallic cavalry, 'for . . . the defeat of the cavalry could have no immediate effect on those Galli who were at a distance.' But it is contrary to Caesar's practice to speak of his Gallic cavalry by the

[1] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., viii, 1863, pp. 27–8.

[2] Heller (*Philologus*, xxii, 1865, pp. 131–2) remarks that the territory on the right bank of the lower Meuse belonged not to the Menapii but to the Batavi; but this argument is obsolete. It is very doubtful whether the Batavi occupied this country in Caesar's time: at all events, it is most improbable that the only passage in the *Commentaries* in which they are mentioned—iv, 10, § 1—was written by Caesar. See p. 692, n. 2.

[3] *Rhein. Archiv*, iv, 1811, p. 235.

[4] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 137, n. 1.

[5] *B. G.*, iv, 1, § 1, 4.

[6] Cf. von Göler, *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 113. M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 325, n. 3; 328, n. 5) decides for Xanten.

[7] *B. G.*, iv, 13, § 3.

[8] *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv, 155.

generic name of 'Galli': [1] they were not likely to side with the invaders by whom they had just been so roughly handled: if they had attempted to do so, the legions would have crushed them in five minutes; and, as Caesar tells us in a later book [2] that the news of an important event could travel 160 (Roman) miles between sunrise on a winter's day and eight o'clock at night, the defeat of the cavalry could have had a very 'immediate effect on those Galli who were at a distance'.

WHERE WERE THE USIPETES AND TENCTERI DEFEATED?

The question which I am going to discuss is the most complicated and difficult that Caesar's memoirs present. Broadly speaking, three solutions have been propounded:—(1) that the Usipetes and Tencteri fled to one or the other of the known confluences of the Meuse and the Waal or to some point in the neighbourhood of one or the other; (2) in spite of the statement of the text,[3] that they fled to the confluence of the Rhine and the Moselle; and (3) that they fled to the confluence of the Meuse with some river unknown. Let us see, first of all, what Caesar has to say.

I. The Usipetes and Tencteri crossed the Rhine, not far from the sea, took possession of all the buildings of the Menapii, passed the winter in their country, and fed on their stores. On hearing of their incursion, Caesar proceeded to join his legions and, as soon as he reached their quarters, learned that the Germans had wandered further south and reached the territories of the Eburones and Condrusi. When his preparations were complete, he marched towards the district where he heard that the Germans were; and when he was within a few days' march of their whereabouts, their envoys met him. The envoys undertook to convey his ultimatum to their principals, and to return with their answer in three days. Caesar was aware, at the time when he was parleying with the envoys, that the German cavalry were in the country of the Ambivariti, on the opposite side of the Meuse, whither they had gone to plunder and collect corn.[4] Immediately after the passage in which he mentions this movement the narrative is interrupted by the well-known paragraph which describes the course of the Meuse. In the good MSS. it runs as follows:—*Mosa profluit ex monte Vosego, qui est in finibus Lingonum, et parte quadam ex Rheno recepta, quae appellatur Vacalus insulamque efficit Batavorum, in Oceanum influit neque longius ab Oceano milibus passuum LXXX in Rhenum influit.* The words *que* and *in Oceanum influit* are absent from certain inferior MSS.: instead

[1] I can only discover one passage (*B. G.*, vii, 13, § 2) in which he does so; and there his meaning is unmistakable. See Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, i, 1664–9.
[2] *B. G.*, vii, 3, §§ 2–3.
[3] Germani . . . cum ad confluentem Mosae et Rheni pervenissent, &c. *Ib.*, iv, 15, § 2.
[4] *Ib.*, 1, § 1; 4–9.

of *ab Oceano* the Aldine edition has *ab eo* and Vind D. *ab Rheno*; and both Vind D. and the Aldine edition have *in Oceanum* instead of *in Rhenum*. Accordingly Nipperdey[1] conjectures that Caesar wrote *insulam efficit Batavorum neque longius ab Rheno milibus passuum LXXX in Oceanum influit*. The authenticity of the description has, however, long been suspected; and Meusel has recently given reasons for rejecting it which seem wellnigh conclusive.[2] Still, it would hardly be safe to set it aside as having no historical value. The various readings only concern us in so far as they affect the question where the Meuse was joined by the Waal.[3] If the inter-

[1] *Caesar*, pp. 75–6.

[2] *Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xxxvi, 1910, pp. 23–6. Meusel argues that the description of the Rhine is irrelevant; that the Meuse rises not in the Vosges, but on the plateau of Langres, both of which regions Caesar had visited; that the Vosges is not *in finibus Lingonum*; that F. Stolle has given strong reasons for believing that the Batavi did not occupy the delta of the Rhine before the time of Augustus; that the Rhine did not flow through the country of the Nantuates (cf. pp. 454–5, *supra*); that the geographical position of the Triboci is mis-stated; that in the list of the Cisrhenane tribes the Rauraci, Nemetes, and Vangiones are ignored; that the statement that the Rhine, as it approaches the sea, 'branches off into several channels and forms numerous large islands' (*in plures diffluit partes multis ingentibusque insulis effectis*) is absurdly false; that, as the Menapii occupied both banks of the Rhine 'not far from the sea', there would have been no room for the Batavi and the 'fierce rude tribes', who are said to have occupied 'many' of the 'numerous large islands'; that Caesar would not have written *parte quadam ex Rheno*, but *parte Rheni*; and, finally, that *caput fluminis* elsewhere [in prose ?] means not the mouth, but the source of a stream. *Caput* is, indeed, used in the sense of *ostium* in Livy, xxxiii, 41, § 7, xxxvii, 18, § 6, 37, § 3, not to mention poets (see *Thesaurus ling. Lat.*, iii, 410); but in the face of Meusel's array of objections it will not be denied that the chapter is at least open to grave suspicion. I am rather inclined, however, to believe that Dion (xxxix, 49) may have found the passage in his copy of Caesar; and if so, the interpolation, assuming that it existed, must have been much earlier than Meusel believes. I should add that Strabo names the same tribes, except the Nantuates and the Batavi, in connexion with the river as the writer of *B. G.*, iv, 10, and names them in the same order; and he remarks that Asinius Pollio blamed those writers who said that the Rhine had more than two mouths. Also, like the writer of iv, 10, he observes that the Rhine is swift. Meusel, emphasizing Strabo's omissions, points out that he does mention the Menapii; and he urges that there is no need to suppose that either of the two writers copied the other, that the Latin writer may have copied Strabo, and that Asinius Pollio may not have referred to Caesar. All this is true: but while Meusel is justified in concluding that 'the proof of the authenticity of the chapter is not made good', it is equally true that spuriousness is not absolutely proved.

[A. Klotz (*Caesarstudien*, pp. 36–43, 135–8), who argues in much the same sense as Meusel, thinks that the chapter was derived mainly, through Strabo, from Timagenes. He remarks that Caesar does not couple the Batavi in *B. G.*, iii, 28, § 1 with the Menapii and the Morini,—the tribes which, 'while all the rest of Gaul was tranquillized, remained in arms'; that he would have written *longius* immediately before *milibus passum LXXX*; that he would not have used the quasi-poetical expression, *citatus fertur*, or the passive, *incolitur*; and above all, that the territory of the *Mediomatrici* did not touch the Rhine. I do not underrate the combined force of these assaults, though I regard the linguistic arguments as individually weak: but the Menapii might well have had lands on both sides of the Rhine and a seaboard without possessing the *insula Batavorum*; and it is impossible to prove that the Mediomatrici were separated from the Rhine.]

[3] In the first edition (p. 680, n. 4) I minutely examined the arguments by

polator wrote *neque longius ab eo milibus passuum LXXX in Oceanum influit*, *eo* means *Vacalo*,[1] and he meant that from the point where the Waal joined the Meuse, the Meuse flowed 80 Roman miles to the sea. If he wrote *neque longius ab Oceano milibus passuum LXXX in Rhenum influit*, he may possibly have meant that the Meuse, after joining the Waal at Fort St. Andries, flowed on till it rejoined the Waal (considered as a branch of the Rhine) at Gorkum, and thence (under the name of the Rhine [2]) flowed 80 miles to the sea : but it is not certain that the confluence at Gorkum existed in Caesar's time ; and Napoleon[3] concludes from a 'study of the deserted beds of the Rhine' that the Waal then joined the Meuse at Fort St. Andries, and that the channel of the Waal which is now prolonged to the east of Fort St. Andries did not then exist. Walckenaer maintains that the words *in Rhenum influit* refer to the junction of the Meuse with the Waal at Fort St. Andries, and that, from the point of junction, the Meuse flowed 80 miles to the sea. The former interpretation is consistent with the theory that the Meuse in Caesar's time, as before 1856, joined the Waal by a connecting channel at Fort St. Andries [4] and again joined it at Gorkum,—if we assume that the interpolator made a mistake in speaking of 80 miles : but it is inconsistent with the statements of Tacitus, who says (1) that the

which the various readings have been defended ; but, considering that the passage is most probably spurious, I do not think it necessary for historical purposes to reprint the note.

[1] C. Müller, in his edition of Ptolemy (*Geogr.*, i, 221), holds that *eo* means *Rheno*, and that the writer was speaking of the distance from the mouth of the Meuse to the western mouth of the Rhine. In this opinion he is, I believe, alone.

[2] General Creuly (*Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., viii, 1863, pp. 27–8), remarking that Tacitus (*Ann.*, iii, 6) speaks of the Meuse, below its junction with the Waal, as *Mosa*, argues that Caesar's statement—*Mosa . . . in Oceanum influit, neque longius ab Oceano milibus passuum LXXX in Rhenum influit*—proves that it was also called *Rhenus*. 'La plume rapide de l'écrivain,' he says, 'verse la Meuse dans l'Océan, puis elle se rectifie en faisant couler d'abord la Meuse dans le Rhin.' Creuly refers to Tacitus (*Hist.*, v. 23), who says *Mosae fluminis os amnem Rhenum oceano affundit.*

[3] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 143, n. 1 and Planche 14. M. Reclus (*Nouv. Géogr. Univ.*, iv, 218) as well as Napoleon denies that the Meuse, in Caesar's time, joined the Waal at Gorkum : it flowed on, he says, towards the west in the bed of the Oude-Maas. Cf. *Rev. d'hist. et d'arch.*, i, 1859, pp. 296–303. On the other hand, A. Belpaire (*Étude sur la formation de la plaine maritime depuis Boulogne jusqu'a Danemark*, 1855, pp. 200–1) concludes that the Meuse 's'est toujours dirigé vers Gorcum . . . ou que la branche, dirigée par Heusden . . . a dû s'oblitérer à une époque bien antérieure à celle de . . . 1421 [the year of the great inundation] de manière à être définitivement abandonnée par les eaux à cette époque'. His argument is as follows : 'Ce qui est de nature à jeter le plus grand doute sur la réalité de l'ancien cours de la Meuse par Heusden et Geertruidenberg c'est que si l'inondation de 1421 avait eu pour effet d'attirer . . . les eaux du Waal vers le Hollandsdiep, à bien plus forte raison les eaux de la Meuse qui auraient dans ce cas été traversées par l'inondation, auraient dû être attirées du même côté et par conséquent le cours prétendu par Heusden, au lieu de se fermer comme on soutient qu'il l'a fait à la suite de l'inondation de 1421, aurait dû s'accroître de manière à devenir le seul débouché des eaux de la Meuse. Est-il croyable que ce soit l'inverse qui ait eu lieu, et que la branche qui s'éloignait de l'inondation se soit accrue au dépens de celle qui s'y rendait directement ?'

[4] See p. 695.

sea bounded the western side of the *insula Batavorum*, and the Rhine its rear and sides (*insulam . . . quam mare Oceanus a fronte, Rhenus amnis tergum et latera circumluit*), and (2) that, at the beginning or eastern extremity of the island, the Rhine divides into two branches ; that the northern branch flows direct to the sea ; that the southern branch, under the name of *Vahalis*, flows on until it joins the Meuse ; and that the Meuse flows on until it joins the sea (*Rhenus . . . apud principium agri Batavi velut in duos amnes dividitur, servatque nomen et violentiam cursus, qua Germaniam praevehitur, donec Oceano misceatur : ad Gallicam ripam latior et placidior adfluens ; verso cognomine Vahalem accolae dicunt ; mox id quoque vocabulum mutat Mosa flumine, eiusque immenso ore eundem in Oceanum effunditur*).[1] In other words, the statement of Tacitus, except in the fact that it does not specify any distance, harmonizes with the reading *neque longius ab eo* [that is *Vacalo*] *milibus passuum LXXX in Oceanum influit* ; and I agree with Long,[2] who says that the meaning of *B. G.*, iv, 10, § 1, ' appears to be that the island of the Batavi was formed by the Waal . . . the Mosa, and the main stream of the Rhine '. But the point which I wish to emphasize is this : whatever reading we adopt, unless it be Nipperdey's conjecture, the interpolator places the junction, or a junction, of the Meuse and the Waal at a point about 80 Roman miles from the sea.[3]

Continuing his narrative, Caesar says that he had got within 12 Roman miles of the Germans, when the envoys returned to him. They asked him to give them three days' grace, in order that they might send messengers to the Ubii, to find out whether the Usipetes and Tencteri might safely settle in their country. Within three days these messengers would undertake to go to the country of the Ubii and return to Caesar. Caesar told them in reply that he would only march four miles further on that day, in order to get water ; and he ordered them to return to him on the following day that he might take their request into consideration. Next day he marched against and attacked the Germans in their encampment, and drove them in rout *ad confluentem Mosae et Rheni*.[4]

What does *confluentem* mean ? It is commonly translated by ' confluence ' ; but Heller,[5] affirming that the word only has this meaning in late Latin, argues that Caesar, if he had meant to denote a confluence of the Rhine with the Meuse, would have written (ad) *confluentes Rhenum et Mosam*. Moreover, Heller continues, the Rhine did not flow into the Meuse, and after Caesar had mentioned the Waal, he would not have spoken of it as the Rhine. With *confluentem* we must supply *fluvium* : Caesar called the Waal *confluentem*, or ' connecting stream ', in order to show that the fugitives

[1] *Ann.*, ii, 6.

[2] W. Smith, *Dict. of Greek and Roman Geogr.*, i, 381–2.

[3] Walckenaer indeed says (*Géogr. des Gaules*, i, 494) that the text accepted before the appearance of Oudendorp's edition—*neque longius ab eo . . . in Oceanum transit*—might mean that the Waal, from the point where it leaves the Rhine to its junction with the Meuse, has a course of 80 miles ; but it is impossible to extract this sense from any reading which has been proposed.

[4] *B. G.*, iv, 11–5.

[5] *Philologus*, xxii, 1865, pp. 132–3.

were hemmed in on their right by the Rhine, in front by the Waal, on their left by the Meuse. But *confluens* was used in the sense of 'confluence' by Pliny[1] only a century after Caesar's death; and seeing that both *confluens* and *confluentes* are very rare, it is surely arbitrary to deny that Caesar might have used the former word with the same meaning. Nevertheless, I admit that Heller's translation may be right.

II. The points that we have first to determine are these:—(1) Where did the Waal, in Caesar's time, join the Meuse? (2) Where were the Germans when they 'had reached the territories of the Eburones and Condrusi?' (3) Had they all, or had only their advanced guard reached that territory? (4) Had they moved from that position when Caesar attacked them? (5) On which bank of the Meuse were the Ambivariti? (6) How far were the German envoys from the country of the Ubii when they promised to go thither and return with an answer to Caesar in three days? (7) How far from the river in which the remnant of the fugitives perished was the camp which Caesar attacked?

(1) The Meuse at present joins the Waal near Gorkum. Before 1856 it was joined to the Waal by a connecting channel at Fort St. Andries as well.[2] According to P. Cluver,[3] who is followed by Desjardins[4] and Kiepert,[5] it did not join the Waal, in the time of Caesar, either at Fort St. Andries or at Gorkum. Those two junctions were, Cluver maintained, due to modern canalization. In Caesar's time the Meuse quitted its present bed at Megen, flowed past Battenburg, Heusden, Waelwyck, Gertruidenberg, Maasdam, Westmaas, Simonshaven, and Biert, and joined the western branch of the Rhine at Geervliet, only 7 miles from the sea. Cluver's argument is that the channel of an old river runs from the neighbourhood of Bockhoven in the direction which I have just indicated; that this channel, in the eastern part of its course, is called the Hedickse Maas, and thence to its western extremity the Oude Maas or 'Old Meuse'; and that this name proves that the Meuse, in Caesar's time, flowed in the channel in question. But in Cluver's map and in Desjardins's the Oude Maas quits the channel of the modern Meuse at Megen: in the *Descriptio Fluminum Rheni, Vahalis et Mosae*, a map which, in the Catalogue of the British Museum, is dated 1630, it is not traced further eastward than a point about two miles south-east of Heusden; and with this M. Reclus's map agrees.[6] The Hedickse Maas, moreover, appears in the *Descriptio* as a streamlet, which enters the Meuse between Bockhoven and Hedickhuysen. It is true that in sheets 39 and 45 of

[1] *Nat. Hist.*, vi, 17 (21), § 63; 28 (32), § 145.

[2] See E. Reclus, *Nouv. Géogr. Univ.*, iv, 218. Numerous maps of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in the British Museum show the junction of the Meuse and the Waal at Fort St. Andries, e.g. *Fluviorum Rheni, Mosae . . . descriptio, emendata per F. de Witt.*

[3] *Germania antiqua*, 1631, lib. ii, pp. 459–60; *De tribus Rheni alveis*, 1611, pp. 34–8.

[4] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, i, 118–9, 124–6.

[5] *Galliae Cisalpinae et Transalpinae . . . tabula in usum scholarum descripta.*

[6] *Nouv. Géogr. Univ.*, iv, 217. Cf. *Kaart van de Rivier de Boven Maas*, &c., (1 : 10,000), Blad 32.

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a map called *Topographische en militaire Kaart van het Koningrijk der Nederlanden* (1 : 50,000) the Oude Maas is depicted in the neighbourhood of Megen ; but it is simply a sheet of water which extends about two miles in a south-easterly direction from a point about half a mile from the bank of the Meuse. It should seem, then, that for tracing the channel of the Oude Maas as far eastward as Megen Cluver had no authority except the existence of this isolated sheet of water ; nor does he adduce any proof of his assertion that the Meuse did not, in Caesar's time, join the Waal at Fort St. Andries.[1] Finally, Desjardins's map is absolutely inconsistent with *B. G.*, iv, 10; his theory forces him to maintain that both the writer of that chapter and Tacitus were wrong in saying that the Meuse helped to form the *insula Batavorum* ; and he is therefore driven to assert that the former knew nothing of the matter which he undertook to describe.[2] D'Anville[3] conjectured that in Caesar's time the confluence of the Meuse and the Waal was at Dordrecht, about 30 miles from the sea ; but while he is justified in rejecting Cluver's theory, he cannot establish his own. I can only conclude that it is impossible to prove that the Meuse did not receive the Waal near Gorkum ; and it may have been linked to the Waal at Fort St. Andries as well.[4] (2) When the Germans ' had reached the territories of the Eburones and Condrusi ' they must have advanced at least as far southward as the latitude of Liège. (3) General Creuly insists that there is not a single word in Caesar's narrative which goes to show that they retreated before him as he advanced against them. Therefore, he argues, those who had advanced as far as the territories of the Eburones and Condrusi were only a party of cavalry who had been sent to reconnoitre the country in which the host proposed to settle.[5] Now Caesar is often desperately concise ; and this part of his narrative is confessedly the most obscure in the whole of his book. If Creuly is right, Caesar omitted to mention that those Germans who had penetrated into the country of the Condrusi were only a reconnoitring party : therefore in either case Caesar was silent on an important matter. When we read that ' Germani ' had advanced as far as the territories of the Eburones and the Condrusi, and that Caesar began to march towards the place where he heard that ' Germani ' were,[6]

[1] ' Tout nous porte à croire,' says Desjardins (*Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, i, 122), who professes himself a faithful disciple of Cluver, ' que la réunion . . . au fort St. André . . . est moderne.' *Tout nous porte à croire* is not proof. Where is the record ? After a prolonged search I cannot find any. Nor, it should seem, can M. Reclus. Nor could Johannes Pontanus, a diligent geographer of the seventeenth century. See his *Disceptationes chorographicae de Rheni divortiis*, &c., 1614, p. 32, and cf. *Jahrb. d. Vereins von Alterthumsfreunden im Rheinlande*, x, 1847, p. 58.

[2] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, i, 122.

[3] *Notice de l'ancienne Gaule*, pp. 467–8, 668–9.

[4] Having patiently studied all the monographs that have been written on the subject, I believe that it is impossible to trace with certainty the courses of the lower Meuse, the lower Rhine, and the Waal, as they existed in the time of Caesar. The Belgian geologist, M. A. Rutot (*Le mouvement géogr.* [a periodical], 1897, col. 99), concludes that ' the physical history of the Meuse closes with the Quaternary Period '.

[5] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., viii, 1863, p. 29.

[6] *B. G.*, iv, 7, § 1.

we naturally take for granted that 'Germani' means the entire German host; for it is hardly credible that Caesar would have marched against a mere reconnoitring party. A. Dederich,[1] quoting Caesar's words—*iter in ea loca facere coepit quibus in locis esse Germanos audiebat*—lays stress upon his use of the imperfect tense, and argues, as I understand him, that Caesar was speaking of successive reports which reached him on his march; and accordingly he infers that by the time Caesar crossed the Meuse, the (assumed) reconnoitring party may have retreated to join the main body. Possibly; but the meaning which Dederich attaches to *audiebat* seems irreconcilable with Caesar's use of the word *coepit*; and I believe that he was speaking of reports which had reached him before he started. All that seems certain is that if the whole host moved away from the territories of the Eburones and the Condrusi, they did so before or soon after he quitted the winter-quarters of his army; for his narrative shows unmistakably that he moved nearer and nearer to a fixed, not a receding point. But the natural meaning of Caesar's words appears to be that the Germans as a body, not merely their advanced guard, had reached the territories of the Eburones and the Condrusi.[2] (4) If so, they must have moved from that country before Caesar attacked them unless their flight occupied more than one day. For it is generally[3] admitted that they fled either to the confluence of the Meuse and the Waal or to the confluence of the Rhine and the Moselle. In either case their final destruction would have taken place at a considerable distance from the territories of the Eburones and Condrusi. (5) I have already given reasons for believing that the Ambivariti dwelt, as is generally held, on the left bank of the Meuse.[4] (6) Caesar makes it clear that, when the German envoys proposed to him to send a message to the Ubii, they were not more than 12 Roman miles from the German camp, which he attacked on the following day. If, then, the defeat of the Germans took place near the confluence of the Meuse and the Waal, and if the said confluence was near the site of Fort St. Andries, the envoys were at least 60 miles, *in a direct line*, from the nearest frontier of the Ubii.[5] If, on the other hand, the defeat took place near the confluence of the Moselle and the Rhine, the German messengers would only have had

[1] *Julius Cäsar am Rhein*, 1870, pp. 19, 28.

[2] Meusel wrote on the margin of his copy of my first edition that Caesar meant by *Germanos* 'sicher das *ganze* Heer' (undoubtedly the entire host).

[3] Generally, but not universally. Von Cohausen, A. Dederich, von Kampen, and T. Bergk think otherwise, as will presently appear; but I engage to prove that they are all wrong.

[4] See pp. 368–70.

[5] I assume that the territory of the Ubii extended no further northward than Cologne or, more probably, the mouth of the Sieg, near Bonn. The name *Sieg* is generally connected with that of the Sugambri, who dwelt between that river and the Lippe. It would appear, then, that the territory of the Ubii was bounded on the north by the Sieg; but Heller (*Philologus*, xxii, 1865, pp. 160–2), believes that they possessed a strip of land north of the Sieg as far as Cologne, and between the Rhine and the Sugambri. If so, the Sugambri must have crossed their territory in 53 B. C. when they made their raid into the country of the Eburones (*B. G.*, vi, 35, §§ 4–6). But do not Caesar's words, *Sugambri qui sunt proximi Rheno*, prove that they crossed the Rhine immediately from their own territory? Cf. *B. G.*, i, 54, § 1, and iii, 11, § 1.

to travel the few miles that separated them from the Rhine, and, after crossing that river, they would have found themselves in Ubian territory. (7) It is generally taken for granted that the scene of the rout of the Usipetes and Tencteri was comparatively near the confluence whether of the Waal and the Meuse or of the Rhine and the Moselle. Levesque de la Ravalière, however, infers from Caesar's saying that the Germans were tired out when they reached the confluence of the Rhine and the Meuse, that their flight had extended over a considerable distance.[1] This is also the opinion of Achaintre.[2] As Caesar does not say that the Usipetes and Tencteri had moved away from the country of the Condrusi, he conjectures that their defeat took place somewhere in the neighbourhood of Aix-la-Chapelle. I believe, however, that almost every one who reads his Caesar attentively will conclude that Aix-la-Chapelle is much too far from either 'confluence'; and I am sure that the 'considerable distance' of which de la Ravalière speaks was performed within a single day. Moreover 'considerable distance' is an elastic expression. On the theory of Napoleon, the scene of the rout, 8 miles north-west of the river Niers, was quite 20 miles from the alleged confluence of the Meuse and the Waal at Fort St. Andries. Surely this distance was enough to tire the Germans.[3]

III. As we have seen, if the MSS. are correct, Caesar says that the Usipetes and Tencteri fled to the confluence of the Mosa (Meuse) and the Rhine. Merivale and Long, however, as well as Cluver, de Valois, Sanson, d'Anville, and von Göler, have argued that by *Mosae* (or whatever Caesar may have written) we ought to understand not the Meuse but the Moselle. I say, 'whatever Caesar may have written,' because Cluver[4] would alter *Mosae* to *Mosulae*, and Long's suggestion[5] that the two rivers had the same name is improbable. The Latin name of the Moselle was *Mosula* or *Mosella*. There is no evidence that the Moselle was ever called *Mosa*; and if it had been, Caesar would not have used the word *Mosa* to describe the Moselle in *B. G.*, iv, 15, § 2, when he had used the very same word to describe the Meuse in chapters 9 and 12.

Cluver decides for the Moselle because, as I have already shown,

[1] *Hist. de l'Acad. Roy. des inscr. et belles-lettres*, xviii, 1744–6 (1753), p. 216.

[2] *Caesar*, i, 145.

[3] M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 328, n. 5) places the German camp 'on the wooded heights behind Sonsbeck . . . less than 10 kilometres [about 6 miles] from Xanten', and (*ib.*, 329, n. 5) conjectures that the Germans fled, not to the confluence of the Meuse and the Waal or anywhere near it, but to Gennep, 30 kilometres, or about 18 miles from the battle-field. I cannot understand how he reconciles the former opinion with Caesar's statement that the Germans, before he marched against them, 'were now wandering further afield (*latius iam vagabantur*) and had reached the territories of the Eburones and Condrusi', or the latter with the statement that they fled *ad confluentem Mosae et Rheni*. 'Je ne crois pas nécessaire,' he says, 'de conclure du texte de César, *ad confluentem Mosae et Rheni*, que les fugitifs soient arrivés jusqu'au confluent.' Perhaps not; but how can any one conclude that they fled to Gennep, which is on the Meuse, about 30 miles from Fort St. Andries, and has no more connexion with the Rhine than Guildford with the Thames? Would M. Jullian maintain that Meaux is *ad confluentem Matronae et Sequanae*?

[4] *De tribus Rheni alveis*, p. 38.

[5] *Caesar*, p. 191.

he believes himself to have proved that the Meuse did not, in Caesar's time, join the Waal or the Rhine at all until it reached Geervliet. If Cluver's premiss is right, so is his conclusion ; but I have shown that his premiss is very doubtful. Even so, however, his conclusion may possibly be right.

Merivale[1] holds that the fact that the Germans 'only required three days[2] to send a message to the Ubii (on the right bank of the Rhine, between Cologne and Coblenz) . . . is quite inconsistent' with the statement that the battle was fought near the confluence of the Meuse with the Rhine.

Long says that Caesar 'tells us nothing of a long march up the Rhine to make his bridge'.[3] And again, 'Before Caesar saw the Germans, they had left the Rhine and advanced south of Liège, and when the Romans crossed the Maas and approached them, they could not move westward, nor would they move northwards into the country where they had wintered and fed on the stores of the Menapii ; and as they finally fled to the Rhine, it is plain that the junction of the Rhine and Mosa is the junction of the Rhine and Mosel.'[4]

Napoleon, on the contrary, thinks that 'the country between the Meuse and the Rhine, to the south of Aix-la-Chapelle, is too much broken, and too barren to have allowed the German emigration, composed of 430,000[5] individuals . . . with wagons to move and subsist in it. Moreover, it contains no trace of ancient roads, and if Caesar had taken this direction, he must have crossed the . . . Ardennes, a circumstance of which he would not have failed to inform us. Besides . . . on the news of the approach of Caesar, instead of directing their march towards the Ubii, who were not favourable to them, the Germans . . . would have concentrated themselves towards the most distant part of the fertile country on which they had seized,—that of the Menapii'.[6]

Napoleon places the battle-field 8 miles north of Goch, which is on the river Niers. Caesar states that on the day before the battle he intended to march 4 miles to get water ; and Napoleon's argument is that 'since, to the north of the Roer, there exists, between the Rhine and the Meuse, no other watercourse but the Niers, he [Caesar] was evidently obliged to advance to that river to find water'.[7]

Desjardins, who accepts Cluver's theory regarding the course of the Meuse, nevertheless places the scene of the rout near Fort St. Andries ; but he does not discuss the question. He merely observes, following Cluver, that the Meuse and the Waal probably approached each other above Bommel without actually mingling their waters, and then separated, to flow, each in its own course, to the sea.[8] But if the rivers merely approached each other, Caesar would not have written *ad confluentem Mosae et Rheni*.

[1] *Hist. of the Romans under the Empire*, i, 453, note.
[2] *B. G.*, iv, 11, § 3.
[3] *Caesar*, p. 191.
[4] *Decline of the Roman Republic*, pp. 157–8.
[5] The number is probably a gross exaggeration. See p. 243.
[6] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 138–9, note.
[7] *Ib.*, p. 141.
[8] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 652.

Mr. A. G. Peskett's note[1] is worth transcribing.—'Florus and Dion Cassius have been quoted in support of the Mosel: but Florus only says *iterum de Germano Tencteri querebantur. hic vero iam Caesar ultro Mosellam navali ponte transgreditur ipsumque Rhenum et Hercyniis hostem quaerit in silvis*, i, 45, § 14 (Halm): Dion Cassius says that the Tencteri and Usipetes *τόν τε Ῥῆνον διέβησαν καὶ ἐς τὴν τῶν Τρηουίρων ἐνέβαλον*.[2] Florus says absolutely nothing about the site of the battle, and Dion may have been thinking of *B. G.*, iv, 6, where Caesar says that the Germans got as far as the Condrusi, who were the clients of the Treveri. . . . The Tencteri and Usipetes . . . crossed the Rhine and wintered among the Menapii . . . in [ch.] 6 we read . . . *Germani latius vagabantur et in fines Eburonum et Condrusorum, qui sunt Treverorum clientes, pervenerant*; taking this passage in connexion with 12, where it is stated that they had sent a great part of their cavalry on a foraging expedition among the Menapii on the left bank of the Meuse, we naturally conclude that the Germans were still somewhere in the neighbourhood of the Meuse. . . . Caesar, in the passage above quoted, is doubtless speaking, as Kraner suggests, not of the whole body of the Germans but of wandering predatory bands; and there is no need to suppose that even these had advanced further south than Aix-la-Chapelle, which would be on the northern border of the Condrusi. Yet though every hint given by Caesar up to the present chapter (15) points to the Meuse as the scene of hostilities, we are suddenly transferred by Göler and Mr. Long to the Mayenfeld near Cologne . . . though the greater part of the cavalry, which must have formed no slight element of strength in these vast predatory hordes, were left about 100 miles away among the Ambivariti.'

Now when Mr. Peskett concludes that 'the Germans were still somewhere in the neighbourhood of the Meuse', he is confusing dates. So long as they remained in the country of the Condrusi, they were no doubt in the neighbourhood of the Meuse; but, as I have already shown, whether the battle was fought near the confluence of the Meuse and the Waal or near the confluence of the Moselle and the Rhine, either the Germans had moved away from the country of the Condrusi, or their main body had never gone near that country. Undoubtedly they were in the neighbourhood of the Meuse, if the rout took place near the confluence of the Meuse and the Waal. But this is the very point which Mr. Peskett has to prove. Moreover, Aix-la-Chapelle was nowhere near the Condrusi, whose nearest territory was a good 25 miles south-west of it; and no unprejudiced critic can fail to see that when Caesar said that the Germans had reached the country of the Eburones and Condrusi, he meant the whole German host.

Still, if Mr. Peskett fails as an advocate, it does not follow that

[1] *Caesar*, Bks. iv–v, pp. 60–1. Parts (which I have omitted) both of Mr. Peskett's note and of the argument which he criticizes have been rendered obsolete by the arguments of Meusel and Klotz, which show that *B. G.*, iv, 10, is most probably spurious.

[2] 'crossed the Rhine and invaded the country of the Treveri.'

his cause is bad. It remains for me to deal with the arguments which he has left unnoticed. Assuming, with Napoleon,[1] that when the German convoys asked for three days' grace, they were at Straelen, the distance, in a straight line, to the frontier of the Ubii and back was not less than 100 miles,[2] which, if the envoys had meant what they said, their mounted messengers might have covered in three days. But this calculation assumes that the chiefs of the Ubii would have been found waiting on their northern frontier, and that the business of negotiation could have been settled off-hand, both of which assumptions are absurd. Mr. C. E. Moberly, indeed, says,[3] 'The difficulty would be hardly less on the other supposition, as the German cavalry would then have had to get from the lower Meuse to Coblenz in the same time.' But the German cavalry had been expected for days past; and the envoys, in asking for three days' grace, might take for granted that they were already on the road. 'It is possible,' Mr. Moberly proceeds, 'either that *ad eas res conficiendas*[4] may mean "in order to arrange for the embassy", or that the ambassadors wildly pressed for these three days without considering what they promised to accomplish in them.' Both of these alternatives appear to me extremely far-fetched.

Long's argument, that Caesar could not have attacked the Germans near the confluence of the Meuse and the Waal, because he 'tells us nothing of a long march up the Rhine to make his bridge', has considerable force. It is true, as Napoleon points out, that, if he beat the Germans near the confluence of the Moselle and the Rhine, he must have made a long march across the Ardennes, and that of that he tells us nothing either. Still, Caesar, who disregards facts that are not essential to his narrative, might have omitted to mention that he crossed the Ardennes; for he tells us that he was marching steadily and continuously on, and he gives us to understand that he was marching towards the Rhine; and he may have thought this information sufficient. But he certainly leaves on our minds the impression that he crossed the Rhine near the spot where he defeated the Usipetes and Tencteri:[5] it is certain that he crossed at least as far south as Cologne;[6] and we should have expected him to tell us that he had to make a long march southward to get there.

IV. And now I will do my best to seize the vital points in this discussion. If we decide that the Germans were defeated near the confluence of the Meuse and the Waal, (1) our decision harmonizes with the reading *ad confluentem Mosae et Rheni*, which is found in all the MSS.; if (2) we assume that *Rheni* is equivalent to *Vacali*, or else that *confluentem* means, as Heller supposes,[7] 'the connecting link' between the Rhine and the Meuse, that is to say, the Waal; (3) we are obliged to assume that the Germans retreated before Caesar, or on receiving the first news of his approach, from the positions which they had taken up in the territories of the Eburones

[1] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 141.
[2] See p. 697, n. 5.
[3] *Caesar*, p. 266.
[4] *B. G.*, iv, 11, § 3.
[5] *Ib.*, 15–6.
[6] See pp. 706–10.
[7] See pp. 694–5.

and Condrusi to the country of the Menapii, which they had recently left; unless indeed we accept General Creuly's desperate theory, that those who had penetrated into the territories of the Eburones and Condrusi were only a reconnoitring party; (4) we are obliged to assume that when Dion Cassius said that the Germans invaded the country of the Treveri, he either included the Condrusi and Eburones among the Treveri or simply made a blunder;[1] (5) we are obliged, unless we accept Merivale's far-fetched suggestion, to assume that, when the German envoys offered to send a message to the Ubii and to get an answer in three days, they were offering to perform a manifest impossibility, and that, unless they were talking wildly, their sole object was to gain time,—in which case they would surely have asked for more than three days, unless indeed they knew that their cavalry would rejoin them within that time; (6) we are obliged to assume that, after the defeat of the Germans, the Ubii asked Caesar to march at least 70 miles up the valley of the Rhine and to cross the river into their territory; that he did so; that he then marched northward again into the country of the Sugambri; that he then marched southward again into the country of the Ubii; and all this in spite of the fact that his narrative leaves on our minds the impression that he crossed the Rhine near the spot where he had defeated the Germans; (7) we are obliged (unless we accept Heller's translation of *confluentem*) to assume, with Napoleon, that the confluence of the Waal with the Meuse was at Fort St. Andries, because, if it was at Gorkum or at Dordrecht or at Geervliet, the difficulty regarding the proposed message to the Ubii and the difficulty regarding Caesar's passage of the Rhine and his unrecorded march are enormously increased.

The objections to the above-mentioned theory which I have numbered 2, 3, 5, and 6 seem to me to be serious.

If, on the other hand, we decide that the defeat took place near the confluence of the Moselle and the Rhine, (1) our decision flatly contradicts the MSS. of the *Commentaries*. We must assume either that Caesar wrote *Mosae* when he meant *Mosellae*, or that he wrote *Mosellae*, but that some blundering copyist put *Mosae* instead; (2) the difficulty about *Rheni* disappears: we need not assume that Caesar wrote *Rheni* when he meant *Vacali* or that *confluentem* means 'connecting link'; (3) we must assume that the Germans moved away from the positions which they had taken up in the territories

[1] Zeuss indeed (*Die Deutschen und die Nachbarstämme*, 1837, pp. 84, 216) infers from Caesar's statement, that the forest of the Ardennes extended from the Rhine through the heart of the territory of the Treveri to the frontier of the Remi (*silvam Arduennam, quae . . . per medios fines Treverorum a flumine Rheno ad initium Remorum pertinet. B. G.*, v, 3, § 4), that Bonn and Cologne may have been in Treveran territory; and accordingly Dederich argues that Dion may have been right in saying that the Usipetes and Tencteri penetrated into the country of the Treveri. But Zeuss's remark is quite unfounded; for the Ardennes, as we know it, is partly in Luxemburg far to the south of Bonn and Cologne, and the forest may, in Caesar's time, have extended even to Coblenz; and, moreover, it is improbable that the territory of the Treveri extended so far northward even as Bonn.

of the Eburones and Condrusi, and that, instead of retreating in the direction whence they had come, they struck off, through the Ardennes, towards the south-east, and plunged into the land of the Treveri. (4) We must assume that the Germans had taken up a position about 70 miles, in a direct line, from the nearest point of the Meuse, to the further side of which they had sent their cavalry on a foraging expedition; (5) the difficulty regarding the offer of the German envoys to send a message to the Ubii disappears; (6) the difficulty regarding the unrecorded marches of Caesar up and down the valley of the Rhine also disappears.[1]

But to this view also there are serious objections. It is, of course, conceivable that Caesar did write *ad confluentem Mosellae et Rheni*, and that some meddling copyist altered *Mosellae* into *Mosae*; but it needs great confidence in one's own judgement, even with the support, such as it is, of Dion Cassius and Florus, to assume that he did so. The objection which I have numbered 4 appears to me hardly less grave.

Nevertheless, I am inclined to conclude, not without hesitation, that the confluence to which the routed Germans fled was the confluence of the Moselle and the Rhine. What has principally led me to this conclusion is the conviction, which deepens with each successive reading of Caesar's narrative, that the rout took place opposite the country of the Ubii. First, we see the German hosts marching southward into the district of Condroz and the neighbouring country of the Eburones. A few marches further southward would bring them to the neighbourhood of Coblenz. It seems to me quite in accord with Caesar's manner that, having already told us that they had moved far from the country of the Menapii, he should have omitted to mention these marches; but I cannot conceive that if they had *retreated* northward 90 Roman miles,[2] he would have neglected to say so. Then their envoys ask for three days' grace to negotiate with the Ubii; and the inevitable conclusion is that the Ubii were close by. Finally, the Ubii ask Caesar to bring his army into their country; and it is hardly credible that they should have expected him to march 90 Roman miles before he could cross the Rhine.[3] Again, it is natural to suppose that, if the rout had taken place near the confluence of the Meuse and the Waal, Caesar would have written *confluentem Mosae et Vacali*; and, after all, the substitution of *Mosae* for *Mosellae* is only what might have been expected from a meddlesome scribe who had read chapters 9 and 11

[1] In the first edition (p. 691) I said that 'we are obliged to assume that Caesar mentioned by name, for the first and only time, so important a river as the Moselle without one word of introduction'. But this difficulty has vanished. For Caesar also mentioned the Meuse in chapter 9 without introduction; and, as he probably did not write chapter 10, the explanation which that chapter would have supplied is wanting.

[2] Napoleon III, *Hist. de Jules César*, Planche 14.

[3] *Ib.* The march would have been diminished by nearly 20 miles if Caesar made his first bridge not, as Napoleon thought, at Bonn, but at the most northerly point at which it can on any reasonable theory be placed, namely, Cologne.

and probably also the interpolated chapter 10. Finally, Caesar tells us that the fugitives who plunged into the stream were overwhelmed 'by the force of the current' (*vi fluminis*); and these words are absurdly inapplicable to the waters that flow past Fort St. Andries.

My conclusion is merely tentative; but of one thing I am sure:— the Germans did not flee to the *confluence* of the Waal and the Meuse. For they would have fled, not westward to Fort St. Andries or Gorkum, but to the nearest point of the Waal. If, then, Caesar wrote *Mosae* and meant the Meuse, we must accept Heller's explanation of *confluentem*. In the next article, however, it will be seen that the choice between *Mosae* and *Mosellae* is inextricably involved in the question where Caesar bridged the Rhine.

V. It remains to notice the views of those commentators who refuse to believe that the rout of the Germans took place either in the neighbourhood of Fort St. Andries or in that of Coblenz. And first of those who accept the reading *ad confluentem Mosae et Rheni*.

1. According to the French Commission,[1] the Germans, when they were attacked, were in the neighbourhood of Gorkum, on the left bank of the Meuse, and had the estuary of Bies-Bosch on their left. This theory, which is based on the erroneous assumption that the Germans crossed the Meuse (regarded as a branch of the Rhine) below Gorkum, requires us to place the Ambivariti on the right bank of the Meuse, a view which I have shown to be wrong.[2] Moreover, I doubt whether Caesar's cavalry could have acted in a region which was at that time probably a vast swamp; and on the theory of the Commission the difficulties involved in the assumption that the rout took place at a point remote from the country of the Ubii are greatly increased.

2. According to von Cohausen, who is followed by von Kampen, the German encampment was near Wissen, about 10 miles south-east of Goch; and the beaten host fled to the Rhine, which they reached at a point near the Cranenburger Bucht, about 5 miles west of Cleve. At this point, says von Cohausen, the Meuse *appeared* to join the Rhine, because the Bucht was inundated by water from the latter.[3] But von Cohausen's suggestion that Caesar was misled on this point by the report of his cavalry is nothing but a wild guess. According to Dederich,[4] indeed, the Cranenburger Bucht is actually inundated, early in the year, by water from the Rhine; and the inundation is only divided from the Meuse by a spit of land not more than 1,000 paces wide:[5] but granting the correctness of his statement, it is hardly necessary to point out that Caesar would not have described the Cranenburger Bucht as *confluens Mosae et Rheni* or, indeed, as a confluence of anything with anything else.

3. Dederich[6] infers from a statement of Dion Cassius[7] that the German camp, which, like Napoleon, he places north of Goch, must

[1] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 52.
[2] See pp. 368–70.
[3] *Jahrb. d. Vereins von Alterthumsfreunden im Rheinlande*, xliii, 1867, pp. 44, 50.
[4] *Julius Caesar am Rhein*, p. 35.
[5] See *Neue Jahrb. f. Philologie*, &c., xcv, 1867, p. 43.
[6] *Julius Caesar am Rhein*, pp. 8, 28–31, 33–4.
[7] xxxix, 48, § 2. Dion, whose authority is *nil*, merely says that Caesar reached the German camp at midday.

have been within one and a half 'Stunde', or about 4 Roman miles, from the *confluens Mosae et Rheni* to which the Germans fled. It will be objected, he says, that at this distance there is no confluence of the Meuse and the Rhine. But the answer is easy. It was not Caesar himself but his cavalry who pursued the Germans. Caesar mistook the bifurcation of the Rhine for a confluence of the Meuse and the Rhine: the Meuse was near the Rhine, and this led him astray.

The objection which Dederich anticipates and attempts to answer is unanswerable. How any man in his senses could delude himself into the fancy that Caesar should have imagined that the bifurcation of the Rhine was a confluence of the Meuse with the Rhine, passes one's power of conception. Dederich's theory can only be reconciled with Caesar's narrative by assuming with Heller that *confluentem Mosae et Rheni* means the Waal.

4. T. Bergk, who argues that *confluentem* meant 'a river which flows into another river', has made an attempt to solve the problem, which is at all events original and ingenious.[1] He holds that what Caesar really wrote was simply *cum ad confluentem Mosae pervenissent* ('when they had reached a point where a river flows into the Meuse'); and that some commentator, unable to understand the meaning of these words, added *et Rheni*. If, he says, it be objected that Caesar would have given the name of the other river, the answer is easy. Such reticence was one of Caesar's characteristics. He knew the weaknesses of the general reader; and he was too wise to trouble him with outlandish names.

Having amended the text to his own satisfaction, Bergk proceeds to identify his *confluens*. The German camp, he says, was at Heinsberg, on the left bank of the Roer; and the Germans fled to the confluence of the Roer and the Meuse. In the narrowing peninsula formed by these two rivers Caesar's cavalry could have acted with effect; and they could not have done so near the confluence of the Meuse with any other stream which joins it in the country of the Condrusi or of the Eburones.

General von Veith agrees with Bergk in deleting *et Rheni* after *ad confluentem Mosae*, but differs from him in details. He believes that the scene of the German rout was Louveignez, between the Ourthe, which joins the Meuse at Liège, and the Vesdre, which flows into the Ourthe about a mile and a half south-east of the same town.[2]

Now the reason why Bergk thought it necessary to amend the text was simply that he regarded it as an inevitable inference from Caesar's narrative that the battle took place in the country of the Eburones or in the country of the Condrusi; and I have shown that this inference is not inevitable. I freely admit that Caesar was sparing in his use of geographical names; but Bergk has wholly failed to prove

[1] *Zur Gesch. und Topogr. d. Rheinlande in röm. Zeit*, pp. 7–8.

[2] Pick's *Monatsschrift f. d. Gesch. Westdeutschl.*, vi, 106–30, referred to in *Jahresb. d. Geschichtswissenschaft*, Jahrg. 3, 1880, ii, 2.

that *confluens* was ever used in the sense which he claims for it or that it was not used in classical Latin in the sense of ' confluence '. In fact, he begs the question, which is whether Caesar did not himself use the word in this very sense.

WHERE DID CAESAR MAKE HIS FIRST BRIDGE OVER THE RHINE?

This question is inseparably connected with that which I have discussed in the preceding note. If the rout of the Usipetes and Tencteri took place near the confluence of the Meuse and the Waal, it is natural to look for the site of the bridge at a position as near that spot as may be consistent with Caesar's narrative. If, on the other hand, the rout took place near the confluence of the Moselle and the Rhine, the bridge must have been made in the neighbourhood of Coblenz.

1. Napoleon[1] fixes on Bonn, for the following reasons.—(*a*) The bridge joined the western bank to the territory of the Ubii.[2] Two years later Caesar built another bridge *paulum supra*—a little higher up the river than the site of the former one—which connected the territory of the Treveri with that of the Ubii.[3] Therefore it is almost certain that the western end of the older bridge also touched the territory of the Treveri. (*b*) Those critics who have chosen Andernach as the site of the former bridge argue on the hypothesis, which Napoleon claims to have disproved, that the defeat of the Usipetes and Tencteri took place near the confluence of the Moselle and the Rhine. (*c*) Cologne, which has also been adopted, is too far north to agree with the *Commentaries*; for when, two years later, Caesar had recrossed his second bridge, he traversed the Ardennes, passed near the country of the Segni and Condrusi, and marched for Atuatuca,[4] which Napoleon identifies with Tongres: but, if he had started from Cologne—or, as Napoleon ought to say, a little above (*paulum supra*) Cologne—he would not have passed near the country of those tribes. (*d*) South of Bonn, as far as Mainz, ' the Rhine flows upon a rocky bed, where the piles could not have been driven in, and presents, owing to the mountains which border it, no favourable point of passage.' (*e*) ' Less than fifty years after Caesar's campaigns, Drusus, in order to proceed against the Sicambri—that is, against the same people whom Caesar intended to combat—crossed the Rhine at Bonn.'

The first of these arguments tells against Napoleon's theory; for it is unlikely that the territory of the Treveri extended as far northward as Bonn,[5] whereas they certainly did possess the western bank of the Rhine between Coblenz and Andernach. The second I have

[1] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 143, n. 3.
[2] *B. G.*, iv, 16, §§ 5–8; 19.
[3] *Ib.*, vi, 9, 29, § 2.
[4] *Ib.*, vi, 29, § 4; 32, §§ 1–3.
[5] See p. 481.

dealt with in the preceding note. The third, which rests upon a doubtful hypothesis,[1] is irrelevant; for, supposing that the first bridge was at Cologne, the second was probably at Bonn; and if Caesar had marched from Bonn to Tongres, he would have skirted the country of the Segni and Condrusi. Napoleon would, I think, have been wiser if he had based his objection to Cologne on the ground that it was probably opposite the territory, not of the Ubii but of the Sugambri. And when he asserts that the bridge could not have been constructed south of Bonn, he surely forgets that, on his own theory, Caesar's second bridge was a little south (*paulum supra*) of Bonn. Moreover, it is certain that the bed of the Rhine between Coblenz and Andernach would admit of the construction of a bridge such as Caesar describes.[2]

2. M. F. Essellen[3] argues that the first bridge was built at or near Cologne. He says first, that it may be regarded as certain that in Caesar's time the Ubii possessed a strip of land between the mouth of the Wupper and the mouth of the Sieg and between the Rhine and the territory of the Sugambri; and secondly, that if the bridge had been built at any point between Cologne and Coblenz, Caesar, in order to reach the country of the Sugambri, would have been obliged to take the road leading through narrow passes past Linz, Unkel, and Königswinter, thus exposing himself to attack from the Suebi, who inhabited the mountains on the right. Neither of these arguments has any value. Essellen offers no evidence or even argument in support of his assertion that the territory of the Ubii extended as far northward as the mouth of the Wupper; and if Caesar had crossed the Rhine at Bonn, he would not have had to march a single yard by the road to which Essellen alludes, Königswinter, the most northerly of the three places which he mentions, being at least 6 miles south-east of Bonn. Moreover, the mountains in question belonged, not to the Suebi but to the Ubii, who were Caesar's humble servants.[4]

M. Jullian,[5] who has revived the case for Cologne, argues that Caesar did not build his bridge on the territory of the Treveri, 'whom he does not mention and in whom he had no great confidence'; that, coming from the north, he would not have built it higher up the Rhine than was necessary; and that he would have chosen a site as close as possible to the southern frontier of the Sugambri. Certainly he had no great confidence in the Treveri, who, as he says, 'would not attend his councils or submit to his authority': [6] nevertheless he unquestionably built his second bridge in their territory; [7] and the fact that he does not mention them in connexion with the first proves nothing, for he does not mention any Gallic tribe.

[1] See pp. 371–83.

[2] See von Göler's *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 123, and Long's *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv, 161, n. 8.

[3] *Zur Frage, wo Julius Cäsar die beiden Rheinbrücken schlagen liess*, 1864, pp. 9, 11.

[4] *B. G.*, iv, 8, § 3; 16, §§ 5–8.

[5] *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 331, n. 9.

[6] *B. G.*, v, 2, § 4.

[7] *Ib.*, vi, 9, § 5.

M. Jullian's other arguments follow naturally from his conclusion that the Usipetes and Tencteri were defeated near the Meuse. But he has left one grave objection unanswered. He places the second bridge at Bonn ;[1] and on his theory it could not be placed further up the stream.[2] But it is most improbable that the territory of the Treveri extended so far northward ; and M. Jullian himself, in his second volume,[3] supposes that it did not extend beyond Andernach.

3. Long,[4] who holds that the rout of the Usipetes and Tencteri took place near the confluence of the Moselle and the Rhine, naturally goes on to express his belief that the bridge was made between Coblenz and Andernach. 'Caesar,' he says, 'could not cross above Coblenz, if the battle was fought where I have placed it, without crossing the Mosel ; nor is the river practicable above Coblenz . . . nor could he cross below Andernach till he came to Bonn. He must therefore have crossed between Andernach and Coblenz or at some place near Bonn, or lower down. . . . But he crossed in the country of the Treveri, and we cannot make the Treveri extend further north than Andernach, or, at the most, the valley of the Ahr.'

Assuming that the battle took place near the confluence of the Moselle and the Rhine, there is no fault to find with any of these arguments, except the one which is founded upon the assumption that Caesar crossed the Rhine from the country of the Treveri, and that the country of the Treveri extended no further north than the valley of the Ahr. It is true that when Caesar made his second bridge, he was in the country of the Treveri ; but it is not certain that he was there when he made the first. It is also probable that the Ahr, if not the Vinxtbach, was the northern frontier of the Treveri ;[5] but we cannot be sure. But even if Long's assumptions are wrong, his error is unimportant. Everybody who accepts his view regarding the place of the rout of the Usipetes and Tencteri will admit that Caesar would not have needlessly marched as far north as Bonn, when, between Coblenz and Andernach, a site, or rather a variety of sites equally practicable, lay ready to his hand.

M. Jullian,[6] who does not accept Long's premiss, argues that if the second bridge had been built near Coblenz, it would have been too far from Atuatuca, which he identifies with Tongres and regards as Caesar's base of operations, and that the German territory opposite Coblenz was not rich enough to support his army. But how can Atuatuca, which was in the country of the Eburones, be regarded as Caesar's base of operations, seeing that immediately before he crossed the Rhine he had marched 'from the country of the Menapii to that of the Treveri'.[7] Major-General Wolf, to whom M. Jullian appeals, says that in order to reach the Rhine near Andernach,

[1] *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 400, n. 3.
[2] See *B. G.*, vi, 10, § 3.
[3] p. 478, n. 1. Major-General Wolf (*Beihefte zum Militär-Wochenblatt*, 1901, pp. 42–4), who places the second bridge only 3 kilometres above Cologne, actually argues that the territory of the Treveri was conterminous with that of the Menapii!
[4] *Caesar*, p. 194.
[5] See p. 481.
[6] *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 400, n. 3.
[7] *B. G.*, vi, 9, § 1.

Caesar would have had to pass through a defile between mountain and stream, and that, cut off from communication with his rear, he would have been unable to feed his troops. In these circumstances, he says, it is inconceivable that he would not have been attacked,—in Germany by the Suebi, on his return by the Treveri.[1] I do not deny the force of these objections: but I would point out that when Caesar had crossed the Rhine he was in the territory of the friendly Ubii, upon whose resources he could count; that he did actually fear that he would be unable to procure sufficient corn, and accordingly gave up his intention of penetrating far into Germany;[2] that he took every precaution to secure his rear;[3] and that it was obviously not the policy of the Suebi to attack him, but rather to lure him on.[4] What impels me to prefer, though doubtfully, the neighbourhood of Coblenz is the fact that Caesar's chief object in invading Germany in 53 B.C. was to prevent the Germans from reinforcing the Treveri, whose territory most probably did not extend as far northward as Bonn, and whose political centre, Trèves, was far south of Bonn, and even south of Coblenz. M. Jullian himself,[5] rightly in my opinion, holds that Labienus, when he was sent in 56 B.C. to prevent the Germans from joining the Treveri, took up his quarters at Trèves.[6]

4. Von Göler[7] and Heller[8] believe that the second bridge was built at some point in the course of the river where there is an island. General Creuly[9] remarks that, on this theory, there would have been two bridges, not one, a fact which Caesar would have mentioned; and he adds that when Caesar says that, after recrossing the bridge, he broke down, for the length of 200 feet, that part of it which touched the German bank, and constructed a tower on the end in the stream,[10] he plainly gives us to understand that there was no island. I do not agree with him.[11]

5. A. von Cohausen[12] holds the amazing opinion that the first bridge was made at the foot of the Fürstenberg, near Xanten. This place is at least 90 miles, in a direct line, from Neuwied, where Cohausen believes that Caesar made the second bridge; and Caesar says that this second bridge was only 'a little above' the first one. But this does not shake the conviction of Cohausen. As Caesar says that the Usipetes and Tencteri crossed the Rhine 'not far from the sea' (*non longe a mari, quo Rhenus influit*),[13] and as, according to Cohausen, the point where they crossed could not have been less than 90 miles from the sea, he concludes that Caesar might have described Neuwied as only 'a little above' Xanten.[14] The answer

[1] *Beihefte zum Militär-Wochenblatt*, 1901, pp. 42–4. Wolf was referring to the first bridge; but his arguments would apply equally to the second.
[2] *B. G.*, vi, 29, § 1. [3] *Ib.*, 9, § 5. [4] *Ib.*, 10, §§ 4–5.
[5] *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 311, n. 5.
[6] *B. G.*, iii, 11, § 1. [7] *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 214.
[8] *Philologus*, xlix, 1890, p. 695.
[9] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., viii, 1863, p. 388. [10] *B. G.*, vi, 29, § 3.
[11] See Long's *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv, 243, note.
[12] *Cäsar's Rheinbrücken*, 1867, pp. 7–11. [13] *B. G.*, iv, 1, § 1.
[14] Cohausen tries to bolster up his theory by referring to a passage in *B. G.*, ii, 35, § 3, which has given commentators a great deal of unnecessary trouble. The

is (1) that, in relation to the whole length of the Rhine, the point where the Usipetes and Tencteri crossed might be said to be 'not far from the sea'; and (2) that Caesar's information about the lower Rhine was confessedly vague. Moreover, there is one fact which simply pulverizes Cohausen's theory. It is certain that Caesar's first bridge touched the western frontier of the Ubii. Everything points to this conclusion. The Ubii begged Caesar to cross the Rhine into their country. After he had punished the Sugambri, he returned to the country of the Ubii (*se in fines Ubiorum recepit*); and, having obtained from them information as to the movements of the Suebi, he immediately recrossed the Rhine.[1] It is clear then that, when he was about to set foot on the bridge to recross the Rhine, he was standing upon Ubian territory. Now the northern frontier of the Ubii, trace it as far north as we possibly can, was many miles south of Xanten.

I conclude, doubtfully, that both the first and the second bridge were built between Andernach and Coblenz, but that there is no evidence for defining their positions more exactly.[2]

passage, as it stands in $\phi\pi$, runs as follows: *ipse in Carnutes, Andes, Turonosque, quae civitates propinquae his locis erant ubi bellum gesserat, legionibus in hibernacula deductis, in Italiam profectus est.* Now Caesar had been making war in the country of the Belgae; and the nearest of the territories which he mentions in this passage was more than 40 miles from the nearest point of the theatre of the war. Therefore, triumphantly concludes Cohausen, *paulum supra* may mean 90 miles. To which I reply that, if Caesar really wrote the passage as I have printed it, either his memory or his geographical knowledge was defective, unless he was only thinking of the distance between the south-western *frontier* of the Bellovaci and the north-eastern frontier of the Carnutes, which is not more than 12 miles. It has been suggested that if we read (Turonos) *quaeque*, which is found in $\chi\rho$, for *quae*, the difficulty disappears. K. Thomann, however (*Der französische Atlas zu Cäsars gall. Kriege*, pp. 12–3), thinks that the reading *quaeque* is unsatisfactory; for, he argues, if Caesar had sent his legions into the territories of any other peoples besides the Carnutes, Andes, and Turoni, he would have mentioned them by name. If Thomann had looked at *B. G.*, iii, 27, he might have withdrawn this objection. His own suggestion that *ubi bellum gesserat* means *ubi bellum et per se et per Crassum gesserat* is futile; for there is no evidence that Crassus had made war at all. He appears simply to have received the submission of the maritime peoples (*B. G.*, ii, 34). M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 276, n. 1), who adopts the reading *quaeque*, holds that Caesar was referring to the Ambiani, Atrebates, Bellovaci, and Suessiones. If so, *his locis ubi bellum gesserat* does not mean the whole theatre of the Belgic campaign, but only points to those tribes in whose territories there was actual fighting, namely the Remi, the Nervii, and the Atuatuci.

[1] *B. G.*, iv, 16, §§ 5–8; 19.

[2] In the smaller edition of this book (p. 75, n. 1) I incautiously committed myself to the view that a Roman camp recently discovered on the left bank of the Rhine, near Neuwied (*Bonner Jahrb.*, civ, 1899, pp. 1–55), was the camp which Caesar constructed after his second passage of the river; but Professor Haverfield pointed out to me that later investigations had suggested grave doubts. In the first edition (pp. 695–6) I mentioned the discoveries or alleged discoveries of the remains of old bridges near Bonn (*Philologus*, xlix, 1890, p. 695) and at Engers, between Coblenz and Andernach (J. N. Hontheim, *Prodromus Hist. Trev.*, 1757, i, 209); but there is no evidence that either of them was made by Caesar.

CAESAR'S BRIDGE OVER THE RHINE

I. The bridge was constructed as follows. First of all, a couple of balks, a foot and a half square in the thickness, and sharpened at the lower ends, were fastened together by cross-pieces, which kept them exactly two feet apart. They were then driven by pile-drivers into the bed of the river, in a line at right angles to the bank, and sloping in the direction of the current. Forty feet lower down, another couple of balks, similarly joined together, were driven in exactly opposite to them, and sloping towards them. A beam two feet wide was laid across from one couple to the other, being let into the space, which it exactly filled, between the two balks of each couple. The couples were kept apart by means of two pairs of braces (*fibulae*), each pair being attached to the upper ends of the balks and to the extremity of the beam. The effect of the whole arrangement was that, the greater the force of the current, the more firmly were all the timbers held together. Similar couples of balks, with similar transverse beams, and similarly kept apart by braces, were driven, in a straight line with the two original couples, right across the stream. Then, to form the roadway, timbers were laid, in the direction of the bridge, over the transverse beams, and covered by a second layer of smaller joists laid transversely, above which was placed a third layer of fascines. The bridge was strong enough already; but, to make assurance doubly sure, piles were driven vertically into the bed of the river along the down-stream side of the bridge. They were arranged in diagonal groups corresponding with the several couples of balks in the main structure, and were connected therewith. On the up-stream side, piles were driven in vertically at a short distance from the bridge, to protect it from the shock of any timber or vessels which the Germans might float down to destroy it. These piles were arranged in triangular groups, each group being exactly opposite to each couple of balks in the main structure.[1]

The foregoing description represents the view which I have myself formed, after studying Caesar's description and the remarks of the numerous editors and modern writers on the subject. But to a modern reader Caesar's description is, on certain points, obscure; and for the present I have necessarily left my explanation incomplete.

A. Rheinhard, finding Caesar's description wanting in lucidity, argues that he had no knowledge of engineering; that, his express statement notwithstanding, he did not himself design the structure; that he borrowed the materials of his description from his chief engineer, Mamurra; and that, as he failed to understand them, it was jejune, loose, and merely intended for popular reading.[2] Lieutenant

[1] *B. G.*, iv, 17.

[2] *Caesar's Rheinbrücke*, 1883, pp. 6–9. There is no evidence that Mamurra was Caesar's 'chief engineer'. He was, as far as we know, simply one of the *praefecti fabrum*.

A. Schleussinger replies that Caesar would not have dared, even if he had wished, to rob Mamurra of his credit, for fear the truth should come out; that he did, as a matter of fact, give his lieutenants the credit which was their due; and that he must have known that professional readers at Rome would study his description in a critical spirit.[1] I agree with Schleussinger; and it appears to me most unlikely that a man like Caesar should have been ignorant of the principles of a most important branch of his business.

II. J. Rondelet holds the singular opinion that the balks of each couple in the main structure were not two feet apart the whole way down, but only at the top. He bases his opinion on the words *prone ac fastigate*. The word *prone*, he thinks, shows that the balks sloped in the direction of or against the current, as the case might be; and the word *fastigate* that they sloped inwards towards each other.[2] But this theory is disproved, first, by the fact that Caesar says that the balks were joined by cross-pieces at an interval of two feet;[3] and secondly, by the fact that Rondelet's arrangement would have greatly increased the difficulty of driving them into the river-bed.[4] As Schneider[5] says, explaining *fastigate*, each couple of balks was so placed that it formed, with the opposite couple, a figure resembling a gable or sloping roof.

The theory of O. Pohl,[6] who represented the two balks of each couple as crossing each other, two feet above the water in the shape of an X, and that of T. Maurer,[7] who argued that they were placed one behind the other, hardly require even a passing mention.

III. M. Sonntag[8] contends that all the plans of the bridge, except his own, exaggerate the inclination of the balks. The result, he says, of their having inclined towards each other at the angles which most of the plans represent, would have been (1) that the pile-drivers would have worked less effectively; (2) that the balks would not have been firmly fixed; and (3) that the obtuse angles which they formed with the transverse beam would have been too great to admit of the insertion of the *fibulae*. (It will be observed that Sonntag here begs the question, how the *fibulae* were fixed.) The inclination, he maintains, would have been such that, if the distance along the surface of the water between the opposite couples of balks had been, as Caesar says, 40 feet, the distance, 6 feet from the surface, would have been 39.

[1] *Studie zu Caesar's Rheinbrücke*, 1884, pp. 25–30.

[2] *Traité théorique et pratique de l'art de bâtir*, 1812–4, iv, 305–7.

[3] Tigna bina sesquipedalia paulum ab imo praeacuta dimensa ad altitudinem fluminis intervallo pedum duorum inter se iungebat. Haec cum machinationibus immissa in flumen defixerat fistucisque adegerat, non sublicae modo derecte ad perpendiculum, sed prone ac fastigate, ut secundum naturam fluminis procumberent, iis item contraria duo ad eundem modum iuncta intervallo pedum quadragenum ab inferiore parte contra vim atque impetum fluminis conversa statuebat.

[4] *Class. Rev.*, xvi, 1902, p. 30.

[5] *Caesar*, i, 353.

[6] *Festschr. d. Realgymnasiums am Zwinger zu Breslau*, 1886, reviewed in *Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xiii, 1887, p. 367.

[7] *Noch einmal J. Cäsars Brücke über d. Rhein*, 1883, p. 4.

[8] *Bemerkungen zu Caesar de B. G.*, iv, 17, 1890, pp. 4–5.

IV. According to Rheinhard,[1] the balks were lowered separately into the water: after they had been rammed in, the cross-pieces were added; then the transverse beam (*trabs*), and then the braces (*fibulae*). Most commentators, however, hold that the balks were coupled before they were lowered into the bed of the river; and this appears to be the only conclusion which can be drawn from Caesar's words.

V. Again, there is a difference of opinion as to the distance between the opposite couples of balks. After describing the couple which was first lowered into the water, Caesar writes that 'he had another couple, similarly joined together, planted opposite them, on the lower side, at a distance of 40 feet' (*iis item contraria duo ad eundem modum iuncta intervallo pedum quadragenum ab inferiore parte . . . statuebat*). G. Hubo argues that the distance of 40 feet could not have been measured along the bed of the river, on account of the difference between the depth near the bank and in mid-stream, which would have caused a variation either in the width of the roadway or in the angle formed by the balks. Nor, he argues, could the measurement have been made between the tops of the balks, because transverse beams 40 feet long would have been difficult to procure and could not have sustained the weight which the bridge had to bear, and because the difficulty of building the bridge on such a scale would have been very great. He concludes that the distance must have been measured along the surface of the water. But, he adds, Napoleon is wrong in measuring the 40 feet so as to include the thicknesses of the two opposite couples of balks. In that case the *intervallum* of which Caesar speaks would have been only 37, not 40 feet; and it is clear from Caesar's words, *tigna bina sesquipedalia paulum ab imo praeacuta dimensa ad altitudinem fluminis intervallo pedum duorum inter se iungebat*,[2] that he used *intervallum* in its strict sense.[3]

Now there can be no doubt that if Hubo is right in his main contention, his correction of Napoleon is justified; and that his first argument is sound is proved by Caesar's statement that the balks were made of varying lengths to suit the varying depth of the stream (*dimensa ad altitudinem fluminis*). According to Mr. E. Kitson Clark,[4] 40 feet was the distance between the lower ends of the balks sunk in the bed of the river. This view is of course equally open to Hubo's criticism, which cannot be rebutted unless we assume that 40 feet was only a rough general measurement. A. Eberz,[5] indeed, holds that the distance of 40 feet was measured between the tops of the balks, that is to say that the roadway of the bridge was 40 feet wide, because, according to Rüstow,[6] the breadth of a cohort marching

[1] *Caesar's Rheinbrücke*, 1883.

[2] 'He took a couple of balks a foot and a half thick, had them sharpened to a point from a little above the lower end and adapted in length to the [varying] depth of the river, and fastened them together at an interval of two feet.'

[3] *Neue Jahrb. f. Philologie*, &c., cxlv, 1892, pp. 485–92.

[4] *Class. Rev.*, xxii, 1908, p. 145.

[5] *Neue Jahrb. f. Philologie*, &c., lxxv, 1857, pp. 849–50.

[6] *Heerwesen und Kriegführung C. Julius Cäsars*, 1855, p. 61.

in column was just 40 feet. A weaker argument could hardly be imagined. Caesar was not bound by red tape : it was necessary for him to build his bridge at the least possible cost of time and labour, and not at all necessary to adhere pedantically to rules of formation ; and nothing could have been easier than to contract the breadth of the column while it was marching across the bridge. Moreover, it cannot be proved that the breadth of a cohort marching in column was 40 feet. But there is not much force in Hubo's second argument ; for if the distance, measured along the surface of the water, between the opposite couples of balks had been 40 feet, the length of the transverse beams would only have been a little less ; and the difficulty of finding beams of the required length would surely have been almost as great as if they had been fully 40 feet long.

VI. The next difficulty concerns the braces, which Caesar calls *fibulae*,—their exact nature, number, and arrangement. I provisionally translate his statement :—' beams two feet wide, fitting into the interval between the balks of each couple, were laid across ; and the two couples were kept apart by a pair of braces on either side at the extremity. As they were thus kept asunder, and on the other hand lashed together, the strength of the structure was so great and its principle so ordered that, the greater the force of the current, the more closely were the timbers held together ' (*haec utraque insuper bipedalibus trabibus immissis quantum eorum tignorum iunctura distabat, binis utrimque fibulis ab extrema parte distinebantur* (v. l. *destinabantur*) ; *quibus disclusis atque in contrariam partem revinctis tanta erat operis firmitudo atque ea rerum natura ut quo maior vis aquae se incitavisset, hoc artius inligata tenerentur*).[1]

The various reading is comparatively unimportant. Caesar may have written *destinabantur* (' were made fast '),—the reading of *E* ; but anyhow the opposite couples of balks could not have been made fast unless they were kept at the right distance apart.

Mr. J. H. Taylor insists that *distinebantur* ' would yield no useful meaning, whether it was held to be predicated of the *tigna* which form the twin-pier [or couple of balks], or of the two twin-piers which one *trabs* joined ; because the former were already securely fastened, two feet apart, by their *iuncturae* ; the latter were sufficiently separated by being driven into the river-bed '.[2] But this reasoning cannot be accepted ; for, as the accompanying diagram, prepared by my friend Mr. Stanley Hall, A.R.I.B.A., will show, the tendency of the current would have been to make the upper couple of balks AB, and, in a less degree, the lower couple CD rotate about the fulcra A, D, thus depressing B, elevating C, and diminishing the horizontal distance between the upper ends of the couples.

The question of the *fibulae* has been debated, sometimes with acrimony, since the Renaissance ; and, as P. de la Ramée said in the days of Queen Elizabeth, ' in the whole construction of the

[1] As will be seen presently, the meaning not only of *fibulis*, but also of *binis, utrimque, ab extrema parte, quibus*, and *in contrariam partem* has been disputed.

[2] *Class. Rev.*, xvi, 1902, p. 33.

bridge nothing is more obscure' :[1] but the truth has gradually been brought to light.

1. Lipsius[2] conceived of the *fibulae* as iron bolts, driven right through the transverse beam, one on the inner side, the other on the outer side of each couple of balks.

2. Kraner and Heller believe that there were four bolts to each couple of balks. Kraner[3] holds that they were driven, at each end of the transverse beam, through the transverse beam itself into the 'cross-piece' immediately underneath it. Heller considers that two were driven horizontally through the transverse beam on the outer side, and two on the inner side of each couple of balks. He defends his view by the following reasoning:—*utrimque* must be understood as referring to the inner and the outer side of each couple of balks; for on any other theory it must be regarded as a mere repetition of (haec) *utraque*. The opposite couples of balks were kept apart (*distinebantur*), he explains, by the inner *fibulae*; while they were prevented by the outer *fibulae* from moving too far apart (*revinciebantur*).[4]



Heller is a thorough Caesarian scholar; but on this point he is mistaken. Assuming that Caesar wrote *distinebantur*, Heller has no right to limit the application of the word to the 'inner *fibulae*'; for Caesar says that the desired effect was produced by all. As to *utrimque*, who can doubt that Caesar used the word in order to make it clear that each couple of balks was provided with two *fibulae*?[5] Read the sentence, in this sense, without the word, and you will see that it is needed.

3. It is amusing to read Fröhlich[6] after reading Heller. Caesar, he argues, did not write *distinebantur*, but *destinabantur*; but the reason which he gives is unsound. *Distinebantur*, he insists, makes

[1] P. Rami . . . *liber de Caesaris militia*, 1559, pp. 17–8.
[2] *Opera*, ed. 1637, iii, 306 and illustration on p. 308.
[3] *Caesar*, 1855, pp. 158–9.
[4] *Philologus*, Suppl. Band v, 1889, pp. 386–8, and *Philologus*, x, 1855, pp. 732–4.
[5] Mr. Roby (*Class. Rev.*, i, 1887, p. 242) takes the same view, which makes Heller exclaim (*Philologus*, xlix, 1890, p. 694), 'it is inexplicable how the English scholar, when he finds in Caesar's text the words "*binis* utrimque fibulis" can get out of them the meaning "*one* on each side"'. Mr. Roby might retort that '*one* on each side' (of each couple of balks) means '*two* at each end' (of the transverse beam). Where Mr. Roby really differs from Heller is in his interpretation of *utrimque*; and if, as I believe, his interpretation of *utrimque* is right, so is his interpretation of *binis*.
[6] *Das Kriegswesen Cäsars*, 1890, pp. 216–9.

no sense ; for, if Caesar had written it, we should be obliged to conclude that *fibulae* were placed on the inner side of the balks, in order to keep the opposite couples apart. But this conclusion is negatived by the words *ab extrema parte,* which can only mean ' on the outer side ' (of the balks). In support of this view, Fröhlich says that in the other passages in which Caesar uses the word *extremus*, ' a double standpoint ' cannot be understood. The *fibulae* therefore, which, as the derivation of the word proves, were bolts, were inserted in the transverse beam, outside the balks, two to each couple. Their object was to prevent the couples of balks from moving apart. The couples could not move towards each other, because the transverse beam was notched at the points of contact. In fine, the transverse beam kept the couples of balks apart (*quibus disclusis*) ; while the *fibulae* kept them sufficiently close together.

Now the unbiased reader who is familiar with Caesar's use of the word *extremus* will have no hesitation in concluding that by *extrema parte* he simply meant ' at the top of the balks ', or (which comes to the same thing), ' at, or near, the end of the transverse beam.' [1] Any one who has seen the collections of *fibulae* in the British Museum will smile at the suggestion that the derivation of the word proves that Caesar's *fibulae* were bolts. And if the transverse beam was notched at the point of contact with the balks on the inner side of them, it is hard to see why it was not notched on the outer side as well ; and why, if notching was sufficient, *fibulae* were used at all. I should add that an engineer whom I have consulted regards every theory which identifies the *fibulae* with bolts as wholly unpractical, and, as Sonntag [2] justly remarks, the pressure of the current would have made bolts not firmer, but looser.

4. A. von Cohausen,[3] who holds that there were only two *fibulae* to each couple of balks, thinks that one of the two served as a cross-piece outside the couple, for the transverse beam to rest upon ; that the other was let into a groove cut in the upper surface of the transverse beam and on the inner side of the couple ; and that balks, transverse beam, and *fibulae* were firmly lashed together by rope.

5. F. Zimmerhaeckel,[4] a Prussian officer of engineers, has devised a modification of Cohausen's arrangement, which is clearly summarized as follows by Mr. A. H. Allcroft [5] :—Zimmerhaeckel ' believes

[1] One would have thought that the meaning of *ab extrema parte* was plain enough; but Heller (*Philologus*, x, 1855, pp. 732–4), like Fröhlich, misunderstands it. These words, he says, were essential to Caesar's description, as the reader will perceive if he will reflect that the *fibulae* were placed on the inner and the outer edge of each couple of balks : otherwise we should infallibly have received the false impression that they had been driven through the middle of the two balks of each couple as well as through the transverse beam. But if Caesar had meant to convey the meaning which Heller, alone among all commentators, has read into his words, would he not have written *ab exteriore* or *ab externa* (parte) ? See *B. G.*, ii, 8, § 4 ; 11, § 4 ; iii, 12, § 1 ; 29, § 2 ; vi, 29, § 3 ; and Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, i, 1242–3.

[2] *Bemerkungen zu Caesar de B. G., iv, 17,* pp. 2–3. Cf. *Jahrb. d. Alterthumsfreunde im Rheinlande*, lxxx, 1886, p. 122.

[3] *Cäsar's Rheinbrücken*, 1867, p. 47 (Fig. 19).

[4] *C. Julius Caesars Rheinbrücke*, 1899. [5] *Class. Rev.*, xiii, 1899, p. 408.

that the *fibulae* were merely bars of undressed wood laid in the alternate acute angles of the X-cross formed by the junction of the horizontal *trabs* [beam] with the sloping *tigna* [balks]; viz. one *fibula* in the outer and lower angle, the other in the inner and upper angle. To hold them in place they were stoutly roped *to each other*; the essential point is that while remaining firmly connected, they should nevertheless move with freedom. This, he says, is a recognized method in modern bridge-building.' Now the force of the current would obviously tend to lessen the acute angles in which the up-stream *fibulae* were placed, and therefore to bind the timbers more closely together on that side; but, not to mention other objections, which will presently appear, on the down-stream side the effect would be the very reverse.

6. Maxa,[1] Rheinhard,[2] and Schleussinger[3] hold, like Cohausen, that the balks were grooved for the reception of the *fibulae*. According to Rheinhard, the *fibulae* bit into grooves in the transverse beam and in the balks. Their arrangement was triangular: that is to say, they rested against the outer sides of the balks, and, sloping upwards, lapped over and met above the transverse beam.[4]

7. Napoleon[5] interprets the word *fibulae* in a wholly different sense. He holds that the opposite couples of balks were kept at the right distance apart by two pairs of wooden tie-beams, each pair being bolted in the shape of the figure ⋊ to the outer sides of the balks.

Professor E. V. Arnold virtually agrees with Napoleon, only differing from him as to the way in which the *fibulae* were made fast to the balks. 'The word *distinebantur*,' he says, 'shows that the main object of the *fibulae* was to prevent the couples of piles [or balks] from falling together inwards; and this end would most simply be attained by notching the *fibulae* or by letting them into the beams at each end.' He interprets *in contrariam partem revinctis* as meaning 'they were linked together crosswise,—i.e. the right-hand upper pile to the left-hand lower pile, and vice versa'.[6]

Now there is one fatal objection to both Napoleon's theory and Professor Arnold's: neither the one nor the other agrees with Caesar's description. *Fibulae* were not tie-beams; *in contrariam partem* cannot possibly bear the meaning which Professor Arnold gives it; and the words *utrimque* and *ab extrema parte* can only mean that the *fibulae* were at the upper ends of the opposite couples of balks and at the ends of the transverse beam.[7] Every writer who has combined a practical knowledge of the principles of the construction of bridges with adequate scholarship has come to this conclusion.

[1] *Zeitschr. f. d. österreich. Gymnasien*, xxxi, 1880, picture on p. 493.
[2] *Caesar's Rheinbrücke*, p. 14.
[3] *Studie zu Caesar's Rheinbrücke*, p. 30. [4] See Rheinhard's plan and p. 14.
[5] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 145–6 and Planche 15.
[6] *Class. Rev.*, i, 1887, pp. 168–9. The professor takes *quibus* as an instrumental ablative. This view Mr. Roby (*ib.*, p. 242) combats, because *disclusis* would then have no subject expressed.
[7] Cf. Heller in *Philologus*, xxvi, 1867, pp. 669–70.

8. Sonntag [1] thinks that the system of *fibulae* devised by Cohausen would have answered for the upper balks, but not for the lower; for, he says, the pressure of the water would have tended to depress the upper and to raise the lower balks, thereby enlarging the acute and diminishing the obtuse angle. He holds that *quibus* must grammatically refer not to *utraque* (tigna) but to *fibulis*, in other words, that *disclusis* agrees with *quibus* (fibulis), not with *quibus* (tignis), or with *tignis* understood; and Mr. Taylor, who agrees with him, remarks that 'to take *quibus* as having for its antecedent *tignis* . . . does not yield any sense such as to explain or justify Caesar's statement about the effect of increased strength of the current'.[2] If they are right, Caesar meant, not that the balks were kept apart by the *fibulae*, but that the *fibulae* were themselves kept open. Sonntag goes on to argue that if, as appears certain, the plan of Caesar's bridge was new, and if *fibula* was not a word used in the terminology of bridge-construction, Caesar must have used it in a sense with which his readers would be familiar. Now the words *disclusis* ('kept apart') and *revinctis* ('made fast') could have been predicated of the *fibula*, or safety-pin, which was used to fasten clothes,—*revinctis* because 'the pin which is inserted in the catch cannot move far from the shaft'; *disclusis* because 'shaft and pin are kept apart by folds of clothing'. Caesar's *fibulae*, Sonntag concludes, were two beams, adjusted in the angles formed by the balks and transverse beam and held together at the ends by iron bands.

But, according to the analogy, did not the two beams form one *fibula*? Wait and see.

9. Mr. Taylor, in an interesting article which appeared in the *Classical Review* of January, 1902, offers an explanation of the *fibulae*, which, as he acknowledges, was anticipated by Colonel Emy,[3] and is substantially identical with that of Sonntag.[4] Like the German scholar, he takes *quibus* as referring to *fibulis* and agreeing with *disclusis*, and translates *quibus disclusis atque in contrariam partem revinctis* by 'since these *fibulae* were separated (viz. by the *trabs* and *tigna bina*) and lashed together in direction opposite to their separation'. His theory, which expressly identifies the *fibulae* with safety-pins, will be best explained in his own words.—'Suppose the *fibulae* to have been poles of six or seven feet in length, placed in the acute angles between the up-stream *tigna* and *trabes*, and in the obtuse angles between the down-stream *tigna* and *trabes*, and that the ends of each pair of *fibulae* which projected beyond the *tigna* on either side of the *trabs* were firmly lashed together. . . . Consider the effect of this arrangement. Any movement caused by the . . . current would be of the nature of a slight rotation of the twin-piers about transverse

[1] *Bemerkungen zu Caesar de B. G., iv, 17*, p. 4.

[2] *Class. Rev.*, xvi, 1902, pp. 32–3.

[3] *Traité de l'art de la charpenterie*, ii, 1841, pp. 369–70 and Atlas, pl. 129, fig. 4.

[4] The only difference is that, according to Mr. Taylor, the *fibulae* were fastened by ropes, which Sonntag (*Bemerkungen*, &c., pp. 2–3) thinks would have been too weak.

axes in the bed of the river. This rotation would tend to diminish the angles in which the *fibulae* were placed, and therefore to thrust them outwards from the vertices of those angles and *ipso facto* to tighten the lashing and bind all the timbers firmer together. . . . Hence it is clear that it is a mistake to figure such *fibulae* placed in the acute angles on the down-stream side of the bridge ; for in that case the lashings on that side would be slackened by any movement induced by the current.' Mr. Taylor adds that he verified his theory by constructing a model.[1]

Now when I read Mr. Taylor's article I wrote on the margin, ' Taylor's *binae fibulae* plus the lashing only constitute one " safety-pin " ' ; and Mr. Stanley Hall endorses this objection. ' The whole significance,' he writes, ' of Mr. Taylor's translation must lie in the fact that the two poles plus the lashings constituted a single *fibula*. In fact he admits as much. . . . In the second place, even allowing this unsurmountable difficulty, can it be claimed that, with his *fibulae*, the greater the force of the current, the firmer is the structure ? I think not : rather the reverse is the case. True, as the angles tend to diminish, the lashings become more taut : the effect of the strain upon them is nevertheless to stretch the lashings ; and the best that can be said for such a construction is that the lashings, in spite of being stretched, will nevertheless remain taut. But Mr. Taylor's *fibulae* still fail because he has not appreciated the importance of keeping apart (*distinebantur*) the top ends of the balks. The *trabs bipedalis* is a beam in compression, to use a mechanical term ; and joints at the points B and C, such as he describes, would allow the *tigna bina* to slide to some degree, owing to the tendency to rotate about the point A, caused by the force of the stream. In fact, the strain put upon both the lashings and the members of the structure is infinitely greater than in a triangulated construction. . . . Further, to take *disclusis* as referring to *fibulis* and translate it " since they were separated " (viz. by the *trabs* and *tigna bina*) seems to me to be forcing the Latin. . . . [Mr. Taylor] says " the words *quibus disclusis* will aptly represent the unclasping of the safety-pins before passing them round the woodwork ". This is all very excellent when applied to a single safety-pin ; but it is quite a different thing when applied to a couple of poles tied at both ends. It has only to be stated to show that the meaning will not hold :—take two poles, unclasp them (!) round the tops of the *tigna*, and then bind them up in direction opposite to their separation ! '

10. Mr. Hall himself has devised a theory which tallies perfectly with Caesar's description. Its novelty is that it supposes the results described by the words *disclusis* and *revinctis* to have been produced not by the *fibulae* alone, but also by a tie. The *fibulae* in Mr. Hall's opinion were iron[2] ' dogs ', such as are universally used now. They are shaped somewhat like a broad angular croquet-hoop, and are

[1] *Class. Rev.*, xvi, 1902, pp. 31–2.

[2] It has been objected that Caesar would not have carried about a sufficient quantity of iron ; but this objection is disposed of by *B. G.*, vii, 73, § 9.

about 12 inches across, with the ends bent at right angles and pointed. They would have been fixed diagonally, one of the points being driven into the transverse beam and the other into the top of one of the balks. If, says Mr. Hall, any one should object that such hold-fasts do not resemble safety-pins, 'it is a perfectly fair and adequate answer to say that they are as much like Roman brooches as their English equivalent is like English dogs.'

Now for Mr. Hall's original idea. Referring to his diagram, he remarks that 'since the points B and C are made fast [by the *fibulae*], the whole structure ABCD will tend to take up the position AB′C′D, and the effect of this will be to lengthen the distance between the points A and C. The most elementary engineer would know that this tendency would be counteracted by a tie'—one tie, remember, not, as in Napoleon's theory, two—'between the point C and a point on AB as near as possible to A. This tie triangulates the structure ABC, and as long as there is a constant pressure in the direction of the stream, the bridge—provided always that the various members of the structure have been designed to meet the various stresses put upon them—must be absolutely rigid. . . . It will be seen,' he adds, 'that I take *quibus* as referring to *haec utraque*, that is, both pairs of balks; *disclusis* as summing up and repeating *binis utrimque fibulis ab extrema parte distinebantur*; and *in contrariam partem revinctis* as meaning 'having a diagonal tie'. It does not seem to me in the smallest degree surprising that Caesar should add the last member of the structure by an ablative absolute clause: any engineer would at once assume that there would be this tie.' In regard to the words *tanta erat operis firmitudo atque ea rerum natura ut quo maior vis aquae se incitavisset, hoc artius inligata tenerentur*, Mr. Hall thinks that 'the meaning of the Latin is sufficiently brought out if we understand Caesar to mean that the constant pressure of the stream was an essential factor in the stability of the bridge'.

11. Mr. E. Kitson Clark,[1] remarking that 'the horizontal beam [*trabs*] was continued beyond its junction with the piers' [*tigna*], affirms that 'between the end of this [*ab extrema parte*] and the top of the piers braces [*fibulae*] were attached in such a manner as to hold the horizontal and uprights [*tigna*] rigidly in position. The ends of these were thus thrust apart [*disclusis*] and could not close, and tied together [*in contrariam partem revinctis*] and could not open. In short,' Mr. Clark continues, 'by the insertion and method of attachment of the fibula, a member combining the properties of strut and tie was introduced, which formed the base of a strong triangle whose apex was the crossing of the main members—a triangle which would resist any distortion of the angle at the crossing.' Mr. Taylor, in a MS. comment, objects that 'no single thing can combine the properties of strut and tie'; for, he asks, 'how can compression and tension coexist in one piece?' Besides, as we have seen, the two *tigna* of each couple were already securely fastened, and therefore could neither close nor open.

[1] *Class. Rev.*, xxii, 1908, pp. 144–5.

The impartial reader will perhaps agree with me that Mr. Hall, if any one, has solved the problem.

VII. The only remaining difficulty is about the supports and defences which were added after the bridge was built. 'Piles,' says Caesar, 'were also driven in diagonally on the down-stream side, which were connected with the entire structure and planted below like a buttress, so as to break the force of the stream. Other piles were likewise planted a little above the bridge, so that in case the natives floated down trunks of trees or barges to demolish the structure, their force might be weakened by these bulwarks, and they might not injure the bridge' (*sublicae et ad inferiorem partem fluminis oblique agebantur, quae pro ariete subiectae et cum omni opere coniunctae vim fluminis exciperent, et aliae item supra pontem mediocri spatio, ut si arborum trunci sive naves deiciendi operis causa essent a barbaris missae, his defensoribus earum rerum vis minueretur neu ponti nocerent*).

1. Long infers from the words *et aliae item supra* that 'the *sublicae* below and above the bridge were fixed in the same manner'; while from Caesar's saying that the balks of the bridge itself were not driven in, like *sublicae*, perpendicularly, but sloping (*non sublicae modo derecte ad perpendiculum, sed prone ac fastigate*), he gathers that all the *sublicae* were perpendicular. He explains *oblique agebantur* thus :—the *sublicae* 'were placed in a triangular form' (that is to say, arranged in a series of triangles), and those on the down-stream side were connected with the balks, and 'presented as they were viewed from the lower side of the bridge the appearance of a head or solid angle.' His Plan[1] would seem to show that he considered each triangle of *sublicae* on the down-stream side of the bridge to have *enclosed* a separate couple of balks. I believe, however, that his Plan does not represent his meaning; for he goes on to say, 'it may be said that it would have been better if the "sublicae" on the lower side of the stream had been placed with the ram's head ("aries"[2]) towards the stream, and inside and under the bridge;[3] but Caesar seems to place this work in the lower part on the outside, as he certainly does place it outside in the upper part, for there the "sublicae" were not connected with the piles [or balks], but placed in front of them.'

2. Schneider, who, like Long, believes that the *sublicae* were vertical, and agrees with him in the interpretation of *oblique*, holds that from a point close to and below the centre of the bridge two rows of *sublicae* extended obliquely to either bank, being arranged in the form of an obtuse angle with its apex pointing up-stream. He

[1] Facing page 194 of Long's *Caesar*.

[2] Mr. Peskett (*Caesar*, Books iv–v, 1887, p. 65) says that 'it is not easy to see what meaning Mr. Long attaches to *pro ariete*'. Long's meaning is embodied in Schneider's note :—*ad aquas rumpendas sic subiectae, ut qui vulgo vocatur aries ad muros diruendos adhiberi solet . . . Neque inepta ad illam, quam statuimus, sublicarum dispositionem arietis comparatio videtur. Quemadmodum enim aries murum, sic illae undarum vim frangebant.*

[3] This is the very way in which Long's Plan represents them as having been placed.

argues that when Caesar says that the *sublicae* were *cum omni opere coniunctae*, he only means that they were close to, not in actual contact with, the main structure of the bridge; and he contends that if the force of the stream, after it had just passed the lower side of the bridge, had been checked, the force of the water above the balks must have been checked also.[1] No doubt: but, as any mathematician or engineer would have told him, only to a slight extent. This objection tells equally against the theory of Long; and both are inconsistent with the statement that the piles were designed *ut vim fluminis exciperent*.[2]

3. Mr. A. H. Allcroft[3] has modified Long's theory in a way which appears to Mr. Peskett 'unintelligible'. He holds that the stockades 'were actually beneath the piers [or balks], the latter sloping over and resting upon them, so that the stockade served as a buttress (*pro ariete subiectae*), and pier and stockade could be securely fastened to one another' (*cum omni opere coniunctae*). 'Remembering,' says Mr. Peskett,[4] 'that a so-called pier consisted of two large sloping *tigna* each a foot and a half thick, separated by an interval of two feet, one would like to see a diagram showing how a pier of this kind could slope over and rest on a V-shaped stockade of perpendicular piles.' I have no doubt that Mr. Allcroft could gratify Mr. Peskett's wish; but his theory does not agree with the words *cum omni opere coniunctae*: for the balks could not have rested upon the piles which he describes unless the latter had been driven in first.

4. Mr. Kitson Clark, who adopts a quasi-V-shaped formation (the figure \/ being substituted for a V), places the down-stream *sublicae* on either side of, and in contact with, each of the couples of balks, and explains *pro ariete* as meaning like 'a lateral buttress'.[5] Arranged in this way, the *sublicae* might, indeed, have been described as *cum omni opere coniunctae*; but Mr. Hall agrees with me that they would have been more effective if they had formed a complete V.

5. Napoleon holds that the lower *sublicae* leaned, like a buttress, against each of the balks.[6] But if Caesar had meant to describe such an arrangement as this, he would surely have written not *oblique* but *prone*. *Oblique* means that the *sublicae* were driven into the bed of the river, not in a line parallel with that of the bridge, but slantwise with regard to that line. Caesar expressly says, in the earlier part of his description of the bridge, that *sublicae* were fixed

[1] Schneider's *Caesar*, i, 358–9.

[2] Mr. Allcroft, who translates *excipere vim fluminis* by 'to intercept the rush of the current', affirms that the phrase 'is used only of an object which, being itself higher up the stream, covers and protects an object lower down'; and he refers to Livy, xxi, 28 (for which read 27, § 8). Mr. Peskett (*Class. Rev.*, xiii, 1899, p. 462) stigmatizes his assertion as 'easy to make but difficult to prove'; but it is supported not only by the quotation from Livy, but also by the other relevant passages—*B. G.*, i, 52, § 4; iii, 5, § 3; *B. C.*, iii, 93, § 2—in which Caesar uses the word. See p. 723, *infra*.

[3] *Class. Rev.*, xiii, 1899, p. 409.

[4] *Ib.*, p. 462.

[5] *Ib.*, xxii, 1908, pp. 145–6.

[6] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 146 and Planche 15.

perpendicularly. If, then, he had used the word *sublicae* of piles which sloped, he would have been guilty of inconsistency and obscurity. Moreover, as Long points out, the *sublicae* were placed in position after the main structure of the bridge was finished; and it would have been impossible, he maintains, in these circumstances, to drive them into the bed of the river 'in the way in which they are represented in the common plates'.[1]

Nevertheless Mr. Peskett will have it that the *sublicae* did slope. 'I believe,' he says,[2] 'that the whole theory of V-shaped stockades is wrong, because I cannot conceive that Caesar's powers of expression were so limited that he would have described such an arrangement simply by the words *sublicae . . . oblique agerentur quae pro ariete subiectae et cum omni opere coniunctae vim fluminis exciperent*.' Evidently on this point agreement is hopeless; but can Mr. Peskett conceive that Caesar's powers of expression were so limited that, after expressly stating that *sublicae* were fixed perpendicularly, he should have proceeded in the same paragraph to say that they were fixed *oblique*, if by *oblique* he meant to denote or to connote a position which was not perpendicular? Moreover, if Mr. Peskett will think again, he will admit that Caesar's 'powers of expression' would have hopelessly failed if he had said that sloping buttresses, such as those imagined by Napoleon, were intended to '*intercept* the force of the stream'. Obviously the stream would have struck the *tigna* with undiminished force; and the buttresses would only have supported them against it. But in this case Caesar would surely have written, not *vim fluminis exciperent*, but *pontem* (or *tigna*) *firmarent*.[3]

[1] R. Menge (*Philologus*, xliv, 1885, pp. 288–9) has shown that it would have been possible to drive piles sloping into the bed of the river in such a way that they would have been in contact with the bridge and supported it; but how can his explanation avail against Caesar's express statement that *sublicae* were perpendicular?

In the first edition (p. 707) I argued that, as there was no evidence that *oblique* was ever used in the sense of *prone*, 'if the *sublicae* were props or buttresses, they leaned *obliquely* against the bridge; in other words, there were two *sublicae* to each couple of balks, both sloping forward and at the same time obliquely against the stream,—one from right to left, the other from left to right'; and I added that 'an engineer, to whom I suggested this arrangement, approved of it as the most effective', and that, 'leaning in this manner like buttresses against the bridge, the *sublicae* would have indirectly broken the force of the current'. In this case the word *aries* ('ram') in Caesar's description might possibly be analogous to *capreoli* (literally 'wild goats'), as used in *B. C.*, ii, 10, § 3, where it denotes pieces of timber forming the framework of the roof of a sapper's hut. But I ought to have held fast to the argument, the force of which I of course admitted, that Napoleon's view obliges us to assume that Caesar was unpardonably inconsistent in his use of the word *sublicae*. '*A sublica*,' says Mr. Peskett (*Class. Rev.*, xiii, 1899, p. 462), 'of course remains a *sublica* whether it is driven in straight or crooked'. The tower of Pisa remains a tower although it leans; but the normal position of towers and of *sublicae* is perpendicular.

[2] *Class. Rev.*, xiii, 1899, p. 462.

[3] It is not, perhaps, absolutely necessary to assume that the arrangement of the *sublicae* was V-shaped. 'If,' says Mr. Taylor (*ib.*, xvi, 1902, p. 33), 'Caesar's bridge was . . . at, or just below, a bend in the river . . . a diagonal line of piles across the front of each pier would have been all that was required to protect them; and this may be what Caesar meant by *oblique*.'

6. Napoleon, after describing the lower *sublicae*, says, 'Other piles were similarly driven in at a little distance above' the bridge. The words 'similarly' might suggest that, in his opinion, the upper piles were also driven in slantwise; but his Plan (15) represents them as vertical and arranged in the triangular form which I have described. I am told that wooden bridges in Norway are protected in the same way now.

7. Cohausen thinks that the upper *sublicae* were not driven into the bed vertically, but were placed at an angle more acute than that formed by the piles of the bridge, and leaned against them.[1] This arrangement is inconsistent with the natural meaning of *mediocri spatio*. Schleussinger, however, defends Cohausen's view. That the upper *sublicae* were in contact with the bridge, is, he maintains, proved by Caesar's having used the word *minueretur*, instead of *frangeretur*, to express that the object of these piles was to protect the bridge from the shock of any timber or vessels which the Germans might float down to destroy it; and also by the word *item*, which, he insists, evidently refers to *oblique agebantur*. Besides, he argues, if the upper *sublicae* had been upright, Caesar would certainly have said so; for those on the lower side of the bridge were unquestionably sloping.[2] I see no force in these arguments. The first implies that Caesar deliberately preferred a less to a more effective and easier method of protecting his bridge: if *minueretur* is to be pressed, it can only mean that Caesar calculated that the *sublicae* would minimize the damaging force of the floating timber, even if they did not absolutely prevent its reaching the bridge. The second recoils against Schleussinger: it is *not* unquestionable that the lower *sublicae* were sloping; on the contrary, it is morally certain that they were vertical.[3]

8. According to Alberti,[4] there were two separate upright *sublicae* to each couple of balks on the upper side of the bridge: according to Scamozzi,[5] two separate *sublicae* sloping towards, but not touching the bridge. Neither of these contrivances, however, would have answered Caesar's purpose so well as that suggested by Napoleon: Scamozzi's is inconsistent with Caesar's general statement about *sublicae*; and both appear to me inconsistent with the words *oblique* and *item*.

WAS COMMIUS KING OF THE ATREBATES OR OF THE MORINI?

Caesar relates that in 55 B.C. he sent on a mission to Britain *Commium, quem ipse Atrebatibus superatis regem ibi constituerat*,[6] which, in conformity with the usual interpretation of the passage,

[1] *Cäsar's Rheinbrücken*, pp. 27 (fig. 10), 44–5.
[2] *Studie zu Caesar's Rheinbrücke*, pp. 13–4.
[3] R. Menge (*Philologus*, xliv, 1885, p. 289) thinks that *item* may refer to *agebantur* only, and not to *oblique*. I do not agree with him.
[4] J. Rondelet, *Traité théorique et pratique de l'art de bâtir*, t. vii, pl. cxxxviii, fig. 1. [5] *Ib.*, fig. 3. [6] *B. G.*, iv, 21, § 7.

I translate by 'Commius, whom, after the overthrow of the Atrebates, he had set up as king over that people'. M. Jullian,[1] however, maintains that *ibi* refers not to the Atrebates, but to the Morini, who are mentioned in an earlier section[2] of the same chapter. He argues, first, that Caesar's later statement, that in acknowledgement of Commius's services, 'he had granted his tribe immunity from taxation [?], restored to it its rights and laws, and placed the Morini under his authority' (*pro quibus meritis civitatem eius immunem esse iusserat, iura legesque reddiderat atque ipsi Morinos attribuerat*),[3] seems incompatible with the view that he had imposed a king upon the Atrebates; secondly, that Commius is never called *rex Atrebatium*, but always *Atrebas*; and thirdly, that in the passage just quoted *ipsi* apparently means *Commius*. Certainly it does; but why should not Caesar have placed the Morini, who had more than once rebelled, in dependence upon Commius, whom he trusted, even though Commius was king of the Atrebates? M. Jullian's second argument does not convince me, for Caesar, as I understand him, had stated once for all that he had made Commius king of the Atrebates; and the words *pro quibus meritis*, &c., are quite compatible with the received view, for they only mean that Caesar relieved the Atrebates from the obligation of paying tribute (or supplying corn ?), and left them free to manage their own internal affairs. Moreover, there are cogent reasons for dissenting from M. Jullian's conclusion. First, the obvious meaning of *ibi*, as the consensus of other commentators shows, is certainly *apud Atrebates*: to make it refer to the Morini is to charge Caesar with unpardonable obscurity, for, if he had intended to refer to them, he would surely have written *apud Morinos*. Secondly, to make *ibi* equivalent to *apud Morinos* deprives the words *Atrebatibus superatis* of all point. Thirdly, the assumption that Commius was king of the Morini implies that he was wholly unable to control his subjects; for in the year after the subjection of the Atrebates the Morini refused to sue for peace and successfully resisted Caesar,[4] and in the following year part of them sent envoys to Caesar,[5] apparently without any authority from Commius, and others rebelled again although a few weeks before troops had been dispatched against them.[6] Lastly, if M. Jullian will read the words *pro quibus meritis . . . ipsi Morinos attribuerat* again, he will acknowledge that they alone prove that the Morini were not placed under Commius's authority until after the second invasion of Britain; for the *merita* in question were the services which he had rendered in the two British expeditions. It follows that the people over whom he was made king in 57 B.C. were the Atrebates.

[1] *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 315, n. 4.
[2] § 3.
[3] *B. G.*, vii, 76, § 1.
[4] *Ib.*, iii, 28–9.
[5] *Ib.*, iv, 22, § 1.
[6] *Ib.*, 37, 38, § 1.

WAS COTTA SUBORDINATE TO SABINUS AT ATUATUCA?

Mommsen[1] holds that Cotta was 'probably directed, in the event of a difference, to yield' to Sabinus. The reasons which he gives are, first, that Sabinus had already performed important services; secondly, that whenever the two are mentioned together in the *Commentaries*, except in *B. G.*, vi, 37, § 8, Sabinus takes precedence; thirdly, that Caesar would not have placed two officers over one camp without providing for the contingency of a difference of opinion; and fourthly, that Caesar's narrative of the disaster at Atuatuca confirms the foregoing arguments.[2]

THE MEANING OF A DISPUTED PASSAGE IN *B. G.*, v, 31, § 5

Caesar, describing how the troops of Sabinus and Cotta spent the night after it had been decided to abandon Atuatuca, writes, *omnia excogitantur quare nec sine periculo maneatur et languore militum et vigiliis periculum augeatur.* Long[3] explains the meaning of this perfectly. 'The passage,' he says, 'seems to mean "every reason is suggested why there was no staying without danger, and why the danger would be increased by the lassitude and watches of the soldiers." Caesar puts it in the most general way. It was settled that they must go, and everybody, at least those who were in favour of going, thinks of every possible reason to confirm his opinion, and to convince others that if they stayed in the camp, it was not without risk,' &c. F. Lüdecke[4] thinks that the passage is out of place, and suggests that it originally stood in § 3 after *perducitur*, representing an argument which was urged by Sabinus and his party at the council of war.[5] But this conjecture is quite uncalled for. To a reader gifted with the least historical imagination the passage, where

[1] *Hist. of Rome*, v, 1894, p. 68, note (*Röm. Gesch.*, iii, 1889, p. 274, note).

[2] *B. G.*, iv, 22, § 5; 38, § 3; v, 24, § 5; 26, § 2; 27–37, 52, § 4; vi, 32, § 4.

[3] *Caesar*, p. 249.

[4] *Neue Jahrb. f. Philologie*, &c., cxi, 1875, pp. 429–32.

[5] W. Paul, who has wasted more time and ingenuity than any other scholar in trying to amend the text of the *Commentaries*, deletes the whole passage. *Zeitschr. f. d. Gymnasialwesen*, xxxv, 1881, pp. 281–4. [I am very sorry to see that Meusel (*Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xxxvi, 1910, pp. 46–7), though he interprets the sentence as I have done, also condemns it as an interpolation. In its existing context, he says, it must mean, as Mommsen (who changes *maneatur* into *eatur*) puts it, 'Everything is done in order to make the march as dangerous as possible and to tire out the soldiers beforehand'! He also remarks, following the restless Paul, that Caesar nowhere else uses *excogitare* in the *Gallic War*, or *languor* at all. But what then? On the very first page of Meusel's *Lexicon Caesarianum*, which I open at random—i, 742—I find three words which Caesar only uses once,—*copiosus*, *copula*, and *cor*: on the next (i, 1198) two,—*excello* and *exceplo*; and on the next (i, 1201–2) four,—*excubitor*, *exculco*, *excursio*, and *excursus*!]

it stands, will appear far more natural and effective than anywhere else. Moreover, as F. Klein[1] points out, Caesar represents Sabinus as unsupported in argument: it was Cotta who was backed up by the other officers. After Sabinus had announced his decision, the soldiers would naturally have talked the matter over among themselves.

I subjoin my own translation of a part of the chapter, to show how naturally the passage reads in its proper place:—'The dispute dragged on till midnight. At length Cotta . . . gave way: Sabinus's view prevailed. An order was issued that the troops were to march at daybreak. The men stayed up for the rest of the night, every one looking about to see what he could take with him, what part of his winter's kit he would be forced to leave behind. Men thought of every argument to persuade themselves that they could not remain without danger, and that the danger would be increased by protracted watches and consequent exhaustion. At dawn they marched out of camp,' &c.

WHAT WAS THE FORMATION OF SABINUS'S COLUMN, WHEN IT MARCHED FROM ATUATUCA?

Caesar describes it thus:—'At dawn they marched out of camp, like men convinced that no enemy had counselled them, but the best of friends, in a column of extraordinary length and with an immense baggage-train' (*Prima luce sic ex castris proficiscuntur ut quibus esset persuasum non ab hoste, sed ab homine amicissimo consilium datum, longissimo agmine maximisque impedimentis*).[2] Obviously Caesar implies that Sabinus was to blame for adopting such a formation; and the blame appears to be defined by the two superlatives, *longissimo* and *maximis*. If so, Caesar's censure was directed simply against the needless length of the column and the excessive amount of baggage which accompanied it. He tells us nothing about the arrangement of the baggage; and perhaps he had no fault to find on that score. But Long[3] appears to think that the arrangement was similar to that which Caesar himself adopted when marching against the Nervii in 57 B.C., and which he discarded when making his final march before the battle.[4] If so, we may perhaps surmise that the legion and the five cohorts under Sabinus's command were separated from each other, each division being followed by its own baggage-train. But there is not a word of this in Caesar's narrative.

Schneider[5] suggests that the order of march was practically identical with that which Caesar adopted when marching against the Nervii, the only difference being that, on this occasion, each cohort was followed by its own little baggage-train. This is very ingenious, but very improbable. Censuring Sabinus as he did for the undue length of his column, Caesar may have thought that,

[1] *Neue Jahrb.*, &c., cxi. 1875, pp. 854–6.
[2] *B. G.*, v, 31, § 6.
[3] *Caesar*, p. 250.
[4] See p. 76, *supra*, and *B. G.*, ii, 17, § 2; 19, §§ 2–3.
[5] *Caesar*, ii, 118.

having foolishly decided to abandon his camp, he ought to have formed his force in what was called a *quadratum agmen*, that is to say, a hollow square or parallelogram, and placed the baggage in the centre.[1] The Emperor Julian once adopted a similar formation, which is minutely described by Ammianus Marcellinus.[2] But we cannot get beyond conjecture.

THE MEANING OF *ORBIS* IN *B. G.*, v, 33, § 3

Aulus Gellius[3] gives a list, in which *orbis* occurs, of the words by which the various military formations were described; and he adds that 'the words are derived from the things themselves, which are strictly so called',—*tralata autem sunt ab ipsis rebus, quae ita proprie nominantur: earumque rerum in acie instruenda sui cuiusque vocabuli imagines ostenduntur.* This passage seems to me to support the view that when Caesar uses the word *orbis*, he means 'a circle', or rather a figure approximating thereto.

A friend of mine, a very able officer of the Royal Artillery, suggests that the word *orbis* should be understood loosely as an irregular figure, such as the men would have been able to form in the circumstances described by Caesar; for, as he points out, to dress the line properly, in such hurry and confusion and with the enemy pressing on to the attack, would have been impossible. Colonel Dodge[4] suggests that 'the term *orbis* may have come from the natural habit of flattening out the corners of such a square' as a legion in three lines could have readily formed 'for easier defence'. 'It is difficult,' he continues, 'to imagine the manœuvre by which a legion ployed into anything approaching an actual circle and again deployed into line. It may have been an irregular half-square, half-circle, according to the accentuation of the ground or to the conditions demanding a defensive formation.' Having regard to the passage in Aulus Gellius, I am inclined to believe that this is the true explanation.

THE EXTENT OF THE CONTRAVALLATION WITH WHICH AMBIORIX SURROUNDED Q. CICERO'S CAMP

. . . minus horis tribus milium passuum XV in circuitu munitionem perfecerunt (*B. G.*, v, 42, § 4). Mr. A. G. Peskett[5] says, 'In the place of *passuum* the best [he means the α] MSS. have $\tilde{p}$, which may stand for either *passuum* or *pedum*; all agree in the number XV.' The latter remark is not correct, for the reading of the β MSS. is

[1] I find that this remark has been anticipated by Turpin de Crissé, *Comm. de César*, i, 1785, p. 358. [2] xxiv, 1, §§ 2–4. [3] *Noct. Att.*, x, 9.
[4] *Caesar*, 1892, p. 363. [5] *Caesar*, Books iv–v, 1887, p. 107.

X milium in circuitu munitionem pedum XV. It would of course have been absurd to surround Cicero's small camp, the perimeter of which could hardly have been much more than a mile,[1] with a contravallation of 15 Roman miles; and Napoleon, Thomann, and others agree in holding that (milium) *pedum* (XV) should be read. Desjardins,[2] however, as well as Schneider and Nipperdey, adopt the reading (milium) *passuum* (XV); but they give no reason for their choice. Probably they were influenced by the fact that Orosius[3] described the rampart and ditch as *vallum pedum decem et fossam pedum quindecim per milia passuum quindecim in circuitu.* Von Göler[4] follows the β MSS.; but a rampart 10 miles in extent would have been as unnecessary as one of 15 miles. R. Menge[5] conjectures that Caesar wrote (milium) *passuum III*, which would make the extent of the wall identical with that specified by the assumed reading (milium) *pedum XV.* I do not believe that Caesar wrote (milium) *pedum XV*; for although in *B. C.*, i, 82, § 4, he mentions a distance of 2,000 feet,[6] he nowhere computes a distance of more than one Roman mile in feet, except possibly in *B. G.*, ii, 30, § 2 (*postea vallo pedum XII in circuitu XV milium*, &c.), where the reading is also doubtful; and this is hardly an exception to his rule.[7]

THE RED-HOT BALLS WITH WHICH THE NERVII SET FIRE TO THE HUTS IN Q. CICERO'S CAMP

The passage in which Caesar describes this operation runs as follows:—*maximo coorto vento ferventes fusili ex argilla glandes fundis . . . in casas, quae more Gallico stramentis erant tectae, iacere coeperunt.*[8] All the MSS. have *fusili*, the ordinary meaning of which is 'molten'; but clay cannot be melted. Holder, following C. Wagener,[9] reads *fusilis* (es): but this conjecture only makes matters worse; the difficulty of explaining the meaning of the passage remains, and, as Scholl points out, *ferventes fusiles glandes* is bad grammar.[10] Let us then accept the reading of the MSS., and translate *fusili ex argilla*

[1] See p. 251 and n. 2.
[2] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 660.
[3] vi, 10, § 3.
[4] *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 190, n. 3.
[5] See Meusel's *Tabula Coniecturarum*, p. 21 (*Lex. Caes.*, vol. ii, pars ii).
[6] A. Klotz (*Caesarstudien*, p. 219) proposes to substitute *passuum* in *B. C.*, i, 82, § 4 for *pedum*, on the ground that 2,000 feet was too narrow an interval between two camps. I do not agree with him. Caesar emphasizes the narrowness. Cf. Stoffel, *Guerre civile*, i, 70–1 and *B. G.*, i, 49.
[7] See pp. 390–1, and A. Klotz, *Caesarstudien*, pp. 218–9.
[8] *B. G.*, v, 43, § 1.
[9] *Neue Jahrb. f. Philologie*, &c., cxxi, 1880, p. 624. Wagener argues that Caesar would never have written *fusili ex argilla glandes* because, as a rule, he places *ex* before both substantive and attribute, except in relative clauses. But the rule, if it can be so called, has numerous exceptions (Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, i, 1161–2). As far as I can make out, Wagener attaches to his imaginary *fusiles* the meaning of 'capable of being thrown',—a meaning which is meaningless and destitute of all support.
[10] *Blätter f. d. bayer. Gymnasialschulwesen*, xvii, 1881.

by 'of softened (or plastic) clay'. But, it has been objected, balls of clay cannot be so heated as to make an object, however inflammable, which they may strike, take fire. If so, the balls must have been made of something else besides clay. Raumer pointed out in 1830 that in the valley of the Sambre people still burned balls made of clay mixed with small coal as fuel; and he suggested that the balls of which Caesar spoke were similar to these. Von Göler, however, affirms that he has proved by experiment that balls of clay can be sufficiently heated to set straw on fire;[1] and innumerable bullets of baked clay have been found in ancient British forts.[2]

'The commentators,' says Long, 'are troubled about these hot balls cast from leather slings. . . . If the barbarians did really throw hot clay balls with slings, let us be satisfied with the fact.'[3] Certainly, if ——. But the difficulty disappears if we assume 'the barbarians' to have had their leather slings lined with metal.[4]

WAS THE LETTER WHICH CAESAR SENT TO Q. CICERO WRITTEN IN GREEK, OR ONLY IN GREEK CHARACTERS?

Caesar describes the letter as *Graecis conscriptam litteris*;[5] and, taken by themselves, these words can only mean that it was written in Greek characters. Dion Cassius[6] distinctly says that the letter was written in Greek; but his testimony on such a point proves nothing.[7] The only plausible reason for concluding that Caesar wrote in Greek is that he would have taken every precaution to prevent the contents of his letter from becoming known; and although it is unlikely that the half-barbarous Nervii and their allies were acquainted with Greek characters, there may have been individuals among them who were: for (unless Caesar feared that Roman prisoners might be forced to read the letter) is it not evident that some of them knew Latin?

O. Hirschfeld argues that Caesar merely wrote in Greek characters; for, he says, although inscriptions written in Greek characters have been found in southern France, all those found in the central and the northern districts are in Roman.[8] If Caesar had meant to

[1] See Schneider's *Caesar*, ii, 144, and von Göler's *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 191, n. 2.

[2] Rice Holmes, *Anc. Britain*, p. 268 and n. 6.

[3] *Caesar*, p. 258.

[4] I find that this remark has been anticipated. See von Göler, *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 191, n. 2.

[5] *B. G.*, v, 48, § 4.

[6] xl, 9, § 3.

[7] It has been said that Polyaenus (viii, 23, § 6) says the same; but this is a mistake. Polyaenus professes to give Caesar's words,—Καῖσαρ Κικέρωνι θαρρεῖν. προσδέχου βοήθειαν: but as he himself wrote his treatise in Greek, it is natural that he should have given Caesar's alleged letter in the same language.

[8] *Sitzungsberichte d. kaiserl. Akad. d. Wissenschaften*, Wien, cxiii, 1883, p. 277, note. Inscriptions in Greek letters on coins have, however, been found in certain parts of Northern France (A. Blanchet, *Traité des monn. gaul.*, p. 93).

say that the letter was written in Greek, surely he would have said *Graece* simply.[1] As M. Blanchet[2] points out, he uses the expression *Graecis litteris* in two other passages—*B. G.*, i, 29, § 1 and vi, 14, § 3—where the meaning 'Greek characters' is indisputable.

THE MEANING OF *NOVISSIMUS* IN *B. G.*, v, 56, § 2

Describing the armed assembly which Indutiomarus summoned towards the end of 54 B.C., Caesar writes, 'This, by Gallic usage, is tantamount to a declaration of war. By inter-tribal law all adult males are obliged to attend the muster under arms; and the last comer is tortured to death in sight of the host' (*Hoc more Gallorum est initium belli, quo lege communi omnes puberes armati convenire coguntur: qui ex iis novissimus venit in conspectu multitudinis omnibus cruciatibus adfectus necatur*). On this Long remarks,[3] 'The words "qui ex iis novissimus venit" must mean, if any man came late and did not arrive in company with the rest.' I do not see how this interpretation can be got out of the Latin. *Novissimus* does not mean 'late', but 'last'.[4] If Caesar had meant 'late', would he not have written *si quis ex iis serius venit*?

THE NEW LEVIES WHICH CAESAR RAISED IN 54–53 B.C.

Speaking of the new levies which he made in the winter of 54–53 B.C., in order to increase his army after the destruction of the legion and the five cohorts commanded by Sabinus and Cotta, Caesar says *tribus ante exactam hiemem et constitutis et adductis legionibus, duplicatoque earum cohortium numero quas cum Q. Titurio amiserat*,[5] &c. The words *duplicatoque . . . amiserat* are generally taken as explanatory of *tribus . . . legionibus*; in other words, Caesar is understood to have meant that his three new legions doubled the legion and five cohorts which he had lost. O. Schambach, however, argues that the words convey a fresh piece of information; that is to say, that Caesar procured not only three new legions but also 5×2 cohorts, which were not embodied in any legion. Caesar, he says, is describing how he made good the loss which he had sustained (1) in respect of troops embodied in a legion and (2) in respect of Sabinus's five cohorts, which do not appear to have belonged to any legion.[6]

[1] Cf. Cicero, *De Or.*, i, 34, § 155; *De Off.*, iii, 32, § 115; and *Tusc.*, i, 8, § 15.

[2] *Traité des monn. gaul.*, p. 92, n. 4.

[3] *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv, 234, n. 4.

[4] Was the last comer regarded as accursed? That his execution involved a religious ceremony I have little doubt.

[5] *B. G.*, vi, 1, § 4.

[6] *Rhein. Mus.*, N.F., xxxi, 1876, pp. 308–9. Meusel, on the other hand (*Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xxxvi, 1910, p. 69) deletes *que* after *duplicato* on the ground that if *que* were genuine, we should receive the false impression that Caesar raised three new legions *plus* 15×2 cohorts,—that is, six new legions. Somehow I never received this impression.

According to Schambach, Caesar did not speak of the ten cohorts which 'doubled' those five as a legion, because they were not Romans, but Transalpine Gauls.

Schambach is certainly mistaken. Before the destruction of Sabinus's force, Caesar had eight legions and five cohorts. Sabinus's force consisted of one legion and five cohorts; and at the end of 53 B.C. Caesar had ten legions. This number corresponds with the received view, that he increased his force by three new legions and no more. If he raised ten new cohorts as well, he never again mentioned them, and, as far as we know, never used them.[1]

DID LABIENUS ENCAMP IN THE COUNTRY OF THE TREVERI IN THE WINTER OF 54–53 B.C.?

Caesar, in describing the distribution of the legions for the winter of 54–53 B.C., says that he ordered Labienus to winter with one legion 'in the country of the Remi just on the frontier of the Treveri';[2] but in a later chapter he says that 'the Treveri were preparing to attack Labienus and the single legion which was wintering in their

[1] Mommsen (*Hist. of Rome*, v, 1894, p. 68, n. 1 [*Röm. Gesch.*, iii, 1889, p. 274, note]) says 'the five cohorts are not counted as part of a legion any more than the twelve cohorts at the Rhine bridge (vi, 29), and appear to have consisted of detachments of other portions of the army'. If Mommsen is right, Caesar had eight legions and no more before the destruction of Sabinus's force. Schneider, however, argues (*Caesar*, ii, 95–6) that he had nine, because in 57 B.C. he had eight (*B. G.*, ii, 8, § 5), and he speaks of the entire legion which he gave to Sabinus as that *quam proxime trans Padum conscripserat* (*ib.*, v, 24, § 4). Schneider and Meusel (*Lex. Caes.*, ii, 1258) take *proxime* as meaning *nuper*,—an interpretation which is supported by a comparison of *B. G.*, vi, 1 with 32, § 5; and, if they are right, the legion in question was raised in the winter of 55–54 B.C. This is also the view of von Göler (*Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 169), who, however, suggests that the five cohorts in Sabinus's brigade belonged to one of the old legions and that the remaining five of the same legion were utilized for repairing losses in the army. This theory is open to one objection. If it is right, the newly raised legion must have marched into Belgium to join Sabinus notwithstanding the scarcity of corn which Caesar so strongly emphasized. P. Groebe (W. Drumann, *Gesch. Roms*, iii, 1906, p. 702) thinks this 'more than unlikely'; but, after all, the legion, even if it had not been brought into Gaul until after the winter of 54–53, would still have had to be fed on the proceeds of the scanty harvest of the preceding summer. The five cohorts were certainly veterans, and, if von Göler is wrong, they must have been detachments from other legions (cf. *B. G.*, v, 9, § 1); for otherwise it is incredible that the fact of their having been raised should not have been recorded. In other words, if von Göler is wrong, Caesar, although he had nominally ten legions in 53 B.C., only had the equivalent of nine and a half, five of the ten having each only nine cohorts. It seems to me more probable that von Göler is right.

M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 372) argues that the five cohorts had only just been raised: 'comme ces cinq cohortes ne font partie des légions'—surely this is begging the question—'ce ne peuvent être que des nouvelles recrues.' I find it very hard to believe that Caesar, after saying that the legion had been recently raised, would have omitted to add that the cohorts were raw recruits.

[2] quartam in Remis cum Tito Labieno in confinio Treverorum hiemare iussit. *B. G.*, v, 24, § 2.

territory '.[1] Napoleon,[2] perhaps following Schneider,[3] explains this apparent contradiction by suggesting that 'the country in which he [Labienus] encamped was either on the boundary of the two countries, or ground of which the Remi and the Treveri disputed the possession'. Labienus, he insists, had remained, throughout the winter, in his original camp, wherever it was; for, he asks, 'is it not evident that, after the catastrophe of Aduatuca and the insurrection of the people seduced by Ambiorix, everything dictated to Labienus the necessity of engaging himself no further in a hostile country, by separating himself from the other legions?'[4] General Creuly, who agrees with Napoleon, holds that the camp was in the country of the Treveri; and that in *B. G.*, vi, 5 Caesar corrected the mistake which he had made in v, 24.[5] Besides, he argues, it is reasonable to believe that Labienus, instead of following his instructions to the letter and encamping within the territory of the Remi but close to the Treveran frontier, found a more convenient site within the territory of the Treveri.[6]

Von Göler,[7] on the other hand, maintains that Labienus did change his quarters, and conjectures that he wished to relieve the friendly Remi of the burden of having to feed his army. This view is certainly defensible. If Caesar's narrative is to be interpreted literally, it is clear that in the autumn of 54 B.C., after Caesar had relieved Cicero's camp, Labienus was still in the country of the Remi; for Caesar says[8] that, on hearing the news of the relief, Indutiomarus, who had determined to attack the camp of Labienus, returned into the country of the Treveri (*copias omnes in Treveros reducit*). But it would seem that in the early part of the following year Labienus was no longer in the country of the Remi, but in that of the Treveri. Caesar tells us this twice.[9] He says that he sent the baggage of the whole army into the country of the Treveri to Labienus (*totius exercitus impedimenta ad Labienum in Treveros mittit*); and he says that Labienus was wintering in their territory. He also says that, after he had finished his campaign against the Menapii, he set out for the country of the Treveri, and that he arrived there;[10] and we may reasonably conclude that when he arrived he rejoined Labienus.

Schambach quotes approvingly an argument of Köchly and Rüstow,

[1] *Treveri . . . Labienum cum una legione, quae in eorum finibus hiemabat, adoriri parabant. B. G.*, vi, 7, § 1. *Hiemaverat*—the reading of the *a* MSS.—is obviously wrong; for it would imply that Labienus had wintered in the country of the Treveri, but was there no longer. But at the time of which Caesar speaks Labienus was evidently in the country of the Treveri; and, moreover, the winter was not yet over. See also *Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xi, 1885, p. 193.

[2] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 227, note.

[3] Caesar, ii, 202.

[4] Long takes the same view in a note on p. 290 of his edition of Caesar, and the opposite one on p. 412. In his history (*Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv, 240) he reverts to Napoleon's opinion.

[5] A. Klotz maintains, if I do not misunderstand him (*Caesarstudien*, pp. 55–6), that Caesar made a mistake not in v, 24, but in vi, 5 and 7.

[6] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., viii, 1863, p. 38.

[7] *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 209, n. 2.

[8] *B. G.*, v, 53, § 2. See also § 1.

[9] *Ib.*, vi, 5, § 6; 7, § 1.

[10] *Ib.*, vi, 6, § 4; 9, § 1.

who say that, if Labienus had really moved into the country of the Treveri, it would be very remarkable that Caesar should not have explicitly stated the fact, seeing that he described the movements of Labienus in detail; and, adds Schambach, Caesar would not have sent his baggage, as he did, to Labienus if Labienus had abandoned his original camp; for the second camp would not have been fortified so thoroughly as the first.[1] This is a groundless assumption. If Labienus had made a second camp, he was passing the winter in it; and, as he was a thorough soldier, we may be certain that he had fortified it with all possible care. As to the argument of Köchly and Rüstow, I admit that Caesar's silence would be (or is) remarkable; but the reticence of the *Commentaries* is frequently remarkable. Schambach offers to extricate us from the difficulty by the usual and futile expedient,—an emendation; and, as it happens, the emendation which he proposes was made two centuries before he was born, by Cluver.[2] In *B. G.*, vi, 7, § 1, says Schambach, for *eorum* read *Remorum*: the false reading *eorum*, you are to understand, led some copyist to interpolate *in Treveros* before *ad Labienum* in vi, 5, § 6. I don't believe it.

Heller, assuming that Labienus remained throughout the winter in the same camp, suggests that it was situated in the territory of some small tribe, perhaps the Segni, between the proper territories of the Remi and the Treveri, which may have been subject to one or the other of those two peoples.[3] But if the camp was in the country of the Segni, whom Caesar mentions by name, why did he not say so? Nothing is gained by making conjectures of this sort.

I admit that there is room for doubt; but I am strongly inclined to believe that Schneider and Napoleon are right, and that the explanation of Caesar's apparent inconsistency lies in the fact that Labienus's camp was very near the common frontier of the Treveri and the Remi.[4]

DID CAESAR CONFOUND THE SCHELDT WITH THE SAMBRE?

Caesar says that in 53 B.C. he left Quintus Cicero at Atuatuca and marched towards the river *Scaldis* (Scheldt) *quod influit in Mosam*, and the most distant parts of the Ardennes (*extremasque Arduennae partes*[5]). Stephanus, who has been followed by many other commentators, altered *Scaldim* into *Sabim* (the Sambre). In support of this conjecture it has been argued (1) that the Scheldt does not flow into the Meuse; (2) that if Caesar had marched in the direction of

[1] *Neue Jahrb. f. Philologie*, &c., cxxv, 1882, pp. 218–20.

[2] Meusel's *Tabula Coniecturarum*, p. 23 (*Lex. Caes.*, vol. ii, pars ii).

[3] *Philologus*, xxii, 1865, pp. 159–60.

[4] M. Jullian (*Rev. des études anc.*, x, 1908, pp. 266–7, with which cf. pp. 383–4, *supra*) has discovered a site which he believes to correspond with Caesar's account of Labienus's movements both in 54 and in 53 B. C.

[5] *B. G.*, vi, 33, § 3.

the Scheldt, he would not have marched towards 'the most distant parts of the Ardennes'; and (3) that he could not have marched from Atuatuca to the Scheldt and back in seven days. In reply to the first of these arguments Des Roches[1] affirms that the Old Meuse (Oude Maas) did communicate with the Scheldt near the island of Tholen; and, according to Ortelius's map of 'Brabantia' in his *Theatrum Orbis Terrarum* (ed. 1573), this statement is true. In reply to the second it may be said that Caesar does not imply that the Ardennes extended as far as the Scheldt: he merely says that he intended to march towards the Scheldt and the most distant parts of the Ardennes, which extended north-westward as far as the country of the Nervii;[2] and if he marched towards the Scheldt, he may have been marching towards the most distant parts of the Ardennes. The third argument is worthless; for Caesar does not say that he marched as far as the Scheldt; and if he intended to do so, he probably did not know the distance.

T. Bergk, who is nothing if not original, conjectures that Caesar wrote (ad flumen) *Calbem* (quod influit in) *Mosellam*. *Calbem*, he asserts, means the Kyll, which Ausonius called *Galbis*.[3] I need not discuss this guess.

It has also been suggested that Caesar confounded the Scheldt with the Sambre; in other words, that although he wrote *Scaldim*, he intended to march towards the Sambre and believed that it was the Scheldt. I have refuted this suggestion on page 674.

THE RAID OF THE SUGAMBRI IN 53 B.C.

Caesar says that the Sugambri raised 2,000 horsemen and crossed the Rhine:—*cogunt equitum duo milia Sugambri*, &c. (*B. G.*, vi, 35, § 5). I originally understood this passage in the accepted sense, namely that the expeditionary force of the Sugambri consisted of 2,000 horse, and no more. A. de Vlaminck, however, maintains[4] that this interpretation is wrong, and that the cavalry formed only a portion of the force. This, he says, is proved by the statement of Caesar[5] that, when the Sugambri saw the foraging party which Cicero had allowed to go out of camp, returning, they advanced to attack them, 'despising the smallness of their numbers':—*despecta paucitate ex omnibus partibus impetum faciunt*. The foraging party consisted of five cohorts, 300 convalescents, a large number of camp-

[1] *Archives hist. et litt. du Nord de la France et du Midi de la Belgique*, 3e sér., v, 1856, pp. 339–40. In support of the correctness of the statement in the *Commentaries*, it has also been remarked that Pliny (*Nat. Hist.*, iv, 14 [28], § 100), while mentioning that the Meuse and the Rhine flow directly into the sea, does not say the same of the Scheldt; but see § 98. A writer in *Bull. de la Soc. de géogr. d'Anvers*, 1877, pp. 175, 185, believes that he has discovered a deserted bed by which the Scheldt once joined the Meuse.

[2] *B. G.*, vi, 29, § 4.

[3] *Zur Gesch. und Topogr. d. Rheinlande in röm. Zeit*, 1882, pp. 33–4.

[4] *La Ménapie*, &c., 1879, pp. 50–2.

[5] *B. G.*, vi, 39, § 4.

followers, and not more than 200 horsemen,[1]—probably considerably more than 2,000 men all told. As the Germans despised the smallness of this force, it is reasonable to infer that they outnumbered it; and de Vlaminck is probably right. The explanation may be that, according to German custom,[2] the cavalry were accompanied by a number of light-armed footmen.

THE CHRONOLOGY OF *B. G.*, vii, 1

Caesar's narrative, which I followed without misgiving in the first edition (pages 101–2), suggests, if it does not imply, that in the winter of 53–52 B.C. the Gallic conspirators did not begin to form their plans until after they had heard of the murder of Clodius. But M. Jullian[3] is probably right in arguing that Caesar disregarded the order of events. The news of the murder had to travel 800 miles and more before it reached the conspirators. The conspiracy was not matured in a day. Caesar did not leave Italy until he heard of the fall of Cenabum. Then followed the movements which I have described on pages 134–47. Caesar marched to Narbonne; from Narbonne to the Vivarais; thence across the Cevennes into Auvergne; thence by way of Vienne to Sens; thence by way of Orléans to Avaricum (Bourges). The siege of Avaricum lasted 27 days; and when it ended winter was hardly over. Is it not probable that the news of the murder of Clodius only gave the final stimulus to a movement which was already in train? Indeed Caesar himself seems to hint that this was what happened when he says that the Gauls 'were already smarting under their subjection to the Roman People, and they now began, *unreservedly and boldly*, to form projects for war' (*qui iam ante se populi Romani imperio subiectos dolerent, liberius atque audacius de bello consilia inire incipiunt*).[4]

HOW WAS THE NEWS OF THE CARNUTIAN RAID ON CENABUM SPREAD ABROAD?

'The news,' says Caesar, 'spread swiftly to all the tribes of Gaul; for whenever an event of signal importance occurs, the people make it known by loud cries over the countryside, and others in turn take up the cry and pass it on to their neighbours. So it happened on this occasion' (*celeriter ad omnes Galliae civitates fama perfertur; nam ubi quae maior atque inlustrior incidit res, clamore per agros regionesque significant; hunc alii deinceps excipiunt et proximis tradunt, ut tum accidit. B. G.*, vii, 3, § 2). On this Napoleon remarks[5] that 'An ancient manuscript belonging to Upper Auvergne, the manuscript of Drugeac, informs us that the custom continued long

[1] *B. G.*, vi, 36, §§ 2–3, and Schneider's *Caesar*, ii, 301, note.
[2] See *B. G.*, i, 48, §§ 5–7.
[3] *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 415, n. 1.
[4] *B. G.*, vii, 1, § 3.
[5] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 241, n. 1.

in use and that it still existed in the Middle Ages. Rough towers were built for this purpose on the heights, 400 or 500 metres apart; watchmen were placed in them, who transmitted the news from one to another by sonorous monosyllables. A certain number of these towers still exist in the Cantal. If the wind prevented this mode of transmission, they had recourse to fire. It is evident that criers had been posted beforehand from Genabum to Gergovia, since it was agreed that the Carnutes should give the signal of the war.' No such agreement is mentioned by Caesar. He merely says that it was agreed that the Carnutes should strike the first blow.[1] If Napoleon is right, criers must have been 'posted beforehand' *along every route* leading from Cenabum; for Caesar says that the news flew rapidly to *all* the states of Gaul. Can anything be more grotesque than this notion of criers 'posted beforehand', standing expectant on all the great thoroughfares of Gaul, and bawling out news from one to another?

Colonel T. A. Dodge fails to see that Napoleon was not such a fool as to commit himself to the statement that the towers existed in Caesar's time, and naïvely remarks that 'the news was passed along by men stationed in towers on convenient hills, who gave out shouts of peculiar kinds'.[2] Colonel Dodge's narrative is hardly less peculiar. A country in which 'convenient hills', dotted with towers, are to be found, at regular intervals of 500 yards, must be worth exploring.

Long[3] examines the passage with his usual common sense. 'What Caesar describes,' he says, 'is simple enough. The country was populous, and great news was quickly carried from one spot to another . . . to make it like a telegraph, there must have been stationed persons in readiness, always waiting for the news, and at distances within which the human voice could clearly convey intelligence; not a trace of which is there in Caesar.'[4]

WHERE DID CAESAR CONCENTRATE HIS LEGIONS AT THE OUTSET OF THE SEVENTH CAMPAIGN?

Caesar says that, after leaving Decimus Brutus in the country of the Arverni, he made his way into the country of the Lingones, where two of his legions were wintering; and that, on his arrival, he sent messengers to the other legions, two of which were quartered near the western frontier of the Treveri, and the remaining six at Agedincum (Sens), and concentrated the whole ten in one spot before Vercingetorix, who was marching from the Berri into Auvergne, was informed of his arrival.[5] Vercingetorix, as soon as he heard what Caesar had done, determined to besiege Gorgobina; whereupon

[1] *B. G.*, vii, 2, §§ 1–2. [2] *Caesar*, p. 230. [3] *Caesar*, p. 330.

[4] M. Jullian (*Vercingétorix*, p. 119), like Napoleon, affirms that 'Des crieurs, tout autour de Genabum, avaient été disposés à travers champs et forêts jusqu'aux extrémités de la Gaule'; but as I remain sceptical, I let my original comment stand. [5] *B. G.*, vii, 9.

Caesar, leaving, as he says,[1] two of his legions and all his heavy baggage at Agedincum, marched to relieve the threatened town. From this last statement of Caesar it has generally been inferred that the spot at which the ten legions were concentrated was Agedincum ; but the statement only proves that they were there immediately before Caesar set out for Gorgobina.

Colonel Stoffel[2] combats the common view, on the ground that, first, Caesar himself[3] gives us to understand that the concentration was effected somewhere in the country of the Lingones ; secondly, time would have been saved by concentrating on the central one of the three posts occupied by the legions rather than on either of the other two ;[4] and thirdly, if Agedincum had been the place of concentration, Caesar would have written *ad reliquas legiones mittit, priusque omnes Agedincum* (instead of *in unum locum*) *cogit*,[5] &c.

I believe that Stoffel is right. When we read that Caesar sent messages from the camp of the two legions in the country of the Lingones to the other two divisions in the country of the Treveri and at Agedincum respectively, and concentrated them in one spot, we are justified in inferring that that spot was not Agedincum ; for the meaning of his words appears to be that he sent *for* the two divisions.[6] The other two arguments appear to me not less sound.

Stoffel conjectures that the central post was Châtillon-sur-Seine ; but it is obviously impossible to get beyond conjecture.

ON THE MEANING OF *ALTERO DIE* (*B. G.*, vii, 11, § 1 ; 68, § 2)

I discuss this question because, unless one can find an answer to it, it is impossible to search, with any prospect of success, for the site either of Vellaunodunum or of the battle-field on which Caesar defeated Vercingetorix just before the blockade of Alesia.[7]

Napoleon believes that *altero die* means ' the second day after '. The former of the two passages in the *Commentaries on the Gallic War* in which the expression occurs, runs thus :—*duabus Agedinci legionibus atque impedimentis totius exercitus relictis ad Boios proficiscitur. Altero die cum ad oppidum Senonum Vellaunodunum venisset*, &c. Supposing that Caesar left Agedincum on March 1, Napoleon would say that he reached Vellaunodunum on March 3.

Napoleon's arguments may be thus summarized :[8]—(1) he quotes a passage in which, speaking of the events that followed a certain session of the Senate, Cicero says, *proximo, altero, tertio, denique*

[1] *B. G.*, vii, 10, § 4.

[2] *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, pp. 142–3.

[3] *B. G.*, vii, 9, §§ 4–5.

[4] Remember that when Caesar gave the order for concentration he did not yet know what the next move of Vercingetorix would be.

[5] *B. G.*, vii, 9, § 5.

[6] M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 431, n. 4) disposes of the word *mittit* by denying that *reliquas* includes the six legions at Agedincum. I cannot follow him.

[7] See *B. G.*, vii, 10, § 4 ; 11, § 1 ; 68, § 3.

[8] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 246, n. 1.

reliquis consecutis diebus,[1] &c. 'Is it not evident,' asks Napoleon, 'that here *altero die* signifies the second day which followed the session of the Senate, or two days after that session?' He goes on to quote several other passages, which I omit, because they only prove, what nobody denies, that *alter* means 'second'. (2) He states that in the whole of the Commentaries the expression *postero die* is to be found sixty-three times, *proximo die* thirty-six, *insequenti die* ten, *postridie eius diei* or *pridie eius diei* eleven, and *altero die* only five. 'Does it not appear certain,' he asks, 'that, if Caesar had arrived at Vellaunodunum the day after his departure from Agedincum, he would have written, *Postero die* (or *proximo die*) *cum ad oppidum Senonum Vellaunodunum venisset*?' &c. (3) He asserts that Caesar defeated the cavalry of Vercingetorix on the Vingeanne, and arrived *altero die* at Alesia, 40 miles off,—which distance he could not have completed until the second day after the battle.

No weight can be attached to any of these reasons. The quotation from Cicero only proves—what everybody admits—that *altero* means 'second'. In the quotation, *altero* means 'second' in relation to *proximo*. Therefore, says Napoleon, in *B. G.*, vii, 11, § 1, it means 'second' in relation to the day following that on which Caesar left Agedincum. No! his opponents reply, it only means 'second' in relation to the day on which he left Agedincum. In other words, in the quotation from Cicero, the use of the word *proximo* makes all the difference. Or, as Long puts it,[2] in the quotations which Napoleon gives, 'there is a word which expresses directly or indirectly, "first," and so "alter" of course means "second".'

Napoleon's second argument is equally weak. Supposing that some future commentator were to discover that, in So-and-So's *History of the Decline and Fall of the British Empire*, the expression 'on the next day' occurred ten times, and the expression 'on the following day' a hundred times: would that prove that 'on the next day' and 'on the following day' meant two different things? On Napoleon's theory, *postridie* would mean something different from *postero die*.

The third argument is absolutely worthless. There is no proof that the cavalry combat between Caesar and Vercingetorix was fought on the Vingeanne.[3] In fact, in order to bolster up the feeble evidence which he adduces in support of that site, Napoleon is obliged to bring forward his interpretation of *altero die*!

In Virgil's Eighth Eclogue occurs this line,—*Alter ab undecimo tum me iam acceperat annus*. 'Authorities,' says Conington,[4] 'were at one time divided on the question whether "alter ab undecimo" meant the twelfth or the thirteenth. . . . Modern editors have found little difficulty in deciding it to be the twelfth, considering "alter" to be convertible with "secundus", but following the inclusive mode of counting.' With this passage Conington compares *alter ab*

[1] *Phil.*, i, 13, § 32.
[2] *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv, 334, n. 6.
[3] See pp. 795–6.
[4] *Vergil*, i, 87.

illo[1] and *heros ab Achille secundus*.[2] He might have added that the Romans called the 29th of June the third, not the second day before the 1st of July, and that in Greek τῇ ἑτέρᾳ means the same as τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ.

Furthermore, in one of the three passages in which *altero die* occurs in *De Bello Civili* (iii, 19, § 3) Napoleon might have found proof positive that his theory was wrong. Caesar is describing the colloquies that passed between his troops and the Pompeians on the banks of the Apsus. Speaking of his lieutenant, P. Vatinius, he says, *Multa suppliciter locutus est, ut de sua atque omnium salute debebat, silentioque ab utrisque militibus auditus. Responsum est ab altera parte, Aulum Varronem profiteri se altero die ad conloquium venturum atque eundem visurum quem ad modum tuto legati venire et quae vellent exponere possent; certumque ei rei tempus constituitur. Quo cum esset postero die ventum, magna utrimque multitudo convenit, magnaque erat exspectatio eius rei, atque omnium animi intenti esse ad pacem videbantur*, &c. Is it not clear that *altero die* and *postero die* in this passage mean the same thing ? [Since I wrote the above, I have found that Heller (*Philologus*, xxvi, 1867, 682–4) quotes the same passage to prove the same point; and his arguments are endorsed by Meusel (*Lex. Caes.*, i, 239).]

THE PASSAGE, *QUI TUM PRIMUM . . . COMPARABANT* (*B. G.*, vii, 11, § 4)

(Caesar) 'pushed on for Cenabum in the country of the Carnutes. Believing that the siege of Vellaunodunum, news of which had only just reached them, would be protracted, they were beginning to collect troops to send to the protection of Cenabum' (*ipse . . . Cenabum Carnutum proficiscitur. Qui tum primum adlato nuntio de oppugnatione Vellaunoduni, cum longius eam rem ductum iri existimarent, praesidium Cenabi tuendi causa, quod eo mitterent, comparabant*). Mommsen[3] regards *tuendi causa* as an interpolation, and explains *eo* as referring to Vellaunodunum. The *praesidium*, he argues, was being assembled at Cenabum, not for its protection but for that of Vellaunodunum. As if the Carnutes were likely to perform this act of altruism ! They were of course collecting the *praesidium* for their own protection; and from over-confidence they had neglected to do so before.

ON THE PASSAGE *VICOS . . . VIDEANTUR* (*B. G.*, vii, 14, § 5)

Describing the arguments by which Vercingetorix persuaded his followers to burn their towns and granaries, Caesar writes *vicos atque aedificia incendi oportere hoc spatio* [*a Boia*] *quoque versus, quo pabu-*

[1] Virgil, *Ecl.*, v, 49. [2] Horace, *Sat.*, ii, 3, 193.
[3] *Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xx, 1894, p. 208.

landi causa adire posse videantur. The words which I have bracketed appear in various forms—*ab oia*, *aboia* and *a boia*—in the best MSS. *Boia*, on the analogy of *Venetia*,[1] would mean the territory of the Boi. Scaliger bracketed the word: other scholars regard it as a marginal gloss, which crept into the text;[2] and the French Commission[3] justly remark that it adds nothing to the clearness of Caesar's narrative. Why should Vercingetorix have decided to burn the towns all round Boia, and yet to spare Boia itself, from which the Romans expected supplies? Von Göler, indeed, remarks that the Boi were in a position to defend themselves, and would not have submitted quietly, on Caesar's approach, to the burning of their towns.[4] But it seems clear that if Vercingetorix was master of all the country between Caesar's camp at Avaricum and the frontier of the Boi, he could, if he had wished to do so, have devastated the country of that feeble tribe[5] as well. What likelihood was there that Caesar, who was encamped at Avaricum, in the country of the Bituriges, would send out foraging parties to the further side of Boia, which was in the country of the Aedui? And if Caesar was alluding in this passage to ravages which Vercingetorix ordered to be carried out in the territories of the neighbouring states,[6] why should Vercingetorix have specified Boia as the central district round which this devastation was to be enacted? Besides, if the country on all sides of Boia was devastated, the Aedui, in whose country Boia was situated, must have burned their towns; but it is certain that they did not, for they had not yet joined Vercingetorix. A. Holder reads *ab via*, an emendation of Madvig,[7] which is also found in the old edition referred to by Schneider as Ven. c; and Dittenberger adopts Hoffman's emendation *obvia*. H. Schickinger[8] suggests that the true reading may be (vicos atque aedificia incendi oportere) *ab hoc spatio omnia* (quoque versus). He thinks that *oia* was an abbreviation, misunderstood by a copyist, for *omnia*, and that *ab* was transposed

[1] *B. G.*, iii, 9, § 9.

[2] See Schneider, ii, 367–8, and Nipperdey, pp. 89–90.

[3] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 170.

[4] *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 242, n. 5.

[5] civitas erat exigua et infirma. *B. G.*, vii, 17, § 2.

[6] Hoc idem fit in reliquis civitatibus. *Ib.*, 15, § 1. Since the publication of my first edition I have noticed that Mommsen (*Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xx, 1894, p. 208) insists that *hoc idem fit in reliquis civitatibus* ('the same thing happened in the territories of the other tribes'), following the sentence in which Caesar says that 'in a single day more than twenty towns belonging to the Bituriges were set ablaze' (*uno die amplius XX urbes Biturigum incenduntur*), must be an interpolation; for, he argues, it is inconceivable that *all* the tribes of Gaul should have been required to burn their towns; and the words *in omnibus partibus incendia conspiciuntur* ('the whole country was a scene of conflagration') can only refer to the Bituriges. But there is no question of '*all* the tribes of Gaul': obviously *in reliquis civitatibus* only means, as in *B. G.*, iii, 9, § 3, 'the other tribes' immediately concerned. Still Mommsen is probably right; for, although M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 441, n. 5) remarks that *reliquis civitatibus* may denote the Carnutes and the Senones, fires in their territories could not have been seen from the neighbourhood of Avaricum; and *conspiciuntur* presumably refers only to what Caesar himself saw.

[7] *Adv. crit.*, ii, 1873, pp. 256–7.

[8] *Wiener Studien*, xxvi, 1904, pp. 342–3.

from its proper place. Various other absurd conjectures have been made. If one must have a conjecture, nothing could be better than Madvig's; but for historical purposes the sense is perfectly clear; and *a boia* is perhaps an interpolation. [Meusel in a marginal note on his copy of my first edition remarked that Madvig's conjecture is inadmissible, because *ab* is never found before *v*; but do we not find *ab Venere* (*Corpus inscr. Lat.*, vi, 2274), *ab veste* (*ib.*, 5197), *ap via* (*ib.*, ii, 4926), and *ab vite* (Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, xvii, 22, § 196)? It must, however, be admitted that Caesar never, as far as we know, wrote *ab* before *v*.]

THE MEANING OF *MISERICORDIA VULGI* (*B. G.*, vii, 15, § 6)

Datur petentibus venia, dissuadente primo Vercingetorige, post concedente et precibus ipsorum et misericordia vulgi. Long[1] interprets *misericordia vulgi* as 'pity for the common sort', who, he adds, 'would have been turned out of their houses in the winter.' But this, as Schneider[2] shows, is certainly wrong. 'Since Vercingetorix,' he writes, 'as may be gathered from his own speech, felt no pity, and the others who were present at the council do not appear to have considered the common sort any more than the whole body of the inhabitants of Avaricum, . . . the word *vulgus* must be understood of the majority of the council, from whom a few, possibly the leading men, dissented.' There is, moreover, a passage in ch. 28—*quos ille multa iam nocte silentio ex fuga excepit, veritus ne qua in castris ex eorum concursu et misericordia vulgi seditio oreretur*—which suggests that in ch. 15 *vulgi* is a subjective, not an objective genitive, and that *misericordia vulgi* means 'pity felt by the mass (of those present at the council).' Another passage (ch. 29) completes the proof. In the speech which he made to encourage his men after the fall of Avaricum, Vercingetorix is reported to have said, *sibi numquam placuisse Avaricum defendi, cuius rei testes ipsos haberet; sed factum imprudentia Biturigum et nimia obsequentia reliquorum uti hoc incommodum acciperetur. Nimia obsequentia reliquorum* obviously describes the same feeling as *misericordia vulgi*. Great men of action do not allow themselves to be turned away from a wise policy by 'pity for the common sort' or pity for any one else.

WHERE DID VERCINGETORIX MAKE HIS FIRST CAMP DURING THE SIEGE OF AVARICUM?

Caesar tells us that Vercingetorix, 'following Caesar by easy stages [from the neighbourhood of Noviodunum, that is from the north], selected for his encampment a spot protected by marshes and woods,

[1] *Caesar*, p. 340, and *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv, 296.
[2] *Caesar*, ii. 374.

16 miles from Avaricum '.[1] Von Göler,[2] who holds that Vercingetorix would not have encamped between Caesar and the Boi, fixes on a site near Vierzon, north-west of Avaricum : but General Creuly makes light of this argument, remarking that the Boi were not strong enough to attack the rebels ;[3] and, assuming that Vercingetorix started from the neighbourhood of Châtillon-sur-Loire, which he identifies with Noviodunum,[4] he believes that Vercingetorix halted on the heights behind Morogues, about 15 miles north-east of Avaricum.[5] Napoleon thinks that he encamped about a mile and a half north of Dun-le-Roi, to the south of Avaricum. 'It was indeed natural,' he says, 'that he should place himself between the Roman army and the land of the Arverni, whence probably he drew his provisions.'[6] But why should he not have drawn them from the Bituriges, who were his allies and were on the spot ? Colonel St. Hypolite[7] argues with good reason that he would not have encamped on the south of the town, because the Romans attacked it on that side, and because the marshes, by which he communicated with the garrison, were on the north. Accordingly he selects for the site of the Gallic encampment Allean, which is near Baugy.

It is difficult, with such slender data as Caesar gives, to determine the site exactly. But there are indications in his narrative which point to the conclusion that Vercingetorix encamped on the north or north-east. When Avaricum was stormed, the garrison 'made a rush for the furthest quarter of the town' (*ultimas oppidi partes continenti impetu petiverunt*).[8] As Caesar attacked from the south, the few who escaped the massacre and rejoined Vercingetorix presumably got out of the town on the north or north-east. Moreover, as M. Jullian points out, Vercingetorix could have communicated with Avaricum (as he did every day[9]) more easily from the north-east than from the north-west, because on the former side the marshes are broken and comparatively small, on the latter the road is often inundated.[10]

WHAT WAS THE HILL NEAR AVARICUM ON WHICH THE GALLIC INFANTRY AWAITED CAESAR'S ATTACK ?

Caesar says that the hill was nearer to Avaricum than Vercingetorix's original encampment, which was 16 Roman miles off ; that its slope was gentle (*collis leniter ab infimo acclivis*) ; that it was

[1] *B. G.*, vii, 16, § 1. [2] *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 242, n. 5.
[3] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., viii, 1863, p. 396. [4] See p. 462.
[5] *Rev. arch.*, viii, 1863, p. 400. [6] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 255, note.
[7] *Recherches sur quelques points hist. relatifs au siége de Bourges exécuté par César*, 1842, pp. 10–1. [8] *B. G.*, vii, 28, § 2. [9] *Ib.*, 16, § 2.
[10] C. Jullian, *Vercingétorix*, p. 359 and n. 4 ; *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 442, n. 2. M. Jullian also argues that Caesar was cut off from communication with the north-east, as he got no supplies from the Senones. I doubt whether, at that stage of the campaign, the Senones, who were hostile (*B. G.*, vii, 4, § 6), would have supplied him even if the road had been open.

almost entirely surrounded by a marsh not more than 50 feet wide ; and that there were dense woods close by.[1] If I am right in concluding that Vercingetorix's first camp was north or north-east of Avaricum, the hill must of course be looked for on the same side.

Von Göler[2] places it on the right bank of the Yèvre, between Vignoux and Mehun : but General Creuly[3] denies that this position is a *collis* at all ;[4] and he affirms that the Yèvre, in this part of its course, is too swift to have been called a marsh (*palus*), unless it overflowed its banks, in which case the marsh formed by it must have been far more than 50 feet wide. He himself fixes upon Baugy. Napoleon places the hill at La Chenevière, east of Caesar's camp. Von Kampen[5] and Mr. W. C. Compton[6] agree in placing it on the left bank of the Auron, opposite St. Just,—'a position,' says Mr. Compton, 'corresponding with the description in chapter 19.' Colonel St. Hypolite[7] finds it at Maubranches. M. Jullian[8] tentatively proposes a site on the same side of the town, between Les Aix and Rians, which corresponds exactly with Caesar's description ; but he admits that St. Hypolite's choice may be right.

Evidently the position can only be guessed at ; and in this case it matters little whether our guesses are right or wrong.

HOW CAESAR WAS OUTWITTED BY VERCINGETORIX

Paul Menge[9] has recently argued that in the affair near Avaricum which is described in *B. G.*, vii, 18–9 and on pages 141–2 of this book, Caesar was duped by his youthful antagonist. Menge points out that he acted simply on the statements of prisoners, although as a rule he avoided taking any step on their unsupported testimony.[10] If, he says, Caesar had ascertained beforehand the nature of the position which Vercingetorix's infantry had occupied—the position which is the subject of the preceding article—he would never have dreamed of attacking it. He might have reflected that Vercingetorix would not have left his infantry unprotected in order to throw his cavalry against the Roman foragers, whose whereabouts he might not be able to divine.[11] Clearly his object was to entice Caesar to attack the encampment in order that its occupants might be

[1] *B. G.*, vii, 18, 19, §§ 1–2.
[2] *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 247.
[3] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., viii. 1863, p. 397.
[4] It is represented as a hill in von Göler's map, which, however, as Creuly remarks, is imaginary. See Sheet 122 of the *Carte de l'État-Major* (1 : 80,000).
[5] *Quindecim ad Caesaris de b. G. comm. tabulae*, ix.
[6] *Caesar's Seventh Campaign in Gaul*, p. 80.
[7] *Recherches sur quelques points hist. relatifs au siége de Bourges*, &c., 1842, p. 11.
[8] *Vercingétorix*, p. 175 ; *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 444, n. 6.
[9] *Neue Jahrb. f. d. klass. Altertum*, &c., xv, 1905, pp. 520–3.
[10] *Ib.*, p. 520. Cf. H. Meusel, *Lex. Caes.*, i, 449–50, and *B. C.*, ii, 39, § 3.
[11] Cf. *B. G.*, vii, 18, § 1 with 16, § 3.

encouraged by Caesar's ignominious failure; for he had organized a service of patrols along the road between the encampment and Avaricum; and the speech in which he vindicated his conduct[1] proves that he had not only set a trap for Caesar, but, like a master of *mise en scène*, had prepared for the outcry which he foresaw would follow his return. Caesar's story is literally correct; but, as he naturally did not choose to proclaim his own humiliation, it must be read between the lines.

Menge's paper deserves careful study.

WHERE DID CAESAR PLACE HIS TOWERS DURING THE SIEGE OF AVARICUM?

Different opinions have been expressed regarding the position of the towers which Caesar mentions in his description of the siege of Avaricum.[2] Long[3] says that the *agger* 'was protected by two towers, one on each side of the terrace and not on it.' Von Göler,[4] Napoleon,[5] and Colonel Stoffel[6] think otherwise; and indeed there is no evidence in any of the chapters in which Caesar mentions the towers to show that they were 'on each side of the terrace'; while there is evidence in *B. G.*, vii, 22 and 24 to show that they were on it. The passage in the latter chapter runs *celeriter factum est ut . . . alii turres reducerent aggeremque interscinderent* (meaning that the towers were drawn back out of reach of the fire which the Gauls had kindled in the front part of the *agger*); while in the former Caesar says that, day by day during the siege, as his own towers were raised to a higher level by the daily increase in the height of the *agger*, the enemy added fresh stories to the towers which they had themselves erected upon the wall.[7] Hirtius also says that a tower was erected upon the *agger* which the Romans made at Uxellodunum:—*extruitur agger in altitudinem pedum LX, conlocatur in eo turris*,[8] &c. To clinch the proof, Stoffel remarks that the towers could not have been moved except on the levelled surface of the terrace, and that, as it was the business of the artillerymen who manned them to drive the enemy from the wall of the besieged town, they must have dominated the wall.[9]

[1] *B. G.*, vii, 20, §§ 6, 9.
[2] *B. G.*, vii, 17, § 1; 18, § 1; 22, § 4; 24, §§ 3, 5; 25, §§ 1–2.
[3] *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv, 300, n. 9.
[4] *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 251.
[5] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 261.
[6] *Guerre civile*, ii, 361.
[7] See the next article.
[8] *B. G.*, viii, 41, § 5.
[9] Besides the passages which I have quoted, Stoffel refers to Lucan, iii, 394–8, 455–7. Lucan writes:—

Stellatis axibus agger
Erigitur, geminasque aequantes moenia turres
Accipit.

THE MEANING OF *AGGER* IN *B. G.*, vii, 22, § 4

Describing the expedients devised by the garrison of Avaricum, Caesar says, *nostrarum turrium altitudinem, quantum has cotidianus agger expresserat, commissis suarum turrium malis adaequabant.* A plain man would understand by this that, as the Roman towers rose daily higher, owing to the rise in the height of the terrace on which they stood, the Gauls matched their height by adding new stories to their own towers. But Rüstow assumes that *agger* does not here mean 'the terrace', but the material (timber) which was used for increasing the height of the Roman towers.[1] Of course *agger* does sometimes mean 'material'. But in all the other passages in which the word occurs with that meaning, the meaning is unmistakable ;[2] whereas, if *agger*, in the passage under discussion, means 'material' the meaning is certainly both liable and likely to be mistaken. Besides, if Rüstow is right, the Romans set the example in raising their towers daily higher by successive stories ; whereas it is probable that, at the time of which Caesar speaks, they were already completed.[3] Finally, I cannot conceive that Caesar would have denoted the operation of building additional stories by the word *expresserat*.

THE GALLIC WALL

Caesar, as I understand him, describes the construction of the Gallic wall as follows.[4]—At right angles to the direction of the intended wall, balks of timber were laid on the ground, parallel to each other and two feet apart. These balks were braced on the inner side by beams, 40 feet long, which were laid upon them transversely, and doubtless mortised into them.[5] The intervals between the balks were filled up, on the inner side of the wall, with earth or rubble ; on the outer side, with large stones. The first layer of the wall was now complete. On the top of it was placed a second layer, exactly like it. Layer was placed above layer until the required height was reached. The structure was protected from fire by the earth and stones, and was so firmly held together by the 40-foot beams that the battering ram was powerless to destroy it.

Caesar's account, however, presents various difficulties. Speaking of the second layer, he says, 'When the balks [of the first layer] are fixed in their places and fastened together, a fresh row is laid on the top of them, in such a way that the same interval is kept and the

[1] *Heerwesen und Kriegführung C. J. Cäsars*, 1855, p. 146.
[2] See Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, i, 211–2.
[3] My view is confirmed by Stoffel (*Guerre civile*, ii, 361–2). Cf. p. 606, *supra*.
[4] *B. G.*, vii, 23.
[5] De Sauley, describing the remains of a Gallic wall, which were discovered at Murscein, says that, at the place where the balks were crossed by the beams, the fastening was secured by enormous bolts of iron. *Journ. des Savants*, 1880, p. 625.

balks do not touch each other, but are separated by similar intervals, into each of which a stone is thrust, and thus are kept firmly in position' (*his conlocatis et coagmentatis, alius insuper ordo additur, ut idem illud intervallum servetur neque inter se contingant trabes, sed paribus intermissis spatiis, singulae singulis saxis interiectis, arte contineantur*).[1] On this Mr. A. G. Peskett remarks,[2] 'It is quite possible that the successive layers were so laid, that beam rested on beam, interval on interval . . . if it be so, *trabes* here will not denote any two beams, but the several whole vertical lines of beams, which were prevented from touching each other by the intervening lines of rubble and stones.' (For 'beams' in the above read 'balks'.) Schneider[3] interprets the passage in the same way; but, unlike Mr. Peskett, he denies that any other interpretation is admissible. Long, however, points out[4] that the clause, *ut idem illud intervallum servetur*, 'expresses the intervals between the balks in the second tier'; and he argues that the second clause, *neque inter se contingant trabes*, 'is unnecessary unless it means something else.' 'The balks of the second,' he proceeds, 'were not laid on the balks of the first tier, but on the stones, so that no balks touched one another. . . . The beams [read 'balks'] would be also better protected against fire in this way than if they were on one another.'

The arrangement may have been what Long describes: Caesar does not inform us. But what Long fails to see is that, if his interpretation of the Latin is correct, either the *trabes* which are the subject of *contineantur* denote something different from the *trabes* which are the subject of *contingant*, the latter denoting the balks both of the first and the second row, the former those of the second only; or, if in both cases *trabes* denotes the balks both of the first and the second row, *paribus spatiis* does not mean intervals similar to those in the first row, but intervals similar to one another. Such an interpretation seems to me inadmissible.

Remains of Gallic walls have been discovered at Mursceint, in the department of the Lot, on Mont Beuvray, and in the hill-fort of Impernal, just north of Luzech.[5] In the wall of Mursceint there are three or four stones between the balks of each layer, and three layers of stones between each pair of layers of mingled stones and balks. The wall of Mont Beuvray conforms more closely to Caesar's description.

Now Caesar does not guarantee the absolute and invariable accuracy of his description. He only professes to describe the general principles of construction:—*Muri omnes Gallici hac fere forma sunt.* Is it not possible that, as the walls which have been discovered are not all alike, and as Caesar does not mention any layer of stones, the wall of Avaricum had no such layer?

[1] *B. G.*, vii, 23, § 3.
[2] *Caesar*, bk. vii, p. 65.
[3] *Caesar*, ii, 402.
[4] *Caesar*, p. 347.
[5] Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 119; *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., xx, 1869, pp. 400–8 and pl. xix; xxi, 1870, pl. vii, x; *Congrès archéol. de France*, 1874 (1875), pp. 451–85; *Soc. préhist. de France*, 1907 (10e rapport mensuel de la comm. d'étude des enceintes préhist., p. 2).

There is another point in Caesar's description which has been misunderstood. 'The stone,' he writes, 'secures it [the wall] against fire, and the woodwork, which is braced on the inner side by beams, generally 40 feet long, running right across, and so can neither be broken through nor pulled to pieces, protects it against the ram' (*et ab incendio lapis et ab ariete materia defendit, quae perpetuis trabibus pedum quadragenum plerumque introrsus revincta neque perrumpi neque distrahi potest*). I have explained these *perpetuae trabes* as beams laid in the direction of the wall and mortised into the balks. Schneider[1] and Long[2] identify them with the balks themselves. But this theory is refuted by the fact that in the Gallic walls which have been discovered, the 40-foot beams are actually laid in the way which I have described. In the wall of Mursceint there are *two* beams, laid parallel with each other; and the balks, which are about 3 yards[3] apart and 23 feet[4] long, occupy the whole thickness of the wall. Moreover, even if no Gallic walls had been discovered, a moment's reflection might have convinced Long of the absurdity of his interpretation. In § 2 of the chapter in question Caesar says that the *trabes derectae distantes inter se binos pedes* (the balks two feet apart) *revinciuntur introrsus* (are bound together on the inner side). In § 5 he describes the *materia* (the balks) as being *perpetuis trabibus pedum quadragenum introrsus revincta* (bound together on the inner side with beams 40 feet long). According to Long, the *trabes derectae* were identical with the *trabes pedum quadragenum* with which they were bound together!

THE DIMENSIONS OF THE *AGGER* AT AVARICUM

Aggerem, latum pedes CCCXXX, altum pedes LXXX, extruxerunt.[5] Such are the numbers given by all the MSS.; and it is better to trust them than to make conjectures. The *agger* which Trebonius made at the siege of Massilia was also 80 feet high;[6] and here again all the MSS. agree. Napoleon[7] accounts for the great height of the *agger* at Avaricum by pointing to the depression of the ground in front of the wall. As to the other dimension, Rüstow[8] proposes *longum*

[1] *Caesar*, ii, 403. [2] *Caesar*, pp. 347–8.
[3] 2 m. 70 c. [4] 7 m. [5] *B. G.*, vii, 24, § 1.
[6] *Huius quoque spatii pars ea quae ad arcem pertinet loci natura et valle altissima munita longam et difficilem habet oppugnationem. Ad ea perficienda opera C. Trebonius . . . vimina materiamque comportari iubet. Quibus comparatis rebus, aggerem in altitudinem pedum LXXX exstruit. B. C.*, ii, 1, §§ 3–4. Commandant Rouby, in his study on the siege of Massilia (*Spectateur mil.*, 3e sér., xxxv, 1874, p. 173, n. 1), remarks that some MSS. have *latitudinem* instead of *altitudinem*. This is a mistake: some old editions have *latitudinem*, but no known MSS. Rouby defends *altitudinem* on the ground that it corresponds better with the words *valle altissima*, and that the alleged height of 80 feet agrees perfectly with the features of the ground on which the *agger* must have been constructed. Cf. Stoffel, *Guerre civile*, i, 291.
[7] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 256, n. 1. Cf. C. Jullian, *Vercingétorix*, p. 362, n. 5.
[8] *Heerwesen und Kriegführung C. J. Cäsars*, 1855, p. 143.

instead of *latum*. I am sure that Caesar did not write *longum* : first, because it is much more likely that he laid stress upon the width of the terrace, as allowing room for the assaulting columns, than upon its length,—or rather its extension from front to rear ; and secondly, because it is more likely that, if there is a mistake in the MSS., the numerals are wrong than the word *latum*. Practical men like Guischard and Stoffel find no difficulty in accepting the statement of the MSS. See my article on the *agger* (pages 599–607).

HOW WAS THE COLUMN OF ASSAULT COVERED BEFORE THE STORMING OF AVARICUM ?

'The legions [unobserved] got ready for action [under cover of the sheds]. Caesar . . . gave the troops the signal. Suddenly they darted forth from every point and swiftly lined the wall' (*legionesque [intra vineas in occulto] expeditas cohortatus . . . militibusque signum dedit. Illi subito ex omnibus partibus evolaverunt murumque celeriter compleverunt*).[1] *Intra vineas in occulto* is the reading of β. The readings of α are *extra vineas* (in χ), *extra castra vineas* (in ϕ), and *extra castra vineasque* in *L*, *in occulto* being omitted in both χ and ϕ but not in *L*. None of these readings can be right ; for the first and the third are pointless and the second is nonsense. Meusel says that *expeditas* can hardly be a participle,[2] because *expeditus* in connexion with *legiones*, *cohortes*, &c., is regularly an adjective ; and that, if it is an adjective, *in occulto* is impossible. He points out that *intra vineas* must mean either inside individual *vineae* or within a space enclosed by *vineae*, and that troops could only have been concealed by *vineae* if they had been inside them ; and he scoffs at the notion that *vineae* would have sufficed for the concealment of eight legions.[3] Accordingly he brackets *intra vineas in occulto*.[4] But Caesar did not always write with precision ; and if only the foremost part of the force was simultaneously concealed *intra vineas*, he might perhaps have spoken loosely of the legions as *intra vineas*. Heller,[5] in order to get over the difficulty, invents or borrows from Achaintre[6] the emendation *inter castra vineasque*, which so nearly agrees with the reading of *L* that it deserves consideration. But, if the troops had been standing only where Achaintre and Heller place

[1] *B. G.*, vii, 27, § 2.

[2] In his *Lexicon*, however (i, 1226), he took it as such.

[3] *Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xx, 1894, pp. 326–8.

[4] It does not matter for our present purpose whether we read *legionibusque expeditis*, which Meusel adopted in his critical edition, or *legionesque expeditas*, the reading of β, which he adopts now. He rejects the former because if, as he concludes, *in occulto* is spurious and *expeditus* is here used adjectivally, the ablative absolute, *legionibus expeditis*, would plainly be inadmissible.

[5] *Philologus*, xix, 1863, p. 534.

[6] *Caesar*, i, 317.

[7] Meusel (*Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xi, 1885, p. 202) observes that the double alteration which Heller introduces into the text is suspicious ; but *que* is found in *L*, which I have recently collated.

them, would not Caesar have written *inter castra aggeremque*?[1] Instead of *intra vineas* von Göler[2] suggests *interea*,—a much more improbable conjecture even than Heller's. Guischard,[3] who accepts the reading *intra vineas*, believes that there were two towers, one on either side of the *agger*, and connected with it by *vineae* ; that some of the troops belonging to the assaulting force were formed up, as Heller believes, between the *agger* and the camp ; and that the rest were formed up under and immediately behind the connecting *vineae*. This suggestion, he says, makes everything intelligible. To my mind, everything is intelligible without the suggestion ; and if there is any difficulty, the suggestion only makes matters worse. For Caesar says that the towers were *on* the *agger*, not on either side of it ;[4] and the imaginary connecting galleries, in order to be of any use for the purpose of communicating between the *agger* and the imaginary towers, would have had to be closed on the side exposed to the town. How then were the assaulting columns to get out of them ? And how were they to escalade the wall unless they first mounted the terrace ?

The reading *intra vineas in occulto* derives some support from the statement—which Caesar makes in the next sentence—that the soldiers ' suddenly *darted forth from* every point and swiftly lined the wall ' (*subito ex omnibus partibus evolaverunt murumque celeriter compleverunt*) ; but I do not deny that Meusel is justified in bracketing the words.[5]

Whatever the right reading may be, this much is clear. Caesar intended to surprise the enemy ; and therefore he concealed his troops somehow. If they had only been concealed behind the *agger* and had become visible as soon as they set foot upon it, the enemy would

[1] In the first edition (p. 732) I argued that the words *in occulto*, if they are genuine, ' throw additional discredit on Heller's emendation, as it is difficult to see how, from the point of view of the sentries standing on the wall, the storming columns could have been hidden unless they had been inside, or within a space enclosed by, the *vineae* . . . even if they had not been seen by those sentries who were standing on the wall right opposite the *agger*, they would surely have been seen by those who were standing on the wall on either side of the *agger*.' This argument was perhaps unsound ; for the *agger* was doubtless so close to the camp that it might have been impossible from any part of the wall to see troops who were just behind it, and although the fact that the Romans had to ascend the wall (vii, 27, § 2) proves that the wall was higher than the *agger*, the difference of level was slight, for they evidently ascended it easily. See also the last sentence of the article.

M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 452, n. 5) attempts to improve Heller's emendation by substituting *intra* for *inter* (castra vineasque). But emendation will not solve the riddle.

[2] *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 258, n. 1.

[3] *Mém. mil.*, ii, 22.

[4] *B. G.*, vii, 22, § 4. See p. 745.

[5] To account for the various readings, Meusel makes the following ingenious suggestion. Some reader may have written *in occulto* on his copy in the belief that the assaulting columns must have been concealed ; another may have added *intra vineas* as an explanation ; and a third, recognizing that there would not have been enough room *intra vineas* for legions, may have written *extra* above *intra* and *castra* above *vineas*, meaning that the legions must anyhow have been *extra vineas*, but may have been *intra castra*. *Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xi, 1885, p. 202 ; xxxvi, 1910, p. 48.

have had warning. Therefore the head of the column, at all events, was probably formed up *on* the agger; and the only means of concealing them was to place them inside the *vineae* or within a space enclosed by *vineae* or both.[1] The rest of the troops would have been concealed either in the space between the viaducts (if Napoleon is right in believing that the central portion of the *agger* occupied only the front of that space[2]) or in the space between the *agger* and the camp.

THE STRATAGEM BY WHICH CAESAR CROSSED THE ALLIER ON HIS MARCH TO GERGOVIA

The passage in which Caesar describes his stratagem runs as follows:—*Cum uterque utrique esset exercitui in conspectu, fereque e regione castris castra poneret,*[3] *dispositis exploratoribus, necubi effecto ponte Romani copias traducerent, erat in magnis Caesari difficultatibus res, ne maiorem aestatis partem flumine impediretur, quod non fere ante autumnum Elaver vado transiri solet. Itaque, ne id accideret, silvestri loco castris positis, e regione unius eorum pontium, quos Vercingetorix rescindendos curaverat, postero die cum duabus legionibus in occulto restitit; reliquas copias cum omnibus impedimentis, ut consuerat, misit, captis quibusdam cohortibus, uti numerus legionum constare videretur. His quam longissime possent progredi iussis, cum iam ex diei tempore coniecturam caperet in castra perventum, isdem sublicis, quarum pars inferior integra remanebat, pontem reficere coepit. Celeriter effecto opere legionibusque traductis, et loco castris idoneo delecto, reliquas copias revocavit.*[4] Now this much is evident. Caesar either kept back two entire legions and sent on four, or selected 20 cohorts out of the 60 of which his legions were composed, and sent on 40; and he so arranged the four legions or the 40 cohorts which he sent on that, seen from the opposite bank of the Allier, they looked like six legions. To me it seems clear that he meant what he said,—kept back two entire legions and sent on four: otherwise, he would, I believe, have written (postero die cum) *viginti cohortibus* (in occulto restitit).

Captis quibusdam cohortibus is found in all the MSS., except Leid. tert., Dorn., and Duk., which have *demptis quibusdam cohortibus*; And., which has *captis quartis quibusque cohortibus*; Oxon., which has *captis quartis quidem cohortibus*; and Leid. sec., which has *captis quartis cohortibus.*[5] The authority of these MSS. is *nil.*

[1] I find that what I have written is supported by Stoffel, who says (*Guerre civile*, ii, 363), 'César . . . disposa ses légions dans les *vineae*.'

[2] See pp. 603–4.

[3] I follow the reading of β, which A. Klotz (*Caesarstudien*, pp. 256–8) slightly modifies thus,—*cum uterque utrique exercitus esset in conspectu, fereque e regione cast⟨rorum Caesa⟩ris castra ⟨Vercingetorix⟩ poneret.* As the accuracy of this part of the text is for my present purpose unimportant, I need only refer to his ingenious argument.

[4] *B. G.*, vii, 35.

[5] *Caesar*, ed. Nipperdey, p. 93.

The modern editors, with the single exception of Frigell, are unanimous in holding that Caesar did not write *captis*, I suppose on the ground that the word cannot be used in the only sense which can be here attributed to it. Schneider[1] follows Wendel, who reads *carptis*. *Carptis quibusdam cohortibus* would mean, I apprehend, 'breaking up a certain number of cohorts into their constituent parts,' namely maniples; and Wendel points out that Livy (xxvi, 38, § 2) writes *in multas parvasque partes carpere exercitum*, where some MSS. have *capere*. Van der Mey[2] refuses to believe that Caesar wrote *carptis quibusdam* (cohortibus); for, he argues, if Caesar had made 40 cohorts look like 60 by breaking up cohorts into their constituent maniples, he would have been obliged to break up the whole 40 and not merely some (*quibusdam*). Therefore, if Caesar wrote *carptis*, and used it in the sense of 'breaking up', he could not have written *quibusdam*. I cannot see the force of this argument. Why should not Caesar have sent on three of the four legions in their usual formation, broken up the 10 cohorts of the remaining legion into their 30 maniples, and, by diminishing the breadth of each of those maniples, extended their length so as to make them look like cohorts? It would have been impossible for Vercingetorix to detect that the breadth of the sham cohorts had been diminished; for he was probably separated by a distance of several hundred yards, at least, from Caesar's column.[3]

Holder,[4] following an emendation of H. Deiter, reads 'ita *apertis* quibusdam cohortibus', which means much the same as Wendel's reading. Dittenberger,[5] following an emendation of Vielhaber, reads *partitis quibusdam cohortibus*: but, as *partitis* is virtually identical in meaning with *carptis*, and much more unlike *captis*, the reading of the best MSS., I cannot see what is to be gained by adopting it. For the same reason, I wonder that Meusel should have adopted B. Müller's conjecture,—*distractis* (quibusdam cohortibus).

Nipperdey[6] proposes *maniplis singulis demptis cohortibus*. 'Since,' he writes, 'Caesar kept back two out of his six legions, the remaining four had to be arranged in such wise as to look like six. Now, as there were 30 maniples in each legion, and three maniples in each cohort, the only way of making six [apparent] legions out of four legions or 120 maniples was to assign 20 maniples instead of 30 to each legion. The most convenient way of doing this was to withdraw one maniple from each cohort; for in this way the number of the cohorts remained the same.' But Nipperdey's emendation introduces a new word *maniplis* into the text, which is not found in any of the MSS.; and Caesar could have effected his purpose just as well by sending on 40 entire cohorts, or 120 maniples, and rearranging

[1] *Caesar*, ii, 435–6. [2] *Mnemosyne*, xii, 1884, pp. 226–7.

[3] See *Eos*, ii, 1866, p. 136, and *Carte de l'État-Major* (1 : 80,000), Sheets 135, 146. Meusel does not agree with me; but has he reflected that ordinary eyesight cannot distinguish cavalry from infantry at a greater distance than 1,200 yards (see p. 460)? Anyhow his objection would tell equally against the emendation (*distractis*) which he has himself adopted and against any other.

[4] *Caesar*, p. 167. [5] *Caesar*, pp. 297, 406–7. [6] *Caesar*, pp. 93–4.

them so that they should look like 60 cohorts, as by sending on 60 mutilated cohorts, each composed of two maniples.

Other conjectural emendations, which German scholars have amused themselves by devising, are *sectis*, *laxatis*,[1] *interceptis*, *sic aptatis*, *cavis*, *dimidiatis*, *distractis*, and *ita positis* (quibusdam cohortibus); *detractis* (quartis quibusque cohortibus); and *demptis tertiis* (quibusque cohortibus). I have no doubt that a good scholar, with a fertile imagination and an hour to waste, might make considerable additions to this list.

Long[2] has recourse to one of the inferior MSS. Following Feldbausch, he suggests that if Caesar wrote *captis quartis quibusque cohortibus*, he may have meant that he took from his 60 cohorts the first, fourth, seventh and so on, and sent on the rest. 'Thus,' he adds, 'instead of taking two entire legions, which the enemy might from some circumstance or other have missed, he preserved the six legions with diminished numbers.' I am certain that Feldbausch was wrong, for these reasons. First, I believe that Caesar meant what he said,—that he kept back two entire legions and not 'every fourth cohort': *quartis quibusque cohortibus* is surely bad Latin. Why not *quarta quaque cohorte*? Secondly, on Feldbausch's theory, if Caesar had written *captis quartis quibusque cohortibus*, he would simply have been repeating, clumsily and obscurely, his previous statement,—*cum duabus legionibus in occulto restitit*. Thirdly, there would have been no sense in saying, 'the rest of the force he sent on as usual, with all the baggage, picking out every fourth cohort, so that the number of legions might appear unchanged.' 'Picking out,' that is to say, keeping back, certain cohorts would not have made the number of legions appear unchanged: by itself, it would have had the opposite effect; in order to make the four legions look like six, it was necessary to rearrange them.[3] If, then, as M. Jullian[4] maintains, *captis* is defensible, the meaning can only be that certain cohorts of the four legions were 'picked out' in order that they might be rearranged and the four legions might thus look like six. But is it likely that Caesar would have emphasized the mere picking out of the cohorts and left their rearrangement to the reader's imagination? The text, then, is almost certainly wrong; and if so,

[1] F. Kindscher (*Zeitschr. f. d. Gymnasialwesen*, 1860, p. 426) defends *laxatis* by the argument that Caesar would have made the ranks march further apart than usual. But this is just what he would not have done, for fear of arousing Vercingetorix's suspicions. He would have made the breadth of the column narrower than usual, because from the opposite bank Vercingetorix could not have seen that he had done so.

[2] *Caesar*, p. 356.

[3] Messrs. Bond and Walpole (*Caesar*, p. 363) suggest that, 'if *captis* is the right reading, the text may mean "that although some cohorts had been *removed*, yet," &c. But we should have expected *uti* to come before *captis*.' Certainly we should; and what then would be the sense of *uti numerus legionum constare videretur*? What would be the sense of saying, 'the rest of the troops he sent on as usual with all the baggage, *in order that*, although some cohorts had been removed, the number of the legions might appear unchanged'?

[4] *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 459, n. 5. After a careful examination of the *Thesaurus linguae Latinae* I can only conclude that *captis* cannot be used in the required sense, though *capio* is often equivalent to *eligo* (*Thes. ling. Lat.*, iii, 335).

we cannot do without an emendation of some sort. Now Professor Tyrrell[1] has remarked, with much good sense, that 'the first duty of an editor is to see that the ms. tradition is not put aside, unless it is quite clear that it is wrong, and cannot be reasonably defended. His next duty is to keep as close as he can to the mss. when he is obliged to desert them, and never to put forward a conjecture without a theory to account for the corruption'. And again, 'the best copyists . . . on meeting an unfamiliar word almost invariably write down, instead of it, that common word which most closely resembles it in form, without in the least troubling themselves about the meaning of the sentence.' Not one of the emendations of the passage in question fulfils the necessary conditions, except *carptis*. *Carptis*, as I have shown, makes perfectly good sense, and it enables us to form a perfectly intelligible theory of Caesar's stratagem. Therefore, unless it is to be condemned as unclassical, *carptis* is the emendation for me.[2] But, for purely historical purposes, it matters very little what Caesar wrote; for even if all the MSS. and all the emendations are wrong, it is impossible to mistake his drift.

WHERE DID CAESAR CROSS THE ALLIER ON HIS MARCH TO GERGOVIA?

1. Napoleon[3] fixes upon Varennes as the site of the bridge which Caesar repaired. He argues that (*a*) the existence of the bridge proves that there must have been a road leading to it; (*b*) only two Roman roads, and therefore probably only two Gallic roads led to the Allier below Moulins,—one at Varennes, the other at Vichy; (*c*) the distance of Varennes from Gergovia, nearly 77 kilometres, or about 48 miles, is just what Caesar would have accomplished through a strange country in five marches, the first of which, owing to the fatigue of the four legions which had done double work on the previous day, was probably short, and likewise the fifth, because Caesar arrived at Gergovia early on that day;[4] and (*d*) Vichy is only 55 kilometres, or about 33 miles, from Gergovia.

I do not think that the strangeness of the country would have interfered with the speed of Caesar's marching, any more than it did

[1] *The Correspondence of Cicero*, vol. ii, pp. vii–viii.

[2] H. Schickinger (*Rhein. Mus.*, N.F., lx, 1905, pp. 639–40) has recently proposed *coartatis quidem* (cohortibus). He ascribes to *coartatis*—a verb which is only used in one other passage (*B. G.*, vii, 70, § 3) by Caesar—the unusual meaning of 'reduced in size'. P. Menge, commenting on his emendation, supports my conclusion, and gives additional instances from Livy and Cicero of the use of *carptis* in the sense which I have attributed to it' (*Rhein. Mus.*, lxi, 1906, pp. 306–7. Cf. W. Schott's note in *Blätter f. d. bayer. Gymnasialschulwesen*, 1908, p. 72). Meusel, indeed, warns me that *carpo*, in the sense of *discerpo*, is not admissible unless it is conjoined with *in* (partes, &c.). Not, as far as we know, unless Livy's *carpere multifariam vires* (iii, 5, § 1) may be regarded as an exception; but does not Cicero (*De or.*, iii, 49, § 190) say that *saepe carpenda membris minutioribus oratio est*? And, seeing that the use of *carpo* in this sense is extremely rare, are we safe in generalizing?

[3] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 267, n. 3.

[4] See *B. G.*, vii, 35–6.

when he was making his rapid march against Ariovistus ;[1] for if guides were necessary, he had probably procured them. Desjardins[2] thinks that the data upon which Napoleon's calculations are based are too slight to be of any value.

2. Caesar says that, three days after he left Gergovia to rejoin Labienus, he repaired a bridge over the Allier and crossed by it.[3] D'Anville[4] infers that this was the same bridge by which Caesar had crossed the river when he was marching to Gergovia. He assumes that Caesar, on his return march, accomplished 28 kilometres a day ; and accordingly he places the bridge a little above Moulins. There is nothing in this argument. The fact that Caesar had to repair the bridge by which he crossed the Allier on his return march goes to prove that it was *not* the same as the one by which he had crossed before ; for there is no reason to suppose that the latter had meanwhile been injured. And it is impossible to say how far Caesar marched in the three days.

3. General Creuly[5] thinks the distance from Varennes to Gergovia too short to have required five marches. He believes that when Caesar went to Decetia, or Décize, to settle the dispute between the rival candidates for the office of Vergobret,[6] he left his army at Noviodunum, or Nevers, where he established an important depot.[7] If so, he observes, Caesar must have begun his march for Gergovia near the point where the Allier flows into the Loire ; and therefore, as a glance at the map will show, he might have crossed the Allier, not at Varennes but at Moulins, which is about 18 miles, as the crow flies, lower down the river. On the other hand, unless he began his march at Nevers, it is obvious that he could not have crossed the river so low down as Moulins ; for, if he started from Décize, he struck the Allier only just above Moulins ; and his narrative[8] shows that he had marched a considerable distance up the valley before he crossed the stream.

Desjardins is quite right in saying that the data are insufficient : but Napoleon's choice, Varennes, appears to me the most probable ;[9] for Caesar's remark, that 'patrols were thrown out [by Vercingetorix] to prevent the Romans from making a bridge',[10] suggests that he had been obliged to pass one of the broken bridges.

[1] *B. G.*, i, 41, §§ 4–5. [2] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 676–7, n. 5.

[3] *B. G.*, vii, 53, § 4. Schneider (*Caesar*, ii, 494) thinks that when Caesar said that he reached the Allier *tertio die*, he reckoned the time from the day on which he rebuked the legions for their disobedience during the attack on Gergovia (*B. G.*, vii, 52). I believe, on the contrary, that by *tertio die* he meant the third day of his march. [4] *Éclaircissemens sur l'ancienne Gaule*, p. 444.

[5] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., viii, 1863, p. 401. [6] *B. G.*, vii, 33, §§ 1–2.

[7] *Ib.*, 55, §§ 1–3. Cf. C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 459, n. 2.

[8] *B. G.*, vii, 35, §§ 1–2.

[9] Von Göler (*Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 289, n. 1) thinks that Caesar crossed the river higher up, as being narrower, when he was retreating from Gergovia than when he was marching to it. But as he crossed by a bridge, which he only had to repair, it would not have mattered much whether the river was wider or narrower. The truth is that we are as much in the dark on the one point as on the other. Caesar crossed the Allier where it suited him to cross it, and that is all that we shall ever know. [10] *B. G.*, vii, 35, § 1.

CAESAR'S OPERATIONS AT GERGOVIA

Since the publication of Napoleon's *Histoire de Jules César*, Caesar's description of his operations at Gergovia has become more intelligible. The emperor's main conclusions had, indeed, been anticipated by Pasumot, von Göler, and others ;[1] but they had not, like him, unlimited funds, skilled officers, and gangs of excavators to help them. Whoever reads the letter from Colonel Stoffel which I have printed on pages xxv–xxvii, will be convinced that he really discovered two Roman camps, connected by a pair of parallel trenches, on the south-east of Gergovia and on the Roche Blanche ; and that the attempts which have been made to discredit his discovery are absurd. Even now, however, the commentators are not all of one mind ; and no man can discuss the question with authority who has not carefully examined the ground with his own eyes.

I. It is no longer necessary to analyse the arguments of J. B. Bouillet,[2] who, notwithstanding Stoffel's discoveries, identified the larger camp with a camp at Gondole, five kilometres and a half, or nearly three miles and a half, east of Gergovia, and located the smaller camp on the hill of Bonneval, north-east of Gergovia, and 1,780 metres, or nearly 2,000 yards, from the plateau. Nobody will believe that Caesar would have encamped three miles and a half from the town which he hoped to take. It is true that he describes the hill on which the smaller camp was situated as scarped on every side, whereas the Roche Blanche, according to Bouillet, is scarped only on the south : but the hill of Bonneval, as Bouillet himself admits, is only scarped on the south and west ; and, as Napoleon says,[3] ' The Roche Blanche, which presents in its southern part an escarpment almost as perpendicular as a wall, has lost on the sides its abrupt form by successive landslips, the last of which took place within the memory of the inhabitants.' I can myself testify that the Roche Blanche is extremely steep on the southern part of its western side ; and it is plain that Caesar, when he described the hill as *ex omni parte circumcisus* could not have meant to say that it was literally scarped on all sides, but only that it was steep ; for if it had been as steep on every side as it is on the south, it would have been impossible for him to capture it, nor would the Gauls, even if they had been as skilful mountaineers as Sir Martin Conway, have attempted to occupy it. It would have required twice as much labour to dig a trench from the camp at Gondole to the hill of Bonneval as from Napoleon's camp to the Roche Blanche ; and the Roche Blanche is

[1] M. Jullian (*Vercingétorix*, pp. 365–6) has justly reminded us that we must not let the results of modern excavation obliterate the record of good work done in the remote past.

[2] *Mém. de l'Acad. des sciences . . . de Clermont-Ferrand*, nouv. sér., xvii, 1875, pp. 45–9. Cf. P. P. Mathieu, *Nouvelles observations sur les camps rom. de Gergovia*, 1863. In the first edition (pp. 738–9) I gave a detailed refutation, which was perhaps even then a work of supererogation, of Bouillet's theory.

[3] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 270, n. 1.

the only hill which is *e regione oppidi*,—'opposite the town' of Gergovia—that is to say, on a line perpendicular to the plateau on which Gergovia stood.[1]

II. Colonel T. A. Dodge[2] says, 'The north slope is wont to be described as impossible to capture. It is not so. The slope is not steep, though it is long. . . . It is probable that in Caesar's day the slope was concealed by woods and that he did not reconnoitre it thoroughly. But the position could have been surprised on the north far more easily than assaulted on the south.' These remarks are altogether misleading. 'Steep' is a relative term: but local authorities[3] agree in describing the northern slope of Gergovia as too steep to have been attacked with any chance of success; and the *Carte de l'État-Major*, Sheet 166, confirms their statements. I have myself ascended Gergovia from the north and from the south-west; and I can say positively that the ascent is much more difficult on the north. Caesar tells us that he reconnoitred the whole position;[4] and it is absurd to suppose that he did his work carelessly or that he threw away his best chance of capturing Gergovia. The truth is that, as he was not prepared to blockade the stronghold, there was only one way of attacking it which offered the least chance of success; and that was to seize the Col des Goules, which linked the south-western part to the outlying heights of Risolles.[5]

III. Caesar says that Vercingetorix 'had encamped near the town and grouped the contingents of the several tribes at moderate distances from one another and *round his own quarters*' (*castris prope oppidum in monte positis mediocribus circum se intervallis separatim singularum civitatum copias conlocaverat*).[6] From the words *circum se* von Göler inferred that the Gallic camps stood in a circle on the slopes of the mountain all round the town;[7] but, as Napoleon[8] shows, this is a mistake. The words only imply that the camps of the contingents surrounded the camp of Vercingetorix. Vercingetorix could have had no object in placing any of the camps on the northern or the eastern face of the mountain; and they doubtless stood on the southern slope and on the heights of Risolles.

IV. Long insists that when Caesar temporarily quitted Gergovia, in order to intercept Litaviccus, he left his smaller camp undefended. 'Caesar,' he says, 'took four legions out of the larger camp, and left two legions to defend it. These two legions were therefore transferred from the small camp to the large camp, and the small camp . . . might have been seized by the Galli, but it probably contained

[1] See pp. 779–80. Various other absurd guesses, of which A. Olleris (*Examen des diverses opinions émises sur le siége de Gergovia*, 1861, pp. 14–5) gives a list, have been hazarded as to the site of the smaller camp.

[2] *Caesar*, pp. 254–5.

[3] See A. Olleris, *Examen*, &c., p. 8, and A. d'Aigueperse, *Œuvres arch. et litt.*, 1862, i, 3–4.

[4] *B. G.*, vii, 36, § 1.

[5] In the first edition (pp. 824–5) I refuted the arguments by which Mr. Stock (*Caesar de b. G.*, 1898, pp. 315–6) attempted to prove that Caesar attacked Gergovia from the north. It does not seem necessary to reprint the refutation.

[6] *B. G.*, vii, 36, § 2.

[7] *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, Taf. ix.

[8] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 270, n. 1.

nothing that they would value, and they would not have been able to defend it when Caesar returned.'[1] This is a sorry argument. It was not what the small camp contained that the Gauls would have valued, but the commanding position on which the camp stood, the possession of which enabled Caesar to cut them off from the principal source of their supplies of water and forage. He had only been able to seize this position originally because it was inadequately garrisoned;[2] and if the Gauls had once recovered it, they would have taken care not to lose it a second time. Caesar simply says that he left two legions to defend his *castra* (*C. Fabium . . . cum legionibus duabus castris praesidio relinquit*);[3] and I believe that *castris* in this passage, as in vii, 82, § 2, 83, § 1, means 'camps', not 'camp'. Anyhow, Caesar would have been mad if he had left the smaller camp undefended.

V. The identity of the *collis nudatus*—the hill which, on the day before his final repulse, Caesar observed to be bared of defenders—is still an open question. Caesar says that it was visible from the smaller camp, that is to say from the Roche Blanche; and that there was a ridge (*dorsum*) belonging to *eius iugi*, which was nearly level and, in a place where it gave access to 'the further side of the town', wooded and narrow. Finally, he says that the Gauls who had previously occupied the hill had been withdrawn by Vercingetorix to fortify 'this place', that is to say, the place which gave access to 'the further side' of the town.[4] *Eius iugi* must mean either the whole range formed by the mountain of Gergovia and the heights of Risolles or, more probably, the latter only; and nothing can be more certain than that the *dorsum*, or at least that part of it which was wooded and narrow, was the Col des Goules.[5]

1. Von Kampen identifies the *collis nudatus* with that part of the mass of Risolles which is marked in the map as 723 metres high; but Mr. W. C. Compton[6] truly observes that 'the Puy de Jussat partially obscures the view of Risolles from the Roche Blanche'.

2. Napoleon, with whom Mr. Compton agrees, identifies the *collis* with a hill, marked A in his Plan (No. 21), 692 metres high, which forms a part of the mass of Risolles, and is about 550 yards south-west of the nearest part of the plateau of Gergovia.[7]

[1] *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv, 312, note.

[2] *B. G.*, vii, 36, §§ 5–6.

[3] *Ib.*, 40, § 3.

[4] Cum in minora castra operis perspiciendi causa venisset, animadvertit collem, qui ab hostibus tenebatur, nudatum hominibus, qui superioribus diebus vix prae multitudine cerni potuerat. Admiratus quaerit ex perfugis causam. . . . Constabat inter omnes, quod iam ipse Caesar per exploratores cognoverat, dorsum esse eius iugi prope aequum, sed silvestre et angustum qua esset aditus ad alteram partem oppidi; vehementer huic illos loco timere, nec iam aliter sentire, uno colle ab Romanis occupato, si alterum amisissent, quin paene circumvallati atque omni exitu et pabulatione interclusi viderentur: ad hunc muniendum locum omnes a Vercingetorige evocatos. *Ib.*, 44.

[5] This is now universally admitted.

[6] *Caesar's Seventh Campaign in Gaul*, p. 93.

[7] So also A. Fischer in *Annales scientifiques de l'Auvergne*, xxviii, 1855, map facing p. 416. M. Jullian (*Vercingétorix*, p. 198) says that 'dense woods covered the Col des Goules and the heights of Risolles'. The Col des Goules

3. Desjardins says that the *collis* was 'sans doute le puy de Jussat'.[1] Of the hill which Napoleon chooses he says, 'elle nous semble trop haute, trop près de l'accès du plateau, c'est-à-dire du col des Goules, pour avoir été dégarnie des troupes, puisque le système du général gaulois aurait été au contraire de mieux défendre cet accès.' Of course! But in order to defend the 'accès', Vercingetorix was obliged to remove troops temporarily from the *collis* to fortify it. Whatever may be said of Napoleon's choice, Desjardins's is certainly wrong. It is incredible that Vercingetorix would have occupied a hill the possession of which would have been useless to him and which was so far from Gergovia as the Puy de Jussat. Moreover, any one who has seen the 'puy' will admit that it would have been impossible for Vercingetorix to occupy any part of it which was visible from the Roche Blanche, except the lower slopes, with more than a handful of men.

4. According to von Göler,[2] the *collis nudatus* was simply that part of the southern slope of Gergovia which lies between the plateau and the Gallic wall of loose stones; and he identifies the place which the Gauls attempted to fortify with Mont Rognon, the nearest point of which is at least two kilometres, or about a mile and a quarter, from the nearest point of the plateau! It is difficult to understand how a soldier like von Göler could have blundered in this fashion; and if he had ever seen the country, he would have realized that for Vercingetorix to fortify Mont Rognon would have been about as useful as to fortify the Puy de Dôme. His son frankly admits that he was wrong.[3]

5. M. Jullian,[4] who of course agrees with Napoleon about the place which the Gauls attempted to fortify, nevertheless follows von Göler in identifying the *collis* with Gergovia. I am obliged to differ from him, first, because Caesar would have seen that the southern slope of Gergovia was abandoned before he ascended the Roche Blanche, and, secondly, because he says that one of the results of the stratagem which he devised after he saw that the *collis* was abandoned was that all the [Gallic] troops were withdrawn [from their former positions] by Vercingetorix to assist in the work of fortifying[5] [the approach to Risolles and the Col des Goules], which

certainly: we have Caesar's word for it; but what is the evidence for Risolles? According to Cassini's *Carte de la France*, t. i, f. 52, which M. Jullian (p. 370, n. 2) cites to prove that the Puy de Jussat was wooded, there was not one tree on Risolles; and Caesar's words—'the ridge to which the hill [the *collis nudatus*] belonged was nearly level, but where it gave access to the further side of the town wooded and narrow' (*dorsum esse eius iugi prope aequum, sed silvestre et angustum qua esset aditus ad alteram partem oppidi*)—surely imply that only the col was wooded. Perhaps M. Jullian has changed his mind; for in his *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 468, n. 3, he rightly includes among the 'high points of the mountain mass' which the Gallic troops occupied (*omnibus eius iugi collibus occupatis* [*B. G.*, vii, 36, § 2]) the heights of Risolles.

[1] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 682.

[2] *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, pp. 277–9, 281.

[3] *Ib.*, p. 277, nn. 3–4. See also Napoleon's *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 275, note, for an elaborate and conclusive refutation of von Göler.

[4] *Vercingétorix*, p. 373.

[5] *B. G.*, vii, 45, § 6.

seems to show that the southern slope of Gergovia had not been abandoned before.

My conclusion is that Napoleon's choice was almost certainly right. That he traced correctly the line which the Gauls fortified, no one who has seen the ground will deny.

VI. Describing the stratagem by which he endeavoured to distract the attention of Vercingetorix before attempting to take Gergovia, Caesar says that he 'sent several squadrons of cavalry thither [that is, towards the place which Vercingetorix was fortifying] about midnight, ordering them to rove all over the country and make a good deal of noise. At daybreak he ordered a large number of pack-horses and mules to be taken out of camp, the pack-saddles to be taken off, and the drivers to put on helmets, so as to look like troopers, and ride round over the hills (*collibus*). He sent a few regular cavalry with them, with orders to wander further afield, so as to increase the effect. All were to make a wide circuit and head towards the same goal.'[1] M. Jullian,[2] if I do not misunderstand him, traces the route of the horsemen along the north of the Auzon; but the words 'further afield' (*latius*) and 'wide circuit' (*longo circuitu*) surely point to the high ground beyond, that is south of the stream. The only conceivable objection to this view is that at such a distance —nearly a mile and a half—from Vercingetorix's camp the cavalry would not have been recognizable as such.[3] But men who have lived their lives in the open country can see further than our town-bred troops;[4] and, moreover, Caesar says that although 'these movements could be seen, far off, from the town . . . it was impossible, at such a distance, to make out exactly what they meant,'[5]—a remark which would have been quite inapplicable if the cavalry had kept on the northern bank of the Auzon, and if *collibus* had denoted the lower slopes of the mountain-mass of Gergovia.

VII. After describing the movements of the cavalry Caesar says that 'a single legion was sent along the same chain; and after it had advanced a little way it was stationed on lower ground and concealed in the woods' (*legionem unam eodem iugo mittit et paulum progressam inferiore constituit loco silvisque occultat*[6].) It has been conjectured that *eodem iugo* means the hill which Vercingetorix was fortifying: but it is needless to say that *eodem iugo* cannot mean the same as *ad idem ingum* ('to the same hill'); and the context shows that the legion was not sent to this place. If Caesar wrote *eodem iugo*, the words must mean that the legion was sent along the same line of high ground by which the horsemen had gone, that is to say, the northern slopes of the Montagne de la Serre.[7] Von Göler,

[1] *B. G.*, vii, 45, §§ 1–3. [2] *Vercingétorix*, pp. 210–1, 370.

[3] 'Good eye-sight,' says Lord Wolseley (*The Soldier's Pocket-Book*, 5th ed., 1886, p. 491), 'can distinguish bodies of troops at 2,000 yards . . . at 1,200 yards cavalry is distinguished from infantry,' &c.

[4] See my *Anc. Britain*, p. 608, n. 3. My friend, Captain Motard, tells me that he knows men who can distinguish cavalry from infantry at over 2 kilometres (2,186 yards). [5] *B. G.*, vii, 45, § 4. [6] *Ib.*, 45, § 5.

[7] So Heller (*Philologus*, xxvi, 1867, p. 686). Dittenberger quotes from Livy (ii, 50, § 10) *ni jugo circummissus Veiens in verticem collis evasisset*; and a

however, believes that Caesar wrote *eodem illo*, 'just towards that side.'[1] There is no necessity for this emendation; and in fact, as Steinberg remarks,[2] von Göler only made it because he had fallen into the mistake of supposing that the place which Vercingetorix fortified was Mont Rognon.

It is impossible and unnecessary to trace the exact route by which this legion marched. According to Napoleon, after leaving the large camp, it crossed the Auzon about a mile east of the foot of the Roche Blanche and recrossed it near the village of Chanonat. Mr. Compton[3] thinks that it moved along the northern bank of the Auzon throughout: but he fails to see that his theory is stultified by the words *eodem iugo*;[4] and, according to his Plan, the legion, instead of descending to lower ground before it halted, as Caesar says that it did, ascended to higher ground. That part, at all events, of the route which Napoleon traced along the slope of the Montagne de la Serre is indicated correctly, at least in its general direction.

Paul[5] believes that Napoleon has made the legion advance further westward than Caesar's words, *paulum progressam*[6], entitle him to do. He considers that it halted on the southern or south-eastern edge of the Puy de Jussat. The point is of infinitesimal importance; but I believe that Paul is mistaken. Caesar's words are vague; and on a question like this the opinion of a military expert like Stoffel is more likely to approximate to the truth than that of the most learned of scholars. Napoleon, following the colonel, made the legion halt just north of Chanonat.

VIII. The various positions occupied by the 10th legion and by Sextius[7] during the attack on Gergovia cannot be exactly fixed. It

passage in *B. C.*, i, 70, § 4,—*eo consilio, uti ipse . . . iugis Octogesam perveniret*, is decisive. Paul argues (*Berl. phil. Woch.*, iii, 1883, col. 563) that *iugo* must mean 'along the *ridge*, not along the slope of the hill. This is an arbitrary assertion; and it is certain that the legion did not go 'along the ridge'; for no general who was not a lunatic would have sent them on such an errand. Paul also contends that Caesar would have mentioned the time at which he dispatched the legion; and accordingly he conjectures that he wrote (legionem unam eodem) *luce* (mittit), &c.,—'Caesar sent a single legion in the same direction in broad daylight.' This is one of the many instances in which this scholar has wasted his time and his ingenuity in correcting what requires no correction. There was no reason why Caesar should mention any time. It was evidently daylight when he sent the legion on its journey; for in an earlier section of the same chapter he mentioned that he had sent a body of horsemen on a similar errand at dawn (*prima luce*). Therefore he would have conveyed little new information by writing *luce* afterwards. [I am glad to find that Mommsen (*Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xx, 1894, p. 209) rejects both *luce* and another conjecture of Paul's,—*decimam* (legionem) for *unam* (*B. G.*, vii, 45, § 5).]

[1] *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 281, note.

[2] *Philologus*, xxxiii, 1874, p. 452.

[3] *Caesar's Seventh Campaign in Gaul*, Plan facing p. 30.

[4] Are not these words also fatal to the theory of M. Jullian, according to whom (*Vercingétorix*, p. 370), the legion, 'après avoir remonté la vallée entre Gergovie et la Roche-Blanche,' turned to the left and disappeared in the woods behind the Puy de Jussat? In his *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 474, he sends the legion 'le long de l'Auzon', but does not say on which bank.

[5] *Berl. phil. Woch.*, iii, 1883, col. 563–4.

[6] *B. G.*, vii, 45, § 5.

[7] *Ib.*, 47, 49, 51.

is certain, however, that the 10th was posted on the left and Sextius's division on the right of the Roman line of retreat, so as to check the pursuing Gauls.

Caesar says in chapter 46 that about half-way up the mountain of Gergovia the Gauls had made a wall of loose stones; and the line of this wall is drawn in all maps about 300 yards north of the village of Gergovie, which was formerly called Merdogne. In chapter 47 Caesar says that after the other legions had passed the wall and taken three camps, he sounded the trumpet for them to retreat, or fall back (*receptui cani iussit*), and made the 10th legion, which he commanded in person, halt; but he adds that the other legions did not hear the signal because a wide valley intervened between him and them. This valley is generally identified with the hollow or depression, which has been largely filled up, on the west of Gergovie.[1] M. Jullian,[2] however, holds that it was the one "où il se trouvait lui-même",—between the Roche Blanche and the hill of Gergovia. He adds that 'presque tous les écrivains placent à ce moment la X^e^ légion . . . sur le flanc de la montagne gergovienne, et pas loin du village'; and he refers to page 744 of my first edition. I adhere provisionally to my opinion, for the following reason. Caesar says[3] that when he saw that the assaulting column was in difficulties, he ordered Sextius, whom he had left in charge of the camp on the Roche Blanche, to take up a position with some cohorts of the 13th legion at the foot of Gergovia, and that he himself advanced a little with his own legion from the position which he had taken up (*ad T. Sextium legatum, quem minoribus castris praesidio reliquerat, misit, ut cohortes ex castris celeriter educeret et sub infimo colle ab dextro latere hostium constitueret. . . . Ipse paulum ex eo loco cum legione progressus ubi constiterat, eventum pugnae expectabat*). According to M. Jullian, Sextius was to take the place which Caesar had vacated. It appears to me, on the other hand, that the words *sub infimo colle* are contrasted with *eo loco ubi constiterat*. Moreover, when Caesar says, just before mentioning the 'considerable valley', that after the capture of the three Gallic camps he 'immediately *halted* the 10th legion, which he commanded in person' (*legionisque X., quacum erat, continuo signa constiterunt* [v.l. *constituit*]),[4] he evidently implies that the legion had up to that moment been in motion; whereas, if the point of departure of the column of assault had been, as M. Jullian says,[5] the smaller camp, and if, as he also maintains,[6] the legion, at the moment when Caesar sounded the recall, was immediately north of the smaller camp, it would surely have been at rest.

Heller maintains that when Caesar gave the order for the legions

[1] If this depression was not the *satis magna vallis*, Caesar (unless M. Jullian's identification, noticed in the text, is right) must have referred to the very broken valley or gorge on the east of Gergovie; and although von Göler (*Gall. Krieg*, 1880, Taf. ix) takes this view, nobody who has seen the ground will admit that Caesar would have taken up his position on the east of this gorge.

[2] *Vercingétorix*, pp. 213, 373–4, 374, n. 3.

[3] *B. G.*, vii, 49.

[4] See p. 763, n. 1.

[5] *Vercingétorix*, p. 373.

[6] *Ib.*, pp. 213, 373–4, 374, n. 1.

to retreat, he set the example of obedience by retreating himself.[1] Steinberg, however, justly observes that it was not necessary for him to do this. As he was himself outside and south of the Gallic stone wall, he could conveniently remain where he was until the other legions should have fallen back.[2] If, as Long believes,[3] he only ordered the legions to halt, or fall back and re-form, it is of course plain that he did not retreat himself.

Napoleon[4] fixes the first halt of the 10th legion on a knoll on which stands the south-western part of the village of Gergovie: von Kampen[5] and Mr. Compton,[6] who has studied the ground, agree with him; and the position is in my opinion right or very nearly so. Von Göler[7] selects a spot about 400 yards north-east of Gergovie, which is too far from the valley, and where, moreover, as any one who has seen the ground will admit, it would have been very difficult for the 10th legion to assist the others.

The second position of the 10th legion is fixed by Napoleon about a quarter of a mile east-south-east of the first. He bases his choice upon the reading *regressus* in chapter 49, which von Göler and he substitute, without any authority, for *progressus*. 'The 10th legion,' says Napoleon, 'must, in the presence of a combat the issue of which was uncertain, have taken up a position behind rather than towards the front.'[8] In other words, the legion which acted as a reserve must have retreated just when its services seemed likely to be required! Von Göler defends *regressus* on the ground that as Caesar had caused the 10th legion to halt immediately after the

[1] *Philologus*, xxvi, 1867, p. 686. Caesar's text here presents a difficulty; and Heller selects the spot where he believes the 10th legion to have stood, in accordance with an emendation of his own. According to the MSS., Caesar wrote:—*Caesar receptui cani iussit legionisque* (*v. l.* legionique) *X., quacum erat contionatus, signa constiterunt* (*v. l.* constituit).' Schneider (*Caesar*, ii, 477–9) defends *contionatus*, remarking that Caesar was referring to the speech which, as he tells us in chapter 45, he made to his lieutenants before sending them to attempt the capture of Gergovia, and suggesting that he addressed the assembled legions—and particularly the 10th—to the same effect. Nipperdey (*Caesar*, p. 95), who puts a comma after *erat*, takes *contionatus* absolutely, and says, 'there is no obscurity as to the subject of Caesar's harangue: he announced that, as he had achieved his purpose, he intended to retreat'. Other scholars, despairing of extracting any satisfactory meaning from *contionatus*, have made attempts, more or less futile, to amend the text. Paul (*Berl. phil. Woch.*, iii, 1883, col. 601) argues that Caesar would have been too busy to harangue the 10th legion at such a crisis, and proposes to read (quacum) *ierat C. Trebonius legatus* (!) Whitte simply deleted *contionatus*; Heller (*Philologus*, xix, 1863, p. 540), who is followed by Holder, proposed *clivom nactus*: and von Göler, who is followed by Dittenberger, Meusel, and others, *continuo*. This seems to me the most probable emendation. See Meusel's *Tabula Coniecturarum*, p. 31 (*Lex. Caes.*, vol. ii, pars ii).

[2] *Philologus*, xxxiii, 1874, p. 455.

[3] *Caesar*, p. 367; *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv, 319–21. See pp. 246–8. *supra*.

[4] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 278.

[5] *Quindecim ad Caesaris de b. G. comm. tabulae*, x.

[6] *Caesar's Seventh Campaign in Gaul*, Plan facing p. 30.

[7] *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, Taf. ix.

[8] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 279, note.

capture of the three camps, he would not have advanced nearer to the town, when his object was to be ready to support the legions, which were hard pressed by the Gauls.[1] But the circumstances were now changed, for the legions, in defiance of orders, had not halted, but had pushed on to the wall of Gergovia : *progressus* would not necessarily imply that Caesar advanced nearer to the *town* ; and he certainly would have advanced nearer to the legions. It is perhaps doubtful whether *progressus* means 'advancing nearer' (to the town) or 'advancing nearer' (to the hollow by which the legions had climbed the hill). Von Kampen and Compton adopt the latter meaning. They find the second position about 150 yards south-west of Gergovie, which seems to me unobjectionable.

As to the third position of the 10th legion, Caesar simply says, 'Overborne at every point, the Romans were driven from their position with the loss of 46 centurions. The Gauls were relentlessly pursuing when the 10th legion, which had taken post in reserve on comparatively favourable ground, checked them' (*nostri, cum undique premerentur, XLVI centurionibus amissis deiecti sunt loco. Sed intolerantius Gallos insequentes legio X. tardavit, quae pro subsidio paullo aequiore loco constiterat*). Where the 'comparatively favourable ground' was, depends upon the line of retreat taken by the defeated legions. Napoleon fixes upon a position about a quarter of a mile east-south-east of the second position, as indicated in his Plan ; and about 600 yards east of this third position, on the Puy de Marmant, he and von Göler find the second position of Sextius, of whom Caesar says, 'The 10th was in its turn supported by the cohorts of the 13th, which, under T. Sextius, had quitted the smaller camp and occupied *a commanding position*' (*hanc* [legionem decimam] *rursus XIII. legionis cohortes exceperunt, quae ex castris minoribus eductae cum T. Sextio legato ceperant locum superiorem*). Napoleon misunderstands the words *locum superiorem*, which do not mean 'a high hill'. In *B. G.*, iii, 4, § 2, Caesar describes the rampart of a camp as a *locus superior* ; and, as A. Eberz points out, the *locus superior* which Sextus occupied was only *superior* in relation to the position at the foot of the mountain of Gergovia, which he had occupied before.[2] Von Kampen[3] holds that 'the flight of the Gauls assuredly took place along the valley which runs from Merdogne [Gergovie] to Donnezat, and not across the hills, the less so because the Romans had regarded the Aedui, who appeared on their right flank, as enemies, whom therefore they would certainly have not hastened to meet'. Heller, objecting to the third position which Napoleon assigns to the 10th legion, says that Caesar would there have been separated from the other legions by the valley of Gergovie, and therefore could not have supported them. Accordingly he puts the 10th legion on the west of the valley.[4] I do not agree with this view. If the line

[1] *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 286, n. 1.
[2] *Neue Jahrb. f. Philologie*, &c., lxxv., 1857, p. 854.
[3] *Quindecim ad Caesaris de b. G. comm. tabulae*, x.
[4] *Philologus*, xxvi, 1867, pp. 687–8.

of retreat of the other legions lay along the valley, Caesar could have supported them from the east just as well as from the west. Moreover, Sextius was unquestionably on the right of the line of retreat; and it is clear that Caesar remained on the side opposite to that of Sextius. Von Kampen finds the third position of the 10th legion immediately north-east of Donnezat, and the second position of Sextius immediately north-east of the village of La Roche Blanche. The latter of these positions is perhaps too far south; for von Kampen makes the retreating Romans cross the parallel trenches which connected the larger with the smaller camp. If he is right in tracing the line of retreat, I believe that the second position of Sextius was on the eastern slope of the Roche Blanche, and the third position of the 10th legion just opposite, on the north-east of Donnezat. I do not feel certain about the line of retreat; but Caesar's narrative seems to me to suggest that the Romans retreated, as they had advanced, along the valley of Gergovie. It might be argued in favour of Napoleon's view, that they would have retreated towards their large camp for fear of exposing it to attack: but Caesar had doubtless left a force to guard it; and if the Gauls had ventured to attack it, they would have been compelled to abandon their strong position on the high ground, and to fight a battle with the Romans in the plain.[1]

Regarding the first position of Sextius, there is no room for doubt. Caesar says that 'he sent an order to T. Sextius, the general whom he had left in charge of the smaller camp, to take his cohorts out quickly and form them up at the foot of the hill, on the enemy's right flank, so as to check their pursuit in case he saw our men driven from their position' (*ad T. Sextium legatum, quem minoribus castris praesidio reliquerat, misit ut cohortes ex castris celeriter educeret et sub infimo colle ab dextro latere hostium constitueret, ut, si nostros loco depulsos vidisset, quo minus libere hostes insequerentur, terreret*). Sextius was certainly in the hollow between the Roche Blanche and the hill of Gergovia; and Napoleon, von Kampen, and Steinberg[2] agree in placing him there, just on the right of the Roman line of retreat.

M. Jullian, who, as we have seen,[3] differs from most commentators regarding the identity of the 'wide valley', naturally differs from them also regarding the successive positions of the legions.[4] 'Tous

[1] Caesar says (*B. G.*, vii, 51, § 3) that the legions, as soon as they reached the plain, halted and stood fronting and threatening their pursuers. Heller (*Philologus*, xix, 1863, p. 539) actually holds that the plain was the narrow depression between the mountain of Gergovia and the Roche Blanche; and in support of this view, which he never could have adopted if he had seen the ground, he refers to the passage in which Caesar says that the distance, in a straight line, from the plain and the starting-point of the ascent to the wall of Gergovia was 1,200 paces (about 1,940 yards). But the distance from the depression between the Roche Blanche and the mountain of Gergovia to the wall of the town, is considerably less than 1,200 paces. Probably, as Napoleon holds, the legions started on their ascent from the low ground between the Roche Blanche and the Puy de Marmant. The ground on the east of the Roche Blanche and just north of Donnezat might fairly be called a *planities*.

[2] *Philologus*, xxxiii, 1874, p. 457.

[3] p. 762.

[4] *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 477, n. 5.

ces mouvements des légions,' he says, 'me paraissent succéder sur une même ligne, le chemin actuel et naturel de la Roche Blanche au village.' Accordingly he fixes the second position of the 10th legion east of the village of Gergovie at the point the elevation of which is marked on the map as 536 metres, and the third position on the site of the village itself; while he supposes that Sextius took up his second position on what had been the second position of the 10th. If this conjecture is right, Caesar, who had before stationed Sextius 'on the enemy's right flank, so as to check their pursuit in case he saw the Romans driven from their position',[1] must have deliberately transferred him for the same purpose to their left.

IX. The path followed by the Aeduan contingent, whom the legionaries, at the time when the fighting under the wall of Gergovia was going on, mistook for enemies, cannot be fixed with absolute precision. Caesar says that they appeared on the exposed (that is the right) flank of the legions, and that he had sent them by a path on the right, to distract the attention of the garrison.[2] The legions had climbed the southern slope of Gergovia. It is clear, then, that the Aedui ascended the mountain by some path on its eastern or south-eastern flank. According to Napoleon and von Kampen, they went up the south-eastern slope, taking the shortest road from the larger Roman camp, and passing about 500 yards north of the Puy de Marmant; but while von Kampen brings them to a point on the north-west of Gergovie and about 160 yards south of the outer Gallic wall, Napoleon makes them turn off to the left from a point about 550 yards due east of Gergovie, and strike off in a south-westerly direction. I am sure that Napoleon is wrong, because, on his theory, the Aedui would never have created a diversion at all; and it was for this reason that Caesar had sent them up the hill. Mr. Compton takes them to the same goal as von Kampen by a long *détour*, passing northward of the long spur which Gergovia throws out on the east, the height of which is marked as 445 metres; and this is in part the route indicated by von Göler: but von Göler makes the Aedui stop short at a point about 900 yards east of the northern extremity of Gergovie, in which case the Romans would not have noticed them until they were themselves in full retreat. Mr. Compton[3] says, 'A second survey of the ground, after some years' interval, has only sufficed to confirm the impression that the point at which the Aedui are seen is the *upper* shoulder, the lower position being out of sight from the ravine under the south gate, where the fight took place (c. 48). But in order to reach the upper shoulder, a troop of armed men would be obliged to make a longer circuit to the north, the south-east corner of the hill being practically inaccessible.'

I believe that Napoleon, von Göler, von Kampen, and Mr. Compton are all mistaken, but that Mr. Compton goes nearest to the truth. It is obvious that the Aedui would not have fulfilled their mission of creating a diversion unless they had penetrated the space between

[1] *B. G.*, vii, 49, § 1.
[2] *Ib.*, 50, § 1.
[3] *Caesar's Seventh Campaign in Gaul*, p. 95.

the town and the outer wall; and it is clear from Caesar's narrative that the legions, when they caught sight of them, were still striving to hold their ground under the wall of the town. Besides, it is very unlikely that if the Aedui had been below the outer wall when they were descried, the Romans would have taken them for Vercingetorix's troops. What conceivable object could the latter have had in voluntarily descending from their strong position?[1] I believe, therefore, that the Aedui, having climbed the hill on the east by the route which Mr. Compton indicates, and encountering no opposition, marched westward along the south side of the hill and on the north of the outer wall.

. . . . . .

In 1896 and 1898 I spent nine afternoons in examining Gergovia and its environs. I was already familiar with the whole literature of the subject and had studied the best maps: but I found that I had a great deal to learn; and I must admit that a great deal remains uncertain.

X. According to Mr. Compton,[2] 'a story is told that in the fight Caesar himself lost his sword, which he afterwards was shown in a temple of the Arverni.' No such story is told, except by Mr. Compton, Napoleon, and other inaccurate modern writers. Plutarch,[3] indeed, says that Caesar lost a sword, but in the cavalry combat that preceded the blockade of Alesia. Another apocryphal story is told by Napoleon in such a way as to suggest that the incident which it describes took place at Gergovia. 'Servius,' he says, 'relates that . . . when Caesar was taken away prisoner by the Gauls, one of them began to cry out *Caecos Caesar*, which signifies in Gaulish *let him go*, and thus he escaped.'[4] But Servius only says that this happened in *one* of Caesar's battles in Gaul:—'Caius Iulius Caesar, cum dimicaret in Gallia et ab hoste raptus equo eius portaretur armatus, occurrit quidam ex hostibus qui eum nosset, et insultans ait *Caesar Caesar* [v. l. *Cecos Caesar*], quod Gallorum lingua *dimitte* significat; et ita factum est ut dimitteretur. Hoc autem ipse Caesar in Ephemeride sua dixit.'[5]

LITAVICCUS'S MARCH TO GERGOVIA

Caesar says that when Litaviccus was marching from the country of the Aedui to Gergovia, he halted about 30 Roman miles from that place to harangue his troops, and told them that they must push on and join Vercingetorix, and not Caesar. On the following night, probably just before dawn, Caesar started to intercept Litaviccus,

[1] These reasons tell equally against the view of M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 474, n. 6), who makes the Aedui ascend the path that leads from the large camp to the farm of Gergovie, and then move along the path that leads to Gergovie itself.

[2] *Caesar's Seventh Campaign in Gaul*, p. 97.

[3] *Caesar*, 29.

[4] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 282, n. 1.

[5] H. A. Lion's ed. (1826), ii, 48. Cf. *Class. Philology*, iii, 1908, p. 445.

and encountered his force 25 Roman miles from Gergovia. Thereupon Litaviccus and his personal retainers made their escape to Gergovia.[1]

According to Napoleon,[2] Litaviccus marched towards Gergovia along the left or western bank of the Allier, halted to harangue his troops near Serbannes, and encountered Caesar near Randan. C. Hartung[3] objects that, on this theory, Litaviccus would only have marched 5 miles, the distance between Serbannes and Randan, while the news of his approach was travelling to Gergovia and Caesar was marching 25 Roman miles from Gergovia to meet him. Hartung argues further that Litaviccus would have marched by the right or eastern bank of the Allier, in order to avoid falling into Caesar's clutches. He supposes that Litaviccus harangued the troops near Vichy, which is about 8 miles, as the crow flies, from Randan, and then marched in an easterly direction, so as to avoid Caesar and reach Gergovia by a *détour*. Caesar, however, so Hartung tells us, had foreseen this move. Accordingly he crossed from the left to the right bank of the Allier; made his legions march on a widely extended line, so as to avoid all possibility of missing Litaviccus; and encountered him near Thiers, east-north-east of Gergovia.

A. Hug[4] admits that there is some force in Hartung's objection; but he holds that Hartung's theory presents greater difficulties than Napoleon's. It is quite inconceivable, he argues, that at a moment when everything depended upon speed Caesar should not have regarded the passage of the Allier as a hindrance; and, he asks, if Caesar commanded the passage of the river, why did he allow Litaviccus to cross it?

I agree with Hug's first argument, though Litaviccus might have got across the Allier before Caesar could stop him. Anyhow Hartung's theory is simply a bad guess. Caesar does not say a word about having marched on a widely-extended line; and if he had done so, he would have lost the all-important advantage of presenting himself before the Aedui in irresistible force. If Eporedorix had not told him by what route Litaviccus was advancing, his own cavalry could have procured the necessary information. Litaviccus might have kept out of Caesar's way by moving away from the Allier in a westerly direction and entering Gergovia by its north-western gate. Caesar's narrative, interpreted in its natural sense, inevitably leads to the conclusion that Litaviccus, after leaving his halting-place, marched straight on; and the conclusion is perfectly credible, even if he did not advance more than 5 miles while Caesar marched 25. Litaviccus may have nearly finished his day's march when he halted to harangue his troops: Caesar merely says that he halted about (*circiter*) 30 miles from Gergovia: he himself was marching at the utmost speed of which his men were capable; and he may have been misinformed about the distance.

[1] *B. G.*, vii. 38–40.
[2] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 271–2.
[3] *Philologus*, xxxii. 1873, pp. 369–71.
[4] Bursian's *Jahresbericht*, i, 1873, pp. 1167–8.

THE MEANING OF THE PASSAGE *IPSI EX FINITIMIS . . . TRANSIRE VIDERETUR* (*B. G.*, vii, 55, §§ 9–10)

Ipsi ex finitimis regionibus copias cogere, praesidia custodiasque ad ripas Ligeris disponere, equitatumque omnibus locis iniciendi timoris causa ostentare coeperunt, si ab re frumentaria Romanos excludere aut adductos inopia ex provincia expellere possent. Quam ad spem multum eos adiuvabat, quod Liger ex nivibus creverat, ut omnino vado non posse transiri videretur.[1] So runs this famous passage in the α MSS.: the reading of β is (inopia) *provincia excludere*. Nipperdey[2] reads *in provinciam expellere*, an emendation suggested by Nicasius; and if Caesar wrote *expellere*, the emendation is obviously required: for the Aedui could not have expelled Caesar from the *provincia*, unless *provincia* meant, not the Province properly so called, but the rest of Gaul; and, as a matter of fact, he never uses the word in this sense.[3] Achaintre,[4] indeed, who reads *expellere*, contends that *provincia* means the country of the Aedui, and refers to a passage[5] in which Caesar makes Ariovistus speak of the Gallic territory which he had annexed as *provincia sua*. But in this passage the meaning of *provincia* is unmistakable; and the use of the word gives additional point to Ariovistus's argument. In the passage which I am discussing every reader of Caesar, except Achaintre, has always understood that by *provincia* he meant the Roman Province; and if he had meant the country of the Aedui, he would have written not *ex provincia* but *ex finibus suis*. Schneider, who regards the reading of α as obviously absurd, follows Morus and deletes *aut adductos inopia provincia excludere*.[6] Eporedorix and Viridomarus, he argues, had no prospect of being able to *exclude* Caesar from the province, and would have been delighted to see him go thither. On the other hand, they could not have been so foolish as to imagine that they could compel him to do so: therefore the emendation of Nicasius does not mend matters. Men, he adds, who are said to have been influenced by hunger (*adductos inopia*), would be said to have been influenced to *do* something, not to *suffer*. It would be absurd to say that a man was *influenced* to be *excluded from* a place. Besides, the repetition in the same sentence, of the word *excludere* would be extremely harsh. We may therefore conclude, says Schneider, that the words *aut adductos inopia provincia excludere* (or *ex provincia expellere*) are a gloss.

[1] 'They [the Aedui] then proceeded to raise forces from the neighbouring districts, establishing detachments and piquets along the banks of the Loire, and throwing out cavalry in all directions, to terrorize the Romans, in the hope of being able to prevent them from getting corn or to drive them, under stress of destitution, from the province. It was a strong point in their favour that the Loire was swollen from the melting of the snow, so that, to all appearance, it was quite unfordable.'

[2] *Caesar*, p. 96.

[3] See H. Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, ii, 1279–84.

[4] *Caesar*, i, 348.

[5] *B. G.*, i, 44, § 8.

[6] See Oudendorp's *Caesar*, i, 401, and Schneider's *Caesar*, ii, 502.

Long[1] remarks that 'the sentence *quam ad spem multum eos adiuvabat, quod Liger ex nivibus creverat, ut omnino vado non posse transiri videretur* shows that the direct object of the Aedui was to prevent Caesar from crossing the river. If,' he continues, 'they kept him on the west side, he would have to levy contributions in a country which he had already passed through, and which was probably devastated. He had also Vercingetorix in his rear. There was corn on the east side of the Loire, for Caesar got it as soon as he crossed. "Quam ad spem" therefore would be quite intelligible if the direct object of the Aedui was to prevent his getting supplies, by preventing him from crossing the river. If he crossed the river, however, he would readily get into the "provincia" by a much easier and shorter road than by crossing the Cévennes. It seems likely then that the Aedui wished to prevent his getting supplies and also to prevent his getting into the "provincia" by crossing the Loire, for Caesar would plunder all the country of the Aedui, if he crossed the river. Davies's conjecture, "in provinciam repellere" is without any authority; and it is absurd. If they simply drove him into the "provincia", where he could get supplies, and from Italy too, they might expect to see him among them again, and the country of the Aedui would be the first to suffer. Their plan was to starve him where he was, between the Allier and the Loire, or if he retired into the "provincia", to compel him to pass south through the Cévennes. I conclude that the text is corrupt; but there is enough to show what was meant.'

I agree with Long that there is enough to show what was meant; and I believe that his explanation of the meaning is right: nevertheless, his condemnation of Davies's conjecture, which is virtually identical with Nipperdey's, is hasty and unjust. For both Davies's conjecture and Nipperdey's do really harmonize with Long's explanation of Caesar's meaning; and of the readings found in the MSS., *provincia excludere*, following *adductos inopia*, is, as Schneider points out, ungrammatical; while *ex provincia expellere* is, as I have shown, absurd. The MSS., therefore, being plainly corrupt, we are driven to conjecture. The only question, for historical purposes, is whether the Aedui desired to prevent Caesar from reaching the Province, or whether they desired to drive him into it. The only satisfactory answer is that they desired, if possible, to prevent him from reaching the Province, by starving him out between the Loire and the Allier; and if this were impossible, to drive him into it by the most difficult way. This is exactly what Caesar meant, according to Long; and virtually what he said, according to Davies and Nipperdey. There are two other passages which go to prove that the Aedui wished to exclude the Romans from the Province. In *B. G.*, vii, 66, §§ 3–4, we find Vercingetorix telling his officers that Caesar was trying to make his way into the Province. 'If he does so,' Vercingetorix goes on to say, 'we shall be free for the moment; but we shall have done little to secure lasting peace, for he is sure to return with

[1] *Caesar*, p. 374.

reinforcements, and continue the war indefinitely.' And in chapter 65, Caesar says that he sent to Germany for reinforcements of cavalry, *quod . . . interclusis omnibus itineribus, nulla re ex provincia atque Italia sublevari poterat*, 'because, as all the roads were blocked, he could not get any assistance from the Province and Italy.' I admit that this passage does not prove my point, because it is not certain that the roads were blocked at the time when Caesar was marching to join Labienus; but it certainly suggests that the object of the Aedui, as of Vercingetorix, was to cut off Caesar from the Province. On the other hand, there is another passage which suggests that the Aedui expected that Caesar would find himself obliged to make for the Province. Describing the rumour which reached Labienus after he had arrived before Lutecia, he says, *Galli in conloquiis interclusum itinere et Ligeri Caesarem inopia frumenti coactum in provinciam contendisse confirmabant*,[1]—'the Gauls . . . affirmed that Caesar was prevented from pursuing his march and from crossing the Loire, and that want of corn had forced him to make a dash for the Province.'

To conclude. Either we must delete the doubtful words, or, reading *expellere*, assume that *provincia* here means the whole of Gaul north of the Roman Province, or accept the emendation *in provinciam*. The first course is to my mind hazardous,[2] and the second is unwarrantable; but, for historical purposes, the second and the third lead to the same result, and the first is not inconsistent with it.[3]

THE DISPUTED PASSAGE *NAM UT COMMUTATO . . . TIMEBAT* (*B. G.*, vii, 56, § 2)

I am not here editing the *Commentaries*; and I only discuss this passage because I want to find out whether Caesar intended to convey that some of his officers were in favour of retreating to the Province, or whether he simply meant that, notwithstanding the difficulties of his position, such a course was out of the question.

Schneider[4] reads *Nam ut commutato consilio iter in provinciam converteret, ut ⟨non⟩ nemo tunc quidem necessario faciundum existimabat, cum infamia atque indignitas rei et oppositus mons Cebenna viarumque difficultas impediebat, tum maxime quod abiuncto Labieno atque iis legionibus quas una miserat vehementer timebat.* The words in open italics are those that are doubtful. The α MSS. have *ut ne metu* (quidem), the β MSS. *ut nemo tunc*, and certain inferior MSS. *id ne metu*.[5]

[1] *B. G.*, vii, 59, 1.

[2] Variety of readings, however, commonly accompanies, and sometimes points to, an interpolation.

[3] A. Klotz (*Caesarstudien*, pp. 258–9) adopts the conjecture, *in provinciam expellere*.

[4] *Caesar*, ii, 504–6.

[5] Reading *id ne metu quidem* and inserting *quod* before *infamia*, the passage means 'To change his whole plan of campaign and march for the Province,—that, he deemed, was a course to which he ought not to allow even the pressure of fear to force him; for the disgrace and the humiliation of retreat, the barrier

Nipperdey[1] adopts Ciacconius's conjecture,—*ut nemo non tum quidem*. He also follows Elberling in substituting *ne* (commutato) for *ut* (commutato)—the reading of all the MSS.—because, with his reading, *ut*, followed by *impediebat*, would be ungrammatical, and, as he points out, *ut* and *ne* were often interchanged by copyists.

Ut ne metu quidem is certainly not what Caesar wrote. I defy any one who adopts this reading to make sense out of the passage. *Ut nemo tunc quidem* has little or no point; and I agree with Schneider that if we accept this reading, we must supply *non*. Nipperdey's version makes perfectly good sense; but that does not prove that it is right. Schneider says in defence of his, which, but for the ungrammatical *ut*, is nearly identical with Nipperdey's, 'I have inserted *non* BEFORE *nemo*, because it is more likely that the course which to Caesar appeared to involve shame and humiliation as well as great difficulty, should have appeared inevitable to *some* of those whom he was accustomed to consult than to *all*.' He also makes a strenuous effort to prove that, admitting Ciacconius's conjecture, *ut* (commutato, &c.) is not ungrammatical. He explains *ut . . . converteret* by referring to two other passages in the *Gallic War*,—*damnatum poenam sequi oportebat, ut igni concremaretur* (i, 4, § 1), and *cum id, quod ipsi diebus XX aegerrime confecerant, ut flumen transirent, illum uno die fecisse intellegerent* (i, 13, § 2).[2] I may be mistaken; but I think it will presently appear that while these passages are strictly analogous to the one which I am discussing if we accept the reading *id ne metu quidem*, the analogy disappears if we accept Ciacconius's conjecture. In other words, I believe that if we accept that conjecture, *ut* (commutato, &c.) must depend upon *impediebat*, and therefore must be ungrammatical. Schneider indeed, while he is careful to explain that he does not make *ut* (commutato, &c.) depend upon *impediebat*, argues that a passage in Cicero—*dii prohibeant, iudices, ut . . . existimetur* (*Pro Roscio Amer.*, 52, § 151)—proves that it might do so. But this is the only passage in Cicero in which *prohibeo* is followed by *ut*; and there is not a single passage in classical Latin in which *ut* follows *impedio*. I believe therefore that if we accept Ciacconius's conjecture, we must follow Nipperdey, and read *ne* for *ut*.

Desperate remedies occasionally succeed; and if we are to make sense out of this passage we must have recourse to conjecture. Long rejects Ciacconius's emendation on the ground that to tell us what others thought in a crisis in which he had to decide is not what we should expect from Caesar.[3] But if he wrote *ut nemo non . . . existimabat*, he was probably alluding to the opinion not of his officers

interposed by the Cevennes, and the condition of the roads forbade him to attempt it; and above all he was intensely anxious for Labienus, who was separated from him, and for the legions which he had placed under his command'. See J. N. Madvig's *Adversaria critica*, 1873, ii, 258.

[1] *Caesar*, pp. 96–7.

[2] J. C. Held takes *ut . . . converteret* as concessive ('assuming that he were to change his whole plan of campaign', &c.), a view which Schneider effectually, but unnecessarily, demolishes.

[3] See Long's *Caesar*, p. 375.

only, but of the Gauls as well. Long adopts the reading which, before the appearance of Oudendorp's edition, was the accepted one, —'Nam ut commutato consilio iter in provinciam converteret, *id ne tum quidem* necessario faciendum existimabat,' &c.; for, although it has no MS. authority, he holds that it 'is the only reading that fits the context'; and he argues that 'it gets rid of the difficulty of the construction "ut . . . converteret . . . impediebat" '.[1] But he has overlooked the obvious fact that, while it gets rid of this difficulty, it introduces another, which can only be removed by supplying *quod* between *cum* and *infamia*.[2] This correction was made by Stephanus, and, although Schneider denies that any classical writer uses *quod* after *cum*, it is followed by Madvig, who, taking as his guide the inferior MSS. to which I have alluded, reads *id ne metu quidem*. If Caesar wrote this, he meant that he had not thought it right, even under the pressure of fear, to retreat to the Province: if Long's reading is right, he meant that he had not thought it right to do so even in that crisis. A. Klotz[3] objects to Ciacconius's conjecture, because Caesar nowhere else uses the expression *non nemo*, though he often uses *non nulli*. True; but Caesar uses numerous words once and once only. Klotz then proceeds to build up a conjecture of his own. Assuming that Caesar wrote *Nam ne commutato*, he remarks that *ne* might easily have been changed into the MS. *ut* by a careless copyist who fancied that the sentence was final, but that whoever read carefully would have seen that *ut* was wrong, and made the correction, *ne*, in the margin. In the next copy this *ne* would have been taken as referring to the *ut* which in *a* preceded *metu*, and so have got inserted before *metu*. We need only make two very trivial corrections, and we get *ut* [ne] *metu quidam existimaba⟨n⟩t*, 'as some under the influence of fear thought' (that it would be necessary to do), &c. For historical purposes this is identical with Ciacconius's emendation, and I am inclined to believe that one or the other hits the mark: it does not seem likely that Caesar would have made the observation which Madvig attributes to him.[4]

It is amusing to read the romance which Mommsen founds upon a piece of doubtful Latin. 'It was,' he says,[5] 'a grave and decisive moment, when after the retreat from Gergovia and the loss of Noviodunum *a council of war was held in Caesar's head-quarters regarding the measures now to be adopted. Various voices expressed themselves in favour of a retreat over the Cevennes into the old Roman province*, which now lay open on all sides to the insurrection and certainly was in urgent need of the legions that had been sent from

[1] Heller (*Philologus*, xlix, 1890, p. 685) also reads *id ne tum quidem*, but inserts *et* before *cum infamia*.

[2] Dübner indeed (*Caesar*, i, 253) reads *id ne metu quidem* without supplying *quod* after *cum*, which he translates by 'dans un temps où'; but if any one will translate the passage to himself, he will see at once that this explanation is hopelessly flat and unprofitable.

[3] *Caesarstudien*, pp. 259–60.

[4] In my recent translation of the *Commentaries* I inadvertently followed Madvig's reading.

[5] *Hist. of Rome*, v, 1894, pp. 85–6 (*Röm. Gesch.*, iii, 1889, p. 288).

Rome primarily for its protection. *But Caesar rejected this timid strategy suggested not by the position of affairs but by government instructions and fear of responsibility.*' The words which I have italicized are based solely upon the emendation *ut nemo non* (or *non nemo*) *tum*, &c., interpreted by a powerful imagination. Not even Dion Cassius, not even that worthless compiler, Florus, says a word to support them. Mommsen has, of course, a perfect right to adopt the emendation. But supposing that it is right, what is there to justify the statement that 'a council of war was held in Caesar's head-quarters'? Or that the 'timid strategy' which Caesar is supposed to have rejected was suggested 'by government instructions'? No wonder that frivolous persons talk of 'that Mississippi of falsehood called history'. Historical imagination is a great quality; but it should not be allowed to run riot. If Mr. Froude had written such a passage, what thunderbolts would have been launched at his head by the νεφεληγερέτα Ζεύς of Oxford and Somerleaze!

WHERE DID CAESAR FORD THE LOIRE WHEN HE WAS MARCHING FROM GERGOVIA TO REJOIN LABIENUS?

Napoleon says that 'there has always been a ford at Bourbon-Lancy';[1] but Desjardins remarks that 'les gués se déplacent'.[2] This may be a reason for not accepting Napoleon's conjecture; but there is also a reason for definitely rejecting it. Caesar crossed the Allier three days after he left Gergovia.[3] According to Napoleon,[4] he crossed it at Vichy; and it is hardly credible that he crossed at any point nearer Gergovia. After he had crossed, Eporedorix and Viridomarus left him, hurried off to Noviodunum (Nevers), and burned it. Nevers is more than 70 miles, in a straight line, from Vichy; and it is not to be supposed that Caesar was standing still while Eporedorix and Viridomarus were riding thither. Not until he had heard that they had burned the town did Caesar determine to hurry; and he did not reach the Loire until he had made 'forced marches by day and night' (*admodum magnis diurnis nocturnisque itineribus confectis*).[5] Now Bourbon-Lancy is barely 40 miles in a straight line, say 48 miles by road, from Vichy. Surely this distance is too short to correspond with Caesar's narrative. The conclusion is that we cannot tell where he forded the Loire; but probably the place was between Décize and Nevers.[6]

[1] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 284, note.
[2] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 686, n. 1.
[3] *B. G.*, vii, 53, § 4.
[4] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 283.
[5] See *B. G.*, vii, 54–6.
[6] M. Jullian (*Rev. des études anc.*, xi, 1909, pp. 347–50, and *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 481, n. 6) argues that when Caesar retreated from Gergovia he probably marched in the direction of Noviodunum; for this was the shortest route to Agedincum (Sens), where he doubtless expected to rejoin Labienus, and it was essential to safeguard Noviodunum. Probably, then, the ford was near Nevers.

LABIENUS'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE SENONES AND PARISII

Whoever undertakes to study the problems presented by Caesar's narrative of Labienus's campaign must bear in mind that, after leaving Agedincum (Sens), Labienus marched, in the first instance, up the left bank of the Seine. Various writers have tried to prove that he marched up the right bank and consequently that the battle was fought on that side of the river. I have refuted this theory on page 353.

I. The first question is, what was the marsh or marshy stream which baffled Labienus on his march from Sens to Lutecia (Paris)? Labienus, writes Caesar,[1] 'marched for Lutecia . . . leaving the draft which had recently arrived from Italy at Agedincum. . . . When the enemy became aware of his approach large forces assembled from the neighbouring tribes. The chief command was conferred upon Camulogenus. . . . Observing that there was a continuous marsh, which drained into the Seine and rendered the whole country in its neighbourhood impassable, he took post behind it, and prepared to stop our men from crossing. Labienus at first formed a line of sheds, and attempted to fill up the marsh with fascines and other material and thus to make a causeway across. Finding this scarcely practicable, he silently quitted his camp in the third watch, and made his way, by the route by which he had advanced, to Metlosedum, a town belonging to the Senones, situated, like Lutecia, of which we have just spoken, on an island in the Seine. . . . After repairing the bridge, which the enemy had recently broken down, he made the army cross over, and marched on, following the course of the stream, in the direction of Lutecia. The enemy, informed of what he had done by fugitives from Metlosedum, gave orders that Lutecia should be burned and its bridges broken down: then, moving away from the marsh, they encamped on the banks of the Seine, opposite Lutecia and over against the camp of Labienus' (*eo supplemento quod nuper ex Italia venerat relicto Agedinci. . . . Luteciam proficiscitur . . . Cuius adventu ab hostibus cognito, magnae ex finitimis civitatibus copiae convenerunt. Summa imperii traditur Camulogeno . . . Is cum animadvertisset perpetuam esse paludem, quae influeret in Sequanam atque illum omnem locum magnopere impediret, hic consedit, nostrosque transitu prohibere instituit. Labienus primo vineas agere, cratibus atque aggere paludem explere, atque iter munire conabatur. Postquam id difficilius fieri animadvertit, silentio e castris tertia vigilia egressus, eodem quo venerat itinere Metlosedum pervenit. Id est oppidum Senonum in insula Sequanae positum, ut paullo ante de Lutecia diximus. . . . Refecto ponte, quem superioribus diebus hostes resciderant, exercitum traducit et secundo flumine ad Luteciam iter facere coepit. Hostes, re cognita ab iis qui Metlosedo profugerant, Luteciam incendi pontesque eius oppidi rescindi iubent; ipsi pro-*

[1] *B. G.*, vii, 57–8.

fecti a palude, in ripis Sequanae, e regione Luteciae, contra Labieni castra considunt).

The marsh has been identified with three streams,—the Bièvre, which once entered the Seine just above the cathedral of Notre-Dame; the Orge, which enters the Seine 15 kilometres, or about 9 miles, in a direct line, above the confluence of the Seine and the Marne; and the Essonne, which enters the Seine about 10 kilometres above the point where it receives the Orge.

1. Before Napoleon's work appeared, most commentators were in favour of the Bièvre. Napoleon, however, affirms that it 'flows through a calcareous soil' and 'can at no epoch have formed a marsh capable of arresting an army'.[1] It has also been argued that, if the marsh had been the Bièvre, the Gauls would have been as near Lutecia as they could well be, and that what Caesar says about their movement from the marsh to Lutecia would be not only superfluous but false.[2]

On the other hand, M. H. Houssaye[3] maintains that Napoleon was mistaken. The bed of the Bièvre, he says, is of clay (*argileux*); and in some places the depth of the mud in it is 6 feet. Lebeuf[4] says that the stream has always been subject to inundations. The sixth Plan, says M. Houssaye, in Lamare's *Traité de la police*, which represents Paris as it was in the reign of Henri III, shows a small marsh formed by the Bièvre;[5] and in 1579 the river overflowed its banks, and the inundation destroyed several houses in the Faubourg St. Marceau. Again, Caignart de Saulcy says, 'to leave a place does not necessarily imply the necessity of making a long march in order to get to some other place'; and he concludes that Caesar might well have mentioned that the Gauls 'departed from' the Bièvre (*profecti a palude*[6]) even if they were only going to march to

[1] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 286, note.

[2] J. J. Quicherat, *Mélanges d'arch. et d'hist.*, 1885, i, 215, 238–9.

[3] *Le premier siége de Paris*, 1876, pp. 75–82.

[4] *Recueil de divers écrits pour servir d'éclaircissemens à l'hist. de France*, ii, 1738, p. 154.

[5] I am unable to discover the alleged marsh in this Plan.

[6] It should be mentioned that the reading of the *a* MSS., except *S*, is not *profecti a palude*, but *prospecta palude*. This reading, however, if it is not exactly nonsense, is absolutely without point; for there was no reason why the Gauls should have taken the trouble to reconnoitre or survey the marsh just before they finally quitted it, or why, if they had done anything so silly, Caesar should have taken the trouble to record the fact. *Profecti a* (or *ab*) *palude*, though only found in the *β* MSS., is read by all the best modern editors, except Nipperdey and Dübner, who follows Hoffmann's unnecessary and absurd emendation *praesepti*. Unnecessary, because *profecti a* (palude) makes perfect sense; and absurd, because the Gauls could not have been said to be protected by a marsh which their enemy had abandoned the attempt to force, and which they themselves were about to quit. Nipperdey's emendation *proiecta* (palude) is even more absurd; and the arguments by which he defends it (*Caesar*, p. 100) are perhaps the very worst that learned and ingenious editor ever devised. It is clear, he says, that the marsh was either on both banks of the Seine, or only on that bank which was opposite Lutecia. In either case, he continues, as the Gauls crossed from Lutecia to the opposite bank, it is clear that they did not abandon the marsh (*profecti a palude*); for, if the marsh was only on the bank opposite Lutecia, they marched to it, not away from it; if it was on both banks,

Lutecia.[1] M. Houssaye also asks why Camulogenus should have taken the trouble to march all the way from Lutecia to the Essonne when, only one kilometre from Lutecia, the Bièvre offered as formidable an obstacle to the advance of Labienus. Moreover, he continues, Camulogenus could not tell whether Labienus would march along the bank of the Seine or along the line of heights on the west of it. Therefore it would have been madness for him to take up his position behind either the Essonne or the Orge; for if the Romans had marched along the heights, he might have been attacked in flank and in rear.

On an impartial review of these conflicting arguments, it appears to me that if Napoleon has not proved his case, that case is nevertheless impregnable. It is not likely that Labienus could have marched along the heights, for they were probably covered with woods; and Camulogenus had the best of reasons for marching as far as the Essonne, for he must have wished to prevent Labienus from devastating the country of the Parisii. But be this as it may, there is one argument which is absolutely fatal to the claims of the Bièvre. Caesar says, in the passage which I have just quoted, that when the Gauls heard that Labienus had crossed the Seine at Metlosedum, or Melun, they sent a message to Lutecia, ordering that the town should be burned, and then marched thither themselves. This statement surely implies that they were a considerable distance from Lutecia and expected to find it burned on their arrival. If they had been within a quarter of an hour's march from the town, why should they have sent any message? They could have kindled the flames themselves. But, as a matter of fact, all the evidence goes to show that the Bièvre was not even a quarter of an hour's march from Lutecia.

they clearly did not march away from it. Therefore we are to read *proiecta* (palude)! Now, as Schneider remarks, it seems doubtful whether Nipperdey is writing seriously or only making a bad joke (*omnis eius disputatio talis est, ut dubium sit, utrum serio, an aliter loquatur. Caesar*, ii, 513). First of all, Caesar's narrative makes it perfectly clear that the marsh was only on one bank of the Seine, namely the left; for that was the bank by which Labienus was advancing when he came to the marsh; and, as the marsh, or rather marshy stream, emptied itself into the Seine, and as it was continuous (*perpetua*), it could only have been on one bank of the Seine. Secondly, Nipperdey forgets that both banks of the Seine were opposite Lutecia. Thirdly, Caesar does not say a word to show that the Gauls 'had crossed from Lutecia to the opposite bank'; and what he does say shows that they had not done so. For the marsh was on the left bank of the Seine; Labienus, finding himself unable to cross the marsh, returned to Metlosedum (Melun), crossed the Seine there, advanced up the right bank, and encamped opposite the island in the Seine on which stood Lutecia; and the enemy encamped on the bank of the Seine opposite Labienus, that is, on the left bank. Therefore the Gauls remained on this bank throughout the campaign. Finally, even if Nipperdey's imaginary and absurd premisses were correct, he would still have failed to prove his point; for he ignores the fact that the marsh probably was, and certainly may have been separated by a considerable distance from Lutecia. It is clear, then, that *profecti a palude* yields perfectly good sense; whereas all the other readings and the various emendations are absurd.

[1] Cf. *B. G.*, i, 51, § 3,—*eo mulieres imposuerunt, quae ad proelium proficiscentes . . . implorabant*, &c., where Caesar relates that the Germans under Ariovistus moved out of their encampment to meet the Romans, who were close at hand.

Plans 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the same *Traité de la police* (tome i) to which M. Houssaye refers show Paris at various times from that of Caesar to that of Philip Augustus, and represent the Bièvre as entering the Seine exactly opposite the eastern extremity of the island on which Lutecia stood! Plans 2, 3, and 4 are founded upon information furnished by Gregory of Tours, Aimoin, and various archives. Besides, a glance at the map will convince any unbiased reader that if Camulogenus had been encamped behind the Bièvre, he would have made an effort to prevent Labienus from crossing the Marne; whereas it is clearly implied in Caesar's narrative that Labienus, after he had abandoned the attempt to force the passage of the marsh and recrossed the Seine at Melun, crossed the Marne without opposition.

2. Quicherat identifies the marsh with the Orge, which has two branches. According to Quicherat, the Gauls occupied a position on the heights of Juvisy, about 600 yards north of the northern branch, and were separated by at least a mile and a quarter from the camp of Labienus, which would have been south of the southern branch of the stream.[1] 'De quoi donc,' naturally asks de Saulcy,[2] 'veut-il se garantir à une demi-lieue de l'ennemi, avec ses mantelets?'[3] Besides, a marsh formed by the two branches of the Orge would have been so broad that it would have been hopeless for Labienus to attempt to make a causeway across it.

I conclude then that the marsh was the Essonne. Napoleon points out that the ground on the banks of this stream is still 'cut up by innumerable peat mosses'; and that it was behind this line that his uncle encamped in 1814, while the enemy occupied Paris.[4]

II. J. J. Quicherat has written an ingenious paper[5] with the object of proving that the accepted explanation, which I have

[1] See map facing p. 234 (t. i) of Quicherat's *Mélanges d'arch. et d'hist.*

[2] *Les campagnes de Jules César dans les Gaules*, p. 50.

[3] See *B. G.*, vii, 57, § 4; 58, §§ 1–2.

[4] One of Napoleon's arguments, however, is questionable. 'The text of the *Commentaries*,' he writes, 'says clearly that Labienus . . . surprised the passage of the Seine at Melun, and marched upon Lutecia, where he arrived before Camulogenus. To allow of the success of this manœuvre, the marsh . . . must necessarily not have been far from Melun. The Essonne alone fulfils this condition' (*Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 286, note). But the *Commentaries* do not say that Labienus arrived at Lutecia before Camulogenus. What they do say is that Labienus, after crossing the Seine at Melun, *secundo flumine ad Luteciam iter facere coepit. Hostes, re cognita ab iis qui a Metlosedo profugerant, Luteciam incendi pontesque eius oppidi rescindi iubent: ipsi profecti a palude in ripa Sequanae e regione Luteciae contra Labieni castra considunt.* This does not prove that Labienus was the first to arrive. (See Long's *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv, 327–8.) Maissiat (*Jules César en Gaule*, ii, 228) adduces an argument which, I think, has weight. Assuming, he says, that Camulogenus had been encamped above Lutecia until the moment when the flotilla of Labienus, coming down stream from Melun, appeared in sight, it is clear that he would have promptly marched to the neighbourhood of Lutecia. Therefore, whether he was encamped on the Essonne or on the Bièvre, he must have reached Lutecia before Labienus.

[5] *Mélanges d'arch. et d'hist.*, i, 217–8, 220–1.

followed,[1] of the campaign is incorrect. His principal arguments are as follows :—First, if Labienus encamped opposite Lutecia, he must have crossed the Marne at its confluence with the Seine. But to cross the Marne at its confluence with the Seine is as difficult as to cross the Seine itself. Why then does Caesar not mention the passage ? Secondly, Caesar thus describes the relative positions of the Gauls and Labienus :—*ipsi profecti a palude ad ripas Sequanae e regione Luteciae contra Labieni castra considunt.* Now, Caesar uses the words *e regione* ' pour indiquer . . . " au droit de " '. Thirdly, Labienus could not have had any object in encamping *opposite* Lutecia, since it had been burned and its bridges destroyed. Fourthly, if Labienus's camp was opposite Lutecia, he was extraordinarily imprudent to send his fleet down stream, under the eye of the enemy, and to march down himself, when he might have been taken in flank from the hills of Chaillot and Passy, which were at that time covered with woods. ' Tant de témérité,' says Quicherat, ' ne serait égalée que par la négligence du général gaulois, à qui l'agitation de l'ennemi aurait complètement échappé malgré la proximité,' &c. Fifthly, according to the received view, there was no reason why, in the early morning, just before the battle, Camulogenus should have been informed of the movements of the various Roman divisions ; for he could have observed those movements himself.

Accordingly Quicherat makes Labienus encamp in the angle between the confluence of the Marne and the Seine, just south of Créteil, and cross the Seine immediately above the confluence ; while he places the camp of the Gauls about half a mile south-east of Lutecia, in a line with it and the Roman camp.

The answer to Quicherat's first argument is obvious. Labienus could easily have crossed, and doubtless did cross the Marne with the barges which he had brought from Melun. Caesar omitted to mention the passage for the same reason that he omitted to mention the passage of the Yonne,—because to mention it was unessential. Quicherat's second argument has virtually to sustain the whole weight of his case. If he is wrong in his interpretation of *e regione*, his whole theory collapses. And assuredly he is wrong. If *e regione* means what Quicherat says, it comes to this, that Caesar is practically giving us no information whatever as to the actual or the relative positions of the Gauls and of Labienus. Any reader is free to take his map and place them exactly where he pleases, provided he places them in a straight line with Lutecia and with each other ! But if the words mean what everybody, except Quicherat and Creuly believes, the sense is clear, with or without a map. Labienus is on the north of the Seine, and the enemy are on the south, opposite Lutecia and over against his camp. The meaning of the words is fixed, beyond cavil, by two passages in *B. G.*, vii, 35, where Caesar describes the stratagem by which he transported his army across the Allier :[2]—*Cum uterque utrique esset exercitui in conspectu fereque e regione castris castra ponerct* (' The two armies were in full view of

[1] See pp. 161–4.

[2] See p. 149.

one another, and each encamped almost opposite the camp of the other'); and again *castris positis e regione unius eorum pontium quos Vercingetorix rescindendos curaverat* ('encamping opposite one of the bridges which Vercingetorix had broken down'). If *e regione*, in these passages, does not mean 'opposite', it means nothing. Quicherat's interpretation of the phrase is overthrown by Forcellini, who says[1] 'absolute, adverbiorum more, *e regione* . . . est recta linea . . . Saepius vero *e regione* significat *ex adverso*'; and he illustrates this meaning by referring to the passages which I have just quoted.

So much for *e regione*. There is another word in Caesar's narrative, which, by itself, overthrows the whole of Quicherat's case. Describing the measures which the Gauls took when they heard that the Romans were trying to cross the Seine in three places, he says, '*Leaving* a force opposite the [Roman] camp, and sending a small body in the direction of Metlosedum . . . they led the rest of their troops against Labienus' (*praesidio e regione castrorum relicto et parva manu Metlosedum versus missa . . . reliquas copias contra Labienum duxerunt.*'[2] Now, on Quicherat's theory, the word *relicto* is simply unintelligible. He assumes that a Gallic outpost had been stationed exactly opposite the place where the bridge of Choisy now stands[3]; and this outpost was, on his theory, the *praesidium* that was left to watch the Roman camp. But Caesar's words obviously do not mean that the *praesidium* had been established from the outset of the campaign on the spot where it was left. Besides, according to Quicherat, the Roman camp was about 4 kilometres away from the *praesidium*; and therefore the *praesidium* would have been useless. Lastly, according to Quicherat, the Roman flotilla necessarily waited, before starting on its voyage down the stream, under the very eyes of the Gauls who composed the *praesidium*. To wriggle out of this absurdity, Quicherat is compelled to maintain that the Gauls would not have been able to tell why the barges were about to go down the Seine. 'La descente de la flottille au confluent' (of the Marne and the Seine), he says, 'est une manœuvre sur laquelle il n'y a rien à décider. Est-elle vraie ou feinte ? Est-ce la Marne ou la Seine qu'on se propose de passer ?'[4] This is flagrant special pleading. The manœuvre, whatever its object, would have been promptly reported to head-quarters. Again, de Saulcy[5] pertinently asks what would have been the use of Labienus's ordering a noise to be made in the Roman camp, when, according to Quicherat, the Gauls were two miles and a half away, and could not possibly have heard it. On the accepted theory, the word *relicto* is perfectly clear. The Gallic camp on the left bank of the Seine was opposite the Roman camp on the right bank. Camulogenus, hearing that the Romans left in camp were preparing to abandon it and cross the river, left a force to hinder them, sent a detachment up the left bank to follow the Romans who were rowing in that direction, and marched

[1] *Totius latinitatis Lexicon*, v, 1871, p. 142.
[2] *B. G.*, vii, 61, § 5.
[3] See map facing p. 234 (t. i) of his *Mélanges*.
[4] *Ib.*, p. 221.
[5] *Les campagnes de Jules César dans les Gaules*, p. 59.

in person with the rest of his army down the same bank to encounter Labienus.

Finally, it may be assumed that Labienus knew, or had ascertained by reconnaissance, that there was no chance of his being attacked in flank from the hills of Chaillot and Passy. Why should Camulogenus, who had no inkling of the stratagem which he meditated, have posted troops on those hills, of all places? Nor can I see that Labienus showed any imprudence in sending his barges down the stream. Quicherat cannot tell how near the stream the Gauls were; and they would have been just as likely to post troops along that part of the river down which Quicherat believes that Labienus sent the barges, as along the part between Lutecia and Point-du-Jour. Besides, as de Saulcy[1] points out, in the latter case, the barges would have been screened from observation, during the first part of their course, by the islands in the Seine, whereas, on the theory of Quicherat, they would have had no cover at all. 'Puis voilà,' he says, alluding to Labienus's passage of the Seine as described by Quicherat, 'Puis voilà que ce passage, qui prend au moins deux heures, se fait forcément au nez et à la barbe de Camulogène, qui met ses deux mains dans ses poches et attend que tout le monde ennemi soit à son rang de bataille pour se permettre de le gêner dans ses mouvements!' Labienus knew that he must risk something. But he ordered the captains of the barges to move as quietly as possible; and if the movement had been prematurely detected, he would not have been any worse off than he had been before.

It is worth mentioning that the great Napoleon took the orthodox view regarding the geography of this campaign, and that he did not detect the blunders which, according to Quicherat, Labienus must, on that theory, have committed.[2]

III. The camp of Labienus, it is sufficient to know, was close to the right bank of the Seine, opposite Lutecia and over against the camp of Camulogenus.[3] But it certainly was not on the heights of Romainville, where Duruy[4] places it; for Romainville is a good 5 miles away from the Seine: it would have been quite unnecessary for Camulogenus, when he was about to march against Labienus, to leave a force on the left bank to watch a camp which was 5 miles north of the right bank; and the whole tenor of Caesar's narrative shows that Labienus encamped close to the river.

IV. One word with regard to the point where Labienus crossed the Seine. Von Kampen[5] finds it opposite Auteuil, which is hardly 4 Roman miles from the site which he selects for the Roman camp; Napoleon[6] a little further down the bank, near Point-du-Jour.

[1] *Les campagnes de Jules César dans les Gaules*, p. 31.
[2] *Précis des guerres de César*, pp. 102–3.
[3] Napoleon (*Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 287) thinks that it was 'near the place where St. Germain-l'Auxerrois now stands'. Various other attempts, which I need not mention, have been made to define the site exactly.
[4] *Soc. de l'hist. de Paris et de l'Ile de France*, 1881, pp. 162–3.
[5] *Quindecim ad Caesaris de b. G. comm. tabulae*, xi.
[6] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 288.

De Saulcy[1] places the passage opposite the island of Billancourt, which is 6, not 4 miles from the assumed point of embarkation : but he argues that the three legions, marching in column, must have covered a space of at least 3 kilometres ; and that, if the whole column had passed the point which was 4 miles from the place of departure, the head of the column would have reached a point opposite the middle of Billancourt. Bronze swords had been found, some years before de Saulcy wrote, in the bed of the river between Billancourt and the left bank ; and he conjectured that Labienus probably used this island and the islands of St. Germain and Sequin to assist his passage. De Saulcy's arguments appear to me more ingenious than convincing.[2] Caesar does not say that Labienus ordered the three legions to march 4 miles down the bank : he says that Labienus ordered the knights who commanded the barges in which the legions were to cross the Seine to move 4 miles down the river and wait for him.[3] Of course the barges did not all cross the river at the same place : but it is natural to suppose that the 4 miles were reckoned from the point of departure to the point where the foremost barge of the flotilla was moored ; and the discovery of the bronze swords proves nothing.[4] M. Houssaye[5] sensibly asks whether it is not reasonable to suppose that, as each company reached the place of embarkation, it simply wheeled to the right so as to form a little column at right angles to the stream, ready to embark. Thus the three legions would have been able to embark within a space of one kilometre at the outside.

V. There is another passage in the Latin text which, even among those who are virtually agreed as to the battle-field and the sites of the two camps, has given rise to discussion. After describing how the Gauls were informed of the operations of Labienus, Caesar writes :—'On hearing this, they imagined that the legions were crossing at three places, and that the Romans, in alarm at the defection of the Aedui, were all preparing for flight. Accordingly they made a corresponding distribution of their own troops. Leaving a force opposite the Roman camp, and sending a small body in the direction of Metlosedum, with orders to advance as far as the boats had gone, they led the rest of their troops against Labienus' (*Quibus rebus auditis, quod existimabant tribus locis transire legiones, atque omnes perturbatos defectione Haeduorum fugam parare, suas quoque copias in tres partes distribuerunt : nam et praesidio e regione castrorum relicto, et parva manu Metlosedum versus missa, quae tantum progrederetur quantum naves processissent, reliquas copias contra Labienum duxerunt*).[6] Desjardins identifies Metlosedum (or, according to the

[1] *Les campagnes de Jules César dans les Gaules*, p. 41.

[2] *B. G.*, vii, 60, § 1.

[3] Cf. *Rev. arch.*, 4e sér., vii, 1906, pp. 174–5.

[4] Such weapons may perhaps have been still used here and there among backward tribes ; but for centuries before Caesar's time Gallic swords had been made of iron.

[5] *Le premier siège de Paris*, pp. 90–1.

[6] *B. G.*, vii, 61, §§ 4–5. Meusel (*Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xxxvi, 1910, p. 53) follows von Göler (*Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 295, n. 2) in deleting the words *atque omnes . . . fugam parare* ; for, he argues, how could the Gauls

reading which he prefers, Metiosedum) with Meudon, which is *below* Paris, in the direction opposite to Melun. He considers that *naves* must mean, not the boats (*lintres*), which Labienus sent up stream, but the large barges, which he sent down ; and he adds, to strengthen his argument, that, whereas, *Melodunum* is the only reading which occurs where Melun is incontestably alluded to, the readings in this passage are various.[1] How misleading this assertion is, may be seen by any one who will consult the *apparatus criticus* of Meusel's original edition.[2] Moreover, as Quicherat rightly remarks,[3] the sense of *naves* is generic :—'il veut dire aussi bien un petit bateau qu'un grand bateau.' Forcellini[4] supports this view. 'Navis,' he says, 'dicitur fere de navigio maiori, interdum etiam de cymba, lintre, scapha, et huiusmodi.' The usage of our own language is similar. It is a common thing to speak of an Atlantic liner as a 'boat' ; and a large yacht is often described as a good sea-boat.[5] If, in the passage[6] which I am discussing, '*Metiosedum*' meant Meudon, it would follow from Caesar's narrative that the Gauls took no heed of the boats and the cohorts which went up stream in the direction of Melun. Why should Camulogenus have taken the trouble to send a small force (*parva manu*) to the point which the barges of Labienus had reached, when he was marching with the rest of his forces, in the same direction, against Labienus himself ? Desjardins[7] tries to get over this difficulty by suggesting that Camulogenus had expected to find Labienus posted *above* Lutecia, but actually found him at the foot of Meudon and Issy, and awaited his attack near Bercy. De Saulcy[8] and C. Lenormant[9] agree with Desjardins. The former says that Camulogenus, when he divided his army into three parts, must have marched with the principal force in the direction of what he was informed was the Roman *magnum agmen*, that is, up the stream, towards Melun ; and Lenormant says that Camulogenus would not have sent his smallest force (*parva manu*) in the direction whence the greatest noise was heard. But the 'principal force' of Camulogenus was the *reliquae copiae* which he led against Labienus ;

have believed that the Romans were preparing for flight when they heard that they were crossing the Seine *in order to attack them* ? But nothing in Caesar's narrative shows that the Gauls heard this ; and even if they did, they must have seen that Labienus was 'preparing for flight' in the sense that he was abandoning his offensive campaign (cf. *B. G.*, vii, 59, §§ 3–6) and retreating to rejoin Caesar.

[1] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 689.

[2] Cf. *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., v, 1862, p. 2, and p. 845, *infra.*

[3] *Mélanges*, &c., i, 238.

[4] *Totius latinitatis Lexicon*, iv, 1868, p. 236. Cf. *B. C.*, i, 54, § 1.

[5] Heller (*Philologus*, xvii, 1861, p. 284) remarks that any difficulty which may be caused by the use of the words *lintres* and *naves* disappears if one reflects that the passage *Quibus rebus . . . duxerunt* (*B. G.*, vii, 61, § 5) expresses the idea which the Gauls had formed on hearing of the movements of the Romans ; and that the word *naves* in the passage in question is to be understood as if Caesar had written *lintres quos esse naves Galli ex magno remorum sonitu suspicabantur.* This criticism seems over-subtle.

[6] *B. G.*, vii, 61, § 5.

[7] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 689.

[8] *Les campagnes de Jules César dans les Gaules*, p. 45.

[9] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., iv, 1861, p. 281.

and, in order to reach Labienus, Camulogenus had to march down the stream, not up. De Saulcy, however, like Desjardins, says that the *parva manus*, which, according to him, was sent in the direction of Meudon, must have returned to the Gallic camp, in order to tell Camulogenus where Labienus was crossing the river.[1] There is not a word about this in Caesar ; and his narrative clearly implies that Camulogenus led his *reliquas copias* against Labienus directly after he had sent the *parva manus* in the direction of Metlosedum. Lenormant's remark is childish. Camulogenus sent his smaller force in the direction whence the greatest noise was heard, because he had reason to believe that the greatest noise was not made by the greatest number of men.[2] The fact is that Camulogenus was only partially deceived by Labienus's stratagem. Moreover, as Schneider[3] observes, the *magnum agmen* was so called because the greater part of it undoubtedly consisted of the baggage-train ; and if Caesar had meant to convey that Camulogenus sent his smaller force in the direction of the barges which had conveyed the legions of Labienus across the river, he would certainly have expressed himself differently. The barges were stationary : the small boats were moving up the river. Caesar would not have said that the *parva manus* was ordered to advance as far as the *naves* should advance (*parva manu . . . quae tantum progrediatur quantum naves processissent*), but that it was ordered to proceed to the point where the barges were moored. And, asks de Presle,[4] how can we believe that Caesar would have mentioned ' Metiosedum ' for the first and only time without saying a single word to indicate its position ? Whatever reading we are to adopt, ' Metiosedum ' must have been *above* Lutecia ; and, as a matter of fact, the right reading in all the four passages in which the town in question is mentioned, is either *Meclosedum* or *Metlosedum*.[5]

But since the first edition of this book appeared, and when I fondly imagined that the debate was closed, Dr. H. Sieglerschmidt has intervened with an entirely novel theory ; and it cannot be denied that in conjuring up difficulties which nobody else had perceived he has shown wonderful ingenuity.[6] He maintains that Labienus's camp was at Boulogne-sur-Seine, 8 kilometres west of Lutecia ; that the Gallic camp was on the heights of St. Cloud ; and that Labienus crossed the river at Neuilly. Now the doctor's case rests upon the groundless assumption that ' Melodunum ' and ' Metiosedum ' were two different places ; and when he appeals to the MSS.[7] he is dealing with a matter on which he is imperfectly informed. He urges that *e regione Luteciae* cannot mean ' opposite Lutecia ', because Labienus and Camulogenus would not have encamped near a town which,

[1] *Les campagnes de Jules César dans les Gaules*, p. 31.

[2] I am glad to find that my argument has been anticipated by M. Houssaye, p. 93. [3] *Caesar*, ii. 521–2. [4] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., v, 1862, p. 4.

[5] The true form is *Metlosedum*, but probably Caesar wrote *Meclosedum*. See p. 846.

[6] *Rev. arch.*, 4e sér., vi, 1905, pp. 257–71. I am sorry to see that Sieglerschmidt's view has been adopted by R. Oehler (*Bilder-Atlas zu Cäsars Büchern de b. G.*, 1907, xxxviii. [7] *Rev. arch.*, vi, 1905, pp. 266–8.

having been burnt, had lost all military importance.[1] Then, assuming that the 'Metiosedum' of *B. G.*, vii, 61 was Meudon, and observing, truly enough, that the two camps were below 'Metiosedum', he triumphantly concludes that Lutecia could not have been between them, but that the Gallic camp was on the prolongation of a straight line drawn from Lutecia to the Roman camp.[2] But he does not understand the meaning of *e regione Luteciae*, which I have already explained,[3] and which does not depend upon that of *contra Labieni castra*. Moreover, although Lutecia had been burnt, it was still a strategical position, commanding a network of great roads; and neither Labienus nor Camulogenus had anything to gain by moving away to the west.[4]

Sieglerschmidt argues, further, that Labienus only had two legions in the battle; and on this hypothesis he constructs an elaborate theory,[5] which I need not examine, because the hypothesis is stultified by Caesar's express statement that Labienus, when he was going into action, had three.[6] 'Mais,' asks Sieglerschmidt, who sees the difficulty, but desperately assumes that some meddlesome copyist wrote *tribus* instead of *duabus*, 'où est ensuite cette troisième légion?'[7] In the centre, Dr. Sieglerschmidt! Caesar, in his description of the battle, only mentioned two legions,—the 12th, which formed the right wing, and the 7th, which formed the left; but he expected that his readers would have sense enough to see that the one which he did not mention was in the centre.

VI. Concerning the exact position of the battle-field there is also divergence of opinion. According to Napoleon, the hill which the Gauls occupied was that of Vaugirard, a little west of Mont Parnasse. Von Kampen places the two armies in line of battle on the plain of Grenelle, the Romans with their backs to the river, and identifies the hill with Mont Parnasse itself. De Saulcy[8] prefers Montrouge. But this problem is insoluble.[9]

WHERE DID CAESAR, AFTER HIS RETREAT FROM GERGOVIA, REJOIN LABIENUS? HOW LONG DID HE WAIT BEFORE SETTING OUT, AND FROM WHAT POINT DID HE SET OUT ON HIS MARCH TO SUCCOUR THE PROVINCE?

There are not sufficient data to enable us to answer any of these questions with certainty.

I. After leaving Gergovia, Caesar marched down the left or western bank of the Allier; recrossed it on the third day of his

[1] *Rev. arch.*, vi, 1905, p. 260. [2] *Ib.*, p. 268. [3] See pp. 779–80.
[4] See M. Blanchet's sagacious remarks in *Rev. arch.*, 4e sér., vii, 1906, pp. 173–4.
[5] *Ib.* vi, 1905, pp. 264, n. 1, 269–70.
[6] *B. G.*, vii, 60, § 4. [7] *Rev. arch.*, vi, 1905, p. 270.
[8] *Les campagnes de Jules César dans les Gaules*, p. 34.
[9] The theory of M. E. Toulouze (*Rev. arch.*, 3e sér., xviii, 1891, pp. 163–85) that Labienus fought a naval battle with Camulogenus in the Seine, near Morsang, rests upon nothing but assumptions, and is not worth discussing. If the assumed battle had taken place, Caesar would certainly have mentioned it.

march ; pushed on to relieve Labienus, who was in the neighbourhood of Lutecia (Paris) ; crossed the Loire by a deep ford into the country of the Aedui ; and, having revictualled his army there, marched on towards the country of the Senones. Meanwhile Labienus defeated a rebel army on the left bank of the Seine, near Paris ; then marched southward to Agedincum (Sens) ; and thence marched to rejoin Caesar.[1] For some weeks active hostilities between Caesar and the rebels were suspended ; and within this interval Caesar sent for, and was reinforced by, a body of German cavalry from beyond the Rhine. At length he marched to succour the Province, which was threatened by a rebel force ; and the route which he took led 'through the furthest part of the country of the Lingones into the country of the Sequani' (*in Sequanos per extremos Lingonum fines*).[2]

In relating the fact that Labienus marched from Sens to join him, Caesar, according to the ordinary reading—that of the β MSS.—uses these words: *inde cum omnibus copiis ad Caesarem pervenit*. *ABL* have

[1] M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 463, n. 2) has raised the question whether Labienus's victory took place (as had always been inferred from Caesar's narrative) after Caesar was defeated at Gergovia, or before. Remarking that Caesar 'appears to say in *B. G.*, vii, 59, § 1, that Labienus learned [immediately after he reached Lutecia] that Caesar had quitted Gergovia', he concludes that, if this is true, (1) Labienus did not leave Agedincum until long after the beginning of Caesar's campaign in Auvergne ; (2) the transmission of the news of Caesar's retreat from Gergovia, Labienus's victory and return from Lutecia to Agedincum, and his march thence to rejoin Caesar cannot have occupied more than 6 or 7 days ; and (3) Caesar must have taken that time to march from Gergovia to the point of junction. All this, he admits, is not impossible ; nevertheless he believes that the news which reached Labienus was merely an exaggerated version of the first defection of the Aedui (see *B. G.*, vii, 37–43, and pp. 151–5).

I do not agree with M. Jullian ; for Caesar's statement in vii, 59, § 1, is unequivocal. (1) If Labienus accompanied Caesar to Decetia (Décize), his march from Decetia to Agedincum was longer than Caesar's march from Decetia to Gergovia, and his march from Decetia to Lutecia was more than twice as long ; it is quite probable that he was obliged on his way to Agedincum to spend a day or two at Noviodunum (Nevers) in order to organize the depot which Caesar established there (see p. 149) ; Caesar's campaign in Auvergne evidently only lasted a few days ; and therefore the rumours which Caesar describes would have had plenty of time to reach Labienus. (2) The distance of Gergovia from Lutecia is about half as far again as the distance of Gergovia from Cenabum (Orléans) ; news travelled from Cenabum to Gergovia in about 12 hours (vii, 3, § 3), and might therefore have travelled from Gergovia to Lutecia in less than a couple of days. On the day after Labienus heard the news he quitted Lutecia ; and his march from Lutecia to Agedincum—about 110 kilometres—would have occupied 4 or 5 days. Thus he would have reached Agedincum 7 or 8 days after Caesar's defeat. (3) Caesar marched from Gergovia to the bridge by which he crossed the Allier in 3 days (vii, 53, § 4), repaired the bridge, and then marched to the ford, near Nevers, by which he crossed the Loire. This last march occupied at least two and probably three days (see p. 774 and cf. C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 481, n. 5). After the troops had forded the Loire they spent some time—probably a day at least—in collecting corn and cattle (*B. G.*, vii, 56, § 5). Then they marched up the road from Noviodunum to Agedincum to rejoin Labienus. The distance of Noviodunum from Agedincum is about 150 kilometres. If the junction took place about two marches, say 50 kilometres, from Agedincum, the chronology is satisfactorily explained. Why, then, should Caesar's statement of the rumours which reached Labienus be distorted from its natural sense ?

[2] *B. G.*, vii, 53–66.

indiem (cum omnibus), which means nothing ; and *MQ* have *indie*. Whitte conjectured that Caesar wrote *inde die III*.[1] But even if the emendation is correct, the data for fixing the place of junction are insufficient, because we cannot tell how far Labienus marched each day.

1. Napoleon, assuming, wrongly as I believe,[2] that the ford by which Caesar crossed the Loire was at Bourbon-Lancy, says that his junction with Labienus ' must necessarily have taken place on a point of the line from Bourbon-Lancy to Sens '. ' This point,' he adds, ' in our opinion is Joigny.'[3]

2. Mr. W. C. Compton,[4] who bases his opinion upon the doubtful emendation *die III*., thinks that Joigny is too near Sens, and suggests the confluence of the Armançon and the Yonne.

3. General Creuly holds that Caesar crossed the Loire near Noviodunum (Nevers), and rejoined Labienus at some point between Nevers and Sens, or more probably at Nevers itself ; for, he argues, Caesar does not say that he actually penetrated into the country of the Senones, but only that he intended to do so (*iter facere instituit*).[5] It is amusing to note that Creuly affirms elsewhere that, in Caesar, ' le verbe *instituere* a toujours le sens d'une action et non pas d'une simple résolution.'[6]

4. C. Rossignol insists that Caesar crossed the Yonne at Auxerre, arguing that if he had crossed it lower down, he would have found himself at Agedincum, whither he had no intention of going ; and that if he had crossed higher up, he would have struck off too soon from the route, leading into the country of the Senones, which he took after crossing the Loire. I may remark that it is not proved that Caesar crossed the Yonne at all before he rejoined Labienus. Rossignol goes on to argue that the junction must have taken place at Eburobriga, near St. Florentin. He gives the following reasons :— first, at Eburobriga, Caesar would have been near enough to the Aedui to be able to observe their movements ; secondly, he would have been on the frontier of the friendly Lingones ; thirdly, he would have been on the natural line of communication between the basins of the Seine and the Saône, that is to say on a route which would have led him into the country of the Sequani ; fourthly, in the passage *Labienus revertitur Agedincum . . . inde cum omnibus copiis ad Caesarem pervenit* the word *pervenit* shows that Labienus, after leaving Agedincum, did not change his direction ; and fifthly, one day's march from Agedincum, in the same direction, would have brought him to Eburobriga.[7] Good or bad, the first four of

[1] Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, ii, 155.

[2] See p. 774.

[3] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 292.

[4] *Caesar's Seventh Campaign in Gaul*, p. 101.

[5] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., viii, 1863, pp. 502–3.

[6] This remark of mine, I find, has been anticipated in substance by Heller in *Philologus*, xxii, 1865, pp. 169–70.

[7] *Mém. de la Comm. des ant. du dépt de la Côte-d'Or*, v, 1857, pp. 11–4. Reference to Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, ii, 95, 1075, and especially to *B. G.*, vii, 58, § 2, will show that Rossignol's remark about *pervenit* is nonsense. Rossignol, indeed, argues that if Caesar had marched past Auxerre and had not crossed the Yonne,

these arguments might be used to prove that Caesar rejoined Labienus at some other place, and the fifth is worthless because there is nothing to show how far or how long Labienus marched after leaving Sens. Moreover, there is nothing in Caesar's narrative to show that the place where he rejoined Labienus was identical with the place where he remained during the period of inaction that preceded his march to succour the Province.

The foregoing theories agree in placing the junction on the road between Nevers and Sens ; and, unless Caesar had some unaccountable motive for diverging from that route, they are so far right.

5. Von Göler,[1] however, believes that Caesar and Labienus met at Troyes. Caesar, he says, had gone to Troyes in order that the twelve cohorts which he had left in the preceding year to guard his second bridge over the Rhine might rejoin him more easily. But how does von Göler know that they had not rejoined him before ? If they had not, how does he account for the fact that Caesar had ten legions—all that he is known to have had during this campaign—without them ? At Troyes, von Göler adds, Caesar would have been near the friendly Remi, through whose territory the German cavalry could have marched securely to join him. No doubt. But the same advantage could have been secured at other places ; nor was it necessary to secure it until after Caesar and his lieutenant had met.

Quot homines tot sententiae. But the *sententiae* will never lead to anything. We shall never know exactly where Caesar rejoined Labienus. It is almost certain that the place was somewhere between Sens and the point where Caesar crossed the Loire ; and we may be sure that Caesar crossed the Loire at the nearest point that he could safely find to the route that would lead him to Sens. I have shown elsewhere[2] that the ford was not at Bourbon-Lancy, but somewhere lower down the stream.

II. It would be futile to attempt to calculate the length of time that elapsed between Caesar's junction with Labienus and his departure for the Province. All that we can say is that it was considerable,—some weeks at least. For we are told that in the interval Caesar had time to send across the Rhine for reinforcements and to receive them ; that a Pan-Gallic council was convened and met ; and that Vercingetorix, after he had been elected Commander-in-Chief by this council, had time to raise new troops and send them to attack the Province.[3]

III. 1. Napoleon considers that, during the period of inaction, Caesar encamped 'not far from the confluence of the Armançon and the Yonne', that is to say, in the country of the Senones, and near Joigny, where Napoleon places his junction with Labienus.

he would have entered a country the resources of which had already been drained by the army of Labienus, and would have been too far from the faithful Lingones. I cannot, however, see any force in either of these arguments ; for Caesar's army had just replenished their stores in the country of the Aedui, and in any case they were about soon to enter the country of the Lingones.

[1] *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 296, n. 3.

[2] See p. 774.

[3] *B. G.*, vii, 63–5.

2. The Duc d'Aumale[1] assumes that the immediate object of Caesar, after he rejoined Labienus, was to rest his soldiers and to lay in a fresh stock of provisions. Although, continues the Duc d'Aumale, the Lingones were friendly, it would not have suited Caesar to encamp near their chief town, Andematunnum (Langres) ; for in that neighbourhood he would have been too far from the Remi, who must have needed his protection against the Bellovaci,[2] and from whom he must have wished to obtain supplies ; his communication with the Germans, from whom he was about to borrow cavalry, would have been cut off by the hostile Mediomatrici ; and he would have made it too evident to Vercingetorix that he intended, sooner or later, to enter Sequania.[3] Nor did he remain near Agedincum ; for, if so, why did Labienus abandon Agedincum before rejoining him ? Moreover, the Senones were hostile : they had, in the preceding winter, been obliged to feed the Roman army of occupation ; and what corn they had left, after supplying their own wants, was probably, in obedience to the orders of Vercingetorix, either destroyed or concealed.[4] The Duc d'Aumale concludes that, during the period of inaction which elapsed between his junction with Labienus and the commencement of his march for the Province, Caesar remained on the Aube, between Arcis and the river Voire, or perhaps, as such a position might have been too close to hostile territory, on the Marne, near Vitry.

3. General Creuly, believing that Caesar rejoined Labienus at or near Noviodunum, argues that we may infer from his silence that he remained there, because his silence would otherwise be inexcusable : he maintains that he had no intention of marching as far as the Province in order to succour it (*quo facilius subsidium provinciae ferre posset*), but only intended to go as far as some point in the country of the Sequani, whence he could communicate equally with the Aedui and the Province ; and he points out that Noviodunum had the advantage of being comparatively near to the Province, and that, situated as it was in the country of the Aedui, Caesar could there exercise a decisive influence upon the political situation, and might expect that the Aedui would return to their allegiance.[5] But it is not proved that Caesar rejoined Labienus at or near Noviodunum : there is no evidence that, at that time, he had any intention of succouring the Province at all : he could easily have communicated with the Aedui if he had remained comparatively near their frontier ; and it is difficult to see why he should have thrown away the alleged advantage of proximity to the Province by taking such a roundabout way from Noviodunum to his destination as the route through the country of the Lingones. Heller argues further that on Creuly's theory it is incomprehensible that Vercingetorix should not have opposed the junction of the two generals; or that when Labienus made his (assumed) march back to Noviodunum, Vercingetorix should

[1] *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, 2e pér., xv, 1858, pp. 77–8.
[2] *B. G.*, vii, 90, § 5. [3] *Ib.*, 65, § 4 ; 66, § 1. [4] *Ib.*, 62, § 10 ; 64, § 3.
[5] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., viii, 1863, pp. 502–5.

have divined Caesar's intention of marching past Alesia into the country of the Sequani; or, finally, that the German cavalry whom Caesar induced to join him should have been able to make their way unopposed to Noviodunum.[1]

The problem is insoluble. Most military men would, indeed, agree with the Duc d'Aumale that Caesar must have established himself somewhere in the country of the Lingones. R. de Coynart,[2] it is true, argues that he would not have taken up his quarters there for fear of driving the Lingones to revolt by the requisitions of corn which he would have been obliged to make; and he concludes that he remained in the country of the Senones. But Caesar had just laid in a good stock of food, and was not likely to bear hardly upon the Lingones for some time: he did shortly afterwards march through their country:[3] if he thought it worth his while, he could pay for what he took; and the Lingones, having remained loyal so far, doubtless saw that it would be to their interest to cleave to the stronger side to the end. If Caesar had intended to remain in the country of the Senones, he would not have voluntarily abandoned their chief town, Agedincum. He would surely have taken up his quarters, if he could have done so with due regard to strategy, among a friendly people: the Lingones were the only people, except the Remi, upon whose friendship he could depend;[4] and the country of the Lingones was near that of the Remi, near that of the Aedui, and conveniently situated for the reception of the expected reinforcements from Germany. We may also, perhaps, infer from Caesar's silence that, after his junction with Labienus, he halted as soon as he conveniently could; and, as he tells us that, after he set out on his march to succour the Province, he took a road leading 'through the furthest part of the country of the Lingones' (*per extremos Lingonum fines*), which must have been the southern or the south-eastern part of their territory, it is clear that he must have come from some point with regard to which that region was most remote, that is to say, from some point either in the northern or in the north-western part of their territory.[5] But if we strive after greater exactness, we have nothing certain to go upon.

WHY DID VERCINGETORIX ATTACK CAESAR WHEN THE LATTER WAS MARCHING TO SUCCOUR THE PROVINCE?

The Duc d'Aumale argues that Vercingetorix's resolution to attack Caesar, when the latter was marching to succour the Province, was not inconsistent with his plan of campaign.[6] 'Évidemment,' he says, 'Vercingétorix ignorait la présence des auxiliaires germains,

[1] *Philologus*, xxii, 1865, pp. 169–70.
[2] *Spectateur militaire*, 2e sér., xvii, 1856, pp. 220–1.
[3] *B. G.*, vii, 56, § 5; 66, § 1.
[4] *Ib.*, 63, § 7.
[5] See pp. 792–4.
[6] See *B. G.*, vii, 14, 64, §§ 1–3.

ou il se faisait illusion sur leur nombre et leur valeur. Il ne comptait pour rien l'insignifiante cavalerie gauloise qui accompagnait César un mois plus tôt. Il croit n'avoir affaire qu'à l'infanterie des légions. Il sait combien elle est redoutable, mais, embarrassée qu'elle est de bagages, il espère la condamner à une immobilité fatale ou à une retraite qui aurait ressemblé à celle de 1812, car lui aussi avait ses Cosaques.'[1]

M. Jullian[2] is not wholly satisfied with this explanation. He offers two alternatives. Perhaps, he suggests, Vercingetorix simply accepted the inevitable. The unchallenged mastery which he had exercised over his host in the earlier stages of the campaign was gone ; for the leaders of his new levies were jealous of his renown. Would the Aedui and the Sequani be unselfish enough to hearken to his counsel and devastate their lands ? Sooner or later his cavalry would insist on striking a blow : would it not be best to let them have their way while the circumstances were comparatively favourable ? Or again, he may only have contemplated a flank attack upon Caesar's baggage-train, but his officers may have got out of hand. Whichever of the three hypotheses we adopt, says M. Jullian, we are confronted with this fact :—'la furie gauloise, contenue depuis six mois chez les soldats et chez le chef, devait être un jour plus forte que leur volonté à tous.' M. Jullian knows the Gallic temperament ; but I think that the chief was made of sterner stuff,—as hard-headed, as much master of himself as when he warned the Bituriges to destroy Avaricum. Nor is Caesar's narrative consistent with the theory that he allowed his judgement to be overruled.

WHAT WAS THE SITE OF THE BATTLE BETWEEN CAESAR AND VERCINGETORIX, WHICH IMMEDIATELY PRECEDED THE BLOCKADE OF ALESIA ?[3]

The data for fixing the site of this battle are scanty ; but the search is not hopeless. Caesar, marching northward from Gergovia to succour Labienus, crossed the Loire and pushed on for the country of the Senones : Labienus, after his victory at Lutecia (Paris), marched to Agedincum (Sens) and thence moved on to join Caesar. Some time after their meeting, Caesar started from some point unknown and marched through the country of the Lingones, intending to get into the country of the Sequani, that he might be in a better position for reinforcing the Province ' (*quo facilius subsidium provinciae ferre posset*). Vercingetorix, who, after he had been confirmed in his office of commander-in-chief, had assembled his cavalry,

[1] *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, 2e pér., xv, 1858, p. 81.

[2] *Vercingétorix*, pp. 248–53. Cf. C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 497–9, and p. 167, *supra*.

[3] See *Carte de l'État-Major* (1 : 80,000), Sheet 97, and *Carte de France* (1 : 200,000), Sheet 34.

and apparently all his forces, at Bibracte[1] (Mont Beuvray), marched to intercept him ; but whether he started on this march from Bibracte or from Alesia, is a disputed point. While Caesar was marching through 'the furthest part of the country of the Lingones' (*cum . . . per extremos Lingonum fines iter faceret*), Vercingetorix formed three camps near the bank of a stream, 10 Roman miles from Caesar's army, and next morning fought a cavalry battle with him close to the stream. During the action the Gallic infantry were drawn up on one of the banks of the stream, in front of their camps, in order to produce a moral effect. On the right of the Roman army there was a hill, down which Caesar's German cavalry charged. This charge decided the battle ; and the Gallic cavalry, afraid of being surrounded, fled. Vercingetorix forthwith retreated to Alesia (Mont Auxois) : Caesar pursued the beaten army until nightfall, and arrived *altero die* at Alesia.[2]

Altero die, as I have proved on pages 738–40, means, not 'on the second day (after),' but 'on the day (after)'. The words *cum Caesar in Sequanos per extremos Lingonum fines iter faceret* have been much discussed ; but to my mind they are tolerably clear. First of all, they certainly mean that Caesar was still within the country of the Lingones at the time when Vercingetorix made his three camps. It has, indeed, been argued that when Caesar said that he was marching *in Sequanos* 'through the furthest part of the territory of the Lingones', he meant that he was marching through the country of the Sequani ! But I shall not notice this absurd interpretation here. I have demolished it on page 356, because it was devised in order to bolster up the theory that Alesia was not on Mont Auxois.

Heller, referring to a passage in *B. G.*, i, 1, § 6, argues that Caesar used the word *extremos* from the point of view of the Province, and therefore that he was describing the northern or north-eastern part of the country of the Lingones.[3] But Heller's premiss is wrong. The passage to which he refers—*Belgae ab extremis Galliae finibus oriuntur* ('The territory of the Belgae, commencing from the most distant frontier of Gaul,' &c.)—is perhaps spurious[4] and, anyhow, has no analogy with the one which I am discussing. In the former passage the writer is describing the geography of Gaul from the point of view of an Italian ; and Caesar had already fixed the meaning of *ab extremis Galliae finibus* by saying that the Galli are separated from the Belgae by the Marne and the Seine. In the other passage Caesar is describing his march towards the Province from a northern standpoint.

It has been argued that *per extremos Lingonum fines* might mean 'through the southern part of the country of the Lingones, and close to and parallel with their southern frontier'. De Coynart, indeed, holds that the words must mean this. '*Faire voyage* (iter facere),'

[1] If *huc* (*B. G.*, vii, 64, § 1) is right. Meusel in the reissue of his school edition deletes it.

[2] *B. G.*, vii, 56, §§ 3–5 ; 62, § 10 ; 66–8.

[3] *Philologus*, xiii, 1858, p. 595. See also xxii, 1865, pp. 125–6.

[4] See p. 394.

he insists, 'ne s'applique jamais qu'à une ligne suivie et non à une ligne coupée.'[1] But de Coynart is over subtle. According to him, Caesar was marching 'par la zone frontière méridionale des Lingons,' with the intention of crossing their south-eastern frontier. Surely we see here 'une ligne coupée' as well as 'une ligne suivie'. According to the view which de Coynart opposes, Caesar was marching through the extreme south-eastern part of the country of the Lingones, with the intention of crossing their southern or south-eastern frontier. Surely we see here 'une ligne suivie' as well as 'une ligne coupée'. Nobody would contend that Caesar meant that, at the moment of which he spoke, he was actually crossing the frontier; for he rarely uses the word *fines* in the sense of 'frontier', and when he does so, the sense is unmistakable.[2] *Iter facere* simply means 'to march',—in any direction, whether there are frontiers to be crossed or not.[3] If the words *per extremos Lingonum fines* might mean 'through the southern part of the country of the Lingones, and close to and parallel with their southern frontier', they might also mean 'through the eastern part of the country of the Lingones (however far from their southern frontier), and close to and parallel with their eastern frontier'. In other words, Caesar would have made use of a phrase which anybody could interpret as he pleased. His words can only, I believe, mean one thing,—'through that part of the country of the Lingones which was furthest from his starting-point in the direction in which he was going.' G. Gouget[4] aptly quotes a passage from Caesar, which seems to show that this was his meaning:—*mandat ut crebros exploratores in Suebos mittant, quaeque apud eos gerantur cognoscant. Illi imperata faciunt et paucis diebus intermissis referunt Suebos omnes, postea quam certiores nuntii de exercitu Romanorum venerint . . . penitus ad extremos fines se recepisse.*[5] Now the direction in which Caesar was going was towards the country of the Sequani, and their country extended to the east and south-east of the country of the Lingones.

'Entre l'est et le midi,' writes the Duc d'Aumale, 'entre "le long de" ou "au travers de", je reconnais que le texte des *Commentaires* laisse toute liberté de choisir.'[6] But if Caesar was marching from north to south through the eastern part of the country of the Lingones and at a relatively considerable distance from their southern frontier, he was not marching *per extremos Lingonum fines*. For that part of the country could only have been called 'extreme' in relation to the western or north-western part; and if Caesar had started from the western or north-western part, he would not have

[1] *Spectateur militaire*, 2e sér., xxx, 1860, p. 426.

[2] See p. 376.

[3] See Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, i, 1269.

[4] *Mém. présentés par divers savants à l'Acad. des inscr. et belles-lettres*, vi, 1864, pp. 208–12.

[5] 'He instructed (the Ubii) to send numerous scouts into the country of the Suebi and to ascertain what they were about. The Ubii fulfilled their instructions, and, after the lapse of a few days, reported that all the Suebi, on the arrival of messengers with trustworthy information about the Roman army, had retreated . . . *to the furthest extremity of their country*.' *B. G.*, vi, 10, §§ 3–4.

[6] *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, 2e pér., xv, 1858, p. 83.

marched eastward right across the country of the Lingones, and then suddenly struck off towards the south. Moreover, according to all the writers, except von Göler, who make him pass through the southern, as distinguished from the south-eastern part of the country of the Lingones, he was moving either up the valley of the Serein or up the valley of the Armançon or between the two rivers; and in any of these cases he would have been forced to pass through the country of the Mandubii before entering Sequania. I do not think that his words can bear this meaning; and I find it difficult to believe that he would have used a phrase which left his readers 'toute liberté de choisir' between two widely different interpretations.

It will perhaps be objected that the battle-field may possibly have been in the country of the Sequani; because Caesar only says that he was marching *per extremos Lingonum fines* on the night before the battle, and that the camp of Vercingetorix, near which the battle took place, was 10 Roman miles from the point where the Roman army encamped for the night. But it would have been absolutely impossible for Caesar to reach Alesia on the day after the battle from any point where the battle could be placed in the country of the Sequani. I am aware that Dion Cassius[1] says that the battle took place in their territory: but that part of Dion's history which deals with the Gallic war is, as I have shown,[2] full of ridiculous blunders; and in this case he either neglected to attend to Caesar's narrative or misunderstood it.

It seems clear, then, that we must look for the battle-field somewhere in the south-eastern part of the country of the Lingones,—that is, in the neighbourhood of Dijon. But, as I do not anticipate that every reader will agree with my interpretation of *extremos fines*, I shall also examine the other sites that have been proposed.

I have discussed on pages 788–90 the question of the point from which Caesar started on his march, and have arrived at the conclusion that it is impossible to fix it exactly, but that it was somewhere in the north or north-west of the country of the Lingones. The question remains, from what point did Vercingetorix march to intercept him? He may possibly have started from Bibracte (Mont Beuvray), where the council assembled by which he was elected commander-in-chief; where also, it should seem, the new levies assembled which he ordered after his election:[3] but it is much more probable that he started from Alesia. We may infer, as I have shown on page 165, from Caesar's narrative, that Vercingetorix provisioned Alesia before the siege; and the Duc d'Aumale points out that the country all round Alesia is intersected by the various routes some one of which Caesar must have taken in order to reach the country of the Sequani, and that Alesia itself was the best position which Vercingetorix could have selected in order to rest in security, to observe Caesar's movements, and to sally forth at the right moment to harass his march.[4]

[1] xl. 39. § 1. [2] See pp. 216–7. [3] *B. G.*, vii. 63, §§ 5–6; 64, § 1.

[4] *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, 2e pér., xv, 1858, pp. 94–5. When the Duc d'Aumale infers (p. 82) from the words in which Caesar describes the retreat of Vercin-

1. According to Napoleon,[1] Caesar started from Joigny, crossed the rivers Armançon, Seine, and Aube ; struck off in a south-easterly direction from Dancevoir up the right bank of the Aube ; and encamped on the night before the battle on the western bank of the river Vingeanne, near Longeau. Vercingetorix, who had marched from Bibracte by way of Dijon, to intercept him, encamped on the heights of Sacquenay, overlooking the southern bank of the Badin, a rivulet which flows into the Vingeanne on its western bank. In this position, says Napoleon, he commanded the three roads, leading respectively towards Gray, Pontailler, and Chalon, by one of which Caesar must have intended to advance to the Saône. The battle took place in the angle between the Vingeanne and the Badin ; and the hill from which the Germans charged was Montsaugeon.

Napoleon argues first, that the alleged battle-field answers perfectly to Caesar's description ; secondly, that skeletons 'many of which had bronze bracelets round the arms and legs', as well as bones of men and of horses, have been found in *tumuli* for some distance along the line of retreat which Vercingetorix would have taken to Alesia ; thirdly, that numbers of horseshoes—evidently shoes of dead horses—were found in 1860, at the dredging of the Vingeanne ; and lastly, that Caesar could have reached Alesia on the second day after the battle.

Von Kampen[2] agrees with Napoleon. He holds, it is true, that *altero die* means 'on the next day' ; but he believes nevertheless that Caesar did not reach Alesia until the second day after the battle. 'As regards the words *altero die ad Alesiam castra fecit*, I think,' he says, 'that everything depends upon the point of time from which the calculation is made.' Of course ! But it is absolutely clear from Caesar's words that that point of time is the day of the battle. 'The actual move to Alesia,' von Kampen continues, 'did not take place till after the day of the battle ; for on the day of the battle itself there was enough to do in attending to the baggage, and also the return of the troops who pursued the rear of the enemy till the evening had to be awaited.' But only two of the ten legions had to attend to the baggage ; and Caesar does not say that 'the troops who pursued the rear of the enemy' did return. Why should they have returned ? Von Kampen's explanation cannot be got out of the Latin.[3]

getorix to Alesia—*copias suas, ut pro castris conlocaverat, reduxit protinusque Alesiam . . . iter facere coepit*—that 'le chef gaulois revint sur ses pas après le combat', he makes a mistake. The word *reduxit* simply means that after the battle and before commencing his retreat, Vercingetorix withdrew his infantry from the bank of the stream into camp. If *reduxit* meant 'led back' (to Alesia), *Alesiam iter facere coepit* would simply mean the same as *copias reduxit*, and *protinus* would mean nothing at all.

[1] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 294–9.

[2] *Quindecim ad Caesaris de b. G. comm. tabulae*, xii.

[3] Fugato omni equitatu, Vercingetorix copias, ut pro castris conlocaverat, reduxit protinusque Alesiam . . . iter facere coepit celeriterque impedimenta ex castris educi et se subsequi iussit. Caesar impedimentis in proximum collem deductis, duabus legionibus praesidio relictis secutus hostes, quantum dici tempus est passum, circiter III milibus ex novissimo agmine interfectis altero die ad Alesiam castra fecit.

Napoleon's arguments are, one and all, worthless. The discovery of bronze bracelets and of horseshoes proves nothing: indeed it is morally certain that neither Gallic nor Roman horses were shod with nailed shoes, though they may occasionally have worn shoes fastened with straps, which the French call *hipposandales*.[1] Granted that the alleged battle-field corresponds with Caesar's description, other sites do the same. Napoleon's interpretation of *altero die* is wrong.[2] Caesar reached Alesia on the day after the battle; and in order to do so, he would have been obliged, if the battle had been fought between the Badin and the Vingeanne, to march 80 kilometres, or 50 miles, and to fight a battle, within two days. Again, for no conceivable reason except to bring him to the mythical battle-field on the Badin, Napoleon makes Caesar travel far away from his natural route. Assuming, with Napoleon, that Caesar marched from Joigny to Tonnerre, and from Tonnerre to Chatillon, he would surely have moved from Chatillon up the valley of the Ource, and then down the valley of the Tille, instead of turning away towards the north-east and then, by a long *détour*, doubling back again towards the south. Moreover, Napoleon admits that Vercingetorix's retreat would have been cut off if he had returned to his camp, and accordingly denies that he did so. But Caesar says that he did!

De Coynart[3] gives an additional reason for rejecting Napoleon's site. He points out that it is 24 kilometres from the eastern, and 58 kilometres from the southern frontier of the Lingones, and observes that such a position cannot be reconciled with Caesar's statement that he was marching *per extremos Lingonum fines*.

2. D'Anville[4] thinks that the battle took place on the Armançon, somewhere between Tonnerre and Ravières; but he gives no reasons. The Duc d'Aumale[5] and M. Gouget[6] have shown that he was wrong. First of all, the only site between Tonnerre and Ravières that at all answers to Caesar's description is nearly midway between the environs of Agedincum, from which Caesar is supposed by d'Anville to have started, and Bibracte, from which Vercingetorix is supposed to have started to intercept him. Vercingetorix must then have left Bibracte on the same day that Caesar left the environs of Agedincum, and before he knew anything of Caesar's intended movements. Such a coincidence is highly improbable. I do not see how this objection can be answered, unless one may suppose that Vercingetorix started a day later than Caesar, but marched much faster, or that he had somehow got information beforehand of Caesar's intentions. Secondly, the battle could hardly have taken place on the southern bank of the stream; for, as the Duc d'Aumale puts it, 'il serait peu

[1] See *Rev. des Soc. savantes*, x, 1869, p. 337, Daremberg and Saglio, *Dict., des ant. grecques et rom.*, iii, 2011–4, and *Pro Alesia*, 1908, pp. 449–51, 1909, pp. 476–80. [2] See pp. 738–40.

[3] See *Mém. de la Comm. des ant. du dépt de la Côte-d'Or*, viii, 1873, pp. 162–3, 168. [4] *Éclaircissemens sur l'ancienne Gaule*, pp. 452–3.

[5] *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, 2e pér., xv, 1858, p. 97.

[6] *Mém. présentés par divers savants à l'Acad. des inscr. et belles-lettres*, vi, 1864, pp. 216–21.

vraisemblable que César eût négligé de se couvrir du flanc dans sa marche [up the valley of the Armançon], et que Vercingétorix eût pris position tournant le dos au territoire ennemi et faisant face à sa base d'opérations.' Moreover, if the battle had been fought on the southern bank, the Gauls would have been obliged, in order to reach Alesia, to cross the river immediately after the battle; and this would have been a serious operation for a beaten host to undertake. The battle must then have been fought on the northern bank. But if so, the Roman army, marching up the valley, must have had its right nearest to the bank. Now it was on the right that the German cavalry, having seized a hill, charged the Gallic cavalry and decided the battle. Therefore the hill must have been close to the river. Only one spot that answers to these conditions can be found,—between Stigny and Ravières; and there the ground is covered with woods and deeply scored by ravines,—in other words, unsuited to a combat of horse.

3. Von Göler[1] finds the battle-field near Beneuvre. Arguing on the fantastic assumption that Caesar started from Troyes,[2] he holds that he marched by way of Châtillon-sur-Seine with the intention of passing Til-Châtel and crossing the Saône at Gray. I do not think that Beneuvre is *in extremis Lingonum finibus*.

4. Rossignol does not attempt to point out the exact site of the battle-field; but he places the three camps of Vercingetorix at Montbard, Nogent, and Courcelles, on the river Brenne.[3] I shall not examine his arguments; for he supposes that Vercingetorix was encamped only 8 kilometres, or 5 miles, in a direct line, say 6 miles by road, from Alesia; and this distance is obviously far too short.

5. De Coynart traces Caesar's route along the high ground between the rivers Armançon and Serein. He translates *cum* by 'pendant que'; and he takes *trinis castris* in the sense of 'three marches!'[4] He assumes that Vercingetorix started from Bibracte, which he wrongly identifies with Autun, and that he marched about 27 kilometres, or nearly 17 miles a day. This string of assumptions he regards as data sufficient for determining the site of the battle; and he finds it near Moutier St. Jean, on the left bank of the Armançon, about 12 miles by road from Alesia. He places the camp of Vercingetorix on a chain of hills on the right bank; and he tells us that the Gallic cavalry attacked the Roman column as it was marching along the ridge between Vassy and the wooded eminence of Bar.

This theory is open to the same objection as that of d'Anville. First, Vercingetorix, *ex hypothesi*, started from Bibracte to intercept Caesar on the same day that Caesar started to relieve the Province,

[1] *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, pp. 300–1. [2] See p. 788.

[3] *Mém. de la Comm. des ant. du dépt de la Côte-d'Or*, v, 1857, pp. 16–7.

[4] It is true that *Caesar . . . quintis castris Gergoviam pervenit* (*B. G.*, vii, 36, § 1) means 'Caesar reached Gergovia in five marches': but between that phrase and *circiter milia passuum X ab Romanis trinis castris Vercingetorix consedit* there is no analogy. According to de Coynart, these words mean that Caesar and Vercingetorix marched exactly the same distance each day for three days, and always encamped exactly 10 Roman miles apart; and that all this time Caesar was marching *per extremos Lingonum fines*!

without knowing what route Caesar intended to take. Secondly, the beaten Gallic cavalry must have crossed the Armançon, with the Romans at their heels, immediately after the battle. And lastly, the site is too near Alesia.

6. I now come to the theory of the Duc d'Aumale.[1] He bases his search upon the hypothesis that Caesar started on his march from the neighbourhood of Vitry,[2] and advanced up the left bank of the Aube ; that Vercingetorix marched to intercept him from Alesia ; and that (according to the true interpretation of *altero die*) the battle must have been fought at a distance of not more than 30 or less than 15 miles from Alesia. He concludes that Caesar encamped, on the night before the battle, about 7 miles south of Ferté-sur-Aube ; that Vercingetorix encamped on a ridge rising above the right bank of the Ource, near Presly : and that the battle took place in an undulating plain between Montigny and Louesme.

Now, on either of the two interpretations of the words *per extremos Lingonum fines* which the Duc d'Aumale himself admits, he must be wrong. Let the reader look at the map, and he will see that Caesar's alleged position was almost in the centre of the country of the Lingones. The Duc d'Aumale endeavours, indeed, to reconcile his theory with the words of Caesar by saying that Caesar's camp was ' près de la frontière lingonne (*extremos fines Lingonum*), découpée de ce côté par l'enclave mandubienne.' In reality, it was nearly as far from the northern frontier of the Lingones as from the common frontier of the Lingones and the Mandubii. But even if it had been quite close to the latter frontier, the argument of the Duc d'Aumale would be of no avail. He forgets that Caesar was marching towards the country of the Sequani, not that of the Mandubii ; and Dijon, the point at which he conjectures that Caesar intended to cross the Lingonian frontier, is very far from the assumed encampment. Again, as Pistollet de St. Ferjeux points out,[3] Vercingetorix, being about 10 kilometres, or more than 6 miles from the battle-field, could not have directed the movements of his cavalry or supported them with his infantry.

The Duc d'Aumale has also suggested that the battle may have been fought in the neighbourhood of Is-sur-Tille. But this place is 14 miles north of Dijon. If the battle had been fought there, would Caesar have said that on the previous night, when he was several miles still further north, he was *in extremis Lingonum finibus* ?

7. Pistollet de St. Ferjeux, assuming that Caesar started from a camp the remains of which are visible on the hill of Ste-Germaine near Bar-sur-Aube, and that he intended to cross the Saône near Pontailler or St. Jean-de-Losne, places the Roman army, on the night before the battle, near Arbot on the Aube, and the three camps of Vercingetorix on three hills separated from one another by the sources of that stream. The battle-field was a little to the north of these hills : Vercingetorix himself was between the Aube and the

[1] *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, 2e pér., xv, 1858, pp. 87, 94–5.
[2] See p. 789.
[3] *Spectateur militaire*, 2e sér., xlii, 1863, pp. 60–1.

hill on which stands the chapel of St. Remi; and the hill from which the German cavalry charged is identified with that of Charbonnière.[1] But Arbot was not *in extremis Lingonum finibus*: it was about 30 miles from their eastern, and more than 50 miles from their southern frontier.

8. F. Monnier[2] makes Vercingetorix encamp at the village of Senailly on the right bank of the Armançon. Now from Genay, where Monnier tells us that the retreat of Vercingetorix began, to Mont Auxois, the distance is not more than 10 miles; and it is hard to see why the Romans should have thrown away the immense advantage of continuing the pursuit, on the day of the battle, right up to and into Alesia.

9. Virtually identical with the view of Monnier is that of General Creuly. He makes Caesar encamp before the battle at Montréal-sur-Serein, and Vercingetorix near Visernay, which is about a mile and a half south-east of Senailly. The distance from Visernay to Alise is, he says, 18 kilometres, or 11 miles,—'c'est qui convient aux détails de cette journée et de la suivante.'[3] I do not think so.

Every one of the foregoing theories, the reader will have perceived, conflicts with the only sound interpretation which, in my judgement, can be given of the words *per extremos Lingonum fines*.

10. The next view which I shall examine is that of Gouget.[4] He assumes that Caesar started from Langres (Andematunnum), the chief town of the Lingones; and he interprets *per extremos Lingonum fines* in the same way that I do. Caesar's best route led, he considers, down the valley of the Tille, and thence to the Saône, which he would have crossed either near Auxonne or near St. Jean-de-Losne. Pursuing this route, says Gouget, he must needs strike the river Ouche, and cross it somewhere between Dijon and the Saône. Evidently, then, Vercingetorix, who was preparing to intercept him, encamped, the night before the battle, on the Ouche. The left camp was on the southern bank of the Ouche, opposite Dijon: the central camp was on the northern bank, in the peninsula between the Ouche and its affluent, the Suzon; the right camp was on the southern bank of the Ouche, just below its confluence with the Suzon. The Romans encamped, the night before the battle, at Arc-sur-Tille. The battle took place on the high ground which extends along the northern bank of the Ouche from Dijon to Fauverney. The hill (*summum iugum*) from which the Germans made their decisive charge was the culminating point of the gently sloping heights between St. Apollinaire and Mirande. The battle-field was about 32 miles from Alesia, whither Vercingetorix retreated, up the right bank of the Ouche.

Perhaps it is hypercritical to say that Gouget rather underestimated the distance. As the crow flies, it is about 48 kilometres;

[1] *Ib.*, pp. 63–5, 67, 69, 74. [2] *Vercingétorix*, 1883, pp. 197–200.
[3] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., viii, 1863, p. 509.
[4] *Mém. présentés par divers savants à l'Acad. des inscr. et belles-lettres*, vi, 1864, pp. 208–12, 214, 228–33, 241, 255–6.

and, allowing for the windings of the road, the actual distance which Vercingetorix and Caesar would have had to accomplish can hardly have been less than 54 kilometres, or between 33 and 34 miles.[1] Still, I have no doubt that such a march was within the bounds of possibility. A considerable part of the distance would doubtless have been covered in the pursuit on the day of the battle. Caesar had every motive for pursuing his beaten enemy as hard as he could. During the operations before Gergovia he made a forced march of 50 Roman miles in 28 hours.[2] Is it incredible that, on the long summer's day that followed this battle, he should have made a forced march of 20 or 25 miles ?

It might, perhaps, also be objected to Gouget's view that the slope of the ridge which he identifies with the hill from which the Germans charged is too gentle. But it would be a great mistake to suppose that that hill could have been really steep. It is practically impossible, says Lord Wolseley,[3] for cavalry to charge down a hill of which the gradation is as much as 10°.

Other reasons, however, based upon a careful examination of the ground, compel me to discard Gouget's theory, which I was formerly inclined to accept. The lie of the country seems to show that Caesar would not have approached the Ouche by the line which Gouget traces ; and, moreover, the ridge between St. Apollinaire and Mirande, if not the whole battle-field, would have been invisible from any of the supposed Gallic camps.

I am glad that M. Jullian, who in his biography of Vercingetorix[4] adopted Gouget's theory in its entirety, still agrees with me in accepting it in principle ; but in detail he has recently[5] somewhat modified it, placing the battle-field nearer Alesia, about four miles north of Dijon and just west of Bellefond. He suggests that Caesar encamped the night before the battle on a hill north of Til-Châtel and overlooking the Tille, and that he continued his march along the line of the Roman road which traverses Bellefond. Vercingetorix, he thinks, encamped on the heights of Hauteville, north-west of Dijon and separated from Caesar by the river Suzon, thus ensuring his retreat to Alesia. If so, the hill which the Germans occupied on the right was the ridge just north of Asnières. M. Jullian tells us that what led him to discard Gouget's details was that he doubted whether an ancient road had existed along the line which Gouget supposed Caesar to have followed. Be this as it may, M. Jullian's theory has the advantage of reducing the distance of the battle-field from Alesia ; and the Suzon, which is now dry, has very high banks, and would have been a sufficient obstacle. On the other hand, Vercingetorix could not have seen any of the fighting except on Caesar's right wing ; for the ground sinks rather rapidly from

[1] I have measured the distance by the direct road with a map-measurer on Sheet 34 of the *Carte de France* (1 : 200,000).

[2] See pp. 153–4 and 635.

[3] *Soldier's Pocket-Book*, 5th ed., p. 359.

[4] *Vercingétorix*, pp. 379–82.

[5] *Rev. des études anc.*, x, 1908, pp. 347–50. Cf. C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 495, n. 1.

the Route Nationale, which passes Asnières on the east, towards Bellefond and Ruffey. Still, the site appears to me the most satisfactory that has been proposed; and I therefore provisionally accept it.[1]

WHY DID VERCINGETORIX RETREAT TO ALESIA ?

'Vercingetorix,' says Mommsen,[2] 'had been prepared for a struggle under the walls, but not for being besieged in Alesia; from that point of view the accumulated stores, considerable as they were, were yet far from sufficient for his army.'

Merivale thinks that 'even though the battle [which preceded the blockade] was lost, the cause might have been maintained by recurrence to the harassing system in which the Gauls had hitherto, with one exception, so steadfastly persevered.[3] If their vast forces had been dispersed or drawn out of Caesar's immediate reach, and the country wasted around him, he would not, we may presume, have ventured to protract an indecisive warfare under pressure of the circumstances which urged him to seek the Roman frontier. The victory he had gained would in that case have been destitute of any decisive result. But the fatal mistake of assembling the whole Gaulish army in one spot, and there tying it, as it were, to the stake, offered an opportunity to his energetic spirit which he was not the man to forego.'[4]

General J. B. Renard[5] conjectures that Vercingetorix retreated to Alesia in the hope of keeping Caesar chained to the spot while the hosts of united Gaul were preparing to come and join him, and annihilate the Roman army. But if so, why did he not send off his cavalry with the fiery cross at once ?

Caesar does not tell us why Vercingetorix shut himself up in Alesia; for he did not care to enlighten those who could not see that Vercingetorix had no alternative. Perhaps he hoped to be as successful there as he had been at Gergovia. At all events, it is certain that, beaten as he was and hotly pursued by Caesar, he was bound to establish himself in the strong position which he had prepared, lest he should be compelled to fight another and yet more disastrous battle, or, as Sir Coleridge Grove has suggested to me, lest his disheartened followers should fall away.

[1] M. P. Perrenet (*Rev. des études anc.*, xi, 1909, pp. 253–5) has proposed a modification, which in my opinion is not an improvement, of M. Jullian's theory. He locates the battle-field alternatively between Messigny and Asnières, or near Til-Châtel between the Tille and the Ignon.

[2] *Hist. of Rome*, v, 1894, p. 88 (*Röm. Gesch.*, iii, 1889, p. 290).

[3] This is not certain. See p. 741, n. 6.

[4] *Hist. of the Romans under the Empire*, ii, 1850, p. 30.

[5] *Hist. pol. et mil. de la Belgique*, 1847, pp. 479–80.

ON THE NUMBER OF LEGIONS WHICH CAESAR HAD AT ALESIA

From what Caesar himself says[1] we should gather that, during the blockade of Alesia, he had ten legions under his command. For he sent ten legions into winter-quarters at the close of the sixth campaign : just before he started for Gergovia, he divided his army into two parts, assigning four legions to Labienus and keeping six himself ; and he nowhere says or implies that another legion joined him. But Napoleon[2] argues that he had eleven. He points out that, according to Hirtius[3], one of the two legions which, after the fall of Alesia, Caesar sent into winter-quarters on the Saône, was the 6th ; and, assuming that this was not one of the ten which Caesar's own narrative accounts for, he concludes that, before the blockade of Alesia, 'it had remained in garrison among the Allobroges or in Italy,' and implies that, although Caesar employed it in the blockade, he, for some reason or other, omitted to mention it. 'The redistribution,' he proceeds, 'after the siege of Uxellodunum gives also the same result, for in book viii, c. 46 the "Commentaries" give the position of ten legions, without reckoning the 15th, which, according to book viii, c. 24, had been sent to Cisalpine Gaul. These facts are repeated again, book viii, c. 54.'

The facts would prove, not necessarily that Caesar had eleven legions at Alesia, but that he had eleven legions to dispose of when he distributed the troops in winter-quarters after the capture of the town,—if it were certain that the 6th was not one of the ten which he had commanded since the beginning of 53 B.C. Napoleon takes this for granted, because the legion which Caesar borrowed from Pompey was numbered I, and the remaining nine were undoubtedly the 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, and 15th.[4] But P. Groebe[5] has argued that the legion which, when it formed part of Pompey's army, was numbered I was, so long as it remained under Caesar, known as the 6th. For, he asks, if its number in Caesar's army was I, why did he not say when and where the 6th was raised, as he did in the case of every other legion ? And if the 6th was raised by him, and not lent by Pompey, why was it not numbered consecutively, as all the others were,[6] and called the 16th ? It cannot, as some writers have suggested, have been the legion named *Alauda*, which Caesar raised in Transalpine Gaul ;[7] for it, as we learn from various inscriptions,[8] was numbered V. But why, it may be asked, was *Alauda* numbered V and not XVI ? Because, says Groebe, whereas Caesar numbered the legions which he himself created, in ascending

[1] *B. G.*, vi, 44, § 3 ; vii, 34, § 2 ; 57, § 1.
[2] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 292–3.
[3] *B. G.*, viii, 4, § 3.
[4] *Ib.*, ii, 23 ; vi, 32, § 5 ; vii, 51, § 2 ; viii, 54, § 3.
[5] W. Drumann, *Gesch. Roms*, iii, 1906, pp. 706–7.
[6] Dion Cassius, xxxviii, 47, § 2.
[7] Suetonius, *Divus Iulius*, 22.
[8] Gruter, *Corpus inscr.*, 1707, vol. i, ccccciii, 1 ; dxliv, 2 ; dxlix, 4; dlix, 7.

order—from XI to XV—he did the opposite when he formed existing cohorts into a legion. Since, then, *Alauda* was numbered V, it is evident that a legion numbered VI already existed; and this can only have been the one which Caesar borrowed from Pompey.

Groebe's argument, ingenious as it certainly is, seems open to one objection :—Caesar did not say when or where the 5th legion was raised; why, then, should he not have been equally reticent about the 6th? But this objection only touches an unessential part of Groebe's argument. *Alauda* was certainly not raised before the end of 52 B.C., and may have been later.[1] M. Jullian,[2] indeed, although he confesses that he is attracted by Groebe's hypothesis, doubts whether Caesar would have ventured to alter the number of a legion raised by the consul, and suggests that the 6th may have been included among the 22 cohorts raised by Lucius Caesar in the latter part of 52 B.C.[3] But has not M. Jullian overlooked one fact by which Groebe clinches his argument? If, says Groebe, we compare *B. G.*, viii, 54, § 3 with *B. C.*, iii, 88, § 2, we shall see (as Drumann saw many years ago) that the legion which Caesar numbered XV, and which he was obliged in 50 B.C. to hand over to Pompey, was numbered III in the army of the latter.[4] We are entitled, then, to suppose that Caesar's 6th legion was Pompey's 1st.[5]

But, even supposing that an additional legion did join Caesar in 52 B.C., Napoleon is certainly wrong in asserting that it took part in the blockade of Alesia. For Caesar expressly says that, before the

[1] *Alauda* was raised, according to Prof. W. Ridgeway (Smith's *Dict. of Greek and Roman Ant.*, i, 96), about 55 B.C. He offers no proof of this assertion, and no proof exists. Desjardins (*Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, iii, 48) argues that *Alauda* was raised during the Civil War; but Groebe gives good reasons for believing that it was one of the unseasoned legions referred to in *B. G.*, viii, 24, § 2, 26, § 2, and was raised in 51 B.C. Indeed, the 5th legion, as we learn from the author of *Bellum Africanum* (1, § 5) was considered a veteran legion in 46 B.C.

[2] *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 396, n. 2; 494, n. 4; 513, n. 6.

[3] *B. G.*, vii, 65, § 1.

[4] See also *Neue Heidelberger Jahrb.*, iv, 1894, p. 187, n. 5.

[5] A. von Domaszewski (*ib.*, pp. 162–3), who holds that the 6th legion was distinct from the 1st, remarks that, according to Plutarch (*Pomp.*, 58, § 5) and Suetonius (*Divus Iulius*, 29), Caesar had ten legions immediately before the Civil War, and, according to Cicero (*Att.*, vii, 7, § 6), eleven: but, he says, the difference is only apparent; for Cicero evidently included *Alauda* in the eleven, whereas Plutarch omitted it because until the troops who composed it were invested with the Roman citizenship it was not officially reckoned as a legion Now Cicero's letter was written in December, 50 B.C., and some weeks previously Caesar, in obedience to the Senate, had sent back to Italy the legion which he had borrowed from Pompey and the 15th, which he had himself raised (*B. G.*, viii, 54). Therefore, if Cicero was correctly informed, Caesar must have had thirteen legions before he gave up these two. In other words, he must have raised not only *Alauda*, but at least one other legion as well. Von Domaszewski, who apparently accepts this inference, argues that the other legion was numbered XVI. But that Caesar had thirteen legions in 50 B.C. is utterly incredible. I can only conclude that Cicero, who, when he wrote the letter to which I have referred, was at Formiae, on his way back from Cilicia, was unaware or had forgotten that Caesar had given up two of his legions. If so, Plutarch and Suetonius were also mistaken.

blockade, it was impossible for reinforcements from Italy or the Province to join him because the roads were blocked.[1] How then was the additional legion to march by itself all the way from Italy or from the country of the Allobroges to Alesia ? If it did take part in the blockade, either it must have arrived in Gaul before the roads were blocked, and yet after Caesar started for Gergovia ; or it must have begun its long march after the news of the defeat of Vercingetorix in the combat which preceded the blockade reached the Province ; and these alternatives are equally improbable.

THE OPERATIONS AT ALESIA

1. According to the great Napoleon's estimate,[2] the entire force which Caesar commanded at Alesia, including auxiliaries and cavalry, amounted to 80,000 men. But there are really no data for forming an estimate. We are not told, and it is useless to guess how many cavalry he had or how many auxiliaries. We know that he had 10 legions ; and they must have suffered heavy losses in this and previous campaigns : but we do not know how far their losses had been made good by the *supplementum* which Caesar had brought into Gaul at the beginning of this year. All told and with the cavalry and auxiliaries, they could not have numbered less than 40,000 :[3] but they may have numbered more.

2. The writer of an article in the *Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie und Paedagogik*[4] complains that Napoleon and von Kampen[5] place most of the twenty-three redoubts of which Caesar speaks, at the foot of the hills surrounding Alesia, although Caesar himself says in chapters 69 and 80 that they were *on* the hills. Five of the twenty-three, he remarks, namely those distinguished in Napoleon's and von Kampen's Plans by the numbers 10, 11, 15, 18, and 22,[6] have been discovered (by Colonel Stoffel) ; and four of the five are on the

[1] *B. G.*, vii, 65, § 4.
[2] *Précis des guerres de César*, p. 109.
[3] See pp. 559–63.
[4] exx, 1879, p. 107.
[5] *Quindecim ad Caesaris de b. G. comm. tabulae*, xiii.
[6] M. G. Fourier (*Bull. monumental*, 1902, pp. 391–4) refuses to believe that No. 22, which is situated on a high point of Mont Réa, was really one of the redoubts ; and even M. Pernet (*Pro Alesia*, 1907, p. 249), who assisted in the imperial excavations, queries the identification. M. Fourier observes that the hill on the north—that is to say, Mont Réa—was not included within the circumvallation ; that the camp of Reginus and Rebilus was unfavourably situated on the slope of the hill (*B. G.*, vii, 83, § 2) ; and that Vercassivellaunus attacked the camp after having occupied the narrow ridge which commanded the slope. This last statement, I may remark, is not expressly warranted by the *Commentaries*. M. Fourier concludes that the entrenchment which Stoffel identified with a redoubt (No. 22) belonged to a prehistoric earthwork. The redoubt, he thinks, was situated on the south-eastern slope, and is probably represented by ' une figure difficile à expliquer ' in pl. 28 of Napoleon's Atlas, ' en haut de la lettre D '. But he apparently forgets that the redoubts were constructed at the outset of the siege ; that Caesar had intended to include Mont Réa within his circumvallation ; and that he was only prevented from doing so by want of time.

hills. The inference is that the remaining eighteen were similarly situated.

Now Caesar does not say, in either of the two chapters to which the writer refers or anywhere else, that the redoubts were on the hills. In chapter 69 he says that his camps were constructed in suitable positions, and that 'there' (*ibi*), that is to say in their neighbourhood, twenty-three redoubts were made. In chapter 80 he speaks of 'all the camps which covered the heights' surrounding Alesia. But we have no right to infer from this that the redoubts were also on the heights. For either the word 'all' is here, as in other passages, used loosely by Caesar, seeing that three of the camps were not on the heights at all but in the plain of Les Laumes; or else he means all those camps which were on the heights, and not the others. Besides, one of the redoubts was unquestionably on the lower slopes of the heights; several of them were unquestionably in the plain of Les Laumes;[1] and the word *ibi* is vague.[2] The truth is that it is impossible to determine the position of any one of the redoubts, except the five which have left traces. All that Napoleon and Stoffel could do or professed to do was to select those sites which appeared to them the most convenient.

3. The author of the article in the *Neue Jahrbücher* points out[3] that, according to von Kampen, the cavalry of Vercingetorix, after the combat which Caesar describes in chapter 70, fled back to the town in two divisions, one along the valley of the Oze, the other along the valley of the Ozerain; and he remarks that for this view there is no evidence in Caesar. This is quite true; but unless all the beaten cavalry were nearer to one than to the other of the two valleys, it is probable that von Kampen is right.

The writer goes on to argue that the terminus of the flight must have been the town itself, and not, as von Kampen holds, the Gallic camp on the east of the town. Only those of the fugitives who could not get into the town owing to the narrowness of its gates (*angustioribus portis*)[4] sought refuge, he maintains, in the camp. I do not

[1] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 318 and Planche 25.

[2] The MS. reading is *castra oportunis locis posita ibique castella XXIII facta*. Commentators have remarked that the number of the camps must have been originally given, because that of the redoubts (*castella*) is specified; that the fact that the camps were in suitable positions is self-evident; and that, since the redoubts were not on the sites of the camps, *ibi* by itself is meaningless. Accordingly, as excavation has proved that there were eight camps, Meusel has adopted R. Menge's conjecture, *castra . . . posita VIII, castellaque XXIII facta*. But A. Klotz (*Caesarstudien*, p. 260) objects that we should have expected to be enlightened as to the position of the camps, and that Menge's conjecture leaves *ibique* unexplained. He therefore offers an emendation of his own,—*castra . . . posita ⟨VIII, quae inter se munitionibus coniungebantur⟩ ibique* [that is, *in munitionibus*] *castella XXIII facta*. I admit that *ibi* in the MSS. is extremely vague: but the alleged superfluousness of the statement that 'camps were established in convenient positions' is not removed by inserting their number: in v, 9, § 1, a similar 'self-evident' fact is recorded in the words *loco castris idoneo capto*; and the *munitio* had only just been begun when the camps and redoubts were made (vii, 69, § 6, with which cf. p. 807)

[3] p. 106.

[4] *B. G.*, vii, 70, § 3.

think it necessary to refute this singular argument;[1] for to every one except the writer it is clear that *angustioribus portis* denotes the gates of the camp itself. Moreover, there is one sentence in Caesar's narrative which so unanswerably demonstrates the truth of von Kampen's view that I am quite unable to conceive how the writer could have overlooked it. Immediately after saying that 'the Germans hotly pursued them [the Gauls] right up to the entrenchments', Caesar says that 'some of the fugitives dismounted and tried to cross the ditch and climb over the wall'. Ditch and wall, Caesar expressly says, were outside the camp. It follows that the pursuing Germans were outside it too.

4. How did the cavalry of Vercingetorix succeed in getting away from Alesia? According to the Duc d'Aumale,[2] we must assume either that the line of redoubts constructed by the Romans was defective or that the vedettes did not do their duty with proper vigilance. The line of redoubts was certainly defective, in the sense that it was not completed; for Caesar says that the cavalry went out through a gap in the works.[3] The only question is whether anything more than redoubts had yet been constructed at all; that is to say, whether the line of contravallation, properly so called, had even been begun. Caesar says that Vercingetorix sent out his cavalry *opere instituto*,[4] that is to say, after the Romans had begun to construct their works, which would seem to imply that they had not had time to do much: indeed a later passage in his narrative would leave on one's mind the impression that the work of constructing the actual line of contravallation was not taken in hand until after the departure of the cavalry; for he distinctly says that he undertook this work after he had learned what Vercingetorix's purpose had been in sending the cavalry out (*quibus rebus cognitis ex perfugis et captivis, Caesar haec genera munitionis instituit*).[5] But many commentators have deceived themselves by arguing on the assumption that Caesar's narrative, even in matters of chronology, was invariably and rigidly precise. They seem to forget that he did not write with the fear of German critics before his mind. It is possible that he had begun the work of constructing the contravallation before Vercingetorix sent out his cavalry; and that, when he wrote the sentence which I have quoted, he only meant that he modified and added to his plan, with a view to repelling the expected army of relief. All that we can say with certainty, then, is that the line of contravallation, if it had been begun, was so incomplete that there was nothing to prevent the departure of the Gallic cavalry.

It is generally supposed that the gap through which they escaped was in the western plain; but the mere fact that the first combat of cavalry took place there does not prove that

[1] I confess that I did so in the first edition (pp. 784–5).
[2] *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, 2e pér., xv, 1858, p. 110.
[3] 'qua erat nostrum opus intermissum,' *B. G.*, vii, 71, § 5.
[4] *Ib.*, 70, § 1.
[5] *Ib.*, 72, § 1.

the works were more incomplete than anywhere else. It seems to me more probable that the cavalry moved *up* the valleys of the Oze and the Ozerain; first, because the bulk of Caesar's cavalry were stationed in the plain, and, secondly, because the map shows that if the Gauls had moved down the valleys, they would have been exposed to attack for a far longer time than if they had moved eastward.

. . . . . .

M. Salomon Reinach, remarking that 500 of Vercingetorix's cavalry would have sufficed to summon reinforcements, and that a modern general in like circumstances would have kept the horses of the rest for food, argues that all were sent out because the Gauls considered it impious to eat horse-flesh. 'La viande de cheval,' he says, 'paraît avoir été *tabou* chez toutes les populations de la langue aryenne.'[1] It was, however, eaten in Britain in the Bronze Age.[2] Is it not likely that Vercingetorix sent out all his cavalry because, while he could not afford to feed them, they would reinforce the cavalry of the expected army of relief? Besides, *taboo* is disregarded by starving men.

5. It is necessary to inquire how far the results of Stoffel's excavations[3] harmonize with Caesar's statements. In the course of the excavations certain trenches were found which did not, at first sight, seem to correspond to anything in Caesar's description. M. V. Pernet, who assisted the excavators, and has very minutely described the results of their labours, believes that the original earthwork (*munitio*) which Caesar mentions in *B. G.*, vii, 69, § 6 is represented by four incomplete trenches in the plain of Les Laumes, on the slope of the hill of Flavigny, on the slope of the hill of Bussy, and along the foot of Mont Réa, and that these unfinished works were abandoned after the departure of Vercingetorix's cavalry, when Caesar took in hand the construction of the lines which he describes in chapters 72–4.[4]

Caesar's narrative would, I think, leave upon the minds of most readers the impression that all the works therein described—the inner 20-foot trench, the two 15-foot trenches, and the rampart of the contravallation—completely surrounded Alesia. He does not, however, distinctly say this; and the results of the excavations show that it was not the case. Nor, indeed, was such an elaborate system of works required; for, as Napoleon remarks,[5] the only sections of the contravallation which required to be fortified with special care were those which crossed the plain of

[1] *Rev. celt.*, xxvii, 1906, pp. 1–15. [2] Rice Holmes, *Anc. Britain*, p. 152.

[3] Some of the excavations had been completed under the direction of members of the *Commission de la topographie des Gaules* before Stoffel took charge of the work, and the results were verified by him (*Pro Alesia*, 1907, pp. 122, 207). Stoffel, however, if A. Bertrand is to be believed, directed the excavations 'd'un peu de loin, préférant à la plaine des Laumes le séjour de Dijon ou de Sémur.' See *Rev. arch.*, 4e sér., xiv, 1909, p. 141.

[4] *Pro Alesia*, 1907, pp. 158, 248–9, 279–80.

[5] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 319–21.

Les Laumes and the valley of the Rabutin. The 20-foot trench [1] extended only across the plain of Les Laumes. Of the two 15-foot trenches the inner surrounded Alesia, but the outer was confined to the plain. The circumvallation had nowhere more than one trench.

Achaintre [2] puts the question whether the 20-foot trench formed a part of the completed system of works, or whether it was merely a 'fossé perdu', abandoned after it had served the temporary purpose of protecting the legionaries while they were constructing the proper works. The former view is defended by Lipsius, Folard, and Turpin de Crissé. Guischard, however, argues that if this trench had formed a part of the contravallation, properly so called, there must have been another like it in the circumvallation, as we may infer from Caesar's saying that the contravallation and the circumvallation were identical in plan.[3] Moreover, as Achaintre justly remarks, Caesar does not say one word to suggest that the 20-foot trench did form a part of the contravallation; and the passage in which he describes the attempt which the Gauls made to cross it while the relieving army was making its first attack upon the circumvallation in the plain,[4] proves that the Romans had abandoned it.

. . . . . .

The distance between the 20-foot trench and the inner of the two trenches in the line of contravallation was, according to the MSS., 400 feet.[5] 'But,' says von Kampen,[6] 'in place of reading *pedes CCCC*, it must be *passus CCCC*'—nearly 2,000 feet—'as a simple measurement of the space between the trenches—traces of which still exist—gives this distance.' Napoleon contradicting the evidence supplied by his own Atlas (Planche 25), says '400 feet';[7] and Mr. W. C. Compton [8] tries to explain the difficulty by saying that 'at either *end* the 20-feet ditch is no more than 400 *feet* in front of the other fortifications'. But this will not do: tested by the scale, Napoleon's Plan makes the distance at the northern end much more than 400 feet. The Greek paraphrast wrote τρία στάδια, which is equivalent to 375 *passus*;[9] and perhaps we may infer that the reading in his copy of Caesar was *passus CCCC*. Following Napoleon's Plan, I have given approximately the distance as measured, according to the scale, from the southern end of the innermost trench to the contravallation.

. . . . . .

[1] The dimensions of this trench do not correspond precisely with those given by Caesar. *Pro Alesia*, 1908, p. 348.

[2] *Caesar*, i, 375–6.

[3] pares eiusdem generis munitiones, diversas ab his, contra exteriorem hostem perfecit. *B. G.*, vii, 74, § 1.

[4] *Ib.*, 79, § 4.

[5] *Ib.*, 72, § 2.

[6] *Quindecim ad Caesaris de b. G. Comm. tabulae*, xiii.

[7] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 303.

[8] *Caesar's Seventh Campaign in Gaul*, p. 105.

[9] The Greek translation is said to have been made from Stephanus's edition of 1544 (*Berl. phil. Woch.*, 1901, col. 41); but Stephanus reads *pedes*.

Excavation has shown that on the hills round Alesia the pits (*scrobes*) which Caesar describes in *B. G.*, vii, 73, §§ 5–8 (with which compare 74, § 1) were not in front but in rear of the circumvallation,[1] which was broken opposite each pair.

. . . . . .

According to Caesar,[2] the perimeter of the circumvallation was 14 Roman miles, or about 21 kilometres; according to Stoffel's interpretation of the results of the excavations,[3] only 18 kilometres. The tracing of the circumvallation in Napoleon's map[4] is, however, partly conjectural; and Commandant Colin[5] gives reasons for believing that the extent may actually have equalled Caesar's estimate. On the whole, Caesar's description of the fortifications, from which one cannot expect the rigorous accuracy of an engineer writing in a professional journal, is subject only to trivial corrections.

6. Guischard[6] holds the singular opinion that there was only one trench in the contravallation besides the 20-foot trench; and that the other of the two trenches which Caesar expressly mentions was in the circumvallation. This view is refuted by the results of the excavations; but it may be well to show that they agree with Caesar's narrative. Guischard argues that *fossa interior*[7] means the trench in the contravallation, and *fossa exterior*[8] the trench in the circumvallation. But, as L. V. Berlinghieri[9] points out, after having mentioned these two trenches, Caesar goes on to say that behind them he constructed a rampart; and it is clear that this rampart belonged to the contravallation.[10] Guischard insists that when Caesar, after describing the 20-foot trench, says that he traced all the other works at a distance of 400 feet behind it (*reliquas omnes munitiones ab ea fossa pedes CCCC reduxit*), he means by *reliquas omnes munitiones* both the contravallation and the circumvallation; but this view is refuted by the very fact that the *reliquae omnes munitiones* were separated by the distance of 400 feet (or 'paces') from the 20-foot trench. If the *reliquae omnes munitiones* had comprised both the contravallation and the circumvallation, Caesar would not have said that they were both separated by the same distance from the 20-foot trench. It is clear, then, that *reliquas omnes munitiones* refers only to the contravallation. Finally, *after* describing the construction of the *reliquae omnes munitiones*, which included the two trenches above mentioned, and of the subsidiary defences (*lilia*, *cippi*, and *stimuli*), Caesar proceeds to describe the construction of the circum-

[1] *Pro Alesia*, 1908, p. 418. [2] *B. G.*, vii, 74, § 1.
[3] *Pro Alesia*, 1908, p. 351. Napoleon's estimate (*Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 322) is 'about 20 kilometres'.
[4] Pl. 25. [5] *Pro Alesia*, 1908, p. 351.
[6] *Mém. crit. et hist.*, 1774, pp. 499–501. [7] *B. G.*, vii, 72, § 3.
[8] The term is Guischard's own. Caesar does not mention the *fossa exterior*, though of course he implies its existence.
[9] *Examen des opérations et des travaux de César autour d'Alésia*, 1812, pp. 77–84.
[10] Hoc intermisso spatio duas fossas XV pedes latas, eadem altitudine perduxit, quarum interiorem campestribus ac demissis locis aqua ex flumine derivata complevit. Post eas aggerem ac vallum XII pedum extruxit. *B. G.*, vii, 72, § 3.

vallation. 'When these defences were completed,' he says, 'Caesar constructed . . . corresponding works of the same kind, facing the opposite way, to repel the enemy from without' (*His rebus perfectis . . . pares eiusdem generis munitiones, diversas ab his, contra exteriorem hostem perfecit.*[1]

7. Napoleon[2] represents the towers as erected on that part of the contravallation which crossed the western plain,—clearly implying that they were not erected on any other part; and he says that the works which Caesar describes in chapters 72 and 73 were 'peculiar to the plain of Les Laumes'. Both these statements are incorrect; and they are contradicted by Napoleon himself, by his Plan (25), and by the *Commentaries*. Caesar tells us that there were *lilia* and *cippi*, as he calls the subsidiary defences which I have described on page 172, in front of the camp on the southern slopes of Mont Réa;[3] and he mentions the towers that defended the *loca praerupta*, which are identified with the Montagne de Flavigny.[4]

8. Guischard[5] holds that the *agger* or rampart in the line of contravallation, which Caesar describes in chapter 72, was protected by a palisade (*vallum*), planted on the berme, as well as by the crenellated parapet (*lorica pinnaeque*) which stood upon the rampart itself. Caesar describes the rampart by the words *aggerem ac vallum*, which show that there was a palisade somewhere: but there is no evidence that it was planted on the berme; and its proper place was the top of the rampart.[6]

9. Guischard also holds that the towers which Caesar erected at intervals of 80 feet (?)[7] along the line of contravallation were mounds, projecting in front of the curtain and protected by parapets;[8] but this absurd theory is refuted by the passages in which Caesar describes the construction of the wooden towers which Cicero erected upon the rampart of his winter camp in 54 B.C.[9]

10. Describing the subsidiary defences which he calls *cippi*,

[1] *B. G.*, vii, 72–4. [2] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 303, 312, 319–22.

[3] The writer of the article in the *Neue Jahrbücher* (cxx, 1879, pp. 175–6) argues that Napoleon was wrong in identifying the hill on the north of Alesia, on the southern slopes of which Reginus and Rebilus encamped, with Mont Réa. I refuted his arguments in my first edition (pp. 792–4); but, considering that it was at the spot which Napoleon identified with the scene of Vercassivellaunus's attack that the whole of the Gallic coins and the great majority of the Gallic weapons which the excavators unearthed were found, I think that it would be superfluous to reprint the paragraph.

[4] *B. G.*, vii, 73, §§ 4–8; 85, § 6; 86, § 5.

[5] *Mém. mil.*, pp. 230–1.

[6] Caesar, says A. E. Masquelez (*Spect. mil.*, 2e sér., xliii, 1863, pp. 354–5), frequently uses the expression *viminea lorica*; and we may therefore conclude that the *lorica* was made of wattle-work. The conclusion may be right; but Caesar never uses the expression *viminea lorica*.

[7] A. Klotz (*Caesarstudien*, p. 219) thinks that the towers must have stood much further apart than 80 feet, especially as artillery was used (*B. G.*, vii, 81, § 5), and accordingly conjectures that for *pedes* we should read *passus*. If, as we may suppose, the pieces of artillery were in the towers, he is probably right. Cf. p. 808.

[8] *Mém. mil.*, pp. 230-1. [9] *B. G.*, v. 40, § 6.

Caesar writes:—*Itaque truncis arborum aut admodum firmis ramis abscisis atque horum delibratis ac praeacutis cacuminibus, perpetuae fossae quinos pedes altae ducebantur. Huc illi stipites demissi et ab infimo revincti, ne revelli possent, ab ramis eminebant. Quini erant ordines coniuncti inter se atque implicati; quo qui intraverant, se ipsi acutissimis vallis induebant*[1] ('Accordingly trees or very stout branches were cut down and their ends stripped of their bark, and sharpened to a point; continuous trenches were then dug, 5 feet deep, in which the logs were planted and fastened down at the bottom to prevent their being dragged out, while the boughs projected above. *There were five rows in each trench* [?], *connected with one another and interlaced;* and all who stepped in would impale themselves on the sharp stakes'). Does *quini . . . implicati* mean that there were five parallel trenches, or five rows of boughs in each trench? Kraner,[2] von Göler,[3] and Long[4] suggest the latter interpretation; and it seems the more probable, because the passage immediately follows that in which Caesar describes how the boughs were inserted in the trenches:[5] if he had meant that there were five *perpetuae fossae*, he would naturally have said so when he first mentioned them, and by planting five rows of boughs in each trench labour would have been saved. Napoleon[6] adopts the other interpretation, but gives no reasons.

Berlinghieri,[7] however, does give a reason. He says that if each of the trenches had been wide enough to contain five rows of boughs, Caesar would have mentioned their breadth. This is no argument. The fact that each trench contained five rows would of itself prove that the breadth of the trenches was considerable. P. Bial[8] holds with Berlinghieri that if Caesar had meant to convey that there was only one trench, he would have written *perpetua fossa*, not *perpetuae fossae*. I have not tried to prove that there was only one trench, but that Caesar does not say that there were five. But in any case Caesar would not have written *perpetua fossa*; for it would be ridiculous to imagine that he meant to describe an endless trench, surrounding Alesia like a ring. What he meant was that, where the trenches were necessary, they were continuous.[9]

11. Some commentators have maintained that the line of circumvallation, as well as the line of contravallation, included a 'fossé perdu', that is to say a 20-foot trench similar to the one which Caesar describes in his 72nd chapter. I suppose

[1] *B. G.*, vii, 73, §§ 2–5.
[2] *Caesar*, ed. Dittenberger-Kraner, 1890, p. 326.
[3] *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 311.
[4] *Caesar*, p. 390.
[5] See Schneider, ii, 571.
[6] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 303, and Planche 27. Cf. *Pro Alesia*, 1907, pp. 239–40.
[7] *Examen*, &c., p. 89.
[8] *Chemins, habitations et oppidum de la Gaule au temps de César*, 1864, p. 210, n. 3.
[9] The writer of the article in the *Neue Jahrbücher* (cxx, 1879, pp. 117–8) gives a fantastic explanation of the *quini ordines*, which I needlessly refuted in the first edition (pp. 789–90).

they thought that it was necessary in order to protect the soldiers while they were at work from the attacks of the unarmed rustics in the neighbourhood. Guischard[1] has taken the trouble to refute this absurdity.

12. On pages 175–6 of my narrative I have written, 'It was just after the expulsion of the Mandubii when the anxious watchers on the hill saw, moving over the plain, a multitude of cavalry. The infantry were on the heights of Mussy-la-Fosse behind.' Caesar does not fix the date of the arrival of the relieving army at Alesia. After describing the fate of the Mandubii, he writes,[2] *interea Commius reliquique duces . . . ad Alesiam perveniunt*, &c. I should think that *interea* is used loosely here, as 'meanwhile' often is in English. If the relieving army had already arrived, we may perhaps presume that the Mandubii would not have been expelled from the town. [Since I wrote these words, I have come across three passages in which Virgil,[3] as Nettleship remarks, uses *interea* in a loose sense.]

13. Caesar says that the relieving army encamped not more than one Roman mile from the circumvallation, on a hill outside Alesia.[4] The hill is generally identified with Mussy-la-Fosse, which is south-west of Mont Auxois, and beyond the plain of Les Laumes.

Mr. Compton[5] gives reasons for placing the camp on the slope of this hill, facing Alesia, not, as von Kampen does, on the plateau. He argues that 'first, the view towards the besieged town is no more comprehensive from the top of the hill than from the side; secondly, a hill, so high and so far removed from the scene of action would be quite unsuitable for military purposes, especially for cavalry; thirdly, Caesar expressly gives a mile from the Roman lines as the distance at which the Gauls encamped, and the *foot* of the hill at the nearest point is about a mile from the Roman works; fourthly, the area enclosed by a line of earthworks in von Kampen's map appears out of proportion to the needs even of so large a force as that of the text; fifthly, the Roman cavalry pursue the Gauls "usque ad castra"'—right up to the camp—'which would be practically impossible if the camp were on the top of so steep a hill.' There can be no doubt that, if the Gauls encamped on the hill of Mussy at all, they encamped, partly at all events, on its slope; but any one may convince himself, by merely comparing the area of the plateau of Mussy with the area of the plateau of Mont Auxois and reflecting that the relieving army was three times as numerous as the tightly packed garrison of Alesia, that von Kampen's camp is not at all too large.

Von Göler[6] objects to the hill of Mussy-la-Fosse altogether, and

[1] *Mém. crit. et hist.*, 1774, p. 504.
[2] *B. G.*, vii, 79, § 1.
[3] *Aen.*, x, 1; xi, 1; xii, 842.
[4] Colle exteriore occupato non longius mille passibus ab nostris munitionibus considunt. *B. G.*, vii, 79, § 1.
[5] *Caesar's Seventh Campaign in Gaul*, pp. 107–8.
[6] *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 316.

places the encampment on the hill south of Pouillenay, which is south-west of the Montagne de Flavigny. He holds that, as this hill abounds in springs and is situated near streamlets which flow into the Brenne, the Gauls would have been able to fetch water with less danger than they would have incurred if they had encamped on the hill of Mussy. He also lays stress on Caesar's use of the singular *colle*, arguing that, according to the received view, the Gauls would have occupied not one hill but two.

Von Göler's arguments are not convincing. Streamlets, from which the Gauls could have fetched water without risk, flow into the Brenne near Mussy as well as near Pouillenay : Caesar might, I think, have used the singular *colle* loosely ;[1] and Pouillenay is more than a mile from the nearest point of the circumvallation. I do not think that any one who had seen Mont Auxois would have any hesitation in rejecting von Göler's theory.

14. The Romans, in repelling the first assault of the circumvallation, drove back the Gauls, *fundis librilibus* (sudibusque, quas in opere disposuerant, ac glandibus),[2] which I have translated by ' with slings throwing large stones (and sharp stakes ', &c.). The meaning, however, depends on the punctuation : if we put a comma after *fundis*, as Meusel does in the reissue of his school edition, it would be ' with slings, large stones (and sharp stakes ', &c.). Forcellini[3] holds that *fundae libriles* were slings that threw stones weighing a *libra*, or Roman pound (rather less than 12 ounces) each ; and stones weighing a *mina* (about 15 ounces) each were slung by Balearic slingers.[4] If *librilibus* is to be taken as a substantive, it may perhaps be interpreted, after Festus,[5] as ' stones of the thickness of a man's arm ', which were thrown by hand.[6]

15. Describing the sortie which the besieged attempted while the relieving army was making its first assault upon the circumvallation, Caesar writes :—*At interiores, dum ea quae a Vercingetorige ad eruptionem praeparata erant proferunt, priores fossas explent, diutius in his rebus administrandis morati prius suos discessisse cognoverunt quam munitionibus adpropinquarent*[7] (' The besieged lost much time in bringing out the implements which Vercingetorix had prepared for the sortie, and in filling up the front [?] trenches ; and finding, before they could approach the contravallation, that their comrades had withdrawn,' &c.). The question is what Caesar meant by *priores*. Most commentators make *priores* agree with *fossas* ; but while Napoleon[8] understands by *priores fossas* merely the 20-foot trench, which was nearest to the besieged, Dittenberger believes that Caesar was speaking both of it and of the nearer of the two parallel 15-foot

[1] M. Jullian, I find, remarks (*Vercingétorix*, p. 388, n. 2) that ' en réalité ces deux collines ne sont que deux branches d'un même massif '.

[2] *B. G.*, vii, 81, § 4.

[3] *Totius latinitatis lex.*, iii, 1865, p. 755. Cf. Daremberg and Saglio, *Dict. des ant. grecques et rom.*, ii, 1364.

[4] Diodorus Siculus, xix, 109, § 2.

[5] *De verborum significatione*, ed. C. O. Müller, 1839, p. 116.

[6] Cf. Vegetius, ii, 23, on *libralia saxa*.

[7] *B. G.*, vii, 82, §§ 3–4.

[8] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 309.

trenches. It has been objected to Napoleon's interpretation that Caesar would not have used the plural *fossas* to describe one trench ; but I think that he might have used *fossas* in the sense of various parts of one trench, just as he often uses *ripas* and *ripis* in the sense of various parts of one bank.[1] Schneider,[2] however, thinks it unlikely that Caesar would have used the comparative when he meant the superlative ; and it may be added that if he had meant the trench nearest to the besieged, he would have written *proximam fossam*, as he did in chapter 79. To Dittenberger's view there are three objections. Is it likely that Caesar would have described two out of three trenches, the nearest of which to the besieged was about a quarter of a mile from the second, while the second was in juxtaposition with the third, as *priores fossas* ? What right has Dittenberger to assume that the besieged successfully crossed not only the nearest trench but also the elaborate system of subsidiary defences, which intervened between the nearest trench and the second, when Caesar's narrative clearly implies that they did nothing of the kind. And if they had reached the inner 15-foot trench, which was quite close to the rampart of the contravallation, how could Caesar have said that they never got near the contravallation ? Moreover, if *priores* agrees with *fossas*, the omission of *et* before *priores* is remarkable. For these reasons I was once tempted to adopt the view of Schneider[3] and von Göler[4] that *priores* does not agree with *fossas*, but that it is in the nominative case and denotes the front ranks of the besieged, who tried to fill up the nearest trench, while the rest were engaged in bringing up the various implements that were required for the proposed assault on the contravallation. But it seems unlikely that Caesar should have drawn a distinction between the front ranks of the besieged and those behind ; and there is a very strong reason, besides the one which I have already given, for believing that *fossas* cannot mean 'the nearest trench', or at all events cannot mean it alone.[5] The besieged, as we learn from chapter 79 (*itaque productis copiis . . . proximam fossam cratibus integunt atque aggere explent*) had already filled up the nearest trench ;[6] and even if the Romans removed the fascines, the besieged could soon have filled it up again. For it must be remembered that there was no need to fill it along its whole extent : all that was necessary was to make causeways here and there. But when the columns, after crossing the causeways, had deployed into line, and were about to attack the contravallation, they were of course obliged to fill up the whole of the trenches. I believe therefore that *priores fossas* means the small subsidiary trenches which the Romans called *cippi*. Guischard is surely wrong in thinking that it also means the inner of the two 15-foot trenches;[7] for, I repeat, if the Gauls had begun to fill up

[1] Cf. Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, ii, 1750, and his edition of the *Civil War*, p. 220.
[2] *Caesar*, ii, 616.
[3] *Ib.*, ii, 615–6.
[4] *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 319, n. 3.
[5] I failed to think of this reason before the publication of the first edition.
[6] See Guischard, *Mém. crit. et hist.*, 1774, pp. 497–8.
[7] Cf. C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 522, n. 10, 523, n. 1.

this ditch, which formed part of the contravallation, properly so called, how could Caesar have said that they did not approach the contravallation ?

16. In the account of the sortie which Vercingetorix made on the day of Vercassivellaunus's attack we read that Vercingetorix marched out of the town and took out of his camp the sappers' huts and other material which he required for endeavouring to force the Roman lines (*Vercingetorix ex arce Alesiae suos conspicatus ex oppido egreditur castris* [*a castris β*] *longurios, musculos, falces reliquaque quae eruptionis causa paraverat profert*).[1] Now many commentators, assuming the identity of Mont Réa with the northern hill, and assuming that Vercingetorix directed his sortie against the works in the plain of Les Laumes, have urged that he would not have marched out of Alesia through his camp, which was on its eastern side, and have therefore altered *castris* (out of camp) into *crates* (fascines). But, as Long[2] has pointed out with his usual acumen, the alteration is unnecessary. 'Vercingetorix,' he says, 'had a camp (c. 70), and though it was at the east end of the hill, it was below it, and on such a level that it was much more easy to carry such things as "musculi" from his camp to the lines on the west side of the town . . . than to bring them from the high plateau of Alesia down its steep sides. Any man who has seen the ground and read Caesar's text with care will reject the emendation *crates*.[3] There would be no use in having all these cumbrous things on the top of the hill in the town.'

17. Maissiat[4] infers from a passage in Polyaenus[5] that some Gallic traitor informed Caesar of the intended attack of Vercassivellaunus on the camp at Mont Réa. I do not believe this; for if Caesar had been warned, he would surely have reinforced the threatened camp before the attack commenced.[6]

18. The statement on p. 178 of my narrative—'The attack on the circumvallation in the plain was comparatively feeble; for the bulk of the relieving force was formidable only in numbers'—is a fair inference from Caesar's narrative. 60,000 picked men were sent to attack the camp on Mont Réa. According to the enumeration given

[1] *B. G.*, vii, 84, § 1. Cf. p. 608, n. 10. [2] *Caesar*, pp. 402–3.

[3] H. Schiller (*Über Entstehung. . . d. corpus Caes.*, 1899, p. 25) gives a reason for accepting *crates* which is in my opinion inconclusive. Remarking that the reading of *α* is *castris* and of *β a castris*, he explains that in certain various readings *a* is really a misunderstood abbreviation of *aliter* (otherwise); and he shows that this abbreviation accounts for the—at first sight inexplicable—reading *auxilio dunum* for *Uxellodunum* in viii, 32, § 2, *auxilio dunum* having been evolved from *a.* (= *aliter*) *uxillo dunum*. But *a* does not always stand for *aliter*; and to suppose that *a castris* grew out of *a. cratis* is surely gratuitous.

[4] *Jules César en Gaule*, iii, 135, n. 1. [5] viii, 23, § 11.

[6] M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 530, n. 5) wrongly, as I believe, supposes that Polyaenus was thinking of the pursuit of the Gallic fugitives which began in the middle of the night that followed the final struggle at Alesia (*B. G.*, vii, 88, § 7). Polyaenus's statement is, in my opinion, so utterly worthless as evidence that I do not even reproduce it; but any one who reads it will see that it is irreconcilable with Caesar's narrative. Cf. *Pro Alesia*, 1909, pp. 531–2.

in chapter 76, 170,000 or 180,000, allowing for the numbers killed and wounded on previous days, would have been available for attacking the circumvallation in the plain. But Caesar does not lay any stress upon this attack : he merely notifies it ; while he does lay great stress upon the efforts of the 60,000 picked men and of the besieged.[1] Indeed, although he implies that the circumvallation in the plain was attacked, he does not expressly say so : he merely says that 'the cavalry began to move towards the entrenchments in the plain, while the rest of the host made a demonstration in front of their camp'. We are perhaps justified in inferring that it was attacked, because Caesar implies that both on the circumvallation and on the contravallation the Romans were distracted by the din of battle in their rear ;[2] but possibly in speaking of the circumvallation, he may only have been referring to the attack on the camp of Rebilus.[3] A. Réville[4] and the Duc d'Aumale[5] make some remarks upon the matter, which perhaps infer too much, but are worth quoting. Réville thinks that the efficiency of the relieving army was paralysed by 'l'intérêt oligarchique et particulariste des nobles'. The nobles, he goes on to say, feared the triumph of Vercingetorix as much as the victory of the Romans. All this, indeed, is pure conjecture ; but it is well-founded conjecture. The Duc d'Aumale suggests that all the Gauls of the relieving army, except the 60,000 picked men, were a confused ill-armed mob ; and that the Aedui were probably half-hearted, and had perhaps, after the rebuff which they received from the Pan-Gallic council, when they claimed the right of directing the campaign, made secret overtures of submission to Caesar. Considering what Caesar says about their disgust when they found that they were not to have the direction of the campaign, and their regret at having flung away their alliance with Rome,[6] we may, I think, assume that they *were* half-hearted.

19. Caesar says that on the day of the final attack he occupied 'a suitable position', which enabled him to note all the phases of the action (*Caesar idoneum locum nactus, quid quaque in parte geratur cognoscit*).[7] The most, indeed the only 'suitable position' is on the Montagne de Flavigny. (See Napoleon's *Histoire de Jules César*, ii, 311.) M. du Mesnil, 'chef d'escadron d'état-major,' decides for the hill near Grésigny, which is on the east of Mont Réa, 'because it was Caesar's interest to keep as close as possible to the point where danger was imminent.'[8] But, as I shall show that the 'steep places'

[1] *B. G.*, vii, 83, § 8 ; 85–8 ; and Napoleon's *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 310, n. 2.

[2] Multum ad terrendos nostros valet clamor, qui post tergum pugnantibus extitit, quod suum periculum in aliena vident salute constare. *B. G.*, vii, 84, § 4.

[3] M. V. Pernet (*Pro Alesia*, 1908, pp. 419–20 ; 1909, pp. 580–1) conjectures that the relieving army attacked not only in the plain and at Mont Réa, but also on the Montagne de Bussy, near the redoubt numbered 15, and on the Montagne de Flavigny, near camp A, where the finds lead him to believe that there was fighting.

[4] *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, 3e pér., xxiii, 1877, pp. 67–8.

[5] *Ib.*, 2e pér., xv, 1858, p. 116.

[6] *B. G.*, vii, 63, § 8.

[7] *Ib.*, 85, § 1.

[8] *Spect. mil.*, xxvii, 1839, p. 630.

(*loca praerupta*), to secure which Caesar marched in person after he had visited the works in the plain of Les Laumes, and from which he went to the relief of Labienus, may probably be identified with the Montagne de Flavigny, on du Mesnil's theory Caesar, before he relieved Labienus, would have had to make a long march from the north of Alesia, right across the plain of Les Laumes, to the south, and back again to Mont Réa. See page 179 of my narrative.

20. Describing the final attempt of the besieged to break through the contravallation, Caesar says that, abandoning the hope of forcing the formidable works in the plain, they attempted to storm the lines at a point where the ascent was precipitous (*interiores desperatis campestribus locis propter magnitudinem munitionum loca praerupta* [*ex*] *ascensu temptant*, &c.).[1] The Duc d'Aumale, who wrote before the appearance of Napoleon's book, considered that the *loca praerupta* which the besieged attacked were Mont Pevenel and the plateau of Sauvigny, in other words the Montagne de Bussy, and that, after Caesar had beaten them, he rejoined Labienus by crossing the valley of the Rabutin.[2] Napoleon particularizes the *loca praerupta* as 'the works situated at the foot of the precipitous heights of the mountain of Flavigny'.[3] The description *loca praerupta* hardly applies to Mont Pevenel or to the plateau of Sauvigny. Besides, the *loca praerupta* were identical with or just above the steep inclines (*declivia et devexa*) which Caesar mentions in chapter 88 : the *declivia et devexa* were visible from the camp on Mont Réa ; and the slopes of Mont Pevenel were not. Heller, indeed, argues that Caesar must have referred to Mont Pevenel, 'because there alone the line of contravallation' crossed the higher slopes.[4] But, as Mr. Compton remarks, 'the besieged might be said "temptare" these heights, if they assailed the lines, the crossing of which would lead to them' ;[5] and M. Jullian[6] justly observes that if Vercingetorix had selected any other point for attack, he would have lost precious time. The plateau of Sauvigny was not crossed by the line of contravallation ; and therefore it is open to the same objection as the Montagne de Flavigny. Mr. Froude describes the final attack of the besieged as having taken place on the *north* side of Alesia.[7] 'Caesar,' he says, 'saw the peril'—of the camp on Mont Réa—'and sent Labienus with six cohorts to their help. Vercingetorix had seen it also, and attacked the interior lines at the same spot. Decimus Brutus was then despatched also, and then Caius Fabius.' No one who had studied Caesar's narrative with close attention could have written the last two sentences. 'The interior lines at the same spot' could not possibly be described as *loca praerupta*. Mr. Froude goes on to say that 'Finally, when the fighting grew desperate, he [Caesar] left his own station . . . and he rode across the field, conspicuous', &c. But what field did he ride across ? If Mr. Froude is right in saying

[1] *B. G.*, vii, 86, § 4. [2] *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, 2e pér., xv, 1858, p. 139.
[3] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 311–2. [4] *Philologus*, xiii, 1858, p. 599.
[5] *Caesar's Seventh Campaign in Gaul*, p. 111.
[6] *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 526, n. 7. [7] *Caesar : a Sketch*, ed. 1886, p. 369.

that Vercingetorix 'attacked the interior lines at the same spot', *there was no field to ride across!* For 'the interior lines at the same spot' can only mean the interior lines nearest to the foot of Mont Réa: whatever the 'spot' was against which the besieged directed their final attack, Caesar, as he himself tells us, went to rescue its defenders; and, when he had done so, he rode to succour Labienus. That is to say, according to Mr. Froude, he 'rode across the field' from 'the interior lines at the same spot' to 'the same spot'! Besides, how would Mr. Froude explain the words '*de locis superioribus* (that is to say, from the slopes, occupied by the Gauls, above Labienus's position) *haec declivia et devexa cernebantur*'. *Haec declivia et devexa* cannot apply to what Mr. Froude speaks of as 'the interior lines at the same spot',—that is, be it remembered, close to the foot of Mont Réa. But if they are understood as applying to the slopes of Flavigny on the opposite, or southern, side of the plain, from which Caesar could be seen descending, the narrative is perfectly intelligible, and every difficulty disappears.

21. Describing the final movement which he made to succour Labienus, Caesar writes, *equitum partem se sequi, partem circumire exteriores munitiones et a tergo hostes adoriri iubet.*[1] Napoleon holds that the part which was to ride round the circumvallation (*exteriores munitiones*) came, not from the Montagne de Flavigny, where Caesar was, but from Grésigny; for the results of Stoffel's excavations show that three of Caesar's cavalry camps were in the western plain, and one in the valley of the Rabutin, near Grésigny.[2] Apart from this consideration, it seems very unlikely that the cavalry which was to ride round the outer lines left the Montagne de Flavigny and went round to Mont Réa by the west; for in that case they would have had to encounter a large part of the relieving army, both cavalry and infantry, on the way.[3] Nor could they, as Long supposed,[4] have gone round Alesia from the Montagne de Flavigny by the east either, because in that case they would have reached the scene of action too late, and they would have lost time by needlessly riding all the way round the outer lines. Caesar's galloper, who, if they started from Grésigny, must have ridden to order them to advance, would have gone between the circumvallation and the contravallation, and moreover could have ridden faster than a large body of cavalry.

22. Just before Caesar came to his rescue, Labienus was reinforced by a number of cohorts from the nearest redoubts (*Labienus . . . coactis una XL cohortibus, quas ex proximis praesidiis deductas fors obtulit*,[5] &c.). The MSS. differ regarding the number. *BLM* have *una XL*; *AQ* have *una de XL*, (39); and *β* has *de XL*, which is nonsense. Guischard[6] defends the reading *una de XL*, arguing that the inaction of Commius allowed this large number to leave the

[1] *B. G.*, vii, 87, § 4. [2] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 318.
[3] M. Jullian, however (*Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 529, nn. 2, 6), chooses this exposed route.
[4] W. Smith's *Dict. of Greek and Roman Geogr.*, ii, 259.
[5] *B. G.*, vii, 87, § 5. [6] *Mém. crit. et hist.*, 1774, pp. 507–8.

redoubts in the plain and join Labienus : but 39 cohorts were almost four legions, or two-fifths of the whole force ; and this number must surely be in excess of the truth. I incline to accept Ciacconius's conjecture,—*XI*.

23. On page 179 I have stated that Reginus and Caninius sent a galloper to inform Caesar, who, as we have seen, was probably on the lower slope of the Montagne de Flavigny, that they required reinforcements, and that Caesar sent a galloper to order the cavalry at Grésigny to make the charge which proved decisive. There is no direct evidence for either of these statements ; and it might be contended that the messages were communicated by signals in the manner described by Polybius.[1] But from Grésigny the signals could not have been seen, because Mont Auxois would have interrupted the view ;[2] and I am inclined to believe that Reginus could have communicated with Caesar by sending a galloper, who would only have had to ride about two miles and a quarter, more quickly than by the elaborate system of signals which Polybius describes.

24. *Eius adventu*, writes Caesar, *ex colore vestitus cognito*, [*quo insigni in proeliis uti consuerat,*] *turmisque equitum et cohortibus visis quas se sequi iusserat, ut de locis superioribus haec declivia et devexa cernebantur, hostes proelium committunt.*[3] The MSS. all have *hostes* ; but Nipperdey and A. Holder, followed by various English editors, substitute *nostri*. If *hostes* is right, the meaning is that the enemy, seeing Caesar approaching with reinforcements, made a last desperate effort to storm the camp on Mont Réa before he could arrive : if *nostri*, that the Romans under Labienus were encouraged to make a bold sortie. In defence of the emendation *nostri*, which he borrowed from Jurinius, Nipperdey[4] says, ' First of all, it is incredible that the approach of Caesar and the reinforcements which the Romans received should have induced the enemy to engage. Secondly the enemy did by no means engage at that moment : they had done so long before, at the time when the attack on the Roman lines commenced ; and since then they had not relaxed the vigour of their attack.' I cannot see that these are sufficient reasons for setting aside the authority of the MSS. *Hostes* seems to me to make perfectly good sense ; and the appearance of *nostri* in the same chapter, a couple of lines further on, militates, I think, against the substitution of *nostri* for *hostes*. But, whichever reading is right, I have no doubt that the effect of Caesar's approach was to stimulate the Gauls to make a last desperate effort to storm the camp before he could arrive, *and* to encourage the Romans to make a bold sortie.

[Since writing the above paragraph, I have referred to Schneider's edition (ii, 634). I find that he reads *hostes*, and that he defends it by practically the same arguments as I have put forward myself ;

[1] x, 43–7. Cf. Vegetius, iii, 5, and *B. G.*, ii, 33, § 3.

[2] The same objection holds good in the other case if, as Napoleon believes, Labienus, whom Caesar sent to reinforce Reginus, was encamped on the Montagne de Bussy.

[3] *B. G.*, vii, 88, § 1.

[4] *Caesar*, p. 110.

and particularly that he expresses the same opinion as I have done regarding the repetition of *nostri*.]

25. The reader must take the story of the surrender of Vercingetorix, which I have told in the text, for what it may be worth. It only rests upon the authority of Plutarch and of Florus; and M. Salomon Reinach[1] regards it as 'simplement l'écho de quelque pantomime historique représentée à Rome': but Mommsen[2] accepts it without question; and Long[3] says, 'It is so lively and so natural a thing, so truly Gallic, that it has been got from some authority,'—perhaps from some lost memoirs by one of Caesar's officers? Florus[4] says, *Ipse ille rex . . . supplex cum in castra venisset, tum et phaleras et sua arma ante Caesaris genua proiecit;* and Plutarch,[5] Ὁ δὲ τοῦ σύμπαντος ἡγεμὼν πολέμου Οὐεργεντόριξ ἀναλαβὼν τῶν ὅπλων τὰ κάλλιστα καὶ κοσμήσας τὸν ἵππον ἐξιππάσατο διὰ τῶν πυλῶν, καὶ κύκλῳ περὶ τὸν Καίσαρα καθεζόμενον ἐλάσας, εἶτα ἀφαλόμενος τοῦ ἵππου τὴν μὲν πανοπλίαν ἀπέρριψεν, αὐτὸς δὲ καθίσας ὑπὸ πόδας τοῦ Καίσαρος ἡσυχίαν ἦγεν, ἄχρι οὗ παρεδόθη φρουρησόμενος ἐπὶ τὸν θρίαμβον. H. Fleming[6] holds that Caesar's statement—(Vercingetorix) *deditur*[7]—'signifie, en son laconisme terrible, que le chef arverne fut conduit à César par ses propres compagnons d'armes.' Obviously this is not inconsistent with the statements of either Florus or Plutarch.

THE PASSAGE *TANTA TAMEN . . . INCUMBERENT* (*B. G.*, vii, 76, § 2)

(Huius opera Commii . . . fideli atque utili superioribus annis erat usus in Britannia Caesar; pro quibus meritis civitatem eius immunem esse iusserat, iura legesque reddiderat atque ipsi Morinos attribuerat.) *Tanta tamen universae Galliae consensio fuit libertatis vindicandae et pristinae belli laudis recuperandae ut neque beneficiis neque amicitiae memoria moverentur omnesque et animo et opibus in id bellum incumberent.* Instead of *moverentur*—the reading of all the MSS.—Meusel[8] adopts Kraffert's emendation, *moveretur*, the subject of which he takes to be not *Gallia* but *Commius*. To begin with, he argues, *moverentur* would have no definite subject. Moreover, Caesar never would have said that the Gauls were *all* indebted to him for favours, whereas *beneficiis* and *amicitiae memoria* are perfectly applicable to Commius. Further, if *moverentur* represented Caesar's meaning, he would have written some such sentence as (recuperandae) *ut nemo aut beneficiis aut amicitiae memoria moveretur omnesque* (or *sed omnes*), &c. Finally, the word *tamen* shows that what follows contains a special reference to Commius.

[1] *Pro Alesia*, 1908, p. 376. See also *Rev. des études anc.*, iii, 1901, pp. 131–9.
[2] *Röm. Gesch.*, iii, 1889, p. 291 (*Hist. of Rome*, v, 1894, p. 90).
[3] *Caesar*, p. 406. [4] i, 45 (iii, 10). [5] *Caesar*, 27.
[6] *Pro Alesia*, 1909, p. 486. [7] *B. G.*, vii, 89, § 4.
[8] *Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xii, 1886, p. 290.

I am not convinced. Read this translation and see whether it does not sound natural. 'Yet so intense was the unanimous determination of the entire Gallic people to establish their liberty and recover their ancient military renown that no favours, no recollection of former friendship, had any influence with them, but all devoted their energies and resources to the prosecution of the war.' What would be the effect of substituting 'him' or 'Commius' for 'them'? As the passage stands, it does contain a reference to Commius :— 'But so intense . . . that . . . all' [including Commius], &c. The lack of a subject to *moverentur* is not surprising; for in vii, 73, §§ 5, 8, 9, *appellabant* is used twice and *nominabant* once without a subject, because the subject—*milites*—is supplied by the common sense of the reader. I can easily understand that Caesar would have said rhetorically of the Gauls in general that he had shown them favours and friendship, just as he said so of the Remi (v, 54, § 4) and of the Aedui (*ib.* and vii, 54, §§ 3–4). Cf. i, 30, § 2. And, even supposing that *moveretur* is right, may not its subject be *Gallia*? Cf. vii, 77, § 7.

THE EXECUTION OF VERCINGETORIX

The only ancient writer who mentions the execution of Vercingetorix is Dion Cassius. Stoffel says that it was in accordance with Roman custom, and that Caesar could not have prevented it if he had wished.[1] But we cannot tell whether he did wish; and for my part I do not care to ask. Ihne,[2] indeed, appears to doubt whether Vercingetorix was executed at all. The silence of Plutarch, he argues, who derived much of his information from the lost books of Livy, throws suspicion on the statement of Dion, who often unjustly charged Caesar with cruelty. I am no admirer of Dion; but I doubt whether he was impudent enough to invent a tale like this.

THE ATTITUDE OF THE AEDUI DURING THE LATTER PART OF THE REBELLION OF VERCINGETORIX

I discuss this question principally because a theory has been constructed regarding it by F. Monnier, which, although it probably contains a certain proportion of truth, has, I believe, been pushed too far, and is, moreover, supported by arguments which will not bear examination. His theory is that the Aedui were mainly responsible for the ultimate failure of Vercingetorix.

1. On page 175 of his *Vercingétorix* he says, 'A ce malheureux siège d'Alise, où domina contre Vercingétorix la faction éduenne, la

[1] *Guerre civile*, ii, 299.
[2] *Röm. Gesch.*, vi, 523, n. 1. Cf. C. Jullian, *Vercingétorix*, pp 396–7.

majorité des nobles gaulois s'opposa . . . à la levée en masse que voulait Vercingétorix, parce que, disent-ils, chaque chef ne pourrait plus ni diriger, ni reconnaître ses vassaux, *nec moderari, nec discernere suos* ; et non seulement les Éduens eurent alors la haute main pour fixer les chiffres des contingents, mais ce fut à Bibracte, chez les Éduens, que se forma l'armée de secours, et le commandement réel fut confié à des Éduens, Eporédorix et Viridomar, tous deux ennemis de Vercingétorix.' And in the same spirit Desjardins says,[1] ' Ces chefs '—that is to say, the chiefs of Gaul generally—' redevenus maîtres de la situation par le blocus d'*Alesia*, craignaient, en présence d'une multitude confuse, de ne pouvoir la contenir, de ne pas reconnaître les leurs, ni d'être en mesure de pourvoir aux vivres : — mauvaises excuses, mesquins faux-fuyants, vains prétextes, les mêmes dans tous les temps, et colorant la défection.'

Now, with all deference to Desjardins, the decision of the chiefs was wise, and their reasons were excellent. The experience of the Belgic confederation which opposed Caesar in 57 B.C. had shown how difficult it was to feed an overgrown army.[2] The other reason which Caesar assigns for the decision of the chiefs does not, as Monnier imagines, imply that they were afraid that Vercingetorix would usurp their authority over their own clients ; for why should he be able to interfere less with a comparatively small than with a large number ? It simply means that they were afraid that, if they sanctioned a levy *en masse*, their respective contingents would get out of hand. How would Desjardins have proposed to feed a host consisting of *all* the fighting men of Gaul ? And, if 250,000 were not enough, can any one with an iota of common sense believe that a larger army, or rather mob, would have succeeded ? It is curious that the Duke of Wellington and Sir Charles Napier, both no doubt unwittingly, sanctioned by their authority the reasons given by the chiefs. ' All history,' wrote Napier,[3] ' tells us that neither barbarous nor civilized warriors of different tribes or nations long agree when compressed.' Of the Duke, Sir William Napier tells this story :[4]—' Speaking of Waterloo, the duke said to Mr. Rogers the poet, " Napoleon should have waited for us at Paris." " Why ? " " Because 800,000 men would then have gathered round him." " Is not that the reason why he should not ? " " No ! why he should ; for when 800,000 men get together, there 's a damned deal of jostling." ' [5]

[1] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 702.

[2] *B. G.*, ii, 10, § 4. M. Jullian (*Vercingétorix*, p. 278) also refers to this passage ; ' mais,' he adds, ' il s'agissait alors d'une campagne longue et compliquée, et non pas, comme pour le salut d'Alésia, d'une marche de quelques jours et d'un assaut de quelques heures.' But has M. Jullian considered how the enormous hosts which he demands—a million instead of a quarter of a million—were to be fed on their way to Alesia, many of them coming from the uttermost parts of Gaul ? Has he thought of the transport which they would have needed, to say nothing of organization ? Has he forgotten that the host which attacked Sabinus in 56 B.C., when the campaign was neither long nor complicated, precipitated their attack for want of food (*B. G.*, iii, 18, § 6) ?

[3] *Life and Opinions of Charles James Napier*, iii, 218.

[4] *Ib.*

[5] M. Jullian (*Vercingétorix*, pp. 274–5, 278) thinks that a million men—nearly 60 for each linear yard of the *entire extent of the circumvallation*—would have

With regard to the other statements in the extract which I have given from Monnier's work, there is no evidence that the Aeduan, or any other faction, 'domina contre Vercingétorix': it is a pure invention to say that the Aedui fixed the numbers of the contingents of the relieving army; and to say that 'le commandement réel fut confié à des Éduens Éporédorix et Viridomar', is to be guilty not only of a *suggestio falsi* but also of a *suppressio veri*. For Monnier knows perfectly well that, besides Eporedorix and Viridomarus, two other generals, namely Commius and Vercassivellaunus, were appointed; and he also knows that the two latter figure much more prominently in Caesar's narrative than the two former.[1] Besides, how is Monnier's theory to be reconciled with the fact that, only a few weeks before, the Aedui had been severely snubbed in a Pan-Gallic council, when they claimed the right of directing the campaign?[2] Is it likely that, in the next council,[3] they would have been allowed to have matters all their own way?

2. Monnier maintains that the fact that the army of relief was assembled in Aeduan territory, proves that the baneful influence of the Aedui was in the ascendant.[4] Does he forget that the council which so emphatically pronounced that not the Aedui, but Vercingetorix was to hold the chief command, assembled at Bibracte,—the Aeduan capital?

3. Monnier appeals, in support of his theory, to the detailed list which Caesar furnishes[5] of the several contingents. 'Les contingents,' he says, 'sont d'autant plus nombreux qu'ils sont dévoués aux Éduens, et moins dévoués à la cause nationale.'[6] If so, how does he explain the fact that the contingents of the Arverni (Vercingetorix's countrymen) and of the Aedui, with their respective clients, were precisely the same? But although he finds an ally—Albert Réville[7]—whom I formerly answered[8] from respect for his reputation, I will not again try the reader's patience by examining arguments which rest upon the uncritical use of worthless manuscripts and which no one who can construe easy Latin would accept.

That the Aedui were treacherous, or at least half-hearted, it would be absurd to deny: we have Caesar's word for it; and I have already shown that they were partly responsible for the ruin of Vercingetorix.[9] But it was not for lack of numbers that the relieving army

been able to fill up the trenches and 'rush' the lines. I ask my friend to consider whether they would not have got in each other's way. I cannot help thinking that for once he has allowed the burning patriotism which with other great qualities makes all that he writes so fascinating to obscure his judgement.

[1] *B. G.*, vii, 79, § 1; 83, § 6; 85, § 4; 88, § 4.

[2] *Ib.*, 63, §§ 5, 7.

[3] *Ib.*, 75, § 1. Monnier requires us to believe that while the Aedui dared not sever themselves from the other rebels (*neque tamen suscepto bello suum consilium ab reliquis separare audent* [*ib.*, 63, § 8]), those rebels were merely instruments in their hands.

[4] *Vercingétorix*, p. 232.

[5] *B. G.*, vii, 75.

[6] *Vercingétorix*, p. 235.

[7] *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, 3e pér., xxiv, 1877, p. 476. Cf. *ib.*, pp. 468–9.

[8] On pp. 802–3 of the first edition.

[9] See pp. 178, 182, 815–6.

failed; it was lack of quality, lack of unity, above all lack of one head that proved their ruin. Vercingetorix had no peer who could impose his will on the relieving army as he imposed his on the besieged.[1]

WHO WROTE THE EIGHTH BOOK OF THE *COMMENTARIES*?

The orthodox view, that the last book of the *Gallic War* was written by Aulus Hirtius, has been impugned by F. Vogel.[2] 'The best MS.', as he admits—apparently he means *Amstelodamensis*—bears Hirtius's name at the head of the book; but he observes that in the same MS., at the head of the First Book, appears the superscription, *incipit liber Suetonii*. Undeniably; but is the blunder of a scribe to discredit the unhesitating statement of Suetonius[3] that the Eighth Book was the work of Hirtius. Let us, however, consider Vogel's remaining arguments. Admitting that Hirtius, like the writer of the *Eighth Commentary*, was a friend of Balbus and that he took no part in the Alexandrian or the African war,[4] he insists that the writer's intention of bringing the narrative down to Caesar's death, but not to 'the end of the civil strife,'[5] must have originated a considerable time after the Ides of March, 44, and probably even after April 27, 43 B.C., —the date of the battle of Mutina, in which Hirtius was killed; for, he asks, before the latter event what could have induced a military historian to think of continuing his narrative beyond Caesar's death? He does not, indeed, deny that the preface of the *Eighth Commentary* may have been written in 44; but if so, it must, he maintains, belong to the second half of that year; for not until then did the political situation give occasion to fear a renewal of the civil war. Now in April Hirtius was with Cicero at Puteoli, practising oratory for his approaching consulship.[6] In May Hirtius and Balbus met at Aquinum; and when Cicero appended to his mention of this meeting the words *sed quid egerint*,[7]—he certainly anticipated that they were going to discuss politics[8] and not to

[1] M. Jullian's view (*Vercingétorix*, p. 234) that Vercingetorix's power was reduced after the council at Bibracte, and that he was hampered by his political opponents even among the Arverni, is, I think, unsupported by evidence. The council had acclaimed him unanimously: he had all the troops that he wanted; and, so far as we know, the only opposition that he had to encounter was that of the Aedui. I admit that the Arvernian chiefs whom he had banished (*B. G.*, vii, 4, § 4) may have intrigued against him; but why more after the council at Bibracte than before?

[2] *Neue Jahrb. f. d. klass. Altertum*, &c., v, 1900, p. 187.

[3] *Divus Iulius*, 56.—De isdem commentariis Hirtius ita praedicat: *Adeo probantur omnium iudicio ut praerepta non praebita facultas scriptoribus videatur*, &c. Suetonius's quotation is taken from *B. G.*, viii, Praef., § 5.

[4] See *B. G.*, viii, Praef., § 8.

[5] *Ib.*, § 2.

[6] Cicero, *Att.*, xiv, 12, § 2.

[7] *Fam.*, xvi, 24, § 2. See Tyrrell and Purser, *The Correspondence of Cicero*, vi, 35, note.

[8] Cicero's letter was written *after* the discussion, whatever it may have been about. After the words *sed quod* (not *quid*) *egerint*, he breaks off. Probably he meant 'But what they talked about,—is no affair of mine.' See *ib.*, p. 36, note.

talk about Caesar's literary papers, which, moreover, at that time were still in the hands of Antony.[1] Soon afterwards Hirtius wrote to Cicero [2] that he was leaving Rome for his Tusculan villa. On the 2nd of September Cicero [3] says that the Roman people had offered up prayers for the life of Hirtius, who had been very ill; and his recovery was slow.[4] Even on the 22nd of April, 43 B. C.—a few days before Hirtius's death—Cicero alluded to his weak health.

How, then, asks Vogel, could Hirtius have found time and strength for the work which is attributed to him? Would he not have alluded to his weak health and his consulship in the preface in which the writer excused himself to Balbus for his dilatory performance of his task? Besides, we must infer from the preface that the writer had taken part in the Spanish War. But Hirtius spent 46 B. C. in Rome, and, as we may gather from one of Cicero's letters to Atticus,[5] did not reach Narbo till the 18th of April, 45,—a month after the battle of Munda. So little, moreover, did he know of the theatre of war that at that time he was ignorant of the whereabouts of Gnaeus Pompeius. Finally, since the murder of Caesar Hirtius and Antony had not been on good terms, whereas the writer of the *Eighth Commentary* speaks of Antony with enthusiasm.[6]

These are not arguments which can disturb a traditional belief. Prefaces are generally written after the books to which they belong are virtually completed: why should the preface of the *Eighth Commentary* be regarded as an exception? Oratorical exercises and discussion of politics with Balbus need not have consumed the whole of the writer's time; the papers of Caesar which were in Antony's hands were not historical, but political; and there is no reason to suppose that Hirtius had not ample leisure for so light a task as the completion of the *Gallic War* before his health gave way.[7] As to the argument which Vogel bases upon the date of Hirtius's appearance at Narbo, H. Schiller [8] justly says that it might deserve attention if Vogel could prove that Hirtius had not been at Munda before. Moreover, the letter which Vogel quotes only proves that Hirtius was at Narbo on the 18th of April, not that he arrived there on that day: he may have served in the Spanish campaign without being present at Munda; nor can I understand why knowledge of the movements of Gnaeus Pompeius should be deemed an essential qualification of a writer who claimed to have taken part in the war.[9] How many officers who served in the Transvaal would have been able at any given time to indicate the whereabouts of General de Wet?

Nobody will suggest that the writer of the *Eighth Commentary*

[1] Cicero, *Phil.* i, 7, § 16.
[2] *Att.*, xv, 6, § 2.
[3] *Phil.*, i, 15, § 37.
[4] Cicero, *Fam.*, xii, 22, § 2.
[5] xii, 37, § 4.
[6] 50, § 2.
[7] See *Berl. phil. Woch.*, 1903, col. 1420.
[8] *Ib.*
[9] As a matter of fact, Hirtius simply told Cicero that Sextus Pompeius had fled to Hither Spain, and that Gnaeus had fled (*Att.* xii, 37, § 4); and Cicero adds *nescio quo*.

was Oppius ; and whoever rejects the orthodox view must be prepared to defend the paradox that, although he was an intimate friend of Caesar and of Balbus, he was never mentioned in the correspondence of Cicero.[1]

CAESAR'S SECOND CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE BELLOVACI[2]

I. The description which Hirtius[3] gives of the geography of this campaign is not sufficiently definite to enable us to determine the various sites with absolute certainty. The essential part amounts to this. The Bellovaci and their allies encamped on a hill, standing in a wooded country and protected by a morass. This morass was at the bottom of a deep and narrow valley, separating the hill from another on which Caesar pitched his camp ; and the position of the Gauls was so strong that it would have been impossible to storm it without very heavy loss. The Roman camp had two ditches with vertical sides (*lateribus derectis*). The hill upon which the Bellovaci were encamped was separated by another small valley (*mediocris vallis*) from a hill (*iugum*), the summit of which formed a plateau, and the sides of which were steep ; and this hill was large enough to admit of four legions being drawn up on it in line of battle. Caesar reached it by bridging the morass ; and the bridge or causeway was constructed within a single day. About 10 Roman miles from the camp of the Bellovaci was a very strong place, upon which they encamped after they had been compelled to abandon their original position. Somewhere in the neighbourhood of this second encampment was a meadow not more than a Roman square mile in extent, which was surrounded partly by woods, partly by a very deep river.[4] This meadow, Hirtius tells us, was said to be not more than 8 miles from the second camp of the Bellovaci.

It is generally assumed that the original camp of the Bellovaci was situated somewhere within their own borders. But this is not certain. When Caesar set out on his march against the Bellovaci, they were preparing for a raid against the Suessiones. When he encamped in their territory, he found that the bulk of the population had left the country, and that only a few scouts had been sent *back* (*remissi*). After narrating this, Hirtius goes on to describe the spot which the Bellovaci and their allies had chosen for their encampment ; but he does not tell us in whose territory it was. The natural conclusion to be drawn from the word *remissi* is that it was *not* in the country of the Bellovaci. Long, however, thinks differently. 'The Bellovaci,' he says,[5] 'a warlike people, would not quit their

[1] See pp. 209–10 and A. Klotz, *Caesarstudien*, pp. 154–5.
[2] See *Carte de l'État-Major* (1 : 80,000), Sheets 32 and 33.
[3] *B. G.*, viii, 6–20.
[4] *flumine altissimo* (*B. G.*, viii, 18, § 1) ; or, if we adopt the reading of *α*—*impeditissimo flumine*—a river very difficult to cross.
[5] *Caesar*, p. 436.

country, but their allies would come to them.' Yes! But just because they were a warlike people, they *had* quitted their country, in order to invade that of the Suessiones; and although the invasion doubtless came to nothing, it is quite possible, and, as I think, it is to be inferred from what Hirtius says, that they found a suitable place for making their stand against Caesar before they got back to their own country.

1. Napoleon claims to have discovered Caesar's camp. The site, Mont St. Pierre, which is on the east of the Oise, and about 3 miles south of its tributary the Aisne, was in the diocese of Soissons,[1] and therefore probably in the territory of the Suessiones. A glance at the map[2] will show that it corresponds exactly with Hirtius's description: but unhappily the sides of the ditches of the camp, as revealed by Napoleon's excavations, are not vertical; and M. Vauvillé has recently proved that the camp was a Gallic fort.[3]

Desjardins[4] believes that the problem is insoluble. 'Il est impossible,' he says, 'avec des données aussi vagues qui se bornent même à des descriptions physiques convenant également à beaucoup de lieux situés dans la même région, sans que jamais un seul nom géographique les accompagne,—de déterminer exactement le théâtre des opérations militaires,' and, after pointing to the unsatisfactory results of the excavations, he adds, 'le ru de Berne n'est pas un marais.' Certainly the rivulet itself is not a marsh: but it flowed through marshy ground; and when Desjardins says that many places in the same district correspond with Hirtius's description, he is, as I shall presently show, mistaken.

2. L. d'Allonville[5] labours to prove that Caesar's first camp was close to Bellifontaine, which is in the commune of Liercourt, about 5 miles south-east of Abbeville. But all his labour is wasted; for Liercourt is in the territory of the Ambiani, only a short distance from the mouth of the Somme; and such a position is in complete disaccord with Hirtius's narrative.

3. Peigné-Delacourt,[6] an enthusiastic French antiquary, discovered, before the publication of Napoleon's book, a wooden bridge, apparently of ancient construction, which he took to be the bridge mentioned by Hirtius,[7] near Clermont, in the Brêche, which flows into the Oise on its right bank. But Desjardins[8] objects that the bridge must have taken a long time to make, and that the adjacent country—the high ground dominating Clermont—does not suit Hirtius's narrative. Peigné-Delacourt[9] himself admits that his bridge would have taken 60 days to make; and, as it is clear from Hirtius that the bridge was thrown across the marsh in a single

[1] See map in *Gallia Christiana*, t. ix.
[2] *Carte de l'État-Major* (1 : 80,000), Sheet 33.
[3] *Mém. de la Soc. nat. des ant. de France*, lxviii, 1908 (1909), pp. 160–84.
[4] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 717–8.
[5] *Dissertation sur les camps rom. du dépt de la Somme*, 1828, pp. 85–124.
[6] *Étude nouvelle sur la campagne de Jules César contre les Bellovaques*, 1869, pp. 5-6.
[7] *B. G.*, viii, 14, § 4.
[8] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 719, note.
[9] *Étude*, &c., p. 24.

morning, this one admission shatters his whole theory. De Grattier[1] points out that Caesar could have reached the hill (Mont de Cren) which Peigné-Delacourt identifies with the *iugum* of Hirtius,[2] without making a bridge at all, and that the hill is not separated from the plateau on which Peigné-Delacourt believes the Bellovaci to have encamped by anything that can be properly called a *mediocris vallis*.[3]

4. According to von Göler,[4] Caesar encamped on the north-west of Morfontaine, on the right bank of the Vandy, which enters the Aisne at Lamotte. This position is about 5 miles south-east of the camp which Napoleon identifies with that of Caesar. The Gauls, according to von Göler, occupied a plateau bounded on the south by the rivulet Rétheuil, on the west by that of Pierrefonds and by the forest of Compiègne, and on the north by the woods of St. Étienne. But, says General Creuly,[5] the plateau was assailable on the side of St. Étienne, and indeed on every side, except where it touches the valley of the Vandy and a part of the valley of the Rétheuil : it would therefore have been unnecessary to enclose it, as Caesar intended to do,[6] by a line of contravallation ; and if such a line had been made, it would have been 22 kilometres, or nearly 14 miles, in extent !

5. M. Litonnois[7] argues on the hypothesis that, according to Hirtius, the campaign took place in the country of the Bellovaci. The river (*altissimum flumen*) which Hirtius mentions in chapter 18, must then, says Litonnois, have been the Oise, because the only other ' very deep river ' in the territory of the Bellovaci is the Aisne ; and as Caesar had already mentioned the Aisne by its name *Axona*, he would not have described it merely as an *altissimum flumen*. But, I may remark, Hirtius, not Caesar, was the author of the Eighth Book of the *Commentaries*.

The Oise, then, continues Litonnois, was the furthest limit of Caesar's operations in the campaign ; and his point of departure was the common frontier of the Suessiones and the Bellovaci. Therefore the camp of the Bellovaci must have been somewhere between those limits. Now the only spot between them that answers to the narrative of Hirtius is the hill of Gouvieux, near Chantilly. There, protected on its rear by the Oise, was the camp of the Bellovaci : the valley of the Nonette, which flows into the Oise, separated them from Caesar ; and the strong place to which they ultimately retreated was somewhere in the hilly district of the forest of Carnelle.[8]

Now Litonnois is mistaken in asserting that Caesar's point of

[1] *Com. arch. de Noyon*, ii, 1868, pp. 168–9. [2] *B. G.*, viii, 14, § 4.

[3] M. Jullian (*Rev. des études anc.*, xi, 1909, pp. 359–60 ; *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 584, note), who agrees with me in accepting Napoleon's site, nevertheless thinks that a modification of Peigné-Delacourt's theory—Caesar encamping at Clermont and the Bellovaci in the ' bois des Côtes '—is not absolutely inadmissible.

[4] *Gall. Krieg*, 1880, p. 339.

[5] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., viii, 1863, pp. 513–4. [6] *B. G.*, viii, 11, § 1.

[7] *Comptes rendus et mém. du Com. arch. de Senlis*, 1865, pp. 129–42.

[8] See *Carte de l'État-Major* (1 : 80,000), Sheet 32.

departure must have been on the common frontier of the Suessiones and the Bellovaci. Caesar came from the south-west,—from Orléans ; and there is no evidence that he first marched into the country of the Suessiones, and then back into that of the Bellovaci. It is true that he had ordered Fabius to march into the country of the Suessiones, in order to repel the threatened invasion of the Bellovaci ; but that does not prove that he marched into the country of the Suessiones, to join Fabius, and thence into the country of the Bellovaci. This, however, is only a detail. I believe that the *altissimum flumen* was the Aisne ; but even if it was the Oise, the camp of the Bellovaci was not on the hill of Gouvieux. For, according to Litonnois, in their retreat they left the Oise on their right ; that is to say, they moved southward and crossed the Nonette. But, if Caesar was obliged to bridge the Nonette in order to reach the *iugum* which Hirtius describes, how could the Bellovaci have crossed it with all their wagons ?

6. Finally, the abbé Devic [1] holds that the Bellovaci encamped on Mont César (which, as we have seen, M. Seymour de Ricci tentatively identifies with Bratuspantium [2]), and Caesar on Mont de Hermes, a hill which is now covered by the Forêt de Hez, on the further side of a rivulet called the Try. But look at Sheet 32 of the *Carte de l'État-Major*. Where is the *iugum* separated by a *mediocris vallis* from the hill on which the Bellovaci originally encamped ? The abbé says that it is ' un espace de quelques centaines de mètres de largeur ' which is ' au pied proprement dit du Mont César ', and which ' fait partie de la vallée [the ' deep and narrow valley ' above mentioned], mais qui est un peu plus élevé que le marais '. So, then, a ' space ' at the foot of Mont César, which formed part of a valley, is to be regarded as a hill (*iugum*) ! The abbé identifies the ' very strong position ' (*loco munitissimo*) to which the Bellovaci retreated with Mont Bourguillemont, which, he says, is 6 or 7 miles from Mont César ; but the map shows that it is not more than $5\frac{1}{2}$ kilometres, or little more than $3\frac{1}{2}$ Roman miles. And where is Hirtius's ' very deep river ' ? The abbé points to the Thérain ; but he adds with a candour which stultifies his theory, ' nous avouons franchement que la qualification de *très-profonde* ne lui est pas applicable.'

In spite of Desjardins's objections, I believe that the site adopted by Napoleon and selected, before the publication of his book, by Caignart de Saulcy,[3] is the most probable of any that has been named. It corresponds in every particular with Hirtius's description ; and it is not correct to say, as Desjardins says, that others correspond equally well. To quote de Saulcy, ' J'ai souvent parcouru, et dans tous les sens, ces magnifiques forêts [Cuise, Compiègne, and Laigne], et je n'y ai reconnu qu'un seul point qui concorde avec la description d'Hirtius ; mais il est vrai qu'il présente une ressem-

[1] *Étude sur les ii^e et viii^e livres des Comm. de César*, 1865, pp. 111-2.
[2] See p. 402.
[3] *Les campagnes de Jules César dans les Gaules*, 1862, p. 401.

blance si saisissante avec le terrain sur lequel tous les faits de cette campagne se sont déroulés, qu'il faudrait être plus que difficile pour ne pas y reconnaître le lieu cherché.' General Creuly agrees with de Saulcy; and minute study of the *Carte de l'État-Major* leads me to the same conclusion. As M. Jullian remarks, the fact that the trenches discovered by Napoleon's collaborators were not made by Caesar does not prove that Caesar did not encamp on Mont St. Pierre.[1]

II. Assuming the correctness of de Saulcy's and Napoleon's identification of the camps of Caesar and the Bellovaci, the next problem is to determine the geography of the second stage of the campaign. The strong position (*loco munitissimo*),[2] on which the Bellovaci made their second camp, can only be Mont Ganelon. Hirtius describes it as not more than 10 (Roman) miles from their original position. The nearer part of Mont Ganelon is only about 6 miles off; but the hill stretches so far to the north-west that his vague statement is, in one sense, no exaggeration. Besides, as General Creuly points out, the distance which the Gauls would have had actually to travel in order to reach Mont Ganelon is greater than the distance as the crow flies.[3] Von Kampen[4] makes the retreating Bellovaci first cross the Aisne, and then cross the Oise; but de Saulcy holds[5] that they would not have attempted the passage of the Aisne at all, in which they would have been liable to attack. Anyhow it would have been unnecessary for them to cross both the Aisne and the Oise: all that they had to do, in order to reach Mont Ganelon, was to move up the left bank of the Aisne and then cross the Oise.

According to Hirtius,[6] the plain in which the Bellovaci attacked the Roman cavalry 'was said to be not more than 8 miles' from their second camp. It must, as de Saulcy remarks,[7] have been on the left bank of the Aisne, because Caesar would not have had time to bridge the river on the day on which he marched against the Bellovaci. De Saulcy and Napoleon[8] place it opposite the village of Choisy-au-Bac: General Creuly[9] and von Kampen, about 2 miles further up the Aisne, in the bend of the river between Choisy and Rethondes. The former site is not more than a mile and a half from the nearer part of Mont Ganelon. The latter, as Creuly observes, agrees better with the statement of Hirtius.

[1] *Rev. des études anc.*, xi, 1909, pp. 359–60.
[2] *B. G.*, viii, 16, § 3.
[3] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., viii, 1863, p. 513.
[4] *Quindecim ad Caesaris de b. G. comm. tabulae*, xiv.
[5] *Les campagnes de Jules César dans les Gaules*, p. 417.
[6] *B. G.*, viii, 20, § 1.
[7] *Les campagnes*, &c., p. 419.
[8] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 332.
[9] *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., viii, 1863, p. 515.

WHERE WAS THE BRIDGE BY WHICH DUMNACUS CROSSED THE LOIRE?

Napoleon[1] asserts that the bridge was at Saumur, but gives no reason. L. Fallue[2] believes, 'avec,' as he asserts, 'les plus savants géographes,' that the bridge was at Cé, on the road from Angers to Poitiers, which, he argues, Dumnacus had probably followed, in order to enter the country of the Pictones.[3] But, even if Dumnacus had taken this road, it does not follow that, in trying to escape across the Loire,[4] he returned by it. M. Jullian,[5] who thinks that the choice lies between Cé and Saumur, prefers the latter because it is nearer Lemonum (Poitiers) and is a very ancient place of passage.

WHO WAS 'GUTUATER'?

The MSS. differ a great deal, the various readings being *Gutruatum*, *Gutuatrum*, *Guttruatrum*, *Gutruatium*, *Gatriatrium*, and *Gutiruatum*;[6] but 'Gutuater' was undoubtedly the same man as the Cotuatus mentioned in *B. G.*, vii, 3, § 1. Schneider indeed thinks otherwise. Hirtius, he argues,[7] reminds us that Caesar has related, in the preceding Commentary, that the great rebellion originated among the Carnutes;[8] but he tells us that 'Gutuater' was 'the author of that signal crime' without quoting Caesar as his authority. This argument is more subtle than convincing. Again, says Schneider, Hirtius speaks of 'Gutuater' in such a way that we should take him for a man of great influence and exalted position, and not a desperate outlaw like Cotuatus. Hirtius simply speaks of him as *principem sceleris illius et concitatorem belli*. *Sceleris illius* means the massacre at Cenabum or it means nothing. Cotuatus was the leader, or rather one of the two leaders (the other being Conconnetodumnus) of the Carnutes who perpetrated that massacre; and the natural conclusion is that 'Gutuater' was Cotuatus.[9] How, then, are we to account for the difference? It is now recognized that *Gutuatrum*, coming from a nominative *Gutuater*—the Latinized form of a Gallic word, *Gutuatros*—is the true reading in *B. G.*, viii, 38. M. R. Mowat

[1] *Hist. de Jules César*, ii, 336.

[2] *Études arch. sur l'hist. de Jules César par l'empereur Napoléon III*, 1867, p. 106. Cf. *Rev. de l'Anjou*, nouv. sér., xiv, 1887, p. 215. In this article M. A. Joubert says that popular tradition places the scene of the battle between Dumnacus and Fabius in the neighbourhood of Cé. But arguments based on tradition are worthless, unless it can be proved that the tradition is genuine, and not the offspring of the brain of some local antiquary.

[3] See *B. G.*, viii, 26, § 1.

[4] *Ib.*, 27, § 2.

[5] *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 554, n. 4.

[6] *B. G.*, viii, 38, § 3.

[7] *Caesar*, ii, 329.

[8] *B. G.*, viii, 38, § 3.

[9] I find that Heller very sensibly remarks, 'There is nothing absurd in the idea that a man who had massacred Roman citizens, even though he had on that account obtained great influence among his own countrymen, should have been called by Caesar a desperado' (*Philologus*, xvii, 1861, p. 283).

cites two inscriptions, in which GVTVATER and GVTVATR appear. In the second inscription, as restored, the words *gutuatri Martis* occur; and M. Mowat believes that Hirtius mistook the word, which means 'a priest',[1] for a proper name.[2] So also does Otto Hirschfeld, who, holding, as I do, that the Gutuater of Hirtius was the person designated, in the MSS. of Caesar as Cotuatus, argues that while Caesar gave the man's name, Hirtius 'only intended to point out that the ringleader held the priestly office of *gutuater*'.[3] Accordingly he suggests that Hirtius may have written *Cotuatum gutuatrum*.[4] I confess that I doubt whether Hirtius knew what *gutuater* meant.

THE DURATION OF CAESAR'S PROCONSULSHIP

On page 191, describing Caesar's operations in 51 B. C., I have written, 'Only one more summer had to pass, as the malcontents had doubtless reckoned, and his government would be at an end.' This sentence is based upon a passage in *B. G.*, viii, 39,—*cum omnibus Gallis notum esse sciret reliquam esse unam aestatem suae provinciae, quam si sustinere potuissent, nullum ultra periculum vererentur.* Long, who holds that Caesar's term of office was not to expire until the end of 49 B. C., remarks that Hirtius may mean 'that Caesar would have no time for a campaign in B. C. 49, for he would be . . . communicating with his friends in Rome about his election in that year'.[5] There would be no need to have recourse to this explanation if we could accept Mommsen's view, that Caesar's term would expire on March 1, 49. But Otto Hirschfeld[6] has recently given reasons for dissenting from this conclusion. If, he argues, the *lex Pompeia Licinia* had provided that Caesar's tenure of office should not expire before March 1, 49, Pompey could not have claimed that the desire which was expressed in the Senate to recall him on November 13, 50, was reasonable.[7] It is now almost unanimously admitted, on the evidence of a passage in Cicero's speech, *De provinciis consularibus*,[8] that the five years for which Caesar was originally appointed terminated on March 1, 54 B. C. The extension of his command, agreed upon at the conference of Luca and confirmed (under the *lex Pompeia Licinia*) by Pompey and Crassus, as consuls, in the following year, 55 B. C., was to last, according to Plutarch,[9] Appian,[10] Velleius,[11] and Suetonius,[12] for another period of five years; but Dion Cassius[13] affirmed, as the result of his inquiries, that it

[1] See *Rev. celt.*, xxviii, 1907, p. 120.
[2] *Rev. de philologie*, nouv. sér., i, 1877, pp. 274–5.
[3] *Sitzungsberichte d. kaiserl. Akad. d. Wissenschaften*, Wien, cxiii, 1883, p. 313, n. 7.
[4] *Sitzungsberichte d. königl. preuss. Akad. d. Wissenschaften*, 1897, p. 1117.
[5] *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv, 443.
[6] *Klio*, iv, 1904, pp. 76–87; v, 1905, pp. 236–40.
[7] Cicero, *Fam.*, viii, 11, § 3.
[8] 15, § 37.
[9] *Pomp.*, 51–2; *Cras.*, 15; *Caesar*, 21.
[10] *B. C.*, ii, 17–8.
[11] ii, 46, § 2.
[12] *Divus Iulius*, 24.
[13] xxxix, 33, § 3; xliv, 43, § 2. It is worth noticing that, as L. Holzapfel remarks (*Klio*, v, 1905, p. 108, n. 1), Dion himself (xliv, 43, § 1), when he puts

had been limited to three, and Hirschfeld thinks that he was not far wrong. Remarking that a passage in one of Cicero's letters [1] proves that a date was fixed in the *lex Pompeia Licinia* for Caesar's recall, he maintains that a clue to this period is to be found in a letter written by Caelius to Cicero,[2] which shows that a clause in the law forbade the Senate to discuss the appointment of Caesar's successor before March 1, 50. But, as the *lex Sempronia* had prescribed that proconsuls should not take charge of their provinces until a year and a half after the provinces had been assigned to them, Caesar's tenure of his province was virtually assured, so long as that law remained valid, for a year and a half after March 1, 50,—in fact until January 1, 48. The *lex Sempronia*, however, was abrogated by Pompey in 52 ; and (assuming that Hirschfeld is right in maintaining that Caesar's command was not expressly secured until March 1, 49) the result was that the Senate would be entitled, without violating the letter of the *lex Pompeia Licinia*, not merely to discuss the appointment of Caesar's successor, but to send that successor to Gaul on March 1, 50. A *plébiscite*, passed in 52, had indeed authorized Caesar to stand for the consulship without presenting himself in Rome ; and, as he could not be elected consul before July, 49, this *plébiscite* virtually authorized him to retain his command until that date, if not until January 1, 48, when his year of office would begin : [3] but the authorization was infringed by the *lex de provinciis*, which Pompey carried later in the same year,[4] although, yielding to pressure, he declared, informally, that his law did not apply to Caesar.[5] I will only make one observation : Cicero [6] implies unmistakably that the *lex Pompeia Licinia* prolonged Caesar's command for five years. Reams have been written upon the question ; [7] but it properly belongs to the history of the civil war. What I am principally concerned with here is the fact, recorded by Hirtius, that the Gauls, as Caesar was aware, knew that the summer of 50 B. C. would be the last in which he would be free to deal with them. Hirtius was Caesar's intimate friend ; and it is incredible that on a point like this he should have been mistaken. Hirschfeld, however, insists that his words have hitherto been misunderstood. He tells us that C. Bardt (a well-known Ciceronian scholar) pointed out to him that

into Antony's mouth the statement that Caesar was forced to return to Italy before the lawful time, apparently confirms the tradition which assigned a legal duration of ten years to Caesar's proconsulship. Still, Antony may only have interpreted the law from Caesar's point of view.

[1] *Att.*, vii, 7, § 6.

[2] *Fam.*, viii, 8, § 9. Cf. *Att.*, viii, 3, § 3 ; *B. G.*, viii, 53, § 1 ; and Suetonius, *Divus Iulius*, 28.

[3] See *B. C.*, i, 9, § 2.

[4] Dion Cassius, xl, 56, § 1.

[5] Suetonius, *Divus Iulius*, 28.

[6] *Att.*, vii, 7, § 6.—*annorum enim decem imperium et ita latum placet?* See Tyrrell and Purser, *The Correspondence of Cicero*, iii, 284.

[7] Mommsen, *Die Rechtsfrage zwischen Caesar und dem Senat*, 1857 ; F. Hoffmann, *De origine belli civilis Caesariani*, 1857 ; A. W. Zumpt, *Studia Romana*, 1859 ; P. Guiraud, *Le différend entre César et le Sénat*, 1878 ; *Journal des Savants*, 1879, pp. 437–49, &c. Hirschfeld's first article in *Klio* provoked a reply in the same periodical (v, 1905, pp. 107–16) from L. Holzapfel ; and Hirschfeld wrote a rejoinder (pp. 236–40).

unam aestatem must mean, not the summer of 50, but the summer of 51 B. C.,—the year of the last Gallic campaign ; and this interpretation is one of the points on which he relies to prove that Caesar's command was terminable under the *lex Pompeia Licinia* on March 1, 50. How, he asks, could Caesar's personal intervention in the siege of Uxellodunum have been explained by Hirtius on the ground that his only remaining summer in command was that of 50 B. C. ? If he could have looked forward to another entire summer, in which he would be free to dispose of his army, why should he have been so anxious to capture Uxellodunum at once ? But Hirschfeld's interpretation does violence to the meaning of a plain Latin sentence. It is certain that when Caesar started for Uxellodunum the summer of 51 was already far advanced ; for immediately after the capture of the fort, when he went to Aquitania, only the fag-end of the summer remained.[1] Now consider the earliest chronological indication which Caesar gives in regard to his first invasion of Britain :— 'only a small part of the summer remained' (*exigua parte aestatis reliqua*).[2] And only a small part of the summer of 51 B. C. remained when Caesar started for Uxellodunum. Therefore, if Hirschfeld is right, *reliquam esse unam aestatem* is equivalent to *reliquam esse exiguam partem aestatis* ! If Hirtius had meant this, would he not have said it ?[3] If he had written *reliquos esse duos annos*, Hirschfeld will admit that he would have meant 'two whole years' : why, then, should *unam aestatem* be distorted into meaning 'a small part of one summer' ? I ask Hirschfeld to look through Meusel's *Lexicon Caesarianum*, iii, 1665 ff. He will not find there one solitary instance in which *reliquus* or any of its cases. coupled with a noun, denotes a part only of the thing—time or what not—signified by that noun. Nothing, then, can be more certain than that, if Hirtius had intended to convey the meaning which Hirschfeld atributes to him, he would have written, not (reliquam esse) *unam aestatem*, but (reliquam esse) *exiguam partem aestatis*.

The one reason which the professor gives for accepting Bardt's misinterpretation can be very easily disposed of. Caesar hastened in person to crush the resistance of Uxellodunum because he knew that if the garrison succeeded in defying his lieutenants, the malcontents throughout Gaul would be encouraged to prolong the guerrilla war into the summer of 50 B. C. ; and he resolved that that final summer should be free from all disturbance. He had been obliged to spend eight years in coercing the Gauls : he intended to spend the last in conciliating them.

[1] *in eam partem Galliae*[sc. *Aquitaniam*]*est profectus, ut ibi extremum tempus consumeret aestivorum* (*B. G.*, viii, 46, § 1). L. Holzapfel (*Klio*, v, 1905, pp. 113–4) has anticipated me in calling attention to this passage.

[2] *B. G.*, iv, 20, § 1. See also iv, 4, § 7 (*reliquam partem hiemis*) ; v, 31, § 4 (*reliqua pars noctis*) ; vii, 10, § 1 (*reliquam partem hiemis*) ; vii, 25, § 1 (*reliqua parte noctis*) ; *B. C.*, iii, 28, § 6 (*reliquam noctis partem*), &c.

[3] See the passages quoted in the preceding note.

WHAT WAS THE HEIGHT OF THE TERRACE WHICH CAESAR CONSTRUCTED AT UXELLODUNUM?

Hirtius describes the terrace as follows:—*extruitur agger in altitudinem pedum LX, conlocatur in eo turris X tabulatorum, non quidem quae moenibus adaequaret (id enim nullis operibus effici poterat), sed quae superaret fontis fastigium.*[1]

The reading *LX* is doubtful. It is only found in *S* and in the margin of *h*. The rest of the good MSS. have *VI*, and two inferior MSS.—Andinus and Oxoniensis—have *IX*.[2] Long[3] characterizes *sexaginta* (*LX*) as 'a bad emendation'; but, bad or good, it is not an emendation at all. It is incredible that the terrace should have been only 6 feet or even 9 feet high, for the words of Hirtius unmistakably imply that it was raised to the greatest possible height: if Uxellodunum was on the Puy d'Issolu, it must have been very much higher than 9 feet; and if it had been only 6 or even 9 feet high, it is to the last degree unlikely that Hirtius would have taken the trouble to mention its height. But to say what its height really was, is impossible.[4]

THE DATE OF THE ANNEXATION OF GAUL

Signor Ferrero,[5] making one of those bold and startling conjectures which have contributed so much to the popularity of his history of Rome, asserts that at the end of 57 B. C. Caesar, taking advantage of the impression produced by his victory over the Belgae, proclaimed, as 'an electioneering manœuvre', the annexation of Gaul. In other words, with the consent of the Senate, which was of course indispensable, he framed a *lex provinciae*, by which Gaul was formally made a Roman province, and the lines upon which the administration was to be conducted were laid down. 'This,' says Signor Ferrero, 'is proved by the great festivals [the thanksgiving service (*supplicatio*) mentioned in *B. G.*, ii, 35, § 4] which were given at that time, as contrasted with the indifference displayed by the populace and all public bodies up to the close of 58, as well as by the statements in Dion, xxxix, 5 and 25, Orosius, vi, 8, 6, Caesar,

[1] *B. G.*, viii, 41, § 5.
[2] Meusel's *Caesar*, p. 242.
[3] *Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv, 386, note.
[4] Achaintre (*Caesar*, iv, 454) remarks that, according to Orosius (vi, 11, § 25), the combined height of the *agger* and the tower was 60 feet. If Orosius had said this, it would look as if he had found the reading *LX* in his copy of the *Commentaries*, but had read Hirtius's narrative carelessly. But it is Achaintre himself who was careless. What Orosius wrote was *extruitur agger et turris pedum LX*, &c. Evidently *pedum LX* belongs only to *turris*; and, as Long remarks (*Caesar*, p. 452), Orosius 'must have calculated the height of the "turris" from the number of . . . stories'.
[5] *Grandezza e decadenza di Roma*, ii, 47, note (*The Greatness and Decline of Rome*, ii, 38, n. *).

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B. G., ii, 35, and above all . . . *De Prov. Cons.*, xiv, 34.' In the last-named passage Cicero says *sed tamen una atque altera aestas* [the campaigns of 58 and 57 B. C.] *vel metu vel spe vel praemiis vel armis vel legibus potest totam Galliam sempiternis vinculis adstringere* :— he affirmed that Caesar had conquered Gaul, and that the conquest would be permanent; whether he implied that Gaul had been formally annexed the reader may judge for himself. If he will examine the other 'proofs', he will find them equally inconclusive; and in fact Signor Ferrero himself apparently lays little stress upon them. Replying[1] to a criticism by M. Jullian,[2] he urges that Caesar had two strong motives for annexing Gaul in 57,—first, the desire to strengthen his political position by 'a great *coup*', and, secondly, the necessity of legalizing his position in Gaul, which was compromised by the illegality of his first two campaigns. But Signor Ferrero relies principally upon another passage in the speech *De provinciis consularibus*. Cicero, pleading Caesar's cause, sarcastically asked whether he was remaining in his province in order to enjoy the delightful climate and the beauties of the towns and to extend the bounds of Roman dominion (*amoenitas eum, credo, locorum, urbium pulchritudo . . . finium imperii propagatio retinet*).[3] How, asks Signor Ferrero, could Cicero have implied that all the Gallic territories were comprised in the *fines imperii* unless they had been annexed?[4] But is Signor Ferrero quite sure that he knows the whole meaning of the word *imperium*? If he will refer to three passages in the *Bellum Gallicum*—i, 18, § 9; 45, § 3; ii, 1, § 4—he will find an answer to his question; but he will also find that as Rome, according to Caesar, exercised *imperium* over Gaul in the early part of 57 and even in 58, he must either abandon his argument or develop it, and maintain that Caesar proclaimed annexation immediately after he arrived in Gaul! There are two facts which alone dispose of Signor Ferrero's theory. Over and over again Caesar opposes the condition of the Roman Province to that of the rest of Gaul: it is sufficient to quote from the speech of Critognatus,— *respicite finitimam Galliam, quae in provinciam redacta, iure et legibus commutatis securibus subiecta perpetua premitur servitute*[5] ('look at the Gaul on your border: *reduced to a province*, its rights and laws revolutionized, prostrate beneath the lictor's axe, it is crushed by perpetual slavery'). Obviously these words prove that even in 52 B.C. Gaul had not yet been annexed. If further proof were needed it would be enough to quote the words of Cicero,—*domitae sunt a Caesare maximae nationes, sed nondum legibus, nondum iure certo, nondum satis firma pace*[6] ('Caesar has subdued powerful peoples; but they are not yet bound by law, by definite rights, by abiding peace'). It is useless for Signor Ferrero to try to explain them away.

[1] *Rev. arch.*, 4e sér., xv, 1910, pp. 93–103.
[2] *Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 277, n. 4.
[3] *De prov. cons.*, 12, § 29.
[4] I have selected the best of Signor Ferrero's arguments. The reader can supply the omission.
[5] *B. G.*, vii, 77, § 16.
[6] *De prov. cons.*, 8, § 19.

Nevertheless he has reason on his side when he contends that the annexation did not take place, as M. Jullian maintains, in the winter of 51–50 B.C. M. Jullian, remarking that this is the orthodox view, defends it by the following arguments.[1] The constitutions of the various tribes and their legal and financial position were, he says, fixed, according to Hirtius,[2] in 51–50, which seems to prove that the *lex provinciae* was framed in the same year. Suetonius[3] says that at the time of the annexation Caesar fixed the legal and financial position of the various tribes, which he did, according to Hirtius, in that year. Sallust[4] specifies 51 as the date of the completion of the conquest, and, like Suetonius, mentions the boundaries of the conquered country: therefore he was alluding to the annexation. Signor Ferrero[5] objects, first, that Hirtius[6] says that nothing remarkable occurred in the year 50, and secondly that annexation, which, according to M. Jullian, would have needlessly exasperated the Gauls in 56 B.C., would have done so just as much in 51–50. M. Jullian, indeed, denies this: 'en 51–50,' he says, 'les révoltes n'étaient plus à craindre; elles avaient eu lieu.'[7] But Hirtius emphatically affirms that they *were* to be feared: that was why Caesar was so conciliatory. *Caesar*, he says, *unum illud propositum habebat, continere in amicitia civitates, nulli spem aut causam dare armorum; nihil enim minus volebat quam sub decessum suum necessitatem sibi aliquam imponi belli gerendi, ne, cum exercitum deducturus esset, bellum aliquod relinqueretur, quod omnis Gallia libenter sine praesenti periculo susciperet.*[8] In the face of these words M. Jullian must throw up his case unless the texts to which he appeals definitively prove it. Do they? Read Hirtius's statement. Immediately after the sentence which I have just quoted, in which he says that Caesar's one object in the winter of 51–50 was to avoid provoking the Gauls to a fresh outbreak, he tells us that '*Accordingly* he conferred titles of honour upon states, bestowed handsome presents upon

[1] *Rev. arch.*, 4e sér., xv, 1910, p. 105.

[2] *B. G.*, viii, 49, § 1. M. Jullian refers also to Dion Cassius, xl, 43, § 3.

[3] *Divus Iulius*, 25.

[4] *Fr.*, i, 11.

[5] *Rev. arch.*, xv, 1910, pp. 100–3. Signor Ferrero also makes a point when he says (p. 100) that M. Jullian himself rightly maintains that the *decem legati* who were assigned to Caesar in 56 B.C. were a commission appointed to organize the conquered country. 'Mais,' says Signor Ferrero, 'cette commission suppose l'annexion.' Now most scholars hold that the *legati* were not commissioners, but lieutenant-generals who were to serve under Caesar: still Signor Ferrero's argument is obviously legitimate. M. Jullian's opinion seems to be founded on the statement of Suetonius (*Divus Iulius*, 24) that the Senate, alarmed by the military activity of Caesar after the conference at Luca, appointed *legati* to investigate the condition of Gaul, though apparently, owing to his success, they never got to work. But how can any one question the prevalent opinion who reads Cicero's words (*Pro Balbo*, 27, § 61),—*C. Caesarem senatus et genere supplicationum amplissimo ornavit et numero dierum novo. Idem in angustiis aerarii victorem exercitum stipendio adfecit, imperatori decem legatos decrevit, lege Sempronia succedendum non censuit*? See also *De prov. cons.*, 11, § 28, and G. Long, *M. T. Ciceronis orationes*, iv, 1858, p. 102.

[6] *B. G.*, viii, 48, § 10.

[7] *Rev. arch.*, xv, 1910, p. 104.

[8] *B. G.*, viii, 49, §§ 1–2.

the leading men, and *imposed no new burdens*; thus he had no difficulty in maintaining peace, for Gaul was wearied out by a long succession of defeats, and therefore more disposed to submit' (*itaque honorifice civitates appellando, principes maximis praemiis adficiendo, nulla onera nova iniungendo, defessam tot adversis proeliis Galliam condicione parendi meliore facile in pace continuit*). If M. Jullian is right in the meaning which he attaches to these words, it is evident that Caesar's motive for formally annexing Gaul and defining the constitution of the newly created province was to avoid provoking a new rebellion. A homoeopathic remedy indeed! But had not Caesar bestowed presents and titles before? How can any unbiased critic maintain that Hirtius was describing a formal annexation? If it had taken place, assuredly he would have made his meaning clear. As to Suetonius, he merely says at the outset of the very brief paragraph which he devotes to Gaul[1] that Caesar 'reduced the whole of Gaul . . . except the allied and deserving tribes [the Remi and others] to the form of a province, and imposed upon it under the head of tribute an annual contribution of [40,000,000 sesterces'[2]] (*omnem Galliam . . . praeter socias ac bene meritas civitates, in provinciae formam redegit, eique * * * in singulos annos stipendii nomine imposuit*). No conclusion as to date can be drawn from these words; nor is it possible to correlate them, as M. Jullian tries to do, with those of Hirtius: for Hirtius says nothing about the formation of the province and is equally silent about tribute. Indeed, if, as M. Jullian maintains, the arrangements which Suetonius describes were made in 51–50, Suetonius contradicts Hirtius; for Hirtius says that Caesar imposed no new burdens upon Gaul, and Suetonius says that he imposed a yearly tribute. To exact an additional £400,000 a year from a country which had been remorselessly plundered already would have been a Gilbertian way of conciliating it.[3] It follows that M. Jullian's theory derives no support from Sallust, who merely defines the extent of the conquest and the date of its completion.

Mr. Heitland[4] agrees with me that in 51–50 Caesar only made a provisional settlement. 'In the ordinary course,' he says, 'the report of the completed conquest should have led to the appointment of a senatorial commission for drawing up . . . a charter or organic statute . . . to regulate the administration. Or the recent precedent of Pompey might be followed, and the scheme of settlement be entrusted to the . . . proconsul alone. But Caesar well knew that the Senate would do neither . . . their first object was to get him out of Gaul,' &c.

I conclude that the formal annexation of Gaul took place in Caesar's dictatorship; but the tribute may have been imposed before the winter of 51–50, just as in 54 Caesar 'fixed the tribute which Britain was to pay annually to the Roman People',[5] although the country had not been formed into a province.

[1] *Divus Iulius*, 25. [2] The amount is ascertained from Eutropius, vi, 17.
[3] Possibly Caesar had collected tribute before, and in 50 B.C. fixed the sum.
[4] *The Roman Republic*, iii, § 1160. [5] *B. G.*, v, 22, § 4.

THE SPELLING OF CELTIC[1] NAMES

In spelling Celtic proper names, I have, throughout my own narrative, generally followed Caesar; and where the MSS. differ, I have endeavoured by collating them to discover what Caesar wrote[2] or have been guided by other ancient writers or by the evidence of coins or inscriptions; while, in default of positive testimony, I have been guided simply by modern usage. But for mere accuracy, where accuracy ran counter to usage, I have cared nothing. That is to say, where the forms which Caesar adopted differed from the true Celtic forms, I have generally preferred the former; but even in following Caesar I have sometimes been deliberately inconsistent. For instance, although Caesar wrote *Haedui*, I have written 'Aedui', not because *h* was wanting in old Celtic, but because 'Aedui' is familiar; and on the other hand, although *h* was wanting in old Celtic, I have written 'Helvetii' and 'Helvii', partly because Caesar used those forms, but also because they are established. Caesar dealt with Celtic in the same way that Anglo-Indians dead and gone dealt with Indian names. If his lot had been cast in India in the days of 'John Company', he would have written Cawnpore not Kánhpúr. As his lot was cast in Gaul in the last century B.C., he wrote Orgetorix, not Orcetirix. I subjoin a list of doubtful names and of others the orthography of which there is sufficient evidence either to determine or with reasonable probability to conjecture. My chief aim throughout has been to ascertain the forms which were adopted by Caesar.[3]

Admagetobriga.—See Magetobriga.

Aedui.—See Haedui.

Agedincum, which is sanctioned by the best MSS. of Caesar,[4] and by the *Itinerary of Antonine*,[5] is right. An inscription discovered at Sens, which stands upon the site of Agedincum, has AGIED.[6] M. d'Arbois de Jubainville considers that the *ie* in this inscription is perhaps only an altered form of the *e* in Caesar, 'comme on a dit "pied" pour *pede*.'[7] Glück[8] concludes that the first four letters of the word were certainly *Aged*; and for the termination he relies on the analogy of *Alisincum*, *Vapincum*, and *Lemincum*. It should

[1] It is not certain that all the names to be mentioned in this note were Celtic; but into that question I need not enter.

[2] I have been greatly helped by Meusel's articles in *Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xii, 1886, pp. 265–71, 277–9; xx, 1894, pp. 214–21.

[3] I need hardly point out that in the MSS. there is no distinction between *u* and *v*, *Suevi* for instance being written *Sueui*, or that in quoting from the MSS. I give the nominative even when a name is only found there in an oblique case.

[4] vi, 44, § 3; vii, 10, § 4; 57, § 1; 59, § 4; 62, § 10.

[5] P. 383.

[6] *Rev. de philologie*, ii, 1847, p. 356. The Gallic coin, bearing the inscription ΑΓΗΔ, to which I referred in the first edition (p. 813), has nothing to do with Agedincum. See A. Blanchet, *Traité des monn. gaul.*, pp. 10, 362.

[7] Desjardins's *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 469, n. 8.

[8] *Die bei Cäsar vorkommenden kelt. Namen*, 1857, pp. 15–8.

be added that the genuine Gallic form was *Agedincon*, and that the Gallic termination of all names which Caesar latinized into *um* was *on*.[1]

Alesia.—According to an inscription found on the plateau of Mont Auxois, the Gallic form was ALISI/A. See *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., xv, 1867, p. 314, and p. 361, *supra*.

Ambivareti is, according to Glück,[2] the name of a people whom Caesar mentions in *B. G.*, vii, 75, § 2, 90, § 6. Glück argues that the word is formed from *ambi* ('around,' 'mutually') and *var* (in Cymric *gwared* = 'freed'), so that *Ambivareti* would mean 'defending each other'. The reading of the best MSS. in chapter 75, is *Ambluareti*,[3] which only differs in one letter from the reading for which Glück argues. *Ambluareti*, says Glück, is 'a monstrosity'. *Ambivareti*, however, is not found in any MS.

Andebrogius is perhaps the true form of the name of one of the two Reman envoys who waited upon Caesar in the spring of 57 B. C.[4] *Andocomborius* has indeed more MS. support, being attested by $\alpha\rho$, while *Andebrogius* appears only in π, on the margin of *h*, and (written by a later hand) in *B*. *Andocomborius*, however, is rejected as impossible by Holder,[5] who, pointing to coins which bear the inscription ANDECOMBO, conjectures that Caesar wrote *Andecombogius*. Meusel[6] thinks it safer to follow π.

Andes and *Andi* are found in the best MSS. of Caesar;[7] but Glück[8] and A. Holder[9] regard *Andecavi* as the true form. They find support in Pliny[10] (iv, 18 [32], § 107), Tacitus (*Ann.*, iii, 41), Ptolemy (ii, 8, § 8), Orosius (vi, 8, § 7) and many other authors, as well as in a coin mentioned by T. E. Mionnet,[11] which is said to bear the legend ANDECAV. No such name, however, is to be found either in the catalogue of MM. Muret and Chabouillet or in M. Blanchet's authoritative *Traité des monnaies gauloises*. M. d'Arbois de Jubainville[12] regards *Andicavi*, which is found in Pliny and Orosius, as the oldest form. Holder derives the word from the particle *ande* and *cav* (in Cymric *caw*), which means a 'band' or 'tie'.

Aremoricus, not *Armoricus* is the true form, though *Armoricus* is found in all the MSS. of Caesar.[13] Pliny,[14] Ausonius,[15] Rutilus,[16] and Sidonius Apollinaris[17] all write the *e*. The particle *are*, moreover, is found in other Gallic names, for instance *Arecomici*. See also Holder, *Alt-celtischer Sprachschatz*, i, 202.

Atuatuca is found in the β MSS. of Caesar; *Aduatuca* in the α.

[1] A. Holder, *Alt-celtischer Sprachschatz, passim*.
[2] pp. 22–4.
[3] In chapter 90 the best MSS. have *Ambibareti*.
[4] *B. G.*, ii, 3, § 1.
[5] *Alt-celtischer Sprachschatz*, i, 143–4.
[6] *Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xx, 1894, p. 218.
[7] ii, 35, § 3; iii, 7, § 2; vii, 4, § 6.
[8] p. 24.
[9] *Alt-celtischer Sprachschatz*, i, 140–3.
[10] Pliny (ed. D. Detlefsen, 1866) has *Andicavi*, with v. l. *Andigavi*.
[11] *Descr. de médailles antiques*, i. 80.
[12] See Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 483, n. 3.
[13] v, 53, § 6; vii, 75, § 4.
[14] *Nat. Hist.*, iv, 17 (31), § 105.
[15] Ed. R. Peiper, p. 59, l, 28 (v. 10, 25).
[16] *Itin.*, i, 213.
[17] *Carm.*, vii, 247, 369.

The former is undoubtedly correct; for, though *Aduaca*, with the variant *Aduaga*, is found in the *Itinerary of Antonine*,[1] Ptolemy[2] writes Ἀτουάτουκον, and *Atuaca* appears in the *Table*.[3]

Atuatuci, which is found everywhere in β and in two passages (ii, 29, § 1; vi, 2, § 3) in α as well, is certainly right.[4] Orosius[5] has *Atuatuci*, and Dion Cassius[6] Ἀτουατικοί.

Aulerci, *Aulurci*, and *Auleurci* are the forms found in the best MSS.[7] of Caesar of a name which, on coins,[8] appears as *Aulirci*. The editors adopt the form *Aulerci*.

Caerosi.—*Caeroesi* is found in the α MSS. of Caesar.[9] Orosius[10] has *Caerosi*; and this, which is the reading of *h*, is adopted by Meusel.[11] Holder reads *Caeroesi* in his edition,[12] but *Caerosi* in his *Alt-celtischer Sprachschatz*.[13] Glück[14] says that the Gauls would have written *Cairoisi*.

Caleti.—Glück[15] prefers *Caletes*. *Cadetes* is found in *B. G.*, vii, 75, § 4, but *Caletos* in ii, 4, § 9; Pliny[16] has *Galeti*; Orosius[17] *Caleti*; Strabo[18] Κάλετοι; and Ptolemy[19] Καλῆται.

Cavillonum is to be preferred to *Cabillonum*. Both forms occur in other writers, and on coins; but in the *Commentaries* there is better MS. authority for the former. It is found (with the variant *Cavillonno*) in all the MSS. in vii, 42, § 5,[20] and in β in vii, 90, § 7.

Cebenna is preferred by Glück[21] to the usual reading *Cevenna*. *Cebenna* is found in *B. G.*, vii, 8, §§ 2–3, in *L* and (written by a second hand) in *M*; in vii, 8, § 2 in *f*; and in vii, 56, § 2 in π *l*. Glück refers to Mela,[22] Pliny,[23] and Ausonius,[24] and derives the word from *ceb* (in Cymric *kefyn*, *cefn*), which means a 'ridge'.

Cenabum is undoubtedly preferable to *Genabum*, although it is not found in any of the MSS. of Caesar.[25] In the two passages in which Hirtius[26] mentions the name, $\alpha\pi$ have *Cenabum*, and ρ *Genabum*. That *Cenabum* is the true form is proved, says Desjardins,[27] by Strabo, Ptolemy, the *Itinerary of Antonine*, the *Table*, and the inscription which was discovered in 1846 in the Faubourg St. Vincent at Orléans. Glück[28] derives *Cenabum* from *cēna*, which, he says, is identical with the Irish *cên*, and from which *Cenomani* is derived. So also M. d'Arbois de Jubainville.

Cenomani.—Glück[29] prefers this to *Cenomanni* (which is the

[1] p. 378. [2] *Geogr.*, ii, 9, § 5. [3] p. 12, col. 1.
[4] *Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xx, 1894, p. 216.
[5] vi, 7, § 14; 10, § 2. [6] xxxix, 4, § 1.
[7] ii, 34; iii, 29, § 3; vii, 4, § 6; 57, § 3; 75, §§ 2–3.
[8] E. Muret and M. A. Chabouillet, *Cat. des monn. gaul. de la Bibl. Nat.*, 7046–9.
[9] ii, 4, § 10. [10] vi, 7, § 14.
[11] *Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xii, 1886, pp. 278–9.
[12] p. 36. [13] i, 677. [14] p. 40. [15] pp. 43–4.
[16] *Nat. Hist.*, iv, 18 (32), § 107.
[17] vi, 7, § 14. [18] iv, 3, § 5. [19] *Geogr.*, ii, 8, § 5.
[20] See *Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xx, 1894, p. 215. [21] p. 57.
[22] ii, 5, §§ 74, 80. [23] *Nat. Hist.*, iii, 4 (5), § 31; 17 (31), § 105.
[24] *Opuscula*, ed. R. Peiper, p. 150, l. 102 (xi, 18, 5); p. 151, l. 114 (xi, 19, 8).
[25] The adjectival form *Cenabensi* is found in π, in *B. G.*, vii, 28, § 4.
[26] *Ib.*, viii, 5, § 2; 6, § 2. [27] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii, 477, n. 1.
[28] pp. 58–9. [29] p. 59 and n. 1.

reading of the best MSS.),[1] on the analogy of many other words of the same termination. He also remarks that Polybius, Strabo, and Ptolemy were wrong in writing Κενομανοί for Κηνομανοί, as the quantity of the *e* is fixed by the line *Te iubet agnatos visere Cenimanos*.[2] I do not question the conclusion; but Latin poets occasionally lengthened or shortened the quantities of proper names, for metrical purposes. Thus Virgil writes *Nec non Tarquinium eiectum Porsenna iubebat;*[3] while Horace writes *Minacis aut Etrusca Porsenae manus*.[4]

Ceutrones.—*Centrones* is, according to Glück,[5] the name which Caesar gives to one of the client peoples of the Nervii.[6] *Ceutrones*, however, is found in all the good MSS. Gluck says that *ceutr*, from which *Ceutrones* would be derived, is a form foreign to Celtic. He derives *Centrones* from *centr* (in Breton *kentr*, in Irish *cinteir*, a spur), and infers that it means 'spur-wearing'. I have not much faith in this derivation; for it would be very strange that the clients of a people who, as Caesar says,[7] had no cavalry, should have been called 'spur-wearers'.

Glück spells in the same way—*Centrones*—the name of an Alpine tribe, which Caesar mentions in *B. G.*, i, 10, § 4. *Ceutrones*, however, is found in all the best MSS., and in the famous inscription of Forclaz.[8] Thus, unless *Ceutrones* was misspelt in the inscription, the etymological argument of Glück collapses.

Commius ought strictly to be spelled *Commios*. See Sir John Rhys's *Celtic Britain*, 1904, p. 25, and *Rev. celt.*, i, 294.

Coriosolites is preferred, as having the best MS. authority, by Holder[9] and Meusel[10] to the more familiar *Curiosolites*. *Coriosolites* is found in *X* in *B. G.*, iii, 11, § 4 and vii, 75, § 4; also in *AQa* in ii, 34 and in *β* in iii, 7, § 4; while *Curiosolites* is found in *φ* in ii, 34, and in *α* in iii, 7, § 4.

Diablintes.—*Diablintres*, which is found in the *α* MSS. of Caesar,[11] is preferred by Glück[12] to the usual form *Diablintes*. The MSS. of Pliny[13] have *Diablintes*, *Diablinti*, and *Diablindi*; of Orosius[14] *Diablintes*. Ptolemy[15] has Διαβλίται. Glück decides for *Diablintres*, out of deference to the *α* MSS., and because he thinks it more likely that the *r* was omitted by copyists than inserted. He derives the word from the privative particle *dia* and *blin*, from which he believes that *blintres*, connected with *blinterus* ('weary'), arose. Meusel, giving due weight to the testimony of Orosius, who used a manuscript of Caesar older than our archetype, and of Orosius, decides for *Diablintes*.[16]

[1] *B. G.*, vii, 75, § 3. [2] *Corpus inscr. Lat.*, v, p. 623, no. 15.
[3] *Aen.*, viii, 646. [4] *Epod.*, xvi, 4. [5] pp. 62–3. [6] *B. G.*, v, 39, § 1.
[7] *B. G.*, ii, 17, § 4. [8] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, 252.
[9] *Alt-celtischer Sprachschatz*, i, 1126–7. Holder refers to Laval, 1892, p. 9, and *Bull. hist. et arch. de la Mayenne*, 1892, p. 163. I have not been able to verify these references.
[10] *Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xii, 1886, p. 277. [11] *B. G.*, iii, 9, § 10.
[12] pp. 93–5. [13] *Nat. Hist.*, iv, 18 (32), § 107.
[14] vi, 8, § 8. [15] *Geogr.*, ii, 8, § 7.
[16] *Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xii, 1886, p. 278.

Diviciacus, not *Divitiacus*, appears to be what Caesar wrote; and this form is also found in the oldest MSS. of Cicero, *De Divinatione*, i, 41, § 90,—the only passage in which he mentions the name.[1]

Dumnorix is the popular form of the name of the Aeduan demagogue whom Caesar put to death in 54 B. C., and is certainly what he wrote. The coins exhibit three forms, *Dubnoreix*, *Dubnorêx*, and *Dubnorx*;[2] but M. Blanchet[3] does not believe that they were issued by Dumnorix.

Eporedorix, the Aeduan chieftain whom Caesar mentions in conjunction with Viridomarus, is generally so called in the MSS.[4] *Eporedirix* is found in an inscription.[5]

Esuvii appears, as I have shown in my geographical note (**Esuvii**), to be the name of the Aremorican people whose name occurs, in various forms, in *B. G.*, ii, 34, iii, 7, § 4, and v, 24, § 2. Glück,[6] who knew nothing of the coin to which I refer in the note in question, decided for *Esubii*. From the point of view of spoken language, he says, both *Esubii* and *Esuvii* are right; and it is difficult to decide between them, because *b* and *v* were often confused. He thinks it safer, however, to adhere to *Esubii*, the reading of *a* in *B. G.*, iii, 7.

Geidumni is, according to Glück[7] the name of a people who are mentioned, among the clients of the Nervii, by Caesar[8] only. The MSS. do not help us much; for some of them have *geidũnos* and others *geudũnos*; and of these abbreviated forms the former might mean either *Geidunnos*, which Nipperdey reads, or *Geidumnos*. Schneider, however, prefers the latter, on the analogy of *Garumna* and *Dumnorix*.

Genava is, as Glück[9] shows, the true form, although the best MSS. of Caesar have *Genua*.[10] *Genavensibus* and *Cenavensibus* are found in inscriptions.[11]

Gutuater.—See p. 831.

Haedui.—Glück[12] prefers *Aedui*, remarking that there is no *h* in old Celtic, and that where it is found in transcripts of Celtic words, it is only 'a breath', which the Romans prefixed to the pure Celtic vowel. Thus they wrote *Helvii* and *Helvetii* for *Elvii* and *Elvetii*, which forms are found in inscriptions.[13] Heller,[14] on the other hand, referring to J. C. Orelli (*Inscr. Lat. collectio*, No. 3432), points out that, if some inscriptions have the form *Aedui*, others have *Haedui*.

[1] *Ib.*, pp. 269–70. ΔΕΙΟΥΙCIIACOS—an amusing jumble—is found on coins attributed to Diviciacus, king of the Suessiones (E. Muret and M. A. Chabouillet, *Cat. des monn. gaul. de la Bibl. Nat.*, 7717–22, &c.), and ΔΕΙVICIA (*ib.*, 7737) on a coin attributed to Diviciacus, the Druid. Cf. A. Blanchet, *Traité des monn. gaul.*, p. 377.

[2] See *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i., nos. 65–6, 163, and *Rev. celt.*, i, 1870, p. 295.

[3] *Traité des monn. gaul.*, p. 408, n. 2.

[4] As there is a consensus in five passages—vii, 38, § 2; 39, §§ 1, 3; 55, § 4; 63, § 9—the corrupt forms which occur in various MSS. in the others are negligible.

[5] *Rev. celt.*, iii, 1876–8, p. 167. [6] pp. 95–102. [7] p. 102.

[8] *B. G.*, v, 39, § 1. [9] pp. 104–7. [10] i, 6, § 3; 7, §§ 1–2.

[11] *Inscr. Helv.*, ed. Mommsen, nos. 83–4 (*Mittheil. d. antiq. Gesellschaft in Zürich*, x, 1854, p. 14). [12] pp. 9–14.

[13] J. Gruter, *Inscr. ant. totius orbis Rom.*, 1707, vol. i, dccxxviii, 9; J. W. C. Steiner, *Codex inscr. Rom.*, 1851, 466. [14] *Philologus*, xvii, 1861, p. 272.

But this only proves that inscriptions, on questions of orthography, are not necessarily conclusive. Meusel hits the nail on the head when he replies to Glück that the critic's business is simply to determine what Caesar wrote; and his minute examination of the MSS. (which is confirmed by my collation of *L*) proves that Caesar wrote *Haedui*.[1] Holder[2] derives the Celtic name from *aidu-s* (in Irish *aid*, in Welsh *aidd*), which means 'zeal' or 'rivalry'. EDVIS is found on coins.[3]

Latobrigi is found in the best MSS. in i, 28, § 3 and 29, § 2, though, like *Nitiobroges* (q.v.), it was misspelt by some scribes in the first passage (i, 5, § 4) in which it occurs, where *A* has *Latovicis*, *B Latobicis*, *M Latocibis*, and *β Latocucis*. A mutilated inscription has ATOB:[4] Ptolemy[5] has Λατόβικοι. Glück[6] prefers *Latovici*, remarking that Pliny[7] mentions a Pannonian people of that name, and referring to the forms, analogous as he believes, *Eburo-vices*, *Branno-vices* and *Lemo-vices*. He identifies *vici* with the Cymric *guic* and the Irish *fích*, a 'district'. Zeuss[8] and Meusel hold to the form *Latobrigi*, which, at all events, has good MS. authority.

Lemonum, the reading of *β* and, in viii, 26, § 1, of *L*, is better than *Limo*, which Frigell adopts on the authority of the rest of the *α* MSS. Ptolemy, says Glück,[9] is wrong in writing Λίμονον, just as he is wrong in writing Λιμονίκοι. *Lemonum*, according to Glück, is derived from *lem* (in Irish *leamh*), 'an elm.'

Litaviccus is preferred by Glück,[10] Holder, and Meusel. The coins have *Litavicos*;[11] but *Litaviccus* is found in an inscription.[12] Glück considers that both forms are right, and remarks that in Celtic names *c* is often doubled.

Lexovii.—The true form of this name appears to be *Lixovii*.[13]

Lucterius is the form found in the best MSS. of Caesar of a name which is spelled on a coin[14] LVXTIIRIOS. See ALESIA.

Lutecia, not *Lutetia*, which appears in most editions, is almost certainly what Caesar wrote. *Lutetia* has comparatively little MS. authority.[15] Strabo[16] writes Λουκοτοκία, and Ptolemy[17] Λουκοτεκία. Holder,[18] who regards the latter as the true form, thinks that *Lutecia* was abbreviated from it, just as *Leucamulus* was abbreviated from *Leucocamulus*. See, however, C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, i, 177, n. 2.

Magetobriga.—The form Admagetobriga is adopted by Holder.[19] *AQ* have (quod proelium factum sit) *Admagetobrige*, *BMS Admageto-*

[1] *Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xii, 1886, pp. 265–9.
[2] *Alt-celtischer Sprachschatz*, i, 65.
[3] E. Muret and M. A. Chabouillet, *Cat. des monn. gaul. de la Bibl. Nat.*, 4822–31.
[4] Glück, p. 113.
[5] *Geogr.*, ii, 14, § 2.
[6] p. 112.
[7] *Nat. Hist.*, iii, 25 (28), § 148.
[8] *Die Deutschen und die Nachbarstämme*, 1837, p. 236.
[9] p. 117.
[10] p. 119.
[11] See *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, no. 67.
[12] Holder, *Alt-celtischer Sprachschatz*, ii, 245.
[13] See A. de Barthélemy, in *Encyclopédie-Roret*, p. 112.
[14] Muret and Chabouillet, *Cat. des monn. gaul. de la Bibl. Nat.*, 4367.
[15] See *B. G.*, vi, 3, § 4; vii, 57, § 1; 58, §§ 3, 5, 6. *L* has Lutetia everywhere.
[16] iv, 3, § 5.
[17] *Geogr.*, ii, 8, § 10.
[18] *Alt-celtischer Sprachschatz*, ii, 301–2.
[19] *Ib.*, i, 42.

briae, and *L Admagetrobiae*: but *f* has *ad Magetobriam*; and Schneider,[1] citing *B. C.*, iii, 79, § 4 (*proelio ad Dyrrachium facto*), *ib.*, 53, § 1 (*uno die VI proeliis factis, tribus ad Dyrrachium*), and *ib.*, i, 38, § 4 (*bellum ad Ilerdam . . . gerere*), maintains that Caesar would have used the preposition, not the locative.[2] Glück,[3] who rightly holds that Caesar wrote *ad Magetobrigam*, believes that the name is derived from *mag* ('a field'). Holder, on the other hand, interprets *Admagetobriga* as 'fortress of Admagetos'. But might not *Magetobriga* mean 'fortress of Magetos'?

Mandubii is the form found in all the MSS. of Caesar, in *B. G.*, vii, 68, § 1 and 78, § 3; but in 71, § 7, while the *β* MSS. have *Mandubii*, the *α* MSS. have *Manduvii*. M. d'Arbois de Jubainville[4] believes that the true form is *Mandubili*, as an inscription with the form *Mandu-bilos* has been found in the territory usually assigned to the *Mandubii*.[5] The MSS. of Strabo[6] (iv, 2, § 3) have Μανδι-βούλων.

Meclosedum.—Caesar mentions the town of which I provisionally assume this to be the name, as written by him, four times. The various readings in *B. G.*, vii, 58, § 2 are *Metiosedum* (πh^m), *Mellodunum* ($\chi\rho$), *Melledunum* (*BMS*), and *Meledunum* (*L*); in 58, § 6 *Metiosedo* (*Sβ*), *Melloduno* (χ), (a) *Metclodone* (*BM*), and (a) *Metlodone* (*L*); in 60, § 1 *Metiosedo* ($\chi S\beta$), *ameclodone*, that is *a Meclodone* (*BM*), and *Mellodone* (*L*); in 61, § 5 *manu et losedum* (*BMS*) and *manu. et tosedum* (*L*). In all the passages Schneider adopts the form *Metiosedum*, Nipperdey and Frigell *Melodunum*: Mommsen,[7] after comparing the MS. forms with *Mecleto*, which occurs in the *Itinerary of Antonine*,[8] and *Mecledonense castrum*, which is mentioned by Gregory of Tours,[9] concludes that Caesar probably wrote *Meclodunum*, and this form is now adopted by Meusel and Holder;[10] but M. J. Vendryes has published an interesting article[11] which will convince any unbiased reader that the Caesarian spelling was either *Metlosedum* or (as I would suggest) *Meclosedum*. Remarking that *-sedum* (a dwelling-place) is a Gallic word as well known as *-dunum*, M. Vendryes observes that the name Melun is derived from *-dunum*, just as Autun, Embrun, and Verdun are derived respectively from *Augustodunum*, *Eburodunum*, and *Verodunum*, and that, on the other hand, a mutilated Gallo-Roman inscription has been found in Melun, containing the letters OSEDI.[12] Melun, therefore, has had two Celtic names, ending respectively in *-sedum* and *-dunum*; and since *Melun* is derived from *-dunum*, the name which ended in *-dunum* was evidently later than the other. As to the first part of the word,

[1] *Caesar*, i, 66. [2] See p. 446. [3] pp. 121–3.
[4] *Les noms gaulois chez César*, &c., p. 128.
[5] R. Mowat, *Inscr. de la cité des Lingons*, 1re partie, p. 35, no. 67.
[6] Ed. Müller and Dübner, p. 962.
[7] *Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xx, 1894, pp. 209–10.
[8] Ed. Wesseling, p. 383. [9] *Hist. Franc.*, vi, 31.
[10] *Alt-celtischer Sprachschatz*, ii, 491.
[11] *Mém. de la Soc. de linguistique*, xiii, 1905–6, pp. 225–30. Cf. O. Hirschfeld in *Corpus inscr. Lat.*, xiii, vol. i, pars i, pp. 443–4.
[12] *Bull. de la Soc. d'arch. du dépt de Seine-et-Marne*, x, 1894, pp. 90–3.

Glück[1] preferred the form *Mello-* on the analogy of *Mellosutum*[2] and *Mellentum*, and also because he believed the name to be derived from *meall*, 'a hill'. But Heller[3] demolished this argument by pointing out that the town was on an island in the Seine, where there is no hill; and, as M. Vendryes says, Glück's etymology has been abandoned. M. Vendryes gives the following reasons for preferring *Metlo-* (for which *Metio-* was substituted in certain MSS. by a natural copyist's error) to *Meclo-*. Phonetically a transition from *Meclo-* to *Metlo-* would have been impossible; whereas it would have been quite natural for Caesar and his officers, when they heard Gauls pronounce *Metlo-*, to transform it into *Meclo-*. M. Vendryes's conclusion is that the primitive name of the town was *Metlosedum*,—an abbreviated form of *Metulos-sedum*, 'the residence of *Metulos*'; and that this name was replaced by *Metlodunum*, which in its turn became corrupted into a mediaeval *Mellodunum*,—the etymological source of the modern *Melun*.[4]

M. Vendryes's excellent article is perhaps open to one minute criticism. He says that the Romans, 'incapables de prononcer le groupe *tl*, en auraient fait *Meclo-*, et cette dernière forme, autorisée par la prononciation romaine, serait devenue la forme écrite';[5] but he goes on to say[6] that in Caesar's text '*Metlosedum* est toutefois la leçon la plus vraisemblable'. Yes, in the manuscripts; but surely not in the original work, written by Caesar's hand or dictated by him?[7] Did not he write *Meclosedum*? Doubtless this is what M. Vendryes intended to convey.

Nitiobroges is rejected by Glück[8] in favour of *Nitiobriges*, which, he argues, is formed from *neith* ('battle') and *brîg* ('valour'). Strabo[9] and Ptolemy[10] write Νιτιόβριγες. On the analogy of *Allobroges*, which form is found in Cicero, Caesar, Florus, Horace, Livy, Orosius, Pliny, Pomponius Mela, Sallust, Suetonius, Tacitus, and Velleius Paterculus, as well as in inscriptions, one might be inclined to think that *Nitiobroges* was the true form. None of the MSS. of Caesar have *Allobriges*, though Ἀλλόβριγες is found in some MSS. of Strabo and Ptolemy. At all events Caesar wrote *Nitiobroges*; for though the archetype has *-iges* in the place (vii, 7, § 2) where the name first occurs, in the other three passages (vii, 31, § 5; 46, § 5;

[1] pp. 138–9.

[2] Query,—*Mellosedum?* *Mellosutum* is not in Holder's *Alt-celtischer Sprachschatz*.

[3] *Philologus*, xviii, 1861, p. 285. Heller suggests that *Mellodunum* may have been written over *Metiosedum* by a copyist who wished to point out that *Metiosedum* was situated on the island opposite the place where Mellodunum (Melun) was afterwards built, on the *bank* of the river.

[4] *Meclodunum* would have produced not *Melun*, but *Meillun*.

[5] *Op. cit.*, p. 227. [6] *Ib.*, p. 228, n. 1.

[7] Unless, indeed, he dictated to a Celtic scribe who knew Latin, like his interpreter, Troucillus. M. Vendryes asks us to bear in mind that the MSS. which present the form *-sedum*, all have *Metlo-* [?] or *Metio-*. Certainly; but may not the scribes have known the Celtic form, which, as M. Vendryes says, Romans mispronounced and miswrote? I have adopted the form *Metlosedum* in quotations (pp. 775, 778, 780, 782) to avoid puzzling the reader.

[8] p. 127, note. [9] iv, 2, § 2. [10] *Geogr.*, ii, 7, § 11.

75, § 3) the authority for *-oges* is overwhelming, and proper names were occasionally misspelt in the passages of a manuscript where they were first written.[1]

Orgetorix.—De Saulcy[2] maintains that the correct form is *Orgetirix* or *Orcetirix*, which is found on coins of the Aedui.[3] Mommsen[4] says that none of the Orcitirixes whose names appear on coins can be identified with the Helvetian chief of the same name; and M. d'Arbois de Jubainville[5] agrees with him: but as the name is confessedly the same, I need not concern myself with Mommsen's arguments.

Osismi, the reading which has the most MS. authority,[6] is adopted by Glück.[7] Good MSS., he says, of Pliny[8] and several MSS. of Orosius[9] have the same. Mela[10] writes *Osismii*, which is also found in an inferior MS. of Caesar;[11] Strabo[12] and Ptolemy[13] Ὀσίσμιοι.

Paemani.—*Caemani*, which appears in β and in Orosius,[14] is adopted by Meusel[15] and tentatively by Holder.[16] But Famenne, the district which apparently reproduces the name of this people,[17] might well have been derived from *Paemani*.[18] Could it have come from *Caemani*? I suspect that this form is due to the preceding *Caerosos*.[19]

Petrocorii is found in all the good MSS. of Caesar;[20] but M. d'Arbois de Jubainville[21] regards *Petrucorii* as the true form.

Rauraci, the form found in the MSS.,[22] is rejected by Glück,[23] Desjardins,[24] and Holder in favour of *Raurici*, which is found in an inscription. The inscription may be right; but who can tell? Inscriptions are not infallible, any more than coins. Some coins show the form *Massalia*; others *Massilia*.[25] Pliny,[26] however, writes *Raurici*, and Ptolemy[27] Ῥαυρικοί; but Ammianus Marcellinus[28] and Orosius[29] *Rauraci*.

[1] *Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xx, 1894, p. 219. Cf. A. Holder, *Alt-celtischer Sprachschatz*, i, 97–103.
[2] *Ann. de la Soc. num.*, 1867, p. 6.
[3] *Cat. des monn. gaul. de la Bibl. Nat.*, p. 110.
[4] *Gesch. d. röm. Münzwesens*, 1860, p. 685, n. 71. M. Blanchet (*Traité des monn. gaul.*, pp. 85, 407) is inclined to agree with Mommsen; but R. Forrer (*Jahrb. d. Gesellschaft f. lothring. Gesch.*, &c., xv, 1903, p. 130) defends the popular view.
[5] *Les noms gaulois chez César*, &c., p. 85.
[6] *Ossismi* is found in φ in *B. G.*, iii, 9, § 10, and in α in vii, 75, § 4, where, however, *L* has *Ossisimi*.
[7] p. 141.
[8] *Nat. Hist.*, iv, 18 (32), § 107. The reading in Detlefsen's ed. is *Ossismi*, with v. l. *Ossimi*.
[9] vi, 8, § 8.
[10] iii, 2, § 23.
[11] Schneider's *Caesar*, i, 238.
[12] iv, 4, § 1.
[13] *Geogr.*, ii, 8, § 5.
[14] vi, 7, § 14.
[15] *Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xii, 1886, pp. 278–9.
[16] *Alt-celtischer Sprachschatz*, i, 676.
[17] See p. 404.
[18] See Müllenhoff, *Deutsche Altertumskunde*, ii, 196–7.
[19] *B. G.*, ii, 4, § 10.
[20] *Ib.*, vii, 75, § 3.
[21] *Rev. celt.*, xi., 1890, p. 505.
[22] In *B. G.*, vi, 25, § 2, the α MSS. have *Tauriaci*; but this is obviously wrong. See Meusel's *Lex. Caes.*, ii, 1626.
[23] p. 142.
[24] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom*, ii, 463, n. 4.
[25] Walckenaer, *Géogr. des Gaules*, i, 322, n. 3.
[26] *Nat. Hist.*, iv, 17 (31), § 106.
[27] *Geogr.*, ii, 9, § 9.
[28] xv, 11, § 11, &c.
[29] vi, 7, § 5.

Heller[1] defends the form *Rauraci*. He argues that if the name is rightly derived from *rauri* ('lord'), the original form, on the analogy of Segonti*aci*, Dumna*cus*, and Divici*acus*, must have been *Rauriaci*, which would have been corrupted into *Rauraci*.

Redones.—Like *Rhenus*, *Rhodanus*, *raeda*, and *reno*, the word is spelled in some MSS. with, and in others without *h*.[2] Mahn[3] has given reasons for believing that all five words should be aspirated. But see HAEDUI.

Samarobriva.—Desjardins[4] thinks that *Samarabriva*, which appears on the famous milestone of Tongres, is the true form.

Santoni, not *Santones*, appears to have been the form adopted by Caesar.[5]

Segusiavi.—According to the best MSS., the people whom Caesar mentions in *B. G.*, i, 10, § 5, were the Sebusiani; the people whom he mentions in vii, 64, § 4, 75, § 2, were the Segusiavi. I have shown elsewhere[6] that in all three passages Caesar was speaking of one and the same tribe.

Nipperdey[7] and Glück,[8] trusting to four inscriptions collected by A. Bernard,[9] maintain that *Segusiavi* is the true form; and Nipperdey adds that this form is supported by Strabo, Pliny,[10] and Ptolemy. The MSS. of Strabo[11] exhibit a variety of forms, among which are Σεγοσιανῶν and Σηγοσιανῶν, which agrees with Nipperdey's reading. The MSS. of Ptolemy[12] likewise exhibit various forms, among which are Σεγουσιανοί and Σεγουσιαῦοι. Against the authority of the inscriptions, says Schneider,[13] is to be set that of a coin mentioned by Mionnet,[14] which has the form *Segusianus*. But when I refer to Mionnet's work, I find that the coin in question bears the abbreviated legend SEGVSIA only. On the other hand, Glück refers to a coin[15] which has SEGVSIAVS (=*Segusiavus*); and the inscription on this coin is one of the four to which Bernard refers. Schneider,[16] remarking that his business is to decide, not what is the right form, but what Caesar wrote, adopts *Segusiani*, 'because in *B. G.*, vii, 64 and 75 the MSS. agree in exhibiting the form *Segusianos*.' But in both of these passages the MSS. have *Segusiavos*; and the inscriptions, coupled with the MSS. of Strabo, Pliny, and Ptolemy, appear to prove that the true form is *Segusiavi*.

Sibusates, which is attested by ρ (*B. G.*, iii, 27, § 1), is to be preferred to *Sibuzates*—the form adopted by most editors—on the analogy of *Cocosates*, *Elusates*, and *Tarusates*.

[1] *Philologus*, xvii, 1861, p. 275. [2] *B. G.*, ii, 34; vii, 75, § 4.
[3] *Etymologische Untersuchungen über geogr. Namen*, 1859, pp. 27–32. Cf. *Philologus*, xvii, 1861, p. 278.
[4] *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, i, 137, n. 1.
[5] *Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xx, 1894, p. 217.
[6] See p. 470. [7] *Caesar*, p. 792. [8] pp. 152–4.
[9] *Mém. de la Soc. des ant. de France*, xviii, 1846, pp. 343–8.
[10] *Nat. Hist.*, iv, 18 (32), § 107. [11] Ed. Müller and Dübner, p. 963.
[12] Ed. Müller, i, 217. [13] *Caesar*, ii, 532.
[14] *Descr. des médailles antiques*, i, 78.
[15] A. Duchalais, *Descr. des médailles gaul.*, 1846, p. 129, no. 377. Cf. A. Blanchet, *Traité des monn. gaul.*, p. 79. [16] *Caesar*, i, 23; ii, 533.

Sotiates is found in the β MSS. in iii, 20, § 2, and in 20, § 3 in ρ; *Sontiates* in α throughout and in 20, § 3 in π. In 21, § 1 $B\beta$ have *Sociates*, and in 21, § 2 β has *Sosates*. Glück[1] pronounces for *Sontiates*. Pliny,[2] he says, has *Sothiates*: various MSS. of Orosius[3] have *Sotiates* and *Sociates*; of Dion Cassius[4] Ἀπιάτας. It is hard, Glück thinks, to decide between *Sontiates* and *Sotiates*, which, he says, appears to be authorized by a coin;[5] but he decides to follow the α MSS., on the ground that there is no certainty that the name on the coin is rightly deciphered. This is a mistake. Several coins of the Sotiates exist, which are numbered 3604-3613 in *Catalogue des monnaies gauloises* edited by MM. Muret and Chabouillet. In Planche xi of the accompanying *Atlas de monnaies gauloises*, by H. de la Tour, there is an illustration of one of these coins. On the obverse it bears the legend REX ADIETVANVS,—evidently the same name as that of Adiatunnus, the commander of the Sotiates, whom Caesar mentions in *B. G.*, iii, 22, §§ 1, 4: on the reverse SOTIOTA. Having regard to the coins as well as to the MSS., I think it probable that Caesar wrote *Sotiates*.[6]

Suebi appears to have rather less MS. authority than *Suevi*;[7] but Strabo[8] writes Σόηβοι, and Ptolemy[9] Σύηβοι.

Sugambri, which has the most MS. authority,[10] and is found in Orosius,[11] is preferred by the modern editors to *Sigambri*. The latter form, however, and *Sygambri* occur in α MSS. Strabo[12] writes Σούγαμβροι and Ptolemy[13] Σύγαμβροι.

Teutoni is to be preferred to the familiar *Teutones*.[14]

Treveri is preferred by Glück[15] to *Treviri*, which, however, is found, in some passages, in good MSS. Glück appeals to the authority of Mela, Pliny, Ausonius, the *Itinerary of Antonine*, and many inscriptions.[16] The MSS. of Tacitus also vary between *Treveri* and *Treviri*. A. de Valois[17] argues in favour of *Treviri*, remarking that it has the support of Strabo, of the *Table*, and of a coin belonging to the time of Vespasian.

Turoni, not *Turones*, is the Caesarian form.[18]

Venelli.—*Unelli* is found in all the MSS. of the *Commentaries*.[19] Pliny[20] has *Venelli*, and Ptolemy[21] Οὐένελλοι. Glück[22] prefers

[1] pp. 154–5.
[2] *Nat. Hist.*, iv, 19 (33), § 108. Detlefsen reads *Sottiates*.
[3] vi, 8, § 19. [4] xxxix, 46, § 2. [5] Duchalais, *op. cit.*, p. 16, no. 30.
[6] See Meusel's remarks in *Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xii, 1886, p. 279.
[7] See Meusel's *Caesar*, pp. 24, 37, 76–8, 80, 86–7, 139–40, 149.
[8] iv, 3, § 4. [9] *Geogr.*, ii, 11, § 11.
[10] *B. G.*, iv, 16, § 2; 18, §§ 2, 4; 19, § 4; vi, 35, § 5. [11] vi, 9, § 1.
[12] iv, 3, § 4. [13] *Geogr.*, ii, 11, § 6.
[14] *Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xx, 1894, p. 217. [15] pp. 155–6.
[16] Orelli, 6718, 5898, 7392, 6838, 7254, &c.; J. Gruter, *Inscr. ant.*, &c., 1707, vol. i, lxiv, 9; ccccIxxxii, 5, &c. [17] *Notitia Galliarum*, pp. 560–1.
[18] *Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xx, 1894, p. 217.
[19] Meusel in his critical edition says that, according to F. Ramorino, in one passage (*B. G.*, iii, 11, § 4), in *l*, the original copyist wrote *Venellos*, for which *Unellos* was substituted by a later hand.
[20] *Nat. Hist.*, iv, 18 (32), § 107.
[21] *Geogr.*, ii, 8, § 2. [22] pp. 165–7.

Venelli, believing that the word comes from *vena*, which he regards as the root of *Veneti*; but, he admits, there is no evidence for explaining either name. He also points out, in support of the form *Venelli*, that *Ubisci* is found by mistake for *Vivisci*, *Uridovix* in one MS. for *Viridovix*, and in Ptolemy (ii, 3, § 11) Οὐρολάνιον for Οὐερολάμιον, which form is supported by the *Itinerary of Antonine*[1] and by Tacitus.[2]

Veliocasses.—Glück,[3] who cites an inscription in Orelli (No. 6991), and the editors adopt this form. The readings in the MSS. of the *Commentaries* are *Velocasses* (ii, 4, § 9), *Belliocasses* in *α*, and *Velliocasses* in *β* (vii, 75, § 3). Gallic coins bear the legend VELIOCAΘI.[4]

Vellavii, the reading of *α*, is adopted by Glück[5] and the modern editors. Glück refers to an inscription;[6] but in another[7] one finds *Vellavorum*. The *β* MSS. have *Vellabiis*.

Vercassivellaunus, the name of the chief who led the assault on Mont Réa at Alesia, is preferred by Glück[8] to *Vergassillaunus* and other variants. He cites, in support of this reading, the name *Cassivellaunus*, and compares with these two the similarly allied *Cingetorix* and *Vercingetorix*.

Vercingetorix is the Latin form of *Vercingetorixs*.[9]

Viromandui is preferred by Glück[10] to *Veromandui*, which has equal MS. authority.[11] The best MSS. of Pliny[12] have *Viromandui*, and Ptolemy[13] has Οὐιρομάνδυες; while Orosius[14] and the *Itinerary of Antonine*[15] have *Veromandui*. Glück relies upon two inscriptions[16] and upon the analogy of many compound names, for instance, *Viromarus*, *Viromanus*, *Virovisca*, *Virovius*, and *Virovedrum*; and he accounts for the form *Veromandui* by the fact that *i* and *e* were often interchanged. M. d'Arbois de Jubainville adds that the name is spelled with an *i* by Gregory of Tours[17] and on a Merovingian coin.[18] It is impossible, Glück says, to decide whether the *i* is long or short.

[1] Ed. Wesseling, pp. 471, 476, 479.
[2] *Ann.*, xiv, 33.
[3] pp. 161–2.
[4] Desjardins, ii, 437, n. 2, 461, n. 4, 462.
[5] p. 164.
[6] *Hist. de l'Acad. des inscr.*, xxv, 1759, p. 148.
[7] Orelli, no. 5221.
[8] p. 174.
[9] *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i, no. 69.
[10] pp. 184–7.
[11] *B. G.*, ii, 4, § 9; 16, § 2; 23, § 3.
[12] *Nat. Hist.*, iv, 17 (31), § 106.
[13] *Geogr.*, ii, 9, § 16.
[14] vi, 7, § 14.
[15] Ed. Wesseling, p. 379.
[16] Gruter, vol. i, ccclxxv, 3; J. de Wal, *Mythologiae septentrionalis monumenta epigr. Lat.*, 1847, p. 226, ccevii; A. de Boissieu, *Inscr. ant. de Lyon*, 1846–54, p. 260.
[17] *In gloria martyrorum*, p. 536, l. 13, ed. B. Krusch.
[18] *Bibl. de l'École des Chartes*, xxvi, 463, no. 690.

ADDENDA

Page 61, note 3. Meusel (*Jahresb. d. philol. Vereins zu Berlin*, xxxvii, 1911, pp. 105–6) urges that the words *vulgo totis castris testamenta obsignabantur* (*B. G.*, i, 39, § 4) may just as probably have been borrowed by the 'Pseudo-Caesar' from Livy or Florus, as by Livy and Florus from Caesar. I have not argued that the relevant passage in Florus *proves* that the words *vulgo . . . obsignabantur* were written by Caesar; but I find it impossible to believe that they were a pure invention.

Pages 78–9. 'The standard-bearer . . . was lost.' Notwithstanding the arguments of Th. Steinwender (*Rhein. Mus.*, N.F., lxv, 1910, p. 134, n. 2), I adhere with C. E. C. Schneider (*Caesar*, i, 181) to the opinion that the standard mentioned in *B. G.*, ii, 25, § 1, whether it was one of the three manipular standards or not, was *the* standard of the cohort. Caesar's meaning is unmistakable.

Page 91. 'The troops clambered . . . short sword.' M. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, iii, 298), referring to Dion Cassius (xxxix, 43, § 1), observes that the Veneti had neglected to provide themselves with missile weapons. But as we may be sure that the Romans had not been guilty of this neglect, and as they probably had artillery as well (cf. *B. G.*, iv, 25, § 1), I doubt whether in any case the Veneti could have won the battle.

Page 112. 'All that night . . . plain of Hesbaye.' If Atuatuca was on the site of Tongres (see pp. 371–83), this statement, in so far as it relates to the plateau of Herve, is incorrect.

Page 206, note 4. If, as A. Klotz believes (*Caesarstudien*, p. 145), the description of Britain in *B. G.*, v, 12–4, was derived from Posidonius, the iron 'currency-bars' (*taleae ferreae*) were presumably mentioned by Posidonius's informant; but see Rice Holmes, *Ancient Britain*, p. 499, n. 2, and *Woch. f. klass. Philologie*, June 20, 1910.

Page 221. 'Signor Ferrero attributes . . . to deal with Ariovistus.' *B. G.*, i, 36, § 4, from which we learn that Ariovistus complained that 'Caesar was doing him a serious injury, for his coming depreciated the tribute', suggests, if it does not prove, that the Aedui, from the moment of Caesar's arrival, relied upon his aiding them against Ariovistus. Otherwise they would hardly have dared to withhold tribute which Ariovistus had hitherto exacted from them.

Page 241. 'Now it is not true . . . to furnish.' I am rather inclined to suspect from *B. G.*, ii, 15, § 3, 16, §§ 3–4, that the Nervii and their allies—the Atrebates, Viromandui, and Atuatuci—had taken no part in the earlier stage of the campaign; and I do not feel sure that the more distant tribes sent their contingents.

Pages 243–4. 'Anyhow Veith . . . heavy loss.' Some of the prisoners of whom Veith speaks may have been taken from the relieving army in the course of the pursuit.

Pages 270–1. 'Although the skulls . . . contrasted types.' M. Manouvrier (*Bull. et mém. de la Soc. d'anthr.*, 5e sér., v, 1904, p. 119), differing from M. Verneau, believes that the negroid characteristics of the skeletons found in the Grotte des Enfants were merely 'des caractères individuels':

and he adds that 'des corrélations anatomiques peuvent concourir à réaliser chez un blanc ce qui se produit d'ordinaire, et suivant des degrés très variables aussi, chez les nègres'.

PAGES 274–5. 'like the Celtic . . . advanced guard.' M. Jullian (*Rev. des études anc.*, xii, 1910, pp. 302–3) finds fault with M. Déchelette for maintaining that the Celts first invaded Gaul in the Hallstatt Period, and thinks that he has no right to 'tirer une *conclusion historique* ou *ethnographique* de *prémisses archéologiques*'. The conclusion is merely tentative; but the physical resemblance of some of the invaders of whom M. Déchelette was thinking, is remarkable.

PAGE 282, note 2. Sir John Rhys (*Notes on the Coligny Calendar*, 1910, p. 34, n. 1 [*Proc. Brit. Acad.*, vol. iv]) writes,—'Hardly a neater piece of evidence could have been produced than *petru-decameto* to prove that the Coligny Calendar is in a Celtic language other than Gaulish, though Professor Loth has brought it forward to prove the contrary. . . . *Petru-* is akin to Welsh *pedwar* "four"... Latin *quattuor*, that is to say, its initial *p* represents an earlier *qu*, as in Latin. How this could help "pour repousser la théorie du maintien de *p* ou de *q* dans la langue de Coligny" with its EQVOS and QVIMON does not appear; and as to *Sequana* being treated as representing an older Sēko-ɥanā, that theory is familiar enough to me, as I tried to work it years ago; I think that my learned friend will find it disappointing. From his interpretation of the Gélignieux inscription he draws the following conclusion:—"Il semble bien certain que le testateur de Gélignieux faisait usage du même calendrier qu'à Coligny." But such certainty as M. Loth found there has been converted into doubt by what has been explained above as to the Coligny entries in point.'

PAGE 305, note 5. Fresh tables, prepared by M. A. Bertillon, but not yet published, are referred to by M. P. Raymond (*Bull. de la Soc. d'étude des sc. nat. de Nîmes*, xxx, 1902 [1903], pp. 45, 52); but my experience leads me to doubt whether the results are seriously different from those of MM. Broca and Collignon.

PAGES 334–5. In 1900 Dr. Beddoe wrote to me, 'I am much inclined to adhere to your view as to the difference of the hair in the Saxon and the Gael.'

PAGE 417, line 10 from foot of text:—*for* Corchester *read* Corbridge.

PAGE 596. 'It might, indeed, be objected . . . have disappeared.' I ought to have remarked that the German host itself fought in groups,—tribal phalanxes.

PAGES 629–30 (IX). I am not sure that the argument in this paragraph is quite clear. The difference between Stoffel's view and that of M. Jullian is simply that, according to Stoffel, the Boi and Tulingi were separated, *on the march*, from the Helvetii by a considerable distance; according to M. Jullian, they were not so separated, but were left to guard the wagons when the Helvetii went into action. M. Jullian's view is not open to the first objection which I have brought against Stoffel's.

PAGE 801, note 1. One more attempt has just been made to identify the site of the combat that immediately preceded the blockade of Alesia. Lieutenant-Colonel Frocard (*Pro Alesia*, Nos. 53–4, 1910, p. 766) places it between Orville and Véronnes, about four miles north-east of Til-Châtel.

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